The Sovereign Rights of the King of Sulu 1 by Datu Michael Y. Medvedev
More than an island, an archipelago, or a sea: Sulu is a nation, a phenomenon of statehood. Continuing its proud history, Sulu’s monarch is a reigning Sultan-King, both in the terms of his public prerogatives and his formal title, the the us use e of whic which h has has been been fully fully resto restore red d foll follow owin ing g the the coronation of the current Sovereign, King Mued I (Muedzul Lail Tan Kiram), on the 16th of September, 2012. Unti Untill rece recent ntly ly,, a poor poorly ly in info form rmed ed gene genera rall publ public ic could be forgiven for assuming that the Royal Sultanate of Sulu was a phenomenon of the past, or at best little more than a religious community. The continued existence of this this Sult Sultan anat ate, e, once once reno renown wned ed as the the prem premie ierr nati nation on amon among g the the Moro Moro st stat ates es and and prin princi cipa pali liti ties es,, was was wide widely ly pres presum umed ed to be in inco comp mpat atib ible le with with the the real realit itie ies s of the the modern world, such uch as the Philippi ppines’ republican stat st ate ehood. Over the years, ars, those hose who sought more information on the Kingdom of Sulu were led to believe that it had long been legally obsolete, its Sultan allegedly deprived of power by the so-called “Carpenter Agreement” of 1915. However since 2011, the Sultanate has become, and continues to be, a newsmaker. Not only were the Ruma Bichar Bichara a (the (the Curia Curia Regis Regis)) and and some some othe otherr st stat ate e bodi bodies es This paper’s original version was presented to King Mued I, the Sultan of Sulu, on the day of His Majesty’s coronation. I am profoundly indebted to Rafal Heidel-Mankoo, a Datu of the Royal Sultanate of Sulu and an internationally known expert, whose insightful and friendly advises enabled me to edit and amend the text. 1
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effectively revitalised, but many steps were made in the sphere of honours. Through several acts issued lately by the the last last Sult Sultan an’s ’s legi legiti tima mate te heir heir,, new new sy symb mbo ols of the the Sultanate have been established, the rules referring to the tradit traditio ional nal nobili nobility ty have have been been revise revised d and confi confirme rmed, d, a dynastical Order has been instituted, several new noble titles have been created, and a number of personal arms have been granted to recipients within as well as outside the Sultanate’s borders. These actions actions imply a claim to a status which which is not merely regal (which would be a dynastic matter only) but is, in fact, equal to that of the effective rulers. Irre Irresp spec ecti tiv ve of the the much much--evol evolve ved d mode modern rn “f “fo ons honorum mythology”, no creation of a new honour may be seen as indisputably valid unless it is supported by the auth author orit ity y of the the st stat ate. e. Inde Indeed ed,, one one of the the purp purpos oses es – secondary but still topical – of the said acts is to manifest the legal and political existence of the Kingdom, as well as the state prerogatives pertaining to the Sultanate’s royal head. What follows is an attempt to explain and clarify this point further. It is necessary n ecessary to stress, however, that the Sultan’s sove sovere reig ign n right rights s outs outsid ide e the Fili Filipi pino no bord border er,, that that is, in relation to North Borneo, will not be discussed here as this sensi sensiti tive ve subje subject ct is unnec unneces essa sari rily ly comp compli lica cate ted d for for our our purposes. Over the course of its history, the Sultanate had its sovere sovereign ign rights rights and prero prerogat gativ ives es restri restricte cted d on severa severall occasions, by accepting the supreme rule of Spain and later of the USA. These restrictions were established by bilingual pacts: with Spain in 1878, and with the USA in
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1899 (the latter commonly known as the Bates Treaty). Both Both acts acts were were flaw flawed ed due to impr imprec ecis ise e and and simpl simplif ifie ied d translations. Although the international versions proclaimed the respective conqueror’s supreme sovereignty over the Kingdom, the Tausug versions of the pacts made no mention of a cession of sovereignty to any fore foreig ign n powe power, r, decl declar ariing less less radi radica call lega legall meas measur ures es inst in stea ead, d, su such ch as the the crea creati tio on of a pro protect tector orat ate e and and a partition of powers and competences. In any case, all versions of the pacts, clearly stated that that Sul Sulu was to rema remaiin a theo heocrat cratiic mon monarch archy y wit with territory, and its own legal system and administration. In 19 1904 04 the the USA, USA, seek seekin ing g to gain gain more more effec effecti tive ve control in the area, unilaterally annulled the Bates Treaty, desp despit ite e the the Sult Sultan an’s ’s form formal al obje object ctio ion. n. Foll Follow owin ing g this this decision the governor of the Moro province, Major General Leon Leonar ard d Wood Wood,, start started ed the the most most di diff ffic icul ultt and and bl bloo oodi dies estt period of what is known as the “Moro rebellion”. In 1915 Fra Frank Carpe rpenter, the governor of the Departament of Mindanao and Sulu, forced Sultan Jamal II to come to Zamboanga “with his councellors” and to sign there a document (actually an inner Memorandum of the Depa Depart rtme ment nt)) whic which h beca became me know known n as the the Carp Carpen ente terr Agreement. Governor Carpenter was, in a sense, a “good colonialist” – not specifically hostile towards the Moros, he work worked ed hard hard to repl replac ace e the the mili milita tary ry admi admini nist stra rati tio on in Moroland with a civil one. As his plans and aspirations were were freq freque uent ntly ly oppo oppose sed d in Wash Washin ingt gton on,, he soug sought ht to achieve some spectacular political successes to support and and adve advert rtis ise e hi his s progr program amme me of refo reform rms. s. Ac Acco cordi rding ngly ly,,
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Carpenter decided to advertise the Memorandum as the Sultan’s “Co “Compl mplete ete Renunc Renunciat iatio ion… n… of his Prete Pretensi nsions ons of Sovereignty ”. ”. Neit Neithe herr thes these e word words s nor nor thei theirr equi equiva vale lent nt appear anywhere in the act itself; but they were used by Carpenter as part of the subheading under which the act was su subm bmiitted tted to the the Fed Federal eral Gove Goverrnme nment and and later ater officially published. Aside from Aside from thes these e ps pseu eudo do-o -off ffic icia iall addi additi tion ons s to the original text, the Memorandum can hardly be regarded as a “complete renunciation” or abdication by the Sultan. The T he document states that the Sultan “ratifies “ ratifies and confirms his reco recogn gnit itio ion n of the the sove sovere reig ignt nty y of the the Unit United ed Stat States es of America America” ” and assigned to the USA “all “all the attributes of sovere sovereign ign govern governme ment nt that that are exerci exercised sed elsew elsewher here e in American American territory territory and dependenc dependencies ies”; ”; but this did not exclude the possibility of retaining the “limited sove sovere reig ignt nty” y” as in the the case case of the the Indi Indian an nati nation ons s2. In return, the act guaranteed the Sultan’s position as the “head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipela Archipelago, go, with all the rights and privileges privileges which under the Government of the United States of America may be exercised by such an ecclesiastical authority, and subject to the the sam same limit imita atio tions whi hic ch appl pply to the the su supr prem eme e
See, for example: Cohen, F.S. Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Washington, DC, 1942, passim. This conside consideration ration alone alone undermin undermines es Carpente Carpenter’s r’s sly statemen statementt according according to which which the the Sulta Sultan n reno renoun unce ced d “of “of all pret preten ensi sion ons s to tem tempora porall sove sovere reign ignty ty through his unqualified recognition of the sovereignty of the United States of America”. The “unqualified “unqualified” ” character character of the said recognition recognition is yet another another cunning cunning mystification. See the “Report of the Philippine commissions to the Secretary of War”. War”. 1915. Washington, 1916, p.287. 2
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spiritual heads of all other religions existing in American territory ”3. It is evident that the Memorandum did not deprive the sSultan of those powers, prerogatives and “attributes “ attributes of sovereign government ” that were not exercised by the USA, such as the powers to create nobiliary honours, or to mainta maintain in (at least least symbol symbolic icall ally) y) those those tradit traditio ional nal public public offi office ces s and and titl titles es trad tradit itio iona nall lly y rega regard rded ed as part part of the the nation’s traditional establishment. The regal dignity itself, being alien to the American legal system, could not be clai claime med d by the the USA, USA, and and ther theref efor ore e cert certai ainl nly y rema remain ined ed intact. It shoul should d be also also unde unders rsto tood od that that the the trad tradit itio iona nall Isl Islamic mic doct doctri rine ne defi efines nes Sul Sultans tans (as (as di dist stiinct nct fro from the the Imams, the religious leaders) as sacred rulers, vested with both religious and temporal powers. Within the European context they are to be considered as personae personae mixtae mixtae,, largely comparable to the two existing ex isting Catholic “synthetic” legal entities, that either maintained (as did the Holy See between 1870 and 1929), or still maintain (the Sovereign Milita Military ry Order Order of Malta) Malta) their their intern internati ationa onally lly recogn recognise ised d sovereign status irrespective of losing their territories 4. It is obvious that the extrapolation of this principle to the whole Islamic world may go pretty far, but this is no reason to ignore the problem. Idem, p.297-298. The Memorandum is normally perceived together with the deliberately misleading introduction added by Carpenter; see, for example, the document’s publication in a historical monograph: Gowing P.G. Mandate in Moroland. Manila, 1977, app. D.
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Of course, historically, a Sultan’s (or a Caliph’s) dual power was indivisible rather rather than mixed mixed.. It could could be this this factor factor which which made made At Atatü atürk rk so rude and intolerant towards the Caliph in the years 1922-1924, although the Caliphate was considered then as a purely religious position. 4
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Many Many of the the adhe adhere rent nts s of the the legi legiti tima mate te King King5, as well as many less loyal Sulu subjects, are advancing other arguments against the validity of the 1915 Memorandum qua a complete renunciation or abdication. It has been explained that an internal document of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, whether signed by the Sultan or not, was not sufficient to reform or alter the organic norms of Sulu statehood, let alone abolish it. It was also pointed out that the “councellors” summoned to Zamboanga could not serv serve e as a form formal al su subs bsti titu tuti tion on of the the Sult Sultan an’s ’s Coun Counci cill (Rum (Ruma a Bi Bich char ara) a);; con consequ seque ently, tly, the Sul ulttan coul could d not not execute his supreme power “in Council” 6. These actions must therefore be deemed ultra vires. vires. HM Sultan-King Mued I (Muedzul Lail Tan Kiram) was crowned on the 16th of September 2012. Over the previous 26 years of his reign, the current Head of the the Sult Sultan anate ate had had decl decline ined d a coro corona natio tion n due due to polit politic ical al circ circum umst stan ance ces s (including the ambivalent attitude of Manila) and chose instead to exercise royal power under the title of Raja Muda (the Crown Prince), this title had been formally recognized for him by the Republic of the Philippines on the accession of his father. 5
Despite being close to absolutist in the days of old, the Sultan’s power always had its restrictions and conditions. He was not usually bound by the decisions reached during the consultations with his Ruma Bichara, but it was absolutely essential that these consultations were asked for, and heard, on any occasion of state importance. Carpenter was aware of this and – in his own words – “the Sultan was called to Zamboanga March 11, 1915, and directed to bring with him his advisers and persons of his immediate confidence” to substitute the council (Report of the Philippine commissions to the Secretary of War. 1915. Washington, Government printing office. P. 289); but nothing indicates that such substitution was lawful or desired by the Sultan himself, or that the delegation was sufficiently representative (the act was countersigned by two Datus, Datus, one Panglim Panglima, a, and the Sultan Sultan’s ’s secret secretary ary;; other other Moro Moro sig signat natori ories es represented the Department). Even Governor Carpenter himself did not claim that the act was approved by the Ruma Bichara. He wrote: “On the part of the Sultan, such witnesses were members of the former cabinet or council of the Sultan and other natives of Sulu whom the Sultan had accompany him in the course of the conferences preliminary to and at the time of the signing of the agreement”. See: “Report…”, ibidem. 6
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Attention has been given also to the terminological flaw flaws s of the the prev previo ious us tre treatis atise es; thes these e flaw flaws s cre create ated precedents that enabled the Sultan to treat the recognition of foreign sovereignty as merely another confirmation of protectorate. Moreover, the loose and legally ambiguous terr territ itor oria iall defi defini niti tion on cite cited d in the the Memo Memora rand ndum um (“Su (“Sulu lu archipelago”) is open to interpretation and, in the terms of 1915, did not encompass some of the minor islands which belonged to the Sultanate’s periphery. It is worth noting that the survival of the Sultanate was was mani manife fest sted ed not not onl nly y by the the cont contin inue ued d us use e of the the Sultan’s royal titles and styles, but also by the persistence of the public dignities, titles, offices and ranks which which continued to be used by the Sultanate’s officials (such as Tuan Panglima Panglimas s etc). Even Carpenter’ Carpenter’s s ardent ardent supporters supporters could not deny it, although they expressed their opinion that no such dignitaries should be appointed in the future7. Jamal II died died in 1936. 1936. He He remaine remained d a reigning reigning Sultan Sultan-King under the American administration, and the autonomous state of the Philippines inherited him in the same capacity. The Filipino autonomy chose to treat the Sul Sultan as a pri privat vate pers perso on (alt (altho houg ugh h thi this was was nev never spe sp ecifie fied in any for formal or legal act) which att attitude provoked a painful schism of the Tausug community. It is worth mentioning that during the Second World War, there were two active claimants to the Kingship, one supported by Japan and another opposing the Japanese occupation – both were related to the previous rulers but neither of them descended from the Kiram Royal line. However the Kirams continued to be regarded as the principal branch, Oroza, Sixto Y. 1931. The Sulu Archipelago and Its People. N.Y., Yonkers-onHudson. P.61. 7
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and had been finally restored to the throne in the person of the the then then legi legiti timi mist st heir heir,, Moha Moham mmad mad Es Esm mail ail Kira Kiram m I (nephew of Jamal II), in 1950 8. After After gainin gaining g full full indepe independe ndence nce,, the Filipin Filipino o state state failed to acknowledge Sulu’s special status in its cons consti titu tuti tio on; howe howeve verr the the cont contin inue ued d exis existe tenc nce e of the the Sult Sultan an’s ’s temp tempor oral al righ rights ts was was neve neverr in doub doubt, t, and and the the Sulta Sultana nate te was was form formal ally ly reco recogn gnis ised ed by the the Filipi Filipino no acts acts issu is sue ed ad hoc hoc, in 1962 and and aga again in 1972. Thes These e act acts trea treatted the the real realm m as a sor sort of vass vassal al st sta ate with within in the the borders of the Republic. The Sultan’s royal rank was also confirmed through the manner of styling him as “Majesty”. These respectful respectful and cordial cordial relations relations continued continued in 1974 1974 with the coronation of Sultan-King Mahakutta, father of the current King. The new Sultan was formally greeted by the Presi Preside dent nt,, and and the coro corona nati tion on was was atte attend nded ed by Fili Filipi pino no state representatives. Moreover, the Philippines recognised the formation of the Government of Sulu by the new Sultan9 as well as the immediate succession rights of the Sultan’s son, HRH Raja Muda Muedzul Lail Tan Kiram (now His Majesty King Mued I). The subsequent political changes in Manila as well as in Mindanao did not affect the validity of these recognitions. None None of the afor aforem emen enti tion oned ed acts acts of the the Repu Republ blic ic implied any “grant” or “concession” of rights, rather they His rights rights were were ackno acknowle wledge dged d even even earlier earlier.. He was was procla proclaim imed ed as heir heir apparent, “the Raja Muda” (Prince Royal), under the previous effective ruler, Datu Tambuyong (Sultan Jainal Abirin), who thereby renounced his branch’s ephemeral claim. 8
It is worth mentioning that the term “Government of Sulu”, continuously used in legal documents, was attested in 1910-ies by Governor Carpenter as an expression and recognition of the sovereign rights enjoyed by the Sultan and his nation irrespectively of the Bates treaty as well as the earlier pacts.
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instead expressed the state’s recognition of the Sulta Sultana nate te’s ’s existi existing ng statu status, s, and pl plai ainl nly y di disa savo vowe wed d the the entire notion of the “complete renunciation” in 1915. It is worth mentioning that there is no constitutional obst obstac acle le for for thes these e Fili Filipi pino no reco recogn gnit itio ions ns as well well as the the representative practices of the monarchy of sulu. There is Art.VI, Section 31, which states that “no “ no law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted”, enacted ”, but this can be applied neither to the dynastical titles of Sulu (which have existed from time immemorial and are preserved by the House and the nation) nor to the new creations (which belo belong ng to the the admi admini nist stra rati tive ve rath rather er tha than legi legisl slat atiive prerogative of the Sultan-King, being a continuation of a long-established practice). Another quasi-relevant Filipino const constit itut utio iona nall princ princip iple le (Art. (Art.II, II, Sect Sectio ion n 26 26)) is that that “ The State State shall shall […] prohi prohibi bitt poli politi tica call dyna dynast stie ies s as may may be defined by law”. law”. It is apparent that the norm is aimed against the misuse of the Republican institutions, and that it si simp mply ly cann cannot ot be impl implem emen ente ted, d, even even theo theore reti tica call lly, y, unl nle ess a legal defi defin nition of a “pol political dyn dynasty” is established, which so far is not the case. The Filipino Filipino legal system, system, far from being incom incompat patibl ible e with with the Sulta Sultanat nate’s e’s ongoi ongoing ng renais renaissan sance, ce, offe offers rs an oppo opport rtun unit ity y for for the the prese preserv rvat atio ion n and and care carefu full development of tindigenous institutions, admitting that the righ rights ts of the first nat nations are inher herent rather than han dele delega gate ted d by the Repu Republ blic ic.. This This conc concep eptu tual al fram framew ewor ork k implies a possibility of peaceful development and constructive consensus. Although prior to his coronation, His Majesty King Mued I already acted as a reigning sovereign, a number of his acts issued during this transitional period (such as the
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foundation of the Order of the Pearl) received only a partial acknowledgement, often being seen even by connoisseurs as acts of a non-ruling head of a Sovereign House. This opi pini nio on was to a certain extent just stiified whilst the Sovereign of Sulu remained, less than a reigning titular King. The time has come to clarify the situation and the term terms. s. May May the the coro corona nati tion on of King King Mued Mued I elev elevat ate e hi his s Real Realm m and and hi his s peop people le,, with with its its need needs, s, pote potent ntia ials ls and and glorious legacy, to a new level of international recognition.
