The Republic Summary

The Republic Summary The Republic itself Republic  itself is nothing at the start of Plato's Plato's most famous and influential book. It does not exist. Not only does it not exist in actuality, but it does not exist in theory either. It must be built. It's architect ill be Socrates, Socrates , the fictional persona Plato creates for himself. In the first episode Socrates encounters some ac!uaintances during the festi"al of #endis. $is reputation for good con"ersation already ell%established, Socrates is approached by some dilettante philosopher ac!uaintances and dran into a dialo dialogu gue. e. The The discu discussi ssion on !uick !uickly ly mo"es mo"es to &usti &ustice ce thanks thanks to Socr Socrate ates. s. The The othe other  r  phil philos osop ophe hers rs,, incl includ udin ing g Thrasymachus, Thrasymachus , Polermarchus, Polermarchus , laucon, laucon, and  (deimantus  (deimantus enthusiastically consent to such a orthy topic. $oe"er, it is unlikely at this point that any of these these philosop philosophers hers)sa )sa"e "e Socrate Socrates, s, of course) course)ant anticip icipates ates the ambition ambition and enormity of their undertaking. In Book Socrates s enterta entertains ins to distinct distinct definition definitions s of &ustice. &ustice. The first first is Book I, Socrate pro"ided by Polermarchus, Polermarchus, ho suggests that &ustice is *doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.* The definition, hich is a "ersion of con"entionally morality, is considered. +ery soon though, its faults are clearly apparent. It is far to relati"e to ser"e as a formulation of the &ustice. oreo"er, its indi"idual terms are "ulnerable- that is to say, ho does one kno ho is a friend and ho an enemy (nd are not friends as much as enemies capable of e"il (nd hen a friend acts ickedly, should he not be punished (nd next, hat does it mean that an action is good or bad The perils of  gi"ing credence to false appearances is introduced early on as a ma&or theme. It ill be dealt ith at length in the succeeding books. Thus surely an idea as noble as &ustice ill not stand on such precarious ground. Socrates is dissatisfied. ( second definition, offered by Thrasymachus, endorses tyranny. */bedience to the interest of the stronger,* is likeise mined for its "alue, shon to be deficient, and discarded. discarded. Tyranny, Tyranny, Socrates Socrates demonstrates employing se"eral analogies, ine"itably results in the fragmentation of the soul. #ene"olent rule, on the other hand, ensures a harmonious life for both man and State. 0ustice is its means and good is its end. That *&ustice is the excellence of the soul* is Socrates' main conclusion. #ut there are too many presumptions. (lthough his auditors ha"e troubled refuting his claims, Socrates knos he has been too "ague and that should they truly ish to in"estigate the !uestion !uestion of &ustice, he ill ha"e to be more specific. #ook I ends ith yet another !uestion. Is the &ust life more pleasurable, more reard reardin ing g than than the the un&us un&ust t Rath Rather er all all at once once the philo philoso soph phers ers ha"e ha"e inund inundat ated ed themsel"es. #ut the first book has succeeded in one ma&or ay. It has established the territory of the o"er%arching argument of the entire orkThe philosophers continue the debate in Book II  by introducing a ne definition that belongs more to political philosophy than pure philosophy1 that &ustice is a legally enforced compromise de"ised for the mutual protection of citi2ens of a state. In other  ords, &ustice is a fabrication of the State that pre"ents citi2ens from harming one another. another. Socrates is certainly up to the challenge. challenge. $e dislikes the idea that &ustice does not not exis exists ts natu natura rally lly,, but but that that it must must be exte extern rnal ally ly and and supe superf rfic icia iall lly y impo impose sed d to discourage un&ust beha"ior. (deimantus' mentioning of the State seems fortuitous, but it is as if Socrates has been aiting for it all along. 3ncertain hether they can arri"e at

an acceptable definition of &ustice any other ay, Socrates proposes they construct a State of hich they appro"e, and see if they might not find &ustice lurking in it somehere. This State arises, Socrates says, *out of the needs of mankind.* (nd the immense pro&ect of building a State from its "ery foundation has officially commenced. #asic necessities are addressed first, then the primiti"e di"ision of labor, folloed by the rudiments of education. 4ithin the ideal State, Socrates maintains, there ill be no need for *bad fictions,* or manipulati"e poetics in general, since education must be perfectly moral. The arts in education are primarily dealt ith in Book III. Socrates concludes his attack on the *libelous poetry* that portrays his belo"ed "irtues in so many negati"e lights. It is not of use to the State. /r if it is to be of use, it must be stringently didactic and partake of none of the indulgence and rhapsody common to their tradition and to contemporary poets as ell. 5"en $omer is indicted. Instead the citi2ens of the state, at this early stage they are generically named guardians, are to be nourished only on literature % broadly termed 'music' by Socrates % clearly illustrating courage, isdom, temperance, and "irtue 6&ust beha"ior7. The second part of education, gymnasium, consists mostly of the physical training of the citi2ens. (t this point Socrates' State needs rulers. 4ho better to rule than the best and most patriotic citi2ens produced by the rigorous education apparatus. These "ery select fe are no more strictly called the guardians, hile non%guardians remain citi2ens. The guardians ill be the rulers. The book closes ith the Phoenician myth, hich Socrates feels ould ser"e as effecti"e mythical explanation for their State. Through the myth citi2ens are told they are made of  a certain mix of metals, gold and sil"er, iron and brass, etc. They are born like this and are to take the re!uisite social station because of it. $oe"er, should a citi2en of gold or  sil"er be born to parents of an inferior metal, he ill rise socially as is &ust- and the rule ill also function in the re"erse situation. The myth pro"ides the State ith an accessible, allegorical illustration of its stable, hierarchical social organi2ation. In Book IV the happiness of the guardians, so strenuously trained, is !uestioned. Socrates takes the ob&ections of his auditors in due stride, reminding them of their  original premise1 that the State is to be for the good of the many and not the fe. Their  State has gron larger in the meantime, and is beginning to di"ide its labors. 8efense and security against neighbors and foreign in"asion enter the debate. #ut surely, Socrates says, the education, military and otherise, that the citi2ens ha"e garnered, coupled ith their lo"e for the State and their solidarity, ill repel or outit all challenges. #elie"ing that hat they ha"e created thus far is a perfect State, the philosopher once again seek out &ustice. Socrates suggests they proceed by a process of elimination among the four "irtues. $e defines courage, temperance, and isdom, but must digress before attaining &ustice. The digression yields the three principles of  the soul1 reason, passion, and appetite. 4hen these exist in harmony, Socrates concludes, there is &ustice. It is a pro"isional definition. The philosophers agreement at the end of #ook I+ to discuss the "arious corrupt forms of go"ernment is, hoe"er, interrupted by an accusation of la2iness. Thrasymachus "oices his dissatisfaction ith Socrates ho, he says, has purposely a"oided speaking of the more practical concerns of the State. The ob&ection blossoms into the section on

matrimony. 5ncompassing matrimony, family, and community, Socrates elucidates his "ery scientific, "ery futuristic plan for population control and the right breeding of the human animal. The strong reproduce more often than the eak. 9ikeise eak offspring are disposed of or hidden aay someplace unnamed. Socrates has bucked to of hat he calls three *a"es.* The third and greatest is the !uestion of hether  their possibility is reali2able in any ay. Socrates' response is mostly negati"e. $oe"er, there is one method by hich the States they see around them might become ideal States. That is, if philosophers become kings or, more likely, if kings take up the study of philosophy. $ence the famous term philosopher%kings. #ut this in turn begs the !uery1 hat is the philosopher This leads Socrates into another complicated idea, an inchoate "ersion of the Theory of :orms. anifestations, appearances, likenesses, opinions)none of them are Reality- they are merely shados. /nly the :orms, the ideals that lie behind are truth. (nd the philosopher seeks abo"e all else knoledge of  these :orms. opens ith the reappearance of Polermarchus, hose hispering in  (deimantus's ear attracts the attention of Socrates. Polermarchus reluctantly speaks up at Socrates' behest- he accuses the philosopher of la2iness and of not ansering some of the more practical !uestions regarding their State, such as early education, family, and community- in other ords, social concerns. Somehat eary of discoursing, Socrates says he ould rather not reduce his philosophy to this le"el, but his audience demands it. Book V

;et another accusation from the gallery directs Socrates' in!uiry in the beginning of Book VI. (deimantus belie"es the guardians they ha"e created are monsters. /n the contrary, Socrates defends, their nobility and orth are beyond !uestion, draing on the parable of the pilot and his cre as an illustration. The parable opposes the ants of the ma&ority ith the authority of the truly fit leader. The multitudes, Socrates explains, do not kno hat is best for them. They are to be ruled by one especially suited and trained to this end, and for the good of all. Socrates is obliged then to de"elop the relationship beteen the guardians and philosophy. uardians, he says, cease to be guardians hen they abandon the truth, be minority or otherise. The final section of  #ook +I includes a series of onderfully "i"id and intelligible figures or metaphors that help clarify somehat the Theory of :orms and the good. +isibility, "ision, and light are analogous to knoledge, the knoer, and that hich makes knoing possible, the good. The good is symboli2ed by sunlight, the "ital means by hich the sun not only sheds light on the orld but nourishes that orld. Philosophy is a lo"e of the light, an attempt to percei"e and understand it in all its metaphorical manifestations. 5"erything else belongs to the orld of the manifold, of shados. :inally the dialectic is the only ay to ascend, as upon a staircase of ideas, to the luminous good. Book VII is

dominated by the (llegory of the
the echoed "oices they hear, they also belie"e to be true. Then one day a certain prisoner is released. The secrets of the ca"e are disclosed to him, and he is lead up into the sunlight, hich blinds his unaccustomed eyes. The third part of the allegory has the enlightened' prisoner, ho has looked upon, contemplated, and ad&usted to the true light of the sun, must return to the ca"e. There he finds his ne eyes ill%suited for ca"e life and is cruelly mocked by the other prisoners. ( summary of the life course of the guardians, the allegory morali2es dutiful rule for the common good. The guardians must gi"e up the beauty and peace of the light to help their fello men, the ma&ority of hom dell in ab&ect darkness. #ut ho ould make such a sacrifice i"en their  education)hich is no expanded e"en further)Socrates is confidant the guardians ould. (fter all they spend the first fifty years of their life training for the opportunity and, as they ould considered it, their honor. Socrates asks permission to backtrack a little at the opening of Book VIII in order to analy2e the forms of corrupt go"ernments. This ay they can also look at the indi"iduals inhabiting them, thus cutting aay the grist so that only the meat, the &ust man, may remain. There are four principle defecti"e forms1 timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. (ristocracy's 6the republic7 degeneration into timocracy occurs as a kind of  hypothetical fluke, an error in population control. The timocracy is a go"ernment based primarily on honor not &ustice, and the timocratic man is torn beteen his philosophical ancestors and ne, ingratiating contemporaries ho flatter his "anity. /ligarchy arises hen ealth becomes the standard. The State separates into to distinct and distant classes)rich and poor. (nd the timocrat embodies the old, honorable ays in competition ith a"arice. (fter a re"olution in hich the rulers are o"erthron by the discontented poor, democracy, the most liberal and "arious State appears. The democratic representati"e is ruled by appetites that hold say ell abo"e reason or  honor. The final dissolution into the orst and most icked form of go"ernment, tyranny, is the result of democracy's supposed "irtue1 freedom. #ut is in excess and, after  another re"olution, a ne ruler, the tyrant ascends. $e has no unlimited freedom and thus no morals. $e feels off the State, taxes his people, protects himself ith mercenaries, and destroys any threat to this poer. The book's most miserable character, the tyrant is antithetical to the guardian- he is in&ustice incarnate. sees Socrates deal ith the figure of the tyrant in more depth. This is a necessary digression, since by e"aluating the life of the tyrant, his pleasures and pains, they may ha"e a better idea of hat constitutes the un&ust life. 5"entually they ill use hat they learn from the tyrant to compare his life ith the philosopher's. The tyrant begins as the champion of the people, promising to release them from debt. #y the end of his reign, hoe"er, he has taxed them into po"erty and ensla"ed them. Then, in an unexpected turn, the tyrant, for a hile master of all men himself becomes a sla"e to all men. $e is go"erned by insatiable appetites, is threatened on all sides and at e"ery moment by betrayal and assassination, and can ne"er lea"e his land for fear of being deposed. The portrait is rather dismal- hat ould seem to be absolute freedom is in reality absolute sla"ery. #ook I= concludes ith the re%introduction of the !uestion1 does the un&ust man ho is percei"ed as &ust in public li"e better or orse than the &ust man percei"ed as un&ust ( discussion of the nature of pleasure ensues and the base pleasures are distinguished from the noble and, in fact, more en&oyable. 3ltimately, Book IX

Socrates ansers, in the long run, in&ustice en&oys much less, if at all, and must ine"itably re"eal itself and be shunned or cast out. The finale, and really the end of the State as such, is Socrates assertion that hether or not the ideal State becomes a reality, the philosopher must alays li"e as though it ere real inside him. The final book of The Republic, *The Recompense of 9ife,* telescopes into to main points. :irst is the issue of imitati"e poetry. $ere Socrates offers his conclusi"e assessment of the poetic arts. $omer, he apologi2es, must, except for those parts portraying nobility and right beha"ior in famous men and gods, be left out of the State. $e may e"en ha"e to be translated from "erse to prose, in order that the musicality of  the language not seduce any citi2ens. Second comes the true recompense of life, hich actually occurs in the afterlife. (lthough the &ust man reaps great reards in mortal life, it is in his immortality, or the immortality of his soul, here he is truly paid his due. The gods recei"e the &ust man, ho has aspired all along to emulate them, as a !uasi%e!ual.  (nd enfin, The Republic closes ith Socrates' colorful narration of the tale of 5r the hero. It is a long description of an afterlife, in hich all those "irtues that Socrates has orked so diligently to expose and defend are gi"en their proper place. Souls are shon in eternal recurrence, mo"ing up and don from the hea"ens to earth and back again 6ith the icked spending thousand year stints in hell7.