The Platonic Concept of Justice Peter Emmanuel A. Mara The most interesting discussion that Socrates brings out in the Republic is the concept of justice. Contrary to the usual perception that justice directly assumes a societal connotation, Socrates puts a radical theory on how to arrive at justice. At the beginning of the Republic, Socrates’ interlocutors raised their ideas about justice that are merely based on social and political domain. For example, Cephalus’ idea of justice is rooted on his wealth. Therefore, justice for him is associated with telling the truth and paying one’s debts.1 For Thrasymachus, he upholds the conventional justice as doing what is in the interest of the ruling class, or the stronger party. He believes that the person is better off unjust than just. Glaucon, also, lays his idea of justice. He offers his social contract theory as an account of the nature of justice. He believes that justice is by nature a compromise between the states of affairs. 2 Socrates pursues a different path in explaining the nature of justice. His problem is where to find the true meaning of justice. Since all of his interlocutors believe in the direct cohesion of justice in state affairs and politics, he proposes to study justice using the individual man. Brann comments, “They all take it for granted that justice is primarily an individual, and not poltical or social matter. Plato does not care Plato, Republic 331, in Great Books of Western World, Volume 7, Robert M. Hutchins (ed.), (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1954), p. 297. 1
Republic 358c1 – 359a6-7. Norman O. Dahl has a brief summary of these ideas of Socrates’ interlocutors in his online article ““Plato's Defense of Justice” in JSTOR (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007). Hereafter cited as Plato’s Defense of Justice. 2
about political or social justice, but justice as a human virtue, an individual quality.” 3 However, there seems to be a problem as he investigates justice in the human individual. The human individual is hard to approach and study. It would be easier then to magnify this individual in order to clearly uproot the notion of justice. Plato writes, The state is larger than the individual… then in the larger quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice first as they appear in the state, and secondly the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser comparing them. 4
The discussion of justice, then, proceeds from the individual, but since it is easier to view it at large, it is primarily analyzed in the society. Plato made the analogy of the individual and the state in discussing justice. However, Plato was apparently aware that his account of justice is a rough draft or mere sketch, and that “a longer and a harder way would have to be traveled for an adequate treatment of these matters.” 5 But as a matter of fact, he does not take this other way; he is satisfied for the present to continue with his inexact method. 6 Thus, he pursues the Eva Brann, The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates’ Conversations and Plato’s Writings, (Philadelphia:Paul Dry Books, 2004), p. 249. 3
4
Republic Book 2, 369
Republic Book 4, 435D. Cf. Charles H. Kahn “The Meaning of `Justice' and the Theory of Forms” in JSTOR (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007), p. 571. 5
Hans Kelsen “Platonic Justice” in JSTOR (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007), p. 393. 6
discussion of justice as it is seen first in the state and the individual, which is the pattern of this exposition as well
A.Justice in the State The theory of the birth of the state is grounded on the premise that man is not self sufficient, which means that there is only single task or talent that he is bound to be capable of. Other needs that his talent cannot provide must be expected to be provided by the other. He is in need of the other which propels him to form association with other not-self-sufficient individuals. Foster puts it, “each man specializes in the production of a given necessity and is dependent on other specialists for the supply of his remaining needs. Plato writes, I am myself reminded that we are not alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations. 7
This principle of Plato suggests that we are predisposed to perform different jobs within the society. This brings out the unique ability of man in every field which enables the division of labor to be established in the state. Division of labor also identifies the social class into which every citizen belongs. According to Plato, the characteristic activity of a certain kind of thing is what only that kind of thing does or what if does better than any kind of thing.8 There is an inherent nature in man that makes him do a certain activity that is exclusive of him to do. Before Socrates makes explicit the predisposition of the individuals based on their abilities, he mythologizeS this point by telling the noble lie. He says, 7
Republic Book 2, 370.
8
Cf. Republic Book 1 352 – 353.
Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, but God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power to command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore he has the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed brass and iron. 9
This should not be taken literally which may mean that there is a chemical substance infused by God in us at birth. Instead, it should be understood as abilities being given as a nature to the citizens by the Divine. Plato wants to base class distinctions on ability instead of birth (or heredity). 10 Which brings us to the notion of three social class: the ruler, auxiliaries, and the merchant. To derive this distinction of classes, the ability must be the criterion. The ruler is defined by his ability to command; the auxiliaries, by his ability to provide aid to whatever the ruler commands; and the merchant (husbandmen and craftsmen) by his ability to provide the basic needs of every citizen. Citizens work according to the nature endowed to them in birth. One’s nature is the basis of one’s occupation. Therefore, in doing fulfilling one single task, he is only actualizing the nature (ability) that is inherent in him. To explicitly discuss justice in the state without its reference to the justice in the individual would be an incomplete task. For it is said that the society is an individual writ large. Its constitution depends ultimately on the individuals whom it is composed, and those characters which he has seen in large outline in the state. 11 For how can the classes in the society be derived if not for the 9
Republic Book 3, 415.
Nickolas Pappas, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Republic, (London and New York, 2003), p. 75. 10
William Boyd, An Introduction to the Republic of Plato, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 41. 11
constitution of the human individual and his abilities? The true justice in the city is derived when we also understand the constitution of the individual for it is the basis of the state. B. Justice in the Individual Plato has established the constitution of the state in order to understand how the soul of the individual is further divided. Since the soul is comparatively smaller or abstract than the state, which is visible, concrete and contained in a larger domain, the latter is effectively used by Plato in order to demonstrate its constitution, and afterwards set this pattern on its direct counterpart in the individual. Plato presumes an analogy between the state and man, and believes that man can be understood easier if viewed in a larger proportion of the state. 12 But since the larger domain of the state has already explicated the three class distinction of the society, then we must turn to the manner it has been referred to the individual soul. Therefore, as the state is composed of three divisions, then the soul is logically divided into three parts. Plato writes, But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason..; instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the appetite [also, concupiscent]; or rather, as the state was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counselors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad is the auxiliary of reason. 13
The method of analogy between the state and the individual makes Plato arrive at the constitution of the individual soul as it is patterned on the society. The three elements of the individual soul are reason, spirit and the appetite. The first one is a rational 12
Kelsen, op. cit., p. 391.
13
Republic Book 4, 440 – 441. (Emphasis mine).
faculty and the other two are irrational faculties unless disciplined. Further, Plato ascribes the function of these faculties and their interconnection with each other. He says, The rational principle ought to be wise and has the care of the whole soul, [and also] to rule; the spirit [ought] to be the subject and ally [of reason]… And these two thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain: over this they will keep guard… 14
Plato suggests that each of the virtues have their own character and goal to pursue. The basis of this characterization is the very object of each faculty that makes it function. Dahl explains it in this way, “Plato takes the three parts of the soul to have their own appropriate objects of desire for wealth along with desires for food, drink and sex [appetite]. Spirit includes not only anger, but also desires for honor and political success. Reason provides a person with desires for knowledge and truth.”15 Therefore, reason must possess wisdom; spirit, courage; and appetite/concupiscent, temperance. Plato has an extensive explanation on each of these, he says, And he is deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear…We call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and the whole… He is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and 14
Republic Book 4, 441 – 442.
Norman O. Dahl. “Plato's Defense of Justice” in JSTOR (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007), p. 819. 15
desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel. 16
Plato calls these things as virtues. It should animate each faculty in order to perform its own task. These virtues allow a person to live characteristically human life and to live it well with respect to different aspects of human life. 17 The virtues are the guiding factor that keeps an individual to keep hold of every function of each of his faculties. Wisdom allows man to realize the rational principle of reason; courage, the spirited principle of the spirit; and temperance, the concupiscent principle of the appetite although guided and controlled by the two former virtues. Importantly, Plato ascribes these virtues in the three classes of the state. Wisdom as pursued by the ruler/guardian class, courage possessed by the soldier/auxiliary class, and temperance embodied by the merchant/trader class. In the mind of Plato, the virtues are composed of four, the other one being justice. The three previous virtues are focused and integrated only to their corresponding faculties and perform their function exclusively without interfering the other’s job. The remaining virtue is then called justice. At the latter part of Book 5, Plato further explains how justice works in the individual, But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the works of others, - he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself…18
16
Republic Book 4, 442
17
Dahl, op. cit., p. 810.
18
Republic Book 4, 443.
Plato has established the justice in the individual as the epitome of all paradigms of justice, more specifically the justice in the state. Justice is merely focused on the inner workings of the human individual with the harmonious interrelatedness of the three faculties. Although, Plato acknowledges the fact that there is a dominant virtue and faculty present in every individual, however he also said that no man is devoid of all of these three virtues, which also presupposes an absence of the other two faculties in man. Nobody is altogether devoid of any virtues. Even the worker must have a wisdom and courage of a kind. Thus justice implies not merely the faithful performance of citizen duties but the regulation of the elements of the soul in view of the business life. 19 The well-regulated soul becomes wise when its reason rules, courageous when its spiritual part acts bravely, temperate when all three parts accepts the rule of reason. 20 Plato is speaking of the justice as equated with harmony and regulation of the soul. The just man possesses a harmonious soul. Harmony in the soul is to be able to endow the task of each faculty to be in their own position, not transgressing other’s job. More importantly, there is no conflict and confusion that arise in the psychic structure of the soul. Justice applies to persons in virtue of their harmonious souls, and derivatively to actions that promote harmony of the soul. 21 Furthermore, the person with a full understanding of the nature of justice will be moved to act justly because doing so is something good in itself, 22 and it is both symptom and contributing causes of justice in the soul, unjust ones are both symptoms and causes of injustice.23 From just actions we can directly discuss the justice in the state because 19
Boyd, op. cit., p. 44.
20
Pappas, op. cit., p. 87.
21
Dahl, op. cit., p. 831.
22
Ibid., p. 829.
23
Pappas, op. cit., p. 88.
these actions are the vehicle of the individual to perform his duties as a citizen of the state. From this supposition, justice in the state is directly similar to the psychic phenomena of justice. Plato says, Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any medling of one with another is the greatest harm to the state, and may be most justly termed evil-doing… [However], when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just. 24
Justice in the state is similarly patterned on the justice found in the individual soul. The primary focus however of the justice in the state is the executory action of the individual as he is fulfilling duty towards social harmony. Doing one’s own job is the essence of social justice. However, justice in general cannot be just relegated to the social order, but must be indebted to its root, the soul. Foster comments, “The mere maintenance of a certain social order – e.g. of the division of labor exemplified in the primitive society – is not the whole of justice. It is important that the just act should not only conform to such an external standard, but that it should proceed from a fixed disposition of the soul which needs to be formed by education. 25 Just like the soul when it achieves psychic harmony, the state enjoys harmony when they keep themselves in their position, and perform their own duties as citizens, without the interference from the other class. To sum up, Plato has established the integral connection of the individual soul and the state. He inquires the nature of justice simply by looking at the basic constitution of the soul based on its 24
Republic, Book 4, 434.
25
M. B. Foster. “On Plato's Conception of Justice in the Republic” in
JSTOR (Date Accessed: September 28, 2007), p. 211.
connection to the state and vice versa. To quote Pappas, “the purpose behind Plato’s theoretical division of the city has been all along to show how the classes come harmoniously back together.” 26 Despite the method of Plato in setting distinction among the parts of the soul and the society, he provides still the pattern of their harmonious playing forth of duties towards the progress of the individual and the state. The psychic parts and divisions of labor tell us the distributive duties among faculties and individuals as they act as participatory towards psychic and social harmony.
26
Pappas, op. cit., p. 81.
