The Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti

THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI

THESIS

Written By RIZKA KHAIRANI NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA

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THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI

THESIS

Written for one of the requirements to complete Bachelor Degree in International Relations at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Written by RIZKA KHAIRANI NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA Even Semester 2013/2014

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THE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI

THESIS

Written for one of the requirements to complete Bachelor Degree in International Relations at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga

Written by RIZKA KHAIRANI NIM 071012079

BACHELOR PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA Even Semester 2013/2014

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PAGE OF APPROVAL

Thesis with the title: “

The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti

Written by : Rizka Khairani 071012079

Agreed to be submitted for Thesis Defense Even Semester 2013/2014

Surabaya, 21 May 2014 Supervisor,

Sartika Soesilowati, Ph.D NIP. 196407301995122001

Acknowledging, Head of Bachelor Program of International Relations

M. Muttaqien, S.IP, MA, Ph.D NIP. 197301301999031001

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”

PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT BOARD OF EXAMINERS

This thesis has been defended before the Board of Examiners on Wednesday, 21 May 2014, at 13.00 WIB in the Cakra Court-room Faculty of Social and Political Science Universitas Airlangga

Commission examiners

Chairman ,

I Basis Susilo, M.A NIP: 19540808 198103 1 007

Member I,

Member II,

Vinsensio Dugis, Ph.D

IGede Wahyu Wicaksana, Ph.D

NIP:19650113 199101 1 001

NIP: 19790602 200710 1001

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NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE

Some parts or all of the contents of this thesis with the title “The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti” was never submitted to obtain an academic degree in the field of study and / or other university and never published / written by individuals other than the author except when written with the format of the quote in contents of the thesis. If it is found that my statement is not true, then I am willing to accept sanctions in accordance with applicable provisions of Universitas Airlangga Surabaya

Surabaya, 28 May 2014

Rizka Khairani  NIM: 071012079

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DEDICATION PAGE

I dedicate this writing to my mother and father, Umi dan Ayah Fikriyati Hapsari and Adi Susilo The two most inspirational people in my life, And to my loveable yet annoying little brother and sister Ahmad Afifuddin and Salsabila Yasmin You are all my everything.  Always and forever.

Your proud daughter and sister.

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INSPIRATIONAL PAGE

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FOREWORD

Security has always been at the front and foremost of any political policies made by states. Although the concept of security has changed through time, the media to intercept and give the sense of security has mostly been dominated by the actions of the United Nations especially through the deployment of peace enforcement troops. Some states view that it should be the goal of all states to give this sense of security, especially to others less fortunate than some. Some states view this as a  power struggle to reassure their position in the global world through their role as contributor or leader of such troops. It is in these assumptions of altruims and alterego of states and their reasonings of peacekeeping deployment that the writer takes great curiosity. The great difference between the usual place of deployment and Haiti is also a great concern when writing this thesis. Of course, in writing this thesis, the writer could not have done it alone. This thesis is a special dedication towards the parents of the writers, who have, for the last 22 years have taken great care and patience when dealing with the writer. Through all the advice, through all the understanding, there really is no better set of parents that can truly help and lead the writer though life. To my little brother and sister, know that no matter what I do, I can only hope that I can be a good example for you. This also would not be complete without the help of Dra. Sartika Soesilowati, M.A, Ph.D, in supervising this thesis. Also for my first family in Surabaya, HITEN, you guys rawwk. Thank you for  being my trash can for when it feels like I would just give up in writing this thesis.

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My second family, DJAMBOELS, you guys truly have been there for me when I was  just down and wanted to thrown everything up. A special shout out to Elsa, my best friend, seems like we see each other everyday but we always manage to talk our ears off at night. Another shout out to Dije, Angga, Wede, Cesar, Adis, Vida, Tegar. Seems like those late night outings and venting helped me clear my head. You guys also helped me to find a new perspective when dealing with things. A huge hug is also necessary for my “Wrong Family” that makes me feel so right. Those 3 weeks together just truly made us a big family that is spread out across Indonesia: Ano, Adis, Acha, Oliv, Tegar, Papih Yos, Mamih Venty, Indra dan Yoyo. Thanks for always making me laugh, smile and giving support through this process, sometimes  people think I’ve gone insane becuase I laugh at my cellphone. But of course, without the guidance of Allah SWT, this thesis would truly be hard to complete. Last but not least, the writer knows that this thesis is far from perfect. There are many faults, mistakes and problems might be left unanswered but hopefully the little knowledge given through this writing would be beneficial for future writings to come.

Writer, RIZKA KHAIRANI E-mail: [email protected]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS COVER .....................................................................................................................................i TITLE ......................................................................................................................................ii PAGE OF APPROVAL ........................................................................................................ iii PAGE OF ENDORESEMENT ................................................................................... ..........iv NO PLAGIARISM STATEMENT PAGE ............................................................... ...........v DEDICATION PAGE  ................................................................................................. ..........vi MOTTO ........................................................................................................................ ........ vii FOREWORD................................................................................................................ ........viii TABLE OF CONTENTS  ............................................................................................ .........x ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. .........xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................. ..................... 1 I.1 Background ............................................. ........................................................ 1 I.2 Research Problem ......................................................................................... 9 I.3 Aim of Research ............................................................................................ 10 I.4 Theoretical Framework..................... ........................................................... .... 10 I.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention ................................................................ 10 I.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P).. ...................................................... 12 I.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation .............................................. 14 I.4.4 English School Theory of International Relations .......................... 16 1.5 Theoretical Synthesis ...................................................................................... 17 I.5 Hypothesis........................................................................................................19 I.6 Method of Analysis ...................................................................................... ...19 I.6.1 Concept Operationalization ............................................. ............. ..19 I.6.1.1 Human Security……………………………………….. .... ..19 I.6.1.2 Mandate of the UNSC ....................................................... ..22 I.6.1.3 Civil War ..............................................................................22 I.6.2 Research Approach ....................................................................... ...23 I.6.3 Scope of Research ............................................ ................. ............. ..24 I.6.4 Data Collection Technique ............................................................ ..24 I.6.5 Data Analysis Technique……………………………………….. .. ..24 I.6.6 Research Overview……………………………………………. .... ..25

CHAPTER II LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI …………………………………………….. ............ 26 II.1 United Nations Charter as the source of International Law in intervention ..................... .............................................. ..................................... 26 II.2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter …………………………………………. 29 II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Opearation ................................................30

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II.2.2MINUSTAH as a Peacekeeping Operation ..................................... 33

CHAPTER III MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF MINUSTAH IN HAITI .. .. 37 III.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before MINUSTAH ……………… 37 III.2 Conflict Escalation of Haiti .............. ................................................ ....... .....47

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PROCESS OF UNSC RESOLUTION 1542  ..49 IV.1 Interest of Powers in the UNSC ........... ..................................................... ... 49 IV.1.1 Power of the P5 members in the UNSC ...........................................49 IV.1.2 Middle Power in the UNSC ..............................................................51 IV.2 Mission in Haiti before MINUSTAH ................ ........................................ ..53 IV.3 Statements by UNSC members in meetings .................................................54 IV.4 Significant actors in the making of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2004 ........61 IV.4.1 Brazil’s interest in MINUSTAH .....................................................62 IV.4.2 United States’ interest in MINUSTAH ...........................................63

BAB V CONCLUSION  .................................... .............................................. .. 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY  ...................................................................................................xiii ATTACHMENT Attachment 1Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya.............................………..............xxv Attachment 2United Nation Charter ......…………………………………………….....xxxiii Attachment 3Resolution 1542 (2004) on Haiti ..........................................................liii Attachment 4 Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 4917th meeting of the Security Council ..............................................................................lvi

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The Peacekeeping Deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti in 2004 ABSTRACT

United Nation’s role of deploying peace enforcement troops in the world is critically important in maintaining international peace and stability. Whether or not a conflict is regarded as an emergency and be given mandate of peacekeeping has a lot of determining factors. This can be analyzed through the legitimacy in terms of the moral justification, the legality and the political process. The long and rigorous  process in authorizing a peacekeeping operation has also been seen as a playing arena for other states to put their interest at play. Between 1993 and 2001, six different United Nations Peacekeeping Missions were deployed to Haiti but each was then  pulled back with an urgency to exit rapidly. It was only from 2004, that the international community through the resolution of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), legalized resolution number 1542 from the UNSC as a long-term commitment in order to secure the future of Haiti. The lack of history of a civil war or any peace settlements to observe or implement are some of the differences between MINUSTAH and other peacekeeping forces in the world. Haiti’s domestic problem is a multidimensional in terms that it is caused by social-economic disparity and its lack of institutional stability thus supporting violence in the slum areas of the capital to develop. This research aims to analyze the reasoning, from the legality, moral  justification and the political process from the UNSC in the deployment of the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti. In giving the example, the writer will also attempt to analyze the political process through one non-permanent member of the UNSC, Brazil and one permanent member of the UNSC, and also the United States. This research uses the descriptive approach in describing the factors contributing to the deployment with the results being the UN Charter as a whole has articles that trumps others making the notion of sovereignty and peaceful means as conflict resolution absolete. The moral justification and domestic problems were deemed as being eligable to be intervened becuase MINUSTAH is a fourth geeneration peacekeeping and the political process of the deployment showing a large political interest of the contirbutors. Keywords : Peacekeeping, Haiti, Responsibility to protect, conflict.

MINUSTAH,

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Humanitarian

Intervention,

Chapter I Introduction I.1 Background

The United Nation (UN), responds to different conflicts and crisis arising in the world in different manners. Some are deemed dangerous enough and deserve a  peace enforcement troops whilst others are seen by the UN as being small enough to be handled by the host state itself thus desiring no intervention. The reason of deployment therefore can be varied depending on the situation and context and the deciding actors. Political interest in peacekeeping that can be seen later on in the  political process of the making of the mandate,gives meaning and values to humanitarian crises, making a definition of what is worthy enough to be deployed a peacekeeping troops or not. One example of the veto power of the deciding powerbetween the  permanent 5 members (P5) of the Security Council, is the case of the deployment of troops under NATO in Libya, under the UNSC Resolution number 1973 1 established in 2011 stating the No-Fly-Zone in Libya, and the lack thereof in the humanitarian crisis in Syria. This is especially strange since the situations of both countries in regards to its humanitarian crisis and the government’s respon se

to

 protesters are greatly similar. Both Syria and Libya seems to have similar causes and effects and which both government thoroughly push and oppress the demonstration done by the civilians resulting in many lives lost. Civil uprising 1

 –   United Nations, UN Resolution 1973 (2011) Nato, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf  accessed on 1st May 2014

and mass protests were spreading everywhere, but the interesting thing is how  both cases do not receive the same treatment in terms of humanitarian intervention mandated by the UN. In response to Gaddafi’s ruthless oppression of his own

 people, the UN passed the resolution that gives the mandate for military involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO began its military attacks against Gaddafi forces with the objective of protecting civilians in Libya. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon held up the historic Resolution number 1973 by stating that the justification for the use of force in Libya was  based on humanitarian grounds. 2 Syria on the other hand, has had no international intervention made against the al-Assad regime. The humanitarian crisis in Syria, although receiving similar condemnation from the international community has not passed the UNSC decision making process due to the veto of both Russia and China. They claimed that the Syrian crisis did not meet the definition of a threat to global peace and security. The reasoning, according to opponents, was the lack of  prioritizing on the part of the UNSC to set up a dialogue with the Syrian government, as well as concerns over previous implementation of the UNSC resolution in Libya. 3 The Charter of the UN4, especially Article 24 of the Charter states how  peacekeeping is the deployment of troops into a host state that has violated humanitarian rights of its citizens, endorsed by the mandate from the UNSC to help the parties to a conflict to resolve a conflict peacefully. The presence of these 2

UN News Center. Libya: Ban welcomes Security Council authorization of measures to  protect civilians,2011,http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&Cr=libya&Cr1. Accessed on 20th March 2014. 3   Luis Peral, R2P in Syria  —   How to Surmount the Inaction of the UN Security Council?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 4 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice,San Franciso, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed at 14 March 2014

 people, soldiers, military observers or civilian police, encourage warring parties not to use arms but rather keep negotiating for peaceful settlement of disputes. International intervention is thus deemed as being legitimate if they were deployed for the sake of saving lives in humanitarian crisis. The Security Council has 15 members. The United Nations Charter designates five States as permanent members and the General Assembly elects 10 other members for two-year terms. Besides having the 5 permanent members in the UNSC, the council also have 10 other non-permanent members with the duration of 2 years in the council. The 10 members are chosen in the goal of having regional balance and some are middle powers. In order for a resolution to  pass, it has to be agreed by the 5 permanent members of the UNSC, and at a minimal agreement by 4 of the 10 non-permanent members, thus all in all it has to  be agreed upon by 9 of the UNSC members. 5 The post-Cold War era has resulted in the increasing number of the conduct of belligerent non-governmental actors within a state, most likely in the form of intra-state war and domestic civil war. It is in conditions of internal chaos that these actors flourish. Intra-state conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes constitutes as threats to international peace and security and is one of the major sources of instability throughout a region. The end of the cold war also meant that the UN Security Council, once paralyzed by US and USSR vetoes, was finally able to make intervention policies once it can be seen that the two superpowers were not polarized anymore. This led to the concept of the Responsibility to

5

 Christian Stock, New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping. University Erlangen Nürnberg, 2011.

Protect (R2P), established in 2001, which asserts that if a state is failing to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures are not working, the international community has the responsibility to intervene: first diplomatically, then more coercively, and as a last resort with military force.

6

Unlike in the Cold War era, where the main goal of the peacekeepers would be to resolves disputes and conflicts between states, the post-Cold-War not only forces the peacekeepers to have the role of traditional peacekeeping but also assist in the rebuilding of the civil infrastructure, administer humanitarian aid and supervise elections and ensure fair and peaceful transitions of power, like in the case of the peacekeeping troops in Haiti, Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH) or in English : UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

Picture I.1: Map of Haiti

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7

 James D Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75 7 http://blog.education.nationalgeographic.com/ accessed on 3 January 2014

Haiti, a country locating in Central America, ever since the early years of its independence has been on an instable state, from economic, political, social sector and has become the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the highest levels of income inequality. 8 Even though, the problems are domestic, these intrastate conflicts are not just dangerous in its domestic realms itself but also be in danger of disrupting other national interest of neighboring states like economic activities, in terms of companies, traders and investors. It can also cause huge migration flows, as Haiti's borders are near the US and other American states, it may create instability. The combination of poverty and violence has resulted in waves of refugees fleeing the country and large numbers of internal displacements. For example, following the 1991 coup in which 1,500 died, 40,000 fled the country and 20,000 to 30,000 fled the capital. 9There may also be a strong  possibility that these conflicts create border instabilities and in international  politics, diverting governments from constructive cooperation in the region and internationally. International interventions started in Haiti in 1990, after the coup of Aristidewhere Haiti has requested the UN to observe the presidential election, the result of this election was the appointment Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the head of state.10 This did not last long as the 1991 coup headed by General Cédras ended the democratic rule. After some diplomatic arrangements, in 1993, General Cédras agreed that Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October. The United

8

 Library of Congress  –  Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Haiti, 2006. Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002. 9

10

Morris, J. ‘Force and Democracy: UN/US Intervention in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping,

2(3): (1995): 391-412.

 Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), led by the US, was established to assist in modernizing the armed forces and in creating a new police force. After the mandate ended, the UNMIH took over in 1995 to assist the Government in maintaining the secure and stable environment established by the force, and to help create a national civil police force. In June 1996, UNMIH was replaced in its functions by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which was followed by other operations like the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) in July 1997 the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in November 1997 and the Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March 2000 and terminated in 2001. In 2004, escalating violence came to a head, with armed gangs and former police and soldiers taking the town of Gonaïves.As a result, then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide left the country, a UN-sanctioned Multinational Interim Force was deployed (succeeded on 1 June 2004 by MINUSTAH), and a transitional government was installed. 11 One of the most important distinctions is the fact that Haiti is not a war zone. There is not a situation like in Darfur or in Somalia where there is constant fighting and a lack of a government, resulting in gross act of violation of humanitarian right. Haiti’s instability stem from the many small neighborhood gangs and there is not a usual post-conflict agreement to supervise and control. What is happening in Haiti is a series of fighting between gangs and supporters from the government clam oring for political power. Haiti’s other sources of insecurity are related to its low economic development which in turns causes state 11

Damrosch, L. F. (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Council on Foreign Relations Press: New York,(1993):1 – 27

led forces including the Haiti National Police (HNP) to not function maximally, and Haiti’s lack of political institution that

can causes anarchy of power to thrive

in society.12The parties at conflict in Haiti are the various urban gangs and armed “political” groups operating in the capital and other cities. Some urban gangs are

mainly political in nature fighting in support of various powerful individuals or factions while some are criminal organizations engaged in inter-gang fighting, clashes with the HNP and MINUSTAH and at times partake in politically-related fighting out of personal gain. 13Haiti does indeed have its problems, but it can be seen as a domesticlingering political and governance crisis which results degradation of the economy and the safety of the society. The origins of the crisis go back to the troubled past of Haiti that was filled with dictatorship history and coups. Ordinarily UN peacekeeping missions get deployed in a post conflict or a conflict situation. Haiti cannot really be described as either. 14 According to the UN Peacekeeping Year in Review 2013, the total number of troops that are stationed in Haiti is 12.5% (12,552 troops out of 99,329  peacekeeping troops across the World), which makes it the third largest  peacekeeping troops in terms of size worldwide after Darfur and Sudan 15. This is interesting considering that it only has an area of just 27,750 sq km (which is slightly smaller than Maryland). Violence and murder rates of the population, as one of the considerations when deploying PKO, are also particular low in Haiti in 12

  Lopez-Claros, A. 2007. The humanitarian response index 2007. Palgrave MacMillan: New York. 13 Spoiling Security in Haiti: LatinAmerica/Caribbean Report No. 13, International Crisis Group, May 31, 2005 14

 Human Security Report, Oxford University Press, 2005. MINUSTAH by the Numbers, Center for Economic and Policy Research http://hcvanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/12/12/minustah-by-the-numbers-haiti-occupied-by-thirdlargest-un-peacekeeping-contingent-in-the-world-and-it-is-not-even-a-war-zone/ accessed on 2 January 2014 15

comparison with other neighboring states. Haiti's homicide rate in 2003 was 6.9  per 100,000 people. That compares to Jamaica at 52, Trinidad at 35, and the Bahamas at 28 and Brazil at 23. The rate for the U.S. colonies of Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands (2007 statistics) is 26 and 39, respectively 16. In no other country has the UN made so many efforts to keep peace. Throughout the 1990s, 5  peacekeeping operations were deployed to Haiti. 17 A peacekeeping operation (PKO) on the other hand has to go through a few considerations before they can be agreed upon and deployed to the host country. It has to be able to claim legal justification and moral legitimacy for humanitarian intervention from the international community. 18 Legal justification can be seen through the analysis of the international law regarding humanitarian intervention, especially in the UN Charter whilst moral legitimacy is seen to be fulfilled when genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing occurs. 19The question of the reasoning of deployment then comes to mind when addressing MINUSTAH. It is worth noting that in the political  process, we not only analyze the states of the permanent 5 but also the other states that have a significant role in the deployment of the PKO. In this case the writer  believe that Brazil is a good example of how political interest might be a variable since Brazil is the leader and one of the biggest contributor of troops to MINUSTAH With more than 2,000 troops Brazil also constitutes the largest 16

2003 Global Study on Homicide by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODP).  Malone, D. Decision Making in the UN Security Council. The Case of Haiti. 1990 -1997, 1998. 18 Holzgrefe, J. L. and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 19 UN Document A/59/2005, United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedomaccessed on 3 March 2014 17

troop contributor to MINUSTAH. Aside from that, the writer will also analyze the dynamic inside the permanent 5 members of the UNSC whilst making the mandate of MINUSTAH. 1.2 Research Problem

Based on the brief background above, Haiti has therefore not fulfilled the normal criteria for a state to be intervened but on the other hand was deployed a large number of troops, thus the main problem of this research is, what is the reasoning of the United Nation Security Council to intervene in Haiti? 1.3 Aim of Research

This thesis seeks to pinpoint and analyzethe reasoning of deployment that correlates to MINUSTAH’s intervention

in Haiti, from legality, moral

 justification and the political interest of some states in MINUSAH, from some of the most significant actors in thenon-permanent member and the dynamics of the  permanent 5 members in making this mandate for MINUSTAH in 2004. 1.4 Theoretical Framework

To analyze reasoning behind the reasoning of the deployment of the humanitarian interventionof MINUSTAH in Haiti, the writer will analyze the legality through the articles in the UN Charter, the moral justificationthrough the means of pinpointing the particular stage of conflict escalation in the domestic scale of Haiti and the political process that coincides with the political interest of the members of the UNSC in 2004 using the theories below: 1.4.1 Humanitarian Intervention

The UN in upholding its responsibility of protecting international actors not only has a responsibility towards state actors, but also non-state actors,  particularity individuals. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes individualsat the center of protection and are provided internationallegal protection. This responsibility falls first and foremost into the hands of the states, but occurrences may occur when a state is well beyond is capabilities to ensure peace and security towards its citizen. Although sovereignty is at the upmost center of international relations, when a state flagrantly violated human rights throughgenocide or ethnic cleansing, there is a need to stop those things, it is during those times that some kind of intervention is thus needed and is deemed legitimate. Humanitarian intervention is thus the justifiable use of force across state  borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. 20 Other than those internal factors of the potentially-intervened states, in order for an international intervention to take place there are a few criteria that need to be fulfilled before external actors are deployed. They are: “a legitimate

authority has to conduct the war, usually sanctioned by the UN, force has to be the last resort and has to be proportional to the injuries and crimes perpetrated, 20

Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention.

intervention should be in the intention to make things better for the civilians, the interveners has to assume the responsibility for the welfare of the people and for establishing peace and have to end the intervention after completing their humanitarian mission ther e has to be an exit strategy.” 21It is basically the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity that recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity. 22 Humanitarian intervention is thus an activity taken by a state, or other actor, which interferes in the domestic affairs of another state for moral reasons concerning human rights. 1.4.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The Concept of Responsibility to Protect has a wide variety of definitions, From the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the High-Level Panel report, the Report of the Secretary-General, and the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit 23, the writer adopts the conclusion by Carsten Stahn in stating that the most comprehensive definition can  be taken from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS shifted the focus from “the right to intervene” to “the responsibility to protect”. Here, R2P views that the “responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from the

 point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention; secondly, the responsibility to 21

  Anthony Oberschall, Conflict and Peace Building in Divided societies: Responses to ethnic Violence. Routledge: Oxon, 2007. 22  Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 1993. 23

CarstenStahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? The American Journal of International Law, Vol.101.No.1, 2007.

 protect acknowledges that the primary responsibility rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility , or is itself the perpetrator, that it  becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place; thirdly, the responsibility to protect means not just the “responsibility to react ”, but the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild ”as well”24.

From the quote above most can agree that the responsibility to protect the sole responsibility to protect its people lie on the host state and only when a state is unable to protect the right of life of its citizen then can external forces be allowed to come. The responsibilities of the forces does not only finish at getting the parties in conflict in agreement but also getting the parties to stop potential conflicts and also the rebuilding of the infrastructures and human capital that might have been lost in the conflict process. Morally, R2P can only be applied when A state has done 4 humanitarian crimes, there are “four R2P crimes,” genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

25

Here, the

military intervention is the last resorttobetaken by the international world. This concept emerged in 1996, which assumes that the international community should have the right to intervene when a state cannot fulfill and give the people its essential needs. A state’s responsibility towards its peo ple. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released a key report entitled “The Responsibility to Protect,” affirms that the international

community, through the legitimacy of UNSC, has the right to intervene militarily

24

  Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect, December 2001. 25 the World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United  Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

when a population is suffering from serious harm due to insurgency or to state failure. 26 R2P is basically the idea that a state should protect its citizens from mass atrocities. ‘State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill’27  and

when that state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the responsibility  becomes that

of

others

--neighboring countries

or

the

international

community, not excluding use of force in extreme cases 28. For international organizations such as the UN, R2P means 'the responsibility to warn, to generate

effective

prevention strategies, and when necessary to mobilize

effective reaction' 29. R2P therefore suggests interplay and an attempt to include all actors who are willing and able to prevent a situation to become grave and destabilize a whole region from happening again. Whether or not to send a  peacekeeping mission is decided in the arena of international politics, and in the case of UN missions in the UN Security Council, where the mandate is designed and discussed 30. This norm can be analyzed in this research paper on whether it really is within the responsibility of the international community in contributing the  peacekeeping force in Haiti that the international community claim is committing mass atrocities and other severe acts of humanities towards its people. This 26

  International Development Research Centre, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,: The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, 2001. 27 Evans,G. The responsibility to protect, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5667&l=1&m=1accessed on 28 December 2013 28  Weiss, T. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007. 29 International Crisi Group, The Responsibility to Protect, 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1&gclid=CKzontWbzJYCFQ86EAo dUDPxwQ Accessed on 28 December 2013 30 Pouligny, Peace operations seen from below: UN missions and local people, C. Hurst & Co: London, 2006.

 perspective can also be used in this research as a tool to analyze the compatibility of the deployment of MINUSTAH to Haiti in 2004. 1.4.3 Peacekeeping and Conflict Escalation

The United Nation itself never clearly states peacekeeping in its charter  but the definition offered by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) seems the most appropriate: “peace -keeping

operation; PKO

[noncombat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement].”31

Picture I.2: The position of Peacekeeping in the escalation of conflict 32

31

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014 32 http://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=51314

Operations.

The difference between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding thus depends on the position of the conflict at hand in each country. Although the three task of peace troops cannot be clearly separated because it is synergized and integrated into 1 cycle, there are clear mandates for each peacemaking,  peacekeeping and peacebuilding troops at hand. Peacemaking refers to the efforts to bring hostile parties to agreementby peaceful means, through diplomatic negotiations and with their consent.Peace making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. 33 Whilst peacekeeping is in the fear that domestic situation could threaten peace and international security. Peacekeeping is a noncombat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement. It is done when conflict has broken out and the UN intervenes to assist in keeping  peace.34 The third stage is peacebuilding which occurs after both a ceasefire and a  political settlement have been reached. Includes building institutions of governance, building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule of law Includes improving respect for human rights through the monitoring of, education on, and investigation of past and existing abuses and providing technical assistance for democratic transition. 35Peacebuilding on the other hand is a political process requiring ongoing political mediation, the strengthening of national capacities at several levels for conflict management, and sensitivity to the 33

Lindenmayer, Elisabet & Kaye, Josie Lianna, A Choice for Peace?: The Story of Forty-one days of Meditation in Kenya, 2009. 34 United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations Training. UN Peacekeeping Training Manual. Nd 35 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (March 3, 1993).

 political, historical, economic and cultural context and dynamics. 36  It entails a range of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and reducing the risk of relapse into conflict.37  Since this research will be mainly focused on the  peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Haiti, it is worth noting that indeed  peacekeeping troops will be mainly deployed in the event that there has been a truce between warring parties which is mainly done after a certain civil war or internal conflict has finished. 38 The conflict escalation process in this case will be used in determining the situation and what kind of stage in the conflict escalation that entails the PKO to take action in that specific country. 1.4.4 English School of International Relations

The English School theory was established in the 1960s and 1970s with Martin Wight and Hedley Bull being some of the most prominent writers. The English School examines the emergence, character, and effects of international society, particularly its importance to world order. 39 In Wights words, the English School has its origins of the rationalist conception of international society. This conception was the middle bridge  between the realism doctrine and revolutionism doctrine. Relism states that states  –   especially

the great powers  –   are always in a competition for power which

makes everyday society provide for their own security. Revolutionism on the 36

Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, ¶ 13, www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/. Accesed on 29 December 2013 37   United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/accessedon 3 January 2014 38 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 39   Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: MacMillan. Palgrave MacMillan. 1977

other hand refers the belief that humanity has the capacity to move beyond geopolitics to a condition in which all communities can co-exist amicably without the threat or use of force. Rationalism, according to Wight, rejects both  perspectives while recognising that they have their respective strengths and have left a distinctive mark on world politics. “The essence of the doctrine is that states may never succeed in eliminating war but they have reached important agreements about how to control the use of force. States are not condemned to compete for power and security; indeed, they form a society that preserves a remarkably high level of order in the context of anarch. Political communities have mitigated the effects of that struggle by agreeing on principles that provide some measure of security for the parties involved. But achievements in that domain are always precarious and they are un likely to survive indefinitely.” 40 English School therefore uses rationalism as the media that rejects the optimism of revolutionism and the pessimism of realism and occupying the middle ground  between them. 1.5 Theoretical Synthesis

Based on the proposed theories above, it can be assumed that MINUSTAH is considered to be a peacekeeping operation and thus falls under the law of and the legal process of peacekeeping. The English School Theory of International Relations explains how the law and regulations are able to control states when implementing their foreign policies. The middle ground between the vying  powerful states and the altruistic reasoning for policies are the main brunt of the 40

Wight, M., International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1991.

theory and will be used throughout this thesis. The application of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect goes hand in hand when a state justifies its actions of intervention into another state and thus the criteria used in determining the deployment can be used in terms of its legality and moral  justification. The theory of peacekeeping itself is common when determining what kind of generation and mandates is to be applied into a specific peace keeping operation mission. A specific mission may have different terms and mandates according to its generation.

Picture I.3: Theoretical Thinking of the writer

I.6 Hypothesis

Based on the above explanation and proposed use of theory, it is that in some events of the deployment of peacekeeping, there are more than just liberalistic and altruistic (for the greater good of the international stability) views of its deployment, rather some sort of national interest are existent and are influencing in the development and mechanism of MINUSTAH. If we are to look into the legality of the situation, the United Nations Charter as the main source of international law in regards to the deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti would see that the peacekeeping intervention is based on the Chapter VII of the Charter. Even though the Charter of the UN states that intervention into another state is very much frowned upon in the international world, there would come a time when humanitarian crisis and other violations of human right is deemed as a justification of intervention. The basic assumption of non-intervention of a state into another state thus not rigid, there are other articles in the charter that would trump another article. If we are to look into the moral justification of Haiti before 2004, even though that Haiti is not a typical situation in which an intervention is deemed necessary, there is a unique situation in Haiti. This uniqueness may stem from that fact of how MINUSTAH is different in terms of its mandates and its generation of  peacekeeping. Another hypothesis in the deployment of MINUSTAH if we are too analyze the political process of the situation would suggest that the moral  justification of a states, in this case Haiti, is not solely for thesole purpose of

humanitarian. The writer suspects that there are other political interests at stake, whether they are the non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time or one of the permanent 5 members in 2004 at the time of the MINUSTAH deployment. I.7Method of Analysis I.7.1 Concept Operationalization I.7.1.1Human security

The changing nature of the international world has made some significant changes in the concept of security ashas been stipulated by the UNSC. Before the Cold War, a threat to the international world might only be seen through the reflection of inter-state wars, but now Council has broadened its concept of security and with it the issues that are deemed to be threats to international peace andsecurity. It is now more common for the UNSC to declare armed intra-state conflict as threats to international peace and security under Article 39. 41 The concept of Human security  puts the fulfillment of individual’s right at the center of its goal but,does not undermine the role that state plays in its part, thus is inseparable from the state. Human security means the security of such chronic threats as from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns and repressions. Although the definition of repression itself is in some ways clouded by many perspectives, ultimately it is some sort of situation where a state prevents its citizens from enjoying all human rights. In this sense, the basic goal of any outside actions done 41

 UN Charter Chapter VII article 39

from something other than that respective state itself, it has to have the goal of ensuring human security towards the citizen of that state 42. Human security is also  based on a multi-sectorial understanding of insecurities. Therefore, human security entails a broadened understanding of threats and includes causes of insecurity relating for instance to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Thus in essence, human security aims on giving human a state of peace of mind in all sectors of their life. Individuals can attempt to secure themselves, but when it comes to matters of national security, border invasion, and loss of territory only states have the capacity and the authority to provide crucial  protection. 1.7.1.2Mandate of United Nation Security Council

A mandate is a result of a series of negotiation and compromises between relevant actors, in the case of a peacekeeping mandate, the members of the Security Council, regional bodies and other actors have put their most basic interests into the mandate. A mandate is therefore the basic benchmark that allows for one party to determine whether the peacekeeping operation (PKO) is of success or failure, usually if there are changes in the future years, it can be seen that the previous mandate has not achieved its maximal target or that the domestic situation at hand has changed considerably. Due to its significant role, it is thus necessary to look at how the goals of the mission are formulated.

42

Jorge Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, Second Edition, Ottawa: IDRC Books, 1999

Failed mandates can be the cause of points in the articles in the mandates  being too vague.43  Several actors might have different perspective on that goal depending on their interpretations, as what happened in UNOSOM mandate in Somalia (1993-1995). It is hence extremely important to not only state the need for a mission, but also clear limitations and goals.

44

1.7.1.3 Civil War

In defining the definition, the writer draws upon the definition from Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 paper which states that a civil war is : “(1) fighting

 between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on  both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). 45 It can also be called to have a characteristic of havinghumanitarian suffering on an enormous scale, numerous armed factions, collapse of the civil infrastructure, absence of governance and a legal system, absence of individual security, possibility of ethnic cleansing and genocide, large numbers of displaced civilians and refugees and unchallenged criminal activities in the host nation.46After the 1994 IASC conference working paper, another term was coined in favor of conflict zone and that is complex emergencies. 47Because these 43 44

Jett, Dennis C. 1999 Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

  D. JChristie, R. VWagner, & D. A. Winter, (Eds.). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 2001. 45 Fearon andLaitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American 46  MaryKaldor, New and Old Wars, Organized violence in a Global Era. Polity Press,1999. 47

AlexSchmid, “Thesaurus and glossary for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms.”

Fewer And Ramsbotham and Woodhouse. (1998): 46

symptoms are so multidimensional, it will not only take one part of an international organization, mainly the UN, to solve this crises but several different areas and. A complex emergency is therefore is not just ahumanitarian or a military problem, its containment requires more than the individual capability of a single element of the response. I.7.2 Research Approach

The approach of the research used will be the descriptive approach. In this sense, the writer will attempt to describe and explain the relation between the factors, in this how the variables of the Legality of the International law, the moral  justification in terms of domestic situation in Haiti and the political process in the making of the mandate. I.7.3 Scope of Research

For the purposes of this paper, peacekeeping operations will refer to those operations that are defined as such by the UN organization, in  particularlyMINUSTAH. In explaining the historical situation in Haiti, the writer will talk about the situation after the last PKO beforeMINUSTAH took over (before 2004). I.7.4 Data Collection Techniques

Data collecting according to Neuman can be defined into two types, quantative data collecting and qualitative data collecting. Quantative data collection will mostly use tools like, survey, and questionnaire and other things that will result in a number that will be used in the research. Whilst qualitative data colleting stresses on the importance of interpretation through interviews,

observation, focus discussion groups and literature study. In this case, the writer will use qualitative data collecting, and due to the lack of resources and means to go to Haiti and see first-hand interviews and observation, data collecting will consists of mainly literature review,through books, printed media, and credible online media. I.7.5 Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis technique is grouped into qualitative and quantitative technique. Qualitative technique is the process of putting data coming from interviews, field observation and other literature data, systematically. According to Miles and Huberman, the activity of qualitative technique includes data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/ verification.

48

 In this thesis. The

writer uses the technique of qualitative. I.6.6 Research Overview Chapter II

Provide the legal background of the intervention in Haiti and how it has catapulted the deployment of MINUSTAH, particularly from the international laws from the UN Charter.

Chapter III

Explain the legitimacy and moral justification of the intervention of MINUSTAH in Haiti by analyzing its social and domestic  problems.

48

SingarimbunIrawati,PemanfaatanPerpustakaan. (1995): 311

MetodePenelitianSurvei.

Jakarta: LP3ES

Chapter IV

Explain the relation of the political process and moral justification of the MINUSTAH deployment with the national interest that is at stake with some of the members of the UNSC in 2004.

Chapter V

Concludes the research and pinpoints the factors contributing to deployment of MINUSTAH.

Chapter II Legal Background of Humanitarian Intervention of MINUSTAH

The explanations in this chapter provides the correlations of the concept of humanitarian intervention, the concept of responsibility to protect and  peacekeeping deployment in the events of domestic crisis that are deemed by the UNSC as being a threat to international peace. The UN Charter, as the main source of legal coding in defining the actions of the UN is used by the writer to explain the legal justification in the deployment of MINUSTAH. II.1 United Nations Charter as the main Source of International Law in Humanitarian Intervention

The UN Charter 49 delegates to the Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 50  The

UN Charter itself

outlaws the use of force on the part of individual states, and it empowers the Security Council to make all decisions on collective measures that involve military force. Article 2(4) states that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The article stresses the prohibition of using force to intervene another state, also goes along with Article 2(3), which insists that UN members settle their interstate disputes by “peaceful means.” This is later reinforced in Article 2(7)

 prohibits the UN from intervening in domestic affairs of states while

49

UN Charter UN Charter

50

allowing for the “application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. 51 Even

though this article outlaws the right of states to use force, article 24, 39, 42 deliver the power to the Security Council. These sections of the Charter establish that the Council has the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 24) and that it can take what measures it deems necessary in

that pursuit, including military action against states or other threats (Article 24). 52 Whilst in article 51 in regards to self-defense and the right of the UNSC to impose coercive measures to maintain peace, according to article 39 and 42 of the UN Charter. It can be concluded therefore, that the UN may interfere in the domestic  problems of a state if the establishment of the mission is based under Chapter VII.53 One of the body that has a lot of authoritative in realizing the goals is the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). The decision in the UNSC has a high global significance. According to the UN Charter 54, the Council acts on  behalf of all member states and its decisions are binding on all member states and to some

extent,

non-members. UNSC in this case can issue

recommendations to disputing parties, recommendations to the General Assembly as well as make mandatory decisions. It is in the council also that the power to determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security are very much in the hands of the UNSC. The UNSC has many roles to be played by the member states. 51

 UN Charter  Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, ‘‘The Responsibility to Protect,’’ Foreign Affairs 81 , no. 6 ( 2002 ), (2002): 99 –  110 . 52 53

This chapter states the UN’s powers to preserve international peace and security, and the

measures that it can take to maintain it. 54  UN Charter

Authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposes is one of the important functions that the UNSC has and does not want to lose, because it shows that the UN is capable of addressing significant issues regarding security of the international society. 55 The United Nations is established for the purpose of providing and maintaining of international peace and security, so authorization of the use of force is an important function of the UN for the fulfilling its main objective. One of the first thing that will be done in response to this international norm was to set down some specific parameters and circumstances in which international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency of the intervened. As stated in the  previous chapter, based on the World Summit High Level Meeting in 2005, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine should  be upheld when facing four crimes against humanity, and they are genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

56

 If those four things

were to happen then the responsibility to intervene and stop those humanitarian crimes would fall on international society generally and the Security Council in  particular. In deciding what constitutes threats to international peace and security, the concept of “security” is very crucial. Throughout the years, the definition of

international threat has also evolved. Now, the UN Security Council includes “civil war, intrastate conflicts and the possession of weapons of mass 55

Jennifer M.Welsh,“Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention,” in United Nations and Global

Security, ed. Richard Price. Gordonsville, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 56 World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005.

destruction and humanitarian crisis” into its interpretation of what constitutes

threats to international peace and security. 57 II. 2 Peacekeeping in the UN Charter

Commonly referred to as ‘Chapter VI-and-a-half’ activity, traditional

 peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter, ‘Pacific settlement of disputes’ and Chapter VII which provides for use of force

 by the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter resulted in the rise of the number of humanitarian interventions. The Security Council started to decide what constitutes a threat to international peace and security in a more flexible manner than during the Cold War. In Chapter VII of the UN Charter the limits to state sovereignty are recognized. These limits are at the points “at which the UN Security Council

determines a threat to

international peace and security under Chapter VII.” Article II (VII) which sets

down the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states also gives the limits to this principle: “This principle shall not  prejudice

the application of

enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

MINUSTAH was authorized under article 7 of the UN Charter. This article directly corresponds with article 41 and 42 which states that: “The Security Council may decide what measures not  involving

the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 57

 Welsh, Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention

relations58. Should the Security Council consider that measures  provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may  be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United  Nations.59” The article above basically states that although the council has the right to intervene in another state in crisis situations, military intervention should be the last resort and prioritizing other options first and foremost. Mandates given under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests that there is a possible need to not only address the problems in non-militaristic way but also address the  problems at hand in a military way to reduce the instability in Haiti. It combines assistance and the use of force owing due to its two roles as a peacekeeping and  peace enforcement mission and it also integrates many humanitarian actors, both military and civilian. II.2.1 History of Peacekeeping Operation

Based on Segal’s60 identification of peacekeeping evolutions, it can be seen

that throughout the years the basic concept of peacekeeping, like the situation and condition of the international world itself, has progressed. The first of these phases, labelled by Segal as “observer missions”, or “first

generation  peacekeeping”,61

is conducted between 1946 and 1955. These

operations are characterized by the unarmed and impartial observer deploying in small numbers to supervise a truce or monitor an armistice and the consent of the 58

 Article 41, Chapter 7 UN Charter  Article 42, Chapter 7 UN Charter

59 60

Segal, “The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures” Australian

International Law Journal ,(2000):182. 61   H McCoubrey, and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulations of United Nations Military Operations, 1996.

host country. In other words, the peacekeeping operations done at that time would have no action in a political level and were merely a passive tool. Phase two operations ran from 1956 to 1965 and saw a change from small, unarmed groups to the deployment of armed forces but the arms carried were strictly to be used in self-defense only but consent of the host country was still needed. The principles of consent and impartiality and prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense was also used. Phase three ran from 1966 to 1985 but saw a decline in the deployment of the peacekeeping forces due to the Cold War. Here it can be seen that these first generation peacekeeping troops were mainly deployed in a warring state.

62

The fourth phase of peacekeeping from 1985 to 1990 also known as the second generation peacekeeping, still relied upon consent of both the warring  parties. However, the operations were now not only focusing on subduing the military violence but also took time to focus with elements of nation building. Peacekeepers were also being used to implement and not merely monitor, comprehensive settlements. This phase saw the transitions of the peacekeeping troops as not only a passive tool, but taking on a more active role.

63

The advent of “third generation” peacekeeping, saw the consent of the state

 being diminished. It also represents a period of time, a loss of impartiality. This change was caused due to the fact that the nature of conflict in that time was different. Increasingly peacekeepers are inserted into internal armed conflicts rather than as a buffer between hostile States. Their missions are to disarm 62

 Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures  Segal, The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures

63

 belligerents, rebuild infrastructure, physically as well as organizationally, in addition to providing security and basic administration for the State. Some scholars even go as far as saying that ‘‘missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight’’ significantly improve the chances

of peacebuilding success whilst observer and

enforcement missions improve the chance for peace but of course not as significantly as integrated missions. 64 The most recent type of UN peacekeeping is represented by the UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. Unlike earlier experiences of the United Nations in governing a territory the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2002) and the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999-to date) were both established under chapter VII by the Security Council which meant that the Security Council has two forms of enforcement actions available to it. 65 According to article 41, actions not involving the use of armed force and according to article 42 military actions by air, sea and land forces. Article 42 serves as the legal basis for the military component of each administration but a closer analyses is required to see whether article 41 is the legal basis of the civilian component. 66 These kinds of missions have never been deployed in the history of United  Nations peacekeeping. In Kosovo and East-Timor, the UN took over the functions of a state due to the fragility of the state. The UN then began to exercise all legislative and executive powers of both territories. The administrations have been 64

  M.W. Doyle, VN peacekeeping in Cambodia, UNTAC's civil mandate,Boulder  –   London, 1995. 65 Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999 66 UN Charter Article 41 and 42

called by some new trusteeships, protectorate style forces or the fourth generation of peacekeeping 67. It can be seen that neither resolution 1244 in regard to UNMIK, nor resolution 1272 in connection with UNTAET, specified which article of the Charter authorized the Security Council to establish the missions. Based on the above description, the writer concludes that MINUSTAH is  part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by challenging goals and a complex mandates. These operations may be deployed without the consent of warring parties and seek to provide assistance and  protection to civilians, force hostile groups to abandon violence, and collaborate on

state

creation

and-or

reconstruction. Though it falls short of formally

exercising sovereignty, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH) has typical fourth-generation tasks. 68 II.2.2 MINUSTAH as a form of Peacekeeping Operation

MINUSTAH is considered to be a humanitarian intervention and is part of the responsibility to protect and is done through a mandate of the UNSC. Below is a diagram which shows the correlation of humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect and the deployment of MINUSTAH.

67

Multi-disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent UN Experience, 1999. Fishel, John T. & SAÉNZ, Andrés, eds. Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2007 68

Picture II: Relations of Peacekeeping with Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect.

Like previously stated, there are a few criteria in order for a mission to be considered legitimate to be deployed. Consent of the parties; Impartiality; No use of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. In terms of consent of the parties, here, the “official” government are defined by the United Nation  but no one really knows what are the parties involved, since Haiti has not declared any armed conflict beyond the political conflict between the ruling political class, the opposition and the masses which also intricate the problem of impartiality. MINUSTAH was established to support the transitional government of Haiti (TGOH) and the Haitian national police (HNP), recognized as the only legally

armed group in the country at the time. 69In the sense of impartiality, it is thus questionable since a mandate that only recognized TGOH and HNP, without recognizing any other party, can hardly be considered completely impartial. As for the consent of the parties although the president was nominated in accordance with the Haitian Constitution, the prime minister who at that time was responsible for running the government, was selected by a ‘Conseil des Sages’

(Council of the Wise) and imported from the Haitian diaspora. This process was considered illegitimate by part of the population, since, according to Haitian legislation, the prime minister should have been chosen by the president and approved by the parliament. 70 Haiti’s security challenges did not fit conventional approaches or doctrines

developed for international peace operations. Especially missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. UN missions in Haiti, including MINUSTAH, did not directly derive from an armed conflict between organized opposing forces. As identified by the Center of International Cooperation, in one of its latest papers on Haiti, “the most salient political violence of the past three decades has involved

not well-organized combat operations, but mobilization of crowds from among the millions of extremely poor, on short notice by murky political interests. Violent political activity often reflects intertwined criminal and political insecurity.”71

69

 Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.), Haiti’s Governance Challenges and the International Community. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation/Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2010. 70  Haitian Constitution 1987 71 Kjeksrud, Stian. "Using Force to Stabilize: Implications for the Integrated Mission in Haiti and Beyond" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and

The United Nation, in this case represented by MINUSTAH needs to realize the extent of its relationship with the Government and other related  political institutions of the State that has been collapsing for decades. In Haiti, this problem is readily apparent as acting government at that time and the absence national political will or capacity were mostly responsible for the withdrawal of previous the international missions. The pride of being the first nation to be independent by a slave rebellion made them distrustful of foreign interventions that were to take part. 72Haiti was neither at war nor in a typical postconflict situation. There was no need for peacekeeping forces to act as a buffer

 between two warring sides since the context in Haiti in 2004 was primarily one of social insecurity, gang warfare and violent crime.

Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, 2010, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p414339_index.htmlaccessed on 14 February 2014 72   Mani, Rama. Déjà vu or Something New? Lessons for Future Peacebuilding from Haiti in Sicherheit und Frieden, Security and Peace, vol 1/2006, Jan 2006. http://www.sicherheit-undfrieden.nomos.de/fileadmin/suf/doc/SuF_06_01.pdf accessed on 15 April 2014

Chapter III Moral Justification of MINUSTAH in Haiti

The domestic situation are one thing that really affects whether or not a  peacekeeping operation is deployed. The moral justification of MINUSTAH intervention Haiti is seen in how the domestic circumstances of Haiti are in correlations with the principles of the responsibilities to protect. 3.1 Socio-Historical Background of Haiti before the Peacekeeping in 2004

Haiti proclaimed its independence on January 1, 1804 making it the second nation in the Americas to gain independence and the first nation governed by the  people of African descent. The fact that the Haitians overthrew the French and got succeeded in fighting for their freedom would eventually affect in how the Haitians view the interventions in the future, it also shows how tied they feel to their roots in Africa. 73 Haiti is categorized as fragile, failing and failed in international humanitarian and development circles. 74 Foreign Policy magazine ranks 59 failed states against 12 indicators in its Failed State Index. Haiti ranks seventh worse among failed states just behind Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and Afghanistan. In 2012 in a composite measure of human wellbeing, Haiti ranked 161 worse off of 187 countries. No Latin American or Caribbean country fell into this ‘low development’ category. 75

73

Also the are a major indicator of

R. Muggah, ‘The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case’. In J. Welsh and N. Woods

(eds.) Exporting Good Governance. Chapter 8. Wilfred Laurier Press, Waterloo, 2008 74 Muggah, The perils of changing donor priorities: the Haiti case’ 75 The human development index (HDI). United Nation. UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2012

how well a country is governed. World Bank’s Worldwide Gover nance

Indicators reports six indexes compiled from composite scores derived from multiple sources. World Bank Governance Indicators Voice & accountability Political stability & absence of violence Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law Corruption controls Picture III.1:

Percentage of countries worse than Haiti 30% 20% 5% 20% 5% 8%

World Bank’s Worldwide

Governance Indicators (WGI) for1996-2011

Even though Haiti's economy in GDP increased during the 1970s, its economy declined by an annual average of 1.5 in the 1980s and by 3.2 in the 1990s and declined again from 2000 to 2003 by 2%, Haiti's GDP was also only US $346 in 2003, way below the average of US $3,273.

76In

the graphic

 below, it also maps out the HDI of Haiti, which is one of the closes measurement for poverty worldwide. Interestingly enough, the HDI has seen some improvement from 1995-2003. By 2005, Haiti was ranked 153rd out of 177 countries by the UNDP Human Development Index, the lowest ranking country in the Western hemisphere. Public services, such as health, sanitation and education, are extremely weak. 77

76

International Crisis Group. A New Chance for Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report  No10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels. 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-americacaribbean/haiti/010-a-new-chance-for-haiti.aspx accessed on 10 February 2014 77 The human development index (HDI). United Nation.

Picture III.2: GDP per capita and HDI trends in Haiti 1970-200478

The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Technology estimated that in 2001, 56 percent of the population was living on less than a dollar a day and 76 percent on less than US$2, which is the international standard for  poverty.The World Bank estimated that GNI per capita in 2005 was US$450. UNICEF estimated the 2005 under-five infant mortality rate at 120 per 1,000, as compared to 43 in Guatemala. 79 Amnesty International reports that the efforts of the UN and the Police Force of Haiti has mostly failed from curbing the violent crime in Haiti. It states that on average, 100 people were murdered in 2004 but not all were processed due to the corrupt and ineffective police and courts of Haiti. 80 Aside from that, Haiti itself has a large and organized crime network, some member of the former armed forces have joined together and formed armed brigades and claim that the

78

 UNDP report 2005, World Bank Report 2005 United Nations Development Programme. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis. New York. World Bank. Haiti Data Profile. Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/ external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=HTI accessed on 24 January 2014 80 Amnesty International Report 2005. 79

governmentowes them in ousting President Arisitde. Haiti is also a bridge for drug trafficking, especially into the U.S, officials in the US estimates that around 8% of the cocaine entering the US travels through Haiti. Based on Haiti’s

constitution, it guarantees the freedom of speech and

 press which the government generally respect, but in some cases,like during the second Aristide administration in 2000-2004, some members of the press were killed for supporting opposition movements. Although the governments does not censor radio, television or internet, it has so far in frequent times ignored the right to assembly and organize. 81 In the political sector, the governmental and political stability in the early years of its independence in the nineteenth century was not apparent. The constitution was never finalized and being treated as just a political game toy for most political candidates, economic stagnation was everywhere and social injustice was still apparent. The United States (US) seeing this violent instability, intervened militarily. Here, the US occupation set the political conditions that were in favor for the rise of the Duvaliers (‘Papa Doc’ and ‘Baby Doc’) –   who

ruled through a brutal dictatorship from 1957 through 1986. In ruling duration of Duvalier, like their predecessors, the Duvaliers used the power of the state to enrich themselves and repress the population. 82 The government’s preference towards the interests of the minority upper class caused the foreign aid coming into the country given to the rich instead of those in need and thus “devastated the

economy, destroyed tourism, drove out foreign investors and ruined rural 81

Library of Congress  –   Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Haiti. 2006. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf accessed on 15th February 2014 82 Library of Congress  –  Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Haiti.

 production”.83 It was not until the late 1980s that ‘economic disparities and  political corruption in Haiti reached ungovernable proportions,’ leading Baby Doc

to flee to France. 84 After Duvalier’s departure from presidency in 1986, there has bee n

an

endless political transition punctuated by several military coups, outbursts of violence and foreign military interventions. The UN’s engagement came in two

waves: from 1990 to 2004 and from 2004 onwards. Between 1990 and 2004, the UN was involved in a broad range of democracy promotion and state-building activities in Haiti, many involved the use of militaristic measures against many Haitian actors. 85 The United Nations first got involved in Haiti in 1990, with the cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS) in assisting in monitoring the elections that brought to power Jean-Bertrand Aristide in December 1990. Winning two-thirds of the vote, Aristide assumed office with an unprecedented mandate, attesting to the appeal of his platform of dramatic social change 86. His victory was partly due to the fact that he had the support of the group that had a nationalistic orientation, including merchant bourgeoisie, grassroots workers, peasants, and student organizations. Despite this popular appeal, Aristide’s domestic opponents were strong and most used any means to get in

83

CarrolFaubert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security, Case Study: Haiti, 2006, http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/thematic/conflict/Haiti.pdf accessed on 7 January 2014 84 Fuabert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security, Case Study: Haiti 85 Fuabert, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries, Human Security, Case Study: Haiti 86  Irwin Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

 power and his rule in Haiti was short-lived as he was forced to leave after a coup d’état on 30 September 1991 and installed General Raoul Cédras as dictator.

The 1991 military coup and the aftermath of the Duvalier dictatorship Haiti became the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the highest levels of income inequality. Approximately 76 per cent of Haitians lived in  poverty, and only 39 per cent had access to safe water. Less than half of the adult  population could read and write. Haitians began to flee the country in the thousands, many of them on makeshift rafts headed for the US. 87 The continuing  breakdown in law and order, the rising insurgency and conditions of sheer anarchy and chaos, as well as the worsening humanitarian crisis, causing displacement of the population and increasing numbers of refugees crossing the  border made the situation not just a domestic problem but also constitute as a threat to international peace and security. The international community roundly criticized the coup and its ensuing human rights violations. This prompted the United Nations, with the help of the Organization of American States (OAS) to intervene the domestic matters of Haiti. When the intervention failed, it called for a series of embargoes, but these ultimately hurt the innocent Haitian civilians. Looking at these failures, the United States perused a more militaristic option motivated primarily by concerns over Haitian refugees and drug trafficking.

88

The international instability that was created by the coup was regarded as a  potential international peace, and thus a mission UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 87

Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy. Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: the Promise of Deliberative Democracy.

88

legalized by Security Council Resolution 867 (1993) and established in Resolution 940 (1994) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was deployed in January 1995 with a mission of restoration of democracy, the establishment of a secure and stable environment and the restructuring of the security forces

89

.

During that time, there was already another international civilian mission in Haiti, UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MCVIH) which was already  present in Haiti since 1993 with the aim to assist the professionalization of the  police in order to increase their ability and capacity to maintain order. After the end of MICIVH mandate in 1996. Other missions following MCIVIH are the United Nations Support mission (UNSMIH) in 1996 with the aim of helping to maintain a secure and stable environment and promote institution-building. The United Nations Transition Mission (UNTMIH) in 1997 was also deployed to continue to professionalize the police force, and promote institution-building and national reconciliation.

Another mission was MIPONUH followed by an

International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March 2000; its mandate was to consolidate objectives reached by MIPONUH and MICIVIH, as well as to reinforce the effectiveness of the Haitian police and judiciary and  promote human rights but the mission was terminated in 2001. On 29 February 2004, UN

Security

Council adopted Resolution

1529 to authorize

a

Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to intervene in Haiti but was quickly replaced by MINUSTAH on June 2004.

90

These comings and goings of the missions were for a number of reasons, some left because their mandate was done and some left abruptly due to the 89

 Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti.

90

failures that they faced. For example, under UN auspices, democratic elections resulted in peaceful transition of leaders, but much of this progress was superficial, and did not do anything to reflect substantive change in the foundations of Haiti’s political system. Political and opposing parties behaved in

front of international auspices, but when these left, they once again struggled for  power. Also, UN forces and missions failed to implement most Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs effectively, which made  political opponents maintained ready access to arms. Finally, in the absence of meaningful reform of the police and other political institutions, public insecurity and human rights violations never completely vanished from the political landscape, undermining the foundations for the rule of law and democracy. The superficial nature of reform in Haiti became obvious in the 2000  presidential elections, in which Aristide and his Lavalas Party declared victory amidst accusations of fraud and voter intimidation. 91 According to the UN, voter turnout in these presidential and parliamentary elections was only 10 per cent, and the opposition opposed the results of the elections. After ineffective efforts to mediate the crisis, tensions between Aristide and his opponents mounted, culminating in violent protests between opposing parties in February of 2004. 92 In early 2004, after years of clashes between Aristide’s supporters and its

main political opponents, consisted of armed gangs, former soldiers and police,  broke out in the city of Gonaïves. The violence thus quickly spread across the country and the anti-Aristide militias soon closed in on Port-au-Prince and

91

Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Haiti.

92

threatened to march on the capital. This resulted in the action of the OAS to call upon the Security Council to take action to address the situation. On 29 February 2004, Aristide left Haiti for exile on a US aircraft. After arriving in the Central African Republic he later moved to Jamaica a few weeks later. Although several Caribbean leaders were angry at what some saw as Washington’s ‘kidnapping’ of

Aristide, an investigation to look into the events into the events leading to Aristide’s departure were never authorized and were blocked by the United States

and France. 93 On the same day the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1529, which authorized a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to intervene. This force were comprised of a nearly 3,000 strong multinational interim force composed of troops from the US (1,800), France (530), Chile (330) and Canada (150). On 30 April 2004, UN Security Council resolution 1542 established the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)  –  this UN mission replaced MIF on 1 June 2004. MINUSTAH includes more than 8,900 military personnel and 3,700 police from more than 40 countries. Alongside leading the mission, Brazil provides one of the largest contingents of forces, which numbers 1,200 troops. 94 Many of the soldiers were provided by states from within the region, especially Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina. Here, the UN adopted its first fully integrated peace-support operation in 2004 — MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH was established as a joint military and civilian mission with a mandate to help Haiti address a broad range of issues, including 93

Walter E. Kretchik, “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview.” in Capacity -Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz, eds. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007. 94

Kretchik, Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview

 peace and political stability, the re-establishment of the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and social and economic development 95. MINUSTAH embodies to some extent the assumptions held by UN member states that violence reduction and stability are precursors to restoring order, democratic governance and development. The United Nation Resolution 1542 96, highlighted the main function and duties of the MINUSTAH Peacekeepers. MINUSTAH’s first mandate stated that the mission should “assist the transitional

government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police….”

“assist

the

transitional

government

particularly the Haitian

 National Police with a comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme for all armed groups” and to “assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law…including t he

re-

establishment of the prison system”. 97

The parties in the past conflict that are still at odds today are the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), the attachés, their armed supporters, the Front Revolutionnaire

pour

l’Avancement

et

Progrès

en

Haiti

(FRAPH), a

 paramilitary organization who supported the army, the economic elite a majority of whom supported the military regime, and the mass population the vast majority supporting the return of Aristide . But as of right now, the significant number of violence in Haiti is not caused by the number of conflicts  between the political parties rather by the number of gang violence, but the absence of the rule of law reinforced a climate of impunity, and crimes such as 95

 U.N. 2004 Haiti Report

96

accessed on 20 November 2013  UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, 7, I, (b), (c), (d).

97

S/RES/142 (2004) www.minustah.org/pdfs/res/142en.pdf

kidnapping, robbery and rape increased. Armed gangs in the capital even become some sort of "protector" towards the people living in that area, in exchange for money. Aristide's supporters believe that he was kidnapped from the country, this revenge was done in the form of the kidnap of civilians. Several known human rights violators, including members of the former  paramilitary group the Front pour l’avancement et le progrèsd’Haïti (FRAPH),

were members of anti-Aristide groups, and human rights abuses, including killings and ill-treatment, were reported. 98 3.2 Conflict escalation of Haiti in Peacekeeping terms

Through this historical process, it has affected the Haitians in terms of its conception of class inequalities, racism, sexism, political violence, poverty and other social disparities. This has without a doubt shaped the perspective that some Haitians have chosen in regards of international intervention. "One should admit that history constitutes with the present, a continuum of experience and choices that were taken and that impact the current situation. History has a certain level of determinism in shaping the situation and characteristics of both the state and the Haitian society".99 Hence, the legitimacy factor of the intervention of MINUSTAH to Haiti is very much apparent. According to the 4 crimes of Responsibility to protect, an intervention is only legitimate genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity happens. Instability in Haiti is mostly caused by criminality that

98

 AI, Haiti: All armed groups must be disarmed. Samuel Martinez, “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in

99

Haiti and the Dominican Republic”. Latin America Research Review, 1999.

increases daily, the unrestricted movement of civilian and military weapons, street gangs and urban guerrillas, impunity and lack of judicial structures, numerous  prison escapes after the departure of M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the deportation to Haiti by the United States of criminals of Haitian origin, the silence of political leaders, the extreme poverty of the population, illiteracy and ignorance, the scarcity of business activities, the high level of unemployment and the HIV  pandemic. Haiti’s conflict in terms of

conflict escalation can be seen to be quite

ambiguous. Since there is not really a civil war, although conflicts and violence are experienced everyday by the society, thus there is no peace treaty implemented, it can neither be said to be in the definition of peacekeeping itself. If it were to be called peacemaking, the violence has in actual reality experienced the climax in the 2004 coup but since there is no peace treaty to be observed and implemented, the function of the peacekeepers as the keeper of peace treaties is not in actual works. On the other hand, it cannot be said to be at the stage of  peacebuilding either because there has not been a ceasefire nor a political settlement have been reached. This goes back to the previous conclusion by the writer in which MINUSTAH is a part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by challenging goals and a complex mandates.

Chapter IV Political Process of the Making of the MINUSTAH Mandate UNSC Resolution Number 1542

This chapter aims to explain the national interest that is apparent in the making of the mandate. This process is not only explained through the UNSC Meetings, but also the meetings and agreement beforehand. IV.1 Interest of Powers in the United Nation Security Council IV. 1.1 Permanent 5 members of the UNSC

The United Nation has 6 main bodies to fulfill its purposes. The main body that is responsible for the deployment of the Peacekeeping troops and thus the maintenance of international peace and security is the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC is made up of 15 nations, 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members elected every 10 years. The authority of the UNSC rests on the fact that it has the power to investigate, give recommendations to settle disputes, and enact mandates. Issues that endanger the stability of the global world are presented to the council by members and non-members of the UN. These issues are brought to the attention of the council after measures are taken to settle the dispute through a variety of peaceful means but were deemed

ineffective. This process enables the UNSC to enact mandates that are in full consent with the parties involved that may include the possibility of military force with the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The importance of the P5 lies in their permanent status and right to veto, which give them in- depth knowledge of the Security Council’s a ff airs, missions, and operating procedures, and enable close collaboration with other permanent and elected members. This power of course does not undermine the power of the non-permanent members of the UNSC because the no mandate will pass unless it has been agreed with all P5 members and at least 4 non-permanent members. The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States. The 10 non permanent members of the Council in 2004 were Algeria (2005), Angola (2004), Benin (2005), Brazil (2005), Chile (2004), Germany (2004), Romania (2005), Pakistan (2004), Philippines (2005) and Spain (2004). 100  The non-permanent members are elected for two-year terms by members of the UN General Assembly. The distribution of countries represented in the non-permanent members of the UNSC was to achieve a regional balance, with five Asian or African members, two Latin American members, one east European, and two members from Western Europe or other regions making up the mix of non permanent members. The decision making process for a peacekeeping force to be deployed is that it has to go through a majority of nine UNSC members, with a composition of 100

Martinez, Samuel.1999. “From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic”. Latin America Research Review.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/org1405.doc.htm accessed on 21 January 2014

5 permanent member of the UNSC and a minimal of 4 members of the non permanent members. It can be said however that real power resides with the P5, and their individual right of veto. As we saw, conflict between the P5 during the cold war made the UNSC moribund as an instrument for managing international security. Even after the cold war, the P5 remain states with great power interests and aspirations. Not all humanitarian crisis are given equal attention and help  because it cannot be denied that the politics and interest of the P5 play a great role in the deployment of the peacekeeping force in the world. When a particular humanitarian crisis is associated with a certain P5 member (or members), other states may withhold their support or even threaten to veto the decision to deploy, unless of course some kind of support is promised in exchange for their interests elsewhere in the world. 101 In the UNSC, draft resolutions are made by one or more members of the UNSC and circulated privately to the others. If it were to be changed, it would have to go through a process called consultations and after it is agreed by all the members of the draft resolution it is then formally proposed to the council. The decision making process in the UNSC varies differently on  peacekeeping depending whether it needs UN troops or they are being contributed  by regional bodies. If member states or regional organizations are willing to  provide troops in order to conduct their own, Council Authorized, Chapter VII peace operations, the decision-making process may not be subject to the

101

  Sara Richey, Is United Nations Peacekeeping a Practical Policy Instrument?: Factors that Influence the Success of Peacekeeping Operations. Senior Thesis. Indiana University, 2011.

kind of prolonged negotiation process as in instances when the UN is actually tasked with executing the mandate. IV.1.2 Middle Power effect in the UNSC

The term “middle power” refers to states situated in the middle grounds

 between two other types of powers; the great and small powers. Therefore, a middle power is a state which is neither a great power nor a small power. This term is, however, relative and not self-evident. States can be defined as middle  powers in terms of the extent of its involvement, its interests, and its ability to contribute to particular situations (functional); 102 according to its tendency to  pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, its tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and its tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide its diplomacy (behavioral); and that which, by reason of its size, its material resources, its willingness to accept responsibility, its influence and its stability is close to being great power (hierarchical).103 From an idealist standpoint, they (the middle power states) “…are the

most likely states to protect the international system, and thus more likely to  participate in multi-lateral activities such as peace-keeping because of their strong commitment to international peace”, but on the other hand “because of the aggregate power they can wield. Middle power interests are served by a continuation of the international status quo because in the status quo they have

102 103

Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Powers,” Canadian Foreign Policy, 7, 2 (Winter 1999) : 74.

Chapnick, The Middle Powers

achieved relative affluence and influence” 104“decisions

of states to intervene are

usually related to two issues: positive cost-and-benefit calculations, and their moral obligations either towards the belligerents. 105

IV.2 Mission in Haiti before MINUSTAH

If we were to look at the political process of the MINUSTAH mandate of 1542, it is necessary to look back a few years before hand. The writer will attempt to look back in 2002 when the Organization of American States (OAS  _established a mission in Haiti, the Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. Its main tasks were to promote good governance and assist in improving the security situation. Even though, it did not have a military mandate, it later supported to the work of the MIF and other representatives of the international community after February 2004. 106 In January 2004, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), after a meeting with representatives from the OAS, the CARICOM, the US, Canada, France and the EU, proposed a plan for a political solution to the Haitian crisis. Aristide accepted the proposal, but another the opposition groups rejected it. The next month, an international delegation including representatives from the CARICOM, the US and Canada tried to get the parties to reach agreement on a revised version 104

  Laura Neack, UN Peace-Keeping: in the interest of community or self? Journal of Peace Research, v. 32, n. 2, (1995): 181-196, 105   RobertNalbandov, Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, (2009): 23. 106 Permanent Council of the OAS, 2004A, Report on OAS Activities Involving Haiti from  November 11 2003 to March 10 2004, Report no: CP/doc.3849/04 corr.1

of the CARICOM plan. Still, the new version was rejected by the same opposition group which only wanted Aristide to resign. 107  Consequently, France and US, called for Aristide to step down in which Aristide later abided by exiling. After Aristide’s resignation, the UN Security Counci l

authorized the

deployment of a US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) for three months under Chapter VII. 108 When the MIF’s mission came to an end, the UN Security Council voted to send a peacekeeping force, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), to Haiti to take over from the MIF. IV.3 Statements made by UNSC members in meetings

Before the meeting that legalized the 1542 mandate on the deployment of MINUSTAH, The open debates organized by the Security Council on civilian crisis management and rule of law and transitional justice in 2004, highlighted some of the frustrations of developing countries on current international approaches to the situations in post-conflict countries. Brazil even stated that “The United Nations has failed t he

people of Haiti in the past by interpreting its role too strictly and focusing it excessively on security issues. This time, in parallel with efforts to establish a more secure environment, we need to launch a sustained programme to assist Haitian society in the political, social and economic areas. (…) I wish to emphasize the need to develop new and better

tools for addressing the structural problems at the root of tensions that lead to violence and conflict. Poverty, disease, lack of opportunity and inequality are some of the causes of conflicts,

107

International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti?, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report No10, Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 2004 108  International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti

 particularly those within countries, which, regrettably, are  becoming ever more prevalent on our agenda.” 109

The quote by Brazil shows how the missions in Haiti in the past failed mainly due to its more militaristic approach and its lack of approach in what Brazil calls, its “root causes”. This will be later developed in the paragraphs

 below. Aside from the open debate in the UNSC, the political process of the making of the mandate was very long and rigorous one. On the 4917th meeting of the Security Council on 26 February 2004. This meeting was a response to a letter submitted by representative of Jamaica, on  behalf of the States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on 23 February 2004 that requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council for the  purpose of considering the situation concerning Haiti in light of the steadily deteriorating situation, which affected peace and security in the region

110

 and also

a response to the letter on 25 February 2004 from the representative of France addressed to the President of the Council. 111 In the letter from the French representative, France advocated the establishment of a transitional government of national unity in Haiti, and France also proposed an initiative that broadened an earlier plan by CARICOM and included: the immediate establishment of a civilian peacekeeping force to guarantee the return to public order; international assistance to elections; the delivery of international humanitarian aid; the dispatch of human rights observers

109

Security Council Ministerial Level Debate on Civilian aspects of conflict management and peace-building, UN Doc. S/PV.5041, 22 September 2004, 17. http://img.static.reliefweb.int/report/haiti/report-secretary-general-oas-activities-involving-haitimarch-11-may-13-2004 accesed on 28 March 2014. 110  S/2004/143. 111  S/2004/143.

and a long-term commitment to providing international aid for the economic and social reconstruction of the country. France also stressed the importance of diminishing the violence done by President Aristide and that the President should take full responsibility of his actions. 112 At the meeting, statements were made by all Members of the Council, as well as by the representatives of Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland (on behalf of the European

Union), 113 

Jamaica

(on

behalf

of

the

Caribbean

Community(CARICOM)), Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela and the Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophone. For the  purpose of the chapter, the writer will only analyze the statements of the members of the UNSC at the time and no other representatives that were not in the UNSC. 114

The representative of Haiti fully associated its position with the CARICOM members which requested that the Security Council send an international force to help restore peace that also correlates with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Haiti wanted the UNSC to condemn the acts of violence, indicate its refusal to accept any form of Government resulting from an

112

 S/2004/143. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Albania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Iceland and Liechtenstein aligned themselves with this statement. 113

114

 S/2004/143.

anti-democratic and anti-constitutional process, and demand that the opposition accept a political compromise to resolve the crisis. 115 Many speakers also supported the efforts of CARICOM and OAS whilst also stating that others that were not in agreement with the plan from CARICOM and OAS rethink their decisions. 116Most speakers also welcomed the appointment  by the Secretary-General of a Special Adviser for Haiti. They underlined the need for urgent international assistance and urged all actors to facilitate the work of international agencies involved in humanitarian assistance. Many speakers urged a broader engagement of the international community.

117

The representative of Spain supported the deployment of a civilian  peacekeeping force in accordance with the principles of the Charter to guarantee security for humanitarian missions and for OAS and CARICOM mediation missions.118 The representatives of Algeria and Brazil also stressed the urgency to consider the deployment of an international force in Haiti in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 119  The representative of the Philippines proposed the deployment of an international civilian police presence to restore order on the ground and went even further as to make a “coalition of the willing” to arrest

continued violence and the breakdown of law and order. 120The representative of Angola expressed his readiness to support the deployment of an international

115

 S/2004/143.  S/2004/143.

116 117

Von Einsiedel, Sebastian and David M. Malone. “Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?” International relations. (2006): 13 -174. 118

Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible? Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible? 120 Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible? 119

force to support a political settlement. 121The representative of Benin called for robust measures to be employed.

122

The representative of Germany held that the

Council should be ready to assist in the stabilization efforts in all possible ways. 123 The representative of Chile stresses the role of the regional organization to for holding the negotiation process, but the Security Council should not discard a more robust action should it become necessary. 124 The representative of Pakistan expressed his willingness to consider broader international engagement in support of a political solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

125

The representative of the United States would also support the deployment of an international force to support the implementation of a political agreement  between the warring parties. In addition, he proposed that OAS can help the  professionalization of the Haitian National Police, promote the rule of law, disarm gangs and encourage a climate of security conducive to democratic activity. 126 France on the other hand, agreed with an external force to be deployed but not under the United Nations force, but would be authorized by the Security Council and based upon a Council mandate. France believed that it could complement to the political solution by supporting a government of national unity, re-establish public order and support the humanitarian and human rights actions of the international community on the ground. France was also willing to contribute 121

Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible? Einsiedel, Sebastian and Malone, Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible? 123  Paul Higate and Marsha Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia. London: Zed Books, 1999. 124 Higate and Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia 125 Higate and Henryy, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia 126  S/2004/143. 122

to such a force, in addition, France also pushed for the proposals by OAS and CARICOM relating to the establishment of a transitional government of national unity.127 The representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and Romania also acknowledged the call for international involvement in Haiti and expressed their readiness to consider proposals for an enhanced role of the international community. 128The representative of China expressed his willingness to participate in the efforts of the international community to help ease the current situation in Haiti and to attain lasting peace, stability and development in that country. 129 Many speakers emphasized the importance of economic, social and institutional development of Haiti, and underlined that a solution to the political and humanitarian crises without addressing the economic issue is not the ideal long terms solution. Due to the lack of initiatives from previous missions in Haiti that failed to integrate the approach of the root problems, there needs to be more improvement for the next mission in Haiti. At the 4917th meeting of the Security Council on 26 February 2004, the President of the meeting, (China) made a statement on behalf of the Council which: “Expressed deep concern in regard to the deteriorat ion of the political,

security and humanitarian environment in Haiti; supported CARICOM and OAS as they continue to work towards a peaceful and constitutional solution to the current impasse; called upon the parties to act 127

 S/2004/143.  S/2004/143. 129  S/2004/143. 130  S/ PRST/2004/4. 128

130

responsibly by choosing negotiation instead of confrontation; acknowledged the call for international involvement in Haiti; would consider urgently options for international engagement, including that of an international force in support of a political settlement in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; called upon all sides in Haiti's conflict to facilitate the distribution of food and medicine and ensure the  protection of civilians; called upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and to cease the use of violence to advance  political goals; supported the Secretary-General's decision to name a 131

Special Advisor for Haiti”.

The writer thus mapped the statements made by members of the UNSC in 2004 in response to the situation in Haiti. Unanimously, there was a huge condemnation from the UNSC members regarding the situation in Haiti.

Country

Year statements in the meeting supported the deployment of a civilian Algeria 2005  peacekeeping force support the deployment of an international force Angola 2004 to support political settlement Benin 2005 called for robust measures supported the deployment of a civilian Brazil 2005  peacekeeping force stresses the role of regional organizations, but UNSC should not rule out anything more if it is Chile 2004 needed UNSC should be ready to assist Haiti in all Germany 2004  possible ways acknowledged the call for international Romania 2005 involvement in Haiti willingness to consider broader international Pakistan 2004 engagement  proposed the deployment of an international Philippines 2005 civilian peacekeeping supported the deployment of a civilian Spain 2004  peacekeeping force support the deployment of an international force USA stresses the role of the OAS willingness to participate in the efforts of the China international community UK acknowledged the call for international 



 













  



131

 S/ PRST/2004/4.



France

 

Russia  

Haiti

involvement in Haiti External force but not under the United Nation insist on the proposals of CARICOM and OAS acknowledged the call for international involvement in Haiti UNSC to send an international force UNSC to condemn the acts of violence, indicate its refusal to accept any form of Government resulting from an anti-democratic and anticonstitutional process, and demand that the opposition accept a political compromise to resolve the crisis.

Picture IV.1: Compilation of political interest in the UNSC 4917th meeting

On the next meeting of the UNSC, on 29 February 2004 (4919thmeeting) the President of the meeting got the focus of the other members to the letter dated 29 February 2004, 132 from the Haiti. In this letter, the President of Haiti called on Governments of friendly countries to urgently support the peaceful and constitutional process that had begun in Haiti, and to this end, authorize security forces to enter and operate in Haiti to conduct activities designed to bring about a climate of security and stability, which would support the political process under way, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and in general help the people of Haiti. This meeting later passed on resolution 1529 133. On the 4961st meeting of the UNSC on 30 April 2004, resolution 1542 passed in which the mandate passed unanimously. IV.4 Significant Actors in the Making of the MINUSTAH Mandate in 2004

Like most regions, when an area in a specific region is in a state of conflict, the neighboring states are also affected. There is a strong sense of 132

 S/2004/143.  S/2004/143.

133

regional ownership of MINUSTAH based on the contributions of Member States who have strong links with Haiti not only because of geographical  proximity but also because of cultural and historical bonds. The shared commitment of Latin American states to development promotion in Haiti was reflected in the creation of

an institutional mechanism  – named ‘2x9’ –  to function

in the form of meetings between the deputy ministers of defence and of foreign relations from the nine Latin American countries engaged in MINUSTAH and the Haitian authorities. This mechanism was the media for Latin American states to coordinate common positions in the UN Security Council regarding the situation in Haiti.134 Combating poverty and hunger in Haiti, an issue not directly included in MINUSTAH’s mandate but shared by all Lati n

American states, did not exceed

the liberal agenda but created a shared ‘space of conversation’ between Northern

and Southern worlds.This mission, arguably a very challenging one for the UN, was almost entirely handed over to Latin American states, in particular Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Latin American countries contribute with 60% of UN troops deployed in Haiti. Countries contributing military personnel (7,039 in all) include: Argentina (558 including a field hospital), Bolivia (208), Brazil (2,200), Canada (10), Chile (499), Croatia (3), Ecuador (67), France (2), Guatemala (118), Jordan (728), Nepal (1,075), Paraguay (31), Peru (209), the Philippines (157), Sri Lanka (959), United States (4), and Uruguay (1,135). 135

134

 Rut Diamint, The 2x9: An Incipient Security Community in Latin America?], Policy paper 18, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftun,2007 http://library.fes.de/pdf- files/bueros/la-seguridad/50501.pdf accessed on 20 January 2014 135 U.N. Haiti Report, 2004, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/reports.shtml accessed on 20 February 2014

IV.4.1 Brazil’s Interest in the deployment of MINUSTAH

Brazil has long expressed a strong desire to gain permanent membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The country has held non-permanent membership of the Security Council ten times, but has become increasingly assertive and active in its international policies to gain permanent membership. Brazil’s top role in MINUSTAH, from being its top contributor and the

leader in the mission is understood by top policy makers in the UNSC as being decisive in preparing themselves to occupy a permanent seat on the United  Nations Security Council. It can be argued that Brazil’s participation in Haiti and

MINUSTAH in particular are hoped to bring some sort of legitimacy to its aspiration of playing a leading role in South America. By being in charge of the  post-conflict reconstruction process in Haiti, Brazil is perceived as the leading regional power coordinating a regional response to a major humanitarian crisis. The assumption of the policy makers in Brazil are played out in logic with the accomplishments of securing Haiti’s condition and to the region as a whole, will  be able to make Brazil a top candidate if it were to propose for a permanent membership to the council. IV.4.2 United States Interest in the Deployment of MINUSTAH

The United States have no doubt been at the front of the missions in Haiti, this can be seen through its early historical interventions in Haiti. Starting from 1915 when the U.S intervened in Haiti and overthrew its government, and controlled the country until 1934. Since then, the US has intervened twice militarily. In 1994, the United States led a UN-authorized force in Haiti to remove

a military junta. In February, after the military coup toppled down Aristide, the United States along with France and Canada, backed his opponents and then led a UN Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to install the new government run by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue. In June 2004, the MIF was replaced by the forces of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil. 136 Through its many support of interventions in Haiti, the united States have no doubt big expectations for MINUSTAH to be deployed. Haiti, in the eyes of US ambassadors, are very much in tune with the interests of the US. In a 2008, former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson emphasizes that MINUSTAH “is an indispensable tool in reali zing

core USG  policy interests in Haiti…It is a

financial and regional security bargain for the USG.” It can be seen that

Sanderson believes that MINUSTAH protects U.S. interests by preventing social and political movements from thwarting neoliberal policies and the postearthquake influx of corporations in the country, which are working on a variety of development schemes on the island. IV.4.3 France Interest in the Deployment of MINUSTAH

One relation that is hard to ignore when talking about Haiti and France is the fact that Haiti was a colony of France and is one of the states that belongs in the Francophone states. It is thus no mystery why even though Haiti is geographically not near to France, France still believes that it should participate in this peacekeeping operation, in the least give its vote to deploy MINUSTAH into Haiti when voting in the UNSC.

136

Diamint, The 2x9: An Incipient Security Community in Latin America?

French defense policy maintains that the country faces no direct threats to its vital interests near its borders, and that ‘the main security risk now lies in the regional conflicts that can jeopardize the quest for international stability’. 137In

 particular, political turmoil in former French African colonies is seen as directly affecting French interests. The French authorities also believe that threats are increasingly likely to be asymmetric (focusing on areas where Western powers are vulnerable, rather than traditional warfighting).This strategic analysis has had a strong bearing on French military doctrine. The motives behind French  participation in humanitarian interventions are not solely security-centered. Humanitarian action is an integral part of French culture and foreign policy, and reflects a larger ambition to maintain Franc e’s standing as a major power .

137

EirinMobekk. “Recent experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform: the Case of Haiti”, Case Study Report from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed

Forces (DCAF), (2007):11-12.

Chapter V Conclusion

The conclusion reached in analyzing the reasoning of United Nation Security Council (UNSC) states in the deployment of peacekeeping operations (PKO) are very much correlated with the realist perspective. Reasoning not only comprises of the legal standings but also the domestic situation and the political  process used in determining the mechanisms and composition of the troops are also a reflection of the political interests of the contributing states. MINUSTAH, therefore is considered to be a humanitarian intervention and is part of the responsibility to protect and is done through a mandate of the UNSC. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government in 2004. States are motivated to form peacekeeping

missions for a variety of rea sons but the goal is the same for each: to influence the future direction of the conflict. The process of peacekeeping can be thought of as

the private provision of a public good. PKO in Haiti is the first PKO where the majority of peacekeepers come from Latin America. One reason that the number of troops in U.N. peace missions relates to the States’ pursuit of a deeper insertion

onto world affairs and the benefits generated as a result of that insertion. Based on the legal standings of MINUSTAH, it can be seen that MINUSTAH was deployed to Haiti under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by which the United Nation through the UNSC are able to impose measures on states that have obligatory legal force and therefore need not depend on the consent of the states involved. To do this, the Council must determine that the situation

constitutes a threat or breach of the international peace, or at least regional peace. The Mission’s presence in Haiti is thus based on the proposition that since 2004,

violence in Haiti has threatened the international community. Even though there is a provision for freedom of speech and assembly in the Haiti constitution, it is still very problematic, there are also frequent attacks from government officials when journalists are expressing different viewpoints from the government. The history of Military coups and political violence reoccurring throughout post-independence period. An armed rebellion ousted Aristide in 2004. In the aftermath, there was prolonged violent armed conflict among different factions competing for state power. As a result, the history of factional and gang violence, often politically linked, and internal security  problems, means Haiti is more susceptible to future eruptions of violence. Since colonization, Haiti has been a region of conflict. More recently, Haiti has been a field of strife between its peoples, especially since the retrieval of Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power in 1993, and the following peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN). Safety and security are unsatisfactory, institutionalization is needed in regards to law and democracy, the economy is not sustainable and social wellbeing is not being fulfilled. Even if the situation did not fit the definition of civil war, a large part of the country was engaged in fighting. The situation continued to be incredibly violent and bloody even after the conflict was considered to be terminated. This goes back to the previous conclusion by the writer in which MINUSTAH is a part of the fourth generation of peacekeeping which is characterized by challenging goals and a complex mandates.

Looking at all the operational measures actually applied in the Haiti, it can  be concluded that there was a lot of political will to prevent to prevent the crisis from escalating. Many of the international efforts were made at an early stage and were too serious to merely be for show. That the international community then deployed military troops with a Chapter VII mandate indicates that there was some commitment, although the troops were mainly Latin American. However, military intervention was never incompatible with the norm of non-intervention  because the interim government that took over immediately after Aristide’s

departure called for UN assistance as well as international forces. The realist perspective and theory in international relations states that  power is the thing that states will strive for no matter the condition. In this case, PKO as a high profile activity in the international world will no doubt have some influence on the elevation of the state’s status. Status and influence in

international affairs is what states strive for, and therefore, participation in  peacekeeping may be motivated by national interest. A realist perspective of state  participation in PKO states that if a state's interest is linked to the continuation of the international status quo, it will use whatever means at its disposal, including peacekeeping, to preserve that favorable status quo. This was blatantly seen in the case of Brazil in which it desires to preserve its status quo as a regional  power in Latin America and at the same time show its power and gain more influence if it were to propose to be an additional member of the UNSC. Leadership on Haiti within the Security Council and in the UN more  broadly reflects geo-strategic as well as more subtle international considerations and linkages. The United States has often driven Haiti policy internationally,

fearing that turmoil there would result in refugee flo ws to Florida’s shores, as was the case in 1991 to 1994. France, with strong cultural and former colonial ties to Haiti, has always asserted an interest and has often mobilized its European Union  partners to assist in sharing the burden. China objected to Haiti’s recognition of Taiwan throughout the 1990s and sought to pressure Port-au- Prince into abandoning its diplomatic and economic relationship with Taipei. In keeping with the more sophisticated Chinese diplomacy of the twenty-first century, China is now participating in MINUSTAH, seeking to induce Haitian gratitude in friendlier ways. Some motivations are internal: a decision to participate may derive from the use of peacekeeping as a means of pursuing a country’s own unilateral

interests, in some cases states view a peacekeeping contribution to greater international prestige or more inclusions in UN decision-making bodies; but on the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that there may also be genuine altruism mixed in with these motivations on specific occasions. Some motivations, on the other hand, are external: states have been pressured by allies into participating in intervening coalitions, or have altered their position based on a specific conflict context as a result of changes in the interpretation of international norms by their leading policy partner.

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xxv

Attachment I

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii

xxix

xxx

xxxi

xxxii

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xxxiii

Attachment II

xxxiv

xxxv

xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

xl

xli

xlii

xliii

xliv

xlv

xlvi

xlvii

xlviii

xlix

l

li

lii

Source:

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liii

Attachment III

liv

lv

lvi

Source:

SRES



www.minustah.orgpdfsresen.pdf

 November 2013

lvii

accessed on 20

Attachment IV

lviii