In Defence of the Hellenic Logos
The relation of thought to action from Modern to Ancient times Lesley Madytinou
Note: For me, one of the most difficult aspects of understanding ancient Hellenic thought was the unpleasant fact that the Hellenic language is conceptually different to English. Hellenic thought is thus different to English thought and the mind raised in the conceptualisations inherent within the common usage of the English language differs vastly from the same mind raised in the conceptualisations within the common form of the Hellenic language. Both minds tend to see different qualities and distinctions in the same objects that, at first, may be confusing and hard to perceive. From the English perspective, it could be successively argued that the correct and precise use of the language would serve the problems of literal vs. figurative translations far better than the modern and common indiscriminate usage of synonymous words that only vaguely resemble one another but have important distinctions that most people seemingly tend to ignore. The matter of translation becomes even more complicated with archaic terms that have not only a modern and common usage but also have a very long historical conceptual development. Many of these archaic terms play a vital role in the correct conceptualisation of Hellenic thought and its relationship to action. The Logos is one such of these terms; it refers to simultaneously to 'word', 'speech', 'ratio' and 'reason' and it is the basic element of the ancient Hellenic civilisation that is, in its own terms, correctly referred to as the Civilisation of the Logos.
"For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common. But although the Logos is common, most people live as if they had their own private understanding." Herakleitos (from Sextus Empiricus. Against the Mathematicians. 7.133) For Speusippos, Logos was the articulate voice that was capable of identifying and naming everything (with reference to the Hellenic language). It was also a dialectic prose between Nouns as the proper names and identification/meaning of things (i.e. thought) and Verbs which convey the activities of the Nouns (i.e. action). Herakleitos identified the Logos as not only a Divine Law but also as an intrinsic and inherent ordering of the Kosmos that within humans renders all things knowable in terms of the Hellenic Kosmotheasis (worldview). Furthermore, Herakleitos makes it implicitly clear that it is the Logos which leads a person to Orthognosia (correct knowledge) and Orthopraxia (correct deeds). The term Hellenismos in its ancient usage specifically designates the correct and proper usage, expression and practice of the Logos. Hence, and finally, any exploration of any aspect of Hellenic civilisation is first and foremost a study of the Hellenic Logos and more specifically of particular terms and their conceptual development and usage. I explain this to clarify my rationale in the following essay which bases my exploration of the modern and ancient understanding of orthodoxy and orthopraxy upon the guiding principle of the Logos as a study of the Words and Reasons underlying such conceptions. This is a personal search for what something 'is' in its own truth rather than what some may argue that it should be according to modern standards.
INTRODUCTION It takes only a quick glance at many religious anthropological studies of various different religions from the last few decades to note that orthopraxy is fast becoming a 'buzzword' and as a concept has been growing in popularity over the last sixty years. Orthopraxy (defined as correct action) as an anthropological term is used alongside the term orthodoxy which is defined generally in English to be correct thought, belief and/or opinion. A slightly more enquiring gaze at a greater array of anthropologies over the last century will illustrate that not all anthropologists even use these terms and a vast majority of anthropological dictionaries do not even list them as official terminology. Regardless, there are those within the Social Sciences (including Anthropology) who use the terms and their treatment of these terms range from (a) the highly selective usage of both terms in conjunction with one another to (b) what appears to be a dichotomised and simplistic binary classification system.
Research into these terms as a binary classification system leads directly to specific anthropological theories that are based upon modernist epistemological dichotomies such as thought vs. action; body vs. soul; consciousness vs. matter and nature vs. culture as frameworks of reference for anthropologists to study foreign cultures and religions. In fact, from an enquiry into these anthropological theories, two separate theoretical dichotomies emerge as the causes that have sundered the field of anthropology as a whole into opposing theories that possess their own internal dialectic. These central dichotomies are Universalism vs. Relativism and Materialism vs. Idealism. At the heart of this theoretical opposition in anthropology lie the modernist epistemological dichotomies between thought/action; body/soul and nature/culture. Interestingly enough, a common ideology could be identified among the different anthropological theories that have been used by others to support and justify such dichotomies. This ideology is the foundation for an important political revolution that changed the world and a fervent religious reformation movement that is highly influential within Christian theology. A Christian religious movement that advocates an emphasis on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy as a theological reform and mission that aims to liberate people from the theoretical, academic, ecclesiastical and social systems that oppress and render them submissive. It is important to note that concerning Christian Theology and the Bible I have had to rely exclusively on the knowledge and opinion of prominent and respected Christian Theologians and scholars. Ironically, at the root of all of this stands three Hellenic logoi (words); Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis. Words that now, in modern times, are isolated in a foreign language and out of context to their original conceptual usage within the totality of the Hellenic Logos. Words and concepts which were (on the surface) written for future political leaders and appropriated by the Christian church fathers from Classical philosophy and transformed into the underlying structure of Christian thought and action. These philosophies now stand accused, by this new Christian liberation movement, of planting the seeds of the ills of Western society. The first part of this essay explores orthodoxy and orthopraxy in their modern form in the field of anthropology while the second part examines the transformation of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis into its Christian form of orthodoxy and orthopraxy as well as the crucial role these three logoi play within Christian theology. The third section of the essay returns Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis to their original context and perspective in ancient Hellenic thought and action. It is only in this return to their source within the Civilisation of the Logos that these three words and the concepts they embody may be understood within context to Orthognosia (correct knowledge), Orthopraxia (correct deeds) and ultimately the Orthos Logos (Correct Reason) in a manner that is purely Hellenic and free from the distortions of foreign political, ideological and theological motivations. The purpose of this essay is neither to repudiate the anthropological or theological usage of the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy nor to condemn the advocates of orthopraxy. This essay seeks the Aletheia (truth as the correspondence of Reason to Reality) of whether such a binary classification system is adequate or refined enough to define the role of thought and action within the civilisation of the Logos. It also seeks to find the answers within the corpus of ancient Hellenic works to the epistemological question that has created the dichotomies of certain anthropological and theological ideologies: "How do we know what we know?" (i.e. thought or action; body or soul). It is only through finding the answer to this question that the modernist dichotomy may be understood and reconciled.
PART ONE: Conflicting Theories in the Study of Humanity 1.1. The use of Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy as Classificatory Terms in the study of religion and culture Firstly, it is important to note that the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy are used by certain scholars as general classificatory terms for religions in the fields of Theology, Comparative Religion, Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology. Despite the valid concerns that could be raised about the general classification of religions in these terms, it is significant that the scholars who make use of such terminology do so as observers rather than as members of a religion. Very few of these religions that have been thus classified have internalised these terms as the mode by which to define and clarify their own religions. Hence in Anthropology, orthodoxy and orthopraxy remain largely 'external qualifying or classificatory terms' as opposed to internal transformative or clarifying principles. Secondly, the classification of any religion and/or culture in terms of orthodoxy or orthopraxy logically indicates that there is a set and standard criteria that determines the nature of that which is orthodoxic and that which is orthopraxic. A definitive list of these criteria could not be found in any authoritative document, book or within the public information from university anthropology departments. If such a list of criteria exists it is not a matter of public record. Hence to identify the criteria, it was necessary to examine the examples of when and how these terms have been used in actual studies of different religions and cultures. "In approaching issues of ritual density, it is has become customary to distinguish the degree to which religious traditions put an emphasis either on correct belief in theological doctrines or on correct performance of behavioural responsibilities. The first style of religion is 'orthodoxic' from the Greek words 'orthos' (correct, right, straight) and 'doxa' (belief, thought, opinion). The second style is 'orthopraxic' from the Greek 'praxis' meaning 'correct action'." Catherine M Bell [1] The first criterion that was identifiable was that of ritual density. "'Ritual density' is a term borrowed from Catharine Bell, Sinologist and theorist at Santa Clara University. Bell defines ritual density as “why some societies or historical periods have more ritual than others” (1997:173). But it connotes more. It is aware of a distinction that exists between a group’s ritual activity and the other components in which its life consists; and, on that awareness, represents the measure of one in relation to the other at any given point in that group’s history. Ritual density, it can be said, is the degree to which ritual plays a role in the life/piety of any given society; otherwise put--the ratio of ritual to other aspects of life in the day-to-day operations of a community. To be sure, conclusions about such a ratio will much depend on how broadly or narrowly one defines “ritual” over against “non-ritual” activity." Michael A Daise [2] Catherine Bell does not adhere to a single definition of ritual activity and quotes William Geertz in her book 'Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice': "In ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the same agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turns out to be the same world" [3] Bell goes on further to explain the reason why the dichotomy of thought and action is used in such a context:
"For Geertz, this opposition of conceptions and dispositions, or the world imagined and the world lived, constitutes cultural life per se. Moreover our perception and analysis of their opposition and resolution constitute a theoretical explanation of 'meaning' in culture. …Thus the dichotomous nature of conceptions of order (worldview) and dispositions for action (ethos) is fundamental to Geertz's approach, as is their resolution. The temporary resolution of a dichotomy is cast as the central dynamic of cultural life." Catherine M Bell [4] From this perspective, a few important points should be noted: (a) The dichotomy of orthodoxy and orthopraxy presupposes an intrinsic dichotomy between conception (general ideas) and disposition (prevailing state of mind and characteristic spirit) and hence a dichotomy between Ideas and Mind/Spirit, Worldview and Ethos, Perception and Reality as well as the Sacred and the Secular that exist as a framework of reference within the mind of the observer rather than in the minds of those who are being observed. (b) The use of the dichotomy relies completely on the interaction of both orthodoxy and orthopraxy as a central dynamic. This central dynamic functions as a classic tension of the opposites which resolve themselves into moments of unity through culture and cultural expressions. Catherine Bell clarifies further on how the dichotomy should be used: "Whether a community is deemed orthodoxic or orthopraxic can only be a matter of emphasis, of course, since no religious tradition can promote belief or ritual at the total expense of the other, and many would never distinguish between them at all. Moreover, whatever the overall emphasis in a tradition as a whole, it is easy to find sub-communities stressing the opposite pole. …Terms like orthodoxy and orthopraxy cannot be used effectively if accorded too much rigidity or exclusivity. Nor can they be used to suggest that one style is more religious than the other; the differences between orthodoxy and orthopraxy appear to emerge primarily from social organisation and history, not the degree or purity of religiosity." Catherine M Bell [5] The function of orthopraxy within this context is thus clarified as the unification of an individual's beliefs, thoughts and ideas with reality and orthopraxy thus becomes the medium through which orthodoxy may be actualised or practiced in the real world. "Competence realised through situational ideals, is the intermediate level of the attainment of orthopraxy, when practitioners attempt to make ideals and reality coalesce." Anna M Gade [6] From the given accounts it is obvious that the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy are two sides of the same coin and work harmoniously in conjunction with one another in an anthropological framework of reference. An excellent further example of this is the work of the Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, James L. Watson whose studies of orthopraxy in the history of Chinese culture are widely respected and cited. His usage of the term orthopraxy indicates that it was through the implementation of orthodoxy that the ritual practices of China were standardised to promote a unified cultural system that was characterised by a high level of uniformity of beliefs, attitudes and conceptions. This example illustrates that both orthopraxy and orthodoxy are emphasised in a balanced manner and not in the form of an active dichotomy. Professor Watson also illustrates perfectly that it was only through correct thinking that a standardisation of ritual action as orthopraxy could be achieved. Furthermore and importantly, Watson states that it was not the details of rituals that were standardised but rather the structure of practice. Now if the term orthopraxy is rather used as an emphasis on practices as the means of achieving cultural unity (because it has been proved that actions assimilate foreign cultures faster than ideas do) as
was done in China to promote the concept of internal unity and uniformity, it acts in the same manner as a dogma and conformity to such orthopraxy becomes the determining factor in whether an individual is Chinese or not. [7] "The proper performance of the rites, in the accepted sequence, was of paramount importance in determining who was and who was not deemed to be fully 'Chinese' " James Watson [8] This leads directly to a second and very vague criterion that appears to be a factor in the use of orthodoxy and orthopraxy as anthropological frameworks of reference. This is the conditions upon which an individual is considered to be a member of a religion or culture and the conditions that would constitute an individual's exclusion from a religion or culture. According to Professor Watson's studies, in China the nonconformation to the standard practices or orthopraxy is simultaneously a non-conformation to the orthodoxy or correct thought that guides and informs actions. Conformity to these standards is essential to being recognised as Chinese and non-conformation is tantamount to the loss of cultural identity. Membership to religions such as Christianity is based upon the adherence to certain beliefs and to Judaism through matrilineal birthright or a long conversion process. Certain religious traditions set different conditions for membership; i.e. location (i.e. citizenship and landownership) and/or common language. How religions within a cultural framework are classified is largely determined by the definition of culture employed by the anthropologist studying them. With reference to classifications of religions and cultures in terms of either orthodoxic or orthopraxic rather than in conjunction with one another; a third criterion of orthopraxy is identified through the study of the Creek Native American Indian religion where there is evidence of a religious philosophy based on actions and activities without the presence of any actual philosophical schools, doctrines or texts. [9] Other religions that have been classified by this criterion include Shinto because of its lack of formulated doctrine and theology as well as a primary focus on ritual interaction with the Cosmos. Interestingly enough it is largely upon this criterion [i.e. no evidence of being orthodoxic] that some academics have classified the ancient Hellenic and Roman religions and cultures to be orthopraxic but this will be discussed more fully in the later in this section. Certain scholars also classify Judaism as orthopraxic based on this criterion due to the fact that they have no word for theology and observe a strict adherence to prescribed and proscribed activities. [10] Professor Fritz Graf, Director of Epigraphy and Chair of the Greek and Latin department at Ohio State University and Professor Sarah Iles Johnston, also of the Greek and Latin department at Ohio State, provide the reason underlying the classification of Hellenic religion as orthopraxic. A reason which is based on the fact that the current Western understanding of what an orthodoxy is, is determined by the Christian Church's definition of it; i.e. defined by what the Church Fathers called the Heiroi Logoi (sacred texts). "Accordingly the Heiroi Logoi implicitly comprised authoritative canonical writings in which the central beliefs and history of a religion were set down. By this reckoning, neither Greek nor Roman 'mainstream religions' could be said to have real Heiroi Logoi. Their religions which focused more on the correct performance of certain acts such as sacrifice (orthopraxy)than on correct belief (orthodoxy), [and] had neither any need or desire to record what a person was supposed to think or feel as he or she practiced its
rituals. …Another trait that earlier scholars often applied to heiroi logoi was that they had been divinely transmitted to primordial figures such as Moses. In the early 19th century, this characteristic, encouraged Max Müller to attempt to enlarge the category of 'heiroi logoi' beyond Jewish and Christian texts. Müller argued that many eastern texts were just as sacred as the bible, largely based on their reputation as revealed wisdom. Müller's endeavor, although admirable in its intention, to move 'heiroi logoi' out of exclusively Western circles, had the side-effect of making virtually any text with any connection to religion "sacred"… As for history, most Greek and Roman religions were strongly local in their focus. A given town might have stories about how particular cults or rituals came into existence but these were of history primarily to the inhabitants or to unusually curious travelers such as Pausanias. Such local "histories" moreover, were open to quite a bit of change as the need or whim arose. …And even when the basic "plot" of a myth remained stable, poets changed details from version to version. …"Canonical" sacred histories therefore were unlikely to exist even at a local level…" [Graf and Johnston continue on to discuss the evidence that may be found within ancient Hellenic texts declaring the existence of 'heiroi logoi' within Hellenic religion] "Having determined that earlier scholarly definitions of 'sacred text' are not quite adequate to the task at hand, let us start anew from what the ancients [Hellenes] themselves said. The first thing we notice is that ancient heiroi logoi are often presented, implicitly or explicitly, as explanations for what is done in a ritual, why a given god is portrayed as he or she is, or why some aspect of the world is the way it is. " Fritz Graf and Sarah Iles Johnston [10] Graf and Johnston go on to offer an example of how at least four 'heiroi logoi' may be found in Herodotus as well as references to the 'heiroi logoi' of the creation of the Kosmos and the nature of the Underworld as used by ancient scholars such as Pausanias and Plutarch. [10] Furthermore Graf and Johnston make especial reference to the aition that accompanied every cult and every ritual as the 'narration of why a ritual or cult had come into existence'. They also make mention of the secrecy surrounding the heiroi logoi of the cults based on the order by Ptolemy IV for all Bacchic initiators to seal copies of their heiroi logoi when handing them in to his ministers (which explains why Herodotus and Pausanias do not narrate the heiroi logoi that they mention). Graf and Johnston also indicate that there is ample evidence of written copies of the various heiroi logoi that were circulated in ancient times. Some accounts and narratives of which has survived the passage of time in either allegorical form or within the usage of particular epithets in hymns such as those of Orpheus, Pindar, Homer, etc. Other narratives were discussed quite openly by various philosophers, albeit heavily cloaked with logic and rhetoric and without the emphasis or context which would draw 'profane' attention. So it is thus not a matter that Hellenic religion does not have 'heiroi logoi', it is merely the fact that current Western definitions of Orthodoxy refuse to recognise any text outside of Judaism or Christianity as being validly sacred. There are, of course, problems with classifying certain other religions in these terms too. "There are of course many problems in defining what is 'mainstream' in such a diverse set of traditions that comprise the Hindu religions and in which there is no tightly defined hierarchy to define orthodoxy and orthopraxy" George D Chryssides, Religious Studies, Birmingham University [11] The role of a religious hierarchy within a religion introduces a key point to the subject of classification, as Professor Watson and the other anthropologists have noted, it is correct thinking that guides any action into becoming correct action. Without any formal religious pan-hierarchy that governs all religious traditions and cults within a large indigenous religion and whose function it is to define what either correct thought or correct action is, the task would fall to a diversity of individual cults and traditions where multiplicity may well lead to diversity.
Identifying mainstream religious circumstances becomes problematic.
thought
or
action
under
such
Studies of Hinduism and the difficulty in classifying it, as a totality, either orthodoxic or orthopraxic, illuminates yet another criterion for the classification of a religion as orthopraxic. Generally, Religious Studies academics have noted that orthopraxic religions are related to ethnicity and the religion is inherited by birth into an ethnic collective. In these ethnic religions, studies indicate that adherence to ritual observances and practices are indicative of whether a member is one of good standing or not within the religion. So based on the ethnic nature of their religion, some academics classify Hinduism as orthopraxic. Another factor in their classification as orthopraxic is based on their adherence to the Vedas as an authoritative ritual text while some note the orthodoxy within Hinduism based on their common theological formulation. [12] The difficulty in discerning the difference between orthodoxical and orthopraxical elements within certain religions and cultures have led some anthropologists to subdivide this binary system further and introduce what is known as an orthodoxic ritual. This term is used because it has been noted that the mere presence of ritual activity (i.e. a primacy of ethical behaviour, a focus on ritual practices and a wealth of cultural traditions) within a religion are not a clear enough indication of whether a religion is orthopraxic or not. Academics have noted that when the elements of a ritual (including its ritual gestures) are symbolic of theological ideology and formulations there is a distinct difference in ritual styles from those who are purely orthopraxic. Because of the specific theological knowledge necessary to perform the ritual, orthodoxic rituals are said to express something that already exists within the participant as opposed to a ritual style that is said to cause something that does not already exist within the participant to happen. [13] This illustrates another criterion; namely ritual style and whether a ritual is symbolic of formulated theological principles or not. This criterion has a deeper connotation too as an orthodoxic ritual is also distinguished from all forms of magical agency where the participant and their correct and precise practice of ritual is thought to act as an 'agent' to bring about something that does not already exist within the participant. [14] Furthermore, orthodoxic rituals imply that the participant bears knowledge as to the proscribed meaning of the symbolic elements within their ritual while orthopraxic rituals are thus defined by ritual gestures and elements which have no proscribed meaning and are open to interpretation. Finally there are scholars, one such example being those associated with the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church, who do not make the distinction between orthodoxic and orthopraxic rituals but rather determine the distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy to be the difference between macro-theology and micro-theology. [15] From these examples, the criterion for classification as an orthodoxy is further clarified. In an orthodoxic religion or culture there needs to be common thought or worldview concerning a common theological formulation. There also needs to be evidence of an organised religious and/or philosophical system (including actual schools and/or a pan/local religious hierarchy) with a recorded common theological/philosophical structure in the form of actual doctrines and/or texts that emphasise a formulated way of thinking. This correct formula for thought would guide
human actions into becoming orthopraxic. Finally, the ritual style of an orthodoxic religion must be symbolic and comprised of known and recognisable symbolic elements that represent common theological formulation. The meanings of these symbolic elements and gestures have thus a proscribed meaning and are not open to interpretation. Furthermore, an orthodoxic ritual does not employ 'magical agency' to achieve its ritual goal and the orthodoxic ritual is merely an expression of something that already exists within the participant. 1.2. Universalism, Culture
Relativism
and
the
Anthropological
definitions
of
A further factor in the classification of religions and cultures in dichotomous terms is the matter of the definition of culture (and/or religion as a cultural expression) that is used in different schools of anthropology. Logically, the definition of culture and religion employed by an observer is a crucial feature in how the observer will analyse and report their conclusions concerning a religion or culture. It is within these definitions of culture and the opposition to them that the first aspect of the epistemological nature of the dichotomies used in anthropology is revealed. This is the theoretical opposition between those who believe that human modes of thought (and by implication knowledge) are universal and those who believe that it is structured by cultural influences such as language, location, etc, and hence is relativistic in nature. As an anthropological dichotomy, Universalism and Relativism illustrate a presumed duality between Nature and Culture. Universalist anthropology schools such as the Structuralist, Evolutist, and Diffusionist stress shared human characteristics and modes of thinking that transcend culture in a manner that may suggest a universal psychic unity. Their studies thus appear to use a methodology called Cross-Cultural Analysis to identify common characteristics within a general and/or abstract framework of reference. Structuralism, in particular, suggests that the structure of human modes of thinking is the same regardless of culture and that all humans think of the world in terms of binary opposites (i.e. the mind dichotomising the world) and this binary thought is reflected in various cultural institutions (including religion). Within Structuralist research all differing opinions observed within any particular culture are recorded as dichotomies. [16] The development of Cultural Relativism as a theory finds its roots in the German Enlightenment thinkers, Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder. Kant stated that humanity was incapable of direct and unmediated knowledge of the world. He went on to explain that all human experience was mediated through the human mind which structures perceptions according to sensibilities of time and space (i.e. spatial awareness). During the same period, Herder was one of the first to argue that language determines human thought which two centuries later would become central to the Sapir Whorf Hypothesis (that now stands in opposition to P.I.E. linguistic theories). Herder also stressed the positive value of cultural diversity. Wilhelm von Humboldt, philosopher and linguist, called for a formal anthropology that would synthesise Kant and Herder's ideologies. The sociologist William Graham Sumner added further that culture is an important factor in structuring human perceptions. Sumner called this principle ethnocentrism and identified that cultures that displayed ethnocentric qualities tended to see their own cultures as the centre of the world against which all other foreign cultures and people
were measured. Franz Boas proposed that the mediation of culture was perhaps more subtle than commonly assumed at the time. Accordingly Boaz determined that culture was far more than just certain tastes in food, music, art or beliefs in religion. His definition of culture is thus: "[Culture is]…the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterize the behaviour of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself, and of each individual to himself. " Franz Boas [17] Boas went further to state that because scientists (and in this specific case anthropologists) grow up in a particular culture they too are ethnocentric. [18] This illustrates that the anthropologist as an observer evaluates and analyses a foreign culture only in comparison to their personal culture. Hence, the anthropologist's view of another culture is relativistic to their own culture. It is likely that this innate relativistic bias of the observer, which is now commonly accepted in anthropology, is the reason why anthropologists are concerned about nonanthropologists employing their theories indiscriminately. It is also interesting to note that cultural relativism was transformed into moral relativism in the context of the Commission for Human Rights of the United Nations in preparing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, Boaz discussed the field of Ethnology to be one that sought to find comparisons and distinctions between vast ranges of different cultures so that the impetus of human action could be discovered. The method used by Ethnologists to achieve this goal was based upon a 'common assumption' that presupposes that all things within any culture may be subjected to standard abstract classification. Boaz disputed this method: "It is only since the development of the evolutional theory that it became clear that the object of study is the individual, not abstractions from the individual under observation. We have to study each ethnological specimen individually in its history and in its medium.... By regarding a single implement outside of its surroundings, outside of other inventions of the people to whom it belongs, and outside of other phenomena affecting that people and its productions, we cannot understand its meanings.... Our objection ... is that classification is not explanation." Franz Boaz [19] From Boaz's observations it is evident that classification alone is not truly explanatory of cultural expressions if its criteria [of classification] is based on abstract general assumptions. Such general categorisations thus are only useful to ethnologists as they compare various cultural studies to determine the impetus for human action. From this perspective, regardless of their epistemological opposition of Universalism or Relativism, the anthropological/ethnological theories of Cultural Relativism and Universalism remain scientific heuristic tools that anthropologists use as a general strategy of analysis when approaching different cultures. As a heuristic tool [20], these theories work in much the same manner as mathematical formulations that measure the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Observer Effect, i.e. the position of the observer must be taken into account. This fact is recognised in anthropology and even Poststructuralists who still support a Universalist binary classification system factor the culture of the observer into the analysis of anthropological data. [21] Although the basis of the theoretical opposition between Universalism and Cultural Relativism may indeed be epistemological in nature, it is rather
an opposition in educated opinion, derived from field research experience, concerning what is the most appropriate and effective heuristic tool by which to study different cultures as individuals within a collective that will yield the most accurate conclusions. In understanding the basis of the heuristic tools within anthropology, the necessity to identify anthropological classification in terms of the culture of the observer is evident within both Universalist and Relativist theories. With reference to the actual epistemological theoretical opposition, it is also evident that the function of the dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy differs depending on the theoretical perspective of the observer. Those who use the cultural relativist models are aware of the purely theoretical nature of the dichotomy and use it as a methodology to analyse the dynamic unity of real human life that they observe. It is thus a method by which an observer may, in their terms, understand the relationship between thought and action in the compound and complex nature of particular collectives of living, moving, breathing human life where thought and action is not always seen in a dichotomised form. From those who use orthodoxy and orthopraxy in universalist theories, it is assumed that all people think and act alike, regardless of whether they are aware of it or not. Conclusions reached from these two vastly different approaches, to orthodoxy/orthopraxy or any other apparent dichotomy an observer may make use of, will also yield different conclusions within the data they may collect. From this it is apparent that general readers of anthologies should not only take note of the culture of the observer but also their theoretical perspective. 1.3. Thought versus Action in Idealist and Materialist Anthropology The second opposition in the field of anthropology arose as a direct result of the thought/action dichotomy in a manner that is not only epistemological but also political by association. The dichotomy between thought and action within this theoretical and methodological opposition is no longer used as a classificatory term applied as a tool in cultural observation but in the form of an active tension of the opposites that divides anthropological thought into two distinct camps; Idealism and Materialism. "Materialism, in anthropology, is methodologically and theoretically opposed to Idealism. Included in the latter (Idealism] are culture and personality or psychological anthropology, structuralism, ethnoscience, and symbolic anthropology. The many advocates of this idealistic approach "share an interest in psychological phenomena, and they tend to view culture in mental and symbolic terms" (Langness 1974:84). "Materialists, on the other hand, tend to define culture strictly in terms of overt, observable behavior patterns, and they share the belief that techno environmental factors are primary and causal" (Langness 1974:84). The contemporaneous development of these two major points of view allowed for scholarly debate on which approach was the most appropriate in the study of culture. " Elliot Knight and Karen Smith [22] Materialist anthropological theories (including American Materialism) are influenced in either part or whole by Marxist Anthropological theory. Marxist theory immediately rejects the existence of (a) anything outside of the material or (b) anything transcendent to the material. This repudiation of Idealism renders thought to be a purely material function, i.e. Materialism; as opposed to the Idealist theories where thought is
seen as spiritual or intellectual and transcends the material. Materialist theory, as a heuristic or methodological tool, is used to study humanity based upon the statistical foundation that any collective consists of a majority class of physical 'doers' (workers) as opposed to a small and elite minority class of thinkers. Here the thought/action dichotomy becomes a matter of majority or minority interests according to the determination that within any collective the majority focus on action and only a small minority focus on thought. Furthermore, within Materialist anthropology the different (and complementary) functions of thought and action become a dynamic dichotomy through the sociopolitical, historical and ideological opposition between the doers and thinkers of humanity. The definitions of culture within Materialist and Idealist anthropologies also differ; materialists tend to see culture more empirically and in terms of overt behaviour patterns while idealists determine culture to be abstract, ideological or symbolic, etc. Materialist anthropologies include: (a) Cultural Materialism whose aim is; "the task of cultural materialism is to create a pan-human science of society whose findings can be accepted on logical and evidentiary grounds by the pan-human community" (Harris 1979: xii). This form of materialist theory is based on an expansion of the Marxist model with a few distinctions and is a reactionary theory to Cultural Relativism and its methodologies. It is thus essentially a Universal Materialist theory whose methodologies are based upon empirical science as the basis of knowledge for the observer (i.e. the cultural materialist) and approaches the study of humans as native thought and behaviours arising from material consideration. [23] (b) American Materialism as a theory which bases its understanding of cultural systems upon three key principles: Cultural Materialism, Cultural Evolution and Cultural Ecology. This anthropology finds its theoretical roots in the works of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and even further back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. [24] Even though Structuralism is an Idealist theory and thus in essential opposition to Materialism; Marxist and Hegelian theory were introduced into its theoretical structure to explain the evolution of cultures. [25] Symbolic or Interpretative Anthropology as an Idealist theory arose as a direct reaction to Materialism and Marxism. It uses Hermeneutics (the art of interpretation) to study the symbolic systems of any culture to determine how people think and act in religious, social and economic contexts within a culture. Hermeneutics is also employed to study the expressions of a culture in terms of art, drama, dance, music, etc. [26] One of the prominent scholars in this school of anthropology is the late Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) and leading anthropologist who served until his death as the professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. In what is now called Geertzian Theory, Professor Geertz determined culture to be: "[Culture is] …a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" Clifford Geertz [27] Geertzian Theory also concludes religion to systems of a society and defined religion as:
be
one
of
the
cultural
" [Religion is] …1) a system of symbols (2) which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. [28] Other Idealistic Anthropological theories include: (a) Cognitive Anthropology studies how people understand and organise the events, experience and material objects that comprise their world and cognition thereof (i.e. worldview). It is an approach that stresses how people make sense of reality according to their own indigenous cognitive categories and not those of the anthropologist. The roots of this anthropological theory, which was only officially recognised in the 1950's, can be found in Enlightenment Thinkers such as Rousseau, Hobbs and Locke and later to Franz Boas. It includes within its methodology a 'Cultural' Model which allows for many different kinds of cultural knowledge. [29] (b) Culture and Personality Anthropology seeks to define the character, psychology and personality of a culture through the study of its individual members. [30] While certain anthropologies reconcile these theoretical polarisations (i.e. Universalism/Relativism and Idealism/Materialism) into interconnected and distinctive methodological or heuristic tools within a single theory, it is important to note that some anthropologists have completely rejected and repudiated the validity or efficacy of such dichotomies. Since the 1990's Ecological Anthropology, who deem both human behaviour and actions to be important frameworks of reference within culture, rejected 'modernist' dichotomies such as thought/action, body/mind and nature/culture. [31] Postmodern Anthropology, as a strictly anti-objectivist theory, not only rejects the dichotomies but actively seeks to deconstruct and demystify epistemological and ideological motivations in the social sciences. [32] The basis of this anthropological opposition in theory and methodology illustrates yet another facet of the thought/action dichotomy within context to the usage of terms such as orthodoxy and orthopraxy; Materialist anthropologies will, as a natural consequence of their theoretical framework of reference, focus on human activities and highlight the elements of praxis (action) and/or orthopraxy in a collective while de-emphasising or negating transcendent, abstract, symbolic or intellectual thought and/or elements of orthodoxy in the same collective. Moreover, Idealist anthropologies will do the exact opposite if their definitions of culture do not include human actions and activities as frameworks of reference together with thought. The accuracy of information derived from anthropologies is thus dependent upon the application of an appropriate anthropological model to any particular culture or religion. 1.4. The Theories
Epistemological
and
Ideological
Basis
of
Anthropological
At the roots of opposing theories and methodologies in anthropology lie a great epistemological question and an ideological movement that are both interconnected and yet remain distinct. The epistemological question concerns humanity as a species and as individuals within cultural collectives. Since ancient times man has wondered about the nature of thought and knowledge and asked the question
of "how do we know what we know?" Man has also questioned human actions and behaviours to ask "what causes us to act?" Many great thinkers have pondered these questions; each contributing to the dialectic of epistemology as the philosophy of knowledge. Some have determined that the intellect is more than just the sensory awareness of the material body while others have gone as far as to say that the material world is just a thought form. Many religions and religious philosophies have determined the intellect to be divine in nature. Others have reacted to this emphasis on intellect and the thought processes of man and denied its primacy while placing the onus for knowledge on physical actions and experience of the world that informs the human brain. Some say that true reality is not the physical world that we see but rather a hidden order that underlies all things and that knowledge and truth derives there from. There are also those who say that the physical world is all that there is and only that which is empirically observable is secure knowledge. Finally, there are men, like Karl Marx, who looked at the suffering of the masses and thought if our knowledge has led us to such ills, we should learn a new way that will serve the majority rather than just the select few thinkers of the world." The influence of Marx's theory, as both a social revolution and a theoretical reform movement, is indisputable. His theoretical reworking of Hegelian philosophy was a direct reaction against the inferred capitalism of a school of thought known as North American Pragmatism, which also finds certain of its roots in Hegelian philosophy. The impact of Hegelian philosophy and of Marxism (with its deliberate emphasis on praxis and de-emphasis of theoria) has changed not only the field of the social sciences but also that of Christian theology.
PART TWO: Orthodoxy versus Orthopraxy in the Christian era 2.1 Relevant Theological and Philosophical Terms There are similarities in the manner in which the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy are generally used in the Social Sciences and how they are used on the most basic level in Christian theology. However, while the Social Sciences generally tend to use the terms in a philosophical or epistemological sense to study and classify the origin of and relation between human thought and action in particular cultural collectives; Christianity tends to use the same words and others in a theological sense to clearly delineate correct thought and action in Christian terms and in accordance with the bible and its derivative doctrines. Hence as Christian theological terms, orthodoxy and orthopraxy denote correct actions guided by the correct thought as determined by Christian doctrines while the Social Sciences' usage of the term studies a culture in respect of the role dogma, rules or correct thought plays in human actions and behaviour. The difference between these usages is fairly evident; in Christianity the terms are used as agents of transmitting Christian culture and in the Social Sciences they are used as projected frameworks of reference to see the same cultural pattern in other religious collectives. Thus for the sake of clarity, it becomes necessary to study the terms and concepts borrowed from the ancient Hellenic Logos to better understand the relation between ancient Hellenic thought and action with that of Christian theology. A relation, which primarily, is both a deliberate 'borrowing' and a natural consequence of writing the New Testament in and translating the Old Testament into the Hellenic language (which has a
particular world view and Reason in the basis of the concepts of the words and language; i.e. the Logos). The conjunction between Christian theology and ancient Hellenic thought and Reason is hence as much a matter of the results of using the Hellenic language to write and translate their canonical texts as it was that of using Classical and Neo-Platonic philosophical thoughts to structure their theological understanding of the use of Hellenic words in the bible. A New Testament written in Aramaic (and hence with an Aramaic worldview) would have led to different Christian theological doctrines as, after all, many of the early Church fathers were not native to Hellas and only had the medium of the Classical philosophers through which to understand the deeper and more profound meanings of Hellenic logoi (words). This becomes selfevident when one looks at the subtle differences in meaning of these terms when used by the Eastern Orthodox Church in Hellas who still preserve the original Hellenic text of the bible compared to those of Western Christianity whose canonical text has been translated into Latin and then further into a host of other languages. The first of these words is Logos itself that Christian theology tends to embrace in the same manner as Herakleitos (whom St. Justin claims was a Christian before Christ) when he says that it is the Logos that will lead people to Orthognosia (correct knowledge) and Orthopraxia (correct actions). 2.1.1. The Christian Logos: The Christian usage of the word Logos is, first and foremost, a 'collecting' or 'collection' of things within the mind and of the words by which they are expressed. This is as result of Logos' root word being 'lego' referring to gathering or collecting which later referred to speech. The Christian Logos is thus both the 'inward thought' and the 'outward form' by which the 'inward thought' is expressed. It was used to denote a 'saying' of God or of man [Matt Matthew 19:21,22; Mark 5:35,36]; the ten commandants [i.e. deka logous; Septuagint: Greek Deut.10.3]; doctrine [Acts 18:15,2; Timothy 4:15] and more specifically the doctrine of salvation through Christ [Matthew 13:20-23; Philippians 1:14]; inward thought as the faculty of thought and reason [Hebrews 4:12]; cause or reason [Acts 10.29]. The term Logos was compared to the Latin oratio and ratio and also the Italia ragionare referring to both thought and speech. It is, however, largely upon the writings of John (who originally wrote in the Hellenic language) and his usage of Logos that much of the theological doctrine about the divine nature and salvation through Christ was originally derived. The Logos of John is (a) a real and personal God [John 1:1]; (b) the Word which was with God before Creation and was one, in essence and nature with God and yet distinct [John 1:1,18]; (c) the revealer or interpreter of the hidden being of God; (d) the reflection and visible image of God and the organ of all His manifestations to the world. "We say that Jesus is the 'on' (existent), the 'on' before all things through whom are all existents. For this is the name above every other name. For 'to on' (the existent) is the principle of names and the principle of substances…indeed have we not said that Jesus is the 'Logos' "with God". Even more. We say he is the Logos "in the principle" and we say this Logos is God. This reality proclaims itself through the herald John. Even demons claim that this is so… Let us consider something if Jesus is the Logos. What is the Logos? I say it is a certain active paternal power which so moves itself and disposes itself that it is in act, not in potentiality. If it is thus why is the Logos with God? Necessarily on account of this: so that through this Logos there might be produced "all things" and without Him, nothing. Therefore God acts through the
Logos and always acts. The Logos is therefore the active power which puts itself in motion so that which is potentiality might be actuality… For the gospel says "in the principle" was the Logos and the Logos was with God. Again it says "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father"… For in God is the Logos and thus in the Father is the Son." From Marius Victorinus' letter to Candidus explaining the Christian Doctrine of the Logos [33] 2.1.2. The Christian Orthodoxia In much the same manner as the Social Sciences, it is generally accepted in Christianity that orthodoxia derives from the Hellenic orthos meaning 'straight', 'upright' and by implication 'correct' and doxia which they translate to mean 'opinion', 'belief' or 'thought'. Western Christian Theology determines Christian Orthodoxia to be that which is considered correct or proper belief, and in particular with reference to the teachings of the early ecumenical church councils from Nicaea to Chalcedon and including the doctrines and practices of Eastern Orthodoxy. [34] It is important to note that Eastern orthodoxia refers to both correct opinions and correct actions deriving from the Church's doctrines and dogmas. Here orthodoxia and orthopraxia are not dichotomous in nature as within the Hellenic conception of thought and action there can be no orthopraxia without orthodoxia to guide and inform it. [35] This is evident by the corollary of orthodoxia and its emphasis upon the performance of correct doctrine in accordance with biblical teachings and doctrines. Furthermore, within the Hellenic conception, the antonyms of orthodoxia are heterodoxia (other opinions/beliefs/thoughts) and kakodoxia (bad opinion) and not orthopraxia. Within this conception of orthodoxia, orthopraxia becomes the correct reaction or response to correct teaching in the manner of a reflective and reflexive action. Thus orthodoxia in a Christian sense is based upon the orthognosia (correct knowledge) of the biblical teachings and doctrines which make up the corpus of Christian theology or theologia (as the Word of God in Christian terms). The roots of the apparent dichotomy between thought and action becomes more identifiable when the development of the word theologia within the early Christian corpus is considered. "We should point out only that during the period directly preceding Plotinus,…'theoria' came to be interpretated in such a way that it was said that in 'theo' - there lies the root of 'theion', 'theos', 'theorein' means: 'looking upon the divine'. This is one specific Greek etymology, as provided, for example, by Alexander of Aphrodisias. We are here concerned with a reinterpretation, one that has its grounds in certain of Aristotle's accounts, yet does not identify the proper sense of the word. 'Theoria' is translated into Latin as 'speculatio' which means pure contemplation; [by this translation thus] 'speculative' means the same as 'theoretical'. The word 'theoria' then came to play a major role in [Christian] theology; where it is opposed to 'allegoria': [in this sense] 'theoria' is that kind of contemplation that identifies historiographical facts just as they are, prior to any 'allegoria'. Finally it [the word theoria] becomes identical to biblical theology and theology pure and simple. The fact that the translation of 'theoria', [namely] 'theologia speculatio' later represents precisely the opposite to exegetical theology [i.e. interpretative or explanatory theology] is one of those peculiar contingencies that occur from time to time in the history of a meaning. (GA, 19, 63) [36] The significance of the synonymous association between the terms theologia and theoria with regard to a dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy is explained [in a Christian understanding] by Max L. Stackhouse, Professor at the Princeton Theological Seminary: "In classical philosophy, PRAXIS was understood to be one of the three basic ways of Knowing, Living and Being in the Kosmos. Praxis stands distinct from, but in a complementary relationship to both POIESIS and THEORIA. Poiesis involves imaginative creation or representation of evocative images. It includes the kind of awareness and orientation to life that can be discovered by aesthetic and kinaesthetic experience. Theoria
involves observation, reporting, interpretation and critical evaluation. It thus includes all that can be known by analysis, systematic study, reflection and contemplation. The central issues of Theoria are less aesthetic or kinaesthetic than ontological, metaphysical and epistemic. In contrast to these, Praxis involves intentional practical engagement whereby people seek to something for the common good. However the kind of life or world orientation that derives from Praxis is not unrelated to Poesis and Theoria." Max L. Stackhouse [37] Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis are the terms used by Aristotle to denote his tripartite divisions of activities through which the soul's potential for knowing could be realised. Within Christianity, orthodoxia, orthognosia, theologia and theoria became synonymously associated. Thus the Aristotelian distinction between Theoria and Praxis and between Praxis and Poiesis thus results later in Western Christianity as a dichotomy between orthodoxia and orthopraxia in an Idealist/Materialist form. Within the Western Christian context, the developing dichotomy between theoria (as exemplifying Christian thought) and praxis (as embodying Christian action) is complicated further by the translation of theoria into the Latin speculatio; a process by which the 'observation' aspect of theoria loses its innate activity and inferential knowledge and is reduced to passive and speculative opinion. It is one instance of the devaluation of ancient Hellenic Reason. The epistemological nature of the anthropological dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy is thus indicated to be between two of the original three Aristotelian activities of knowing; theoria and praxis or what they have translated into English as contemplation/thought versus action. Anthropologists thus seek to identify the forms of knowledge and human activity as theoria and praxis and their interaction or primacy within a collective culture. As has already been noted, some anthropologists reconcile this dichotomy in the manner of a tension of the opposites that illustrates thought and action as interconnected and complementary human activities while others leave it as a binary classification system. 2.1.3. Christian Orthopraxia In its earliest form, Christian orthopraxia referred to the participation in Christian sacraments such as the regular attendance of church services, fasting, prayer and receiving communion. This developed into action which was worthy of the call of God and conformed to the image of Christ [Eph.4:1; Rom.8:29]. In its modern and generalised form orthopraxia has come to mean literally the right practice as the reflective and responsive action or the practical reflection of the knowledge gained through one's concrete experience or reflection on the truth of Christian faith in love and justice. [38] "Praxis, in short, has become the technical term for the 'action/reflection' mode of teaching and learning, one that does not focus primarily on either speculative theory or aesthetic expression but accepts these as possible resources for action." Max L Stackhouse [39] In many Christian theological circles, the relation between theoria and praxis is still not dichotomised but rather exists in a harmonious and unified manner. "The relationship between theory and praxis is nevertheless not simply to be determined in such a way that out of theory, in the form of a conclusion, a practical case of application is made…. In praxis 'theory is
manifested'. From the realisation, i.e. in the praxis of friendship, love, self-giving and forgiveness, is disclosed what friendship, love, self-giving and forgiveness are, what they contain and what they mean." Heinrich Fries [40] From this interrelated concept of the function of Christian praxis in theoria, a further epistemological aspect of these two terms is identifiable; praxis is transformed from its Aristotelian activity through which common sense or practical wisdom could be known into both a specific type of teaching and learning which focuses on the reflection that comes from human action; i.e. learning from experience which differs from the learning and teaching derived from speculative theory or aesthetic expression. It is also through praxis that the Christian values may be truly actualised and known through experience. This sheds a new light on the anthropological use of orthodoxy and orthopraxy as modes of theoria and praxis that identify the manner in which a human cultural collective teaches and learns. However orthopraxia, in its modern Christian form, has gained a new emphasis and active advocacy that actively seeks to promote a primacy of praxis and a deliberate de-emphasis on theoria. This purposeful religious movement brings the true nature of the growing popularity of the usage of the term orthopraxy into perspective and explains the modern dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Christian theology that has simultaneously expressed itself as a theoretical reform movement in the Social Sciences. "These [Christian] theologians moved away from the ancient Greek notion of Praxis and develop a new meaning based on the insights of Hegel, Marx, Freire, and contemporary Christian social thought. Under the combined influence of Aristotle and Plotinus, early Christian thought conferred a greater dignity on theology. Doctrine assumed a primacy, sometimes even an exclusiveness, over praxis in early Christian life. In their critique of the Greek emphasis on theory, liberation theologians have deliberately sought to develop a theology that better integrates theory and practice, doctrine and pastoral action, contemplation and active service of others. Liberation theologians depart from the Aristotelian meaning of praxis as a solely ethicopolitical activity. They hold that the goal of praxis is not simply any good action in the political world, but liberative action that frees people to participate in the polis….liberation theologians also speak of two types of praxis enunciated by Marx; praxis as creative work which satisfies basic needs and praxis as revolutionary work that changes alienating structures. …Following Hegel, Friere underscores the importance of praxis that heightens awareness and changes human patterns of thinking and action. His distinguishing praxis of denunciation and annunciation will be adopted by certain liberation theologians. " Thomas L Schubeck [41] 2.2 The Dynamics of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis in a new form of Praxis "[Matthew L] Lamb believes that what the Greeks and, even more, the Enlightenment minds generated as theory has in modernity developed into a rationale for imperialistic domination. The fact that much of [Christian] theology has become wedded to the [Hellenic] Theoria has brought theory to the brink of nihilism. ...At points, very large claims are made about how certain ideas have shaped oppressive structures of civilization. But is it really the case, for example, that the terrors of racism, classism, imperialism, sexism and colonialism have been especially engendered by Classical and Enlightenment theories, especially those taken up by [Christian] theology? ...One side of this point is that Praxis is based upon Theoria and the former is only as good as the latter upon which it is based. That is a point which the neo-conservative advocates of Praxis also stress. And it is against the way that Classical (especially Greek) philosophical tradition has influenced Catholic social and political life." Max L Stackhouse [42] The Hellenic primacy of Logos as Reason and order was inherent within the very development of the language and the structure of the Hellenic worldview always held that thought directed action. The rise of
philosophy and the politics of the time led to philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle holding a personal preference for a more contemplative life in accordance with the ancient Hellenic concept of Theoria (which will be discussed in Part Three) rather than one wrought with the corruptions and vices of the socio-political sphere of activity (termed praxis by Aristotle). This preference for a life of theoria is believed by certain scholars to have influenced a disjunction in early Christianity and induced its emphasis on theology under which the sociopolitical aspect of praxis became limited and poiesis thus became restricted to only appropriate theological expression. [43] During the Age of Enlightenment (18th century), thinkers further abstracted theoria until it was so detached from poiesis and praxis that its theory of knowledge (i.e. epistemology) no longer had a stable ontological, metaphysical or material nature. As a reaction to the Enlightenment thinkers and to correct what he believed was their erroneous conclusions, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) began to focus once more on the more practical and historical accounts of the attainment of human knowledge. Hegel's use of the German term Aufhebung as the 'simultaneous preservation and transformation of a concept through its interaction with an opposing concept' became thought of as a recasting of the Hellenic praxis in the historical formation of political unities. Hegel's concept of the German Geist (as the 'Spirit' that moves man and his interactions in the making of history and thus is the means by which human knowledge of the world is gained) became the influential concept within this new praxis. From this Hegelian perspective theoria in its sublimated form is the human attempt to convey the patterns made by poiesis and praxis in the reasoning processes that arrive at the truth. In direct antithesis to the Enlightenment thinkers, Hegel repudiated the belief that theoria was the guiding principle of poiesis and praxis. He recast theoria as that which identifies and expresses the human reasoning process which is both poetic and pragmatic. [43] "…Pragmatism as the North American form of Praxis presumes that a creative spirit is at work in human progress and that the purpose of theological, ethic, metaphysical and moral theory is the exploration of existing conditions, to identify possibilities that can be actualized to create values, enhance satisfactions, supply solutions to problems and lend integration in conflicts." Max L Stackhouse [43] The works of Hegel greatly influenced the philosopher, psychologist and [Christian] theologian William James, who is often referred to as the father of American Psychology. Using the Hegelian recasting of praxis and along with concepts from the works of Bacon, Kant, Hume, Reid and Mill; William James developed the North American form of praxis known as Pragmatism. He then applied and developed the definitions of religious experience used in practical theology in accordance with this new Pragmatism. John Dewey later applied this Pragmatism to the formation of professions and in particular the teaching profession and furthermore to the democratic theories of education. It should be noted that theory and practice were deliberately not dichotomised in Dewey's conception and he saw theory as making practice intelligent rather than uninformed. Furthermore he proposed to "intellectualise practice rather than practicalise the intellect". [43] These motifs became highly influential in the development of practical theology in North American seminaries where theology and piety were held to be personal 'inference' policies. The validity of any form of theoria
or poiesis was determined by its usefulness to individuals and communities in general as well as the measure of success and prosperity that any theoria may secure in pragmatic or praxic terms. [43] Karl Marx was hugely influenced by Hegelian philosophy and so much so that he objected to the capitalistic notions that American Pragmatism had associated with Hegelian praxis. To combat this, Marx replaced Hegel's Geist with a human understanding of material and social reality that was stripped of illusion and based purely on rational thought. Through his belief that philosophy was a tool of change in the world, Marx brought forward his ideology that theoria, as the enabler of praxis, was often cast as the tool that oppressed and subjugated the agents of praxis (the workers) through false theoria and the illusory power of poiesis in the form of religion. Within this Marxist ideology, all social dimensions, artist expressions and theories must serve only to clarify the role and function of praxis. The Marxist de-emphasis of theoria was brutal and any individual or collective who placed a primacy on theoria was held to the agents of a manipulative, selfish and controlling form of praxis. [43] During the 1950's and 1960's, the development of dependent capitalism in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba was based on industrialised growth in the form of import substitution. Its impact was a deep economic chasm between a minority ruling/middle class and the majority who ended up in marginalised rural areas and large urban shanty towns. The conditions under which the majority lived were a source of concern for the Christian evangelists and missionaries who ministered to the poor in these regions. These conditions led to strong popular movements that sought to bring about socio-political change in their countries. The Socialist revolution in Cuba became an inspiration to other impoverished people and small armed uprisings broke out in many countries aimed at overthrowing the ruling class and installing a Socialist regime. [44] It was in the midst of this ideology that Liberation Theology began to take form. Catholic missionaries brought their concerns to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and a strong sense of a need for change filled the council. Influenced by Marxist ideology, South American bishops and missionaries began to see Socialism as the orthopraxis of true Christian values and other Christian missionaries (both Catholic and Protestant) employed the tools of Marxism without the emphasis on materialism to affect social reform through raising the consciousness of the communities they served. This Christian work amongst the impoverished and marginalised was the basis of Liberation Theology in practice and inspired the formation of lay Christian communities within these areas where an emphasis was placed on community orthopraxis as their means to liberation and independence. Certain theologians, missionaries and evangelists integrated Marxist tools (i.e. de-emphasis of theoria and emphasis upon this new form of praxis) that would liberate the impoverished and dependent masses by the effects of Christian orthopraxis. In 1971 these new religious reform movements who favoured a social revolution became known as Liberation theologies. The term Liberation theory came to refer to various 20th century theological movements who saw the gospel "in praxis" as liberation from all forms of economic, political, social and spiritual oppression. Their orthopraxis is the practical methods by which they liberate the oppressed as a call of God. [45] The importance of action (and activism) in Liberation theology has both practical and political content within the Christian Faith. [46]
These new Liberation theologies were and are opposed by traditional Christian theologians. However, regardless of opposition, the religious reform movement spread rapidly in some Western countries and influenced even the Social Sciences and other fields of study in a more secularised form. The distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy became an active socio-political dichotomy and new advocates of orthopraxy emerged from all over and in all forms. 2.3 The New Advocates and Forms of Orthopraxy There are modern theologians, both living and dead, who have sought to reconcile the growing disjunction between theoria and praxis by attempting to mediate the dichotomy and balance the socio-historical and existential needs of Christian people. This is done in terms of both faith and practice while upholding both the transcendence of their theology and the immanent needs of their people. [47] There are also those who sought to strengthen the dichotomy, such as the Canadian Jesuit Priest Bernard Lonergan and Johannes B. Metz who believed that it was the responsibility of the Christian Church to guide the direction of history. "Lonergan's primary focus is not the known, but the knowing. Knowing, according to Lonergan, has a compound structure. First, insight is always insight into sensible or imaginable presentations. Thus there is a distinction between experience and insight. Experience occurs on one level, understanding on another. Second, insights occur spontaneously, but it remains to determine whether they are correct or not. Thus there is a further distinction between insight and judgment or reflective understanding." The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology [48] [Johannes B Metz proposes that the Church should] "…seek to contribute to the liberation of noetic praxis from the oppressive academic, ecclesial and social structures which both condition and are conditioned by those [other] theories." Matthew L Lamb from 'Solidarity with Victims: Towards a Theology of Social Transformation' [49] The 'other' theories Metz and Lamb mention in the quotation above refer to those of ancient Hellenic origin, theories whose influence Liberation theologians particularly resent and oppose. Princeton Professor Max L Stackhouse in his book 'Apologia: contextualization, globalization, and mission in theological education' identifies four distinct groups that advocate this new orthopraxis: "[The first group of] Contemporary advocates of Praxis frequently hold that western thought has taken some wrong turns, specifically when, in the history of piety, it elevated Poiesis over Praxis and when, in the history of theology, it elevated Theoria over Praxis. The one becomes preoccupied with religion in its cultic, mythical and liturgical dimensions; the other with reason in its speculative, abstract senses….It is in any case ironically convenient that these three Greek terms represent a typology of current attempts to repudiate the connection between theology and classical philosophy." Max L Stackhouse [50] "Ironically, a second group advocating a recovery of Praxis consists primarily of conservative political philosophers who believe that Post-Enlightenment religious, intellectual and political life is so entranced by abstract theories of modern science that it loses contact with those basic 'natural' structures of human virtues so necessary for any Polis (State) ….A third group consists of 'new philosophers of deconstruction', a still rather inchoate group of intellectuals who hold that theology, ontologically based ethics and classical political philosophy are basically dead topics, as Nietzsche has declared. Radicalising the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' they argue that
talk of the true, the good and the beautiful is basically an echo of faded dreams that were never valid in the first place. [They] …claim that humans today are liberated by knowing that Theoria has no foundations beyond the poetic fantasies of those who play with them and that Poiesis is the Praxis of the strong, devoid of any pretence that it is rooted in any objective vision of the true, the good or the beautiful …the fourth group consists primarily of 'radical' Christians who share with other groups a series of presumptions about intellectual and social history. Many are convinced that religious Poiesis and intellectual Theoria must be subjected to a radical hermeneutics of suspicion, although few know about or care about the practical implications of modern deconstructionism. " Max L Stackhouse [51] This new Western orthopraxy has also attracted the attention of scholars of Eastern Orthodoxy whose research has also identified four different types of orthopraxy within Christianity in the United States alone. They identify these four forms of orthopraxy as: (1) Ultra Conservative/Fundamentalist orthopraxy which consists of strict adherence to old fundamental practices without embracing change or innovation; (2) Traditional orthopraxy as the fulfilment of the requirements of a tradition without applying doctrine; (3) Reform orthopraxy as gradual changes of tradition to best suit new environments and circumstances; (4) Reconstructionist orthopraxy as complete innovation and rethinking of orthopraxy to best suit an American environment. These four types directly correspond to the four types of orthopraxy from Judaism and each of the types can be found in all Christian orthodox jurisdictions. Research indicates that all four types of orthopraxy are also found in converts as well as evangelical and ethnic groupings within Christian orthodoxy. [52] From these scholarly analyses of the new orthopraxy, it is apparent that it is a plurality and not a single form even though as a totality it appears to have arisen from a single source (i.e. Hegelian epistemology). These forms are either religious/spiritual in nature or entirely secular. In both its radical secular and religious forms it is used as a type of deconstructionism to liberate people from theoretical structures believed to be the source of the ills and/or illusions of Western society. The motivations of this deconstructionism are general socio-political reform. The advocates of these orthopraxies are many and promote orthopraxis with a de-emphasis on theoria and poiesis from both religious and secular platforms. Aside from the hope and promises of liberation these new orthopraxies bring, there is another side to the dichotomy and one fraught with genuine concerns about the practical implications and consequences of this new movement. 2.4 Concerns about the New Orthopraxies "It is, of course, very bad form in many centers of theological education today to raise any questions about the priority of Praxis or the current forms of intellectual characterization, socio-historical analysis and liberation theology that turn it [Praxis] into an Orthopraxis. To let it be known that one might have some reservations about any of these is frequently taken as a failure to discern the movement of the Holy Spirit (Geist?) among oppressed people of the world, or as a moral blindness to the practical demands of life in favour of the 'idealist' ideology of white, male, bourgeois and Western cultural imperialism." Max L Stackhouse In the first part of this essay, the implications of non-conformation to orthopraxy as a standard were discussed within context to Professor
Watson of Harvard's research into Chinese culture where conformation to orthopraxy is essential to maintaining cultural identity. As was noted, orthopraxy as a rigid standard thus acts in exactly the same manner as a dogma that effectively excludes or marginalises those who do not act or think in the standard manner. Within this new orthopraxic movement in Christian theology much the same has begun to happen as has been observed by Princeton's Prof. Stackhouse. "Those with other [than Orthopraxis] orientations are unofficially excommunicated (by being told that their views represent the consciousness of oppressive classes). Thus the appeal to Orthopraxis engenders a new sect of fideist [Faith as independent of and/or opposed to Reason] politics for which theology is an instrumental ideology." Max L Stackhouse Hence the very movement that proposes to liberate people from oppressive theoretical structures simultaneously limits the freedom of people by the establishment of another oppressive theoretical structure. Another concern and one that may engender many questions is the simultaneous usage of theology as a tool for fideist politics that heed Metz's call for the Church to direct the course of human history. "There is no doubt that responsible participation in societal life includes political responsibility but some areas of living should be exempt from political interest or manipulation, especially since all serious politics finally involve command over, the use of, or the threat of use of coercive force. This focus on politics by Praxis-orientated liberation theology could easily make [Christian] theology (and religion) into an instrument of power only." Max L Stackhouse [53] Professor Stackhouse also indicates that such liberation does not encourage a critical analysis of the problems of the oppressed people it seeks to make autonomous. From Christian theology in all its forms and especially through the growing popularity of these new orthopraxies, the ancient Hellenic influence upon the situation is evident. The recasting of the Hellenic concepts of logos, theoria, praxis and poiesis and the dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy that has resulted is not a true reflection of Hellenic thought on the matter or the realities of Classical philosophy and the sacred concepts they expressed frequently by means of allegory. Yet the ancient concepts that these words represent have been blamed by some of these new advocates of orthopraxy for seeding the ills of Western civilisation while other advocates have merely dismissed them as poetic illusions of the past that were never real to begin with. The third part of this essay deals with these concepts in their own culture and in accordance with their original definitions and reason.
PART THREE: The Hellenic Logos It is relevant that in anthropological terms and according to leading anthropologist William Geertz (as was discussed in part one), the dichotomy between thought/action; orthodoxy/orthopraxy is also expressed as the dichotomy between the conceptions of order (worldview) and the disposition for action (ethos). This is a crucial understanding of what orthodoxy in a cultural or religious sense truly is; a conception of order or, what in more common terms is called, worldview. In other words, in the same manner as the Christian biblical teachings and theological
doctrines develop the Christian worldview through guiding people to view, understand their place and act within the Christian order of the world; so too does any culture or religion. In places where there is no clear delineation between culture and religion because the religious beliefs are ethnic and shared by the collective, there will simultaneously be no clear disjunction between the cultural and religious conceptions of order or worldview as they will be completely integrated. This is especially evident when the ethnic religion of a collective is simultaneously their State religion or the religion of their leaders. With this in mind, it bears mention that certain religious anthropologies classify ancient Hellenic religion as strictly an orthopraxy with little or no emphasis on any related orthodoxical elements. This classification is based on what anthropologists tend to identify as a lack of cohesive religious thought and theological formulation. As there is no clear delineation between religion and other cultural elements of ancient Hellas, this would also mean that, according to these anthropologists, there was no cohesive formulation of thought or common conception of a religious order in ancient Hellas that provided the impetus for human action/activity or guided and informed the conduct of the people. It would also thus indicate a disjunction between their worldview and their ethos (used in this context to mean the distinctive spirit of a culture in the manner of Hegel's Geist). In simpler terms, anthropologists identify an absence or lack of adequate theoria in amidst what they perceive to be evidence for a primacy of praxis. There is a certain irony in this classification when one considers that it is the very preference for theoria that the advocates of this new orthopraxy accuse Classical ontology of. It is also inconsistent with the verifiable fact that all philosophers did not write only of ontological matters concerning the nature of beings but many of their writings also randomly discuss the nature of the Gods which is, in the ancient Hellenic language, called theologia. The philosophers did not, of course, clearly separate the discussions of the ontologia and the theologia in their works under separate headings or in separate papers as it was generally presumed that everyone who studied such things knew the common Logos (Reason and order). A common Logos which was not only inherent within the very structure and development of the Hellenic language but was also transmitted in a more elaborate form through that which more accurately is called the Palaios Logos (Reason of Old). This Palaios Logos forms the foundation and mainstay of Hellenic thought as the seed from which the dialectic process began as well being the dialectic's formative and cohesive principle. The dialectic process is thus not one of disagreement of opinions but in reality that which refines and develops the Palaios Logos. 3.1 The Palaios Logos and Common Conceptions of Order Those who wish to hear about the Gods should have been well guided from childhood, and not habituated to foolish beliefs. They should also be in disposition good and sensible, that they may properly attend to the teaching. They ought also to know the common conceptions. Common conceptions are those to which all men agree as soon as they are asked; for instance, that all gods are good, free from passion, free from change. Sallustius - On Gods and the Kosmos
The search for order and ordering principles, in one innate to ancient Hellenic culture. Regardless of appears in the form of theogenies, cosmogonies, founding myths, the tuning of instruments, the meter
form or another, is whether such order genealogical myths, of poetry or within
the framework of philosophy or the law; the search for, discovery of and elucidation of order and the ordering principles is evident as a constant motivation for Hellenic thought, expression and action. Herakleitos calls this order, which is hidden under the phenomenological appearance of things, the Logos and the Pythagoreans discovered that it could be expressed in mathematical terms. Stoic linguistic theory later differentiated between the internal logos as thought and the external logos as speech. In philosophy, the search for the principles that clarify the Logos of the Kosmos was made sensible by the development of the concept of Nous (Mind) as an intellectual principle, which for Xenophanes was the means by which the Divine accomplished their ends within the Kosmos and for Empedokles was distinctive from (but not in opposition to) the matter which it worked upon from 'within' (in a manner that is simultaneously transcendent and immanent).[54] In fact, under Empedokles, the Herakleitan and Pythagorean concepts of order were placed under the governance of the purposeful and intellectual force called the Nous whose knowledge encompassed past, present and future simultaneously. By the time of Plato, Logos and Nous along with other important concepts became what is known as the Palaios Logos (Reason of Old) in the same manner as the ancient laws and customs were called the Nomos Arkhaios. As the Nomos Arkhaios was the basis for the development of civilisation (as a verb) and the foundation of the Thesmon (customs) of Hellas so too was the Palaios Logos the basis for not only the development of the language but also the structure of Hellenic thought and the Hellenic worldview. The Palaios Logos is the Reason and Words of the Ancestors and it was and is kept with respect and honour. It is within the Palaios Logos that the common foundation of Hellenic thought and actions may be found. Now in modern times, the entire body of ancient Hellenic writings has effectively passed into the Palaios Logos and this is affirmed by the Supreme Council of Ethnikoi Hellenes who state that: "We don't have one sacred book containing the commands or revelatory words of 'God', whose purpose is to regulate humanity's servile obedience to a celestial dictator. On the contrary, the large number of our texts, numbering many thousands, presents the truth in its entirety. Sacred texts are for us the whole corpus of (ancient) Hellenic Learning, at least those works that have survived the sinister flames of Christian pyres (fire). These texts are the condensation of human reasoning in its attempts to validly interpret the Cosmos in a way liked by the Gods, that is, logically." [55] As the corpus of ancient and primary text Hellenic works are generally accepted by the Ethnikoi to be truth in its entirety it is necessary to move beyond personal opinions and personal terminology to discover the true significance of concepts such as Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy in purely ancient terms and in accordance with the Palaios Logos. As orthodoxy versus orthopraxy deals purely with mortals and their ordering principles or worldview as well as the means by which humans gain knowledge and what guides their impetus for action; it is the corpus of Hellenic ontologia that must be consulted to determine what such terms meant to the ancient Hellenes and how they were used. This may seem strange because in Christianity the same dichotomy is examined in terms of theology. This is only comprehensible when one considers one of the most important differences between Christianity and ancient Hellenic thought. In Christianity, its ontology is incorporated within its theology while in ancient Hellenic thought it is always understood as separate as an absolute convention and necessity. This separation is the means by which to clearly differentiate between the existences of the Gods and the classes of onta (essential or substantial beings).
The reason for this separation is simple and derives back to some of the earliest concepts of the Palaios Logos, i.e. that the individual Gods are immortal and therefore not subject to the eroding effects of time in the world of changes [56] while the prosopon (the phenomenological world and mortal beings) [57] is subject to mortality and divisiveness and hence obviously belongs to a different taxin (order). The theologia deals purely with the nature of the Gods while the ontologia deals with the nature of Beings. The separation begins to take shape with Xenophanes and his repudiation of anthropomorphism. The reason underlying his concern was that for the Gods to be immortal and unchanging, they must be immobile and to accomplish their ends by the power of Nous (intellect/mind) alone. Hence the Gods are seen as immortal and immobile rather than in motion and subject to mortality. By the time of Proclus, the separation between theologia and ontologia was highly developed and the distinction was made clear between the existence and power of each God. From this distinction the difference was clarified between (1) that which transcended ousia (substance) and formal unity and was not bound by the ontic laws of unity and multiplicity or in other words those who were supra-essential, i.e. the theologia and (2) that which was subject to the ontic laws derived from the domain of the Eide or Forms (and was subject to ousia as either essence or substance, i.e. the ontologia). Furthermore, for Proclus, the distinction between Ontology and Theology was the difference between a discourse on taxein (classes or ordering principles) and proper names. The theologia studies the proper name of an individual God as individuated from other Gods while the ontologia deals with taxein (classes or ordering principles). [58]
This convention of separating the ontologia and the theologia is another good example of a common conception of order within the Hellenic worldview and brings the often difficult subject of the myths into perspective. Myths are largely ontological in nature and concern the powers of the Gods rather than the existence of the Gods. The genealogical myths are very often expressions of ontological orders or the classes, functions, essence or permeations of the Gods within the Kosmos. The theologia differs in that it is a study of the Proper Names and nature of the Gods. In this sense the Gods are referred to as Makarês to denote their chief characteristic of Makariotis (the blissful, inert state of perfection and goodness that is the true nature of the Gods). [59] The adjective Theoi is used to refer to the Gods as the multiplicity of organised, systematic, uniform, self-actuating, recurring and perfect Onta (beings) who constitute the Essence of Intellect in the Universe which extends and permeates all things [59]. The adjectives and proper names used to refer to the Gods collectively and individually are thus evidence of a highly formulated and developed religious sense of order and worldview that exists within the ancient Hellenic language itself and is remembered in the logoi (words) that perfectly express each conception of the Hellenic Kosmotheasis. The myths are thus symbolic, interpretative and poetic human gnosis of the nature and order of an essential and substantial reality beyond the phenomenological appearance of things [60] that depicts the essences and permeations of the Theoi ontologically. 3.2 Psyche, Human Knowledge and the Impetus for Praxis (Action)
Some of the most archaic concepts of Psyche (soul) are found in Anaximenes, Anaximander, Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. These are associated with pneuma and aer (air) as that which life depended upon. However, Pneuma was a far deeper concept than it is commonly translated to in the form of breath. It was wind in Homer's usage and used to indicate the inner fervour within people by Xenophanes while for Aristophanes it was the demeanour of a person. [61] In Herakleitos, the concept deepened through the correlation of human breathing during sleep with the unconscious cognitive system that was active while the senses were closed off from the Kosmic Logos of the waking world. By the 6th century BCE, the concept of Psyche incorporated the early functions of the Homeric thymos (as the animating factor of the body and the impetus for heroic virtue) and was understood to be the term that described the psychical totality of a human that correlated to the totality and unity of body parts into the soma (body). The Pre-Socratic philosopher Empedokles took this psychical totality to be a daimon (spirit) that had to undergo various incarnations within a soma (body). In Pindar, Psyche was divine in nature and immortal in so much as it survived the death of the soma (body) and [in the manner of Herakleitos] was active while humans slept and its processes could be observed through dreams. All the motifs of this Palaios Logos are later found in the works of Plato and his tripartite division of Psyche in which he integrates, deepens and expands upon the works of those who went before him. Plato's anamnesis (recollection) is also founded upon Palaios Logos based upon the account which is given of Pythagoras' recollection of his previous incarnations as well as the thoughts of Empedokles and Pindar. Through Plato anamnesis is raised to the level of episteme (secure knowledge) and Psyche becomes that through which we may recollect knowledge of the Eide (Forms). The recollection of this knowledge is made possible because Psyche shares certain qualities with the Eide in that both are immortal, immaterial and invisible. [62] Plato's tripartite division of Psyche is an acknowledgement of the rational and somatic (bodily) functions of the psychês which enables human reflection, observation and participation within a totality of human potential for consciousness, awareness and activity. [63] These three parts of Psyche are: (1) The Logistikon is the rational division of Psyche that in Plato's Phaedo takes on the characteristics of the unitary Psyche. The Timaeus states that it is divine in nature, was created by one of the Demiourgoi and is located in the human head (but not in the brain itself which is allocated as the seat of aesthesis (sensation) which Pythagoras states is one of the supports of Psyche). The logistikon also has a prenatal vision of the eide (forms) and as such is the cognitive archê (principle) of a non-sensory dianeia (genius and associated with Nous which Pythagoras determines to be another support of Psyche). This division of Psyche is the 'ethical' ruler of the lower two parts of Psyche. Its natural function is dianeia (genius) and logismos (logic) and when it is beset by the pathoi (passions) of the body, aesthesis (sensation) results. [64] (2) The Thymoeides (the enspirited) receives communication from the logistikon and acts upon it. This division is very much in line with the Homeric Thymos as an early conception of Psyche which was heroic in nature and in motion and animated the soma (body) during life and was the impetus for heroic activity although it was only in the later work of Aristotle that it was formally associated. Upon its departure at death,
only the motionless soma remained. In Thales, an identical notion of Psyche is found in that he concludes that the power to produce kinesis (motion) is evidence of the existence of Psyche. He extends this early conception of Psyche to include the ensouled nature of inanimate objects which can cause kinesis (motion) in other things, such as the magnesian stone (magnet). The Atomists also held Psyche to be the source of motion. Their perception of Psyche was that of an aggregate of spherical and fiery atoms that were both in motion and the cause of motion. [65] (3) The Epithymetikon (the appetitive) receives no communication from the logistikon and pursues physical pleasures and is sometimes tempered by dreams and divination. [66] It is the division of Psyche which the seat of epithymon (desires in terms of longing or wilful desires). [67] Each division of Psyche has its own appropriate arêtes (virtues) and pathoi (passions). [68] Furthermore, Plato distinguishes between primary motions that are of Psyche itself and secondary motions that are somatic (related to the physical body). As the logistikon is autokineton (selfmoved) and in aeikineton (perpetual motion), Plato's conception of Psyche is very similar to the Pre-Socratic motif of Kinesis (motion) and Alkmaeon's conception of Psyche in aeikineton (perpetual motion). Plato develops and refines this earlier Pre-Socratic motif in that the selfmoved Nous (mind) which is within the logistikon participates in true reality through its connection to the Eide (Form) of Kinesis and this 'self-motion' is the ousia (essence) and definition of Psyche. [69] Aristotle determined the kinesis (motion) of Psyche to be circular in nature thus identifying that Psyche is in motion because it is the final cause [of Psyche] and movement is originated by noesis (thought) and proairesis (choice). Aristotle revises the Platonic concept of Forms and in a more materialist sense states that Psyche has no innate knowledge of the Eides (Forms) but is in itself the eide (form) of the soma (body). Aristotle was not however referring to the shape of the body but rather the Psyche as the actuality of the soma (body), i.e. Psyche is that which enables the capacity for life and upon which life is dependent (which is the same as with all other conceptions of Psyche except said with far more complexity). [70] He identifies this actuality as a potentiality or more simply put a dunameis (capacity/influence/power) [71] for Psyche to engage in functions or activities. Aristotle returns to the tripartite division for the dunameis of Psyche which he categorises in the form of a nested hierarchy (i.e. the higher powers of Psyche possess the lower powers as well): (1) Plant (Phyton) Psyche which possesses the Threptikon (the Nutritive power) which is the basic requirement for Zoë (Life) and gives the capacity for growth, decline and nourishment. (2) Animal (Zöon) Psyche which possesses the Threptikon but also the Aesthetikon (the power of Sensory Perception) thus gaining the additional capacity for perception/awareness as well as the capacities of Orekiton (appetitive), Epithymia (desiderative) and Voulesis (will), Thymos (enspiritedness) and Kinetikon kata topon (motion according to place/environment) (3) Rational (Logikon) Psyche which has the powers of Threptikon and Aesthetikon as well as the capacity for Intellect (or thought) through the power of Dianoetikon (Genius) These dunameis roughly correspond to the various functions within earlier concepts of Psyche such as the Homeric Thymos, etc as well as the Platonic tripartite division with a few slight changes in detail but no change in structure. Aristotle differs in that he includes plants within
his ensouled life forms and does not separate the appetitive or desiderative capacity of Psyche from the Logikon as Plato does with the Epithymetikon. Aristotle, like Demokritos, Epikouros and Speusippos, determines Aesthesis (Sensory Perception) to be the beginning point of all knowledge. Aristotle too, like Pythagoras and Demokritos believed that the conclusions of Logiki (rational thought as a function of both Aristotle's Logikon and Plato's Logistikon) had to be supported by sensory input. This correspondence of Reason to Reality (i.e. total comprehension/understanding) was held by the ancient Hellenes to be Aletheia (Truth). [72] Aristotle, in his discussion on the Logos of Psyche further identified five hexeis (ways of knowing as moral and intellectual virtues) by which the Logikē Psyche (Rational Soul) could arrive at Aletheia (truth). "Let it be assumed that there are five [ways of knowing; hexeis] through which the [rational; logikē] psyche comes to truth by way of affirmation and denial, namely art [technē], scientific knowledge [episteme], practical wisdom [phronesis], wisdom [sophia], and nous. Judgement and opinion are capable of error [and are therefore excluded]. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics [73] The Hexeis are, however, only potentialities and for them to be actualised, they must be put to use, i.e. the potential for knowing through different kinds of knowledge must find an appropriate activity through which that which may be known can actually become known. Thus Aristotle assigns each hexis (way of knowing) to have a corresponding energeia (activity). As the hexeis (ways of knowing) of Nous and episteme (scientific knowledge) are both ways of knowing that are products of the intellectual process (namely induction and deduction) they are unified under Sophia (Wisdom) and assigned a single activity. Aristotle determines these three energeia (activities) to be [73]: (1) Theoria as the activity of Sophia (including Nous and Episteme) (2) Praxis as the activity of Phronesis (3) Poiesis as the activity of Technē [73] (Note: these will be discussed at greater length in the next section)
In the same manner as Aristotle, Epikouros of Samos also proposed that Psyche was materialistic and vitalising in nature and that its full potential was actualised within a soma (body). By unifying certain concepts from the Palaios Logos, Epikouros (like the Atomists) held Psyche to consist of atoms which act upon and are acted upon by the atoms of the soma (body) and resembled pneuma and heat mixed (as per the PreSocratic concept of pneuma). Epikouros differed in that, for him (and later Lucretius), Psyche was not immortal and had no existence outside of the soma (body). [74] The Stoics too revisit the Palaios Logos and determine Psyche to be fiery or heated pneuma. For them, the ruling part is the Hegemonikon which in humans is called the Nous (mind) or Dianeia (genius) which is very similar to that of Plato's Logistikon and Aristotle's Logikon. The Hegemonikon is completely rational when fully developed or matured and manifests four mental powers; (a) the capacity to receive impressions; (b) to assent to or concur [with these received impressions]; (c) to form intentions to act in response to them and (d) to do these things rationally. [75] Epictetus also determines the ruling part of Psyche to be the Hegemonikon and defines it as the epistemic and moral way of knowing/disposition of a human. [75] The Neo-Platonists expanded and developed Plato's relation between Psyche and the eides (forms) with their highly developed theory of
sympatheia and assign a medial position for Psyche between the noeta (mental) and the aestheta (sensory impressions). [76] Plotinus affirms this and elucidates that Psyche is a product of and eikon (likeness) of Nous that is both turned inward to its source [toward the Nous] and outward towards the world [which it vitalises]. In turning inward Pysche is fertilised by the Nous and produces activities that 'move outward' such as aesthesis (sensation) and growth. By participation in the En, Psyche becomes a plurality of individuated Psychês that are unified through sharing a common source and natural function but are differentiated in that they operate in and over distinct somata (bodies). Through the unitary nature of Psyche, Plotinus identifies a systematic plurality of Psychês within the framework of Kosmic sympatheia. The distinctions and gradations of the Psychês provide the foundation for the continuation of belief in palingenesia (rebirth). The function of Psyche in Plotinus remains synonymous with the Palaios Logos, Plato and the Stoics before him and Psyche is thus said to vitalise and govern matter. [77] In Proclus, Psyche is seen in terms of the trias (mean and two terms) and hence there are three types of Psychês: (1) the divine Psychês (the Ouranioi, including those of the planets); (2) the Psychês that pass from intellection to ignorance (noesis) and (3) [in the manner of Empedokles before] the Daimones (further subdivided by Proclus into the Psychês of angeloi (messengers); daimones (spirits) and heroes). Proclus too affirms the Palaios Logos and Psyche maintains its intermediary position through its participation in eternity by reason of its ousia (essence/substance - as per Plato) and within time through its energeia. So too does Proclus preserve palingenesis (rebirth) although he denies that psyche can be reborn into animals. Proclus discusses Psyche as being both Zoë (Life) and zoön (living things) thus affirming Plato's 'ousia (essence/substance) of Psyche. [78] From this account of the ancient Hellenic ontological thought regarding the origins of human knowledge and the impetus for human action, it is clear that such functions/capacities belong to the Hellenic conception of Psyche (soul). It is also evident that there is cohesion of thought concerning Psyche that affirms and develops the Palaios Logos through the centuries. This consistency of thought exists within the very structure of order as the Logos within the Hellenic Kosmotheasis (worldview) regardless of minor variations in expressing the ratio (as another form of Logos) of the divisions of capacities, powers and functions to one another within Psyche. The ontology implicitly specifies that it is intellect that guides actions and actions that actualise the intellect through activity. Thought and action is thus co-equal, complementary and harmonious within the ancient Hellenic ontology. This consistency of thought concerning Psyche is found too within the body of myths. In Homer, the Theoi as the essence of the Intellect within the Kosmos interacts with the world of mortals and guides their actions. This is especially apparent in the Iliad through Zeus' (who is identified with Nous) guidance of the heroes' thymos (as not only the Homeric conception of Psyche but also the source of heroic arête and the coordinated motion of the heroes virtuous thoughts and actions). Another example is given by the Stoic Kleanthes who states that the myth of the birth of Athena from the head of Zeus concerns the emergence of Wisdom from Nous and the location of the Hegemonikon as within the Nous of Zeus. A final and elegant example is that offered by Damaskios: [79] “By the method of Kore the psyche descends in genesis [conception/creation],
By the method of Dionysos it is fragmented at genesis [i.e. [conception/creation], By the method of Prometheus and the Titans it is bonded with the body, It is liberated [by] acquiring the powers of Heracles, It is gathered through Apollo And, by Athena Soteira it is cleansed through the true philosophy, [and] it is brought cause/purpose by Demetra” Damaskios Damaskios thus explains much of the formulated ontological structure underlying many of the myths in this quotation. It illustrates not only the fragmentation of Psyche in the manner of the relation between unity and multiplicity which is an ontic law but also shows the intimate bond between Psyche and soma (body). The method of liberation is also clarified by the power of Herakles which is the heroic thymos as the coordination of thought and action in arête. The gathering of Psyche by Apollon is a direct reference to the harmonising power of the Logos (i.e. the tripod and the lyre) while the katharsis (cleansing) of Psyche is the 'saving' wisdom (i.e. true philosophy) of Athena Soteira and given cause/purpose by Demetra who, as the mother of Kore, is both the beginning and the end of the motion of Psyche thus indicating a circular motion. This affirms the existence of orthognosia (correct knowledge) concerning Psyche within the ancient Hellenic ontological writings of both philosophy and mythology. This orthognosia not only offers a spatiotemporal perspective of the place of the human Psyche within the Kosmos but it also gives a sense of order to the Hellenic Kosmotheasis concerning the origins of human knowledge and the impetus for action. "The ancient debate on the substance of the soul is clearly different from that of the later Western tradition about the mind which is centred on the dichotomy between consciousness and matter. For there is no question in antiquity that body and soul interacts with one another and that consciousness entails certain physical processes." Roberto Polito [80] 3.3 Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis According to the accounts of Cicero and Iamblichus, Pythagoras identified three different types of people that attended the Festival Games. The first type consisted of those who went as observers, the second were the competitors and the third comprised those who sold their wares at the games. These three distinctions were revisited by not only Plato but also later Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato's tripartite division of the psyche (soul) into logistikon, thymoeides and epithymetikon roughly corresponds to these three Pythagorean 'types' as does Plato's three functional 'class' divisions as found within his Republic: (1) Philosopher 'Guardians', (2) Political 'Auxillaries (in the form of civil servants and military) and (3) those, either rich or poor, who engage in economic activities. Aristotle affirms the traditional divisions with his five hexeis (ways of knowing) and the three energeia (activities) that correspond to these five hexeis. (1) Theoria as the activity of Sophia (including Nous and Episteme) (2) Praxis as the activity of Phronesis (3) Poiesis as the activity of Technē
These three energeia (activities) correspond to the three different lifestyles which people tended to gravitate towards according to their activities or disposition (and as per Pythagoras' insight): (1) The contemplative (nous/episteme/sophia and theoria); (2) The practical (phronesis and praxis); (3) The productive (technē and poiesis). Now it is important to note that each of the hexeis (ways of knowing) and each of the energeia were held to be co-equal in Aristotelian thinking although Aristotle's own personal preference lay with a life of theoria. It is also important to remember that in Aristotelian terms the kinesis (motion) of Psyche is circular. The hexeis are thus both the impetus for the energeia and the telos (purpose/perfection) of the energeia. [81] Hence without engaging in theoria, the soul potential for nous, episteme and Sophia will never be realised or known and without praxis, one will be without any true knowledge of phronesis in the same manner as without technē the perfection of poiesis will never be attained. Furthermore, the importance of theoria is usually stressed because without it, nous (which most agree to be the ruling part of Psyche) and its intimate relationship with logos (reason) will not become an actuality and Reason or rationality (as the guiding principle for thought and action) will remain unrealised thus leading to irrationality and disorder. This brings Herakleitos' identification of logos as the guiding principle for orthognosia and orthopraxia into a new perspective as it is through the nous that logos guides thought/opinion into becoming orthognosia and action into becoming orthopraxia. Aristotle clearly determines the dynamics of these energeia (i.e. theoria, praxis and poiesis) to consist of two separate and distinct relations; (1) theoria to praxis and (2) praxis to poiesis. Before discussing the significance between the Aristotelian relation of theoria to praxis and praxis to poiesis it is necessary to explore how the terms were used in the ancient Hellenic language. 3.3.1 The ancient meaning of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis (a) Theoria "We can, in conclusion, say that the constant in Greek philosophy is theorein, now emphasised in its speculative value and now in its moral value, but always in a way where the two values reciprocally are involved in a structural way. Moreover, a proof of this is in fact previously expressed by C. de Vogel that the Greeks always maintained that true philosophers are only those who know how to exemplify a coherence of thought and living, and hence are teachers not only of thinking but living." Giovanni Reale and John R Catan [82] Originally, in Pre-Socratic times, the term theoria referred to observation and theoroi (plural) to those observers who were sent to games, oracles or religious festivals within Hellas and abroad to report on or observe the events that transpired. Theoria is not an activity that involves just looking at particulars (i.e. in the manner of the verb skopeo) but is rather a mode of apprehension and comprehension through observation. [83] Within philosophy, theoria retained its meaning of observation and simultaneously came to refer to the contemplative life in a metaphorical manner that retains all the nuances of its earlier usage. As a contemplative mode within philosophy theoria thus comes to denote the activity of apprehending and comprehending universals such as Logos, Nous, Psyche, Agathon, Dikeosyne (Justice), etc, through observation.
"In his title essay 'In Praise of Theory', the German philosopher, Hans Georg Gadamer suggests two senses of theoria [theory in the Hellenic sense of the word], both derived from its Greek etymon. It is a form of seeing. This does not mean 'seeing that which is' simply in the sense of observing ambient phenomena, rather it involves seeing things of fundamental importance, catching a glimpse of the secrets beneath the surfaces of the visible. At the same time theoria refers to the functions of an envoy sent to participate in, for example, a religious ceremony or communal games. Since the envoy is an official representative of his home city, his role has a political aspect. The 'theoros' is both witness and participant and his presence is also a mode of intervening in public affairs. Theory then is not disinterested, disengaged contemplation of immutable truths; it is a form of involvement which alters the context in which it appears." Colin Davis [84] Furthermore and very importantly, from the ancient perspective, there is no distinction between the observer and what is being observed. Hence the modern distinction between subject and object does not exist. Observation or contemplation is thus simultaneously participation. [85] This type of observation/participation (i.e. participation mystique) was also the mode by which the ancients approached theatre as a didactic medium. The theoria of the philosopher is merely a metamorphosed observation of the universal principles in real life and the Kosmos in much the same manner as theatre goers would observe the principles of human life reflected through poiesis upon the stage. "In the same way, Greek metaphysics, still conceives the essence of 'theoria' and of 'nous' as being purely present to what is truly real and for us too, to act theoretically [in the Hellenic sense of the word] is defined by the fact that in attending to something, one is able to forget one's own purposes. But theoria is not to be conceived primarily as subjective conduct, as a self-determination of the subject, but in terms of what is contemplating. Theoria is true participation, not something active but something passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and carried away by what one sees." Hans Georg Gadamer [86] "Plato in the Phaedrus already portrayed the lack of understanding shown by rational analysis in mistaking the ecstasis of 'being-outside-oneself' by regarding it as the mere negation of being collected and thus as a kind of derangement. In truth, being-outside-onself is the positive possibility of being fully there in the presence of something. Such being has the character of self-forgetfulness. It constitutes the essence of the spectator to be given over, in self oblivion, to what he sees." (GW 1, 131) [87] Karl Kerenyi believed this to be an important facet of Hellenic religion which he interprets to be a religion of Schau (German: showing or seeing) which in the words of Hannelore Rausch may be understood as: "For the Greeks, festivity and the point of view of the spectator are inextricably connected and we now understand that in the Greek feast this situation of thea [the act of seeing and the root word of theoria] is always repeated as the one in which the Gods and the human beings come together." Kerenyi also notes that the Gods too come to festivities as theoroi (observer/participants) and he describes the fundamentals of Hellenic religion as one that is "a reciprocal, active and passive, vision, a spectacle in which men are both viewers and viewed." In Plato's Republic, the philosophical theoros ascends to the Eide (Forms) not only to apprehend the Good but also to take the pattern for Arête in ordering their own life as well as that of society and the individual. [88] Hence it is through Theoria that the philosophical ascent to the Forms occurs and through contemplation that the basis for virtuous praxis (action) is found. Perhaps the finest manner in which to
understand the sacred nature of this philosopher's ascent to the Eide (Forms) within a Platonic framework may be found in Plato's Symposium where Diotima likens the contemplation of the Eide as akin to the epotika (revelation) of the Greater Eleusinian Mysteries. Diotima uses the technical language of the Eleusinian Mysteries to refer to the theoroi (observers) who come for the first time as mystes (initiates) and afterwards as epoptes (watchers). [89] Another good Platonic analogy of the journey of the theoros and the activity of theoria is that of what is commonly called Plato's Cave (which is again offered as 'alike unto' to the Eleusinian mysteries that began in darkness and ended in a blaze of light). One particular reference to the 'Cave' explains the type of 'seeing' that is the activity of the theoros: "But our argument indicates that the capacity for knowledge is innate in each man's mind and that the organ by which he learns is like an eye which cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole body is turned; in the same way the mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of all realities which is what we call the good… The rest, therefore, of what are commonly called arêtes of the mind perhaps resemble those of the body, in that they are not in fact innate, but are implanted by subsequent training and practice." [90] From this it is possible to see that the highest virtue is thus goodness which is innate and found both through and within Psyche. Bringing this internal goodness to the fore is thus the aim of the ascent of the theoros. Aristotle also uses the word 'theorein' in manner that illustrates the totality of its ancient meaning and describes observation in the manner by which one would observe a custom referring not only to the watching or seeing of something but also to the participation therein. His exact treatment of the word has an implicitly ethical implication within its conceptual usage as he refers to 'the observation of neighbours actions as the means by which eudaimonia (happiness) may be attained'. In other words, if a neighbour greets you, it is appropriate to greet them or if a neighbour invites you to his house, it is appropriate to invite him to yours. Aristotle also thus implies that it is only in the total understanding of one's neighbour's actions that happiness may be achieved. [91] (b) Praxis The word praxis derives from the verb pratto which means to act. It refers directly to the activity of taking action or 'acting' and is not concerned with what is accomplished or results from the act. However, it does not refer to any or all physical actions but firstly to that of a reciprocal act or participation in an interactive act. In other words, in a similar manner to eudaimonia (happiness), praxis is not isolated but requires the presence of others or something else in an interactive way. As such, any interactive act may be called praxis and the ancients used the word to both describe political or communal actions as well as sexual intercourse. As an interactive act, praxis may refer to the act of loving someone or taking revenge upon them equally. It is also the root of the word eispraxis which means 'I earn' in the manner of reciprocal compensation. Praxis may also be used to denote participation in a military operation where individuals are coordinated and act together interactively. In the same manner praxis also denotes the actions of the individuals who collectively govern a polis via their corresponding and interactive civic functions. [92]
In more technical terms, praxis denotes an action whose result is its own telos (purpose/perfection/end) and it is in this sense (as well as etymologically) that praxis stands in opposition to poiesis. "To be practical in the Aristotelian sense does not only mean the competence to apply 'theoria' to concrete situations; it, in fact, refers to a world of free and creative 'praxis' (action) beyond the noisy world of productive technological endeavours." Daniel Franklin Pilario [93] From the above quotation, praxis in Aristotle's usage of the word becomes clearer. For him, praxis refers to the skilled application of theoria (i.e. using rationale or critical analysis to make a decision or solve a problem) indicating that praxis is neither purely reason or purely action but a combination of the both with theoria acting in conjunction with and informing praxis. [94] Yet praxis is more than this too and is simultaneously any rational action that is voluntary and does not seek to produce anything other than its own activity. Aristotle further makes a distinction between praxis and those actions which produce things through craft (such as shipbuilding, shoemaking, poetry, etc) Aristotle put forward that for arête (virtue/personal excellence) to be actualised, it must become praxis (i.e. an interactive action) for it is insufficient to hold the potential for and have knowledge of virtue and never use it or apply it. This is an important statement as it illustrates that personal virtue is not a reality unless it is reflected in one's actions towards one's fellow human beings. The praxis of personal arête is thus not a solitary activity that one pursues on one's own but is rather an interactive and communal action. If one considers this statement within context to the Pythagorean/Socratean/Platonic association of the innate talents and abilities inherent with Arête and Agathon, this is Aristotle's call for such talents and abilities to be initialised within students of Ethics and Political Sciences if they should truly wish to be a benefit to the polis. Praxis is caused by and is the perfection of phronesis (common sense/practical wisdom). (c) Poiesis The term poiesis derives from the verb poiō referring to construction of something. Poiesis also denotes the technē (craft writing poetry) from whence derives poiema (poem) and poietis (poet). word has also been used in manner to denote the actualisation of power of a God, i.e. "Zeus is making it rain". [95]
the of The the
Aristotle uses poiesis to denote the activity related to any technē (craft) and furthermore defines poiesis (in a manner that is antithetical to praxis) to refer to the making or construction of something that has an aim (telos) that lies outside of its own activity; i.e. the telos (purpose) of building a ship is not the building itself but rather the sailing of the ship. [96] Within context to poiesis as the energeia (way of knowing how it works) of technē (craft); Aristotle defines technē as any craft, skill or art which is the purpose/result or perfection (i.e. telos) of poiesis. He furthermore determines technē to be a productive potential or capacity which is informed by an understanding of its own intrinsic rationale; i.e. the rationale of building a ship is different to the rationale of writing a poem and simultaneously the rationale of building a ship is related to the rationale of sailing a ship.
In the mass production of crafts, the multiple applications of a particular skill or in the performance/creation of an art there is also a level of inherent mimesis (artistic imitation) within poiesis which renders it reflective of life. Within context to human life, Aristotle observes that the development of culture is, in part, the evolution of technē (craft) and that the first products of human society were necessities while further developments improved the quality of life. The definitions alone of these terms only begin to show the significance of the ethical concerns posed by Aristotle in his separation of theoria, praxis and poiesis into the dynamics of the two separate comparisons of theoria to praxis and praxis to poiesis. 3.3.2 Theoria, Praxis and Human Fulfilment The first distinction between Praxis and Theoria centres on the Classical debate about which type of lifestyle is best suited for human happiness and fulfilment, i.e. a life of contemplation (theoria) or a life of political and interactive activity (praxis). Even though Aristotle too favoured Plato's emphatic emphasis on the superiority of choosing a contemplative life, it is important to bring Plato's choice into the context of his own life and experience of political life. This is important because it is this very preference for theoria that Christian Liberation theologians blame for causing the ills of Western civilisation. Plato's 7th Letter which he wrote as an old man reflecting on his younger years may bring his own experience of political life into the context of his choice for a contemplative life. "The existing constitution, which was subject to widespread criticism, was overthrown…and a committee of Thirty [was] given supreme control. As it was some of them were friends and relations of mine and they at once invited me to join them, as if it were the natural thing for me to do so. My feelings were what to be expected in a young man: I thought they were going to reform society and rule justly, and so I watched their proceedings with great interest. I found that they soon made the earlier regime look like a golden age. Among other things they tried to incriminate my old friend Socrates, whom I should not hesitate to call the most upright man then living, by sending him, with others, to arrest a fellow citizen and bring him forcibly to execution; Socrates refused, and risked everything rather than make himself party to their wickedness. When I saw all this, and other things as bad, I was disgusted and drew back from the wickedness of the times. … Finally I came to the conclusion that all existing states were badly governed and that their constitutions were incapable of reform without drastic treatment and a great deal of good luck. I was forced, in fact, to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become, by some miracle, true philosophers." Plato [97] Socrates further justifies abstention from a political life in Plato's Republic: "One who has weighed all this keeps quiet and goes his own way, like the traveller who takes shelter under a wall from a driving storm of dust and hail; and seeing lawlessness spreading on all sides, is content that he can keep his hands clean from iniquity while life lasts…" [98] The true matter at hand then is not only what type of lifestyle is best suited for human happiness but what type of lifestyle is best suited for personal arête (virtue as excellence) when faced with the corruptions of political life. Plato firmly believed that the contemplative philosopher should participate in the political life of a good city but to refrain
from participation in the politics of corrupt regimes which were (and are) commonplace. In the Republic, Plato identifies the ideal role of the theoros (i.e. a person who engages in theoria) as one of the Philosopher/Guardians: "Then our job as lawgivers is to compel the best minds to attain what we have called the highest form of knowledge, and to ascend to the vision of the Good as we have described and when they have achieved this and see well enough, prevent them from behaving as they are not allowed to… [They are not allowed to be left] remaining in the upper world and refusing to return again to the prisoners in the cave below, and share their labours and rewards, whether trivial or serious. …The object of our legislation is not the special welfare of any particular class of society, but of society as a whole, and it uses persuasion or compulsion to unite all citizens and make them share together the benefits which each individually can confer on the community; and its purpose in fostering this attitude is not to leave everyone to please himself, but to make each man a link in the unity of the whole" [98] This statement clarifies Plato's vision. Socrates believed the concepts of Arête (Virtue) and Agathon (Beneficial Good) included innate talents and abilities and the cultivation thereof. This association of Arête and Agathon was first held by Pythagoras who determined Arête to be the harmony of Psyche (soul). Socrates and Plato affirm this Palaios Logos by logically concluding that if the cultivation of individual talents and abilities lead to the harmony of Psyche in the individual thus the virtue and harmony of a State would be determined by the harmonious and appropriate placement of each citizen (as a part within a whole) according to their individual talents and abilities. These intrinsic potentials within each individual were what Aristotle was referring to in his identification of three life styles and three types of energeia (ways of knowing). With further regard to this; it is crucial that the allegorical nature of Plato's Republic not be forgotten: "And so the recapitulation of 'The Republic' which appears before the section on physics addresses itself to a consideration to the structure of the universe by means of eikonikos [as likeness/representation/reflection]" Proclus Hence whatever distinctions exist between Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics are simultaneously metaphorical differences. Aristotle's lifestyles and the energeia with which they are associated are thus not so much a political statement about social classes as they are a metaphor for and of the multidimensional (and holographic) order within all things. From this perspective they are the innate potentials and activities of: (a) The Universe; (b) the State as a collective of individuals and (c) an individual. While the energeia of theoria, praxis and poiesis are within each rational Psyche; they create a disposition or tendency in individuals towards certain types of knowledge and lifestyles. However, all three are necessary for the different aspects of life and are developed to a greater or lesser extent as a natural consequence of living. "We must be content, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions which are no better… " Aristotle [99] In this quotation Aristotle clarifies that such distinctions as between three energeia and the three types of lifestyles are structural paradigms through which the student of Ethics and Political Science may reduce the
complex compound of human life and knowledge into simplistic order to know the 'whole' by a study of its parts. The Nichomachean Ethics is thus not an instruction manual for rather the means of accumulating the knowledge which will actions.
elements in purpose of action but inform our
The concept of restructuring a corrupt society is also visited by Zeno in his Politeia where he restricts membership to only those who are good and virtuous and excludes wretched people on the basis of them being 'hateful', 'enemies', 'slaves' and 'aliens to one another'. This was Zeno's way of illustrating that no true community is possible while the wretched are mixed among the good because the wretched destroy the basis for true fellowship in their passion-ridden pursuit of false values. Although later Stoics would reject some of Zeno's proposed 'reforms', his central position was affirmed by Cleanthes and Chrysippos who adhered to the wise/ignorant dichotomy. The central Stoic concern was achieving homologia with their rational nature and that of the Kosmos. The earthly political life was transcended within their thinking due to the inconsistency between earthly laws and constitutions with the Orthos Logos (the will of Zeus and the 'plan' of Physis/Nature). The homologia which the Stoics sought to attain is similar to the harmony of psyche as a state of Arête (virtue). Zeno's dichotomised society of men, like Plato's and Aristotle's, is an allegory of the parts of Psyche and the struggle of the individual to find from freedom from the governance of the irrational, appetitive and desirous tendencies (that are not governed by the Orthos Logos/Nous). Such allegories admirably represent the holographic and geometrically three dimensional Logos of Hellenic conception that is perhaps best summed up by Thales when he said "All things are full of Gods". The Divine Logos is thus within everything and orders everything in accordance with the design of Physis (Nature as 'self-emergent'). The same Logos (as an underlying order) is found in the Kosmos as it is found within Psyche. The structure of a polis reflects this Logos too but sadly is subject to the irrational desires or passions of its leaders/lawgivers and the corrupt state of political life in many places bears witness to this. [100] The corruption of a polis is thus an important factor in whether participation therein (i.e. praxis) could truly be ethical or not. It would, after all, not be ethical to assist a politically corrupt regime to the detriment of both personal arête as well as the beneficial good of the human collective. Within Plato, the ethical options of life under a corrupt regime are limited to either complete withdrawal or political and constitutional reform. For Socrates, Plato and later the Stoics, no eudaimonia (happiness) was possible in the political life under the governance of wicked men. The question is thus raised by Aristotle whether eudaimonia, as happiness which may only be complete by the eudaimonia of others, is a possible achievement within the contemplative and sometimes solitary life of a theoros. "All this indicates clearly that the being of self as 'praxis' which is developed in books VI and X of Nichomachean Ethics and which appears to argue that 'theoria' is ultimately a solitary, free and independent activity makes sense only insofar as this solitary activity first arises and remains a genuine possibility of human existence, only in a political context, of being with others each of whom are equally free in their being. The continuity and solitariness of 'theorein' [observation as contemplation] as the highest
way of relating to being (to the worldly being of beings as a whole) should thus, in its intrinsic import, properly be understood ontologically (as finitude and individuation of one's freedom) and not as an ontic isolation of the individual from others." William McNeill [101] Aristotle determines theoria as the activity of the mind (i.e. the energeia of the nous) for its own sake. From this it is clear that theoria and praxis are not a dichotomy because they share a similar characteristic in that they are both fulfilling purposes in themselves and have no product other than their own activity. Aristotle furthermore identifies that theoria is distinguished from praxis (action) in that it [theoria] is directed either to reality or to the object of physis (nature) and applied to such things such as philosophy, astronomy, cosmology or mathematics. Theoria is distinguished as an intellectual rather than moral virtue and for Aristotle, the contemplation of the universe for its own sake results in self-sufficiency or autonomy. [102] Theoria within Psyche is hence the act through which reason and rationale may become the ruling part of the soul and free it from enslavement to the pathoi (passions). This is illustrated in the metaphorical analogy of the primacy of the contemplative life in Aristotle and the rise to power of the class of Philosopher-Guardian rulers in Plato. The use of such metaphorical analogies is merely the philosophers' way of pointing out to students that much may be learnt of universals and principles from observing life. Both theoria and praxis are a source of virtue and eudaimonia (happiness) because theoria is not a solitary experience but rather an autonomous one where the theoros participates in the true reality of things through their observation both in participation mystique and through informing praxis in a complementary and interdependent manner. To further understand the significance between actions that are an end in themselves and those that result in products outside of their own activity, the comparison and distinction between praxis and poiesis is relevant. 3.3.3 Praxis, Poiesis and Human Motives The second distinction between Praxis and Poiesis concerns the difference between action and production and the difference between 'doing' and 'making'. This distinction derives from the roots of both words and their opposition to one another; praxis derives from the root verb of pratto meaning "I am working" (indicating a work in process or a 'doing' of something already in existence) while poiesis which derives from the verb poiō which means "I am attempting for something to happen" (indicating the making or construction of something from its beginning). [103] "The reasoned capacity to act is different to the reasoned capacity to make. Nor are they included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor making acting." Aristotle [104] The reasoning behind this [second] distinction is made clear by the statement: "While making has an end other than itself, good action is itself its own end" Aristotle [105]
This distinction is thus one between activities which are an end in themselves (i.e. praxis and theoria) and those that are intermediaries for ends other than their own action. This differentiation comes into better perspective when one considers the meaning of the ancient word telos which is simultaneously purpose, fulfilment and perfection. [106] The distinction is thus between activities that are their own telos and those activities that are not. Aristotle clarifies this further in Metaphysics: "[when] the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing being made; i.e. the act of building is in the thing being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven…but when there is no product apart from the actuality is in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of contemplation in that in the object of contemplation and that of life in psyche (soul)" Aristotle [107] This statement serves metaphorically for Aristotle as he makes a central assertion to his ethical theory: That certain human activities such as ethical virtues, political practice and even the philosophical contemplation of the 'theoros' are all ends in themselves and have no ulterior motive other than their own 'praxis'; i.e. neither does one act in a virtuous manner to earn praise nor does one engage in a political life for financial security. These activities which rightfully belong to the moral sphere as they have no ulterior motives and seek no reward are called Praxis in the Aristotelian sense of the word. In contrast and distinct from Praxis is Poiesis that refers to any activity whose meaningfulness lies in their external effect,; i.e. Rhetoric, the ends of which are persuasion or shoemaking, the ends of which is protection for feet. This brings Aristotle's separation and comparison of theoria to praxis and praxis to poiesis into a clearer light. The first distinction is thus one of disposition towards either goodness or [through the pathoi] corruption (i.e. metaphorically expressed as a preference towards either a contemplative or a political life) which simultaneously speaks of the human capacity for virtue and passions depending on whether one is ruled by reason and rationale or desire. The second distinction between praxis and poiesis is thus the difference between an action that is a reward in itself and those actions that are only a means to an end. This distinction Aristotle illustrates metaphorically by drawing on the root distinction between praxis and poiesis i.e. the difference between the verbs pratto and poiō. This second distinction thus serves to support and develop conclusions of the first distinction in that the Psyche that is enslaved and ruled by pathoi (passions) will forever be desiring or longing and all actions will merely become the means by which people attempt to actualise their passions. Such actions have a telos (purpose/perfection) that exists external to the action itself; i.e. the purpose of such actions are never the activity themselves but rather something that may be achieved by the actions. These actions, as a means to an end, Aristotle likens to the skill of a craftsman whose activity produces a product other than its own activity. [108] This is an important ethical distinction as it illustrates a crucial factor within the Hellenic kosmotheasis which is 'understanding why we do things'. A good example of this is the distinction between a shoemaker who makes shoes according to a pattern based on the 'rules of making a shoe' but with no understanding of what the purpose of shoes are in comparison to a shoemaker who understands that the purpose of making shoes is the protection of feet and that the perfect shoe is thus one that perfectly protects the feet. In the shoemaker who lacks the understanding of the cause of shoes there is no purpose in his actions other than the technological production of shoes for commercial and
economic reasons. The telos (purpose) of this shoemaker is thus not the protection of feet but the commercial production of shoes as a by-product to the activity of making the shoes. However, for the shoemaker whose telos (purpose) is the protection of feet, the activity of making the shoe that perfectly protects the feet fulfils his purpose and is an end in itself. The same may be said of the difference between a politician who is elected to public office without understanding either the cause of his office (i.e. to serve the common good of his constituents) or the cause of common good itself, i.e. Dikeosyne (Justice) in comparison to the politician who knows both the cause of his office and the cause of the common good. Aristotle may be understood further, if one considers the earliest meaning of the word Aitia (cause) which refers to the portion of responsibility allocated to something or someone. It is thus the aitia of an activity that is the impetus of human action through being not only the causation of an activity but also being the responsibility to fulfil the cause through action. In terms of praxis, the aitia is also the telos (purpose/end) of an activity including the responsibility to act in a manner which fulfils the cause as its end. Understanding the causes of activities and basing ones actions on fulfilling the cause of the activity is thus self-determined praxis that is in accordance with Physis (Nature) and hence is Sophrosyne (common sense) which is the Metron (measure) of Psyche concerning natural desires and pleasures. [109] This is the basis of Aristotelian Praxis as an ethical act which is distinguished from any action that seeks something other than its own cause as its purpose or end. Furthermore, it is through the activity of theoria that these causes may be known and an action chosen that may best exemplify the ethical determination of Aristotelian praxis. The introduction of the concepts of Physis (Nature) and aitiês (causes) into the discussion of which actions may rightfully be called praxis and which fit more accurately under the term poiesis yields a further factor that sheds light on the matter. In early Hellenic thought the human artisan or agent of poiesis was an 'intermediary' who merely aids or abets an already existing impetus of Physis as 'self-emergence'. Regardless of whether it was in the making of wine, the growing of wheat or a midwife assisting in the birth of a child, the person acting was not seen as the prime mover but rather as the necessary agent of the unseen prime mover of Physis (Nature). [110] This differs from the modern world where Physis has been conceptually subordinated to man who is now perceived as its prime mover. The role of Physis in early concepts of poiesis brings to mind the importance of Kairos (appropriate time or timely) within such intermediary activities. Speusippos stated that Kairos referred to the appropriate time to accomplish a task, perform a function or fulfil a need. It is Kairos that determines which action or activity co-operates with the Agathopraxia (good deed) and as such Kairos is considered the Ortho Metron (correct measure). Kairos itself is determined by Ananke (Necessity) who is both a Goddess (according to the Orphics) and a sacred institution/decree of the Gods (according to Empedokles). Philosophically Ananke is the compelling nature and force that regulates past, present and future events. [111] Due to the determining factor of Kairos in certain activities that deal directly with Physis (Nature) such as
agriculture, midwifery, etc, and regardless of their technical nature would thus be considered as participation in an agathopraxia (good deed). The concept of Ananke is central to the determination of aitiês (causes) and hence what may considered ethical, moral or beneficial praxis and what may not. The reason for this is simple. Ananke (Necessity) is an aitia (cause) that is a deep seated impetus for action that governs both the need for protective footwear as well as the need for politicians who truly do serve the common good of the people. Any action that is not caused by Ananke is thus unnecessary. The criterion of praxis is thus not only an action where its aitia (cause) is simultaneously its telos (purpose/end) and is self-fulfilling in its own activity but it is also an action determined by the decree of the aitia of Ananke (Necessity). The connection of Ananke with both order and the regulation of desire and appetite may be attested to in the following example of Plato's criticism of a man for "being a jumble of desires" while of the same man Socrates says: "There is no 'taxis' (order) or 'Ananke' (necessity) in his life". [112] Ananke as Necessity and the Orthos Metron of Kairos is consequently also associated with Sophrosyne as the Metron of Psyche and the selection of only that which is required and at the appropriate time. 3.3.4 Theoria, Praxis, Poiesis and the Reconciliation of Opposites There is a very ancient and common conception concerning duality and dichotomies found in the Palaios Logos which is as a direct result of the ontic law of the relation between unity and multiplicity. This common conception is that which in English is referred to as the tension of the opposites that derives from the famous quotation from Herakleitos: "They do not understand how, though at variance with itself, it agrees with itself. It is a backwards-turning attunement like that of the bow and lyre." Herakleitos [113] Every tension of opposing forces is a unity alike unto a unified structure with the tension of parts that constitute this unity being an essential component to produce both form and function. It thus only through the tension of the parts that the multiplicity of parts may function as a harmonious unity which produces variance while still allowing each part to retain its own nature and its relational nature within the unity. The essence of this is found in an Orphic fragment in which Zeus addresses Mother Nyx. "And how will all things but as one subsist, Yet each its nature separate preserve?" The tension of opposites is a relation of parts within a whole. Examples of this are; (a) The relation of the planets to the sun that creates a solar system (b) The lyre which is constructed by the convergence of two 'arms'. Energeia (energy/activity) is stored in potential within the frame. To further unify the structure the strings of a lyre are stretched from the yoke to the frame (in the manner described in the myth of Hermes who is the Messenger of the Logos and his construction of the lyre) to produce a continuum of circular dynamics. Each part causes an opposing reaction in the other parts while serving the purposes of the unified state. Through
the tension of the strings, the energeia which is stored in potential within the frame is released as a harmony or actualised. "Things taken together are whole and not whole, [something which is] being brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity; and out of a unity all things." Herakleitos [114] If one part within a tension should be removed, the tension that holds the unity of multiple parts in a form will simultaneously slacken and the form and function of the unity will exist only in raw potential rather than actuality. In its place all that will be left is a disparity of individual parts. Due to the fact that there are three terms in this particular instance, theoria, praxis and poiesis are seen within context to the trias (two terms and a mean) and placed diagrammatically upon the ancient tool of the metron i.e. the balance beam.
Theoria
Praxis
Poiesis
These three divisions hence create two separate relations, i.e. praxis to theoria and praxis to poiesis.
Theoria
Praxis
Poiesis
Praxis is the mean because Aristotle distinguishes it from both theoria and poiesis while simultaneously being the common term in both distinctions. The real tension of the opposites is thus not between praxis and theoria but between theoria and poiesis. This tension of the opposites is akin to the opposition between Idealism and Materialism in that theoria is concerned with the reality underlying the surface appearance of things while poiesis is concerned with the material reality and that which reflects life. "One party is trying to drag everything down to earth, out of the heavens and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands; for they lay upon every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and is resistant to touch… And accordingly their adversaries are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in certain intelligible and bodiless Forms. " Plato: The Sophist. It is thus through Aristotle's distinction between praxis and theoria by way of the essential opposition between praxis and poiesis that he resolves the tension of the opposites between theoria and poiesis by illustrating that praxis shares a common characteristic with both; i.e. (a) praxis and theoria both have their aitia (cause) as their telos (end) while (b) praxis and poiesis are both physical actions distinguished only by the difference between acting and making. This distinction is resolved by praxis as an interactive act with both the underlying reality (as
informed by theoria) and the surface appearance of life (as guided by poiesis). Praxis is also the means by which poiesis may be improved ethically and productively by theoria. Simultaneously though its material nature, poiesis through praxis becomes the foundation of knowledge for theoria. Within the ancient Hellenic language, this tension of the opposites is called the palintonos armonie and as such refers to a counterbalancing harmony that is stretched equally in all directions. As the palintos armonie of theoria, praxis and poiesis is a trias (triad) as a unity it is a triangular number which is diagrammatically illustrated as below:
Praxis
Theoria
Poiesis
This is the expansion and contraction of the On (as that which objectively exists in reality) which is changed into various forms through the metron (measure) without losing its true identity according to Herakleitos. Their unity, however, is indisputable because of the fact that Aristotle specifically arranges them as a triad which, in Pythagorean terms, is a triangular number (which is exactly half of oblong numbers) upon which all interdependent and cyclic/circular harmonies are founded. The circular harmony of these energeia (theoria, praxis, poiesis) is thus the foundation of Aristotle's relation of the hexeis (ways of knowing) to the energeia as both their aitia (cause) and telos (end/purpose/perfection). This is reasoning supported by Herakleitos' statement concerning the unification of the opposites: 'The beginning and the end are common on the circumference of a circle.' Herakleitos [115] It is also important to note that no formal tension of the opposites is made by Aristotle between the five hexeis of nous, episteme, sophia, phronesis and technē. He also specifically states that all five of these hexeis are ways of knowing through which the Logikon Psyche (as the part of the human psyche which differentiates us from other animals or plants) may know Aletheia (as a correspondence of Reason to Reality). It is also clear from Aristotle that is through the tension of the opposites between affirmation and denial that these hexeis as aities (causes) find their telos within their own perfection. It is thus through the tension between affirmation and denial that the potential within each hexeis i.e. its energeia is transformed by the metron (measure) into theoria, praxis or poiesis. The motion of each hexeis through its activity to find its own perfection/end is thus a refining by distinction process.
Theoria, praxis and poiesis are all thus ways for the potential for knowing to be known. Together they act as the activities that seek to know objective reality and as such correspond to Aristotle's tripartite human Psyche as the activities through which each division of Psyche interacts with and knows the world. Through poiesis, the basic requirements for life may be known and perfected while praxis brings the knowledge of communal co-habitation. Through theoria all things within the heavens and upon the earth are observed and their underlying patterns drawn upon to perfect and inform thought and action. Each energeia is distinct but also interdependent on the others. Their combined effect is the harmony of the fulfilled Psyche whose potential has been actualised. The actualisation of this harmony between psyche and its soma (body) is simultaneously the actualisation of a complete human being. A complete human being who observes, participates in, interacts with and is an intermediary of the Orthos Logos, Humanity and the Kosmos in perfect balance of thought and action and body and soul. It is through the Divine Law and the beneficial Goodness of the Logos that all things are ordered and it is within this perfect pattern that the potential for a fulfilling human life may be known and realised.
Conclusion Again, every good 'psyche' (soul) uses 'nous' (mind); but no 'soma' (body) can produce 'nous': for how should that which is without 'nous' produce 'nous'? Again, while the 'psyche' uses the 'soma' as an instrument, it is not in it; just as the engineer is not in his engines (although many engines move without being touched by any one). Sallustius - On Gods and the Kosmos
In the end, the true conclusion of whether any modern dichotomy has a place within the Hellenic religion or whether it is truly representative of its deepest truths is ultimately the choice of the reader. For one who chooses to accept the entire corpus of ancient Hellenic works as the sacred texts which express truth in its entirety, as do the Supreme Council of Ethnikoi Hellenes and many others (including myself), the conclusion is quite simple and determined by the comparison between the modern dichotomy in all its forms and the same words in the Hellenic language of the ancient texts. It is to these people that I address this conclusion as it is not my intention to persuade anyone to see the truth in the Hellenic texts if they do not already. It is also not my intention to question whether modern dichotomies are truthful for those to whom they apply but rather to assess whether such modern dichotomies are truthful within the Hellenic conception of thought and action. The Social Sciences/Anthropology/Ethnology is the study of humans as individuals and collectives in diverse cultural settings and at different periods in time. The basis of the earliest anthropological theories were entirely epistemological in nature and were concerned with determining whether human thought was universal or relativistic to culture in nature. However, actual case studies and research into the universality of thought have only confirmed approximately thirty elementary human concepts [116] that are not relativistic to cultural differences. Hence more modern anthropological theories now mostly adhere to a greater or lesser degree to varieties of cultural models. In terms of the cultural models, the uses of abstract principles such as orthodoxy and orthopraxy as frameworks of reference are not neutral and derive from the ethnocentric perspective of the observer. As such, epistemological and ideological dichotomies are heuristic tools through which an observer is
able to measure the ratio and relation of thought and action within a foreign culture. The ideological dichotomy between thought and action through Materialism versus Idealism is a very old debate and one that Aristotle was reconciling when he drew the distinction between theoria and praxis. However, within anthropology this old theoretical opposition has gained a new vigour through the growing influence of Marxist materialism in the West since the 1950's. Marxist materialism theoretically and methodologically opposes all anthropological theories that are Idealist in nature. In other words, Marxist materialism opposes any theory that supports a conception of a true reality based on unseen principles or ideas. As Materialists, Marxist theory defines culture to be only behaviour patterns that are overt and observable while denying the validity or influence of an unseen reality. Research appears to indicate that it was from the Marxist materialist primacy for orthopraxy that the dichotomy became a popular framework of reference within anthropology. As such, orthodoxy and orthopraxy roughly correspond to the methodological and theoretical opposition between Idealism (orthodoxy) and Materialism (orthopraxy). From researching the various ways that orthodoxy and orthopraxy have been used by anthropologists, I find it perfectly logical to use a dichotomy between standards of thought as opposed to standards of behavior to measure the ratio and relation of thought to action within a culture or religion if both thought and action are represented in an accurate, coequal and interconnected manner. This approach has been used admirably by reputable scholars such as Geertz, Bell or Watson among others. In the same manner, to my mind, it is not neutral to refuse to note the patterns of thought in a culture because the observer is a Materialist and thus culture for them is comprised only of behaviour patterns. In a culture that truly does have a conception of an unseen reality; Materialist anthropology would not offer accurate information about the reality of that culture due to their theoretical perspective. The same may be said of any binary classification system. For those Hellenes and Hellenists who accept the Hellenic texts as sacred, any classification by any scholar who bases their conclusions upon a perceived lack of canonical writings is both an insult to the ancestral writings and a misrepresentation of Hellenic religion. It is also important to note that certain highly respected scholars and academics dispute the validity of any type of classification and it is clear that whether such a classification is even supported is determined by which definition of culture is used within the diversity of definitions of culture in existence. Classification certainly doesn't explain anything and in a religion and culture like the ancient Hellenic, explanation is a vital part of the worldview and the ethos. In the end, these theoretical oppositions within the Social Sciences remain the heuristic tools and strategies of analysis for observers while, generally speaking, most members of any collective being observed will not abandon their own religion's epistemological answers about thought and the impetus for human action in favour of an external classification. It would also be a pity to see any religious collective fracture into theoretical camps based on modernist dichotomies. In terms of Christian theology, it is evident that the dichotomy between correct thought and correct action is not dichotomised within Eastern Orthodoxy which has retained some of the Hellenic complementary nature of thought and action. It is also clear from this perspective that there can be no correct action without correct thought to guide it and logically a
standardisation of action requires a standardisation of thought to support the correct action and prevent endless diverse interpretations. It is also self-evident from the comparative study of the three parts of this essay that there is little but the most basic resemblance between how the Hellenic terms are used by the ancients as to how they are used by scholars and Christianity in the West. This is due to the redefinition of praxis by Hegel, the North American Pragmatists and Marx. An English dictionary [117] defines praxis to be: Exercise or discipline for a specific purpose; practical application of rules as distinguished from theory. A Hellenic dictionary [118] defines praxis to be: Praxis derives from the verb pratto which means to act. It refers directly to the activity of taking action or 'acting. In its ancient Hellenic form praxis is distinguished from poio (to construct/make). In an Aristotelian sense the distinction between pratto and poio is used to specialise the word praxis to denote only those actions whose cause is phronesis (practical wisdom/common sense) and whose ends are phronesis. The English grammatical opposition between praxis and theory is carried forward into and further compounded by the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy in their modern English dichotomised form which is firmly based on Christian theological and post Enlightenment ideological definitions. In an English dictionary, orthodoxy and orthopraxy are defined to be: Orthodoxy: 1. Belief in established doctrine 2. Agreement with accepted standards, established doctrines, ideas Orthopraxy: 1. Correct action 2. Theologically in its earliest form refers to participation in Church sacraments and regular attendance of Church. Later it developed into an action which was worthy of the call of God and conformed to the image of Christ. In its modern and generalised theological form orthopraxia has come to mean literally the right practice as the reflective and responsive action or the practical reflection of the knowledge gained through one's concrete experience or reflection on the truth of Christian faith in love and justice. While in the Hellenic dictionary, orthodoxia and orthopraxia are defined to be: Orthodoxia: (1) The correct opinion and action in agreement with specific principles such as political or economic principles, etc. (2) The correct religious opinion in opposition to the heretical opinions; the teachings and dogma of the Orthodox Church. The antonyms for orthodoxia are: heterodoxia (other and distinctive religious dogma foreign to a country wherein it is found) and kakodoxia (bad opinion). Orthopraxis: The correct deed; (for one) to act correctly. The dictionary also includes the following statement: Η ορθοδοξία είναι και ορθοπραξία which means orthodoxia is also orthopraxia, i.e. orthodoxy and orthopraxy are interconnected and inseparable from one another as there is no such thing as correct action without correct thought.
The usage of classificatory terms such as praxis, orthodoxy and orthopraxy within their modern Western definitions may thus be seen as problematic in conjunction with the foundation of the Hellenic Logos as exemplified by the Hellenic language due to the usage of the same or similar words with different meanings and grammatical antonyms. Sallustius emphasises the importance of common conceptions and it would be highly confusing and misleading to newcomers of the religion if they should be confronted by classifications of the Hellenic religion that do not precisely reflect the meaning of the word within the Hellenic language. This is especially important when one considers that kyriologia (precise wording) is a grammatical virtue. One such instance is the translation of doxa in both the Social Sciences and Christian theology to mean opinion, thought, or belief. This is simply not entirely true of its Hellenic meaning and is thus imprecise. Doxa does refer to opinion and specifically to opinion based on subjective awareness. Parmenides determines doxa to be awareness of only the surface appearance of things. Within this context, it is cannot be associated with theoria that is an awareness/comprehension of an underlying or higher reality. The association of doxa with theoria is thus highly imprecise. By this definition, even doctrines, in the English sense of the word, because of the reason that supports them cannot accurately be referred to as doxa. However, the word doxa has another meaning too (and one that is not included in its English form) and as such it refers to any form of praise that expresses one's opinion. Doxa refers thus to personal or communal praise within a hymn or prayer to a God or Goddess as well as a compliment one may give to another person. Doxa in its Hellenic form does not include any form of inferential knowledge thus an opinion that is reasoned and supported by reason is not considered doxa but is rather considered knowledge as gnosis or even episteme (depending on how verifiable the knowledge is). To state that inferential knowledge was merely doxa would be the negation of Reason. Doxa is however a support of Psyche (soul) according to Pythagoras and is an important process in the activity of knowing therefore cannot be discounted or negated within the modern religion. Simultaneously, the English praxis and the English orthopraxy which both include an inherent opposition to theory is even more imprecise because through its negation of theory is becomes antithetical to the term Logos which includes the capacity to theorise within its general meaning. As the ancient Hellenic civilisation was called the Civilisation of the Logos it would be a contradiction in terms to classify it with a term whose meaning in English would include an opposition to theory. Even in the modern Hellenic language praxis does not stand in opposition to theoria. In the ancient Hellenic language, praxis (through pratto) stands in opposition to poiō (making/constructing). In a Hellenic grammatical sense the opposition between praxis and theoria is inaccurate. It is only in the Aristotelian distinction between theoria and praxis (which serves a specific philosophical and ethical purpose) that this distinction is made and resolved simultaneously because of the common conception of not only the meaning and etymology of words but also the ontic law of the relation of multiplicity to unity. As has been illustrated in this essay, the epistemological and ideological influences within the use of these terms by some scholars in the Social Sciences is indisputable and especially for those whom orthodoxy is determined by Western standards of Heiroi Logoi (Sacred Texts). There is an irony in such a classification when one properly purveys the ancient texts which indicate ample evidence of many accepted
standards, ideas and beliefs of a highly formulated nature. If one should consider a comparative study of what Marcus Terentius Varro (Divine Antiquities Frags. 6-10) wrote of ritual orthopraxis in Etruscan and later Roman religion to be a relevant study of the norms of ritual praxis that may have too applied to Hellenic religion. It is then important to note that he referred to the strict observance of what Gods had to be approached by which priests in which cults and under which circumstances in which places. Varro called this ritual orthopraxis 'civic theology'. [119] If the Hellenic Gods and the temples or altars dedicated to them with different epithets are seen within the context of Varro's definition, there is further evidence of formulated and established Hellenic religious thought that guided just any action into becoming a correct action. It is also evidence of a highly organised communal religious life that may not have been pan-hierarchical but was nonetheless structured and orderly. The common perceptions of the Gods in the forms of their proper names, epithets and spheres of activity are what the Christian theologians would term established doctrines. There is also little doubt of the presence of fundamental principles that underlie and support Hellenic religious beliefs when one considers the fact that each God or Goddess had not only a proper name and epithets but also a Theotēta which is the abstract meaning of a Theos or Thea as a totality of their attributes. The Hellenic ontology which is based on reason would also be considered established doctrine by Christian standards. There is also the historical example of the committee commissioned by Ipparkhos, son of Pesistratos in Athens in 6th century BCE to collect together firstly Homeric fragments and secondly Orphic fragments. One of the leading members of this committee named Onomakritos was accused by Lasos of interpolating his own lines into an Orphic text and was exiled (for a period of time) from Athens. Such a severe punishment for 'selective insertion' is indeed confirmation that firmly established writings were not open to adjustment. [120] In other words, new works may be added but the old works may not be changed. There is also emphasis placed on Ortho Logos, ortho metron and orthognosia by many of the philosophers and the Palaios Logos remains, all at once, common reason, a cohesive foundation and a guiding principle in the development of Hellenic language and thought. Simultaneously the importance of orthopraxia as a consequence of orthognosia is a central tenet of the Hellenic kosmotheasis as is evident by the example of the usage of the Delphic Maxims within the education system to teach not only the correct knowledge of the language but also the correct knowledge to produce correct actions. Within my reasoning and based upon the research used within this essay, I am forced to conclude that the inclusion of scholarly theoretical oppositions and religious or secular reform movements within the ancient Hellenic religion are completely unnecessary. I am also forced to conclude that defining and classifying the Hellenic religion in terms of the Christian conceptions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy in its modern Western form is inappropriate. For those of us who accept the corpus of Hellenic writings as our sacred texts and allow the wise and truthful words of the ancestors to guide our thoughts and actions to find our highest potential in accordance with the Orthos Logos and Physis, the heuristic tools of external epistemological enquiry and Christian rhetoric is needless when the reason, profundity and beauty of the ancient Hellenic writings provide ample epistemological answers concerning Logos, Nous and the potentials and actualisations of Psyche. Both external classifications and these new orthopraxies are foreign to Hellas and a highly probable source of miasma considering the
essential opposition to theoria and the complete negation of poiesis that they bring with them. The true implication of any de-emphasis of theoria in Aristotelian terms is dire; for without the energeia (activity) of theoria, the Nous, Sophia and Episteme will simultaneously be de-emphasised. Without Nous, the Logos will be rendered insensible and unknowable. Without Episteme, all secure knowledge will be lost and everything will descend into purely a matter of opinion or belief. Without Sophia which is the source of human Reason and Aletheia as the correspondence of reason to reality, the highest wisdoms will be lost to us and our means to know truth will remain unrealised. This would mean the simultaneous loss of the Hellenic worldview, the theologia, the ontologia and all of the explanations the Ancestors left to us of why things are the way they are. The simultaneous de-emphasis on poiesis will be a loss of creative expression, allegoria, mythos, hymnos, craft, skill and production that is one of the central means by which a culture evolves. I am therefore in agreement with those who state that this new orthopraxy is purely and simply deconstructionism. It is my earnest hope that those who truly care for the Hellenic Gods, religion and the civilisation of the Logos will accept and embrace the full potential of the human Psyche (soul) and to understand theoria, praxis and poiesis as co-equal, interdependent and complementary activities through which the harmony of each Hellenic psyche may be actualised. They are also the means by which the innate talents and abilities within all modern Hellenes may be actualised into productive and thriving communities where all the gifts of Psyche are honoured equally. Without a balance between them, we will be less than we could or should be. It is through the Logos that we may each come to know orthognosia and orthopraxia. We should not choose between them and we have our entire lifetime (and perhaps many more) to strive towards them. They are something we have to each come to know for ourselves and in our own time, it is not something that can be enforced on anyone. To find them we need look no further than the corpus of ancient Hellenic works and the thought and action they inspire within us. Orthognosia and orthopraxia are both equally important and inseparable from the Logos. The Gods willingly afford us the freedom, happiness and potential to fulfil both as a consequence of being ensouled in life. Together, orthognosia and orthopraxia are the most perfect and complete expression of the Logos that we may aspire to.
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