IIANTIBOOK OF FACTS ON: THE NTTT:AI{-UP OF YUGOSI"A\TIA,, rN' f I.] I INATIONAL POLICY,
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ffffiHfl,,, HANDBOOK OFFACTS ON: THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA, INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AND THE WAR IN BOSNIAHERCEGOVINA
By ALAN R FOGELQUIST, Ph.D. Post-Doctoral Scholar Department of History UCLA
Director of Research Instirute of South Central European and Balkan Affairs Los Angeles, Califomia
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Copynght 1993
Alan F. Fogelquist
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TIiE BnEAK-UP OF YL]GOST-AVIA,
Guide to prtmuiolaiion (parantra$h numbers): 1. Slobodan Milolevld, preeident of Serbia
2. 9.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AIYD TTIE WAR IN BOSNIA"HERCEGOVINA
slow-boh-done moo.hXt-sheh-vich] Dobrica Corl6 (alro {1, e0) I
SIJMIUARY
ldoe-breet le ohoh.rlchl Aliia lzetbcgovld, prctldent of Bosnia lah-lee-ah Garc.at'bGj.oh.vichJ (also 2e, g0-1, gg{, gg, {1, t6, tt, c6, c0.?0, 7?-8)
uttl-ich]
The current war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is essentially a war of aggression ffom the outside, even though it has internal ethnic dimensions. The contlict is a continuation of the war of aggression against Slovenia and Croatia, which temporarily subsided in those countries but is re-igniting in Croatia. If the Serbian war machine is not stopped, the war can only spread to new areas and is likely to result in a confrontation of continental proportions. In the meantime, Milo5evid's allies in Bosnia are carrying out step-by-step destruction of most of the country. In the name ofprotectingSerbs, no-onehas done more to endanger the lives of innocent Serbian people than MiloBevid and his political
Croatian
.
chalrmln of Yutpdry hdrrrl pretidency 11. Fraqfo Tu{lrnrfr ffnhn.Wh tiqf .mahni prclidcnt of Crurdr (rlro n, gt.!, gg.r,lr, 66,98.9, 71,79)
L2, Milan Babic lnee-lahn brh.blohl
allies. If inter-comrnunal violenco and "ethnic hatred" have energed in what was once regarded ae a model nulti-ethnic or multi-nationalfederation, it io an ethnic violence lVlilo5evid and the federal army have manufactured, stinulated, and perpetuated in their last-ditch effort to hold power in an era of democratic and nationalist revolutions. It was his chauvinistic
(elso tg, gz) leader of Ssrbhn rrbolllon in the Iftqflna rcglon
18. fuitn MarkovlC, [rhn-hh arrh-oh.vlchl last federd prlme ralnlrtrr (elro r, u) 19. Vojislav SeSelj, lvoloo.lahv rhrh.rhrl,]
28. 28, 28. 31.
Ieader of Serbian noo.farcht prrrmllltrry groups (also gU, 4g,E2.t8,8t) Party of Democradc Actlon (rho lg, gg, 4Zr, led by Aliia lzetbotpvl6 Sdepan lqtqlid, lrtt'r.Ddur hlyoo.lohl leader of Bosnlan bruoh of Grortlrn Democratic Unlon (alro tt.t) Radovan l(araduld, lreh-dohqrhn kah-rah-jichl leader of thr Serbhn Democratic Party of Bornlr (rlm m.gt,
36.8,40-1,,18.6, 6?,88, ?1,
policies which culminatcd in the arbitrary abolition in March l9E9 of the autonomous status of the provinces of bolh Kosovo and Vojvodina which had been guaranteed by the Federal Constitution ofthe Yugoslav Federation.
Elections ond Independence. In March and April of
favoring national sovereignty within a reorganized Yugoslav confederation. [n November and early December 1990, similar nonCommunist democratic nationalist coalitions emerged victorious in multi-party elections in Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as well. Throughout the first half of 1991, Bosnia's Muslim president Alija Izetbegovi0 and Macedonia's president Kiro Gligorov desperately
?&l)
Mate Boban, [neh.tch boh.brhn.l loadar of Hercegovinlan wlngof Crcatlan Democratic Union (alro tt,80,68.9, ?4) 31. Gen. Martin Spegc! [rhpeh-gehli, Croatian Defense Minishr (this list continued after geographic names - see inside back cover page)
1990,
Slovenia and Croatia held their first multi-party elections in almost fifty years. The Communist reformers lost the elections to parties
I
sought to find a democratic solution which wbuld allow the Slovenians and Croatians to remain within a decentralized and reorganized union of sovereign Yugoslav states but announced their desire to leave the Yugoslav federation should the Slovenes and Croats refuse to remain. Izetbegowid and Gligorcv feared that if the Cnoatians and Slovenians left, Bosnia and Macedonia would be left to the mency ofMilo6evid and otJrer intransigent Serbian leaders.
Milosevic and tho fadcral mllltary leadership flatly rejected joint slovenian and croatien prcpolllr for a Yugoslav confederation as well as the Bornian and Mrordonirn cornpromise proposals for a looser federation or unlon of rovcrcign Yugoslav states. Serbian leadere appolntcd puppet npnrcntatives to the presidency ftom tho no.longur.cxlrtclt lutonomous provinees of Kosovo and Vojvodlna whoru rutotony hadahoady been arbitrarily and uneon*ltutlonelly abollrhcd by the Serbian parliament. The last straw for the slovrnlrnr and croatiang came when the serbs and Montenegrint, togethor wlth thrm bogus representatives of no longer existent Kosovo andVqfvodlnr, blocked the confirmation ofthe very moderate, rational, and oonolllrtory Croatian Stipe Mesic as chairmtn of the fedcral prerldlnoy, A0cording to the post-Tito conetitutlonal arrlngcmcnt, thr ohalrmanahip of the federal presidency, thc hfihrtt.rmutlv. body ln the country, was to pass each year to tho ropralcntrtlvc of a dlfrerent republic who was to be chosen by hh ropubllc't parliament. It was Croatia's turn to select the federal prorident and Stipe Mesic was the first non-Communist ever to be nominated tn head the federal presidency. lhe Croatians responded co serbian stonewalling and provoeations with a plebiscite in which the vast mqiority voted to authorize the Croatian Sobor to declare independence at the end ofJune 1gg1 in the event that the coming weeks' negotiations proved futile. Cowtitution ond Ciail Libertiec. In December 1990, the croatian parliament orsoborpassed a democratic constitution which guarantees the civil liberties of all of its citizens and provides for cultural and educational autonomy for the serbs and other national minorities in Croatia. Under this constitution, Serbs and representativee of smaller minorities are given the right to have their own schools and to use their own language and alphabet as the ofticial language and alphabet of distriets where they form a majority. In
btreir own army and police forces in the Kra.;ina. During Lhe spring of'1991, while negotiations weretakingplace between the republican
g
percent Serbian, then entered the rebellious districts under the pretext of preventing ethnic violence. Long before the Croatians -rade their frnal and inevocable declanrtion of independence from Yugoslavia, the 'federal" army had completed the occupation of as much as one quarter of Croatian teritory. Recognition. Despite all the evidence, the American, British, and French governments continued to harbor the notion that a unified Yugoslavia had to be preserved and that Croatia and Slovenia
should be pressured into remaining in the Yugoslav federation. Ignoring the months offruitless negotiations deliberately sabotaged by the Serbian and federal army leadership, in the final week before the Slovenian and Croatian independence proclamations, American
Secretar5l
of State James Baker and Under
Secretary
Lawrrence Eagleburger publicly opposed the Croatians' and Slovenians' moves towards independeuce. The German government, which had followed evenls much more closely and carefully, rightly. advocated immediate recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and an unambiguous policy against Serbian or "federal'military intervention to prevent the independence of these republics. Had the Germans been heeded, much bloodshed probably could have been prevented. At times European and American diplomats seemed str4ngely oblivious of the human suffering caused by Milosevic's war of agigression. Seizure ond Dedruction of Territory. In the course of their war against Croatia, Serbian and "federal" armed forces not merely entered Serbian-populated areas to "protect" Serbs but seized wide
May 1002, urged by the United Nations and European communlty, th€ Cruatian government went even further, paseing a law guaranteeing self.gover:nment and political autonomy to dlgtricts where Serbs make up a mqiority of the populntion. Because of these conciliatory measures taken by the croatian government, it seems clear that the legitimate goars and eoncerns ofthe serbian minority could have been addressed through negotiation and compromise, and that there was no need whatsoever
stretches of territory where Croatians formed an overwhelming majority. In such regions, they embarked on a
for an armed rebellion. Ineurgente in croatia. In the fall and winter of 19g0, serbian insurgents centered in Knin organized autonomous districts with
systematic effort to terrorize and expel the Croatian population. This
has been well documented by international human rights organizations. The same pattern was introduced simullaneously in
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vojvodina againrt looal
Hun3rrlrnl, croatians, and other non-serbs. eectionr of crurtlr rnd now Bornra have been eonverted into a wasG€lend olnrbbh rad ohrrrsd rafiters. Factories and buildingr' capltel roGultuhhd thrcryh decades of toil and investment, havc bcoa totdly dotroyed. Hundreds of serbian civillanr have becn kllhd by thr lndhcrrminate bombard ment of villager of nlrcd artlolrllty lnd clfiee like vukovar and sarajovo, wherc a lubrtratld pirt of tho populatioi is serbian. Hundredc of nalvo Eorblan rrnry roonrrti have also been killed in the senselesl and wlntoa umultr on croatia and Bosnia. Hercegovlna. The dortructlon rnd krilrng perpetrated first against innoeent croats and Bornlrn m wdl m 6crbs by the serbian and "federal" forcec har bccn, ncvorthdcrt, of a far greaier magnitude and is the regult of conrclour g-ovcmnantally rponmred policyiather than spontaneour outburrtr of "rthnls hatred.t Pcac.a AClerypt!, For r rhort whlls ln the firct months of 1992, it appeared that the Yugorlav cririr might, indeed, finally be settled peacefully. Representatives of the Euiopean communily and later the unlhd Nations had spent manyrnonihr tryrng to find rot,rfion acceptable co Milosevic. cynrs vance, ttre ctrier united" Nations negotiator, after months offoot draggingby Milosevic and the federal army' appeared to have convinced the serbian and "federal" military leadership to agree to withdraw federal forces from croatia. But peace was not to be, and what followed casts grave doubt that Milosevic and the federal military readership had Iny inteniion of respecting uN or European community-sponsored agrelments. After con si d erabl e del ay, th e united Nation s sen t peace-k Jeping forces in to th e desi gnated areas of croatia, but none to Bosn ia. mr L .ria.rat" a.d serbian military and civilian leaders have blocked the of thousands of croatians who were driven out of their homes ""pal"iation and are claiming the right to determine which croatians will be attowea into the areas they control. lrh-e federal army handed .o.t oi it, t weaponry over to local serbian militias in croatia, who have put ""ny on the uniforms of local police forces allowed by the peace Efforts by UNPRoFOR to collect $,eapons from berbian"forces "gree-"nt. in croatia have been ineffectual and are hopelessly behind Jedure. Because of th e UN failure, th e croatian government has now I aun ch ed military action to reestablish control over part ofthe occufi"d The united Nations has been unsuccessful ln overseeing """ar. th'e i"t,r"n or any but a small handful of croatian refugees ail o"f *ho,n fu." dangerous and uncertain conditions. In the ieantime the neigr"ae regime and its allies in Bosnia-Hercegovina have launehed a new war rrYhole
The Wor in Bosnio. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims ancl Croats were driven from their homes by the Serbian forces in a deliberate campaign of territorial conquest and ethnic purifrcation. At the last count, the number of refugees from the Serbian war of destruction and extermination in Bosnia was approaching two million. The "federal" military in Bosnia joined the fight on the side of the Serbian neo-fascist legions and added its weaponry tbr the step-bystep destruction of Sarajevo. Wherever Bosnians and Croatians have been able to organize defense forces to resist the Serbian attacks, the sysbematic mass killingand ethnic cleansing of these two peoples has been prevented. In areas where Bosnians handed over their weapons to the yugoslav army or Serbian militias, the local non-serbian population has been totally defenseless and has suffered mass atrocities. Areas which were well defended by local Bosnian Muslim and croatian militias were spared this fate. Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces have generally defended only areas where members of these nationalities are in a majority. They have not engaged in systematic ethnic cleansing, and their actions have been largely defensive. Retponae of the World to Aggrestioz. The nesponse of the United States and Westet! European governm-nts, Russia, united Nations officialdom and the European community to what is clearly a serbian-Montenegrin or "Ytrgoslavt war of aggression against the now internationally recognized independent and iovereign nations of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has been inesponsible with appallingly destructive consequences. The United States, France, England, and Russia failed to intervene in an effective and con structive way to mediate a democratic and peaceful disassociation of former Yugoslav republics from the Yugoslav federation after its viability had been destroyed by a series of arbitrary actions of Milosevic's serbian government and the Serbian-dominated federal army leadership. The United States, France and England - by initially publicly opposing the democratic decision of the Slovenian and Croatian peoples when they declared independence after months ofserbian and Montenegrin sabotaged negotiations- gave the {ugoslav" military
an open invitation to intenrene militarily to prevent the independence of these republics and to seize teritory for
Greater Serbia aliac Yugoslavia. By imposing an arnrs embargo on all of fomrer yugoslavia by Besolution 713 on September 28, lg0l, the United Nations Security Council effectively granted a monopoly on heavy weaponry and airpowerto the aggressors in the conflict, the
of aggression.
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'Yugoslav Netlonrl Atuyt rad ths various serbian rind Montenegrln purnllltrry ltrc€t tupported by the army
little to change the situation. While some prisoners were relerased from the mostnotorious camps, many others were merely transferred
leaderehlp. - Human RQlttt, B-o,rnh,Htn0lfovlna and Macedonia were the only republicr offormcr Yryorhvlr to mcst the human rights criteria 9et by the European c_ommunlty ln Dcccmber of 1991 as"a condition for recognition. Prerldrnt lr-rtbijovlo had already shown himsetf to be a democrat and advocrtr of hufrrn rlghtr foratiiiiizens,ee"rdt".s of religion o_r nationallty, The only -rcnribre choice was'for the
to unknown locations or perhaps killed. Vanae.Owen Peqae Ptan. According to the version of the plan which Vance and Owen submitted in January 1993, the Bosnian Muslims who made up 44 percent of the population in BosniaHercegovina before the war began are to receive 29 percent of the land in the republic for their three cantons,.the Croatians who rnade up 17 percent of the population 25 percent and the Serbs who made up 3 1 percent of the population 42 percent. This arrangem ent leaves approximately 44percent of the Muslims living outside the cantons where they are in the majority, 37 percent of Croatians outside the Croatian controlled cantons and 48 percent ofthe Serbs outside the Serbian controlled cantons. Nobody but the Tudjman government, the Boban wing of the Croatian Democratic Union of Herceg-Bosna, and some Croatians living inside the proposed Croatian controlled canton are satisfied with the Vance Owen Plan. In lzetbegovic's
ilTltT'$i?l#H,Hl?;.:ff, f EIJ^ll.i,T*t?s#T*.ffi lg *a
demoeratie and peaceful trrnrlilon to rndependin.. t" provide reasonablc Euaranteet to thc Srrblan mtnbriti Uv ,""Jine L ctear
mesnego to serbiarYugorlrvla
-Boinian
rnd lh Berblan ctiSnts tt at they accept ruch, r pirorful and damocratic solution or fuce t},. combincd force ofthe lhhrnrtlonal oomnunity andihe democ."ti.attyelected govornnontt of Bornh.Hcrcegovina ana Cro*i;:-- sanotlorr anld Ald, The united Nations has failed to provide
view, Bosnian unitSr can bo naintained only if Bosnia is organized as a democratic and secular state which stresses the hu"'an and political rights of all individuals rather than the rights of national or confessional groups, and only a united Bosnia can be economically viable. If the plan were
effective rupport for a juet and democratic resol"tion ;iih" cri'sis a'd har_pauod a numberofineffectual resorutions orwtrictr r,",,r" aon. pt!r-ns lo- rlqp the continued_on-slaught by serbian .ititu.y'ro"..r. on Mny 81, l9g2 the united Nations-imposed eoooo-ii on +q.ruqp Y_ugoelavla or Serbia'and Montu""gro. ""letions ffri. -serbi re solutlon for the-first time cin gred out yusoslavi;oi a
lt
actually implemented, the Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslims would receive the least and give up the most. Bosnian Serb forces led by Karadzic and General Mladic would be required to relinquish about one third ofthe territory they have already conquered and ethnically cleansed while keeping two thirds. An Alternatiue Solution: enUltimotum. Contrary to recent statements of Lord Owen, his and Vance's approach is not the only one available. An alternative to more futile negotiations over a plan which no one has the intention of enforcing is to issue an ultimatum to the Serbian aggressors in both Bosnia and Croatia: Either
as tlre_ aggressor in the Boenian confliet. it rr*tio* t,urr. created considerable eeonomie discomfort in serbia " Mon[un.gro but have had little effect on.serbia's poricy towards C"r;f-H;;;;govina ""a or the behavior ofthe serbian forces in liosnia. In sum-"i oiili5z, tt,. united Nations belatedly p:gq" p-ro-vr{i1g food qnd ,"piri., -"ai.rr F thg hungry, sick, and blockaied cirijlns ;f S;fi;;;lriJ otne, Bosnian cities. The aid nis'ion has aone aidrJss tr,e fundamental causo ofhunger, diseaee, i4iury "ottringToau"ilr.-*rri"r, is the war itserf. Ttre united Nations i"6r;;; "ia totlur"" humanitarian aid and monitor cease fi*;g"";;"iti'rr"rr* beeome virtual hootagee. For months after the outbreak of the conflict united Nations officials failed to heed the maly leports of ethnic cie"n.ingl*p" mass killingbe.ing canild out by serbian forces on a massive scare."na In fgshi^on, the Bush administration for .;th; ;fiiessed i_:i'''tl* darty reports of atrocities in Bosnia which were reaching the^united states,Embassv !n lqlcrade. onry after televisil ffi;';;D-orte.s showect the worrd public video footage of the appalling treatment prisoners at serbian-run camps didunited Gii;;;iffililiJo- of o, leaders
comply with all United Nations resolutions concerning the cessation of hostilities and the blockading of cities, transfer
weapons to United Nations peacekeepers, free
csrnrnrrni4ations, and pernit the retriin.of refugees, fiee prisoners and meetotherhu'nanitarian demands orface the air power of the world cornrnunity and the massive aming of the Bosnian and Cnoatianforces with sophisticated modem weaponry. Military Ascistonae. In case the Serbian forces refuse to respond to an international ultimatum in either Bosnia-Hercegovina orCroatia, airsupport and militaryaid shouldbe granted the elected
th";;i;-.^iir"*l.ri"ur
of major world powers take notice ot Ked uross monitors and united Nations "f speciar missions have done
governments of these countries immediately if they meet certain conditions. Both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina should be required in return for military assistance to allow the immediate ;bationing
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of lnternatlonel ptao€hmplnf lbrocr and human rights monitors in lnrgoly Eorblan aram whloh runandat [o govornmentforces. Croatian militaty lbrsgr and leorl rdmlnlrtrrtlsnr within Bosnia-Hercegovina rhould iwoar lolnW h thrcrlrtlnlWlUtutlon ofBosnia-Hercegovina unl,ll r naw oonrtltutlon lr r$rbllrhrd,
llrr
ulthnrh md of mllllrry oprrrtlonr would be to
THE BREAK-UP OT' YUGOSI.A\TTA, INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AIYD THE WAR IN BOSNIA.HERCEGOVINA
force
oompllanor wlth rurolullonr rnboiUrd ln tho ULTIMATUM and to brlnt rn cnd to tho rtlllrdon r5llnr! tha lcgitimate government of
1. The current war in
Botnlr Hrrt{pv{nr pcndlnf thrllhbllrhmontof a new constitution hy a oonrtltucnt rframbly dJme*rtlorlly glectrd under international rupcrdrlon, Milltary rnd llnrnclrl mrliience from Ialamic countries could provfule for a lirp pruportlon of thr effort ln Bornia. Tho forcer of thc Scrblrn Y{Brlav rnny and itr paramilitary alller ln Croatia and Bornla aro not lnv{nolbla, Thoy have performed poorly in infantry battles and hand.to.hand combat, Thoir main skill in in bombardingcities from mountrlntopr rnd pillaging and looting places where they meet little rerirtance. The current war bears no similarity to the partisan warfare of World Wa/ II. Tito's partisans were a multi-national, multi-confessional force fi ghting all over former Yugoslavia with an enemy that was over-extended. Unlike the Croatians and Bosnians today, they were not hampered by an arms embargo and received massive supplies of weapons from the United States, Great Britain and Russia. Today's self-proclaimed Serbian Republics of Bosnia and the K.rajina are short of manpower and overextended militarily. They are separated by miles of enemy territory from Serbia. There is little enthusiasm for the Bosnian war among the majority of the youth in Serbia who have made draft dodging a full time profession. In contrast the Bosnian and Croatian people are well motivated to defend their homelands. It is not necessar5r to send large numbere of gtround forces to Bosnia or Croatia to make the coste of aggreseion hlgh for the Serbian neo-fascists, nor is it neceerartrl to carry the war into Serbia. All thatis needed ie to stop the afgr.etrlon againet Croatia and Boenla and ln eo doing to pruvent aggneselon against the nonSerblan populatlon of Kocovo and the Sandzah. United Nations
Bosnia-Hercegovina is
essentially a war of aggression from the ouiside, even though it has internal ethnic dimensions. The conflict is a continuation of the war of aggressiiin against Slovenia and Croatia, which tempoiarily subsided in those countries but is re-igniting in Croatia. The regime of Se$ian president Slobodin Milo5evi0 lmee-trsl-shehFchl, the largely Serbian military establishment of the former "Yugoslad Army, and Seibian ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups both in and outside Serbia are respgnsible for initiating and perpetuating the war. If the Serbian warmachine is notitolped, thJwar can only
spread to new areas and is liliely to result in a confrontation of continental proportions. Milo5evid's
recourse to violence rather than serious neg_otiation represents a dangerous pre,cedent for deqling with t-he complex na-tional ind religious
in Eastern Erirope, the former Soviet Llnion, and all othermulti-national multi-religious empires and states that are likely to dissolve in the future. In the meantime, Milo5eviC's allies in Bosnia are carrying out step-by-step destruction of most of the country. differ_e-nces
?,
d'6tat
In 1987, Slobodan Milo5eviC engineered a coup in the Serbian Communist Party by fostering
Serbian paranoia and ethnocentrism diiecfed againsi the non-S_erbian peoples of the Yugoslav federation. It appears that Milo5evi0's initial intention was to become paramount leader of all of Yugoslavia using a Serbian power b_ase as a springboard.t- He was zupported by a gloup of intellectuals belonging to the Serbian Academy who argued that Serbia andseibians had been placed in an unfavorable position in fitoist Yugoslavia -and that the- Yugoslav federation must be reor[anized in such a fashion as to give Serbia more power. Their assertion that the republican boundaries oTTito's Yugoslavi a were "essentially unjust to Serbs because man! Serbs were lelt outside the Serbian republic" ignored-the fact that most of the Serbs in question had}istorically lived in
peace keepingforcea ghould immediately be dispatched to these areas as requested byAlbanian presidentSali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Koeovar Albanians. The world muet show its resolve to do its moral duty to humanity.
What is moral is also practical. The two go together. President Clinton has a golden opportunity to exercise leadership and bring about the neeessary coalition ofinternational forees. Ifthe leaders of some Western European countries want to bury their heads in the sand and allow this war of aggression to escalate out of control, the United States should seek alliee in the Islamic World and establish new links to build a wor'ld order that is more humane and just.
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onclav€t, inaldc Botnle'Hcrcogovina and Croatia nap.nr.aLed.by maRy hllomehrr frorii the republic of Seibia a4d that the bcrr{toder ln qu€tl,ion had never been parr gf hlatodc EarHan rtetm'clthcr medieval or modlr.t. l'hay_alro lporpd thp lb.ei lhat a much larger minority of non.Earbl liVed lnrldc the bordora ofserbia itself. These Earblen lntcllaotuali alao obleitad to lhe ract itiat serri" alone amgnE thc.Yrryorlai rupublf.cq had ils legal u,ttho.ity weakaned by th€ prc!€no€ ndthin its borders of two H.utonomout pruvlnogr, Sgroyo gnd Vojvodina. Among tho I egd i nF proponsnh ofthe Bcrblnn Acadomy's nosi tion wns Serbiah lhtollcctual and nsvollnt, I)otiricir Cosic Idoe-hrcet-sn choh-sichl, now presldont of what ramains of former Yugoslavia, the -ropublict,of Sarbia and
elsewherer. Ifrom f966 the administration ol' t,he Autonomous Province of Kosovo was controlled by rg-presentatives of the Albanian rnajority, who, it was alleged, were sometimes insensitive to the concerns of Serbs. There were occasional violent incidents between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Serbs maintained that the largely Albanian authorities in the province were not acting energetically to protect Serblan lives and property. In the early eighties there was a movement among the Kosovo Albanians to elevate the status of the province to that gf a republic within the Yugoslav federation. A small group of Kosovar Albani ans, iro stly students, favored the annexation of 'Kosovo tb neighboringAlbania, atthat time under the iron control of the Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha, but this group was never more than a tiny minority. Probably e_ncouraged by the Albanian regime, representatives of this grolrp eyen tried to organize gueriilla warfare in Kosoio birt failed to attrait suppirt for their plans. Serbian and federal authoritiris branded all members of the Albanian movement as pro-Hoxha separatists and used separatism as a fretcxt for fiotitical repression The early 1980s movement for elevation of Kosovo's status was strongly repressed by the Serbian and federal security forces; and dozens of Albanian activists were jailed. This repression resulted in greater resentment against local Serbs by the Albanian majority in the province and probably led io an increas e i n viol ent incidents. As tensions between Serbs and Albanians rnounted in Kosovo, Albanians living in Belgrade and other Yugoslav cities outside Kosovo were flequently
Montenegro.z
3.
Milo5evi0's desire for an authoritarian centralized Yugoslavig was welcom-ed _by elements of the largely Serbian oflicer corps of thg Yugoslav army and secu?ty apparatus. After the death of fito in tg80 key eiements in the militarydrewup plans to reestablish audhoritarian centralized rule and eliminate the vestiges of federali sm, if lecessary, by a military coup d'6taf. The efforts of MiloSevid and the military to reorganize yugoslavia algng more authoritarian centralized lines domifiated by a serbi an c ommuni st politico-mi litary clas s were re si stefi everywhere by non-Seibs, but it was ds much the extreme methods by which Milo$evit and his allies sousht to achieve their aims which drove non-serbiun iEsion. towards independence from the.Yugoslav" federafiion. Immediately upon gaining control of the Communist I. I'arty apparatus in Serbia and establishine a virtual monop-oly over the mass media, Milo5eviC orianized an anti-Albanian campaign focusing public atte-ntion on a supp.osed "threat"- to-Serbs posea by the Albanianspeaking majority in the Auton6mous piovince ofXo.o"o. As a result of out migration and a lower birth rate than that of the local Albanians, the percentage of S""l. i" Kosovo decreased from 27 percent in 195"g to less tn"., ten percent of'the total by the mid-lgg0s. Over the dccades qaly Serbs had left Kosovo provinee, largely in seerrclr of better jobs and economic opportu"ni[ies
suhject to violent attacks and persecution by local Serbian
authorities.
5. At the behest of Milo5evie, the: Serbian statecontrolled media played up every incident of Serbian sufferin_g at the tianils of Albanians while remaining silent about acts of violence and persecution against Albanians. The political views of the Albanians of Kosovo were misrepresented, and truckloads ofMilo5evic su,pporters were sent around Serbia to organize antiAlbanian rallies. When Milo5evid tried- to send a caravan of militants to organize such a rally in
d&
SlovonJa, th€ 6lovgalea euthorities intervened to Itop tbenl lnehed.of tryinS to resolve the co.,hicts bet,we€n ttcrbt anel Albeninns b.y dialosue and roconelIietlon, Mllol€v.ld lntnrducad'Serbian--itii".y rule ln Korovo and trted to rqlve thc problem by Urrtritv roprerrlng thc Albanlent, Hh chauvinistii poticie-s aulmla_atcd ls the rrbltrary abolition in March I 0tP of-the e u toaeuoua ;tr t'ur of ail-;;"itt".s
both Koro-vo esd Vqfvoatna whicfi tira--ut"o "r qd HuareFt bV tbs Farderal Conltltution- of it, Yugotlav Fcdc-ratlon. Borblan polico wjth tho support ot yugofllav tederal army unitt, int,roduccd a brutal
roginre of military occupltion, uihich killad dozens of pcace fu I protesters. Many Albanian-speaki ne omci ais of l,hc defunct Autonomous Province were jaifed, others were fired from their jobs, which were grven to Serbs. The Albanians ofKosovo respond-ed to the3erbian,"gi-" of occupation with non-violbnt demonstrations unfi trt. creati on ofnew democratic political organizations inspired Ly t!r. -recent East-European demdcratic revolutions. The leaders ofthese groupl have been subject [o constl"t -SLiUiu" harassment, prersecution, and arrest by the occupation authorities.s
6.
In the name of protecting Serbs, no-one has done more lo-.g"9"lqer the lives oflnnocent Serbian p"opt.
than MiloSevid and his political allies. If inter_ communal violence and .,ethnic hatred" have emerge{ in what was once regarded -an multi-ethnic or multi-national Tederation. "s " it-"a.i is ethnis violence Milo5evid and the fedirii perprt""r-va !av_e m anufacture drs timu! at_ed, in their last.ditch effort to hold bowei "oa inin era ";, of democratic and nationalist revolutions. MiloJ"uic't p.olicies more than any other factor have .o"trin"t"d to the destruction of thd Yugoslav rederation, d".trovi"s the uncasy-e_quilibrium, ciafted in the iiil ;*, *[,i.h
II i
relbrmers lrom the republican Communist ptrrty
olgani zations, human rights activists, represen tativcs ot the ecolory and anti-draft movementsl advocates of multi-party democracy, and nationalists all came to the conclusion that life in a Yugoslav f'ederation dominated by authoritarians like Milo5evic and hidebound hardline Communists of the federal arrny was no longer possible. In both Slovenia and Croatia, democra"tic reformers favoring multi-party elections and democratic pluralism gqined-control-of the regional organizations of the already federalized Leazue-of Comriunists. In
MiloSevid and his allies in the largely Serbian officer corps of the Y,ugoslav aimy steadfastly resisteil the introd"uction of a plurali_st multi-party systern, not only in Serbia but in aU athei re-gions bf yugoslivia. At the last congress of thd Yugoslav League of, c-ontrast,
Cornmunists inJanuary lgg0, Croalian and Sloienian reformers withdrew from the federal organization and organized multi-party elections.
8. In March and April of lgg0, Slovenia and Croatia held their nrst multi-par'ty elections in fifty years. The C ommuni's t reiormers I o s t th e
al m os t
elections t_o parties favoring national sovereignty within a reorganized Yugoslav cohfederation. In November and early December 1990, similar non-Communist
democratic nationalist coalitions emerged victorious in multi-party elections in Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegbvin-a as well. In Serbia and Montenegro former }ard-line Communists renamed
had allowed Yugoslavia's national groups to co_exist.
their parties So-cialist and reluctantly agreed to multiparty eJections held in two rounds in-bofh republics on December g and 23, 1990, which the Seibian and Montenegrin Communists managed to win by playing on ultra-nationalist themes and makiig ude oT their control of the mass media and tf,e state
authoritarian and ehauvinist policies of Milosevid acted to stimulate the movement towards national sovereignty or total separation r"bYugoslavia. In eroitia and $;;e-ni;-aur*.ruti.
in which almost ni-nety percent of the eligiSle voters authorized the Slovenian parliament -io declare
7._.- The
apparatus.
9.
On December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a plebiscite
independence
ifin six months the Slovenian government
hnd no[ that
n€tt €on:titutional arrangement
democratic aspirafion for 80v€r€ll lut 6hc flrut, half of 1901, Bosnia's Murllni l6h-lee-ah ease-etprenident Kiro Gligorov raColy sought to frnd a demogratte mlfHoa rihtoh foouH luld 6ttow allow flro fhe Sioue"ia", Slovenians and Groatlanr to reneln wlthln a docentralized and yugoglav srates r€orgenllq{.uplo.n r€orEenllqd unlon of Of eoverelm aoverelgn Yugoslav states but annou announo€d thclr dc:lre to loav6'the Yugonlav federation qhouJd rhoulr the Elovon€r and Croali to- te-ui". tv€R€Er
iT";;
trethe.Iovld and Gllgorov feared inat ii tt Croatlanr and _Slo_venlant left, Bosnia and"
Megedonla would be left to the merby of UitoseviC end other lntranslgent Serbian lead-ers.
L0. Milolevtd and the federal military leadership flatly reJected joint Slovenian an-d Ct"atiai, p-ropgsals for a Yugoslav confederation as well as the Bosnian anii Macedonian .o-pro-i"" proposals for a looser federation or irnion of
sovereign Yugoslav states. Serbia and its Montenegn; ally. blocked the efforts of the four other republici to lchleye a majority vote-in the federal presiddncy *t serbian leaders appointed puppet rbpreseniatives ""
to .the presidenCy from qhi no-Ioiger.eiistent autonomous provinces of Kosovo ant Vo;vodina
whose autonomy had already been arbitrahlv and unconstitutionally abolisled by the Seibian parli?ment. The list straw for thd Sloveni-ans and
Croatians came wh-en the Serbs and MonG*grirrr, gether_with these 13"e." .bogu s. .repte! entabives oi existent Koeovo and Vojvodini, "o blocked the confirttruliort gf !tt" y9ry.+9dgrate, ritional, and .o".itiuto"y Crouiiun Ptlpe Mesr0 lsteep.pay mess-ich] as chairman of the federal .,presidenc;i. - According to itre-port-fito col stitutional arrarigeqelt-, the dhairmansliip of-the federal presidency, ihe-highest executiv; b;ai i" tti. c,ggntry, was to pass each year to the representitive of a to
orlre.rent republrc who was to be chosen bv his republic's
parliament. It wes Croatia's turn i" sell?t-;E; fedelal prestdent and satp" -MA;iA *"i-iii'frrsr non'comm'nist ever to beinominatea l" iurairr*
federal presidency. In the final weeks before Croatitr
and Slovenia declared their independence, in the absence ofMesiC, Yugoslavia was nominaily governed by a Serbian
puppet "presidential coordinator," an Albanian army sergea+t frglr Kosovo named Seido Bajramovic [saydough by-rrihl|-oh-vichl. Bajramovic h-ad no politicll experience and little education. The Croatians reiponded to Serbian stonewalling and provocations with a pl6biscite in which the vast majoiityvoted to authorize the Croatian Soborto declare indbpendence atthe end ofJune 19g1in the ev,ent that the cbming weeks'negotiations proved futile.s
L1. All the time that the non-Serbian republics were
u{rs_uccessfully attempting to negotiate a new constitution
with the Serbians and Montenegrins, MiloSevi0 and his allies in the federal aqmy we-re encouraging and supporting a1r amed iebellion'by the Serbian Tinori_ty in- Croatia against the democratically
elected-authorities
it'that republic. HardJinl
Serbian Communist officers tried -to find a pretext to ggny qut a miltqry coup and end all plans for d-emocracy, Y3goslav confedeialism, or nationll independence f6r the lon-Serbianrepublics.o Milo5evi0's wife became the i*ological- he-ad ofan organization of Communist military officers which advocatid preservation of the existing regime.and Yugoslav unity by military force. As a pretext tor actively tbstering armed rebellion and sedition in neighboring Croatia, Milo5evi0 and the Belgrade press under his control maliciously exploited-fears- and memories of atrocities against Serbs committed during the Nazi occ_upation of Yugoslavia, and deliberately
propqgated the myth that the newly electeil Croatian government ofDn Frarrio Ttrdiman tfr6hnyoh tooj-mahnl and his party, the Croatian Democratic Union, intended to -commit genocide against the Serbian minority in Croatia. Such pccusations, while patently absurd, were highly
inllammatory.
12. After an initial period of post-election euphoria, tpumplralism, and rather pompous nationalistic rhetoric, the Tudjman government-adofted a conciliatory attitude -elected
towards democratically
parliahentary
representatives of the $erbian minority in Croatia.
In
the sqmmor of lg00 the Croatiin parliament introduced e p_u4bor ol oonatitution'al changes aim_ed at ettablhhlng" Cro-afla as a ;;;;;i"gn and demoerallo nef,lonel etate in whicL-tF"
14. 'Ihe word Kraji.na [cry-eo-rrah] literally rneans frontier, and the Cordprises & liamow swath o? ""grgr territory yttigtt extends tor rniles ol'ng thl borders of uroatra with -tsosnia and serbia. During the long period g!$qbspury {ule in Croaria (which i*r["a t o-iEze to 1gl8),the Habsbyrg emperors settlsd Serbs irrifr" .ruu, which was organi?id ui a speciai-mititu"y irb"li* ro, purposes of defending their-empire from ihe Otto*an Turks. According to ihe census bf iggi, o"iy uUo"t o"u third of Croatia's approximately 600,bb'0-$;b, tivea in this underpgpr!_ate-d re_gron,? In A;gult S.pdt;;r, and uctober of 1990, the Krajina ser5s led by extremists belongilg to thb Serbiai Democratic partS *l barricades and armed gunmen blocked roads drid cut "p off rail traffic between tlie heartland of crouiiu trru seacoast. $rajina serbstook overlocal police stationsby ""a fbrce and broke into arms depots. wien the croatian
rights of ett oltlrrnr would be equal.
Representqtivgs of t[o Serbian Domocratic party f"a by Jovan Rabkovi0 lyoh.vahn rnh.ehko-vich] aer"a"d"6 special-proviaions- guaranteclng the national riei;is or the serbian minority.- Inltlafy lhey demanded cilltural autonomy for-tho Sbrbp ln Oioatid, but soon escalated their demands to include political autonomy. Th;
Croatian governnFnt_ grprrtted willingiress to negotiatQr .but Qerblei Democratid party representatlve-a boyeotted parliament. anil extnemlrt pqlty lgadeil lod by a'denrisr Milan naUic lmee-lahn bah.bich] and a poli-ce officer Milan Martic
[me_e.lahn mar-tich] organized an a"mea,evolt of Serbs eentened in Knin, part ofa Serbian aominatea
government sent policemen to reestablish control, they were attacked by armed Serbs. Milosevid n"'Uii.i!, supported the, Knin Serbs and vowed to protect them against- the Croatian regime, which hu'suid- *u, u reconstitution of the ill-ff,med ustasho resime. tnu of.the Serbs in Croatia tivsoiitside.the 3qi9.-tv r$aji_na legion and were opposed to the policies of t-he r$qiina extremists. The federal air- force shot down a croatian police helicopter, a"a iua"tui e"""tutt tnu legan to threaten military inteiwention aglT"ii Croatian government. Cr
region known as the Xiqiina. In December tgg0, the Croatianparliament or !3. Sabor passed a demdcratic conitifutioo-*ni"f guqlanteeq _the elvil liberties of all of its citizens
an,{ provides for cultural and educationaf agtongmy-fo{ the Serbs and other nationat minorities in croatia. under this constituiion,b"ru, a.n{ ryprgsentatives of smaller minorities tli. ".. si;""o*" .nght to have- th9i1 own schools and to uJe-tfrei, lqnpugse
tddile
a"d ?+.d qlphabet as- the- officiai alphabet of districls where they form a ma:o+iil?M"t ii"""p.ro l???: urgi.ed !y t4. United Nations community, thq Croatian government "ha went 6rren
of members of the Serbian Democratic pa-rtv. In some cases local officials acted with excessive zeai and
further, passing g..laW guaranteeing selfggverruFent political
e-xpe_lled Serbs who would otherwise have been loval to the -croatian government. The serbian state-coniiolled media^reqresented these acts as a wholesale campaig to expel Serbs.e
and
autonomy to dlstricts where Serbs make up g mqiority of tht pop"f"li"o. Eecause of these conc-iliatot| me-asures tikin bv-the c roatian governmen t., i t seenis cleai ifiat tii"l.siii-ut. goals and concerns of the serbia" mi"o"itv-.o-,ifJr-riuu bee-n addressed through negotiation urd ",,o-pro*ir., and that there was n,i need"whatsoeveirr.-"il^"r*"a
1Q, In response to local rebellion and a hostile federal mil.itary, .the Croatian and Slovenian leaders began palring mililary preparations for defense ofttrei" repuliics rn the case ofan attack bythe federal army. They began
rebellion.
building rlp local poiice and territb.i"t-i"f"-o". lbrces and purchasing arms from abroad when ir,'
[.tr
federal weapon; factorlet ln Serbia and Bosnia ref'sed to meet thelr ordern. 'l'he efforts in slovenia
and croatia to build up ropublican defense forces were greeted with alarm anil hoitility by the federal military leaders, the mqiority of whom- were Serbs. Miloievie cultivated the support of tho pro-Yugoslav federal oflicer go{ps by portraying himeelf air n dcfdirder ofthe yueoslav f'ederation and branding tho slovcnian and crdatian leaders as secesgionist. l[ in now known that the]ederal military already had plann to institute a coup J et.t, arrest the democratically olocl,ed lcaders of croatia- and Slovenia and institute irn authoritnrian regim.. tn. Knin revoltprovided them with a prctext foriritervention in the interests of preventing "ethnic" warfare. Because of divisions in the offieer c'orps and the fact that lhe majority. of tho onlisted mcn were non-Serbian. the prospectiv-o coup leaders did not feel secure enouetr [o $ry out those pla.ns prigr to the Slovenian and Croitian declarations of independence.s
16. In the fall and winter of lgg0, Serbian surgen ts ggo Fo9 d in Knin orgn n i 2s a a..'t"""-o" districts with their-own amy"and p"ub" i"r".r io" Thgy later elevaled thi stalur-of tt"r" t|e $rniioU. districts to that of gn- ind_ependent republic, and in t[e lnrips of 1991, proclaimed iheir unificbtio" i'itn s.rriu. il?
Ll unng the spring of 1 9.9-1, whil e negoti a ti on s were taki ng plqge between the reprrblican governments over the future 9f Yugo-9-lavia, arme-d guerrill"as a"a asitatori from Milo5gFt, "Y-ug6-slav" army l.aEe"r,-"ira'S"iiir" "ip
*itiit
io;;;ft.; ;*" "*",
officials, infiltrated village after and district after district-in the serbii" "itt"Su, p"p"t"i.a of Croatia. These-agitators brought iu"iJq"""titi"s of weapons provided by the Serbian police,'the federal g.rmy, and st-ate_we3bons factories a"a Utlrrtiv-Chrust
qpon the Serbian villagers in ttreie ail'..- ih. !but-ugoslav federal army,Ied"by an offieer c""p-" tl"t -in* was,eighty- percent -serbia-n, then reDe[rous districts undpr the pretext of"lrt"r5a preventing ethnic violenee. Except in a fe#caser *ri"rt t["r" ,rlru non-serbian officers, the federal units utilized tii.i.ir"u"y mi li larv .hardware [o. protect ttre- posi ii;;ilffii ui' bi the Serbian insurgents.ro r
t0-
L7. l'rom the outset, the gyoups rebelling against the elected govertrtt enf in eroatia reJorfed to vi6lf nce, looting, kidnapping and hostage-taking
gainst local Croatians as rvell as to ac Ls oTviole nce and intimidation against those local Serbs who a
were reluctant to join the insumection.rr
The wanton acts of destruction and violence committed by the Serbian rebels, organized, financed, and armed by ttre MiloSevi0 regime nrith the active assistance of th-e federal officer corps, p_redictably and regrettably led to spontaneous outbursts of iruelty and violilnce a gainst_loc al,Serbs by enraged Crolti an vi ll agers pnd political extremists. -Such acLs were iot, however, part of,a-deliberate policy of the Croatian govgrnrylent and have been vigorously criticized in the Croatian press. The Croatian-government showed its goodfaith and its desire to stop tlie spreading I a wl e s sne s s and vi ol e-nce by all owi ng the federal a rmy t6 occupy large areas of Croatia on the condition that ihe prmy act impartially and assist in preserving the peace ; instead ofassisting the democraticaily electedand legally constituted government of Croatia- in preventing th-e entry of armed guerrillas, however, the federal army sometimes secretly, of[en openly, assisted the guerrillas in attacks on Croatian polic-e stations. Long before the
Croatians made their final and iFrevocable
declaration of ildependence from Yugoslavia, the "federa-I" army had completed the odcupatio-n of as much as one quarter of Croatian teritory. 18. All of these events took place before Croatia and Slovenia's declarations of independence in the last week of June 1991. It should f,ave been patently clear to any person who followed them carefully ani obj-ectively ttrat the game plan of Milo5evi0 and the military leadership ofthe Serbian-dominated "federal" arrny was to seize and occupy Croatian territory. The Croatians and Sloveniani-made no mad rush to independence. Instead, they patiently and honestly attempte-d to negotiate with MiloBevi0 anil the.,yugoslaf, anTy and what was left of the federal civilian leadlrship
ynder_t_he-powerless and ineffectual prime minister
Ante Markovid [ahn-teh mark-oh-vich], the man
ll
preferred Fy the U..S, State l)apartment and many .Eur_opeq4leadere. 'Fho roeponno lrom the Serbia., arri
"federal" aido. w.qr..nothing- but stonewalling,
ntransi gen co,, dupli c-r tnur dou'lil-o- tal k, mi I ita"y .o.,p threats, actg ofintimidation, nnd MiloseviC's sponjorshiir of armed terroriam. i
19, Ily tho timo of the Croatian and Slovenian depc nd ence cl.eclaration
on Juno 2F, I gg
l, the federal premicr Ante Markovid was tho virtual brisoner of Milo$evit and the hard-line authoritnrian cbmm,r.tist. and/or ex-Communist military. Milo$eviC in" Serbian military_ !!en were rap-ldly_d iscovering ""a in
s
lhat greater Serbian ultra.naiion-atism or-o"osubstitute for the now discredited tfrarxismLeninism or Titoism. A strange concoction of fascisry was a good ideological and propag"odi"tic
hqc.kneygd Titoist phraseology andireo-faJcii- *u. taking shape as the official ideology of the Serbian government and the-military- leadeiJhip. Milo5evid,
in a manner similar to that of Mussolini. was completi-ng his conversion from socialist to ultranationalist. In the spring and summer of 19g1 the pro-Milosevic press cairieil articles praising voiiri"" SeSelj [voice-lahv sheh-shel'], the le^ader ofi grdwing ?.rmy of fanatical-para--militaiy volunteerr, *fio, *itfi the assistance of serbian goiernment o{hciair federal arrny officers, had riovea i"io ta.ee ur."r'of ""a uroatia and was beginning to infiltrat-e serbian populated districts of Bosnia-Heiceeovin;. - I" ^;" interview- with .the pro-Milo3eviC ,i.*J -lii, -ueuri"u l"!.fyj,u,.Sedelj boast'ed that he anh i";;1;;;1lA nol krll their enemies with knives but would employ lusty ehoe*spo_ops so that the victim, il;id ei;';"f |.gt"rllt,r,tz .Se6e\i's men were already putting similarly tr-loo.dthirsty_ideas into practice in irie villa"ees of the 4raJrn-a and Eastern Slavonia. Se5elj was sublequently elected as representative to the Ser6ian f;.til;;;;i, replace-a deceased member, a sign of t}e climate of frenzied ultra-nationaliet hysteria i; his ;iil;;. direct resulr of the insidfous ;;;i;t';;;;";;;'d, " sponsored month-after-month by p"ii-Ndiifs*"ie ournnlists.
.f
l?
!0.- "Qespite all the evidence, the American, British, and French governments continued to
harbor the notion that a unifred Yugoslavia had to be preserved and that Croatia and S-lovenia should be_pressured into remaining in the Yugoslav federation. Ignoring the months of fruitless
negotiations deliberately sabotaged by the Serbian and federal army leadership, in thifinai week before the Slovenian and Croatian independence proclamations,
American Secretary of Stat€ James Baker and Under Secretar5r Lawrence Ea gleburger publicly opposed the Croatianst and Slovenfansr moves tgvgard.s independence. This attitude only encouraged the hard-line military leadership with the help ofSerbian extreme nationalist guerrillas to begin their assault on
Croatia
in the tame of stopping:secessionism
and
prese-rving Yugoslavia. The German government, which
had followed events much more closely and carefully,
rigtrtly advocated immediate recolnition of the independence of Croatia and Sloienia and an unambiguous policy against Serbian or "federal" military rntervention to prevent the independence of these
ihe Germans be6n heeded, much plgrodslqd probably could have been preriented. Milosevic's imperialist project could have 6een nipped in -the bud, ind the'd6struction of Vukov^ar, Dubrovnik, Sar{evo, Mostar, and a host of other cities and towns might have been avoided. The United States, Great Britain, France, and the rest of Europe are now faced with a crisis of much greater dimensio4s, which will be much harder toiesolve even if resolute action is finally taken. At times European and Arnerican diplomats seemed stra!-gely oblivious of the human suffering caused Milo5efrC coyly !,V MiloSevid's war of aggression. -for lgRublics. _Had
the actions of
denied responsibility
dhb
paramilitary invaders bfCroatia, while all the time providi.ng- political and military support and ideologica_l justification for their aCtions. -European leaders either failed to notice or ignored these facts.
2I. In mid-July 7992, as a result of mediation by the European Community, the federal military leadeiship l3
t
withdrawitF forcet flom Sloveniain exchange for permission to withdraw their heavy weaponrv and Th lr, v o a p o n ry wa s .!r b-. ; dil ;ai qt Tll",q ry- 9 9 st PF_o_t ! : L;roari !_and Borni a. tVhite the military $::11q.T I ?S"reed to
t f f, H?"H'ff#,rlll,ti,iffi ,,1*g;i:m,::t'il pre.vent
by. forge thc-ldm o[ Croatia wit[-lGirq, serbian mlnorlty. If thoy failad to crush croatian
resistance totally,-thqy at Ioaat hnpea to ;;ir. ilfu. tracts of croatian terrilory for nnneiation to . r*rilu" Yr rgosl avi a or Greater sorbi a, th rnrehb"t J"r u.
n a ti ojr a I i s Ra ra !
mi
I
i
ta ry vo I u n to o r s fr6
n
i S. rui d n "rt""aL a
rnto Liroatia to sr.lpport tha Krqiina rebellion. Federar ""
military. .unite followed, proieciine [ii;-'ilriti*, militiaa with tanirs, heavy :Ttlr1g $y !,nopationalirr aruuery. and atr r_uppo1!. In August the federai milttafo' leunched i luii:scat" -iiilrily "ir"iiii "" Croatld.
-
22, In-the course oftheir war against Croatia, Serbian and nfederal" armed forces not,freiely,;1;;d S";il;;_ pgnula-ted areas "protect" SerbJ"b;T;;i;;,i'ffii.
!o stretches of teritory where CroaUans-fori;a;, gyg,11l}r"hing rn.qiority. In suct .eeio"., Darked on^a systematic effort to tenrorizd and exp--el_ the Croatian population. This haJ-been
the;;.
welldocumentedbvin0emaii-JriatU"-"o""frl-t" organizations. lhe _pame pattern was i;troAi..a simultaneousl;, in VojvoTini rgrifit-f"Jir -uunganans,. Croatians, and othel non-Serbs.
l n ere r s aI so erndence that the fede ral army has engased n the sys tema tlc destmcti il A-i;;i- ;iii ; ;" prevent tens of thousands of non-serbs nofr- .'"", returning. to their former homes. rttJr.r"ii oItt.r" acts, now being repeated in Bosnia with ;;;;;;;;;, tne.t argest ref bgee cri sis in post worl d war II Europei' rustory' w hole sections of croatia and now Boinia nave been converted into a wasteland of mbbie
;;;il;
i
and charred rafters. fa"to"i"s and-buiidfr; apital accu mulatea tnrou;h e;rd; ;itJi;i"di
e
investment,have_U.rot"tilTvt"rtiirvih.-iit1"n" beginning of 1gg2, ttt"
loss
rrti-"t"J'ai-ug.
in property
in eroatia'alone ;;;;iltee"n ,n-a ,'["ir -14'
li
i
,t
billion dotlqrs;, moreover, the self-styled
serviors a.d protectors of the Serbian people have shown little re spect for the lives of Serbians iir ttr-e areas they assault and lay
to waste.t.t Hundreds of Serbian civilians have been killed by the indiscriminate. bombardment _of _villages gf mixed nationality and cities like Vukovar and Sarqi evo, where a sirbs tanti al part of the population is Serbian. Hundreds of naive Serbian army recruits have also been killed in the senseless and wanton assaults on Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina. 23. In the autumn of 1991, the European Community and subse-qgeltly the United Nations made repeatei
unsuccessful efforts to broker a ceasefire between S-erbian and Croatian forces. The ceasefire was broken cuickly each time, in most cases when the "federal" and S'erbian forces lega-n an ?ssault on a new area. The strategy of
the federal and Serbian forces was to emplo/ihe
c-easefires to regroup, to move in reinforcem6nt! and lhen tg conqluer new areas of Croatia. The poorly armed Croatian defense forces responded by surroundinf federal
army barracks
in Croaiia. Bv a combinition
of
negotiation and blo_ckade, the Croatians induced "federal" garriso-n commanders to gurrender their weapons and by suglr me^ans they were able to gain substantial qua-ntities of weapons and ammunition including some lanks and heavy-artillery. The Serbian and "fideral" forcers, however, still haii a large advantage in sheer numbers of heavy weapons anii a total minopoly on guli_tary air powei through their control of the air f6rce. In the s u m rn er a n d autumn of I gg2, federal mili tary officers of Croatian origin defec te il to the Croa tian side, where they becalme the backbone of the professional of6cer cor?s of ttre newly forming
Croatian army, which has sho*n great skill in resi-sting the invading arrnies of an enemy with fai c-ourage and considerable
superror weaponry.
24.- Despite the efforts to establish military discipline and. a.centrally controlled professional army, iome undisciplined local military units have committed acts
of violence against innocent civilians of Serbian l5
nationality.. In_ono notorioun case, armed men..in camouflageduniforms who holonged to a regionJ zuard unrt abducted to a hundred Serbs -from
-sixty
un d e rgro u:r d e h e I to ra i n t h e to w n o f G o s pi C t go T.hgse Serbs were n-€vorheard from agal".
-s
pi
c-h
1
.,
the Serbian arld ..l'ecleral" military leadership to ?gree- to withdraw federal forceJ from Croitia. According to.the agrgeme-nt, United N;tio", puu.ul;pfig
i
S".t[.i, or tolence are morally. uqiurtifiatrre iil i"".."rirh". The croatian authoiitiei wourd be wise lo ptoi"*t.
aqd,qunis.lr tlle nepetratorJ, foi fi," .rlltv lumanrights of the seibirin popuration of croatii and tlosnla-Herceg.ovina ia a mnttcr ofgreatimportance to a definitive settiglnent ofloday's cinnicts iil-ro*", Yugoslavia and to all decont humirn beinsJof;di;e" na ti onali ty. Amnesty Internationnr and tiJ ri"t i-ft i.r, 'have uncovered sev_eral othor ca'es of atrociiies committed by partic-ular milil,ary unitJ agalnst serh' sincs thc war bagan. while these human .ights organizations believe tfre c-roatian go".."-""t could.prosecute these-cases more vigorousli, t["v ha"" tbund a. completg lack of cooperation by lhe S6.li* au[nontles anct tugo,slav army in the investigation of
tbrces woul d be stationed in areas of croatia sei zed nv tnE
:g,olglllf and
o;l"di;e;;i;
atrocities committed by the-Serbi"" *itil?rv"u"a -fili"i paramilitary €roups.rr destmctio" --The gerpetrated first qgainst innocent Cr"ats ""a -infi Eosnians as welf as SerbG uv tt. s""6iJ" ?ira "federal" forces has been,.r.y.rthel6rr, fr#il.#." m agnitud-e an d i s the_ re sul t of cons ci o u s gov "f "ernmt ntaliy sponsored policy rather than spontaneour o"tu"rsts or
"ethnic hatied.'r Local drril"-Crr"tl" ;diuiu, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, $""Ur, have unfortunateiv parti"ioit"a rn armed insurrection-against the demodr^aticallu u"a
lgsallvconstitutedauthdrities*ai"-i1"r-.iii""r?illi?l,t
the-ilnon-serbianneighbors.iil;;jil;t;?bffi
;,#,
and Bosnians merely #ant to live in p"'uc" d"a p-rorp"riiv as the citizens of democratic indef,e"Je"i^Jtliiii'i"'
25. For_a short w_hile in the first months of 1gg2. appeared that the yuglsl av crisi s migh t,i"- a.gd,
be s ettled. peacefully.?"p"ere.t"-t-iuE*
it liif y oftn. nil""ril"" fi
uommumty- and later the united Nations had ipent ll?.ny months rryrqg to find u
,ot"ti*-;;;;;;i""i"
ir Vry.",-tr,; ;iri;f U#;;"hi;ti;;. negotiator, aftgr months orffi i;;'gstil bt Mii"if"ic a n d th e fe d ra I a rmy, pp"""" d l;'ffi ;'."d";;l;;;d " Milosevic. Cy e
=16-
I I
f"4.."1 army and Serbian paramilitary eutrriito*'rf,u lgdgtal grnly would withdraw from Crlatia, and the United Nations would disarm the paramilitary groups. The United Nations peacekeepers wo.ria f"otect the local Serbian pofulations from the ven!i"o". of angly roa ti qn s _alnd would oversee tne$ro mp t qelum of^C thousands of Croatians who hdd been driven out of their homes by t[e ieder*-f"rc*r. ffru V"itu_d Nations wogld protecl ttte i"i"*i"g Crouliu", from Serbian irregulars and_ the federai ur*i a"riil th; peri-od of transition. A final peace settlemeht brokired
o;ati;;;;.iot" o? for human rights Indielf-eour**ur,i f;; theSr-r6iun by the United Nations would Le based
respect for existing republican boundaries dnd reipect
ryrnority.__Unfortunately, no provisions were made for tne-large Hungarian and Albanian minorities in serbia or the smaller Croatian minority.
26. The successful implementation ofthe UN sponsored peace process in croatia and a peaceful tran'sition to independence in Bosnia-Hercegoiina apDeared to be a real,possibility
{hgt MiIoSeviE, the feh'erat milit""y a tian lovemme n t form a ll ] -It appeared that th'e to the Vance plan. lgreed German-sponsored lea de rs h i p, ?n d_t_he Cro
recogiition of Crohtia and Stovenia ofEurope, the re6l possibility that Croatia would to obtarn arms to counter the serbian invaders, and increasing dissatisfaction with ihe *u" u*o"g ttr.i population in serbia had persuaded Milosevid th"at it was time for peace. He made a show of sunnort for pV most De aDle
the-peace settlement by openly criticizing the
leaders of the serbs in cioatiia fo'r their-threitr to resist the LIN peacekeepers by fonce oi ar-sl27. Bgt qeace was not to be, and what followed casts flaye {o.ubt- that Milo5evi0 bnd the federal *itiiu"y leadership^|rad any intention _of ,rrp".tirrg--iN o, .tJuropean C_ommunity_-sponsored agre6mentsl After considerable delay,ih*i unitea Nitions s6''t ,rbr"ukeeping forces i" t6 ihe designa t"a ;4" ;f C;;"td,
_t7-
butnone to Bosnle. The "Foclernr" and serbian military a.nd civilian leaders havo blocked or thousands of Croatians who
Hni?ufl:l.,n The federal
ir,t 1ilffi ji i army handod
pqgslde,nt of a tri-national, tri-religious coalition in late
th;;;;;riuilo" *ei. ari";;;;;;jir,"i,
':
1990, he was clearly a partlsan of a secular 4emocratic Bosnia aid a slecular and aemo-cratic Yugoslavia _ig which members of all religious groups coFl4liv_e together in harmony, peace, and 9-g.u$ty.tt .Thg leader of the Bosnian Ci6its, Sti"pu., 5lj"ji9 [sty6-pahn klyoo-ich], leader of the'goinian
ii: g,i :, ru :,:Hl i[. rt.L"v i"."Jp"""v
serblan mi I i ti n',,ictt-nf s i n c roati
*[ oiu".T"t o" ", :'#'dfi Jffstg:iift'rt6;.tg'r."Sr:f *um: lH":fr from serbian forces in croatia t ou. t oo" i""Ln .irifu"a are,hopelel$ly brhind o-ver to I ocal
ule.
I
R";;;;;^iii[t
uls government has- now l1_1llT",,the,.Croatlan rauncned military acfl_on to reestablish control schod
I
reasons, cooperated with the other two leaders
but became increasingly uncooperative and
N;;;*
gygTla"t of the oceupled arean. The U"i t"a nas Deen unruceettftrl ln overseeing the return of anv but a nmall handful orcroaiia"?"f"g;*JJr yh gm face d an Ip rogq a n a uncl-"taii J"'iii'tt ,,r. "r !n thg moantimeTtre netgrade reeim;;d it.;iiJ. -#r? i" Bosnia-.Hercegovina haie t;;;;h;d or aggression.
;';;;
The. patterT of Serb-ian aggression in Bosnia_ ,2,8-. Herc_egovrna has been similar to that in croatia. After the fi rst mutti.qarty eleeti;il
il -b;^""iil;Tgixi, together the -thr6g mqjor p"tiii"* l"it"i., Igpl_.".enting each of- Boinia;s- nalil-oaf-
il:T,',"i?"k:$:,'"?t:l*f"*i ta tes m aiu he
f.Tff :ffi ;'if
&i
ttplo"ri
b6g-oh-victr], leadei "ofr". the -s
idfr ff- ;f l"'. i p"tv;iD;;;;;Jti. " fi.iio", -
t
[::ffi1?Ti?3'J,HJi't*iili?*iat'i#;11*[#S1i
iliff qg''3:,0,i?'iT:'*H;:ligJtTf i%:'.i;1',Ts$:l ilBf, 1H,:f,tf,
-Ui :;,11tr_li:i*r**i"":i*tif"'ftTlt rr. -ft'a"-o..iti. 'ethic;i speculated about i;i, ";;;
fi Croatians and Serbs to trt"i;;;;. T;";;"e;;-;id i,"a m c rely written *qr\ g of pol i ti cai phi il; il"rir,iir, _the
goverr'nent in an Isramic society and-the pdiliiJi Islam in-the modern *;;ia. - Hi. i,riii"e. "r proposals to cre.ate. an Islamic state in "" Bosnia_ Hercegovina. By the time Ir.tGiriC assumed office as
;;;;il;?
l8-
branch of the Croatian Democratic Union, was equally reasonable and moderate. Initiallv Radovan Kariaziit lrdh-doh-vahn krih-rah-jich], the l"eader of the Serbian Democratic Party ofBbsni-a, forapparently tactical
belligeren_t-under the inflrleirce of his iolitical Slobodan Milo5eviC. i
I # T
I
$
t; I
f i
*.rrtot
29.
For a time after the Bosnian elections in November J99Q, it appeared that Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and Muslims might be able to avoid bloodshed. The'first
in the government coalition occumed when the Serbian Democratic Party expressed adamant
c_rack
oppositigq to the Declaralion- of Sovereignty proposed !y _Izetlegovid's Party of Demociatib Action and the Croatian Demdcratic Union of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. KaradZi0's Serbian Democratic that Bosnialg*y was uncompromising in its demand Ilercegovina remain withfi a federal yugoslavia. The Bosnian Muslims were wiliine to re-main within
Yugoslavia as long as Slovenia and Croatia remained to act as a counter to Serbian efforts to achieve hegemony. The Bosnian Croatians, like those in Croatifproper, were willing.to remain in Yugoslavia only if ft dere transformed into a confederati6n of soverei-gn states. 30. After the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence and the beginnineofall-out warin Croatia t" J*lV 19?1, Izetbegor.i0 [ea1e-et-b6g-oh-vich] and
President Kiro Gligorov [key-roh gJee-go-rov] of
Macedonia sought to ieach an aicommdaatiin witlr-the leadership of the federal army and thus avoid the bloodshed that was occurringin Croatia. IzetbegoviC, in particular, believed that if f,e showed moderat'ion and accommodated the legitimate interests of the Bosnian
l9-
serbs, he mightbeable to nogotinte Bosnian sovereignty or in dependen ce wi th ou t wa
i. Izetbegovic'smoaliate
should be made part ofa special self-governing confbderal
unit within Bosnia with close political, ctiltural, and economic ties to Croatia. On this matter, Tudjman,s
was actl_vely encouraget by the Unitea :lrqtegy States, eqpegiaffy by the Untt€d Starejambassador to Yugoslavla, Warnen Zlmmermnn, and migli t a"e
attitude was similar to that of Karadzic except that the
ifj
iff ! :ff ff i'5*i,?1,''i:J[?1 lllt ff ll'ft: f#tffi pre-dominantly Serbian leaders of the,,yu goJlav;u.*y.
*
31. .4" *qqsy relationship developed between the presidents ofBosnia-Hercegovina and croatia and their respective governme_nts which hampered joint efforts to contain serbia. Tudjman's attitudi was echoeJlu nit
principal. supportei in Bosnia, the leader-od tn. $elcegoyrnian wing gltbs Croatian Democratic Union, VUE Boban tm6!-teh b6h-bahnl. In the ;;;ih; b;fbr; the Croatian and Slovenian dectaritions,1il4;p;;Ii.,.u,
Tudjman was lukewarm towards Izetbeeo;ab';;;;r"d ggmprgn}se between a federal and corifederai rvii"*. The mild-mannered ar.rd moderate lie[bee;;t;;'r;or.
optimistic about the possibility o? ;-;;;*uf"t
reorganization of Yugoslavia than Tudjman,'*fro ,u, alreadv facing an arried rebellion iG;rii"r 3eru. bv ysgosr av Mi "fthd
-ta;i:?r,th
Tf;%i!:llt'gm Jj 1}1 D"];r;ri,ii"dd,l,rting"l[i]3i.-"nnlrepeatedry expresse-d a view common -among C'roadian qationalist historians that the -nisnialr ana
flelgeSovinianMusliqsyrereierUyC-""*i"lrrino had-been converted
to rslam. The Eosnian serbian Ieader Radovan Karadlr-c, iq ;trni6;;iffi"n F rs-se"uJ eonsiders the Bosnran MusHmJ -rr.i converted to Islam. This interpretation ornirio.y is rejec.tejl by most Bosnian M.irti**i;;h;;il; gparate Bosni an or Muslim identity. M^"v nos"i""" Muslims see thernselves otiiu'" ;itir;"; ;;ir; repj:blic not as Muslims, Croats, ""a o. S*bst;t.il;it as Bosnians, heirs tothe medieval no;"i;;ki;fi;; 32. Acco.rding t9 ludman, as members of the least .s
numencal group in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Croatians neeoed specral guarantees for their national rishts.ra 'I'heret'ore' areas where croatians formed *ijuty
"
z0-
I 't
i I i i,, ,
latter stated openly that the Serbian cantbn should eve^ntually-be annexed to Serbia. At the end of April _1_991, Tudjman met privately with Milosevif at Karadjordjevo at which time h-e is believed to have proposed the division of Bosnia.rg On at least two gr..ccasions, onc_e in January and again in July of 1g92, Tudjman.paqe public stitementl indicatin-g that ne was considering a compromise with MiloSefrC which would entail the divisionbfBosni a-Hercegovina Croatia and Serbia.zo
be
tween
13. Jq4jman's attitude and his private overtures to the Serbia! regime alarmed Izetbegovi0 and all those Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and othdrs who identified themselve,F p-nma4ly as liosnians. They feared that the creation of ethnically-based cantons or confederal units wogld be merely a pielude to their annexation to Croatia or Serbia. T\pV were adamantly opposed to any attempt_ _to _divide up Bosnia.Hercegovina. Th-e Bosnian Muslims, in particular, wanted to-maintain the qgly and tenritorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina as their one and only hoheiand. Unlike the"Bosnian Serbs and Croatians, the Muslims have no outside mother co_untry. In lzetbegovid's view, Bosnian unity-can be maintained only if Bosnia is 6rganized as a democratic and secular state which Jtresses the human and political rights of all individuals rather than the iights of na-tional or confessional groups, and only a united Bosnia can be
economically
viable.zr
.,
34.
Izetbegovi0's and the Bosnian Muslims'fear that Ju{jpan pight be willing to strike an agreement with Serbia behind their bac[s was a constant source of
irritation between the Bosnian and
Croatian
governments. The fear persisted even after the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the establishment of an alliance of necessity against a mutual enemy. F'or
their part, the Croatians resented lzetbegovid's 2t
neutrality dur{ngSerhla't lnitial war of aggression against Croatla and the ute of Bosnia as alase for federal troope flghltng Croatia. Many Bosnian Croatians and Muslimi aliko saw Izelbegovid's colciliatory approach to the Sorbian regime aid the
established a headquarters in the region of Mount Roma'ija by spring of 1991 In the I'all of' 1991,
federal army units which were withdrawn from Croatia and Slovenia were massed in Bosnia-Hercegovina.23 While distributing weapons openly to Serbian militias, the federal units beganharassingCroatian and Muslim villagers in an effort to confiscafe weaponry. In fall of
federal military as naive. fluch critics bel-ieved that he failed to take adequate stqpn to prepare Bosnia militarily for the Sero-ian onslaught and that he tmsted to6 1nugh in promises of eupport by western leaders.zz Izetbegovid, neverthelees, Fied to prevent the yugoslav a.rrny from using Bosnian and Hericgovinian recriits in the war against Croatia. Alao, subsiantial numbers of Bosnian-Hercegovinian Croatians and Muslims fought as volunteers in the fledgling Crontian defense forces. Becausc of Rosni a-Hercogovi na'e land-locked geosraphic position, thc prcsenco ofilisloyal Serbs in theiepirblican security_and- police forces and the huge concentration of "federal'military forces in the republic, it was much
more difficult for the Bosnihn government to force in anticipation of a future-conflict than il had been for the governments of Slovenia and
1991, Yugoslav
o I
acquine weaponry or build an indefbndent defense
Croatia. 35. In the autumn of 1991, reDeatinE the pattem which had occunred earliei in Croatla, gr6ups of lgitators gld gUerrillas began appe"arin-f in Serbian. villagei of Bosnia. - In tfid meantlme, Izetbegovi0, hoping to avoid a confrontation with thd mili tgry, all owed the "f"4"I4" to con fi scate weapons "rmy ttom -Bosnian territorial defense ornational guard uirits.
Many ofthese weapons were almost immedia"telv ha"aea over to local serbian militias and to serbian paramilitary groups-sqgh gs-!_hose led by Vojislav ".io-rus.ist SeSef:
lvoice-lahv sheh-sh9lJ, Zeljko RaZnjitoviC lzh6l-kofi razh-nydh-t9lvich] "Ari
angJi [o Se.b s-. " io;;l S;;b;." grolps had been acquiring -weaponry even befor. liiu multi-party electiond of N"ovemter tggo nna-Voll.i"u scKel.j's ultra-nationalist paramilitary forces t,aa Mi
Io
Sevid's theme-of "the
d
-)1
I
il
*t] l$
$ $
j
military forces bombarded the
Hercegovinian Croatian village of Ravno, razing it to the ground and nendering its inhabitantS hombless gq-dqr the pretext of searchingfor weapons.24 In fall of 1991iir response to the actiois ofthe fe-deral army and Serbian armed groups, Bosnian-Hercegovinian Croats, especially those in we stern Hercegovina and the Posavina region (along the Sava River) of northern Bosnia, began arming themselves in self-defense. They received help and encouragement from the Croatian government and political groups inside Croatia. The federal army and Serbian iriegular units began a
wholesale military campaign against the Croatians in these aneas ih the weeks before Bosnia's declaration of independence at the
beginnisg of March 1992. Afterlhe outbreak of fullscale war in April 1992, the majority of the Croatian militias became part ofthe Croatian Defense Council (Hwatsko vijde dbtante, Iilfo) of Herceg-Bosna. A smaller group of Bosnian and Hercegovinian Croatians joined the militia of the right-wing nationalist Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stanka pnava, [ISP). This paramilitary force was known under the acronyrn ofHOS (Hryatske oruIante nage). S ubstantial numbers of Muslirn s also j oined both the local militias which became the HVO and HOS paramilitary formations.
36.
As ultra-nationalist paramilitary forces flom Serbia began fl ooding into Bosnia with the blessing of Milosevic
and protection by federal army commanders in Bosnia, some members of lzetbegovit's own party became
alarmed and started organizing Muslim militias. In response to the increasing belligerence of Radovan KaradZit and the Serbian Democratic Party (SD.S) and
-
-23
the massive armingofthc Serbs, Yugoslav armyofficers of Bosnian Muelim origin left the ra-nks of the nfederal" prmy and organized a clandestine military organization known as the Patriotsha liga or Patriotii Leigue.2s
37. On Novcmber 9 and lO, 1991, KaradZid
of
European Community representatives was mqi or bloodshed temporarily averted. Spurred by the
had
staged a"plebiscltett in which more than one hundned percent of the Serbian population of Bosnia was said to have voted in favofofbn "Independent Serbian llepublic ofBosnia" encompassing mori than two thirds
of Bosnian temitory inCludine the capital city of Sarajevo. Such a demand wai patentiy absuid if one considers the fact that Scibs comprise only
other national confes sional and political group s. OuIy
by the intervention of United Nations and German plans for immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the European diplomatic community and the
United Nations began applying greater diplomatic
I i
pressure on Milo5evi0 to use his moderating influence on his Bosnian Serbian stepchild. Unlted Nations efforts at this time were, nevertheless, ineffectual, and the world organization paid no attention to President lzetbegovi0's urgent appeal for the dispatch of United Nations peacekeeping forces to Bosnia to prevent the outbreak of fullscale war.26
SL pcrccnt of the population while-Muslims re-present 44 percent, Croatians 18 percent, and others 7 percent. ln staging such a- "plebiscite," Karadlid was folloyirlg tiie fattern set earlier by th e Serbi an extremist leaders of the Krajina Republic in Croatia led by a former Communist hentist from Knin, Milan BabiC. KaradZiCs extremism wasthe last straw for the moderate Muslim and Croatian leaders and those Bosnian Serbs who rejected KaradZit's confrontational attitude. The Muslim.-Croat mqiority in the Bosnia parliament voted in favoi of a declaration of sovereignty in December of 1gg1
39. In mid-December 1991, the European Communit5r announced its willingness to necognize the independence of those former Yugoslav Republics which satisfied certain human rights and other criteria, such as the governmentts effective control over its temitory. In January
38.
absurd demand that Macedonia change its name because a Greek region had the same name.
and sought diplomatic recognition from the United States and the nations of the Euiopean Community.
Radovan KaradZiC threatened war against the Croats and Muslims if they_dared try to impldment their plqns for independence. ihe Serbiin nenis media both in Bo snia and serbi a carried arti cl es accusing Izetbeeovic and_the Party of Democratic Action of plannjne to d;te an Islamic fundamentalist state in 'Bosnia. " In press interviews and television interviews Karadzic rep6ited the charges in an effort to convince the gosnian'SeilJ that they were in mortal danger from ,,Islamic f'undamentalists." The vast majoiity of the Bosnian Mgslims are Muslim by-are heritage but hoid modern secular poliJical yiews and noT strict practitioners of
traditional "fundamentalist" religion. A" l""rio"s
mounted,_ there were a number o-f violent incidents between Serbian supporters of Karadfil;;a *..b.*
1992, the members ofthe Community formally recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia but withheld recognition from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. Macedonia failed to receive recognition because of the objections ofthe Greek government. Greece made the
According to the twisted logic of the Greek government, use ofthe name Macedoniawouldimplythat the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had territorial claims on the Greek region. Since that time the Macedonians have offered to sign a treaty renouncing all claims to Greek teritory and to renaqe the country New
Macedonia or Nbrth Macedonia,,but the Greek government continues to block Macedonian
recognition by the European community.
Macedonia remains in a dangerous diplomatic limbo. President Kiro Gligorov alone of all the non-Serbian leaders offormerYugoslaviahas managed to obtain the peaceful withdrawal oflfederal" troops from his country.
The reasons for the tYugoslav'military leaders' willingness to withdraw from Macedonia seems to
24
-25
be that they could not at the time afford to risk the openiqgof a new.front and possible Bulgarian or
even Greeh or Nbanlan mllitary inte-nrention while they were tied up ln Bosnia and Kosovo faced the prospect of a rebellton of the Albanian
mqiority. Until recently MiloHevi0 and his supporters in the federal anny have avoided fighting on mbie than one front.
40. The European Community (EC) initially
withheld recognition from Bosnia because ofthe confliit between the Muslim-Croat mqiority and the Bosnian Serbs who followed Karadli0 but lihally recognized Bosnia at the beginning of April 1gg2 after an
internationally monltoled p[ebiscite held on
l. On this occasion the of the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians voted !n favor of independence, while the mSyority of the Serbs, influenced by KaradZid and other intransigents, boycotted the piebiscite. Some sixty-eight percent of all elieible-voters voted in fayoq of.-independence. In the city of Sarajevo substantial numbers of Serbs vot6d in favdr of i4dgpendence and against the recommendations of Karadlid's extremists. Febmary 29 and March o_verwhelming majority
I
ethnic lines. Boban, with the moral and political supp.ort of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, had succeeded in pushing aside Stjepan Kjujic [sty6h-pahn klyoo-ich] as leader of the Croatian f)emocratic Union tbr BosniaHercegovina. Boban's stance was supported by Croatians inwestern Hercegovina and parts ofthe Posavina where Croats formed a compact majority. Kljuji0, who, like Izetbegovi0, favored a democratic, unified, and secular
Bosnia with strong provisions':for human rights,
represented the view ofmany Croatians in Sarajevo and central Bosnia, where Croats represent a minority or plurality of the population. Each side represented at
Lisbon presented maps and proposals frlr the administrative and territorial ilivision of' Bosnia-
Hercegovina. EC experts in Lisbon immediately began drawing up proposals for the cantonization oflBosnia based on ethnic principles.2T
42. Because of the tremendous national-confessional heterogeneity of much of Bosnia, such a division could not easily be based on ethnic criteria. No matter how Bosnia-Hercegovina were divided many people would be forced to reside in areas where their nationalconfessional group is a minority. The only alternative
is a unified state with strong institutions
4L. At the Lisbon Conference which began in January 1992, the Egropelq Congm.qnity p-roposed thir cantonization of Bosnia.Herdefovfna along
to guarantee human rights and the right of national self-expression of the constituent peoples. Such a
by the E c and the united Nations andlnuch int"rnutio.tat pressure, Radovan KaradZiC and his Serbian Democratic
Bosnians of mired background as well as those who had voted for the opposition parties favored a unified secular Bosnian state. Such views were especially strong in the ethnically mixed Tuzla area,
national-confessional lines as a s6lution to tEE Bosni an dilemma. As a re s ul t of negotiation s brokeied
f ulty appeared willing to accept Bosnian on the condition thAt Bosnia be divided into self-govenring cantons based oo tn" national and religious idefrtity of the inhabit"ot" of each district. President Izetb6govic, in theint.""rt* i_4dgpe4dence
of a. pea-ceful settlement, agreed to"accept somelorm of regionalizafion based on "a variety of economic and o grap hi c, but no t exclusively etf,nic cri teri a. tvlate 93 f?obql, the representative of tlie Bosnian C"oatia"s at the Lisbon talks, favored cantonization of Bosnia on
26-
state could also include some form of regional and local self-government with guarantees for minority rights at the local as well as national levels. A large gSoup of
where many Muslims, Serbs, and Croais alike had voted for the non-nationalist non-religious Party ofDemocratic Change. People who had voted for thenon-natlonal
parties were not represented at the Lisbon C_o4gfess or in any of the subsequent peace talks, although they represented approximately 22 percent of the electorate in the elections of
1990.28 Altogether if one adds together Muslim supporters of the Party of Democratic Action,
December
27
Kljujie's supporters among the Croatians, and the supporters of the non-national parties, one finds a
president of the Serbian half of the federation. At the beginning of July Lgg2 at the behest of Cosi0 and MiloSevi0, the "Yugoslav" parliament invited Milan pani0
substantial majority in favor ofa unified non-cantonized Bosnia.
Imee-lahn pah-nich], a Serbian-American
43. The negotiations mcrely
provided KaradZid's Bosnian Serb militias, the fedeial arrny, and ultranntionalist paramilitary gloups from Serbia, time to complete military preparations for an all out assault on Bosnian independence. All that was necessary was a p-retext to initiate armed action. The pretext came when the United States, European Community and other nati.ons officially recognized Bosnian indeiendence on April 5, 1992. Two days later on April ?, Serbian extremist
r-epresentatives gathered in Banja Luka and proclaimed the_Serb-ian Rgpublic of Bosnia-Hercegovini. On the night of April 6 I 7 1992, the Serbian bombardment
of Sarqievo began !n an effort to take the city by force and forCe the Bosnian government intb submission. At the same time, Serbian paramilitary
forces invaded Bosnia in mass and with asdistance from
federal arrny units,_unleashed a wholesale military assault on the newly recognized nation. Armed battalions of marauders led bv the Belerade underw-orld figure Arkan and Voji-slav SeSeljt tteofascist legions joined KaradZi0's Bosnian Serbian militias in a campaign to seize teritory. The heavily armed Serbian paramilitary invaddrs could not have entered Bosnia without the blessing and support of Milo5evid's government. 44. The Serbian/federal government in Belsrade devised a crude scheme to avo-id admitting responslbility for the war in Bosnia. On April 27:191i2, a new "Yugoslavia' consisting of Seibia and Monienegro was proclaimed. The Serbian nationalist novelist Ind intellectual Dobrica CosiC ld6e-breet-sa choh-sich]-took was elected president of the new federation and office on June 15, 1992. Cosid, though more moderate in lis -methg-ds, shared Milosevic's 6ssential political gg-al that- all Serbs must live in one state, either "Yugoslavia" or Greater Serbia. The real Dower in the new Yugoslavia remained Slobodan MiloSevid, the -28
I
I
businessman who had become an American citizen, to become Prime Minister ofYugoslavia. Milo5evi0 hoped that Panid could be used to-convince the United States, European and world leaders to remove the
economic sanctions which the United Nations Seqq"ity Councilpl,aced on Serbia and Montenegro
9n-M ay - l, l9g2.2s Pani C s urp ri s e d Mil o S evi C by tak-i n g independent steps to compromisewith theCroalian anii Bosnian leadership and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, but he was-unable to defelt nnilo5evi0 in elections to the Serbian presidency in December 1992. After this
electoral defeatr- Pailc resigned as ,Yugoslav" p_rimq lninis_te_r, laving failed-completely to stop IbradriC and the Serbian mititary frbm coLtinuing their merciless war on Bosnia. 30-The m ain effec t oT Panid's premiership, as it turned out, was to ward offactive military intervention by Uiited Nations
forces against Serbia and./or intern ation al assistance to the Bosnian government.
military
45. In creatinga new"Yugoslavia," the Serbian regime hoped to inherit the Unite? Nations seat and asse"ts of the forrner Yugoslav Federation. Yugosl avia had ceased to exist both in reality and on paper-by December 1991 yhgn the European iommunityigree"d to recognize the independence 6fthose former Yug6slav republi"cs which
applied formally for recognition and satisfied certain human rights and other criteria. The leaders of the recons titu te d (Yugoslavt or Serbo-Montene glin state,,acting at the behest of Milosevic, fired sbme genernl s, and-reorgar'lized the federal army. General Zivota Pani t I zhee -voh-tah pah- ni ch ] re pl ac-e d Bl agoj e Adzic-lblah-go-yeh ah-jichl as head ofthe yugoilav armed forces. The new niilitaryleaders then anno-unced the withdrawal of all "federal" troops of non-Bosnian gri-gn{rom Bosnia, claiming that eighty percent of all federal troops in Bosnia were of loial-oiigin. These troops and all of their military hardware were placed under the command of General Ratko Mladi0 [rairt-koh 29
mlah-clichl,-a Yugoslav army general born in the Krajina
region of Croatia. Mladid was already belng prosecuted for war crlmes ln Croatia and has subsequently been nRrned by llelsinki lVatch, the Bosnian governmenf and fonner acting secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger as a-suspected. perpe trator of mqi or war cri mes in Bosnia. 3f The se forces, including a substantial part of the Yugoslav air force, equippedwith jet fighter planes, fighter-bombers,
and attack helicopters became the armed forces of KaradZi0's Serbian Republic of Bosnia; the creation of this Bosnian Serbian arrny did not stop the in{lux of
heavy weaponry and manpower irom Serbia.
Paramilitary volunteers from Serbia continued to move in and out of Bosnia; federal army uniLs from Serbia
have qe-gularly _ provided- weaponry and
ammunition and have frequently participated -Many $rggtly in.military ac-tiong lnside Bosnia.
Serbian soldiers captured by Bosnian forces have been found-to be carrying documbntation showing that they were born in Serbia, not Bosnia. Despite aU tha evidence, Milo5evid and the..Yugoslaf" i.e. Serbo.
Montenegfln governmentr, continue to deny responsibility for the war of aggression againsl
Bosnia. 46. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats were driven from their homes by the Serbian forces in a delibjlrate campalgn-of territorial conquest and ethnic purification. At the last count, the nuirber of refugees from the Serbian war of destruction and exterminaiiort in Bosnia was approaching two million. The "federal" rylltary in Bosnia joined the fieht on the side of the Serbian neo-fascist legions and_idded its weaponry for the step-by-step destruction of Sarajevo.
47. .By_the late_st estimates in Febn ary lggS the war in Bosni a-Herce govirla has already -produced over a hundred thousand dead, betwidn twenty and fifty lhqff"g! rape{ wonlen, and property property d:amaee it $.amag.e of 200 billion llollars. $lovenia is estimated at approximately z billion do-ilars and that in Croatia at 18.5 billion dollirs.s2 The war in 30-
t
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has also left,more than two million people as war refugees. Whole cities. from Dubrovnik and Vukovarin Croatia to Sarajevo, Mostar, and a host of other localities in Bosnia-Herbeeovina have beenrazed to theground orhave hadlaree Ji.fiont destroyed. Litgral]y thousands ofchurches, m6nast"ri"r, rygsques, and other historic monuments have been 4gliberately targeted and destroyed by the Cities and towns are mercilesslybombirded "egr.r*o"r. ai"d shelled every day, and Serbian or "Yugoslav" military airplanes repeatedly fly on war missions in violation of-the United Nations air embargo. Ethnic cleansing continues. 48. Vlrherever Bosnians and Croatians have been able to organize defense forces to resist the Serbian
attacks, the systcmatic mass killing and ethnic cleansing of these tyo pgoples has bedn prevented. In areas where Bosnians handed over theifweapons to the Yugoslav- army or Serbian militias, the to.ii Serbian population hae been totally defenseless and"o"has suffered mass atrocities. Such was the case in the
Priiedor in northem Bosnia, where, !9*+. of men Muslim met and decided not io offer
resistance to the Y_ug-oslavarmy. Afewdays after the Muslims handeii over their weaponi to the army, Serbian neo.fascist p-aramilitary lugoslav forces entered the town and began-abusing thb local inhabitants. Most of the me-n of militarf age wene led off to eoncentration camDs such ai tfie ill-faTed Maqiacha and Omarski. Many were
terrorized into handing over tlqeir property to Seibs and into leaving perhaps forever. Musiirnwoiren who went to the center of town to collect humanitarian aid were beaten mercilessly by Serbian soldiers. Aneas which were well defended by local Boiinian Muslim and Croatian mititias wene spared -forcesthis fate. Bosnian
Muslim and Croatian have generally defended only areas where memberJ of these nationalities are in a nrtqiority. Ihey have not enga ge{ in systematic ethnic eieansin!, and their aetions have been largely defensive,
=31
49. Initial
resistance to the attacking Serbian forces
came from local police and Territorial Defense (Teritorijalna od,_brdrw, TO) units loyal to the Bosnian government, local Croatian militias which ioined together to form the Croatian Defense Council (Hr'uatsko uijece odbrone, I{VO) of Herceg-Bosna, and in some nlqges-from qnits of HO S, the army of the Croatian Party qf Rights, {gmer Yugoslav rirmy officers of thir a (latriotic League), mostly Bosnian ! otr!.gtsko_lig he_lped mold TO units-into I regular Uuslims, Bosnian and Hercegovinian Army known as the Oruzone anoge Borne i Hercegoaiie,Os BiH. In the first weeks ofthe war Serbian forces sucieeded in seizine between 50 and ?0 percent of the republic's territorv.33 In general, the Serb! were able to seiZe those towns #th a substantial Serbian population but failed to take area s where Muslims, Croais,br Muslims and Croats formed a solid-majority. tlre Serbs had hoped that their
superior weqponry, better preparedness and surprise would allow them to tdke the capital city of Sarajevo in a matter of days, but t-he local
inhabitants pnoved nnexpectedly resounceful in preventing this despite an almost total lack of heavy wealx)nry. Sarajevo defenses have held and the
area glder government control has expanded more than twofold since the initial Serbian attac[, even though the Serbian forces have blockaded Sarajevo and bomb-arded it with heavy artillery, rockets, and-grenades. Saraievo was initially defended by a host of local lightly armed gro_ups which were spontaneously organized-, soinetimes by local gang membbrs and ruffians. Ammunition and rifles were in such short supply that men in the trenches had to take turns usingthe avaiiable weapons. Gradually, with assistance offormer federal arrny 6fficers and locli policemen, a semblance of order was dstablished over at least part of these forces.34 Bosnian Croatian forces belo-nging to tbglM have succeeded in defending and holding onto Western Hercegovina, parts of Ceitral Bosnia, and part of the Posa-vina region in Northern Bosnia.
5q. Teritorial
Defense Forces pledging loyalty directly to the govermment of Bosiia-Herdeedvina
-32-
have established control over most of Sarqievo, Central Bosnia, and the anea of no*heaitcrn Bosnia around Tuzla [too-zlah]. The Bosnian Territorial Defense forces in the Saiajevo and turla areas include amongtheir officers and soidiers Muslims, croatians, and serbs. In Tuzla the forces lovai io ttr,i Bosnian government have achieved some ,uira"kubi" successes. The multi-national multi-religious Tuzlans
managed-to seize substantial quantitijs of infantry
weapons from local weapons depois and to capture some heavier weapons from tlie forced ofthe serbiafuyuno.t"" ?rmy. -Dqriqg the summer months of 19g2, Trizlans drove the serbian forces from inside citylimiis to some twenty kilometers from the city out of ieach of shorter
r?nge artillery.35 Although much of Eastern Bosnia ?Jor_g the Drina liv_er was occupied by Serbian forces in the first weeks of the yaq, thg_city irf Croralde tgdahz_h-dehl, although totally iurrounded'ind isolated from the worldr {as able to resist a long
an4 bloody siege by Serbian and monteneodi military_ and paramilitary forces. The Muslirfr_tea Bosnian forces broke the siege atGorazde and captured substantial amounts ofweafons from the neeins3;;boVontenegrin _forgss, The largelv Muslim i6*ln of Srebrerric-a lsr6h-breh-neet-s-ah] was also able to r_esist Serbian efforts to eonqu-er it. Throughout
the war, Bosnian Muslim forceC bval t6-tfi government have sueceeded in defdnding the enclave of Bihad and Velika KIaduSa in the far northwestern corner of Bosnia.S6 To the south and west there are Serbian forces loyal to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and to the north and wesi foices lelongrqg to the "serbian Republic of the Krajina in Croatia."
51. IqJuly lgg2forcesoftheBosniangovernmentand
their allies in the croatian Defense coriircit were driven out of Odz.ak [6h-j-ahk] and Derventa [dare-vent-ah] in the Po s avina. At the begi nning of October lggz,Serbian forces captured the key crosEroads town of Bosanski Brod directly across the Sava River from the Croatian
town of Slavonski Brod.3? These conquests have allowed the Serbs to establish a nino* land 33-
corridorfrom Serbia eastwards to the core area of sSerbian the Republlc of Bosnia' centered in Baqi a Luka lbahn-yahluke-ah]. The corridor is very thin aid
the Serbian forces have been unsuccessful in overcoming resistance of CroatianDefense Council brigades around Oradje. In December 1992 and January 1993,
Cnoatian Defense Council (H\fO) forces at OraSje [oh-rash-yeh], joint I{VO and Bosnian Armed Forces (OS BiH) units locatedbetween Gradacac lerah-dah-chahtsl to the outskirts of Brcko lbirchkohl, and OS BiH fonces from T\rda defeated all Serbian efforts to widen the coridor, destroying large numberg of tn"ks and amed vehicles and capturing tanks and artlllery in the process. Bosnian Muslim forces massed on Mount Igman to the south of Sarqjevo as of February 1993 had not yet attemptcd a mqior offensive to break the blockade of the capital city, partly because of disputes between commanders of various units and because of disputes between certain OS BiH and HVO commanders.ss 52. In general the military performance of the OS BiH and IIVO forces has been remarkable in the face of the ovennrhelming superiority in tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, rocket and missile launchers of the Serbian/Yugoslav arrny forces and the total monopoly on air power of the Serbian forces who have inherited the entire arsenal of the former Yugoslav army. This tremendous arsenal was paid for mostly by tares extracted from the nonSerbian repubHcs of fomer Yugoslavia and by considerable assistance from the United States and NATO. The arsenal was seized and usurped by the Serbian and Montenegrin Serb military officers, who made up approximately 80 percent of the entire officer cor?s of the former Yugoslav army from generals at the top down to non-commissioned officers. The United Nations arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia
and now applied inappropriately and probably
illegally to sovereign and internationally recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina has gravely hampered the Bosnians' ability to defend -34-
themselves against the ruthless Serbian flggressi^on, butdefend themselves they nave. lne Serbian forces show no signs of being abldto .o-plet"
their conqu e st of Bosnia. The Bosnian-s' lack of ad eqGte weapons will only mean that their defense will'take longer and cost more blood and lives; in the long ho_weve_r, the poorly motivated Serbian finces y1llnropably lose the wan Bosnia will be Serbia's
*o,
Afghanistan. 13. Thereslrcnseoftheunitedstatesandwestern Egrgpgan go-ve-rnments, Russia, United Nations officialdom and the European Community to what is clearly a Serbian-Monteriegrin or .yugoslav,' war of aggression against the nowinternationllly recognized indepen_dent and sovereign nations of eroatii and Bosnia-Hercegovina has been irnesponsible with lpnallingly destmctive consequenies. The United States, France, England, and Russlia failed to intervene a
in an effective and co structive way to mediate democratic and peaceful disassociation of
foi-",
Yugoslav republic- from the Yugoslav federation after its.viabililylfa been^destroyed 6y a series of arbitrary actions of Milosevic's Serbian iovernment and th6
Serbian-dominated federal armly leadership. Th; United States, France and England - by'initially plrblicly opposing the democrafic decisidn of th"e
Slovenian and Croatian- peoples when they declared independence after monthi ofSerbian and M6ntenesrin sabotaged qegollatf gns - gave the..Yugoslav' mihtlry
an open invitation fo intenrene militarilv
ti
prevent the independence of these republics-and to seize territory for Greater Se,ibia, alias Yugoslavia.
Byi4pgsinganamsembargoonallofformer $. Yugoslavia by Resolution 713 oln Sentember
28.
1q.91, -the_ United
Nations Securily Council effectively granted a monopoly 6n heavy
weaponry and air lx)wer to the Cgsiessors in the conflict, the_ iYugoslav National"Army' and the various Serbian_ plrd Montenegrin palamilitary forces supported by the army lebdership. Because 35-
of its geopolitical location on the Danube next to former
Communist states eager to eell weapons, SerbiaMontenegro hag been able to circumvent easilv the United Nations arms embarso and to import-both weapons and advanced tecf,nology with'military aoolicabilitv. Durine the same oefr-od the European Communiti pressuret the Croatiins into endine their blockade of Yusoslav armv bases and installations in Croatia. As a re-sult, the Yugoslav armywithdlew large amounts of heavy weaponry and arms manufacturing equipment whicb further enhanced the already enormous weapons superiority of the Yugoslav army. Arms
manufacturing nachlnery and technology withdrawn from Croatla and Slovenia under European Communlty aueplces have made the truncated Yugoslavla or Serbia-Montenegro nlrn s6f sempletelV eelf.Bufficient in heavy weapons production Most of the forces and equipment were
then stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina wheie they were later used in the Serbian assadf,on the independ6nce of that republic. Forces and equipment earlier-withdrawn from Slovenia nnder EC auspices were also concentrated in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which was used as a staging area in the Serbian war against Croatia. A similai withdrawal was arranged early in 1 992 from Macedonia. All in all, according to the Zagreb newgweekly Globus, the Yugoslav aruy was allowed to nemove some f20 tanks and 46 planes from Slovenia, 310 tanks and 210 rnilifuy aincraft fron Cnoatia, and 120 tanlrs and 86 planes from Macedonia. In addition, the federal army was allowed to remove some 200 pieces of artillery from Slovenia, 260 from Croatia, and 80 from Macedonia. Many of these weapons have been used by the Serbo-Monteriegrin forces in Bosnia. It is an irony
that Slovenia and Croatia alone had paid more lhqn frfty percent of tlre Yugoslav militdny budget. Today, neither Croatia nor Slovenia noi BosniaHercegovina nor Macedonia has an air force with which to defend itpelf.se
55.
The military superioritywhich the United Nations arms embargo assured the Serbian aggressors has allowed them to seize approximately one third of Croatia
-36-
ii'4ilHisr':"#'ff'",i1"ff lH,;F:T"g:ffi :
llonte.negri_nfonces,loc-al-noo-S""U-iaop""poiiii""* as well as Serbs who hr"ted to delend tf,&i"ll"lr-
!:*lgpeig_hborsornetuiediopa"tt"ii"tilo"tn. a_ggression faced expulsion, ferro, ioa E""" slaughter. If first the c-roati;; ild t;i", tliEoioiu" government forces had not been prevented-nv- fiiu
weap;ifi.:;;il;
embargo from obtaining tiJtt tn. aggression, much iould have b;;;,i""d"u"a .terd-tory manv civilians might have been ru""a maiss killing, ana f:.Tp:'^ry ?{J?Tor, by tbrces "tn"i.have been lE"".qleq as.suspectedwhose chief leaders war criminals by reputable ;"rta lq:I!!.$ numan nghts organizations.
i[. liiilirut"
.i;;;i";
;eT#f;tff ilsffi *lTJ,t?Igl,,Tffi t€ndbi;war of
i!o3,lfa tree hqlrd to launch rorces the
ftsfiinft:f{n}1i$lui'f ar;s*;ru"yf, 'fg
flecu.ritv.C^o,uncil failed to hJei lrr" ,r"g.rrt appeal of presrdent Alija Izegbegwic in December igg r fo'"'pi.ur(eeprng tbrces in united N;ti-o-fs Lad losnia. If the respondedin a timell{ashion tp prJsidlnt
i"riliio"i.', ffi 3#-ffi1."-:l,lf ti:ltiflL%.ffr",5tr;iiij",:::"1:
war, the entire bloody confl ict mi ght have b..t, pr"rr.rrt"a or greatly reduced.
57. _ Some Britis-h poli_tieialq andjournalists who wish to rationglii" thg fniled E-u6pe;"p"it"y have sqsgps.F{ that rhs war prevented if Germany had -i?-tff,il""il."o no-t pusnea- tne
^Eyronganpopmu!_ntyt",eJogni".i"iiTiii"lra Drovelran indgpengence in December of lggl.It is clear. that by t[at time, neither the Slovenians, the uroatrans, the Bosnians, nor the Macedoni"rrs-iu"r" willing- to rem.ain ir q yugoslavia A;;il;da" * t" brutal serbian poritic6--iiiiarvltrT.. Sil.r," indivijluals. ign-ore the that-the dar in si""""i; -fact and Croatia be_gan_before the independence of thes e cou ntrr es f, a d bee n re*-o grti re?.T a,
iiiiti,
-37
-
Yugoslav federation was clearly impossible because had Yugoslav-wide elections taken place throughout former
Yugoslavia, the non-Serbian votes plus those of the Serbian opposition would have ousted the neoCommunist leadership of Serbia and would have implemented drastic changes in the officer corps of the Yugoslav arrny. The Serbian potitico-military elite
could maintain Inwer and domination only in an authoritarian Yugoslavia. None of the non-Serbian republics could alford to remain in such a federation.
The "Yugo-nostalgists" in the United States and Europe are clearly wrong. "Yugoslavia" afber the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence was simply a thinly veiled disguise for Great6r Serbia. By Deceinber
1991, given the arbitrary and belligerent stance of
Radovan lGradzic and the Serbian Democratic Party of Bo snia, the recent bloodj' war in Croatia, the destructi on of the town of Ravno in Hercegovina, and the massive
military preparations for war in Bosnia, which had already been put into effect by the Yugoslav federal army and the Bosnian Serbian militias and other paramilitary groups, there was no chance that the majority of the people in the republic would accept
continued membership in a Yugoslav federation. Bosnia's continued membership in the federation would have rendened the republic subject to the same kind of Serbian colonial oppression that had already been intrcduced in Kosovo. The pattern of wanton criminality, violence and ethnic cleansing of non-Serbians was already patently clear not only in Croatia but in Vojvodina. The Bosnian government has uncovered military documenLs which show that Karadrid and the federal military had made preparations to seize Bosnian territory by force long before the war began"lo All negotiations that took place during this time were simply used as a cover for Serbian military preparations against the democratically-elected Bosnian government and the people loyal to it. 58. Bosnia-HercegovinaandMacedoniawere the only nepublics of fomer Yugoslavia to meet the
human rights criteria set by the European -38-
Communi ty ilr December of lggl as a condition for President Izetbeg, oviO had already sho*r, Sgcoqgition himself to be a democrat and ailvocate of tiumah tiitrtJ for all citizens regardless of religion or natio;Aitv. hh;
only sensible choiie was for the iite.pqgio"ri .o*ri^L"itv pgcled up by the military power ofNATO u"a-tt u Urrit.i Nations to assist Bos_nia-Hercegovina to achieve a democratic and peaceful transition"to i"aepe"a""ce u"a to provi-de reasonable guarantegs to the.seruian mi"oritu pv qe.ndi gS a cl e arrne s sage to Serbi alyugo i;; DerDran Sosruan clrents that they accept such a peaceful and democratic solution orface the combi""a roriu oltrr. international community and the democruti.uiiv-.r..t.a goverrrments of Bo snia-Hercegovina and Croali a.
;i;;;;;;
59. If the world community did virtually nothing to plevent ttre_spread of the cioatian war t6 nosnialits etlbrts to lFle a just end to the Bosnian conflict have been equally lacking. The united Nations has f,ailed to provrde ett-ective support for a just and democratic resolution of the cribis and has -passed a numuer or ineffectual resolutions all ofwhichhave ao"e "ottri"gto ltop !!e continued onslaughtby Serbian milita-rv?ortes.
On May 31, t99Z the-Unfted NatiooJ-ifrnosea economic sanetions on the nrmp yugostafia or Qerbia and Montenegro. This reiotuEo;i;; th; frrst time singled out-yugoslavia ot Sertia ;; aG Fggressor in the Bosnian conflict. The sanctions
have created considerable economic discomfort in serbia and Montene-gro but have had little o" policy tgwards Bosnia-Hercegovina or"ffe.t the behavior of the Serbian forces in Bosnia." In summeiof iggt; tti;
S;bdt
United Nations belatedly began providing iood'a"a medical supplies to the hunfrry, slick, anf blocladed
citizens of sarajevo and otherr Sosnian, cities. Smali detachments of UNPROFOR troops were stationed at S.apj gyo pirport to oversee the airlifting ofhumanitaf an ai d to the besieged capital and subsequeitly UNpROFOR tlggpr were stationed in other localions io oversee the delivery of.aid by lgq!. _The aid progr.- ta, U"*r, fraught with many difficulties, technicd. political. and military. Yundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees, both in and outside Bosnia, have no pnesent prospdet of
-39-
returning to their homes. Tbe aid mission has done
nothing to address the fundamental cause of hunger, diaease, irfiury and death, which is the war itself, the deliberate blockading of cities, towns and targeting of civilian objects by the Serbian forces. The United Nations fonces sent to deliverhumanitarian aid and monitor cease fire agneements have beeome virtual hostages. Countries such as France and
England are opposing stronger military measures against the aggressors because of fear for the lives and safety of the relatively small detachments which they have stationed insido Bosnia.
60.
UN-sponsored cease fires have been repeatedly violated bV ttr. Serbian forces. Thusfar the pr6sence of UNPROFOR forces has provided little more than a shield for Serbian military conquests. United Nations officialq on the ground have assumed a false neutrality which has played into the hands of the aggressors. Military efhrts by Bosnian government forces to break the Serbian stranglehold have been hampered by the Unit€d Nations cease-fire policy. In summer of 1992, Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, commander of UNPROFOR forces located at Butmir airport in Sarajevo, and other United Nations officials malle an issue of rninepnilitary actions by the Bosnian govemment fonces in Sarqievo, which were primarily defensive, while ignoring a massive military offensive which Serbian fonces wene carrying out all over Bosnia.
61. For months after the outbreak ofthe conflict United Nations officials failed to heed the many reports of eth'lic cleansing, rape andmass killingbeingcarried out by Serbian forces on a massive scale. In a similar fashion, the Bush administration for months suppressed daily reports of atnocities in Bosnia which were reaching the United States Embassy in Belgrade.al Only-after television news reporters showed the world public video footage of the appalling treatment ofprisonere at Serbian run camps did United Nations officialdom or leaders of major world powers take notice of the problem. The an{val of Red Cross monitors and United Nations special missions have -40-
done little to change th-e situation. While some prisoners were released from the most notoriouJi.6r -""v others were merelytransferred to unknow"lo6iio", o, perhaps killed.
62. United Nations Seeretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali Ers been espedialv-"ttr"" i" ni" 4pproaeh to the Bosnian situation. Ghali s-uesested
that the situation in somalia and other piacer fr-airi." was much worse lhan that in Bosnia lut naa t"c.iued greater attention from European leaders. He presented lhe gnattended sufferings ofthe somaiianJ"r!" for the lack of effecrive iction by the urit;d N;iio"i "*."r" i"
Bosnia. In tate June tggz,g6uiroJcfii;tiilt a to a Security_Couneil Resolution to,e-oie ana place under Uni,te.$ Nqtigqs supenrision tle-heary y_e1p9\ry^*hich the Serbian for_ces were oJni tb noTlbard Sarqi_evo on the grounds that the UniTed i\.af,rons tacrred nesounces to inplement the plan. R-ather than requesting reso_lrrces' to i-ptut"""T-Lrr" plan, he offered-the cuirent budget consiraints as a reason t-o oppoqe it. Boutros Ghalfs attitude is notone expected ofthe leader ofwhat should be the woridls most important h-u-manitarian organizaii;; ;;d-q"uri_
ti;'ffi
iff tlH3'+$,f,lSltia*:##"HAffi ,$
the aggresso"-in- ihe%;iilct, Yontenegro_aF Boutros Ghali h.as persiEtiently oppor.d proposald
toapRlls-reatermilitirypressurbaE"iinsts"iuia.t'ro"."s "ll continues to endorse the arns embargo which {epriv_qs Eqs,oie of a nooe eme"ti"" ,i.dii t defend itself. unitedNations speciar En"ot c'*,r" Vance has similarty insistea _on ,"rrEo,iiog negotiations while reiusing to endors" unv coaintE measures to enforce the resulting resolirtions or and
agreements.
Q3. With much fanfare,
General Secretary Boutros
p_gulros Ghali representirig the UN a"d g"itirt Fri-" M i ni s ter Jo-hn l-\4aJ_or pre si de-d over a spe ci al c o nference
held in London-from August 26 tlroug! August 28,lgg?l2 The London Coilference adoptect seven measures pertaining to Bosniao-n Yug_oslavia
-4t
-
Hercegovina: "1) a cessation of all hostilities in the Republic ofBosnia-Hercegovina; 2) an end to all ouLside
involvement in the current conllict either in terms of material or human support; 3) the gathering of all hgqvy _weaponry undei interrrational supen'ision; 4) the demilitarization of large cities with oversight by international observers; 5)-the establishment"of refugee centers and centers of humanitarian
assistance for citizens ofBosnia-Hercegovina who have been driven from their dwellings or ihose dwellings have been destroyed until such time as their return can be_assured;6) thri erpansion;f [nfiniaarian aid all areas of Bosnia.-Hercegovina where it is needed
tt
in cooperation with local participants: 7\ the
establishment of DoaG€.keepiiq fordes urider the auspices of the Unft€d Nation6 in order to maintain the-cease-fire,the supenision of all military movements, and the estdblishdent of other confiddnce buildin{ measureg." As on previous occasions, there were no effective provision-s for the enforcement of these provisions. "Supervigion" of heavy weaponry did not mean control, and Serbian bombardment of cities and tow_ns throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina continued without cessation. Not a single city oi town was made safer for its residents by these resolutions. The London Conference established- the framework for yet another Conference on former Yugoslavia, which was held in Geneva be ginn i ng Septe-mber I 8, I 992under the C oChairmanship of Loril.Iames Owen who replaced Lord Carington as the chief mediator for fhe EC and special United Nations envoy Cynrs Vance. 64. OnAugust 13, 1992 afterthe world news media's revelations of concentration camps and widespread atrocities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the United Nations
Security Council belateldly passed a resolution prgvidigg for the gathering of information on war
of the Geneva conventions and other violations of Humanitarian iaw. tii*Giltilio", which contained no provisions- foi actua[piori.iiio" yaT, c+Tinals. was-weaker than u p"oplo*.I *"a;-bt "r bre-aches
u ni ted s ta te s se crelrrr of s tate La wrte n ci
loT"lt'#1.FJfJsf,"Haffi
E
a
gG-burge r.
ifl'n?;;iliF,if;
consisting of Serbia and-Iylont
innerii-tntmilnbqrs-lipi4tn"'ti?Ha*Rt?liflj3? lhe former Socialisi Federal n.i"Ut"rt of The passage of thi; E;"fi;i;ii"""t* luggslapa. doubt the valiii-ty _5f tn-arms embarso io of
*s,Tfr?"f
"fj;infi:S,;t:tt*Y":L;*:"{:* gttitr Socialist "f"so;i;ii ^frra
n_on-existent
effe crivelv. cea sed to
t€deral 1-9.91.
exiit wiitr
priqe minister, Ante
on octoHgT
ltr e re siex"?i";
;i ite last
Markovi"c in Decemter of
o'- 1992, ararmed-uv-Jii,'iiio*a flights of mili-taiy aircrart -"".it-"li""ii"-
H;"J"iif'"#ffi ":*:fr:ntll,l**l*-rd''3* Lh:::f.*li:.JlitS,"'uanangurs";ir;ffi;?i;;it),, rne qocument taire-dto name the principal violator. tlie
L.-*:::'^{.lylqhhasavirrual-monoilli;;TliU,y ajr power and had been b-ombing cities a"a t"o*"J
Ji o"u, BosniaandHercegovinaform;iG.Tt'iS;;bi;;#i,iLry
ty aimini;ffi; -t# hi?r,ir" r'il"t iut coniinued to uEe attact< helic.opters whigh were less eaby fo; th; u"ii*a-rGiio", monitoring equipment to detecf. tn aG firsl;lrilii trre ban alone, Nations monitoring "r equipment pickbd_Unite*{ up 6g violati""s of-tiJbr". responded to the-ban
aircraft over Bosnia
rrosDran: government authorities on the ground reported many more violations. 65. The attitude-of-the international communitv has adverselv. affected the relatio".fiip 6.-i;-;;'F,i'r"i"Hercegovina -and croatia. The defe.tse o? nor"i"Hercegovina ".
crimes by "internafional humanitarian organizations" and c_alling on the Secretary General to subinit a report based on the information r,rt^Lus gathered. On Octobdr 6, 1992,_ the Security Council passed resolution 780 which called for the Secretary General to establish a Commission of Erperts to review evidence on
its military forces on the militarv telaeist iJoiit . s'snran and Herce_govinian croatians on the'other. These disputes partlv reflecr th" ti""ri*J-;ri;;iffii;ip
-42-
-43-
has been hampered Uv ai.p"t;
f,ne s'sruangovernment-and one hand a"q tJte political and
#il;""
between presidents lzetbegovid and Tudjman and their re-spective governments wrhich was discussed earlier.
Although. tlre. C-roatian government immediately
f
co gni ze 4 -thg i n d e pe_nd e nce -a_nd terri to ri al i n te gri ty o Ros{ria while Serbiah leaders Milo$evit and Cosic[cn6U-
le
sichl have steadfastly refused to do so, the Croatian government's behavior towards Bosnia has been
ambiguous eno-ugh to lead many to wonder whether or not croatia really supports the territorial integrity ofits neighbor. This imbihroos attitude to;;;a;tsoJ"ia is stimulated by the international community,s fiailure to support unequivocally the independence arid territorial sovereignty of either Croatia or Bosnia in the face of military ag.gression by a much_better armed enemy.
Lqck of stnong lntematlonal rupport for a iuit solut_ion to the Balkqn conflict hras producdd a moo4 of desperation rind helplessnesjin Croatia.
'Ihe Croatian capital is only about thirtv miles from the cease'fi re line with the serbian forces arid could easily be !,qrgeted by Serbian longer-range artillery and missiies. When the international community gives indication that it is ready to ratify Serbian territoiill gains or to resolve the conllict in Bosnia-Hercegovina bj' Oviaing it into semi-independent cantons, wfu ch can -easily be innexed to Bosnia's more powerful neighbors with th; hon's share going to Serbin, the reaction of the Croatian leadership has been to_ sglvqge qlrat it can even ifit is at the expense ofits erstwhile ally. Tbose who urge Croatia to dgree to a cantonal division of Bosnia.Eerceqovina waile accusing Croatia of favoring the disfremberment of Bosnia are indeed hypociitical. 66. Almost immediately after the outbreak of war and the.severing-of tle capitil city of Sarajevo from the rest of the replblic, Croatians in westerrr Hercegovina
succesefully resisted Serbian advance! and
organized a virtual state within a state under the leadership of Mate Boban lmrih-teh b6h-bahn]. In pockets of central Bosnia where Croatians form a pajgrity, the Posavina Croatians organized their own local government, police, and military forces under the umbrella of the Cioatian Defense iouncil, HVO. In these areas, whichthe Croatians callthe Croatian Union
-44-
of Herceg-Bos_na, (Hruatsha zajed,nica Herceg-Bosne) the Croatian flag flies, C-roatiai."r"L".v i* there is little to iidica!{fitacitxise regrions "a are"?#, anything
g:#tf n;t*;r*r*t"n"l"T !!:elb'"",trirxf mi.litgv.assist-ance ttre croatGn g"""'**"ii
private individual s lroqr in croatia.
""a ifr"'bio?tiu" government maintqlns that [tt[""?ii HVO T"oops-aiJ aff .
iliEiffii?,tr#sf,H.a**,ri*".;:.lm:el* the HVO units. .
67 ln the H ru at s k a 3 ajed. nic a H e rceg - Bo s ne,Croa ti an -naliJi_,s monopolize- local administrati;; complain thar they. .i.t"a.d or importance. _rn Zeiiea r"
.fi;i;;i fiJ
"".,rA;;;i"n
il.iiil",
central -an4 northeastem ;f;
:'3lf,**ffif
"iilJJii'#ili Bo;"tA-M;ffi" t"r," [fi:833fltt$'"'ii,f ::lffiff in
localwartimeoligarctti"itept!#;i"g.;;;"#tj'o'it"ritv
flifi;rdil;;;"" rt iiiiii"o i 3i[]iih"n,a*,*"{g,,mx d t'-;;ii#' o"tr to seek domination.tras caus-ea Uit]:i" croatians and Muslims- The". ir iro-;fiffi ilEi#."" Io-cal factions wirhin ttrTiori"igro,rp. of the central eovepnnent "".ti a;;t" fi" uro*]i"ft
6a-;;6;&.
rn other-qrdJ lrtH;"?d;t":""9: northeasternBosnia,an_dinsara.i.*;il;;;"6..ri"?rt.fl{ -unils of os BiH and r{vQ fr;a; leaders.hip. {p Salaje.'^o ana th; ffirt" iiiH ..ttt"ically mix6d force, "ri"1lJ'OS i: 1l "iaho"sh
;;;;iloiiffo". B*;#ii';fi*,
iiruf :ff63,iifi 3ilH.Tf$3,r_tlllT:":'":y,g
Muslim officers.
?;,,8*l,ifl
.i,l#,"ral:#l:*;r*ff
flleader iffi 'd:Ifi,,"'j Radovafr GTa{iiqi;e;d"A"stria ostensiblv to discuss ways to end rhe
nos"irni;"ftfi:"iil'BH#""
g1:nT111t suspected.that the meeti"s ;;fire"t"a X19!1.." qtF*pt to part_itlon Bosnia betweln Slrbi"
uroarra atthe exnense ofthe Muslims and otheis ""a avo"ing a unified Bosnii. U""y c.J"ti,iiii o"iria"
ilrid;;a
.45
"
Croatia proper had similar fears and wrote letters of' protest against the meeting. Boban responded to the outcry with the explanation that the Gratz meeting was merely_an extension of the peace negotiations orgafuzed by th-e European Communiiy at Lisli6n.as Boban pointed out that the London Conference had called each party to meet separately with each of the others as well as to participate in discussions involving all three parties. Boban created a simil"t, uproarwhen he officially proclaime d "The C ro atian-Union of Hence g-Bosna-" 9n Jul-y 3,_1992. When confronted with strong protest from the Bosnian government, bad review6 in the international press, and letters of,protests from many C_roatia{r_s, Bota! again backtrackei, claiming that thb Union of Herceg-Bosha was not an independenf, state but a temqorary wartime administration which had emerged from the need to establish law and order in the regiirns under his control.aa
69. The Herceg-Bosna
declaration led to a call for sanctions against Croatia and demands that Croatian forces withdraw from Bosnia. It is possible that llterna4onal pressu"e on Cioatia i.r"tfi"g T"oh ttte Herceg-Bosna-declaration was a factor in 6 Croatian decision to withdraw a small artillery unit from northern Bosnia which led to a collapse ofloint Croatian and Muslim defenses a{oqndqdzak [rih-jahk] and Derventa ldare-vent-ah] and the fall of the western Posavina to the Serbsas. After the Herceg-Bosna incident, presidents Izetbegovid and Tudjman- met and signed a joint agreement on diplomatic and military iollaboration Qgginst th-e new Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia. Subsequently each time a major dispute arosJbetween the Bosnian and Croatian governments, it was patched over with a joint declaration.a6 Izetbegovid spent much time traveling back and forth between Saiajevo and Cro_atia and Sarajevo and Hercegovina to m-eet with T\r,djman, Boban, and other Croatian leaders in a series of desperate efforts to iron out disagreements. 70. In the last week of October and first week of N-oye4ler L992,armed clashes took place between units of the HVO and the OS BiH in cential Bosnia at Prozor [prose-or], Novi Travnik [n6h-vee trahv-nick], and the
-46-
lve-glqzl vqlley._The clashes caused mistrust Ii!., between I{vo and _oS BiH forceJ a;f;Hii r# iity or {ajce [yah.ee-tsehl and contributed 6]ffi 6if if tr,* to attacking. Serbian forces. O; pr"slae"t !o*It Izetbegovic's iniFar,ive- a joint crorti"" i"{ rii.ii"" commi si on was formg{ toinve stigal" ni o"iefir"oi tt . fi ghting and the c-o1fl igt *"r- u"o""g[i--to ]ti u"t tensions remained high s
*1ll,q"y uroaf,ran
in centraigo;d:- l"-r"ia"na".'
1993, there were ttew
a"*ea.-t"rf,., U"i*"."
and bosnian government forces at BusovaDa l bo_o- so -vah- ch ah J, g ofrS i V" LgT rr"fr -"t o ofl -iiirrlJi*L and..adjacent areas in ce-ntral B;ffii* or writing, it p.ppears that once agai"j oi"C"fort. ofg;r;iu" gt: y rr"-rl"n political and mi litary I e ad e-rs have s topped f,ne anned encounters, but the underlying causis of distrust still remain.az'
iS";-,ii;
71. The Bosnian gg.vernment has complained
repeatedly.thp! humailtarian ai-dl
weaporrrvEd;th;;
fr"8trfr s&t"f #fl?ittu:;'i,1fr'lr3z6lb#ff.Iil';tTr anp .war-lords foelonsrnt to the-IIito: f;erceg-Bosna" uro_atian sources claim that onry abolt[wen[v perclnt
scatedas-a"r.i"alrGil;rfi il-i;n :lt|^"^{o-o*irgonfi wnrle the Bosnians maintqrn that often it amounli do mor-e than half. Spq. goo-ds d&tin;A fo; d;t;-ilh;
nortreast of Bosni-a haie been .6iiiir."iia 6"^tr,ii,iiwarl ord s in C enrral Bo sni a. B;h""fi; g gz grouqs of voluntee!:B- from IsJamie-cb-unt"i"s'LJs"" 9lt"I"g Bosnia to fight as "mujairldi;;;; th; sidE oi me, rr.gsryan government. Ttre Croatian government and the Hvu ar.e-uneasy about the arrival of these
iri,"ifi.if
volunteers from Islamic iountries ;iro; t-h;;f;;":'*ili contribute to a risein "Muelim extremisir; i;"8;;;;: S; far, est-imates of the total -to lange f"g*_ no more than several iidrdred thoqsand. More importantty, in l[L i"il"" tt"tfrrlg9z, j the losnian governrie-nt force begar p"..hu'"a ii-*i"ra black *""GT. #;f;"ffi€ff 3#Hi by I sl ami c copn triqs._Mp st of iiie ;"tfidffi il! iiliil- a into Bosnia throur we,, a s F;*
n"-6";-ir".iiioid6.",
;?*
;ffi','Hiheikffiififfih
'';*#ii
variousAraucouniri-eilap;;;;6i";;ffi lilri,il"ti"lirr -47.
contributions. The Croatian authorities have allowed
substantial arms supplies, some ofwhich are confiscated !y^t!r". HVO, to reaitir Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Oclober 1992, in order to-maintain a pretenie of obserwing the arrns embargo, the Croatian government searche? an Iranian.plane and handed ovdr a load of weapons and ammunition to United Nations officials. The irickle of arrnaments to the Bosnian goverrrment forces has in recent weeks contributed to a substantial improvement in their battlefiel{performance as*witnessed by a January 1 993 offensive in Dastern Bosni a. In January fhe Bosni ai Qrc,es succeeded in retaking substantial ireas around
Srebrenic_a[sr€_h-breh-ne-e-tsah],Bratunactb"atttoo-nahtsl, qn{ Zvornik and were moving southward
flln9;51pr[8or-ahzh-deh]towardst"hesandZak 72. The Serbian forc-es in Bosnia-Hercegovina have received assistance from ultra-nationalist Russian
voluqteers who have at'peared in various pu*s ofBosnia and Hercegovina and may number seviral thousand. Among these forces is a group of several hundred
"Cossaclrso under the tomfoand of former Red Radovan Karadzic has threatened that he and his Russian allies will launch a generqlreligious war between Christian Orthodoxy and Islam if necessary to counter the assistance the Boinian government is receiving from the isiami. *otia.nb73" In late December L9!t2, UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC Negotiator Lord Robert Owen announced the completion of a peac-e plan which they had developed {uring the Geneva Confeience. Accordirig to this VariceOwen plan, the solution to the Bosnian cjnflict is a new con:titution, which would provide for the division
Army General Filatov.
of Bosnia.Hercegovina into ten autonomous
regions. Each of the three major national-confessional gg:rps, Muslims, Croats, ald Serbs would form a majority -of
in three ofthe ten regions. In the tenth region, that thb capital city_of Sara.ievo no ole group worlld constitute a majorilV. Eq..h fel'igr.r would have its own legislative, executive a-n$ ju{ic{al branches, their organizalion to be determined locally. Foreign, monetarj, and military
-48-
policy would be in the hands of
;il["
a
to be o".ti3th?t riT'rHno'jfi go ve rn";h;-;;tters ments. Accordi n g.to. the pl.an, fo. oiui; g ; fi'fi;i y !! lsreqd ces_s ati on of hostilities,'the ;iii t"ry F";." J lr tr, B o s ni a n M u i m s, C roa t! a-n s, dn d SLrb; ;;"i ;;;h;., *" I
sI
i";;;*r;h;ii
into the resrg_nq asglgne! theio."a nluuy weapons to united.Nations-peacekeepe"s. r-tils. 6r.", would be increas-ed in numb." rilru;ilJ;i;;I tnu
borders of each region_oI ".a A;ffi.'"'ii;il;"th" constitution p19nos94. Uv ViFe ,-dl*6*"o, elements from the.eTistini nitit;r??;;iioo, are to be integrated intd a ir"il,i"o.
"oin".a. 'Hri,la.,ll:.*lx.T;lr,lilT*ii ffi:"r*"xtffi nationalities nume.ricaily proporti oilJ Io lh;;ilillii o" ffi ::t"fi"tthT,.l,*,i:nagi;tii'"ifrj':fr fi .iur f,
fl
ed.,rm.llFfli?frgTr:ffi :ti "..uiroioh";;lpecifi ach n ati onal -confei si on al group-a.t a* ri-il pasls.Accordin-gtogeff ailt"il;dliilrirT"ii"a "*i". " ", bgf gre_national-andreEionai;iAG;;,a-"""irl"n g th !h'9. replesegtaliveJ oa ;;h- ;f tii"tlr_" e
r*:ii3g"f .f; :ffi iJ li$::"i:,fi3.";;fJ$,i?,'*f has representatives of the three"majo;h;;i;;liiiJ, i"
the republic.
to the version of the plan which !!vanceAccording and Owen su_bmitted in
Januafo, lgggJh; Bosnian Muslims w-ho nade ..p-r+ ffieiil? in* ponul a tio n i n Bosnia- Heree gofi o" 6Jrb-t tli--", be gap_ are_ to receive_ 29 peretnGa the i;lra ii in* republic for thell threa cantons, th;-C"diiir" who made up.-tz_pe_rcent th;;o;;I;l", 25 perceot q''4 tue s6ruJ *n" "a of the populati on 4?_percent. Thi; ap.pTgxillatety 44 percent of"fr"iriiii"rt the lliuslims l9aJes uvtngoutside fire cantons where they are in the majority, BZ .pe-rce_nt of Ctoatians -6"tria? in" u roa ti an controlled caqtons and ag percenior in"
il";;""fifl;;lJ."t
-*"it"or, Fpfbq outside thg Serbian iont.oifed dj ma sgy"rnilen t, tli; B, b;; *i,, 1. l!:h"^tXl I !, l!-"J" e or lne uroatran Democratic Union of Herceg-Bosna, and
=49-
some Croatians living inside the proposed Croatian controlled canton are-satisfied with tlie Vance Owen P-lan.-9-"lVthe Croatian side has actually signed the plan. Ifthe plan were actuallyimplemented, the-Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslims would receive the least ?14 grvg rry the most. Bosnian Serb forces led by KaradZi0 and General Mladid would be required tb relinqJrish about one third of the tendtory they have cgnqrrered and ethnically cleanseO wtrite t
7F.
sadistic war criminals and new armed conflicts will
develop, as they did in Croatia aft,er the failure of the earlier Vance Plan.sl
76, In January 1993, the C:oatian government became fld up with the lhilure oft INPROFOFforces to implement the-most impo-rtan! part ofthe Vance Plan, the disarming of the renegade mililias of the Krajina republics and thE safe returm of more than two-hundied thousand Croa_tians who had been cethnically cleansed, or expelled from the areas under Sei:bian control. The Croatian government was especially concerned that -50-
the serbians s{ll -controlled the area where they had up-the ]vlaslenica uriasi across an Adriatic Flg"tr inlet,andtheirforceswgrepr_E""r*;;tGC"t"ti"o government from_ construiting g ;r""ot""ilfiag. io ilg plgce. This bridge is-o?-c""iti;;t il"friLn..
f":'h:"EtHtHiffs::rbh*?lir*HtfJ*if [? croatia. Also of coqcern d ldC;;tid#;ilment was the continued serbian. oecupati-on-oi tne
flmne
if.E:l,l"i:#ilffiH,H"'i:'".H:F,1f Nations'failure to enforce theVance pL",,;;Jii, F"it.r.u to resolve the issue ofthe tvtart""icu-f,*asJ"ia F.ir.t, 9u-, the croatian government took matters into it own hand
s. c roa ti an rfritlta.y ro-rce s" sei r-ed Ivr"riL"I#, trr. Perucha dam and the Zeniun uirpo"l, aiip".t;ilili;pink zones" or areas where Qr-oats f;*r;d;-;;jJriTv"of the
ifyt'fi ;;:l'^ffi::i j;,#Ho?;f,.d;;?;il;i.ii,ia. meanr *','dngthatifth; 0;iihlrHrutrf*Sffi
", " failed to enforce the piovisio"r biiii.Tl".. communitv plgll, the Croatian governr4ent wouid-h;;; io ir.r.
t["
;F Sr,*r"ftHhrt HJTff : tilit':fri:rs:;:f area.sz --'
trJ expelled from the
77. _ The VaDC€-Ow€n plan has also sparked new armed gonflicts between croglisq tisSj'""a tgqnian sovernment.(gs niH) io"ceJi" e;;d;i i6rniu sglSs.e_Serbian camRaiqn of eth_-.
4f.;; d;;;li
a;;;il; T*:::ili,:ffiro"iliiqq ryqffi gs,f ,# flfl::'sHx ylgBozoBajidlbo-zhohrah_ichl,lh"-a;?;;;;iiister
9, ooqry-ttercegovi4s, -B Croatian, ordered Bosnian armed .t'orces i4 tlre area of Gornji Vatuf ig""_ "+itq ch th e Va n ce -O wd FG; h;"i ri fr," a lyg g va,! - koof I whi to the Croatian canton to ptace th;;;1";ilfia#tn. command of the IfVO. The drea h"d 6;;;;;;;;i ; th.
j3; :l*lj iliiff lf ;Rft ,:*:*#,3.11-*.itisf that tne no* a""Ji"""""i."f i, a
Raj ic's order, stating
not Tcepted tlre teri:itorial division "i p"6por.a by and owen. when the Bosnian-.omtitr"?Jrr
v"n.u
"rto*"a
- 51 -
to
obeyRajid's order, the HVO leadership sent armed units complete with tanks qnd heavy artillery to force the Bosnian government forces to submit. Iieavy fighting ensued and there were by all accounts dozens of casilalties on both sides.58 78. _
During the fighting, Hercegovinian Croatian
authorities in the "Union ofHerceg-Bosna" blocked relief supplies to areas under Bosnian government control, confiscated the automoliles and belongings ofMuslims, a-nd pu-t a 4umber of Muslims in jail. troatian sources claim that Bosnian government ufuts attacked Croatian villagesin central B-osnia and burned down houses ofthe inhabitants.Ea Bosnian Bources claim that IIVO forces attacked and burned the homes of Muslim townsmen.Sb
President Izetbegovid, after consultins with
representatives-of the OS BjH, IIVO, and UNPF,OFOR, concluded that the reports ofBosnian attacks on Croatian towns were untrue and wrote a letter to President Tudjman urglng him to consult more than one source before reaching conclusions about who had caused the conflict. Izetbegovid appealed to Tudjman to.ioin him in a joint investigation at the scene of the conflict.56 With the help of IJNPROFOR mediators stationed in Central Bosnia and the efforts qf high OS BiH and IIVO officers, a truce was arranged. Warringunits on both sides were ordered to lift the banicades between them and to direct th-eir acti_ons against the Serbian aggressor and not each other. The Croatian press has blamed the conflict on Muslim extremists belonging to the OS BiH. The real problem however seems to have been a combination of mistrust which had developed between HVO and OS BiH gor-nryanders, disagregment over the Vance-Owen Plan, Rajid's prov-ocative orde-r, thel{VO's effort to enforce it by use of deadly force, and the OS BiH's armed response. 79. Even more alarming than the skirmishes between the I{VO and OS BiH inCentral Bosnia is the massive Serbian military campaign in eastern Bosnia in response to recent successes of the Bosnian Armed Forces in the
area. At the end of .fanuary and beginning qf
Febnrary 1993,large amoreduniUs of thl yugoilav army were reported to have crossed into Bosnia.
-52-
ftop serbia.b? At the time this article went t9 press, the serbian forces in eastern Bosrria *ere e,ngagrng in a new and brutal campaig"-o-f'"tlr"i. 91eg1sifrg. A,s a result of the Serbiarr off6nsive, ,o*. 100'000 peoplerrvere cut offfrom h"-r"ila"iu" ald a"a as m-any as 20,000 people driven out of theitho;;. Hercegovina
town of Trebinj. L1,Il_:.::ggyinian rierbran extremists expelled
I;
tftii-il;_;rehi;
4,000 Muslims. The seiuiaii to be-moiivated by a"ri".1o L*pl-rlif lorcps |ppear DerDs rrom areas that are assigned " to them inihe vance"o"Owen plan.
80.
United Nationsofficialj,.Eulgp.eaq heads of state, and influential members of the ttfrril poli cv. e stablishment_lgy." applied such i"rr rr.* American pre.sident william 'cti"to" t-tt;t il;h;; lsr""a to sgpRolt the Vance--Owen plan uiU"ii-*iif, ?o_. modifications to m.ake it more fato"abi;ir trt" n"Joi"r,
$il;"il;is; il il;
Muslims. clinton has agreed tJappoini i rpJ.iri.""ri, to partici,pate in negotiations o*reiihe n".i"ior-;f;h; ptan and has promised to contribute united sGtes mrlrtary tbrces to--enforce it. According to the iatest statement of policy.gf Se_c-retary ;i Bt"t"-W"]".r, Chri.stoph"t rnd pr,jsident Ctiirt"il dr; ;ffi ;rro,ia u.
modified in such a way gs to malie ft parties.and no party ri'itt be forced t"
;il;Aii;Jo alt il;;l t[; ;1";:
jlt t_p^" lTy-r_epre se lrts a retre at fr om C l i ntods camf ai gn ]pte-dge to exert milita_ry pressure on the serbs- -No* "6"."r pr.essure on-serbia 1[J s.*i"" $liF"y Bosnia has been indgfi 4 telv postponed ""a iiit favor of more negotiatiotts. Wesi;*
i"
ii;;i;t;i i" bd;;;;G;e.r; andPresidentye'irqi"oiffi sri";ii;;iliifil*i,"fr"tr,. new American president that they were stronelv
opposea ro rncreasect mili+,?{{ nrgsggre on serbia. -i""Ji -limbiican,
udi t'e a Na ri on s gi-;;il;; P::lf :_t _11 d and _ bureaucrats cautious military" gppgsed to i_ntenrention of any
an-atvsti
kda-#e-T"-fr""" f"igtrlenedthenevAmericania-i"iri""tiJ"-ilt" from its moraristic!::Itlq_"Ily_ promises qy evoking pessimistic worst-""". ""di"isn scenarlos. According to such individuals, liftins of the against Fosniu, ,"ppiyi"S tfr"-."oi"t.v gTbargo f11r wrth weapons, and air strikes againlt-sefuian military --53-
targets in Bosnia would be ineffective and to strike military targets in Serbia would risk provoking the retaliation of the Yugoslav military and might provoke right-wing forces in Ruesia.68
81. Unfortunately President Clinton is being
persuaded to abandon his own initial impulse, the right one, in favor of another policy, the wrong one, a policy crafted by the same bonstituency responsible for all of the past policy failures in this conflict. The Vance-Owen plah is little more than a repackaging of the United Nations resolutions and pres,criptions which have thus far proven to be totally ineffective, because the requirement that the Serbian side give up some of what ft has taken from the other parties is made without any credible force to back it up. Unfortunately, in some re spects the plan even appears to be a.step backward. For example the unambiguous call for immediate placing of heavy weaponry under United Nationg supervision embodied in the London resolutions ofAugust 28, 1993 appears to have been abandoned.seAs
long as there is no penalty for aggression and no indication that the Serbian side will be forced to fulfiil its obligations, there is no reason to believe that it will comply with any stipr lation that is not to its liking. Thus far the Serbian stratery has been to pretend to asree with conditions laid down bv United
Nations or EC mediators whenever there apne-ars to be a real threat of militarv action to force comofii,nce. Once the threat of military-force is removed, the aggression
continues. The fuida"'ental problbm w6lch the negotiators have refused to address is the imbalance of power artifrcially maintained by the arms embargo against Bosnia-Hercegovina and
Croatia which leaves ninetv oercent of the
weaponry of the fourth largest-ariny in Eunope in the hands of the aggressor. It is this imbalance of power wtrich allows the aggressors to continue creating thousands ofnew victimsJ,o influence in their own favor the terms of any agreement, and to choose to comply or not comply with any ofits provisions. The victims are
fgr all frlrctical purposes being asked to give in to the insatiable demands of the aggressor. The
-54-
legitimate ?n4 democratically elected Bosnian
government is,-in.effect, peing- asked to agreJ to an arrange.ment-which is likely to-leave two mi'hion olG people. t-r.qmelgq-s
qrth no lrospect of refurni"e to u li k""p
normal life, while their victimiz^ers are allowed most of what they have seized.
82. _The costs of a solution whieh put_s pressure _on the weak andpenalizes thevictidsa"e-Iikei" t" be much higher thag toda/s Nevi-lie-Cnamb;;G6; lmagrne-. Unless the world finally shows Serbian military leadership, Milo5evi0, SeSeli, and other ,rtt""nationalists that it is readli -to stop their_ military adventures by_force, they are-likely tocarry the-war to new regions. If they g.arry the w_artd Kosovo it will surely lead to war with Albariia and Turkey. If the West, be-traying iqs own values, fails to"support a iusf solu tion to the wag-ig- posnia, _Wes terd de mociacy -
will lose all cnedibttttv in ihe *orta. n;itd i; democratic
solutions in Eistern Europe tne?oi-., U_ pion yi ll diminis h,""a a"a ditta tors and della_g_ogues will seek to imposd their will bv rep Sbl i cs of the Sovie t
force. If Western democracies fail to come to th6 defense of the most baeic human rights of i[e BosnianMuslimsr lvho ane the prtneipil victims in !$" Vl", the_chasm between Euiope aid the Islamic World will deepen Ifthe United Nations continues to p-ush s^olu tions that are based on expe diency rather than justice, it_will be discredited as-morally Sankrupt
and become totallyineffective as an honest b?oker. Tfie chief victims of this war of aggression mav aDDear weak and defeated, but they will Jo-oner or latei.nLht back as they are now doing in Qro-atig. Even if a tEmporary
cease-fire is re_aehed, it is unlikely to providir lasting peac_e if fundhmental infusiices'are left unaddressed. The Bosnian Armed trtorees show no sign
9f b.eing defeated and thousands of Bosnian refugees]if tomo"rrow's terro ri st b and s or ave-n-gi-n g armi es. Mri sli m gove rnm ent s
their needs are not addressed, hay join
throughout the world have already indicated openly that they_maybreak the arms embari;o and step uptheir supply of men and arms to Bosnia.
"55"
83. Given the experience of the Vance Plan in Croatia and the experience of many months offutile negotiations and- unkept agreements, there is no reason to expect the Serbian side to comply with any provisions of the VanceOwen Plan which aie not to itslildng. The acceptance
by the Clinton administration ofone more round of neg-o-tiations represents one more postponement of effective action. Unfortunately postponerirent means continued _iqjustice, co_ntinued et[nic cleansing, rape, murder- and death of innocent victims, an-d moTe _g_ains for tbe aggressor. Worst of all, it probably means the s-pread of the war untii it becomes so big it can no longer be ignored. The long-gr the_world waite to take effective action, the costlier solutlons become. There is no indication'that Greater Serbian imperialism will be satisfied with its gains in Bosnia. Fibhtihg has returned to Croatia, because ofthefailuie oftAe UnitedNations to fulfili
its commitments there, and a campaign of ethnic cleansing has already bezun in Kosovo and the
Sandzhak. Vojislav SbSeli-and the Serbian Radical P-arty are openl_y calling for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and the international community has thought ofnothing more effective than to send a few
unarmed monitors. 84. Contrary to recent statements of Lord Owen, his and Vance's approach is not the only one available. An alternative to more futile negotiations over a plan which no gne has the intention ol enforcing is to issue an ultimatum to the Serbian aggressors in both Bosnia and Croatia: Either comply *ith all United Nations resolutions concerning lhe cessation of hos ti lities and thg blockading of cities, transfer weapons - to
United Nations
peacekeepers,
free
communications, q nd perinit the retumof refu gees,
free prisoners and meet other humanitalian demands or face the air power of the world
unity and the massive arming of the Bosnian and Croatian forces with sophistlcated modern weaponr)r. Such assistance should be provided to tip coqr
rln
the balance ofpower away from the aggressor and make
the cost of continued aggression prohibitive. The -56-
ULTIMATUM should contain a demand that
Bosnian Serb fo_rces withdraw to a few aeJignatea aneas and hand over their weapons to N^rrrTO or LJNPROFOR forces, which wouid be statiorrea ilr tlepe ar_eqq to protect and guarantee the t rights of all irylividuals. The ultimatum to the"-"rr serbs in croatia should be that in return for protection oittreir human mqhtp by NATO or UNpROfOn p."r. t uliu"., they should immediately- hand over all weaponry.' Ali
weap_ons handed
over to interhational
peaceke_eping forces should then be taken orrt of fbrme-r Yugoslavia for immediate destmction. The united Nations Protected zones in croatiu und desiilated areas ofBosnia-Hercegovina where serbians roim%d trre ove-rwhelming majority before the war should be pla.ed und.er temporary mandate of the international community until such time as human and minority rights of civilians of all national-confessional groups citr 6" s"a.a"leea. war criminals livingin these areds should b6prosecuted - r- ----by an InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal. 85. In case the Serbian forces refuse to respond to an international ultimatum in ei ther Bo sni a-H6tcusorrinu or Croa!i?, ail support and miHtary aia sn".ila Ue grante-d the elected governments of'these couot"ies
im_mediately
if they meet certain
conditions.
Mili_taryaid to Bosnia and croatia wouldbeissued on the condition that human rightg_moni-tors be preseni aio.rg with miliFry advisors from United Nationi, NAIO, lstamrc Conf'erence or Arab Leazue countries. The ""fi military force-q receiving aid should"agree to dismiss any officers or enlisted men indicted for ivar crimes. Bot[
Croatia and Bosnia.Hercegovina snouta te
required in retunr for mili tary:assistance to allow the immediate stationing- of international peacekeepiqg fglces and huhan rights monitors in largely Serbian areas which Eurrender to gov_ernment forces. Militarv aid to Croatia should be made conditional. on_the couirtry's cooperatiott i.t ttt" defense of Bosnia-Hercegovind, and'r"spu.iirrg it. territorial integrity and slvereignty. To'the eitent necessary, Croatia should serud ad a safe base and training area for Bosnian military forces. A formal -57-
mili?ry alliance
between the two sovereign countrics should be established and international lidison oflicers sho_uld be_ appointed to monitor the joint military effort. All I{VO forces should be required tolntegrate wiihin t}re command structure of the OS BiH. HVOofficers should become officers in the OS BiH with rank and position commensurate to their ability. International'liaison
oflicers should mediate and monitor the integration
plocess. Croatian military forces and-local
nistrations within Bosnia.Hercegovina should s wear loyalty to the eristing cons ti tutlon of BosniaHercegovina until a new constitution is established. ad nri
All-government oIfices and buildings should be required lo flJr the Bosnian llagin leturn for a guaranteed ribht to fly the Croatian flag should the legitimate organs oflocal g_overnment so _determine. The rZajednica -(Union) of
H_erceg-Bosna' should
be integrated into
the
administration ofBosnia-Hercegovina until such time as a constitutional asseFlly changes the existing Bosnian constitution and establishes new regional enti-ties. 86. The ultimate goal ofmilitary operations would be to force compliance with resolutions embodied in the ULTIMATUM and to bring an end to the aggression
against the legitimate government ol-Bosnia Hercegovina pending the establishment of a new constitutio{r by a constituent assembly democratically
elected under international supen'isioir. The proposeil Vance-Owen constitution could be offered as one model for consideration.
87. The military strategy should be to close off the corridors between Serbia and the Serbian forces in the Banja Luka and Croatian Krajina areas in order to
prevent new Yugoslav or Serbo/IUontenegrin military forces firom entering either Croati6 or
Bosnia from Serbia. Although dassive air support and supervised military assistdnce may not biine an immediate end to hbetilities and conipliance witl all resolutions, it should ver.y rapidly halt the offensive capacity of the aggressor -forces. 'The capacitv of the Bosnian Armed Fdrces can be rapidly iniproved with logistical assistance from the inteinationaf communitv in the form of transport planes and helicopters, truck6, -58
tanks, armored personnel carriers, road build. ;;;;"Ei;{;E eilii*",,t. Mititarv a'*H fr na n cial issis tance frori tslainic c;fi ffitJ do"ra provide -{o-.r a large proportion of tFJ iE"* in Fosnia. Where neces_sary,-supplies ."" UJaiop-p.a i" by pgrachute, but with ttie coriferation oibro.iiu u"a the lJosman
;;;hih"'y,
uroatia_ns mqch sophisticated equipment be deliver6a .r"oq Slrid;iilou;i;
il{ central Bosnia all the way-to Tuzla. cro?[ian ioi."t yt+polg csFl{
from the north and Bosniai forcesfrbm
t[;;;;th ,ffi"ia
easily be.able clt qff the strategic;;*ia;; ;[i;[ -to connects both the Bglje-L,lka regirih *o.t ;f tk; Croatian Krajina with Serbia. t? Sernia ""a to -i"ri"i introduce new force-s into Bosnia or croatia. "tt"*ii. -iis[r]t bombardment ehould be-applied to rtop ttrein. .. against. blr.dggF,. roads ^and tranipoitation -and communication links between Bosnia ahd serbia pio.tre ineffective, -tfep-_massive bombardment-Jf ffifii.r" targets should.follg* ip orde-r to deal t;*ift-firJi"."u ,.iti,ii"t blow to serbia's offengive qilitary capacitv. th re ar o f a mil i rary
.a
ction o f th.
rlh6*,;i"r i a,iii?iii
tit-if,h^lft ,}ft :tiP,#b?::3ff
U
"
.:.n',irf:""HT"i3i
in the b.egnnins t-o show ttre'aggressorith; ,Eill"u;"d deternunatron ofthe world community. Iflimited strikes &{"d to deliver the message a maiiiie ilsil""r;;ilirta follow. 88. The forces of the Serbian yugoslav arrny and its paramilitary_allies in Croatia aird BoJnia"are-not invincible.. . They h?ve performed poorly in infantry battles and hand,to-hand combat. Their-main skill ii
i1__bolnbarding cities from nountaintopJ-ana pi[.a$ng andJooting plaees where they mebt Httle resistance. 'r'he current war bears no simllaritv to the partisan warfare ofWorld War II. fito's pa*isrfis*er" a multi-national, multi-confessional force fiehtine all over former Yugoslavia with an enemv that"was 6*rerextended. Unlike the Croatians and "Bosnians todav. they.were not hampered by an arms u-UuieJaiiai received massive iuppliei of weapoil f"Ah th; U4ited _States, Great-Britain and nussia.-- ftre Italian defeat in 1943 followins the Allied invasion of Italy resulted in the Italian forcet in Dalmalia;s ]ia"ai"g over large supplies of weapons to thc I)almatian 5q-
Partisans who were mostly Croatians. Today's selfproclaimed Serbian Republics ofBosnia and the-Krajina are short of manp-ow6r and overextended militaitly. ThgV are separate-d by miles of enemy territory from Serbia. The-ne is littl-e enthusiasm firr the Bdsnian waramong the mqiority of the youthin Serbia who have made draft dodging a flll.time profession. Only the ultra-nationaliSt fanatics of Se5eli and Arkan have sho'n'n any enthusiasm for fi ghting in Bdsnia, mostly on relatively riasy looting and p-lundErins expeditions. They h"yg-ofteri-_scatteigd arid run wf,en'faced by
reasonably well-armed opponents. Serbian invincibiliJy is a myth offereil !y the nay.sayers as an excuse for appearement and inaction. In contrast
the Bosnian and Croatian people are well motivated to defend theirhomelands. Itis nbtnecessarv to send larse numberg of ground forces to Bosnia or Cr-oatia to ma[e the costs of aggression high forthe Serbian neo-fascists, nor is it necessary to carry the war into Serbia. All that is n_eo4ted is to stop the lrggression against Croatia
and Bosnia and-in so doing to preient assession against the non-Serbian popufation of Kosovi"and the Sandzak. United Nati-ons peace keeping forces should irnmediately be dispaJclre! to these areas is req ues ted by Albanian pigslde-4t Sali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova, the leadefof the Kosovar Albanians.
89. The world must show its resolve to do its moral duty to humanity. What is moral is also practical. The two go together. President Clinton has
a golden opportunitf to exercise leadership and bring about the necessary coalition of internation-al forces. ff the leaders of someWestern European countries want to
bury their heads in the sand ahd allow this war of a_ggression to escalate out of control, the United States should seek allies in the Islamic World and establish new links to build a world order thatis more humane and just.
FOOTNOTES
I A collection of political speeches reflecting MiloSeviC's ideas during his rise to power is presented in: Slobodan MiloSeviC, Godine Rasoleta (Belgrade: Beogradski izdava0ko grafi0ki zavod, 1989) 2 The views of the Serbian nationalist intellectuals were set forth in 1986 in a famous'Memorandum'. See Srpkska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 'Memorandum,' in lzvori velikosrpske asr€si i e (R ijeka: Tiskara Rijeka,
l99l),
pp.256-30O.
3
See Dimirije BogdanoviC, Kniiga o Kosovu (Belgrade: Knji2evne novine, 1990), pp. 301452: 224-230; J.F. Brown, S_urge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastem Eurooe (London: Durham University Press, l99l); DnaS (Zagrcb), 1987-1990 issues; East European Newsletter, 1988-1990 issues; Alush A. Gashi, M.D. Ph.D., The Denial of Human and National Rights of Albanians in Kosovo. (New York: Illyria Publishing.Co., 1992); Slobodan Milo5evid,'U interesu pravde i progresa za sve ljude koji na Kosovu Zive,' in Godine rasBleta, pp. 340-346; Pedro Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yueoslavia 1963-1983 (Bloomingon: IndianaUniversity Press, 1984; pp. 156171; Sabrina Petra Ramet, Yuqoslavia (Boulder: NIN (Belgrade) 1987-1990 issues; Mark Thompson, A Papgr Heusc: Thc Endine of Yugoslavia @antheon Books, 1992), pp. 125 -146.
4
For discussions of multi-party clecdons in Yugoslavia see East European Newsletter (London), l9February 1990, 30April 1990, 28May 1990, l9November 1990 and TJanuary
and newsweeklies Danas (Zagreb),
5 For discussions of negotiations
over reorganization of Yugoslavia, see East EurolpanNewslener(London),SOctober 1990, lgNovember l990and?January I 99 I , 4 Febru uy l99l ,2 April I 99 I ; and newsweeklies Danas (Zagreb) , Nedjelja (Sarajevo); NIN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues for November 1990 to July 1991.
6 Yugoslav military intelligence chief General Aleksandar VasiljeviC revealed plans for the arrest of hesident Tudjman of Croatia and President KuIan of Slovenia in his interview with Novosti Extra edition 1992 (Frankfurt). Interviews with Vasiljevid werc.also published in NIN July-August 1992 and in Viesnik August-September 1992. General Martin'Spegelj, Croatia's first Minister of Defense, who until 1968 had been commander of Yugoslav army forces in Croatia and Slovenia, discussed his knowledge of federal military plans for intervention in Croatia with me in a personal interview inZ.agreb on September 1,19912. 7 Republic of Croatia,
l99l
-60-
l99l;
Nedielja (Sarajevo), MN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues forNovember 1990toJanuary 1991.
Republicki zavod
za statistiku,
(Zagreb: Republilkl zavo{ s6 statistiku, 199?),
Pspis.$anoynlltyg
slavonijc, 1992); croatian Informarion service, The Chronoloey of the Aeercssion €asreb,
ffi,
8_ For brief but precise accouns of the Krajina rebellion sec Easr E,urc4rcall Npw__lletter, 27 August, 1990 and l8 March 1991. For an accounr of rhe frajina
rebellion which pays more anendon to fte subiective fears
of the
Times, and rhe Egropean
Sei-bs
l4December 1990, pp. 18. 19.
9
See interview
by Yugoslav military intelligence chief General
Aleksandar vasiljcvid with Nqvosti Extra edition 1992(Frankfurr); inrerviews with vasiljevic wcrc_also pgblished in MI! July-August tggz and in viesnik August-Septembcr 1992. General Martin Spegelj, Croatias frst tvtinGer of Defense, who rntil 1968 had been commandei of Yugoslav army forces in croatia and slovenia, discussed his knowledge of feoerat initirary
in croatia with me in a personal interview in
plans for intervention
Zagreb on Septcmber 1,1992,
l0
For accounts of events from the beginnings of the Knin rebellion to the declarations of independence, see newsweeklies Danas (agreU),-&djdia (Sarajevo), NIN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues for Aug-ust 1990 though July 199 1. For a good chronology of week by week evenrs see
ll
"llrvatska 1991," Vjesnik 13-18.
12 Vojislau SeSelj, "Ja nisam voda, ja sam vojskovoda," Interview with Verica Lazovid ald MomCilo Perovid in Intervju (June 7,
l99l),
p.18.
13 Foran estimate of wardamages, see Croatian Informarion Service, The Wzr inCroatia:AChronoloeyoftheAggression (Tagreb:Vedernjitisr,tgg2),p.63. 14 For details on GospiC,
see
Glenny, "The lvlassacre of yugoslavia."
l5 For accounrs
of the war in Croatia, see Amnesty Internarional, Yugoslavia: repprts of leirture and deliberate and arbitrary killings in war zones further (Amnesry lnternational, March 1992); aulrd, Helsinki Warctr, Utefgrules_U Bosniq:Herc=egoVina (New York: Human Righrs Watch, 1992) especially appendices C and E which deal wirh Croaria, pp.230-273 and pp. 310-356.
16 For accouns of the war in Croatia
see Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: reports of orture deliberate and and arbitrary killings in war zones lprther (Amnesry Inremarional, l{arch 192); Croatia Minisry of Heailr, Mass Kitting (Zagreb,Minisuyof Healrh, 1992), MisE qnd CenaiCe in Croada , Th9 Massacre of Yugoslavia," New York Review of Books (30 Janrnry, Q^l91gf 1992), pp. 30-35; Mladen Kevo, Rat za Hrvatsku (Vinkovci/Osijek: Glis
tqglry
Army in his interview of Septembe-r I
l,lgg}in
-d Zagreb.
7 For a good r-eview por.itigar of deveropm ents in Bosnia from l 990 to
ffisle&f"i'$ilfl'* sar-elqnglil-Bosn
Hels i nki warch,-
Rights Warch, 1992,pp.
t947---
ia-
Herceq;vina
f,"i{j,lffi j:8"'jiT:il'#,T"*
&;
r"d;;A,d;.;;ffi r'11"1.';%i
g.ofi I
nsri
e
f
,it *.tionat
pubt ication
,ff
r, ldir
y,ffi "'
""1sarajevski "1r*itf oroces (Zurich: gosansri'insrit tur, ii,'iqg7)."
]f rol exaqples of pre.sident Tudjman's
ln:'il,H':yH;,i"fffi
fa
v#f,'
18 See Aliia lzetbeqovld. Islam Retwepn
il
H
rggz
uman
,*il?,Hlf
sN
;
v\
view on Bosnia-Hercegovina, see the
croatia seeks a cease-firc;@!tiz Aug[st rgg2l, p.H.-fioliiou-', views on rhe eve of Bosnian fiagryn[enci, righdfdi h; G[a;, p.oil'rit or tr," croatian Democraric union of'Bosnia-Heftelouina, see the
Inir*rc*
Mate Boban in Globus (6lvlarch 1992),p,6.
to.l a. plgn on_the ?3 ^ (2 April, 1991), pp. 7-8.
Seenorc6above.
m lom lunerggTttrffihTanffirmtSffi
consulted were Belgrade, Zagreb, and saraj""o-o.ii"---o weekrv newspapers and news_ magaines for. rlre. period. " censrJ-iurri; S;Gij provided information gnthe organizati6n ,m6;; --" oFlri i.*trun
rather than actual facts.and is ov-erly iridulgent in accepting thc Kraj ina leaders' rationalizations of rh6ir e xuelmis r ac tionsi see fiaisna Glenny, Thg Fallof Yqgosl=avia (London: Penguin Books, 1992). A rnuch fuller picture can be obtained by following the acrual course of rhe rebellion in zagreb and Belgrade newspapers and news magazines of the period. Some relevant articles can be found in Danas 2lAugust 1990, pp.13-15 and 30.October 199_Q, pn.2-l-22 and N.edjgUa l2August 1990. Day by day developmenrs in the Knin rebellion can be followed in the pages of vjeshit (zagrebj, polirika (Belgade), and BorbA @elgrade) issues foi August througttOcbber t990. An interviewwiththe-politicat leadcrof the Knin scrbs, Milan Babidappears in NIN
war in croatia: A
Vuir"ffi
Karadjcdjevo meeting
see "Susret
*in
?a razlaz,, Danas
31,InoTo:o.n ,l:?gz and Helsinki Watch, p. 43. For a Bosnian reacrion ro j^uoJman's Jvty r99z siatement,about the possibility of dividing Bosnia, sei 'samo nepodijerjena Bosna - mima Bosna,'N;aj;rj; tzriiiry,'iig'ii, o. r r.
D
A collection of essays the identity of the Bosnian-and {e{ing-t"rusiim-cto"tian -with Hercegovinian Muslims the rcrationsrriil uy u b" i;;i'ili6rarrim ryrgeptive H_ercegovinian Muslim intellectuar
ffiti'
c;
r,::"ul****tntt
B.osnian president in N,edielja (SDejgmber l99l), pp, iO-ii. fo, discussions of cantonization]Gt iecim sarac, -Kantoniliao rcpubrike,,, pujic, "rh;ik, nrj"uri"ni'iti.rc," l!.4.t.[r {?_8lyly I9e-l), p.18 Dr.raran Ncdjelja (22March t992j, p. 6. 23 croatian news articles which reflect this view are "svak je mio ko je Bosnu
lf,
ii;.ffi
aruc_re goes so tar as to
'aft
gf;l il;ti
Tx*'f f" T'# I
charge that the Bosnian Government and Armed Forces
nrc full of agcnls of the yugosrav (serbian) inteiligcncc
,.r"ir", *os.
-rni*
33 uelsinti Warch, pp,29-38.
charge has often been repeatul in article.s in the Croauan press. Fcw of rhese articles nametheir sources orproduce any reliable documentation. The Commanderof the Bosnian Armed Forces, Sefer Halilovid has repeatedly denied such charges abouthimself. See the interview with SeferHalilovid in LjiUan (a January 1992),
34 Telephone con_versation of February 15, 1993 wirh theBosnian-Hcrcegovinian
United Nations l-egation; Croatian Information Service, The War-Aeainst Croatia, p. 63.
pp.5-6.
lj fped ilgryiew wirh retugee husband and wife, both Muslims, from prijedor october l,1992. The husband and wife asked to remain anonymous. The man was an engineer who had wo*4 paly ygan for a local indirsrial enrerprise.
24 Nedjetja (19 lvlay l99l), p.
17; Nedielja (16 June l99l), pp. 9-10 and 16; Nedjelia (25 August 199 I ); Nedielja (22 December I 99 I ), pp. 5-7; and Nedjel ia (26 January 1992), pp I 1-12.
They showed thedocument which the serbian occupation authorities had fbrced sign-relinquishing their home and propertibs in hijedor ro rhe serbian
t"rg Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
25 "Ravno: Savjest Herceg-Bosne," Hercegovadki Tjednik (17 Ocober 1991),
pp.12-13.
36
26 Iruerview with Sefer Halilovid, Commander of the Armed Forces of BosniaHercegovina in Ljilian (4 January 1992), pp.
56.
For general information on Bosnian govemment and Croatian m.ilitary groupq in Bosnia-Hercegovina, see fruman Rights Watch, W.3234. For general information on the course of ttre war in Boinia-Herceg6vina, I 37-,-
27
For awounts of ovents in Bosnia-Hercegovina during ttre latter months of 1991 see Danas (l Octobcr l99l), pp.28-29; lnterview with Bosnian President Alija lzetbegovid, Danas (22 October I 99 I ), pp. 3G3 I ; Danas (29 October I 99 l,
have. consulted numerous newspapcr and joumal articres from Behar-press. a publication. of-.y.oung Bosnian wlu reporten who work rrom' EksklssryJsplit); --Dalas (Zqgr€t); Gtobus (Zsgreb) Ljitian (Sarljevo ana
%EtEiE
pp. 15-17); DruAS (26Novembcr l99l), pp. 14-15; Danas (10 December l99l), p. 3 I ; Danas (24 December l99l),pp. I 1- 13; Nedjelja (l September I 991), p. I ? ; Nedielja (8 September 1991), p.l4; Nedielja (15 September 1991), p,p. 8- I Q Nedjelia (22 Sepember 199 I ), pp. I 5- I 6: Nedjelja ( I 7 November,
1991), pp.l2-14; and Nedjelja
(l
December
Interview with General-Bojnik Anre prkaLin, Commander of HOS at
StardeviCev Dom Zagreb, August 27, 1992.
l99l), pp. 8-10; NIN
(27September, 1991), pp.?"U21; NIN (25 Ocober l99l), pp. 15-17; Vreme (28 Ocober, l99l), pp. 2ol2l; and Vreme (18 November l9l), pp. 26-27.
-war
editions, Nedieljna lagreb);..S$9jgje, ?Wrcb and Zenica nannac .rh (Spltt); Novi Danas (Zagreb); Novi viesgik (hgeb):pogm, ilC serbian nationalist newspaper published inTffimush CanaitaGng' ttre economic emt_argo againsr serbia, slobodnr Dalmacija (Spli0; and Vecemji list (Zagreb), and Vreme (Belgrade) for months fromTpfri tSeZ tnrougtr feUilary 1993.
28 See Danas (31 December 1992),pp.24-25;Danas (14 January lgy2), pp.16-17; Danas (21 January l99lz), p.l0; Danas (28 January 1991), pp.l0-16; Danas (25 February 1992>, pp.34-35; Javnost (21 December l99l); Javnost (4January 1992): Javnost (25January 1992): Javnost (29February 1992); Nedielja (l2January 1992), pp. 8-10; Nedielja ( I March 1992), pp. 9- I I ; and Nedjelia (8 March lg92), pp. 1 3- 14.
38 t"p"d int"rview held in Zagreb on Seprcmber 7, I g2 wi rh Senka Ba I iC, war reporter for Behar Press; Taped intcrview with Dr. vlado pandzic, president of the Parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Muinko Pejid hesident of the HVo (Croatian Defense Council) Sarajero, held in Zageb on September 22, 1992, and Interview witl sefer Halilovic, commander ol tne nrmeo Forces of BosniaHercegovina in Ljilian (4 January 1993), pp. 5-6.
29 Kntan MaleSevid,
Personal interview held in Tagreb, September 4,lgg2 wirh lvica NosiC, citizen ofruzla and warreporrcrforNovi vjrxnik, and twoofficers of the oS BiH Tuzla region, who requested that their names not be printed.
"Marginalije o Be Ha izborima 901 Reviia za sociiologijq,22, No. 34 (June-December l99l), pp. 315-326.
30 I discussed the reasons for the Serbian leadership's invitation to Panid to become prime minister in a telephone conversation on August I l, 1992, with ioumalist Smian Cerovid of Vreme in Belsrade. Cerovid said that oeople in
Belerade oboosition circ-les -were sivine that Panid was like the win-dow drbising in a store windolt' wfiile the real product was Milo5eviC. See "Fani0 and hope,' Newswegk QTJuly l9 4t2, pp.36-37 nd 'Kapialisa s ljudskim likom," NIN (l7July 1992), pp.10-11. 3 I Uihn MiloSevid, "Izbori 92: Stvarno i mogude,' Vreme (28 December I 992), pp. l0-13.
32 Globus
14
February
lW,p.20;
Helsinki Watch, p.6; Norman Kempster, [ns Angeles Times (lTDecember,
"Eagleburger seeks Balkan Atrocity Trials,"
1992),p.1.
39
40
lapeA interview by amateurradio with Dr. Irfan Lulbijankid, Mayorof Bihad and Director of Bihad Hospital, Tagreb,Septembr 12,lg9}.
CaqolWilliams,'Serb forces capture key crossroads town," Lns Angetes lfTimes (8 October, 1992),p. 44 and taped inrerview with Or. Semso
tanfovrc,
President of Party of Democratic change and acting Bosnian Ambassador to Croatia, 7 agreb, October 14, 1992.
42
.$Etstlusu (Split); Danas (Zagreb): Globus (Zagreb) Ljiljan (Sarajevo Zagreb); O.s,lobpdjefrie,7.agreb and Zenica wai editions, N_edjsuta !n{ pdnaqrjs (Splig; Novi Danas (Zagreb); NoJi vjesnik (Zagreb); S!aba.d_!a "t).alugstia(Split)l and Vecemji list(Zagreb) foimonth.s lrom April 1992 t
hrough Fchruary 1993. Also scc articlcs on the war in Bosnia-Hcrccgovina
52 'Posavina u plamenu i kvi," Novi
in the Los Angcles Times and New York Tinres lbr rhe santc pcriod.
43
For information on how the "Yugoslav" army took advanhgc ol'the ECbrokered withdrawal of "federal'forces, weaponry, and equipment from Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia see "Srpski oklopni bataljuni prcSli su Drinu!,'Globus (5 February 1993), p.2 and p. 10.
44
See John F.
Burns;'Underground in Sarajevo, the Ethnic Groups Share
the Tenor and the Hope,'New York Times (10 June 1992).
45 nre betraviorof the Bustr Administration had been revealed in a series of news articles by George Kenny, the formerhead of the Yugoslav desk at the State Department. See George Kenny, "Truth as a policy casualtly,' The Washineon Times, 7 Ocober l9/2 and George Kenny, "Sarajevo 99 l,' Washinqton Post, I 5 October, 1992. Both the Bosnian gov ernment and the Bosnian Rcd Crcgs, a non-govemmental organization, presented
evidence of prison camps, mass killing, and systematic ettrnic cleansing weeks before the sightof emaciated prisoners onthe world'sTV cameras made it impossible to ignore the Ovidence. Such evidence can be found
in a document of the Bosnian non-govemmental organization World Campaign Save the Humanity, Renort on War Destructions.Violation of Human Ri ghts and Crimes against Hurn anity in Bosni a and Herce gov i na. 3 June 1992, (Sarajevo: Save ttp Humanity, 1992) and Repon on War Destructions. Violation of Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzeeovina. Part II, 7th July, 1992, (Sarajevo: Save the Humanity, l99zr. These reports contain signed depositions by witnesses to atrocities and are presented in a professional marmer similar to that used.in r€ports by Helsinki Watch and Amnesty Intemational.
46 United Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia 25 Segtember
l99l
- 30 October
lD2
(New York: United
Nations, 1992),p.9.
47 "Sedar rccaka za BiH,'Novi viesnik (28 August 1992), p. 3A. 48 UniteO Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia 25 September l99l - 30 October 1992,pp.3642,
49
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Lettqr to rhe Security Council dated 13 November 1992 (New York: United Nations Public lnformation Office, 1992). 50 "Bomba iz Graza potresla Mostar, NedjeJjna Dalmacija Q7 lvlay 19912), p. 14 and Mate BaBiC, "Rogovi u bosanskoj we0i, Danas (12 tvtay 1992), pp. 18-20.
5l
See interview with lvlate Boban in Globus (10 July, 1992\,p.5. Also see *Henzeg-Bosna Decisions lllegal,'Report of B-H Press News Agency of Bosnia Hercegovina (5 July 192), Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Information," "Croal.ia recognizes sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina,'Press Release 279 Q June 1992); Laura Silber, Washingtqq Post (6 July 1992); 'Tudjman i IzetbegoviC sklopili su Vojni savez," Globus
(l9June 1992), pp.3.
192), pp. 8-10. Joint Communique on Talks Between President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman and President of the Presidency of the Republic ofBosnia Hercegovina Mr. Alija lzetbegoviC,Zagreb, I November I992;"Realizacija sporazuma izmedju dr. Franje Tudjmana i Alije Izetbegovid,'_Slobodna Dalmrib (29 August l9{2), p. 3; and'Vojska bez zajedniCkog vodswa,' YgI@iL[g! (26 Septembcr 1992), p. I l; 'Izetbegovid danas (6 July,
53
f'ozvao Bobana u Sarajevoi Novi vjesnik (23 Octobcr 1992), p. 9A.
54 See"U Sarajevu izrnsen vojni pr[," Slobodna D. almapija (21 October 1992), is an account of a HVO press conference at which Bo2o Rajid, then the Vice-presidentof the IIVO, now Ministerof Defenseof the Republic of
p.4. This article
Bosnia-Hercegovina, lold newsmen the fantastic sory that the reason for rccent confl icts between Bosnian govemment forces and the HVOwas thatEjup Ganid, one of the members of the Bosnian Presidency; Sefer HaliloviC, Commander of the OS BiH; Jovo Divjalc, vice-commander of Bosnian government forces in Sarajevo; Arif PaSaliC, commander of the OS BiH Mostar region; and several other high officers had canied out a coup d?tat against president lzetbegovi0 in concert with KOS (Kontra obaveltajna slu2ba) or the Yugoslav (SerboMontenegrin) Counter-Intelligencc Servicc. None of thesd charges has been substantiated in any way and appear uttcrly fantastic. How Defense Minister BoZo Rajid, is today able to work along side of Ejup GaniC, Sefer Halilovid, Jovo Divjak, and others he accused of being KOS qgents would malce an interesting story. Other aticles on HVO and OS BiH tensions in central Bosnia are found
in Nedjelina Dalmaciia (21 October 192),p.31; Noviricsnik (22 October 1992), p. 7A; Globus (30 October 1992), pp 5-7; NewYork Times (30 October (2 Novcmber 192) p. 60; Interview with BoZo Raji0, Slobodna Dalmacija (5 November 1992), p. 12; New York Times (6 November
l992),p. A5; Newsweek 1992),p. A4;
55
See Carol Berger, "Bosnian Muslims hrn to Kuwait for money, arms'The Christian Science Monior (28 January I 993), p. 6; and Steve Coll, "Despile U.N. Embargo Weapons Snealc lnto Balklni,' Washington Post News Service, (15 February, 1993); Askold Kruschelnycky, "The Arms Trail," The European (28-31 January 1993), p.6.
56 One of the early reports of Russians in Bosnia Hercegovina was in Veternji list (28 November, l9V2),p.9. I warched Radovan KaradliC make these threats on several occasions in press reports and interviews on Banja Luka Television in October 1992. 57
5.
See
"Hrvatima bi pripalo 25A% powsine BiH," Globus (8 January 1993), p.
A copy of the Vance-Owen
constitutional proposal for Bosnia-
Hercegovina can be found in United Nations Security Council, Report
58 For reports on ongoing negotiations over the peace ptan I have consulted January and February 1993 issues of The Christian Science Monitor. Los Angeles Times, New York Times. and the Croatian newsweeklies Danag, $_lobus, and Ned iel ina Dalm acij a. For Bosn i an poi nts o f view see i ssues
of BiH Eksklusiv and Ljiljan.. For Iranian and Islzrnic viewpoints I have gonsulted tlrc_newspapers Elala'at, Keyhan. Jahan-e Eslami, Jomhuri-ye Eslami, Resalat, and Salam for the same months. 59
See^The ghristian=S=cielgq Moniror, l.os Angeles Times, New
york Times
from January 23, 1993 ttroughFebruary t5, t993 for anicles on the Croatian military actions. Also see Foreign Press Bureau Z,agreb repons for the same period. Detailed articles on the Maslenica operation aric its iTpgnangqto Cro-atia are "Maslenicaopet premoSCuje," Danas 29 January 1993, pp 5-7, and'Hrvatska na prelrremici," Danas. 29 ianuary telf , pp.8-9.i_ssues
qqlottn I'.. Burns, "Croats vs. Serbs vs. Muslims: Guns define borders," New $ York Times (l February 1993), p. 43 and UPI Report (19 January 1993): 6l Foreign Press Bureau Tageb,see repons January l4-February 3, 1993.62 fWne ness Ccnrcr Zagreb Report (9 February 1993).
t**t of Juruary 28. lgg3 from President Alija lzetbegoviC of Bosnia9l Herceggyila to Prcsidcnt Fnnjo Tirdjman of Croatia (l iublishedln Ljiljan
qpurs
n"*
-
_th_e
Feb-
ruary 1993),p.4. 64_Ctruck Sudetic, ?eac-e planspurs new Serb attacks," New york Times (8February lP9_3), p. A8 and "Arresh-e serbesran vued-e bosrliffiGtResalar fiehran) (8 Shaban t37ll 30 January 1993).
65 Cnuct Sudetic, ?eace plan
Guide to pronunciation 9eographlc names (paragraph numbers): 2. [movo (also 4, 5, 10, 39, 5?, 8a 88,88) t2, !9tilfl"ry-ee-nuhl (also L4, i6, ig, Zt, gt, BZ, {6, 60, 76, 97, gg) 42, luzla (alro 60, 51, 67, 7L,87) [two's-luh] 48. Eq$te Lqk" (also 51, S?) tbahn-yuh lukl-ahJ 48. Pr[iedor [pre-yeh-door] - city in northern gosnia 60. Gor_al-de [gor-ahzh-deh] (a[so ? 1), Srebrenica hreh-breh-neet-sahl_(also ?1), Bi'[aG lbee-hotch], Kladuia [veh-lee-kutr lUaU-aew-shah]- " lgti[e 51. Qdzgk [oh-jockJ and Derventa [dare-vent-ah] in
S"rU a[acks," p. A8.
f
+ +: waning days of the Bustr Administration, Vance was so heavyhanded in pushing his and owen's Peace plan that he called rhe while House, StateDepartment and ttre clinton transition team asking them not to meet with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic at the time of-the latte/s visit to the united states in early January I99g. vance was afraid ttrat Izetbegovlc might try to convince the American leaders to assist Bosnia militarily thus undermining his peace plan. Elaine sciolino, "Bosnian Arrives, Embarrassilg U.S.," NewYork TimCs (January 9, I 993), p. A5. See also lloward laFranchi, "Europe Puu Tough ralk on Hold," The ihristian science (3February 199_3), p. 6; and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Reporred Witting ro So4tor
Put Troop-s_in.Bosnia"" !o! Aneqlg.s Timgs (10 February 1993), p. Al; Stariiey *Mediators Meisler, Push Peace Plan at security council," L,oi Aneeles Timei (9February 1993), p. 46.
See._11yge disappoinrrnenr from Clinton on Bosnia,,,Los Anseles fl OCS_(t2february 1993, p-B6 and*Marching Blind lnro gosnia@ $ York Times (11February 1993), p.A22. 68 This point was emphasized by leaders of Islamic conference Nations at a meeting at the end of January 1993. See "Hamid Al-Ghabid rarh-e jame'e-ye orupa-ra taqsim-e bosni racl kard,- Etela'at X3man-e-melal va (Iehran, 3February 1993), p. 16. -
Po_savina (aleo 6g); Bosanski Brod, Orasje - shy_e hl, G_ra d adac grah-d ah-cir utz ], " I
loh-rah
Br[ko lbirch-koh]
70. Pro-zor [proseor], Novi Travnik [no-vee !r ghv_-n e_ekl, a nd the_Vi tez lvee-lez ] vall ey, .laj ce. gl1- e e_-tseh], Busova[a [boo - eo -va]i *huhl, [y Gornji Vakuf [gore-nyee vah-koofl 71. Eratunac [brah-too-nuts], Zvornih [zvor.neek], the Sandzhak, Split (also 8?) 76. Maslenica [ma-sleh-neat suh] bridee across an $driatic inlet; Peruda [peh-root-ctrlh] dam, Zentun [zeh-moon] airport 79. town of Trebinje [treh-bean-yay] (cantinuation ftom inside front couer page)
35.
Zeljko RaZ4iatovid ; tzhel'-kotr razh-nyah-toh-vichl "Arkan," (also 48, gg) 35. HVO (also 49, 5L-2,6G-7, ?0-1, ??-9, 85) 35. HOS (T/ruatske orufane snage) - (aleo 4g) qg. lglriotgha liea - Patriotic League (also 49) 44. Milan Pani0, [mee-lahn pah-nichl SerbianAmerican invited Jdy fggZ to become prime Minister of Yugoslavia 46. Gen. Ratko Mladid lreht koh mlah-dich], Yugoslav general from Iftajina (also za) 49. TO - Territorial Defense -units loyal to the government, which develofed into: lg.ryql (Oruiane 4e. oS BiH sndge Bostte i Hercegouine)
*
armed forces of Bosnia-Hercegovina
The author of this paper, Dr. Alan F-. Fogelquisr, is ir post-doctoral scholar in Modern Ilalkan and cornparative History, wirh aPh.D. in history from UCLA and an excellent knowledge of the Bosnian language (also known as croatian or Serbian, or croato-serbian or Serbo-croatian) as well as knowledge of other languages (including Spanish, Portuguese, French, B ulgarian, Macedonian, Slovenian, Russian, Persian, Tadzhik, Arabic and Italian). He lived in Sarajevo from I 98 I - 1984, thus acquiring direct experience in addition to scholarly study of modern Balkan hisiory. He recently returned to "the former yugoslavia" in a factfinding mission toZ.agreb(Sept-Oct l9g2)and worked in February 1993 as a consultant researcher for Helsinki Watch on War Crimes. The editor of this paper, Colleen B. London, is an American linguist and formerresident of Sarajevo (19691976) who worked for sarajevo Terevision as a translator during the winter olympics in lg$4. with the belief that in order to understand what is happening in Bosnia at this time, there is need for adequate interpretation by those with a goodpriorknowledgeof thelanguage and culture from the point of view of both an "insider" and an ',outsider,,' she founded the sarajevo News Network (sNN) Newsletter in November 1992. In Dr. Fogelquist she has found ,'an excellent source of reliable and accurate information and interpretation."
Sarajevo News Network (SNN) Newsletter P.O. Box 130146, Ann Arbor, MI 49118 published by: AEIOU Publishing 11982 N. Main, Whitmore Lake, MI 4g1gg
