The “Demon of Yugoslavia” David MacKenzie University of North Carolina-Greensboro Carolina-Greensboro General Petar Îivkoviç (1878–1947), the intimate and powerful friend of King Aleksandar Kara∂or∂eviç, played a key and mostly destructive role in royal Yugoslavia (1918–41). He bore a heavy responsibility for its total military and political collapse before the Axis invasion of April 1941. Through his pervasive influence over the army, regime, and ruler, by his malevolent and selfish policies, Îivkoviç contributed greatly in undermining the royal regime established in 1918 after World War I. That regime had been founded amidst hopes that the national and religious antagonisms of the past had at last been overcome. Here we will describe and analyze Îivkoviç’s pernicious role as the Achilles heel of royal Yugoslavia. Živković’s Career to 1918
Let us look first at Petar Îivkoviç’s character and actions before royal Yugoslavia was established. Born into a poor family in Negotin in Serbia’s interior, Petar, nicknamed Pera, completed his secondary education successfully, but both then and during his subsequent studies at the Belgrade Military Academy, his classmates were struck by his shyness, timidity, and complete avoidance of female company. Army service merely reinforced his childhood fears and indecisiveness. Seemingly lacking all genuine military qualities, Pera towards his superiors and elders revealed a servility and self abnegation that provoked taunts and antipathy from his comrades. 1 In the officer conspiracy leading to the murder of King Aleksandar Obrenoviç and Queen Draga on 29 May/11 June 1903, Petar Îivkoviç played an undistinguished and humiliating role. Assigned the simple task of opening the palace gates to admit officer conspirators led by the dynamic and towering Captain Dragutin Dimitrijeviç Apis, Lieutenant Îivkoviç fumbled with the heavy keys. When he finally managed to unlock the gates, he was hurled to 1
Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (ASANU), 13609:1. Aleksandar Blagojeviç, “Kratka biografija demona Jugoslovenske ideje u mundiru.” For a summary in English see David MacKenzie, Apis: The Congenial Conspirator (Boulder, CO, 1989), 80–81. Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 15(2): 257–68, 2001.
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the ground by the surging conspirators. Refusing aid from a solicitous Apis, Pera slunk off humiliated and anxious for revenge. Later, seeking acceptance into the company of the triumphant conspirators who restored the Kara∂or∂eviç dynasty to the Serbian throne, Pera engaged in drunken carousals with good looking young officers. 2 Prince ≠or∂e Kara∂or∂eviç, becoming heir to the throne occupied by his elderly father, King Petar, discerned soon after their return from Russia that his younger brother, Aleksandar, was strongly attracted to Îivkoviç, encountering him frequently in Aleksandar’s room. When Prince ≠or∂e accused Îivkoviç of interfering with the government’s work, Pera retorted: “I consider that you have no right to complain about that, Highness.” Noted Prince ≠or∂e: “Îivkoviç gets on my nerves.” 3 Major Panta Dra‰kiç, later Prince Aleksandar’s duty officer who knew Îivkoviç well, noted that as time passed, Pera became more and more arrogant and unscrupulous. Affirmes Dra‰kiç: “He [Îivkoviç] lacked absolutely everything necessary to occupy the posts he later held.” Dra‰kiç stressed Îivkoviç’s diligence and persistence in malicious undertakings. Valuing only those who paid him court, Îivkoviç linked himself closely with Prince Aleksandar “in a very dishonorable way”—Dra‰kiç failed to specify how. As his power grew, Îivkoviç acted haughtily towards everyone except Prince Aleksandar. Later, in royal Yugoslavia, added Dra‰kiç, Pera’s role became awesome and frightening: His power gradually became greater than anyone had ever possessed in our country, based exclusively upon the subservience towards him of Prince Aleksandar. 4 The formation in 1911 of the secret patriotic organization “Unification or Death,” soon dubbed the “Black Hand,” that aimed to unify all Serbs, activated the latent hostility between Major Dimitrijeviç Apis, its chief leader, and Îivkoviç’s circle which spread rumors that “Black Hand” was a subversive, terrorist organization. Furthermore, Îivkoviç sought to persuade Prince Aleksandar, who had become heir to the throne, that Apis and “Black Hand” were his deadly enemies. Late in 1911, Îivkoviç formed a rival to 2
ASANU, Blagojeviç, “Kratka biografija”; ASANU, 14434, Papers of Milan Îivanoviç, No. 3289, “Crna i Bela Ruka”; Dragi‰a Vasiç, Devetsto treça (Majski prevrat) (Belgrade, 1925). 3 ≠or∂e Kara∂or∂eviç, Istina o mome Ïivotu (Belgrade, 1988), 167. 4 Panta M. Dra‰kiç, Moji memoari, ed. Du‰an Batakoviç (Belgrade, 1990). 164–65. Princess Naryshkin, a childhood friend of Prince Aleksandar, affirmed that Îivkoviç and Aleksandar had been lovers.
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Apis’ organization, dubbed the “White Hand,” that posed as a loyal defender of the Serbian throne against the allegedly subversive “Black Hand.” Their enmity deepened after Major Apis, learning that Îivkoviç was a passive homosexual, informed War Minister Stepa Stepanoviç, who sought to have Îivkoviç removed from service at the royal court. When Prince Aleksandar blocked Pera’s removal, Apis informed King Petar, who insisted that Îivkoviç be transferred to Serbia’s interior. Thereby, Major Apis acquired as bitter enemies both the Îivkoviç group and Prince Aleksandar. 5 Despite his evident cowardice during the May Coup of 1903 and never having commanded troops in battle, Petar Îivkoviç nonetheless was constantly promoted. During the epic Serbian retreat in late 1915 to the Adriatic Sea, Colonel Îivkoviç played an especially disgraceful role. As a regimental commander in the Timok Army’s Cavalry Division, he persuaded its commander and his fellow regimental commanders to disobey a direct order of army commander General Ilija Gojkoviç to relieve exhausted troops defending the approaches to the Albanian port of Dürres. Because Prince Aleksandar headed the Serbian Supreme Command and Pera Îivkoviç was his intimus, the grave offense of disobeying a direct order of a superior officer in wartime brought Pera only a slap on the wrist. 6 After the Serbian regime and army had been taken to Corfu Island by Allied ships, Prince Aleksandar and Petar Îivkoviç collaborated during 1916– 17 to destroy Colonel Dimitrijeviç Apis and his “Black Hand” that contained some of the bravest, best trained, and most decorated officers in the Serbian army. With Prince Aleksandar’s blessing, Îivkoviç directed the preparation and conduct of the sinister Salonika Trial from behind the scenes. 7 From his house near the Prince’s residence, Îivkoviç remained in constant touch with Regent Aleksandar, participating in all his work as they decided everything together. Îivkoviç headed the infamous “Committee of Ten for the Liquidation of Apis and Co.,” an offshoot of his “White Hand.” It established legal and political bases for the Salonika Trial, selected false witnesses, and decided how they should testify. The Salonika military courts then carried out the Committee’s decisions leading to the execution of Colonel Apis and two colleagues.8 5
ASANU, Blagojeviç, “Kratka biografija”; Îivanoviç, 5, “Dnevnik generala Milo‰a BoÏanoviça, 1911.” 6 Îivanoviç, 4215, “Kapija kod Soluna”; 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.” 7 For that trial see MacKenzie, The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonika 1917 (Boulder, CO, 1995). 8 Îivanoviç, 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.” On the “Committee “Committee of Ten,” see MacKenzie, MacKenzie, Apis, 207 ff.
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All this was confirmed just after World War II by retired Colonel Vladimir Tucoviç, a leading Salonika defendant. 9 Then at the Belgrade Retrial of the “Black Hand” in June 1953, Nikola Premoviç, in 1916 head of a railway command on the Salonika front, affirmed that the alleged attempt on Regent Aleksandar’s life near Ostrovo in August 1916, blamed on Colonel Dimitrijeviç Apis and his colleagues, had actually been staged by Colonel Îivkoviç and his agents to secure the conviction of Apis and his friends. 10 Just before the Retrial, the Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik wrote that the executed Salonika defendants had strongly opposed Regent Aleksandar’s palace clique "in which were gathered the most corrupt and incompetent elements, military and civilian, headed by the military nonentity and morally depraved charlatan and intriguer, Pera Îivkoviç. That clique monopolized all power for itself, holding it feverishly in its hands by the most unscrupulous means.” 11 The Salonika trial of Colonel Milorad Radovanoviç Koãa in 1918, formerly a close friend and colleague of Îivkoviç, reveals clearly Îivkoviç’s deceitfulness and immunity from prosecution, despite his well-known homosexual behavior with army personnel. In Serbia then such actions were considered criminal and normally brought automatic removal from military service.12 Radovanoviç’s trial confirmed Îivkoviç’s intimate relationship and stifling control over Regent Aleksandar and from 1921 King of Yugoslavia. Aleksandar utilized his autocratic powers repeatedly to save his intimus from deserved dismissal from army and court service. Radovanoviç and his friend, Lieutenant Colonel Pavle Juri‰iç ·turm had gathered voluminous proofs of Îivkoviç’s homosexual activity from young soldiers forced to have sex with him. Radovanoviç explained to his commanding officer that his accusations against Îivkoviç of passive homosexuality were not based upon personal dislike: “I raised this issue because I dared not leave Îivkoviç with such a loathsome passion in an influential position conducting responsible functions.” Such charges would normally have brought Îivkoviç’s immediate removal as commander of the Royal Guards and him to trial. However, the Prince Regent, blocking formal charges against Pera, allowed him to retain all his influential posts. Relieved that the charges against Îivkoviç were actually directed against himself, Aleksandar urged Îivkoviç to accuse Radovanoviç 9
Vladimir Tucoviç, “Skidanje zavesa sa jednog sramnog procesa” (Lifting a Curtain on a Shameful Trial), Republika (Belgrade), 12 February 1946. 10 Politika (Belgrade), 7 June 1953, 5. 11 “Solunski aveti,” Vjesnik (Zagreb), 27 May 1953, 5. 12 For the most complete account in English of the Radovanoviç trial see MacKenzie, The Exoneration of the “Black Hand,” 1917–1953 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998), 20–28.
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Koãa of slander. Koãa was then tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. This scandalous trial undermined attempts of Îivkoviç’s former intimate friends to remove him from the Serbian army and end his extraordinarily irresponsible influence there. 13 Eighteen months later Regent Aleksandar, back in Belgrade, ordered Radovanoviç Koãa amnestied and restored to the army, apparently following a quarrel with Îivkoviç. The latter promptly requested retirement from the army, arguing that Radovanoviç’s amnesty would have a terrible effect on him, the army, and the public.14 Major Milan Stojkoviç, former commander of Salonika Officers’ prison and Îivkoviç’s confidant, informed the Prince Regent that after Radovanoviç’s amnesty Îivkoviç had sworn at Aleksandar and said he would seek to have the Prince Regent “eliminated.” For Îivkoviç nothing and nobody were sacred, not even his beloved protector. Noted exColonel Milan G. Milovanoviç Pilac: Crying and swearing at the Heir [Aleksandar] over Radovanoviç’s reactivation, Pera told Anta [Antiç] that he would place the Royal Guard at our [the Salonika defendants’] disposal if we wished to undertake something against the Heir. The old schemer! 15 However, regent Aleksandar refused to accept Pera Îivkoviç’s proffered resignation from the army. Soon Îivkoviç confirmed his willingness to resume his slave-like devotion to Regent Aleksandar, and the latter responded by once again retiring Radovanoviç Koãa from service. Îivkoviç remained indispensable to Aleksandar, who knew his Pera would execute without question all his orders and wishes. Also Îivkoviç knew that Regent Aleksandar would not dare remove him from his post because of incriminating documents and pictures which “the old schemer” had gathered and could, and would, use against the Regent if need be. For his part, realizing the abyss that faced him if his master cast him from his lofty perch, Îivkoviç continued to serve Aleksandar obediently. 16
13
Îivanoviç, 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.” Îivanoviç, 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.” 15 Îivanoviç, 11, “Odlomci iz Beogradskog dnevnika M.G. Milovanoviça” (Excerpts from the Belgrade Diary of M.G. Milovanoviç), entry of 8 November 1919. “Schemer” ( poloÏara ) can also be translated as coward. 16 Îivanoviç, 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.” 14
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Živković’s Role in Royal Yugoslavia, 1918—1941
Surviving the Radovanoviç trial, Îivkoviç retained his key position as commander of the Royal Guard and King Aleksandar Kara∂or∂eviç’s chief adviser and co-worker. In Topãider near Belgrade, impressive barracks were erected for his Royal Guard. Formerly a small entity utilized chiefly at Court ceremonies and parades, the Guard under Îivkoviç became a powerful force, including regiments of infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers, supporting King Aleksandar’s regime. Inasmuch as this greatly enlarged Royal Guard ranked as an army, Îivkoviç as its commander became an army general. He served constantly in Belgrade with King Aleksandar who above its barracks had a palace built in Dedinje, where he resided constantly. The Officers’ Club in Topãider became the site of General Îivkoviç’s drunken orgies with close friends—both officers and civilians. Chance participants related their experiences there with fear and loathing. There was open talk about these scandalous activities in Belgrade; reports about them spread throughout Yugoslavia and even abroad. Thus as army general, and later war minister and premier, Îivkoviç continued the lifestyle described graphically by Radovanoviç Koãa. In Îivkoviç’s office as Guards commander, decisions were reached on all army matters in an atmosphere of alcohol-laden orgies. High ranks, decorations and command assignments were all handed out there. Meanwhile, those convicted unfairly at the Salonika Trial, or retired involuntarily from the army, had severed all ties with Îivkoviç. Vainly seeking a retrial, they sought under the leadership of Colonel Milovanoviç Pilac to gather voluminous authentic data about Pera’s true role in Salonika and at the Salonika Trial.17 Professor Mihailo Petroviç, Prince ≠or∂e Kara∂or∂eviç’s close friend, welcomed him home from French exile. To ≠or∂e’s query who was then in 1921 the most important personage in Yugoslavia’s young royal regime, he replied: Your friend, Petar Îivkoviç, of course (ironically!). He was the strongest influence and is the first of the power holders. His every word is obeyed, and behind those words stands your brother [King Aleksandar]. You know Îivkoviç well. He has no scruples nor sense of moderation. Prince ≠or∂e concurred fully with his friend’s evaluation of Îivkoviç: 17
Îivanoviç, 40, “Petar Îivkoviç.”
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Yes, he is no longer that captain of my early youth. Now he is a general, commander of Aleksandar’s entire Guard, a personality who shakes things. That intriguer, that evil spirit of the Salonika affair [trial].18 From 1918 on, affirmed Dr. Milan Stojadinoviç, subsequently Yugoslav premier, General Îivkoviç’s power rested upon the disordered conditions prevailing in royal Yugoslavia: the greater the chaos, the stronger and more essential became General Îivkoviç, poised like a sword of Damocles over all Yugoslav governments and allying himself with disgruntled politicians to increase his own leverage. 19 He was aided by King Aleksandar, who after 1918 had placed at the top of the officer corps loyal and often incompetent “White Hand” leaders who soon turned the royal Yugoslav army into Îivkoviç’s obedient instrument. 20 Dr. Svetozar Pribiçeviç, a Serb from Croatia and an influential political opponent of General Îivkoviç, noticed in 1928, shortly before King Aleksandar proclaimed his so-called dictatorship, that General Îivkoviç was interfering constantly in Yugoslav politics and that the “White Hand,” acting on his orders, had grown more active. Through a friend, Pribiçeviç warned the General that Serbo-Croatian coalition would struggle against the “White Hand” if it continued such activity. After talking with Îivkoviç, General ≠uro Dokiç informed Pribiçeviç: Nothing can be done. Petar Îivkoviç is linked closely with the Salonika Trial, and when he interferes in politics, above all you should know he is not doing so at his own initiative, and finally that he is protecting his own head which is always in danger. 21 Citing growing disorder and crime in Yugoslavia, King Aleksandar on 6 January 1929 proclaimed a royal dictatorship. The dramatic prelude to this was the shocking murder in 1928 of the Radiç brothers, Croatian leaders, in the National Assembly in Belgrade. The sculptor Ivan Me‰troviç claimed that this crime was committed with King Aleksandar’s foreknowledge by a subordinate of General Îivkoviç. The King promptly entrusted the premiership and war ministry to General Îivkoviç, who, however, failed to inspire much confidence as a military man who had never revealed ability on 18 19 20 21
≠or∂e Kara∂or∂eviç, Istina o mome Ïivotu , 393. Milan Stojadinoviç, Ni rat, ni pakt. Jugoslavija izme∂u dva rata (Rijeka, 1970), 340. Îivanoviç, 3814, Milan Îivanoviç, “Solunski process i politiãka emigracija.” Svetozar Pribiçeviç, Diktatura kralja Aleksanda (Belgrade, 1952), 178.
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the battlefield. Pera surrounded himself with Serbian Radicals Ra dicals known to favor Greater Serbia. Soon after the royal coup of 6 January, speaking to Me‰troviç, King Aleksandar explained: With such disorganized political parties, I need Îivkoviç because my main support is the army. Even among Serbian parties there are no agreed views; each wishes to hold power and nothing more. 22 Forming a new cabinet, General Îivkoviç soon became highly unpopular. Civilians disliked seeing a military man heading the state administration while military men tended to oppose a general whose career was based mainly on links with the royal Court. As premier, Îivkoviç sought to introduce into the government the severe discipline of his Royal Guards. Naming his own cronies as inspectors, he sought to interfere in all ministries and state affairs.23 Under the so-called January 6th regime tight censorship was imposed on the press, and all traditional political parties in Yugoslavia which opposed the Îivkoviç cabinet promptly went underground. Soon even the conservative Slovene clerical leader Dr. Anton Koro‰ec resigned from the cabinet after telling King Aleksandar: “I can no longer bear the corporal’s methods of your premier.” Soon the Îivkoviç regime interned its chief political opponent, Dr. Svetozar Pribiçeviç, and others. 24 Under the electoral law of 1931, only Premier Îivkoviç could present a list of candidates. In 1933 when the chief Croat leader Dr. Vladko Maãek denounced the Îivkoviç regime to foreign newsmen, he was arrested allegedly for drawing up an anti-regime resolution.25 In an address to the Communist-controlled Yugoslav National Assembly in 1946, Salonika defendant Vladimir Tucoviç affirmed that General Îivkoviç, directing the royal dictatorship, had been King Aleksandar’s chief assistant in all the evils committed in those years. He continued to fascinate Aleksandar, who did whatever he asked. Adopting the new Tito regime official view, Tucoviç concluded: “The entire blame for the disaster of 1941 [collapse of Yugoslavia] falls on the monarchy headed by King Aleksandar.”26 General Îivkoviç, wrote Tucoviç shortly before, created the sorry army that fell apart in 1941: “Pera’s generals with their Belgrade 22 23 24 25 26
Ivan Me‰troviç, Uspomene na politiçke ljude i doga∂aje (Buenos Aires, 1961), 190. K.St. Pavloviç, Vojislav Marinkoviç i njegova doba (1876–1935) (London, n.d.), 38, 47–48. Stojadinoviç, Ni rat, ni pakt , 259–61. MacKenzie, Exonerating , mss. 143. Îivanoviç, II:1, Tucoviç to National Assembly, 1946.
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palaces destroyed in two weeks what the Yugoslav people with their blood and suffering had created over three decades.”27 Svetozar Pribiçeviç in his book The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar , published in Parisian exile, cited a report by Pribiçeviç’s son, Stojan, about his April 1931 meeting with General Îivkoviç at his private residence at Royal Guards headquarters. Arriving at the park surrounding the Guard’s home, Stojan passed through numerous guards until finally reaching a pretty villa: “I had to time to even turn around before Îivkoviç in general’s uniform entered at the other door.” Îivkoviç had sought the meeting with Pribiçeviç’s son in order to induce that inexperienced youth to sign a “declaration” about possibly freeing his interned father. Îivkoviç had invented this “ izjava” from start to finish, noted Svetozar Pribiçeviç. Noting Îivkoviç’s nervousness and anger, Stojan noticed that the General sought to absolve himself of responsibility for Svetozar’s arrest by blaming it on the Belgrade city administration which he controlled. Îivkoviç told Stojan that to be released his father must declare his loyal devotion to the royal regime. Stojan stressed Pera’s evident concern to save his own reputation as dictator and to have the last word.28 After King Aleksandar was murdered in Marseilles in October 1934, his cousin Prince Paul became first regent with Îivkoviç’s support. At first Îivkoviç’s military forces exercised decisive influence and in the reformed cabinet of Nikola Uzunoviç he became and was navy minister. 29 Early in 1935 Îivkoviç and Milan Stojadinoviç competed for the premiership until Dr. Stojadinoviç prevailed with Prince Paul’s support. In the Stojadinoviç cabinet that assumed office in June 1935, Îivkoviç remained war and navy minister. Îivkoviç’s presence in the cabinet, contended Stojanoviç, initially had a calming effect on pro-Yugoslav and pro-dynastic elements anxious to preserve a unitary Yugoslavia. Expecting soon to become premier and opposing attempts to democratize the regime, General Îivkoviç favored strong-armed rule, the only system that he could implement successfully. Noted Dr. Stojadinoviç: When he [Îivkoviç] saw that my government had a majority in the Skup‰tina [National Assembly] and that I intended to govern for a lengthy period, his patience waned. As a military man accustomed to
27 28 29
Tucoviç, “Skidanje zavesa,” 5. Pribiçeviç, Diktatura, 153–62. Ljubo Boban, Svetozar Pribiçeviç u opoziciji (Zagreb, 1954), 139.
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obedience, he readily exploded when anyone opposed his views or intentions.30 Late in 1935 under Îivkoviç’s direction was formed a “Special Club” containing the bitterest opponents of Stojadinoviç’s cabinet: professional conspirators, “dangerous types,” and “people capable of anything.” Its chairman was Îivkoviç’s instrument, Vojvoda (commander) Vasilije Trbiç, who had played a dishonest and deceitful role in the Salonika Trial. This “Special Club” carried out various conspiratorial and terrorist actions as Îivkoviç apparently instructed its members to provoke scandals and angry opposition in the National Assembly to Stojadinoviç’s cabinet. An especially disreputable Club member—Skup‰tina deputy Damjan Arnautoviç—was incited to shoot at Dr. Stojadinoviç in the National Assembly. All cabinet members were present at this failed murder attempt except General Îivkoviç who had insisted on being received in audience by Prince Paul while the shooting occurred. When Premier Stojadinoviç related details of the shooting, Prince Paul affirmed: “All that is the work of Petar Îivkoviç.” There were indeed strong indications of Îivkoviç’s direct involvement; the Premier agreed: “He [Îivkoviç] was too impatient and could not control his excitement.” Nevertheless, Stojadinoviç opposed Prince Paul’s suggestion that the General be arrested: As my first measure, I will expel him from the government immediately. This will reduce his influence significantly and at least he won’t be able to utilize the army for the purpose of a coup. If investigation then revealed Îivkoviç’s direct involvement in the attempt against him, the Premier pledged to have Pera arrested and placed on trial. “I know that he is prone to plots,” added Stojadinoviç perceptively, “but not to participating in them directly or carrying them out. He is able to incite others while remaining in the background.” 31 Reacting angrily to his dismissal from the cabinet, Îivkoviç returned to the Royal Guard barracks and ordered a “war drill” designed to look like an attempted military coup. He believed that Stojanoviç would then discredit his own government by ordering his police to fire on innocent army troops. His skillfully conceived plot failed only because the Premier did not order his police to fire. General August Mariç, Îivkoviç’s successor as War Minister, claimed that Îivkoviç had caused chaos in the military by naming his 30 31
Stojadinoviç, Ni rat, ni pakt , 310–19. Stojadinoviç, Ni rat, ni pakt , 343–53.
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incompetent cronies to key positions. When General Îivkoviç swallowed his humiliating defeat without any public reaction, Premier Stojadinoviç noted accurately: “I assessed him as a man lacking personal courage. His strength lay more in behind the scenes intrigues and the political wisdom to retain royal favor.”32 Even after his formal retirement from the Yugoslav army, General Îivkoviç retained during Prince Paul’s regency predominant influence through generals he had promoted as his instruments of power. Under these incompetents, the Yugoslav army collapsed in ten days before the Nazi invasion of April 1941. In luxury limousines “Pera’s generals” mostly abandoned their troops and surrendered hastily to the Germans. Some of them then collaborated with the Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia. 33 Epilogue
When the Yugoslav royal government fled to London after the April 1941 debacle, Îivkoviç was among its leaders. Named minister without portfolio in the émigré royalist government of Mi‰a Trifunoviç in April 1943, he became soon thereafter assistant commander of royal Yugoslav forces and sought maximum British aid to the royalist Chetniks of General DraÏa Mihailoviç. He even worked out a plan to “liberate Yugoslavia” by the Chetniks aided by the West. Marshal Tito’s Communist-led Partisans, founding the Anti-Fascist Council for Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in November 1943, condemned the London émigrés as a collection of Greater Serbian elements under General Mihailoviç and Îivkoviç. According to Slobodan Jovanoviç, premier of the London regime, General Îivkoviç enjoyed the trust of the British, who believed he could introduce order into General Mihailoviç's undisciplined army. 34 However, neither he nor others could do that. After Nazi Germany’s defeat in 1945, “Pera’s generals” either left Yugoslavia with the Nazi occupiers after serving them, including General Josif Kostiç, or emigrated from German war prisoner camps. Knowing that he faced war crimes charges back in Yugoslavia, General Îivkoviç remained in exile in the West, dying in a Paris mental sanatorium in 1947. At the staged trial of General DraÏa Mihailoviç in Communist Yugoslavia, Îivkoviç too was condemned to death in absentia.35 32
Stojadinoviç, Ni rat, ni pakt , 353–57. Îivanoviç, 3814, “Solunski process i politiãka emigracija,” 14–15. 34 K.St. Pavloviç, Razgovori sa Slobodanom Jovanoviçem (Windsor, Canada, 1969), entry of 28 June 1943. 35 Îivanoviç, 3814, “Solunski proces.” 33
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Conclusion
General Petar Îivkoviç was unquestionably a key and sinister figure in Serbian and Yugoslav politics and military affairs between 1910 and 1941. In royal Yugoslavia, especially during King Aleksandar’s “dictatorship,” his power ranked second only to the King’s. Supposedly the King’s obedient servant, in fact Îivkoviç often dominated and manipulated the King and helped determine his policies. His dominant influence and control over the Yugoslav army eventually doomed it to destruction in 1941, aided by Croatian and Slovene opposition to an overwhelmingly Serbian officer corps. Neither by intellectual ability nor qualities of character did Petar Îivkoviç possess the credentials to hold the top political and military positions to which he clung so stubbornly. A coward who consistently avoided battle, disobeyed a key order in wartime, and regularly compelled young soldiers and officers to engage with him in drunken orgies and then prohibited homosexual activities, Îivkoviç by his incompetence helped undermine the Yugoslav army’s morale and fighting qualities. His vengeful, unscrupulous intrigues destroyed or ruined military leaders far abler and more deserving, such as Colonel Dimitrijeviç Apis, Vladimir Tucoviç, Milan G. Milovanoviç Pilac, and Radoje Laziç—all leading defendants at the Salonika Trial—through that infamous trial which he and Regent Aleksandar organized and orchestrated. Îivkoviç’s career, disastrous for his country, suggests that true military and political leadership requires at least some degree of honesty, dedication to ideals, and consistent hard work. Unfortunately, the “demon of Yugoslavia,” as some opponents called him, possessed none of those attributes. Instead his role was based upon lies, intrigues, and debauchery and involved a constant irresponsible abuse of power.
