LU ME -
II
LASSiIE~
SMALL UNIT 14011 CS A PARTI S1AI -N FARESS ON N
t~ ir
BRARY J
FREAVENWORTH KA
P0 RECIST
m
__
w
1952
U HSORIAL
HADQUARTR
DIISO
EUROPEAN
CMAN
l i- Lt UNLA ALIN--
MS #?P
S1,1ALL
-
060e
UNIT TACTICS
PARTISAN
WARFARE
Copy 7-of
/00 Copies
HIS TORICAL DIVISION EUROPEA~N CO~ML ,ND
UNvCLASSIFIEP
UNCLASIt-I
1i-
Comments on Exanpies of Partisan Series Warfare Compiled For the on "Small Unit Tactics"
nor generally
rules
tactical
knows neither
warfare
Partisan
applicable forms.
and unscrupulous. in numbers, of simple design and limited His weapons are usually wiliweapons become dangerous because of the In the East these with which they are used, because of the inness and trickery human self-sufficiency because of their
The foe is unpredictable
mobility,
who use them and of those and the cruelty since they are independent of a supply
Additional factors. are the proficiency terrorism the z;uthless units end the partisan own country, of their the population against
in camouflage of exert which they
system.
Success in vance of certain methods which,
but on a
obserwarfare depends not so much on the partisan application of principles or on the doctrinary worth, instances., have proved their in individual
systematic determination of all
factors which in
any
specific
case might influence the enemy-Is command, his col muniThe population. with the relations end his mobility his cations, study for the examples available number of practical larger the be the imagination and will the, better. trained factors, of these on to lead the fighting understanding of those who may be called against partisans which, under contemporary conditions commanders. military may become the mission of all
of warfare,
examples drawn from the following that this spirit Far more should be read. during World War II tactics policies however, are the real tactics., important than small unit by These are the policies partisans.. fighting for successfully means turn economic. and political meens of which propagandistic, the native population against the partisans and gain its collaborain
It is small unit
the fight
tion in
against them.
This task,
which is
in
out
In
the
at
least
fight
the
dence
of
long run,
partisans
the passive partisans
it
can neither
support of is
therefore
live
flight
of
nor wage war with-
the population. essential
the hands movements
with the first of the supreme command agencies, begins the first and with onto enemy soil of the combat troops bomber aircraft over the enemy country.
to
In gain
order to
the confi-
the people.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIE1t
STUDIES
MILTARY
FOREIGN
Historical Headquarters
voLUME I
Division European Command
NUBER 6
January 1952
C ON TE NT S
Page Comments on Examples
Introduction.,t Example
1 .2
.
Fighting in
*
Partisan
4
--
A Company
5
--
The
.
Camp.
.
.
Story,.
Commander.s
Forest
0
_
8
,..
Warfare Without Partisans
-
.b
Subterranean Stone
Quarries 3
.
.. Clash with Partisans
Partisan
.
.
................... The First
--
Warfare.
of Partisan
... ..
..
,.......
.
.
.
*.
>9
0
by the Historical Prepared nonperiodically of increaspurpose the for Comand, Headquarters, European Division, and monographs prespecial studies of selected ing the availability Division and in coordinaof this pared by or under the supervision tion with other staff ctivisions of this headquarters as appropriate. Foreign Military
The material Department information
Studies.
official reflect does not necessarily herein presented for but is or accepted practices, of the Army doctrine only.. Local reproduction may be authorized upon speci-
A limited to this headquarters.. fic request copies may be obtained from the Historical Karlsruhe Military
Phone Control Officer,
t I
iri
,
number of additional Division, EUCOM, APO 403, 2614,
''1
N
rr
li ldla
UNCASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEP Introduction
The following five practical examples are conceived as a contribution to the collection entitled "Smail -Uit T:.ct .cs.tIt The examples deal with -partisan warfare and describe historical events that took place from 1941 to 1943 in the Eastern the ater of war, In the Russian campaign the principal author of this Iwork was a division commander and a corps commander in the fighting against the 'partisans Other officers who fought in the East made minor contributions, The problems of partisan warfare and the mieasures which, on the basis of German experience in the East, were considered appropriate to deal with guerilla-infested areas, are treated at length in the German manual "Combat against Guerillas" (Der Bandenkampf) and in the German translation of the Russian "Manual for Partisans" (Handbuch der Partisanen). Several of the principles contained in these two manuals will be demonstrated below in the form of examples reflecting actual events. No detailed explanatiorn is required to show how the aricient weapon of partisan warfare 'has gained in importance in recent times, and to what degree it determines the 'plans of statesmen and soldiers. A study of the nature of partisan warfare' is absolutely ess'ential in any up-to-date military training, in the furtherance of which the following examples may provide interesting material because they are 'based on actual front-line epxiiier'e. Example .: e-1r)_depicts the first clash between 'German troops and partisans near the East Prussian frontier in what was formerlyj Lithuanian territory. ° Here the partisan units were compo-sed mainly of isolated Soviet troop units, but also of local :inhabitants , During the first two days of combat a hitherto unexpected characteristic of the Soviet Armr was noticed. Isolated Russian soldier s considered it their self-evidenI military duty: to con-. tinuc the fight as paitisans and: to enlist the civilian population; It was no lornger possible- as in Woild Wav ".I to' leave Russian stragglers or isolated units unobserved behind the :German front, where they were practicallyon their own. In cases where a group which had been cut off had an energetic leader, ''the fighting spirit would be rekindled immediately after the first shock, and trouble spots behind the front became inescapable. *Commanded 5th Jaeger Division, 1940 - 43, and V Corps in late 1943; later commanded Seventeenth Army (May to.September 1944).
11
L; _I _____jVINCIPLSSIAS
UNCLA SIFtED
E7Cr&
The command and the troops were initially inclined to regard the partisans as unimportant and not fully on a par in combat value beThis was a cause they usually were equipped only with, small arms. dangerous fallacy, Most partisans were energetic and ambitious men, and many among them were actually driven by fanaticism. Weaklings stayed away from them from the start. Since t1 Russian civil wars, a sort of legend had grown around the 'guerillas. The will to resist damage on the enemy without regard for and the resolve to inflict international agreements on warf are made up for the lack of military equipment. It would thereCombat against partisans .is cruel and merciless. fore be a mistake to oppose them with s'econd-class or weakforces; On the contrary, in order to save lives and time, the forces employed In particular, the paragainst them should be as strong as possible. tisans rust b; attacked with, such arms as they lack themselves, namely, heavy weapons and artillery. It is equally important in any attempts at encirclement to set up It Was a partisan an air-tight ring around the actual combat area. practice not to continue a hopeless engagement, but to disperse, to exfiltrate from a pocket, and, if necessary, to break through in order to reassemble in previously fixed areas. Even an otherwise successful operation uill prove a. failure if elements of the' partisans manage to slip through a cordon that is too weakly manned. In such a case it would be safe to assume that they would soon appear elsewhere in order to continue their raids, Example 2 e is an example of combat against partisans who, under extraordinary circumstances (in deserted, subterranean stone quarries and caves in the Crimea), ,held: ,Qut for months behind the German lines... It is thus not a typical training example of "normal" partisan fighting methods in forest, jungle, swamps or mountains, but rather the narration of a unique action that may merit interest inasmuch as partisans may conceal themselves anywhere, a fact that was- confirmed by German experience in the Balkans, and is now confirmed by the fighting in southeastern Asia.
h.
The operations against t partisans in the- Crimean stone quarries failed, principally because accurate geographic information proved even more important than, the numerically superior forces of the attacker. Underground caves,. corridors and shafts were difficult to locate and their extent could be estimated only roughly. Moreover, any fighting against an enemy who has barricaded himself in a bewildering labyrinth is technically difficult if, one does not wish, or is' unable, to use poison gas. Since
operations
had to
be
carried
on in
this
subterranean
labyrinth
it seems more than doubtful whether a third attack, as suggested in the example, would have led to success. The chances.. of, a. defenider familiar
UNCLASSIFIEP
~5S7iSSIO7LED
with the
and accustomed to.
terrain
darkness,
as compared with an
uneven, the appear too' qualifications, and agresolute had an exceptionally
assailant who lacked these more so since. the. partisans
gressive leader.. even if a wire obstacle had been completed, it Furthermore, since the surrounded partisans probably would have been useless, and through the under the wire obstacle dig a tunnel had begun to aim their to achieve unable were They the open. into stone soft hunger. induced by physical exhaustion because of the it of Crimean stone quarries During a subsequent investigation syscave a subterranean at Bagerovo existed there was learned that southwest of Kerch than the one in the stone quarry larger tem still
The Bagerovo system was carefully prepared for sectional defense, fuzed explosives and machine gun emplacemainly by means of built-in In addition, everything needed for ments covering the passageways. defense was available, bay, sick a special
stocks,
such as a command post, emergency assemfbly areas,
a dressing station, food and ammunition
a reservoir for collecting drip water and colored direction-
there even kept partisans the Originally one by one (the natives which were slaughtered cattle). timely use of the stone quarries to hide their
signals, al of cattle
According
to
statements
by local
several head had made
the underground
inhabitants,
stone quarries near Kerch had previously been used during the Russian After the Bolsheviks occupied the Crimea, the Whites were civil war. said
to have lived Here
in
years.
them for
remains unsolved
the problem
how a tenacious
of
enemy, who
is determined to fight to the end in large subterranean stone quarries .or catacombs, can be overpowered other than by starvation, poison gas or without In operations parations for
the
the
prospect
of
on a smaller scale, seizure of the rock
heavy friendly
casualties.
as for instance' fortifications
in the preof Gibraltar
that a me ans which offered was believed the summer of 1940, it that even of success was to be found in the fact some prospects rapidly and that the narrow openhard rock can be drilled. through ings thus formed could be emplpyed tQ produce underground explosions.-* could not have been considered subThe measures under consideration in
ject
'to
t1F
"Gas Warfare"
been poison gases
but rather
rules,
as the means used would not have
a highly
explosive mixture of carbon
and oxygen.
*The German term used is "Schiagendes Wetter" which refers to dust or gas explosions in, mines.
1V
...
-
UNUlm LA%5,%j
Example 3 deals with the rear areas of the German Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies. which "were Operating in the northern sectors of the Eastern .front. Owing to the- seesaw. movements of 'the winter battles of 1942, the location of ;the' 'fronts held by these armies. was. not clearly defined and the rear areas, due to the existing tactical confusion and the terrain conditions, offered idealpossibilities for partisan activities on..a la:ge':scale. The successful tactics ;of constantly °avoiding action, brilliantly practiced by the partisans in this :instance,- is impressively reflected in the description of a mopping-up operations with whidh a German regiment had- been entrusted. For the. same reasons as those mentioned in Example 1, the German efforts wIrere doomed to failure because the availabe mopping-up protect an operational, area of the size forces were far too weak conc=erned.
to
M
'illustrates., as does. Example 5, an episode Example' which occurred in the central sectbr° of the Eastern .front, where the typical White Russian scenery is characterized: by forests, swamps and waterways, and where through-traffic 'isnecessarily confined to a few paved. roads and to the railways.. Any attack 'gainst a major. partisan headquarters, such as discussed at length in Example 4, is always a ..doubtfu.lundertaking because such a headquarters possesses far more nurous contacts with, the population and a far more extensive intel3igence service than an ordinary partisan 'group.
it
and
When to
is
large forces are committed against such a, major headquarters, be expected that
that he will
the enemy will learn about, the
irmpending
attack
avoid action by' a timely:4w~thdrawal.
If the size of the unit which is to carry out the attack is small, its approach may remain unnoticed by the -enemy.. On the other hand, it will, then lack the strength, to safely overcomrie the resistance of guards, cover detachments and finally of the--headquarters itself, and also at the same time to tightly seal off the entire area so as to prevent the escape of the senior staff members Ith Ue leaders of a partisan headquarters succeed in. escaping,, 't~he attack 'may: be consider ed a faCilure even though all the troops. have been captured or killed. The only alternative left is the emiployment of h4ghly mobile units equipped with cross-country motor vehicles for rapid movement over large distances and difficult terrain. Such a unit will have to be organized in accordance with the tasks which an effective attack demands. The unit aust be able -to "rapidly :overcome the advanced and direct security lines. ed for
Guns on self -propelied this purpose. The unit
UNCLASSIFRED:
mounts anid 'numerous machinrea guns are needmust have an.. assault, detachment to break
1 T
II
III_ *-
F-l-.
F.--
L) ~ LL
4~ d~
5~7-.
I
I
U CLAfSSIFtE1
r
Frr. e~
UNCL
:.
.
SS
~f5
through the security lines and immediately advance to the headquarters proper and overpower its personnel, In addition the unit must have armored vehicles equipped with superior weapons, flame
throwers,
trench
mortars,
and have
the support
of
low-flying
air craft, Finally, troops to cordon off the partisans are absolutely essential as well as adequate infantry and engineer troops equipped with cross-country vehicles of good quality. In many instances the nature of
the
Russian t errain will pre-
vent the use of the most modern combat and transportation equipment,
inasmuch as partisans usually protect the mselves
military covering forces tage of difficult terrain unable to master in all
capture
of
a
whenever possible, which present
not only by
take advanday vehicles are
seasons,
Example 5
Finally, in the
but also, features,
"forest
there is
-
camp"
that,
situated
the description
in
the
of
midst of the
huge Bryansk forest, threatened German main supply channels constituted by the railway line and highway between Gomel and Bryansk, In
contrast
to
Example
4,
the action
took place in
the
middle of
winter.
This example illustrates equipped for the climate,
how an aggressive
winter warfare, to overcome the
arn. ice mane easily than it forests
and fields
turn
into
was able, in Russian terrain
could have in
spite
unit, trained and
of the difficulties
hardships of in snow .
the warm season when roads,
quagmires.
gjuirni'ilnCLSIF
UNCLASSI FIED r~
~#
I
I
SMALL UNIT TACTICS Example. 1 The
First
w.'
"«++
~I
till '
Clash with'Partisans
_
-
-
KK~ I GTE~
UNCLASSI FIED.'
The First.
C ash with:
Partisans
At 0305, on 22 June "1941, the' day when the campaign against the Soviet Union began, the German V Corps.attackcd from an area east ond northeast
of Suwalki
Lithuanian capital of
(110
kilometers southwest
of the
former
Kaunas),
mission of breaking The spearhead division of V Corps had the from Suwalki to astride the, road leading through the Russian front and, in addition, of, establi phing the Seirijai by way .of Lasdiji same evening
a bridgehead
across
the Njemen in
the
Krikstoniai
area
(forty kilometers air distance ee.st .of the Germ'an jump-off positions).
following four
tThe
1.
to the
jump-off position
On the way from the
head the
projected
bridge-
obstacles hadto be overcome:
so-called Soviet border pcosition close to the fron-
tier'in the Suwalki
area,
the P6lish 'campaign
which had been occupied by the Germans
These emplacements
after
consisted of field positions
and oie. antitatnk trench, A.newly built
.
concrete
bunker
line
near
Lasdijai.
A field position in the narrow passage south of Lake Dus,
3.
west bof Seirijai.
4. The the first
The Njemrren River,
'spearhead attempt.
division overran. the :Russian 'border position on The attack against the newly-built bunker line
near the small town' of Lasdi jai was executed by two regiments . succeeded in peretrating regim-nt, on the right. (southern) flank
The' the
town "at .1000 hours, It then traor sdc '.the . narrowi passage south of Lake Dus and, inthe 'late afternoon, near Krikstoniai, it forced a side. crossing of the Njemon and established a bridgehead on the far Meanwhile, the regiment on the left. (nqrthern)'flank was engaged in 'where the last heavy fighting near the bunkers north of Lasdijai
-.
strong .oncrete emplacements the next day® On the evening
of the
first
were
not,
day
destroyed until the evening of
of the
attack the division was
recongreatlly spread out, : The searhead regiment, the 'division'son the ,,artillery were bulk of, the and the battalion naissance Njemein or within the bridgehead on the! other, s-ide' of the river, kilometers from the,.The regiment in the rear, in an area thirty river, was. fighting' the' enemy in. the bunkers near Lasdijai. The
runn
4
through the regiment, having been pulled s.:.original reserve division with its area the Seirijai had reached point, penetration Lasdijai .cortact_ with the divisions leading elements, ''There was no. direct of the spearhead diviiforward on the tdght -and left' which had thrust
sion.
-right
The division on the
on the
division
Seirijai;
the
Lake Dus,
had encountered
left,
had reached the area southwest of which was to
heavy resistance
of
advance north the lake.
of
.northwest
At dusk, calm prevailed in the .sector' qf. the 'spearhead divis ion, It did At about 2200 hours the noise of battle. was suddenly heard not
come from the Njemen bridgehead or the' Ladijai'
were
there
further
it : should be, ientioned that on the
'Before proceeding further, German side
bunkers
area.
west,A but unexpectedly from the, Seiijai.
'who had fought in
many officers
Russia during
the battalion comWar I.. The regimental commanders, 'soame , of:"; manders, as well as the older reservre officers who headed the rear 1914 - 18. Russians in had learned, to know the echelons and services, belief that the Russians were Previous experience supported their. f lanks had been overOnce thes;e highly sensitive to flank attacks, fate as prisoners of war with powered, Russian troops accepted their
orld
In
resignation.
two or 7'orld War I it .was not considered unusual for or cavalrymen to lead' a column of some 500 from the' battlefield to the prisoner of
German bicyclists three kilometers Russians several
war collection point without either''difficulties or resistance. Smaller
columns were put
in
the: ranking prisoner
charge.. of
back to the collection point even 'ithout German *guards. speaking,
partisans
,wring World War
were
unknown
in
the E esbern ih tir
I
Such experiences consadered to the Red Army.
practically
and sent
Generally
and memories
dating
back to
World War I were
be still valid wit'h_'regard '.to th'e new Soviet that this. Red Arnm Overlooked was the fact
forces, could not
:)e
'the former Czarist Army, for simply regarded as a continuation .of a long, and cruel civil war .:where the objectives Lt had been born in Several oys of fighting and considerthe means used. aad justified of the ble reserves were needed to 'make us realize that the 'spirit Army was different from .that prevailing in former Czarist forces.
Ied.
The ,first .reports ;about rocturnal combat 'noises, 'supposedly emani.ting from street fighting in Seiri jai, were rot considered very n)ortant. On the contrary, the idea pr'evailed that,' due to the excitelent on the
.ach
first in
other
day of the'campaig;
Germnan 'l.nitsmight be firing
on
the darkness,
This opinion was proved wrong by reports arriving'soon afterward Lt the division command post located five'kilometers: south of Seirijai.. :he fluctuating volume, of battle noises weri'e not derived from gunplay elements ii wound'ed motorcycliSt'°.eportd .that among our own troops, needed.,to build' a bridge f a bridge column, which had been.urgentlyy. Lear Krikstoniai,
'had been'ambushed from'. the . -forest west,; .of Seirijai
n.
while en route
trr
-v!
of advance
t
3r.& vi4'
ard that
J j.
west of. the
forest
the route
was
heavily.,jammed..- The - commander of the reserve' regiment that had been moved up to the Seiri jai area, reported street fighting in the town against armed civilians who had appeard suddenly.. The report initially
about the
fighting
participation
of armed civilians
was doubted;
Only a
in
the
short time previously
this
area had been;"in Lithuaria "" Under a .German-Soviet agreement) after the Polish campaign. Lithuaina had beent ceded to the USSR -U entirely against
the wi2L of its
citizens,:,
-it therefore
appeared
incredible
that the Lithuanians ,should' so suddenly have taken up the Russian cause, On the. whole it seemed more likely the fithting were Russian soldiers who had unit
that the civilians been separated
doing from their
s ,i
Toward midnight with security
in
the.' .comnrinhder of the reserve regiment the Seirijai area reported as follcws:
t t
charged
Seirijai is shooting ' in
firmly .held by us .There is occasional the Seir~ijai forest, the southern fringe
of which is
bounded
by the
divis
ion
s
advance and
supply route, Participation of armied ..civilians in 1 the fighting ias been confir rd.
Seirijai-
Thereupon forest
the regimental at dawn.::.
commander
was ordered
to
mop up the
The widening
fighting for
of.the Niemen bridgehead also began at dawn, while the bunker line flared up again at Las dijai.
On the assuaitiaox that the'enemy in the. forest was made up of civilians-'and stiagglers of 'negigible fighting power, when opposed by regular troops,: the -regime tal commanderr ordered one, battalion to mop up t;he' forest,. The battalion :commander, 'for the Same reasbn, considered as adequate the employment: of' ort comparhny -reinforced by heavy machine guxns, After- penetrating into th.e forest for a short distance, the company snet heavy resistance
and was
same happened to the 'scond which was -sent
battle
into
compelled to switch'. to- the defense. coar y,', Nor wasthe third company,.
the -for'est
The action
in
able to
carry
forward the
the
enemy in
assumed,
bogged-dawn
the- Seirjai forest proved a failure,
However, this failure had cleared up the situation. that
the forest
was
stronger
It
had shown
and 'more effective
than
and that he" had been underestimated by a wide margin,
fortunately,
The.,
the :..eneTmy-.hold forest dominated thy.terrain over
Una wide
dis tance No by-pass protectbed' fromenemy, observation. and usable by vehicles was avail ble. :Consequently, :not only were communications within
the
divisioh sector;, int'errupted.,but
IMF=
also the
flow of
supplies
moving~ to the leading regiment which was .:'then 7.:widening the bridgehead across the Njemen. This situation being: unbearable, the commander of the reserve forest with battalions
:orders: to .odcupy:immediately entire regiment and one attached
regiment received the aid' of the
the Seirijai artillery
The unknown foe in the Seirijai forest. had thus been more successful than he- probably had expected, :.He tied . ddwjr an entire reinfcrced of the divisjones fighting :power, ' and prevented its regi nt, one third decisive employment in an attack ibeyond the: N jem en echeloned in depth commander committed two ,:battalions on the enemy in the. .frdest, .. :Becaus e of the failure during
The regimental in
an attack
the morning hours they were to attack systematically sector and break resistance with the help of the concentrated fire
.by sector, of heavy
in-,
fantry weapons and theartillery.,:,Elements
of the
third
battalion
sealed
Is
off
the
terrain
outside
of
the forest to prevent the enemy escape; other battalion troops remained in Seirijai, which was. urprotejctedC: toward the south and north, In. the.
woods the attacking battalions, met stubborn resistance.
of fire
Gqncentration
by infantry
the dense wooded
terrain
desired
The situation
effect.
uns,
was difficult
mortars and artillery and. not
did'not
The
pieces in
always accompanied the artillery
c.h .nge ..until
by the and
the regimental 37-m antitank guns had been moved up._ close behind the infantry and had begun to fire at point-blank range. This direct fire broke the resistance of the savagely--Fight ing enemy7. These tactics deal of..time.,
on the part of a tenaciously fighting foe took up a great it was evening before :resistance..
had
-finally
collapsed
and
'the,regiment had occupied 'the, entire forest,. After the end of the fighting the following information 'became'.available Some. 400 .- 5Q0 Russian soldiers, who had been isolated
by the German breakthrough,
farrre.d the nucleus of the Only a few still wore their uni:forms while. most of them had. procured civilian lcth ing in villages and .farss, so that. they couldnot be:.identified as:,soldiers.. The majority, hcwever, actually wer:e. civilians, from thel upper. strata of the Russian populaforces
fighting
in
the
Seirijai
forest,
tion, who had settled in the area after. the Soviet Union t s occup tion of Lithuania. They had joined. the soldiers either voluntarily or -under duress, The. leader of the unit. operating in forest was the Soviet field grade
:the
officer
who had commanded the attack on.Seirijai,.
It was impossible to
capture him.
...
He was not the only: one to, escape Aproximately p one-fourth of the unit was able to hide in the wheat fields outside the forest, andi, under the cover of -darkness, to slip:through the:..thin. lines Qf. Gerrmn troops surrounding therm: It.: was.. assumed at. thc tie that at.- least some ..elements, succeeded in reaching the far side of .th j N emen. As the".--division continued its eastward., advance.., from,the. bridgehead several, oficers and' men disappeared
*
-4.-
without trace in an inexlicable manner in the densely wooded terrain behind the front, In ors instance a fiel.d grade air officer vanished shortly after he had eft the division command post, In spite of systematic investigation, nothing was ever heard about him, his driver or his vehicle. Whether rightly or wrongly, the German troops attributed these incidents to the partisans who had escaped from the Seirijai forest.
I
~)1
1 \ NT.. 1~
17F
SMALL UNIT TACTICS Example 2 Partisan Fighting in
Subter-ranean
Stone Quarries
P artisan Fighting in Subterranean Stone __-uarries
On the eastern
tip
of the Crimean Peninsula
lies
Kerch,
a city,
owes its founding by the Greeks as The city of 50,000 inhabitants, a trading outpost, and an eventful history covering more than 2,000 years to its favorable location on the Black and Azov Seas and the. Crimea with
Kerch Strait
connecting
the
the Kuban area.
After German troops occupied Kerch in World War II the city played an important role as a transloading point for shipments to the Kuban area, In early October 1943, when the Seventeenth Army evacuated the Kuban bridgehead because of Russian successes in the Don area and wi thdrew across the became part of' the combat, zone.
strait
to
the Crimea,
Kerch again
The Seventeenth ArmyJ was conosod of German and Rumanian divisions, :After retiring from the Kuban bridgehead all German divisions except two (one, near Kerch, the other at the Isthmus of Perekop, were moved the continent to the north) which connects .the Crimea with Thrown the Sixth Army, then fighting north of the Sea of Azov, up to the ultiwere unable to alter battle, these divisions. pieceneal into The Russians Army. fate of -'the Sixth iaS toward. Khers on, The Crimea was cut off.
thrust
forward past Perekop
Late in a large
October 1943, under. cover of darkness, the Russians launched to occupy the scale landing operation and crossed the strait northeast
mountainous terrain
of ..Kerch.
Counterattacks. by the
German.
98th Division, which had to defend sixty kilometers of coast on both The enemy of. ;Russian superiority. sides of Kerch, failed as a result gradually head,
moved
ten
divisions-
and. two, armored, units
into
the bridge-
In the six months of fluctuating fighting against four major it was ,7ossible tp prevent a widening of the bridgeRussian offensives north extending to head beyond the. city of Kerpch and the hills ,to the the Sea of Azov. , The, min burden: of the fighting against the bridge-
head troops was borne , by, the 98th. Division and another .German' division by air. u an an: troops protcted the, coast on' wvhich arrived later both sides of the bridgehead againist further landing attempts. Partisans- had always, pperated - .in the Crimea, although usually only the Yaila' and .Yalta Mountains ; .At first, the populaEarly- in: 19.4.4 tion in the, vicinity of Kerch; caused no difficultis. in
this
city-
the woods, of situation
changed....
A road loads in a southwestorly direction from Kerch to the port It was the, only, paved, road. in the area and. thereof Feodosiyae
fore the main supply route feeding the defensive battle then flared up anew near Kerch. About five kilometers
which had southwest of
the city,. ally
a number
only at
of
night,
attacks
occurred and personnel
Trucks
suddenly on this road, initicarriers were ambushed and
set afire,
their.drivers and passengers were killed,
before
and soldiers proceeding After a short time the attacks
officers
daylight.
Ni= r
the advance Bagerovo airfield
It
alone were
was not long
shot
down in occurred over a larger
(west of Kerch)
a
broad area.
Ger~i~an antiair-
craf t soldier was found shot dead. North of the airfield a battalion marching to the front was engaged in a regular fire fight by an enemy who appeared at its front and flanks as suddenly as' he later disappeared,
By
this
time partisans
were a
commnon feature
of
the fighting
in
Russia. In the above instance, however, the Germans were unable to discern the area from which the partisans were launching their attacks. The extensive
area between Kerch and Feodosiya,
the
so-called Kerch
Peninsula, is completely barren, with no woods and still less a real forest. Even in villages a group of trees is a rarity, Denuded hills and mountains, at the summits and crests of which the bleak reck pierces through, alternate with flat steppes, Visibility was therefore excell-
ent.
The localities
1Kerch area was
The riddle of the partisans' afternoon,
1oreovcr,
were easily kept under control.
occupied by numerous artillery
again
in
the
area
the
and supply units.
hideout was soon solved.
southwest of Kerch,
a
large
On a certain truck
was am,-
bushed., Under its tarpaulin were not supplies, as the partisans had probably assumed, but Rumanian soldiers, armed with submachine guns. The ambush miscarried, During the pursuit across the open field, the Rumanians suddenly found their
very
themselves
eyes as if
alone,
The fleeing
swallowed up by the
A systematic search of to
shell
explosions;
ground.
However,
they were
exits of a large subterranean
the stony--sided holes were
the old,
dilapidated
by the
glaring
The dazzling
white.
are built.
entrances
and
stone quarry,
A visitor to Kerch and the nearby villages will, struck
disappeared before
the terrain revealed numerous holes looking
like large bomb or shell craters. not due
partisans
whiteness whiteness
on a
sunny day, be
of the houses. The houses are hot oainted is due to the -stones from which the houses
The stones are procured from underground quarries.
When
freshly cut they are said to be so soft that they can be sawed (similar in this to the stones in the Cher Valley, south of Orleans); when exposed to the air they harden and become durable, The subterranean stone quarries
have existed for ages. the vicinity quarries. several It was in
of
In
the course of 2,000
Kerch worked
almost a
years the inhabitants in
dozen
of these underground stone The largest of them have multi-storied galleries extending hundred meters in length plus numerous side-galleries,
was
now absolutely
the subterranean
clear stone
that
the
headquarters
quarry southwest
of
of, Kerch.
the partisans
of the Russian bridgesouth area.. directly, decided to wrmest the landing 'attacks,
stone quarry sout1i est of Kerch from the partisans raids, sible and to put an end to their
as soon as pos-
chose to. fight instead of avoiding action, partisans In case the a savage.,and unusual Light undoubtedly leader, and had an energetic The troops selectdark underground .abyrinth, was impending in the company specicomprised a reinforced penetration ed for the initial submachine to pistols, In addition action, this equipped for ally large they carried searchlights guns,- flame throwers and portable entrances of up all was planned to fill It of grenades, quantities
Through this entrance the company was the stone quarry except one. to penetrate into the gallery and overpower the partisans in cldse. Two additional fighting. when needed,
companies
company's forward Even while the the entrance and were still silhouetted from the dark. carme under heavy fire
stood ready. as reinforcements
through elements were passing they dutside light, by the . daring the Rumanians great
Tkth
succeeded in gaining about 100 meters of ground in the main gallery. While they were vainly fighting to break down frontal resinstance they were attacked from the side-galleries behind them, Reinforcements which' subsequently
arrived
the underground darkness, to
to
turn the
tide of battle
in
Suffering heavy losses) the Rumanians had
way back,
their
fight
were unable
trained out by specially time carried this A second operation, .. entrances at through sever4 who penetrated troops sureender, which had A demand to once, met with the same failure, sans, preceded, was brusquely rejectoe. by .,the parti
Rumanian assault
The two operations the partisans that underground labyrinth, entrances and exits forcing' the
partisans
seemed to'indicate heavy losses with their their of arms in could not be defeated. by force The Rumanian commander therefore ordered all the hope of in up and guarded by sentries filled food and owing to lack of air, to surrender
water
Contrary to expectations)
the raids, in
the area southwest' of
Kerch did
not cease, During one of the last nights in January, 1944, from open te'entrance was attacked guarding a filled-in the sentry due to the rapid employment of reinforcefailed The attack rain. a few wounded, who were. capturd. The partisans .left ments.
the' subthe : fdllowing facts: .in plus a stone quarry: was .about" 120; well-armed. partisans, and wouided.and cooked for the of women who nursed the sick was an engineer} formerly employed by the steel Their leader
Their .interrogation established terranean number men,
boom
plant
located
between
wished to accept
Kerch and Jenikal&.e
A
group of the
the Rtmanian' demand for. surrend.er'.,
their spokesmen shot,, express such thoughtsin
He set
the
partisans
The engineer had
death penazltyfor anyone who should .The f illi ng-in of the entrances
the futures
had not cut off the air
supply, indeed this me:as.ureprqved absolutely
ineffectual,
the partisans
Moreover,
DLuring as exits
the day the for, raids,
had dug shafts camoufl+aged but adequate,.
shafts were carefully Food was rationed
shortage existed, A shaft' dripping -water was collected.
filled
straight upward. and at night used No acute water
with. grater.was available;
in
addition,
On the basis .of these statements the Rumanian. commander questioned the. German command as to what he now should do ,. It :was a difficult decision, It would of course have been desirable.; to quickly and vopletely eliminate the partisan nest located' so. close behind3 the front. After two unsuccessful operations it..appeared mree than doubtful, however, whether a third operation, for which the Rumanians requested German aid, would have scored any worthwhile gains even with very strong
forces, 1944),
Furthermore, uider
our troops were- at that time
such- heavy pressure
.(the end
of January
from ,the Russian bridgehead that
it
was impossible' to detach German units, On the, contrary, given a con-tinuation of the Russian attacks it was to be expected that even the Rumanian units securing the coest on both sides of the bridgehead against renewed landing attempts would have to be. throw n into the defensive battle near -Kerch, Consequently, .it was, irmpossible to assume responsibility
for
a
The German command
large-scale
therefore
operation gave the
with its: prospective. losses, Ruranian division commander the
followitng order: "To operation in
force will- take place,
The subterran-
'ean partisan nest southwest of Kerch' will bey completely sealed off from the outside by substaritial iwire :obstacles,. .After, setting troops will
from
'the
up the wire be withdr awn,
rear services
assume guard duty;TI
obstacles li- their
the Rumanian combat place; 'units dr awn
'.(so-called alert '
The order to set up the wire obstacle
units) will '
was, ne-ver carried: out.
IfThen
the Rumanians began building it the partisans recognized the impending danger, broke through the inadequately-manned cordon during darkness, and moved with all their belongings into the .huge..underground stone q'uarries near Bagerovo,
Located ten kilometers west of KerchBagerovo not onlyh. d
an airfield
but
also -a r ailhead and was thus the most. important transloading point behind the front. The new quarters of the partisans therefore represented a still more 'serious menace than the' ones they' had -abandoned, 'souttwest of
Kerch,
especially since the engineer of the steel
capable' and very energetic leader,
plant was ,undoubtedly a
r:
44 QT
i
The German command therefore requested the following measures to be taken. Rumanian reserves were to imediat ely and definitely isolate. the underground .stone quarry system. near Bagerovo, an area extending for
strong,
almost a
square kilometer;
and they
were to
build
a
continuous. wire obstacle in uninterrupted day and night
A commander was to be appointed who'.was to be in full charge of all labor and guard personnel., The German command assigned to the Rumanian commander so-called, alert units drawn from the personnel. of ammunition columns,,signal and supply units, orderly rooms, ,kitchens, as well as one searchlight battalion, shifts,
field,
Forces such as are hardly ever required namely, two Rumanian infantry battalions,
,.alert
units,
given the taste thousand ;en,
numbering
only a little may,
the bud.
talions departed, charge
over one hundred men., after
five days an effective., continuous wire
had been completed,
nipped in of
fighting in the open German and Rumanian
one searchlight battalion, two construction battalins of setting up the wire obstacle -all told soi - two were thus pinned down by -a; subterranean.,par tisan unit
Be that as it obstacle
for
The
Nightly breakout
attempts were usually and construction batRumanian and German alert units in
two Rumanian infantry
leaving
the
guard duty
In daylight
only a
few observers were on guard duty.
At night,
sentries were moved up t o the wire obstacle while patrols kept the area under surveillance, The alert units themselves, in contact with each other by telephone, were grouped compactly behind the elevations of the terrain, on which the searchlights were located. During several
weeks of the cordoning operation the partisans breakout attempts which failed from the due to the machine gun fire that was synchronized with the searchlights, At the end of February, three weeks after the operation began, the first clandestine deserters appeared at the wire obstacle. They stated that food stocks were nearly exhausted and that contact no longer existed with the outside world, The partisans' leader (still the engineer from the steel plant near Kerch) was preparing for a breakout in order to move to another subterranean stone quarry, made start
Because of
the first nocturnal
this information,
Rumanian companies; If the establishing themselves in which, because of the lack
tries,
the alarm units-were reinforced by two
partisans succeeded in breaking out and one of the nearby underground stone quarries of manpower,could be guarded only' by sen-
there would be "a bottomless barrel,"
so to speak.
The expected breakout did not take place until late in Mlarch. It was executed with great daring by the starving partisans, MIost of them were killed, the rest taken prisoner 0 The engineer was to be found neither among the prisoners three months he had been the driving
nor the dead, however. For power of activities which
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literally were underground, . of activities which had cost both Germans and Rumanians considerable casualties. He had tied dow;n forces of significant size and had caused the loss of much time, .In accordance with intercepted Russian radio messages, the engineer had succeeded in slipping through the German lines that same night and had arrived
safely
inside
the
Russian bridgehead.
Only hunger had induced him to make the breakout attempt. could have
held out for
even w-ithout a breakout the'defenses
one more week,
attempt.
he
For on 8 April the Russians pierced
of the Perekop Isthmus
towaard Simferopol, troops -ho, for six
If
he *:ould have been liberated
and advanced
in
great
superiority
the Crimean capital. In the night of 9 April our months, had contained attacks from the Russian
bridgehead, were compelled to evacuate thejir positipns. They w ere able tot j oin fordes wiith the one-time t Perekop Group,"as ordered, because Siiforopol had meanwhile fallen. In an adventurous march along the southern Crimean coast by way of Sudak and Yalta,
.no longer
they fought their
wray to
the Sevastopol area.
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SMALL UNIT TACTICS Example 3
Partisan Warfare Without Partisans
I
5
L~....
%~d'
5
~
I
Pa
tisan
Warfare
Tfithout
Partisans
The shape of the front lines and the coniat' conditions inthe the -German Sixteenth Ar'my, operating in Russia under Army Group North, had, since the spring of 1942, taken on forms which even a .tactical instructor gif ted with a very lively imiaginatiQn The left flank of the Sixteenth Army. could hardly have. imagined. Here close contact dxis ted with the was anchored on Lake Ilhn', right flank of the Eighteenth Army, and this was actually the only feature that could be called normal within the entire zone of the Sixteenth Army.. South of Lake Ilnen the so-called,' t funnel; route" had developed, a funnel-shaped approach to the Demyansk pocket which formed a salient far in front of the lines and in which there were seven to eight divisions, faced on all sides by four times as many enemy troops, zone
.,of
The narrowest point in this pocket, at the Lovat River .bridge .near Ramushevo, was. only 3 500 meters across and was under Russian The only approach route artillery fire from the north and south. :leading through the funnel into the pocket', a route which was called '"Reichsknueppeldaimm'" (Reich corduroy highway), was inadequate to For this reason numerous transport carry supply traffic. alone, planes flew into the pocket daily, just skimming the tree t.ops of the If, then, the Russians informed their air force at swampy forest. the moment when the transport planes,' under mrtachine gun fire, crossed the narrow passage at Ramushevo, almost brushing the roofs of the houses, .Russian -planes were able to arrive just in ti=n& to attack, while they: were being unloaded; the 'planes which had landed on the only strip- in the pocket;' The e'nemy carried ovit unceasing .ma ox. attacks against.: the funnel and pocket in ' order to annihilate .these_:two unusual positions. Heavy casualties .were incurred duiring stubborn fighting.: in swamps and forests' In early. June1942: the average fightGerman compa anie s -committed at focal' points. had. ing strength.of O dwindled to -about twenty -men., Behind the besieged Demyansk pocket, beginning in the Rramushevo area, a second. front had developed running southward to the city of Kholnmi In one :sectar- of this front, in the midst of'. swarms,, the 5th Luftwaffe Field Division ' -vas ' committed, As it had to hold . a. very large area with inadequate for eces, this newly activated division was unable to establish: acontinuous line. Its position, comprised a. series. of various-sized 'strdng-po nts, 200-800 meters apart. Only. at the most important "places did there exist anything resembling a, defense '.in depth. ' Khol itslf, -d nstitutin7 the right flank of the Sixteenth Army, had been surrounded since winter by the Russians and
I _V
was defended by General Scheerer, jacent army on the right . The. large a. sort of no-man s land;
There was no contact with the adswampy area south of Kholm was
A similar no-man's land, although mere densely populated, was situated directly behind the positions of the 5th' Luftvraffe Field Division. without a
This was an area approximately fifty single paved road, very swampy, axn
kilometers
square,
with narrow strips of land between the,.swampy parts. The villages were located on these narrowssips of land.. To the south the area joined the no-man's. land near Kholm, while to the north its extent ffluctuated, In the west ;it reached almqst to the railway junction at Dno, the main transloading point of the Sixteenth Army, In
this
large
area
of about 3,000
not a single German soldier, area was left to, ing. Its actual
tried vital.
itself
still.
because
masters were the
square kilometers
manpower
for
its
line
was
garrisoning
was
The lack-
partisans.,
Several times during the winter of 1941to. penetrate into this area., in order at Dno area, by an outpost
there
less a German. administration-
42 the Sixteenth Army least to protect the
of some. depth..
Since the
Sixteenth,.
Arry was always under strength, only, hastily improvised units of' at most battalion strength could. be put into the -field. After initial successes -these units regularly had to contend with superior partisan forces
who
inflicted
.danger of falling
bloody losses,
Drio itself
into partisan hands.-
was
That- this
severa .times.
in
did not happen the
that
Six.teenth Army owed only to the fact the partisans commander of less than average qualifications.
were, led
by a
When, in the spring of 1942, the snow, melted,, turning the area into a quagmire,, the situation automatically calmed down for a. while because of the. difficulty of moverre nt k With the progressing improvement 'of the roads, the partisans tactivities resumed. They were now directed less against the Dno railway junction than against the rear of the 5th' Luftwaffe Field. Division. Impossible conditions gradually developed. in this division's sectcr. The extended line of strong points, which lacked depth, time and again was attacked from the rear. The road from Staraya Russa to Khoi '(the division s only.supply road) led close behind the 'line of strong points and was, sometimes cut for days., If the road was cut at the diiision's northern flank,. the center and southern flank would remain' without sup'lies,
In the'vast cruits
until
area under .theii.
the road was
again: cleared
of
enemy- forces.
cont 'ol the partisans for rally drafted re-
who :received
four weeks of training, After completion, of their the conscripts slipped through the Gorr an strong points at and over 'to .the Russian lines in order as expressed by recruits captured'while 'passing through..the German lines -"tto carry out their t military duties . Soviet agents bound. for northern Russia slipped through in the opposite direction. training night
-13
I L. ItJ
A division would have been required to -clear.:the': entire area of partisans
and to pacify it
no such reserves, fighting
within
definitely.
But
"funnel"
the
mitted
the.worst
teenth Army had
the> continuous"
and the Demyansk pocket.
manpcwer sufficed- only for the commitment eliminated
the S3i
not even as re inf orceents for
damage until
new acts
The
available
of smaller units, which of violence were co-
elsewhere 4
possible; to detach .conNot until the late summer of 1942 was it tingents from the divisions committed in the "funnel"f These were formed:into a regiment composed of two battalions, one mountain artillery battalion and one engineer company, Equipped ith highly mo-
bile vehicles,, in
the rear
the regiment was ordered to
of the
Luftwaffe Field
clear the area.of partisas
Division
and to
restore
the. entire
area to German control. The
regiment
order contained two main difficulties. On the one hand, the would probably have only a limited time, at its disposal, in-
as it would be needed in the renewed the offenive which had just order had to be executed speedily. asmuach
the main.
difficulty,
unless they the partisans
"funnel" if collapsed, On the other
the Russians there Consequently, the hand, and this was
the partisans had to be forced to fight
were defeated had always
the area could not be pacified evaded action and. withdrawn into
since Hitherto the depth
4
of the area as soon as they faced an opponent of anything noar equal strength. Only when, by drawing on reinforcements, they had obtained absolute
superiority
would they
go over to
the defense and finally
to counterattack,
partisa
According to- available informtion thIe headquarters n supply depot were in thle center of the area in
close to each other
,'rich;were
and the main three villages
located ;on one of the :narrov
tongues
of land. surrounded by swamps;
the :cornmand eTr o, ,the regiment believed could best be :engaged ,in battle if the, regiment
that the, partsans. were to suddenly penetrate the areasupply depot, by the shortest , route, In
and ;, advance against their
to prevent, the partisans
order
,main
from learning about the impendmrch- to ;the north
,ing operation, the reginnt was assembled. a days': of
the
5th, Luftwaffe Field
Dvision.
F.or the.
purpose
of -.maintaining
surprise, the regiment omitted' at.the point of departure, namely, the 5th, Luftwaffe Field Division's. command- post area, any sort of scouting or. reconnoiteringg This actually ,was necessary inasmuch as a few days before
a woded area. close behind the
division
command post
had
been penetrated by a partisan battalion numbering several hundred men. The 'division cormmnder had been able to enploy against the partiss only a weak alert unit consisting 'of clerks, kitchen personnel, and horse grooms:
14''
The annihilation of these enemy forces.:was the first objective of the regiment,, ' With this' "accomplished, the troops, wre to advance on the main supp-ly depot, For this purpose the regiment marched southward during the night. to the division command post area and' at daybreak launched an attack from the march column through the ranks of the alert unit against the enemy forces, which had undertaken several local attacks during the night. when the regiment'began its attack) hardly a hostile shot was fired Without 'opposition it penetrated into the forest where not a single partisan was seen, 'A laborious combing of the adjoining swa-ps proved fruitless,, Since the partisans were again applying their usual tactics of evasion, the regimental commander decided on an immediate advance on the main supply depot, in the belief that the partisans would -defend their supplies. The, regiment commenced the 'arch in two columns along miserable, half-mired roads, In the first villages, situated on strips of land between swamps, the two columns met only a few, old men and women. Questioned about partisans, they replied that they had seen none. In answer to queries about the whereabouts of the younger and women of the village- and the children, the old people pointed to the west, saying "they fled, from. fear."
men
It _was remarkable that no fleeing inhabitants were encountered. The country was completely deserted, The reconnaissance planes attached to the regiment did not notice any movements except those of cattle herds on roads and in the swampy lowlandsThe majority of the people had also left the next villages, which were reached without firing a shot. But the footprints leading'from -the villages across the wet meadows to the swamps, which were largely covered by brushwood, clearly indicated the route the natives had taken when they escaped to the nearby swamps. Scouts who followed the footprints into'' the dense brushwood occasionally met some women and children and a few heads of. cattle but hardly' ever an able-bodied man, It was. soon realized that the partisans and the 'population were cooperating closely, and that women 'and children were to hide in the nearest- swamps as long as the Germans:ere in the vicinity. All cattle had been declared the property of the-partisans, had been confiscated and had had to be driveni to specified collecting points... All men in any way fit for service were ordered to hide in the, swamps during daytime and to march by night, grouped according to villages,to the, nearest partisan unit. Toward evening the two columns approached the main supply depot without having been attacked and without having sighted a single
..15
armed partisan. The regimental comrmander's aim to frce the partisans finallyto: fight was not. fulfilled. The three villages were not defended. On the other hand, nt5 . single -round of ammunition 'Nor. was there' :any clue to innor a bag. of f.%our was to be found. dicate that large amounts of supplies had ever been; ,stored. in these three poverty-stricken villages. The existence- of a main supply depot had merely been simulated to mislead the German intelligence, Somewhere in the, large area,, however;, thJ: partisans were boud' to have stored their stocks of.weapons, armmunition.and food. To discover the whereabouts of the' depots prisoners were necessary, During the, entire day not a:.sinigle prisoner had been, taken who, ad-mitted being a member of the partisanics ' SinCce larrconnaissance was also unable to detect any. movements by partisans in the open terrain, it was assumed that they were- hidinin in the scamps. The regimental commander therefore decided to comb the nearest, swanps the next day. Even if the enemy should again ,aavoid. battle, the-re was at ieast the likelihood of cspturing prisoners. During the night the regiment witnessed a surprising spectacle. Airplanes approached which undoubtedly-were of Soviet. rigin. As soon as the planes had become clearlyaudible, varicolored. light signals went up on all sides of the all-aaound defense positions taken up by the regiment on the. tone of landdurng. the day) including the sector which the regimnnt. had just cossed. Some clever German observers noticed the unifoim color combination of
the light signals and~. thereupon fi:redi
identical light signals when
new airplanes were heard approaching. To .their; surprise they saw," parachutes float dovn 1n the ::ilumn t&'aiea:,. The parachute packs contained ammunition and, unfo turu t 'lyonly .:n a few cases,,. a sort of choclate and tcbacco. '
The enemy was evidently in the regiment.
the area and had actually surrounded
However, the end result: of :th second day of the operation. was' again fruitless. In the dense . brushwo'd ,ad'reed wilderness of 'the surrounding swamps the German forces captured; 'women and children from nearby villages; a few heads of cattle which had been .withheld from the partisans; a few unarmed'-ien who claimed to: be harmless' family heads4 . Nowhere .. was .there any re'sistance. Just as.bon"the, previous day, air reconnaissance :reporte'd: TN' pparti.sans. deteced; cattle herds are being driven -outhward," After dusk the same. situation prevailed aa on the, previous night. There was the 'sound of approahing i'S6viet ;supply planes and light signals were sentup onall sides of' the regimen Is perimeter defense position, Af ter midght there was heavy, rain,
7) Ar,_ z
It was 'evident nom that the partisan comn ndhad issued orders to avoid a clash with the regiment., How, under these circumstances, was the regiment'ever going to carry out .its mission to clear the area from partisans?; The regimental . commander reasoned that where the cattle herds converged there must 'also be partisans.. The same The rains c onnight the regimert moved southward in twfo -columns, tinued. An advance detachient moving forward on. cross-country motor vegot stuck in the low-lying sections of the terrain. In the afternoon, the regiment overtook several. cattle .herds in spite of the muddy roads& Shots were exchanged from, a great distance with the cattle guards when, they tried to drive the animals into the No reports were received from No prisoners were taken. swmps. hides
-
air
in
reconnaissance
because
of
rain
were found
:No. supplies
and fog.
the villages Which the Germans passed, through during the. advance..
Finally, on the fourth stock southti~ard, a large
had advanced far day, when the regiment of flour from the -new harvest was discover-
ed in a village. A group of armed men who, fled from the village into a German ambush.. Documents found on one of the dead showed fell against regular *that definite orders had been-issued not .to fight During' the presence Germane units,- but to .evade and- to observe them, of German troops
the principal
mission
of the
partisans
was to
store
portions of the supplies in small, inconspicuous depots, to be cared for by the population; to safeguard the c attle by driving them into the southern part
.order
of the area,
.and if necessary.into
the
to maintain a food supply for -the coming winter.
swamps,
in
-
Hoping that, through the destruction of their. food supplies, he make the partisans give battle, .t he regimntal comnand.er ordered a systematic search for supplies in the, villages. The Luftwaffe received orders to shoot all livestock, especially the cattle hePds in the swaps
;could finally
For two weeks the regiment crisscrossed the large area, finding numerous small depots with food and ammunition, but no partisans. In the latter part of the two weeks there were: no more cattle herds as -the. Luftwaffe had destroyed- them all. The final result of the regiment's expedition was at once, surprising and disheartening. One evening,: in the area of the Dio railway junction, the rear 'services had to be alerted because a7 strong .partisan
column,
numbering more
than :1,00
men, had left
the pa-
trolled area and, on its northward marh, :;shad crossed the railway line and was proceeding in the direction of the Luga forest -where it would be more-than-a 'day's .march from the regiment, which at the time was also advancing north. The .alerted supply'units were unable to engage the far superior partisan;column, which disappeared In the huge' forest south :of :Luga,. In doing so 'it had,
certainly unconsciously,
crossed an invisible and Eighteenth
boundary between the Sixteenth
partisans. of its teenth Army was rid the Eighteenth Arrmy, whose operations
wall, namely,
the
The
Six-
Armies,
They now «belonged" to seriously irathey later
pedled, Three days later
new Russian attack
a
was launched
against
A lack of reserves there made it necessary to ship the "funel," No other units were available the regix; :nt back to the "funnel,," The entire area nt. that could have replaced the departing regii to itself, was, as in the past, left In
the autumn the partisans were back in
i III
~ I'
-
S18
-
V
I: ^
r-1 r
33) L~-.4-~-L,_ '
the area,
Ilr
*SMIi L UNIT TACTICS
Example 14 A Company
Cornmarder's Story
A
Co
as
CommanrderIsStorV
Since the winter of 1942 - 43: the main effort of the partisans in Central Russia had been~ directed -gainst the major railways which The fate of the front depended on c arried supplies from Germany. the operation of 'the railways. By means of attacks on moving trains and large-scale demolition of rails, bridges and tunnels, the partitraffic on the two imsans succeeded at times in halting almost all portant
feeding routes;
the
one running from Warsaw to
Eryanek; and further to the north, Borisov ard Smolensk.
Gomel and
the' one passing through Minsk,
In.the early summer of 1943 it was possible through agents to discover the location of the headquarters of the partisan staff directing
the
attacks
the railways
against
in
the Borisov
sector,
The headquarters was located in the village of -Daljok., fifteen kilometers south of Lepel. Inconspicuous surve lance exercised in the Daljoki area confirmed the agents' reports. For the German sector command it was of paramount importance to capture this dangerous and long-sought staff, which was the brains of the partisan organization in the Borisov area,
For immediate commitment the German sector commander had the following units available: In the Borisov area, one bicycle battalion-* that had been withdrawn three weeks ago from the front and had temporarily been made available to combat partisans; one "Landesschuetzen"L '(regional defense) battalion in Lepel (fifty kilometers north of fighting partisans in the Bere Borisov) which, ho ever, was presently sina Valley (thirty kilometers west of Lepel) and of which only one company was still in Lepel; one .troop was in the Senno area (sixty
kilometers east of Lepel)., Generally speaking, evolved in
partisan
in
the course of time a.certain pattern had After the
fighting.
whereabouts
of a
partisan
group had been discovered. ina village or somewhere deep in
*,A bicycle battalion was 'organized as follows: and communication platoon;
first,
.second
and third
mounted on bicycles and equipped with. l2 'light light
mortars;
with
12 machine
fourth guns
(Heavy Weapons) and six
a'headquarters companies,
machine guns,
company (motorized),
37-nm antitank
Ilr
guns;
the woods,
each
and 6
equipped a motorized train.
an attack-.was launched simultaneously from several sides with superior forces and weapons. The attack was usually scheduled to cormnence at dawn. Although this system .of concentric attacks was undoubtedly successful it also undeniably involved a great disadvantage, for the attack succeeded only if the partisans- did not learn befarehand of concentric approach, In the course of time, however, the partisans had not only grown numerically, stronger, ,especially since Stalingrad,
the
but they also had improved their organization and intelligence services. Ever more frequently '.the German units approaching from several in
for
sides
would find
no partisans
to
kttack.,
because they
had withdrawn
time. Under the circumstances the most logical course would have been the German sector commander to order an'attack against Daljoki to
be carried out by the bicycle battalion fron the, south and west, by the
Landesschuetzen
from the north,
and by the troop from the
east 9
However, it was not an ordinary partisan group that was stationed in Daljoki, but the highest partisan' staff of a large region, where all communications converged. Moreover, the sector commander desired not merely to liquidate in order to gain interrogations.
the staff but to "capture the staff members alive, information about the partisan organization through It was unlikely that the partisan' staff. would not
'Peihaps
learn about an approach march from three sides. knew about the ent places.
pr eparations
which 'had had to
be made
at
it
already
three
diff er-
The sector and planned to
commander therefore decided against a joint operation have the bicycle battalion, ithen stationed in area of Borisov; carry out the attack on the partisan staff. In this decision he was supported by a message frqm the 'co and er at Lepel stating that the fight against the partisans' in the Beresina Valley was progressing only slowly, and that this fact would probably necessitate the commit-
ment of the Landesschuetzen company which
was
On 23 June the sector commander visited mander who, on the previous day, had returned forests east of Borisov, and gave him a newi partisan staff in Daljoki. The next :morning,
on 24 June,
the battalion.
still
in
Lepel.
the bicycle battalion from an operation order, namely, to
in attack
commander issued
11.
The battalion,
without
the 3d Company,
kilometers
the
west of Lepel)
in
which
will leave, camp at reach Beresina
for -the
0700'
(thirty
tw6 ,days of marching,
"Ivssin: To destroy the' partisans in joint action with battalion from Lep'el which 'already is 'fighting in the
Beresina Valley.
I:*
the
the fol-
lowing written, battalion order:
time being remains, in its billets, hours toniorrow, 25 .Juno, and will
comthe
?2,
Irarch route:
Boris ov-Lepel-Beresina
"3. Billets from 25 to 26 June: -,Staff ana signal coimuni_cation p'latoon, in Wily; 1st Company, in Sloboda, 2nd Cormpany, in Gadsivlia; 4th (Heavy Weapons) Company, in Anoshki. "Quartering details- in charge of Lieutenant X will move forward at 0400, 25 June, After the arrival of the battalion at the prescribed billets at about 1600 hours, the quartering Details will assemble at about 1900 at the battalion command post in Wily whence they all will proceed by way of Lepel to Beresina Here they will report at post headquarters, which will assign. billets.
" 4, At 0700, 26 June, the battalion will leave from the northern exit of Wily and continue its march by way of Lepel to Beresina0 The operation against the partisan headquarters in Daljoki is described by the commander of the 1st Coriany as follows:
"It was very hot on 25 June,, After using the dilapidated Borisov-Lepel..Beresina road, the only so-called paved road in the .entire: area, we reached our assigned billets in the afternoon, Ir coipany was .quartered in Sloboda, The - quartering parties, which drove on to Beresina after our' arrival, had taken great' pains to :select for us the houses which were least' infested with lice . But if one used thepoint of a bayonet to poke in the crevices. between the. tile stove and the wooden: walls it became evident that ther~ewas
.not, a:. single
house free of;lice in
the en;-
tire village, As a, precaution; the company bathed in the Essa, which runs immediately west: .of!Sloboda, .As:elsewhere; the. population here* also was: poor, .inif'ferent, although polite, and, naturally, quite hostile, to the, parttisans.,: .Thank Heaven, not ea single partisan is in. the area, '..they said . But .they had heard that a day Is march from.there, -in the : Beresina Valley, there had unfortunately been some partisans: in..Zecent times' tEarly next day, 26. June,.- the company bathed once more' in the Essa in order to shed thel lice -of Sloboda,. realizing however that in exchange. that same evening.,they wouldbe visited by the vermin of, Beresina, As ordered, my company: stood ready gat 0700 at the northern. exit. of Wily. In a. dense cloud., of dust. the con'pany .rode off to Lepel. "The battalion executive officer awaited us at the first small .;wooden house in the little rural conmunity of Lepel,. Here we had a -two-hour break, were. issued rations,. and:the company commanders reported to the battalion "c mmander,
S21,.
-
-i 17
"Guides directed- the comrpanies. to their resting places in the western part of tepel, along the Beresina road. In a house behind the bridge, at the, exit toward Beresina I found the battalion commander, a major whom I had known for a long time. At the.beginning of the war against Russia he had commanded a company in our battalion and I was then his platoon leader. ' I noticed- immediately that he was not entirely at ease. When all company: commanders were present he said immediately. and somewhat bluntly: 'Just so you know right away, I fooled you. Our battalion never was ordered to fight the partisans in the Beresina Valley in joint action wi-th. the Landessc huetze n. That is. a fabrication on my part so as to camouflage our real mission., .Actually, it is the supreme: partisan staff of the Borisov guerilla area, who has been seen in Daljoki, that we have to attack and capture alive "ne were by no means as surprised as the major expected. It was obvious that he could not have publicly announced the day before in his battalion order that we were on the way to. attack the partisan staff in Daljoki. Considering the excellent partisan intelligence service, the news of our intention would have travelled to. Daljoki far quicker than we could have reached the village. "'Let us look at the map., ' the major continued.. . !When I received orders to proceed' with my battalion to Daljoki. and to capture the partisan staff which had comnitted numerous attacks on railways and which had carried out demolition' operation on both sides of Borisov, I tried to think up some method likely to-catch the partisans by surprise. . In thD present, case I consider it. impractical to follow the standard procedure, which would be to bring up rmy units during the night from a2ll four sides toward Daljoki: and to wait for morning to break simultaneously into the village.. X am convinced that the staff in Daljoki would have. learned., about our approach from Borisov to Daljoki, a distanc'e of roughly forty kilome ters, and even more definitely, of our assembly at night. I believe that we would have found the nest deserted. I would have-! liked best to use a small unit on motor vehicles, one or at most two companies, from Borisov, W~ithout a stop, and driving at full speed, we would, after reaching Sloboda, have turned from the Lepel highway into the dirt road to Daljoki; the leading company, on its motor vehicles:, would have driven right into the center of the village, while the rear coiany would have scaled -off the village in the south and east toward the' swamp area. That would have been a real- surprises But for such an undertaking one needs suitable. cross-country vehicles -- .and I do not have them. The solution, therefore, is to simulate. normal march movement such as frequently takes place on the road from Borisov to Lepel The objective given out.will be'tthe -partisan hotbed in the Beresina Valley, which is known, t o all, In order to strengthen er i pression of a routine march movement which in no way has anything to do with the staff in Daljoki, yesterday I .ordered ,the battalion to: be billeted at a level with Daljoki along the march route, For the same
a~~rt
reason, the quartering details which. were sent in advance have requisitioned billets in the usual manner,'.whereupon they went on in There they are at "work providing for billets, a body to Beresina, tonight that they have not find -otit unti as ordered, and they will All these measures :are- for the. sole purpose of' 'worked in vain. preventing the partisan staff from becoming suspicious and to induce it to remain in Daljoki. Besides , .I'-anconvinced that the partisan
staff has already known sinc:
last. night
to march into the Beresina' Valley'
that the battalion is. going
1
"The major thereupon said, 'Accordirg to my watch it is now a few minutes past 0900 hours., Until "1100: hours please continue t.o, Nothing must behave as if we were resting on our way to Beresina. in different entirely something have that we point to the fact before' southward or turn place No vehicle may leave its mind. Beresinal Until 1100 we have only one'-.objective: 1100.. "'At the stroke 'ibf 1100 the battalion will turn around, leaving and. any other elements. not absolutely essential behind the train and drive back over the same road it used a few for the attack, The' following sequence will be to Lepel. way hours before on the. roads lead1st, 2d. and 4th Companies.:" The three dirt maintained:' taking the 1st Company: the follows:, ing to Daljoki will be used- as one fr.om the Company, the, 2d from.Wily .(by way of Soyaditai) The Sloboda; the. 4th (motorized) Company,.:.the road from Gadsivlia. procced with, the-,.4th Company. will battalion staff
:one
For each the way there will be no :halts' or reconnaissance. I believe, resistance, company the objective is. Daljoki;.- :'-The first trtiOn
be encountered not later than at the f-arm houses at Liski, will Podrussy, Pospach and Ivan, Bar which: front Daljoki in a semi-circle. For I assume that an important. staff.. 'such as the ons in Daljoki will not be satisfied.with protecting pits imniediate vicinity. Any reFor this farms must'. be broken quickly. sistanco offered, at ,these purpose the, 4th Company will detach one platoon of 'two antitank guns I want to both the 1st and 2d Companies. At 1200 hours, gentlemen, clear?' Is that' to see yoti and your' companies break iunto Daljoki. I, as his senior "The major's plan was by. no means. clear to us. company comriander, answered'in : the name:oof the others, arguing as follows: 'To penetrate Daljoki::at noon is' something we can probably manage, provided there are no strong enemy forces in the farm, houses the partisan"' front ing'the village .. On the other hand, what will hears _shots fired at. the farms or at the edge ofdo when it staff
the village?'
.
"'I definitely believe, t I said, 'that the real partisan staff, quickly run ,either toward -the s'outh or leaders, will its namel, t :am 'fraid that in this manner we east and iriash . in the swanmps. ns in~the.rear guard.' catch a few unimportant pa'ti may perhas
But the very men we are most anxious to get will not fight but -dis' appear as fast as possible.' "'I think so, too,' the major replied, '.That is why the 3d . Company will take up positions at the edge of the swamp at 1100 hours. "iHe placed an aerial photograph, of the Daijoki area on the table. 'The 3d Company,' he added, 'remained in camp when we marched off to Borisov, Yesterday afternoon it was loaded on tarpaulin-covered trucks and in the evening it was billeted' in Gorodok, that is, behind the 4th Company. The 3d Company took along no..bicycles and carried only light weapons such a's pistols; ca±bire s, submachine guns and rifles :with silencers,:" This mrning before 'dawn the company rode from erodok toward Lepel. Inro kilometers north of Anoshki, at a point.where. the forest touches the road, the six trucks stopped briefly. ' My orders were to stop for only hal a minute. 'The company detruck'ed, whereupon the empty trucks, which had not' their motors shut, off, were driven through Lepel to Beresina. Thee'3d Company- had orders, using the aerial photograph you see here, and"with the aid of .a c ompass, to march straight eastward through the woods and moors, and, after crossing the Essa, to march into the swamp 'south of Daljoki, or rather to wade. In the swamp, which is covered by dense brushwood, the company will hide. in a very small area, I repeat, in the 'middle of the swamp. It will send out-no reconnaissance patrols.. Its only task will consist in remaining unnoticed. At 1100 hours, at the very moment when the battalion here in Lhpel will turn around for the attack on the partisan staff, the '3d Company will cautiously and secretly occupy the fringe of the swamp south of Daljoki ard' alsd the forest directly east of Ivan Door. There the company will remain. It will not even attack when the battalion penetrates Dalljoki. Its mission is to capture 'the real partisan staff when it tries to escape into, the swamps. Everything else is of secondary interest to it.. - told the commander of 3d Company that for half a day his company was. to act like Indians. "'Of course I would have gladly 'spred the 3d Company the unusual march through the wet forest and the moors, the wading in the Essa and the painful stay. in the hot swamps south of Daljoki, where they will be half devoured by myriads of gnats' and other stinging insects, I could. have ordered the company to' advanc e on the dirt road which runs some six to eight kilometers east of the paved road in the direction of Liski and then on to Gadsivlia, However, this dirt road is, in my opinion, one of 'the roads connecting the partisan staff in Dalijoki with the partisan units 'operating in the Borisov woods. I have no doubt that an advance by the 3d Company on this road would *,Russian rifles captured from the partisans "and'equipp'ed with silencers and:us ing special'ammrunition,. The report is hardly audible at a distance of a, hundred paces..'
41Z 1311
be 'rapidly' reported. toB th. partisan staff, a f act which' would make our entire undertak; ng a failure, That is the reason I ordered the 3d Company' to' move, through woods arId swamps. In doing so, I' am
'have
fully
aware that
if
:there is. a
single
minor
and ridiculous
slip
all
our trouble
and laborious preparations will hve been in vain. Some fellawrfrom Daljoki or'Liski need, only see our approaching company and reach' the staff Daljoki unseen by us., .'That would be the end; But there is nothing todprevenit hiat; either we'will be lucky :or we won tt. I feel the 3d Company will have luck and bring to- a successful con-
''in
clusion
our last
operation
against
bn 1 July,'we are returning
the
partisans.
"TVWhen I returned to my company the field issue
'For in
four
days
to our dj.vision at the Smolensk front,' kitchen was ready to
food. I used this opportunity to sit down with my platoon group leaders in a corner of. the farm, courtyard and, while we
and
ate, to inform them of the battalion's new mission. I''f orbade then to Daljoki before we had left Lepel behind us At 1050 the corany assembled on the street outsidd the couintyarrd, facing in the
mention
direction
of Beresina,
I
managed
to get the inhabitants,
who wit-
nessed the assembly,
quickly off the road when I let them know that they could have the r'est of the food from the 'field kitchen in the courtyard. I was well aware that I was thus giving more than one of the ,partisah spies and collaborators an undeserved lunch.
"'At 1100 their'
sharp I gave the signal to depart. The company fturred bicycles around. We drove back on the same road on which we
had come three
hours earlier.
Since we could use the tracks
we had
left in the morning on the very por road, we were able to proceed at a good 'rate of speed with our bicycles, In we turned into the dirt road to Seyaditai and Daljoki, Since the dirt 'road' was
Wily
sandy our speed was' somewhat reduced. lWre passed through Seyaditai.
It was just 1130 when the forward platoon with the two attached antitank guns left the vilJage in.: the directibn of Pospach. Through binoculars
I
cleairly saw,
on a, low rise
in
the ground,
and between
'some bunches of trees the roofs of Pospach looking like a country estate; the distance was about 2,500. meters , I could not see Daijoki, which lay behind the rise in the: ground. , "The
company followed the forward platoon
meters..
In my sidecar motorcycle
leader.
The head of
close to Pospach on the thinking
buildings that
"Just
as I
the platoon's
-that with
bicycle
the nak.d eye
of 'the estate. perhaps, in spite
ceptive maneuvers, .operation and 'fled
at a distance of 500 I rode up to the forwaird 'platoon file
had already
staff
mid-it have gotten wind of the
stopped.. near~ the platoon leader it all
'.'I
icri:i ;.-r-
of a
sudden
Rifle shots sounded and simultanecusly swept the dirt . road'. The 1st.: Platoon
7 25
S-
so
I began to'feel uncomifortable, of alL our carefully prepared de-
the.petisan
became" lively in Pospach. a burst of machine gun fire
come
one could see the details
I
I
~'3~~~ac
_-r I
jumped from. their
bicycles
began. to fire
in
The
and took cover.
behind the platoon were unlimbered. enemy machine gun with high-explosive
shells To run up against.such
Pospach,
Me neither expedientno
two antitank
guns
Their crews tried to hit
necessary.
the gun
second nachine fire. appeared
*A
to
I ordered the platoon-leader,
next to
whom I was lying, to use his four -,machine guns and the antitank platoon to overpdwer the enemy. 'Under the cover provided by the trees I led the other two platoons in an eastward lunge against the enemy's rear. "Unfortunately, we did not At the
last
still
succeed
in
encircling
enemy forces
moment they withdrew toward Ivan Bor.
to cover them with machine
the impression that
gun
fire
in
only vexy few of the
sent a reconnaissance patrol after "The action, which and five wounded,
l as-ted
the open field
partisans
I had
0
had escaped.
I
them.
almost an hour,
"About two kilometers ahead
0
But we were able
of
us,
in
had cost
a flat,
us one
head
open field,
was
the
Behind it one saw ,the wooded arc constivillage of Daljoki, If all haad gone well, the 3d Comtuting the fringe of the swamp.
pany was bound it
was
Loud battle
to be in -this
to
close
noises were
from Podrussy to
houses
1300 hours
rswap.
--
to
audible
Liski,
be
The 2d:Comany just
coming
appeared
penetrating from the
area behind a
fromn Daljoki,
and perhaps also
Podrussy.Q
into
where
line a few
burned.
tSince ' I' had first
to Save time,
platoon.
-in in very loose and Daijoki,
to
east;
order in
of the dirt
the barren and
savage machine gun fire Ivan Bor.,
send back for the bicycles,
and in
order
committed the forward platoon -- it was noiCTthe 2d an attack on. Daljoki on foot. The riflemen advanced I
directly on its
The platoon
elements facing
road.
flat terrain,
was therefore
east.
As
the
Halfway between Pospach the platoon
received
flank from the direction of
forced to employ some
intensity
of
flanking
fire
of its
from Ivan
Bor increased, endangering the advance of the company to Daljoki, I ordered"the 3d Platoon, which at the .momrnt.was waiting for the bicycles
at
take
Ivan Bor.
?ospach,
"Shortly
after
together
the
from Daljoki, tive officer.
1st Platoon, to
3d Platoon had assembled,
This meant:
signals rise in'Daljoki. therefre in
with the
our hands.
speeding toward Pospach. He transmitted a battalion
4th
'Daljoki has been taken by
-its
Bor.'
"q
yb,(
>
;..
It
Daljoki was
a motorcyclist was the
battalion
order which
came execu-
stated:
Company," Podrussy,. by 2nd Company.
Elomnnts of the 3-d Company are still.:'.ghting from Ivan Bor in the 'woods directly east
Company will discontinue
we saw white ground
'We are here! V
Immediately thereafter
attack and
against of this
village.
the partisans The 1st
advance toward Daljoki and occupy Ivan
1
t
In order
to
II)
quickly end partisan
resistance
to
and
avoid
casual-
In spite of committed the entire company against Ivan Bor. from twelve machine guns, six light mortars ancd two antitank
ties,
I
fire
gu.7ns, the partisans did not surrender. They fought on to the last round. Wen h, we penetrated Ivan Bor we met a platoon of the 3d Copawny coming toward us from the forest east of tho estate. The men
simply looked awful. sect
bites,
their
Their f,.ces were' bloody and swollen from in-
uniforms
caked
ported as follows:
'Soon after
Bospach we noticed
r
with mud.
The platoon
leader
re-
the beginning of the action near
horse-drawn
carriage
coming from Daljoki.
In-
side the carriage s t, in. addition to the driver, four woren who wore the large shawls customary in the area. The carriatge passed through Ivan'Bor in which thre was a partisan unit. of Ivan Bor the carriago ran up against the platoon
since
pany, which, in
the
100,
Directly east of the 3d Com-
had been hiding on both sides of the road
The four wom.en immediatelv aimed their weapons and fired. They ,,ere shot dead. Actually they wore men, perhaps the core of the staff. Unfortunately we could not find a single scrap of paper on them. ' swamp.
".Ater the reduction of Ivan Bor all resistance within the battalion area seemed to have ended. giftor 1500 not a shot was fired, I had the bicycles brought up and sent my conrcany commander to nearby Daljoki to inform the battalion commander that we. had occupied
Ivan Bor. I rescinded my order to the company comrmander, however, when I saw the battalion c omander t'scommand car approaching from Daljoki.
pany. that I
The mya jor was accompanied
"The
as, staff
by the
commnander
of the
The gnats in the swamp had made such a mess of could barely recognize him. major stated
except for
t hat
a'few men
the attack
had been eliminated.
Unfortunately it
to capture the top leaders alive. twenty men,
had early
doing so had run right the edge
of
the swamp,
their submachine guns.
had been successful
who had managed to escape, had not
insofar
the partisan been possible
The core of the staff,
withdrawn southward
into the rifles
some and in
of the 3d Corrpany,
Upon our command to
They were all
from Daljoki, strrender
killed in
3d Co-
the latter
they
hidden at fired
hand-to-hand
fighting.. "After the attack
returned
the battalion
2
...
to
the caup in
Borisov."
T.
j
SMA LL UNIT ThOCTICS Examiple5 The Forest Camnp
w
V
I .1
The
oretCm t
In the huge forests west of Bryanek (Central Russia), wich are to for German forces with swamps, it was never possible interspersed really
get
the
upper hand over the
partisans
for
any length
of
time.
by the few Ger- "n Casualties inflicted There were too many of theme security units available were readily offset by reinforcements repartisans) rear areas. They (the ceived from the extensive stocks equipped with automatic weapons which came froze large
were which
rehad had to leave behind in the woods during its the Soviet Ary treat in the summer of 1941. Under tight and uniform direction from Moscow, the partisans their own activities
in
time of crisis,
in
the
with
Bryansk area had carefully
operations
they became
on the
coordinated
battlefield,
and thus,
a heavy burden and a cause for daily
worry to our supply services.
A Ruda,
very active group numbering 300 to 400 mn, the so-called Group mainly attacked the railway line and the highway west of Bryansk;
More than
units
other partisan
distinguished
by having
in the
an especially
Bryansk
Group Ruda was
area,
energetic
and audacious
around whose name a legend. had grown in the course of discipline. was characterized by aggressiveness and harsh
commander
time. . His group His orders
were also willingly obeyed by the civilian _population in remote to
which German reconnaissance
or police
patrols
came
villages,
only occasionally.
Over a long period only one case of noncompliance became known, when milk village refused to deliver the last the mayor of a small forest cow of the village and instead offered some sheep9 . A few days later the
mayor appeared with his
headquarters
where
Wife and children 'at he counted out twenty Czarist
table and demanded that
the nearest gold rubles
German on the
he and his faiily be iimmediately evacuated by which was endangered by partisan attacks,
air, and not by the railway, because they feared for -their
lives.
attempts to destroy In the summer of 1942, several Group Ruda failed because each time the group managed
the
dangerous
to escape
into
remote woods and swamps. In the autumn it was finally possible to discover the actual. hide-out and strong point of the group, a fortiof of land sirrounded by several belts fied camp located on a strip swamps. The German troops which were sent to attack bogged down with their vehicles in the first 'swamrp belt. The German sector commander broke off the action, feeling that he could not accept responsibility
for the losses which would probably be incurred in heavy weapons statements,
against
was protected
a fortified
camp that,
an attack without
according to
by mines and wire obstacles.
prisoner
The beginning of the
Companies were rifle
dependently.
muddy period proved crippling to Germans and
time to organize comander used this " The German sector comprising five cqrmpanies, The 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th
partisans alike. a ski battalion
companies, but they were
had twelve light machine guns, mortars which, loaded on light
were hauled by the troops.
three
equipped to
submachine
addition to numerous
In
guns,
heavy machine
Finnish
plywood
fight
in-
each company
guns,
and
six
sledges called
The 5th (Heavy Wleapons)
medium
Akjas,
Company had four
75.--i~i mountain guns which could be disassembled, as well as six Russian heavy mortars. , The weapons were transported by pack animgals, the am-
munition on indigenous sleds drawn by a ?anje*,% horse, talion was equipped with radio In
November,
when the
The entire bat-
telephones.
first
big snowfalls
came
and the
swamps be-
gan to freeze over,' partisan attacks were renewed. For training purposes, the Gerrian ski battalion was at first employed as a sort of flying-squad to protect the vital railway line. The advantage of its greater mobility, as compared with the slower movements of the partisans who made their attacks against the railway on foot, soon became apparent~ -On several, occasions our ski troops were able to follow the tracks
made by partisans
their
returning to
woods after raids,
and
to overtake them. On the other hand, the partisans soon adapted themselves to the new situation which confronted them due to the appearance of the ski
battalion.
Whenever
a ski coirpany took up quarters
in
a
village, the large-scale attacks against moving trains and against guardea tunnels and bridges in the vicinity of thc village would cease. The partisans would then restrict -their activities erous small demolition teams who attempted to fic. It was therefore obvious that a.well-prepared service between the civilian ioning intelligence
to disrupt
the work of numthe railway traf-
and rapidly functpopulation and the
ski battalion ordered a thorpartisans existed. The commander of the ough search of the villages near the railway and highway. The search brought to light an amazing number of German radio instruments of the battalion. The instruments undoubtedly came from type used' bythe ski supply trains
that
had been raided.
However, the recapture of the radio instruments failed to produce even the slightest change in the activities of the partisans, for they possessed, still other means of transmitting mander therefore decided to avoid all villages. words,
sleeping
in
the
open at
the
height
information. This
of a
first, this decision was received with scant out, however, that during the defense of the ious winter, he himself had lived for several
The ski com-
meant,
in
Russian winter.
enthusiasm. Orel salient weeks in the
He pointed in the prevopen, that
is to say, in huts built from snow and' a thick layer of fir~-tree branches, with a shelter-half as a door.
-I:Russian farm horse,
other At
the the
the parti-
the battalion commander insisted that if
Moreover,
en of nights in the open, the spend the winter procure to measures took He could do likewise battalion ski the the best: means against and, especially, necessary clothing
sans were able
to
dreaded nighttime freezing cf feet,
namely, the high felt
white paw'ka a
of
pair
were worn in
night
felt
place
to
boots attached
boots,
even in legs warM carried under his
normally used throughout Russia, which keep the battalion extreme cold. Every member of the ski the
belt
at
which
shoes worn during the day.
of the ski
had become ski battalion By the end of November the men of the an hour and to biwithin accustomed to building snow huts quite were immediately epparent, The results vouacking in the woods, as was no longer as efficient service intelligence The partisan On 2 December,, a partiin villages., when we had spent the nights thirty a furlough train attacked -not Group Ruda san unit
of a ski co:ipa.ny kilometers west of Bryansk, in the vicinity Th. had taken up quarters in the woodsa a -short timeo 'bef ore. noises -for pany heard tl! battle hazardous a weapon on this carried and joined -mounted on each train
which co m-
ran
going on furlough and machine guns were Any partisan the action 0
every
ttretch in
on the spot was shot down while fleeingu The same day not killed another ski company dealt similarly with a different partisan unit wheh it
Gerran bridge guard detail.
a
attacked
swanmcps covered the time ice By this forest the against prevented an attack group was still that the forest evident The German sector bone of Group Ruda.
the ski
which, in the autumn, had Tt was camp of Group Ruda. the headquarters and backcommander therefor.e ordered
battalion comm rand'er to eliminate
the partisan camp,
had been billeted in several the 'battalion On 7 December, after' and ' purpose of resting "a 'few days for the' near Pocep for villages and continued:. it started to snow steadily supplies, replenishing battalion night In the. morning of 8 December the snowing during the Patrols the adjacent woods, and moved northward to its quarters left - of the battalion in order to see if any'enemy scouts covered the' rear
followed the march peasants
Following the snow tracks of the battalion arrested
we're actually
one by one,
proved that they had any .ther
four
although it:could.not'be
purpose than haul wood
on
-their
sleds
from the woods. As a
deceptive
maneuver
westerly direction. tcard the
away.
In
the
battalion
camp of Group Ruesa,
forest
first
marched in
the depth o~f the forest. it,
a
north-
turned eastward
about twenty-five kilometers
The loca'tion of the carp was only. approximately known.
was situated
in
one' of' the
meters
north of the
of the
former forest
Bryansk settlement
large'
forest
railway line, of
30 ,,,,
Ruda.
zones, and
roughly ten seven kilometers
,'It
kilowest
UNCLASSIFED
MyY
The camp undoubtedly was well camouflaged sance had been unable to locate it accurately
or after the beginning of winter, and the
Communications
were
camp evidently
since either
mainly directecd southwrard .Bryansk highway. The wooded. zone north
air in
reconnaisthe autumn
from the forest
to the railway line of the camp was
desolate, very swampy and azlmout without roads, Since the unsuccessful attack against the forelst camp the zone h-ad nct been entered by German troops, The ski battalion- commander assumed that the partisans direction
probably would at
least
expect a
German attack
from that
It was the battalion comnmariders intention to advance on 8 December to an area about ten kilometers north of the partisan camp; during the follcwing day the exact location of the camp was to be determined, and on 10 December .th battalion was to carry out the attack with the point of main effort directed from the north. The battalion, without having, made any contact with the enemy, reached an area' about ten kilometers northwest of the partisan camp on the evening of g. December and bivouacked in the forest. At dawn the "1st Company left, with orders to reach the. area southwest of the camp, and from! there to reconnoiter the exact location of the camp. The battalion itself remained in its bivouac,
On. the afternoon of. 9 Decermber the commander of the 1st Company reported as follows: "Have reached an area roughly three kilometers southwest of partisan camp. Closer approach to' camp -is now im.possible because the partisans, who wear white parkas as we do, are carrying out exercises on self-made skis around the camp, During the night we shall reconnoiter exact. location of camhp.. The swamps are frozerY,.t
all the
If the partisans were conductingski exercises in the vicinity of the camp, then, so the battalion commander assuimed, they must be unaware of the presence of the ski' b attalibn. He was therefore somewhat surprised
when the 1st Comr-pany,
which
soon -after
reported the location of the forest camp according to radioed before
dawn that
it
was
engaged .in
'def-ensiv e
rnight grid
had
squares,
fighting
against
partisans who were attacking from the direction of the 'camp. The commander of. 1st Company reported further as At OCOO
(Daybreak):
follows:
"Attack. by ,par:tisans increases
in
intensity. At
0830:
Company position cle right flank
M4CLASSIFI
ttNcavy fighting against entir e Group 'Ruda. under' heavy mortar fire.: :Partisans' encirof company,,"
c At 0900: enemy in
"Front on right flank pressed back.
rear,
Position
of company uintenable.
withdrawing, westwa.rd while continuing to The
battalion
ha.d alerted 'the simpler than it
UNCLASIFIE
commander who, battalion, actually
on the basis
had to was, It
reach a was self
New I
am
fight." of
the
decision cyident
first
reports
which seemed that the 1st
Com-
severe struggle, but the question was pany must be supported in its hcw. By the immediate participation of the battalion in the battle Or by means of an attack 'by the battafought by the 1st Company? lion against the forest camp, which would at least draw away part of the partisan units from the 1st Company?' Or would it be better to divide the battalion in such a manner that sonmc of its elements would support the 1st Company while the rest would attack the camp which at the time was' not fully manned?
By means of excellent radio ~telephone coimnunications the battalion commander was accurately informed about the progress of the battle
and the present
tion was,
difficulties
of '
ht Company.
But
whether the company commander's report that
the great
ques-
he was engaged
by the entire Group Ruda was accurate, So far, 1s-t Company had' not captured any prisoners, and the company commander's report was based on his observation that he. was fighting against fourfold supe rioi-ity
prsonal
If the company commander was right, the forest camp was either not manned at all or only by weak forces, Thus thor o was a unique opportunity
of taking
the headquarters
and backbone
of Group
Ruda
speedily and without losses. The capture and destruction of the forest camp was, after all, the battalion's real mission, In case the camp was empty' or
only weakly held,
it
would n~t even be
-necess-
ary to cormit the entire battalion against it. Some' elements would suffice while the rest could rush to the aid of 1st Company,. What would happen,
however,
if
the
comp any commtander's
report
proved contrary ' to the facts? The exact strength of Group Ruada was unknown; it might have been more,:than 3Q0 to 400 men. It was inprobable that the efficient and cautious leader. of :Group Ruda should leave his mst important strong point unmanne.d. If, however, a strong force. was defending the camp, which supposedly wbas protected by mines and wsire
obstaclgs,
a
division
of forces
might," cause
the failure
of
the attack against the camp. The elements'sent to.the aid of 1st Coma pany, would be too weak to carry out a crushing blow against the enemy forces
engaged there;
at best
it.
would provide some relief.
Consequently to' divide .up the: battalion was, in the' final analysis, "neither to hop nor tojurnp.' ". A decisive change in the. situation could only be expected if 'the battalion was' corrmitted as a body, either to crush the partisans in' front of the 1st 'Co.any:. or to capture the forest camp The battalion conander decided to -attack-the 'forest camp.
UCSI ~~
'4 1
i
-
12A
'Y"~~
. .fF
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED He reasoned that
the 1st Company was presently about nine kiloIn view of the
meters away from the battalion,
deep snow in
forest, where one had to rely on compass and instinct to bring its it- was hardly possible for the battalion
about
at
the dusk which fell
would leave about four hours, until
This
noon,
at
approxiately
is,
that
hours,
than three
less
bear in
the
when marching, strength to
an to inflict possible would be quite time it During this 1600. Company, proof 1st the enemy in front blow against annihilating previous experience one According to all vided he decided to fight, to avoid doctrine It was partisan however. could not count on this,
As soon as they recognized the imagainst superior forces, battle In camp. pending danger they would withdraw, presumably into their a
the 1st Company sector
be
success. might possibly
local
scored- but
of camp would' cohtinue t.o remain in possession as the On the conThe situation would not have improved. the partisans.
nothing more
on the A surprise. attack would have become more serious. since German plans would have then be out of the question, by the battalion of any operations The final result been revealed. against of 1st Company would have to be a systematic attack in support it
trary, camp
the
would
camp conducted later, hand,
On the other
if
at
while a
present,
considerable
part
of
Group' Ruda was fighting the 1st Company, the battalion as a body were be to attack the forest camp, an effect of surprise might still was the camp was unmanned or only weakly defended, it If achieved. battalion. taken up by the bound to be speedily to, the camp would simultaneously bring relief
against An attack the 1st Company, for
it
could-hardly be assumed that the partisans would continue to attack strong point was in danger of filling into the. 1st Corpany if their
assumed that of success. Shortly
camp was so strong in the force however, the present was to be it by the battalion, attack the chance on would have even, less later systematic attack
If,
enemy hands. be able as to
to repii.se
a
after
.marched from its
battalion
0900 the ski
way of the shortest route toward the forest camp';
by
billets
At the head marched
75-m. mountain 'guns. four by the the 2d Company, which was reinforced The company had orders to use all 5th (Heavy. Weapons)' Company. of the encountered on the way. smash any resistance to rapidly forces its 5th Company, and of the remnants the with Company Then followed tie '3d the leading with marched staff battalion The Company.. 4th the finally company,
The advance proceeded without enemy interference. flank
battle
noises gradually
meters south of the camnp, 1130,
became
where the
when we were probably very
st
gun fire,
the
close to
which carne from the
swamp which was now snow covered.
aNCLASS1FtEF
four kilo-
Cmpany was fighting.
shots were fired near the leading elements submachine
On the right
audible from an area forest
camp,
the
of the 2d Company
Toward first
It
was
brushwood beyond an open- level
The corany commander,
accompanied
-CLASSIFUNEP by the-battalion commander, sent tro platoons and the mountain guns The attacking force soon into action against the enemy riflemen. succeeded
in
wooden bunkers,
five
taking
vance position, which had just
as an ad-
probably intended
been evacuated.
It
strip of brushwood, and was through the adjoining, met heavy fire a second snow-covered swamp when it about 150 meters away. forest opposite,.
then advanced just about to cross comiing from the
The camp we were looking for was bound to be located in northwestern side. forest, presunably on its The battalion six
heavy rmortars
of the
occupy the
ordered the 2nd company to
cogimhander
The 3d Col:pany,
northwestern part of the camp.
reinforced by 'the orders
received
5th Company,
this
the
to attack
kept in reserve for use The 4th Ccmiany ws camp from the north, of the right flank. The against soft spots and for the rs'otetion time was fighting abcut four kilometers 1st Company, which at this southwest of the camp, was instructed to change from delaying action to attack in order to pin dow n the enermy in front of it, the
At about 1300 the 2d Company penetrated while the 3d Company was stubbornly
forest,
camp
zone
combat
partisan the camp.
against
toward
of
fringe
units
the
the northern
for
the reserve company had to
A short time later
bunkers.
ed southward
forward
fighting
be shiftCompany's
which rushed from the 1st
in front of 2nd Company 1400 hours the resistance These guns of the mcoantain guns. collapsed due to the fire
Approximately at
finally
fire
had opened direct partisans
lived
at
penetrated into the camp.
on the bunkers in
range
fifty-meter
and which they
defended,
At this
stage
The battalion commander
which the
the company
committed his last
by a 2d Company. These reserves were constituted reserves behind the of the 4th Company. The advance of the 2d Company, which platoon fought its way forward from bunker to bunker, brought relief to the north, The 2d Company moved to the 3d Company attacking from the
center of the came, contact
deliberately left
with the enemy,
only a few assault troops in
and then attacked
the
camp from the
By 1500 all resistance had ceased in the camp. the partisans, who now were fleeing southward, still.
fusion in
the sector of 4th Company which,
then engaged
against
the
forces
that
east.
The remnants
of
caused some con-
southwest of the camp, was
previously
had fought the
1st
Company. Having lost almost a fourth of its strength during the day, 1st Corrany, together with the 4th Company, was unable to encirthe cle
the
We
enemy,
who escaped while
were absolutely
amazed at
suffering
heavy losses.
the size
of the camrnp
and
the amount
of supplies, which comprised tens of ammunition and weapons, in addifor many months, In addition we found a tion to enough food to last whole
arsenal
of materiel
from raided
German supply trains,
~se~rt.
NCGLBSSS
including
IItE
UNCLASSI FED 1
binoculars, ment.
._
-.
'
battery commander telescopes
and the latest radio equip-
An interrogation of prisoners brought ':t.,o:light the fact that the camp had been held by a fcr ce numbering 150 men. Appryximately 350 men had attacked the 1st Copany during the 'day. The company commi'nder's report about a fourfold superiority of enemy forces therefore proved accurate, We learned that the area immediately surrounding the cam±p, except for a few lanes, had been very heavily. mined. The, ski battalion had been favored by luck, inasmuch as heavf' sncwf - lls during the past few days had covered the mines, making them inffectual. The ccmrnmnd er of Group Ruda had booen kied the. saimo evening in front of the 4th. Company. During the follcwing rocnths, Group Ruda remained inactive.
35
UNCLASSIFIED
as
-~-~p~P"T~ F r~;''~ ~,
ae~":.i:"
-
r'71~-~ )
r t~ 7"f Y
Appendix 1
S ketch for Example 1 "THE
FIRST CLASH WITH
PARTISANS"
Situation on the Evening of 22 June 1941
Adjacent div on the left
Merkine
Scale: 1: 250,000 Kilometers
AJ1 CI
1-
Appendix 2
N~
w -J 0-
z
F(I)
Oi)
t
'I)
'9 f,to
Gods
Scale Approximately 1: 100, 000
'pO
0
U
0 0 0
Iia
E-C
w a:-
0
0
UJ 0
W~ H
/ /
/
/
/
G/y
/
'I
1
kP hIDL
5
;i:4
~
4
r Ur rr
~
UNCLASSIFIED
DISTRIBUTION
No.
of Copies Office,
Chief of Military
History
Historical Division Seventh Army Headquarters, European Command Intelligence School Berlin Military Post SHAPE COIMNAVF ORGER US AFE Military Posts
F
3
'
UNCLASSIFlED
NC l~s ss"c[ato
The release of this manuscript to non-U.S. personnel is controlled. Non-U.S.personnel desiring access to this manuscript should forward their requests to their respective Military Attache, Washington D.C., who in turn should transmit requests to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Attn: Chief, Foreign Liaison Office.
UJNCLA SFiE
UNCLASS
IF
.'GL (1) 9-51 105-22807
