Sereno - Quo Warranto - Motion for Reconsideration

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT

MANILA EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, – versus – versus – CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 237428 For: Quo Warranto

Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV , Movant-Intervenors. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Movant-intervenors, Senators LEILA M. DE LIMA and ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, through undersigned counsel, respectfully state that: 1. On 29 May 2018, Movant-intervenors, in such capacity, requested and obtained a copy of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 11 May 2018, by which eight members of the Court voted to grant the Petition for Quo Warranto, resulting in the ouster of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno. 2. The Supreme Court’s majority decision, penned by Justice Tijam, ruled that: 2.1. There are no grounds grounds to grant grant the motion for inhibition filed by respondent Chief Justice Sereno; 2.2. Impeachment is not an exclusive means for the removal of an impeachable public official;

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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR RECONSIDERATION Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Page 2 of 25

2.3. The instant Petition for Quo Warranto could proceed independently and simultaneously with an impeachment; 2.4. The Supreme Court’s taking cog nizance nizance of the Petition for Quo Warranto is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers; 2.5. The Petition is not dismissable on the Ground of Prescription, as “[p]rescription does not lie against the t he State”; and 2.6. The Petitioner sufficiently proved that Respondent violated the SALN Law, and such failure amounts to proof of lack of integrity of the Respondent to be considered, much less nominated appointed, as Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council and the President of Republic, respectively. 3. Movant-intervenors, Movant-intervenors, respectfully disagreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, hereby file the instant Motion for Reconsideration. 4. The majority decision likewise denied denied the Motion for Intervention filed by herein Movant-Intervenors, stating that their claimed interest as Senator-judges in impeachment proceedings is merely contingent or expectant, as it “is still contingent co ntingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate”. 5. Movant-Intervenors Movant-Intervenors likewise seek reconsideration of this ruling, on the grounds that, as will be further discussed below, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the present Petition clearly show that the interest they invoke and seek to protect through their Motion for Intervention is actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, such that an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court will result in an actual injury to the constitutional rights, duties and prerogatives of herein Movant-Intervenors and their fellow members of Congress, particularly in in the Senate. In fact, this view view is supported by Proposed Senate Resolution No. 738, which was signed by fourteen (14) members of the Senate, including eight (8) majority members, namely, then Senate President Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, Senate President Pro Tempore Ralph Recto, Senators Joel Villanueva, Villanueva, Loren Legarda, Sherwin Sherwin Gatchalian, Francis Escudero, Sonny Angara, Angara, and Grace Poe, and all six (6) ( 6) members of the Senate minority, namely, Minority Leader Franklin Drilon, Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, Bam Aquino, Risa, Hontiveros, and herein Movant-Intervenors, Antonio Trillanes IV and Leila de Lima.












IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL

PUBLIC

6. The subject of the said proceeding, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is, by express provision of the Constitution, removal from office exclusively by by impeachment, as is every other member of the Supreme Court, the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.1 7. Under the same Article of the Constitution, the exclusive power to try and decide all cases of impeachment is vested upon the Senate,2 whose judgment in such cases “shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.” 3 8. In other words, under the Constitution, it is the exclusive domain of the Philippine Senate, acting on a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment, or Articles of Impeachment, filed by at least one-third of all Members of the House of Representatives, to remove the Chief Justice (or any other impeachable officer for that matter) from office. 9. Thus, the filing of the quo warranto petition seeking the removal of Chief Justice Sereno violates the legal interest and duty vested by the Constitution on the Senate, of which movant-intervenors are members, and is, thus, repugnant to the Constitution and destructive of the system of checks and balances established established therein. 10. Hence, this opposition-in-intervention, seeking the outright dismissal of the quo warranto petition, it being without basis and, in fact, contrary to the Constitution.

Chief Justice is an impeachable officer 11. The The constitutional qualifications under Art.8, Sec. 7(1) for appointment to the Supreme Court are limited to: (1) natural born citizenship, (2) age, (3) and experience, i.e., at least fifteen years of practice of law. These are legally enforceable objective qualifications in the sense that the Supreme Court can nullify the appointment of someone who does not possess any of these three qualifications. The President, for example, cannot appoint someone who is a foreigner, or 30 years of age, or is not even a lawyer. These












are qualifications for which there are judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and can thus be passed upon by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of judicial review. 12. On the other hand, Art. 8, S ec.7(3) states that “[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” These are not objective constitutional qualifications, but subjective characteristics of a judge. 13. These These subjective characteristics are addressed for consideration of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President. Questions of competence, integrity, probity, and independence are not susceptible to analysis with the tools of legal doctrine; instead, they require political discernment on the part of the JBC and the President. They are “soft variables” for which there are no judicially manageable standards. 14. Thus, Thus, a person possessing such objective objective qualifications, qualifications, who is also determined as possessing the subjective qualifications by the fact that he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and appointed by the President, and who then takes the oath of office, as in the case of Chief Justice Sereno, is already an impeachable public officer and can no longer be removed, except through the process of impeachment.

The Removal from Office of Members of the Class of “Impeachable Officials” Can Only Be Obtained Exclusively Through Impeachment 15. The The quo warranto petition filed by the OSG seeks the removal or ouster of the Chief Justice via a means other than impeachment. 16. This This is contrary to the language, spirit and design of the Constitution.

The language of the Constitution provides for the manner by which “impeachable officers”, including members of the Supreme Court, may be removed from office. Article XI of the Constitution, on “Accountability of Public 17. Article Officers”, Section 2 states that the Chief Justice, as a member of the t he Supreme












18. That That the said constitutional provision uses the word “may” does not take away from the exclusive character of removing impeachable officials solely by impeachment. 18.1. First of all, the word “may” applies to the phrase “be removed from office”. office”. It is meant to emphasize emphasize that these officials – who who are among those who hold the highest positions in their respective spheres and who are, thus, the most powerful officials in the land – nonetheless nonetheless remain accountable to the public because there remains a mechanism that “may” be resorted to in order to remove them from office. 18.2. In other words, the word “may” indicates that, though the sensitivity of their positions necessitate that they be free from the threat of being charged and removed from office by less stringent means that could affect the effective discharge of their powers and responsibilities, they are nevertheless still subject to public scrutiny and “may” still penalized for their actions, albeit through the mechanism outlined in Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. 18.3. In fact, it is precisely the use of the word “may” in this provision, in this particular Article of the Constitution, and in the context of the special character of this class of officials that emphasizes both the possibility of removal of these officials from office, as well as the intent to make the process of removal be exclusive. 18.4. Secondly, it is deceptively simplistic to argue that the word “may” means that resort to impeachment is directory, in the sense that other means of removing this class of officials from office is still available. As far back as 1913 (and reiterated thereafter4 ), the Honorable Court has unequivocally rejected such simplistic interpretation, holding that:

In Rock Island County Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says: The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that

. What they are empowered to do the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not for their benefit, but for his. . It is given as












. Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be

The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect. (Colby University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128 Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs.Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953, 956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S.W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.)5

18.5. Applied in this case, and in the words of the Supreme Court, Court, the constitutional provision “is, in fact, peremptory” one, given that it is one: i. “where power is given to public officers” ( i.e. i.e., the power to remove this class of officials from office); ii. both “the public interest” ( i.e., i.e., the interest to ensure that a balance is struck between giving these high-ranking officials, who are holding sensitive posts, the security needed to discharge their duties without fear or favour, and the need to nonetheless preserve a means, albeit a stringent one, of holding them accountable to the public) and “individual rights” ( i.e., i.e., the right of these officials to invoke the protection,6 limited as it may be, afforded to them by the stringent requirements of impeachment proceedings), call for its exercise in the manner set forth therein; and 18.6. Furthermore, as will be further discussed below, the intent to make impeachment the exclusive mode of removing impeachable officials from office is clear, not just in the language of the provision, but also implicitly in the context of what it intends to accomplish as a feature of the system of checks and balances that underpin our structure of














government, and explicitly based on the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution.

The system of checks and balances set forth in the Constitution requires that the method of removal of impeachable officers be exclusive 19. The The landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 explains the implicit, yet undeniable, fundamental principles upon which our system if government is founded: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses.

And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments












The power to remove impeachable officers from from office is explicitly explicitly vested in the Senate, acting on the Articles of Impeachment duly filed by the House of Representatives.

The Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission leaves no doubt as to the intent behind Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution 21. The The exclusivity of of the impeachment process, as a means by which Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office, is explicitly apparent in the deliberations of 1986 Constitutional Commission: MR. REGALADO: I propose to add in Section 2 as a last sentence thereof as already amended the following: ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW BUT NOT BY IMPEACHMENT. The reason for the amendment is this: While Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officers, there is nothing that will prevent the legislature as it stands now from providing also that other officers not enumerated therein . Under Section 1 of P.D. No. N o. 1606, the Sandiganbayan Decree, justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only by impeachment, unlike their counterparts in the then Court of Appeals. They are, therefore, a privileged class on the level of the Supreme Court. In the Committee on Const itutional Commissions and Agencies, there are many commissions which are sought to be constitutionalized — if I may use the phrase — and the end result would be that if they are constitutional commissions, the commissioners there could . What is there to prevent the Congress later — because of the lack of this sentence that I am seeking to add — from providing that officials of certain offices, although nonconstitutional, ?9

22. The The

ed use of the phrase “also… only by impeachment”












of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office. xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. MONSOD: We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is . MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not . MR. MONSOD: We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, . We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, , Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Do we have a quorum? There are Members who are in the lounge. The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present. THE PRESIDENT: We have a quorum. MR. MONSOD: May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a few minutes ago. MR. DE LOS REYES: Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word “Ombudsman” and, therefore, we have already voted on it. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, may I comment on that.












MR. RODRIGO: Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question? THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized. MR. RODRIGO: The Ombudsman, is this only one man? MR. DAVIDE: Only one man. MR. RODRIGO: Not including his deputies. MR. MONSOD: No. VOTING THE PRESIDENT: We will now vote on the amendment. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.) As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.) The results show 10 votes in favor f avor and 14 against; the amendment is lost. 10

24. The The imperative character of the exclusivity of the impeachment proceedings as a means to remove this class of public officials is, once again, explicit and invites invites no doubt. doubt. In the words of the President President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, these officials “have to be removed from from office only on impeachment.” 25. The The rationale is also clear, it is as much a means of exacting the accountability of such officials, as a means of “insulating them from politics” and of protecting them from retaliatory acts arising from the discharge of their delicate functions that entail “stepping “stepping on a lot of toes.” The idea behind the protection is to clothe them with some form of immunity so that they may act independently without fear of being removed from office through ordinary means.












The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the exclusive character of the impeachment process as a means of removing impeachable officers from office 28. The The Honorable Court has consistently held that this provision “proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutio nal officers by any other method,”11 and, in one particular case, had occasion to repeat this in connection with an attempt to remove a Supreme Court Justice through disbarment proceedings.12 29. The The case of In re: Gonzales 13is especially instructive: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms: There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,

. xxx (Emphasis supplied) This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan, the Court said: xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, the above provision ; otherwise, to allow a public officer who














xxx

xxx

xxx

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that

. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. .14












retaliatory acts from those who may be aggrieved by their discharge of their duties. 31. Section 3 of Article XI further states, in part, that: SECTION 3. (1) The House Hous e of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. xxx

xxx

xxx

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed f iled by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and . (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. 15












make it applicable only to the President), and deliberately decided to adopt the United States version ( i.e., i.e., with the Senate having the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases), to wit: MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner need not overhaul the procedure. But

MS. AQUINO: . xxx xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE: Commissioner Aquino must be aware that the main provision on impeachment in the draft article under discussion was xxx xxx xxx xxx THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair would like to understand the present parliamentary situation. Is Commissioner Aquino proposing a specific amendment? MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): On what section and what is the nature of the amendment?












MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I am presently inclined to respect the position of the Committee. xxx xxx xxx MR. GUINGONA.: Last question. Mr. Presiding Officer. Mention was made here about the impeachment proceeding . Is the honorable Commissioner aware that ? I would like to cite, among others, the following countries: United Arab Republic, Zambia, the Republic of France, Burundi, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Gabon, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, and others. MS. AQUINO: I am not aware of that, Mr. Presiding Officer. But I am thankful for that citation because it reinforces my position. xxx

xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, the proposed amendment on Section 3 (5) would seek to , such that I would seek co-sponsorship with Commissioner Guingona to propose an amendment by substitution on Section 3 (5), page 2, beginning on line 15. The proposed amendment reads: “The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachment CASES AFFECTING THE VICE-PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL C ONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS.












As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.) The results show 13 votes in favor and 25 votes against; the proposed amendment is lost. 18

35. It is clear from the foregoing that the intent to vest the power to remove impeachable officers from office solely on the Senate, to the exclusion even of the Surpeme Court, is completely deliberate and, thus, unequivocal.

Quo Warranto Is Not The Proper Remedy 36. Quando Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. 37. If Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI were so meticulously and deliberately framed to make impeachment an exclusive means of removing impeachable officers from office, and to vest solely on on the Senate the power to try and devide impeachment cases, then to attempt to t o oust an impeachable officer, such as the Chief Justice, through a means other than impeachment is an attempt to contravene the Constitution, which the Honorable Court cannot sanction. 38. This This is especially true if the proposed mode is a quo warranto proceeding, which relies on the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme














applied for the position of Chief Justice is a question that does not go into her constitutional constitutional qualification. qualification. Submission of SALN SALN is, in the first place, not a constitutional qualification. 41. Whether Whether or not such incomplete SALN amounts to a lack of integrity on her part is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the JBC and the President pre-appointment, and the House of Representatives and the Senate upon her assumption into office. 42. In fact, such grounds is subsumed among those set forth in Section 2 of Article XI, i.e., betrayal of public trust, and, in the case of Chief Justice Sereno, is precisely one of the proposed articles for her impeachment. 43. To To seek her ouster in such grounds is, therefore, an undue undue intrusion into the prerogatives vested solely on the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively.












favor of finding probable cause to impeach Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno,25 and, on 19 March 2018, it approved the following six (6) articles of impeachment, as stated in the speech of House justice committee chairperson Rep. Reynaldo Umali: i.

Non-filing and non-disclosure of her sworn statement of assets and liabilities and net worth (SALN), constituting the impeachable offense of culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayal of public trust;

ii.

Committing corruption and betrayal of public trust when she misused a total amount of ₱18 million of public funds thereby manifesting her grandiose sense of self-importance;

iii.

Committing culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and/or other high crimes when she arrogated unto herself the powers reposed upon the Supreme Court as a collegial, deliberative and consultative body;












probable cause to impeach Sereno and prepared the corresponding committee report and Articles of Impeachment against her.”28 45.4. The same official Press Release of the House of Representatives stated that “[b]efore Congress adjourned last March 21 the Committee on Rules referred the matter for plenary consideration.” c onsideration.”29 45.5. Thus, it is public knowledge that the Quo Warranto Petition, alleging the same grounds for the th e Chief Justice’s removal, was filed long long after the impeachment impeachment process has already been filed.

45.6. The fact that this is one of the grounds for impeachment charged against Chief Justice Sereno was made known to the Honorable Court as far back as August 2017 of last year, considering that on 24 August 2017, it was reported that that the Supreme Supreme Court, in in resolutions resolutions dated August 8 and 15, granted the requests of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) and of Atty. Larry Gadon, respectively, for the release of documents that are to be “used in filing an impeachment












proceedings, according to the Solicitor General himself, when he admitted,

in a press conference held on the occasion of the filing, that the filing of the Petition for Quo Warranto was intended to prevent the impeachment trial from proceeding, claiming that it was “an act of kindness”, as “[t]he Office of the Solicitor General will not allow [the Chief Justice] to undergo the indignity that the late Chief Justice Renato Corona suffered at the hands of politicians who unjustly convicted him.”34 47. Thus, Thus, it is very misleading to state that the Quo Warranto Petition Petition could proceed simultaneously with the impeachment proceedings, as, obviously, the Supreme Court’s act of granting the same – same – as as it did, indeed, do in this case – would would render moot and inutile the earlier initiated and ongoing impeachment proceedings. 48. Therefore, Therefore, even assuming that Quo Warranto is a valid remedy and and impeachment is not exclusive, following the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior c onstitutional Doctrine est jure 35 and in accordance with the respect due to the constitutional of Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court ought to have, at the very












suit was the more appropriate action to resolve the real issue between the parties - whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land under the terms of the lease contract; this was the subject matter of the second suit for unlawful detainer, and was also the main or principal purpose of the first suit for declaratory relief. In the is the critical element.

the bonafidesor good faith of the parties

In Teodoro, we noted that the first action, declaratory relief, was filed by the lessee to anticipate the filing of the second action, unlawful detainer, considering the lessor's letter informing the lessee that the lease contract had expired. 36

Applying the “more appropriate test”, it is the impeachment 51. Applying proceedings that is the more appropriate proceedings , considering that the Supreme Court is is not a trier of facts. facts. This fact cannot be made more apparent than during the oral arguments, when rules of evidence, including














CONSTITUTION; HENCE, MOVANT-INTERVENORS’ MOVANT-INTERVENORS’ INTEREST IN PREVENTING SUCH A VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IS NEITHER MERE EXPECTANT AND INCHOATE

53. As As stated earlier, the impeachment proceedings is not only ongoing, it also preceded the Petition for Quo Quo Warranto. So, too, the fact fact that the












The Sense Of The Senate To Uphold The Constitution On The Matter Of Removing ”, stating, in part: A Chief Justice From Office ”, WHEREAS, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that members of the Supreme Court "may be removed from office, on impeachment for, for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution xxx";

WHEREAS, Section 3( 1) of Article XI states that "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment"; Section 3(6) of the same Article states that "The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases cases of impeachment xxx";












60. In the course of the proceedings, the animosity between the parties and some of the members of the Honorable Court became quite palpable and apparent. It has become evident evident that the Honorable Court Court cannot render a judgment based purely on the merits of the case, given such hostile environment. 61. With With all due respect to the Honorable Court, the proceedings last 10 April 2018 cannot honestly be considered as wholly impartial, as to satisfy the due process requirement that those who shall hear, try and decide cases ought to possess the cold neutrality of impartial judges.












FLORIN T. HILBAY Counsel for Movant-Intervenors

Roll of Attorneys No. 44957 PTR No. 5642721; 01/11/18; Q.C IBP Lifetime Membership No. 08505 MCLE Exemption No. V-000908, issued on 12/3/2015 [email protected]

Sereno - Quo Warranto - Motion for Reconsideration

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