RULES on EVIDENCE Case Digest Compedium-Von

RULES ON EVIDENCE Case Digests

Submitted to: Judge Orlando Gallardo Professor

Submitted by: Capilitan, Diamer B. Ditucalan, Sarah Jane B. Enriquez, Desiree Von D. Guirnaldo, Onella M. Macalanggan, Junisah B. LLB- IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS Cases:

Page No.

1. Dr. dela Llana vs Rebecca Biong GR. 182356, Dec. 4, 2013…………… 3 2. People vs Vivencio Sabellano and Wesly Sabellano…………………….. 5 GR no. 93932-33, June 5, 1991 3. Tating vs Marcella GR No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRa 79…… 7 4. People vs Marjorie Castillo GR No 116748, June 2, 1997………………. 8 5. People vs Francisco 105 SCRA 516……………………………………….. 9 6. US vs Capa Capa and and Carino 19 Phil Phil 125, 1291 . ……………………………….13 ……………………………….13 7. Pp v. Hodges, 46 Phil. 502, 503……………………………………………. 14 8. Pp v. Liera, 82 SCRA 163…………………………………………………… 15 9. Pp v. Muñoz, et al. 107 SCRA 313…………………………………………. 17 10. Malig v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 313………………………………….. 18 11. Pp v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 525……………………………………………….19 525………………………………………………. 19 12. Pp v. De la Cruz, et al., 91 SCRA 525……………………………………...20 525……………………………………... 20 13. Pp v. Extra, 7 2 SCRA 200……………………………………………………21 200…………………………………………………… 21 14. Pp v. Alitao, et al., G.R. No. L- 74736, February 18, 1991………………... 22 15. Pp v. Bolima, et al., G.R. No. L-96549, L- 96549, March 22, 1991………………….. 23 16. Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. L- 68834…………………. 68834………………….24 24 June 6, 1990 17. Pp v. Tandoy, G.R. No. L-8 0505, Dec. 4, 1990…………………………… 25 18. Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, Ramol ete, 66 SCRA 431…………………………………….. 26 19. Pp v. Castañeda, Castañeda, 88 SCRA 562……………………………………………..28 562…………………………………………….. 28 20. Ortigas v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773 ………………… …………………29 29 June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 636-637 21. Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas n g Manggagawang Pilipino……………… .32 G.R. No. L-38964, June 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 258, 263-26

TABLE OF CONTENTS Cases:

Page No.

1. Dr. dela Llana vs Rebecca Biong GR. 182356, Dec. 4, 2013…………… 3 2. People vs Vivencio Sabellano and Wesly Sabellano…………………….. 5 GR no. 93932-33, June 5, 1991 3. Tating vs Marcella GR No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRa 79…… 7 4. People vs Marjorie Castillo GR No 116748, June 2, 1997………………. 8 5. People vs Francisco 105 SCRA 516……………………………………….. 9 6. US vs Capa Capa and and Carino 19 Phil Phil 125, 1291 . ……………………………….13 ……………………………….13 7. Pp v. Hodges, 46 Phil. 502, 503……………………………………………. 14 8. Pp v. Liera, 82 SCRA 163…………………………………………………… 15 9. Pp v. Muñoz, et al. 107 SCRA 313…………………………………………. 17 10. Malig v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 313………………………………….. 18 11. Pp v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 525……………………………………………….19 525………………………………………………. 19 12. Pp v. De la Cruz, et al., 91 SCRA 525……………………………………...20 525……………………………………... 20 13. Pp v. Extra, 7 2 SCRA 200……………………………………………………21 200…………………………………………………… 21 14. Pp v. Alitao, et al., G.R. No. L- 74736, February 18, 1991………………... 22 15. Pp v. Bolima, et al., G.R. No. L-96549, L- 96549, March 22, 1991………………….. 23 16. Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. L- 68834…………………. 68834………………….24 24 June 6, 1990 17. Pp v. Tandoy, G.R. No. L-8 0505, Dec. 4, 1990…………………………… 25 18. Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, Ramol ete, 66 SCRA 431…………………………………….. 26 19. Pp v. Castañeda, Castañeda, 88 SCRA 562……………………………………………..28 562…………………………………………….. 28 20. Ortigas v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773 ………………… …………………29 29 June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 636-637 21. Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas n g Manggagawang Pilipino……………… .32 G.R. No. L-38964, June 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 258, 263-26

CASE No. 01: Dr. DELA LLANA vs. BIONG 2013-12-04 | G.R. No. 182356 FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving and his sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing pushing the car forward. forward. Dra. Dela Llana suffered minor wounds. The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero who is an employee of respondent respondent Rebecca Biong. In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of hernneck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression compression of the nerve running to her left arm and is required to undergo serious medication to alleviate her condition. Thus she demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This made her sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana but was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury injury and and consider her medical certificate as an admissible evidence. RULING: The SC said that “the basic rule that evidence which which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.” In sum, Dra. dela Liana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Liana's favor. Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on. Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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CASE No. 02: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIVENCIO SABELLANO and WESLY SAPELLANO 1991-06-05 | G.R. Nos. 93932-33 FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 65155, On February 6, 1985, Walderita Abrogar was in her house at 536 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong watching a wake across the street. A game had then been in progress for about two (2) hours between one Julio Catayong and Wesly. Julio cursed 'putang inamo' and delivered a fist blow to Wesly. Seeing the trouble erupt, Salvador pulled out a knife and advanced towards Wesly. Vivencio Sabellano, at the same time, had also approached and held up Salvador preventing the latter from attacking Wesly. As this occurred, Wesly went home and after getting hold of a knife, rushed back and stabbed Salvador twice. Almar, who was then a mere three (3) armlengths (sic) away watching. Salvador asked Almar to fetch a taxi to which the latter obliged. Wesly confronted Almar and told him not to be involved. Almar ran to the house and hid. The deceased, Benito Abrogar, was at that time fixing the toilet. Hearing the commotion, he went out holding a bolo. He was met by Vivencio, Mayoling, Wesly and Jaime who struck him with a bareta. Mayoling and Wesly mauled Benito while Vivencio delivered a stab to the back with a 29" knife. He was then picked-up by his wife who, along with other relatives, took him to Rizal Provincial Hospital and confined for ten (10) days." In Criminal Case No. 67688, On March 9, 1986 at 3:45 a.m. met the group of Vivencio, Wesly, Jimmy and John Doe at a grocery store. Further down the street, Gertrudes noticed that two (2) joggers. One of the joggers, Wesly, grabbed Walderita with his left arm around her neck. On the other hand, Vivencio, embraced Benito and stabbed the latter on the right breast. Jaime and John Doe stabbed Benito in the abdomen. Wesly released Walderita and stabbed Benito in the back. Walderita tried to help Benito for home but he died shortly. Gertrudes was only an arm-length away and was able to recognize the assailants. RTC decide in Case No. 6515 and Case No. 67688 against Vivencio Sabellano as “Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt” for Homicide and Wesly Sabellano for Murder respectively. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY BIASED, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF WALDERITA ABROGAR. RULING: The SC ruled that although the records do not show any direct proof showing that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano together with his three other companions agreed to inflict fatal wounds on the person of the deceased, there is overwhelming evidence from the elaborate testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Benito's attackers were at the time and place of the stabbing incident that led to the death of the said victim,


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Benito Abrogar, and that all of them acted in consonance with a common design so that the guilt of one becomes the guilt of all. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the trial court's decision dated June 6, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of increasing the amount of indemnity.


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CASE No. 03 TATING vs. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27 FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the C A. ISSUE: Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts. RULING: The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.


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CASE No. 04: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARJORIE CASTILLO G.R. No. 116748 | 1997-06-02 FACTS: On or about the 27th day of November, 1990, the abovenamed accused, armed with a long barrel twelve gauge shotgun, in company with persons whose identities and whereabouts are unknown, with intent to kill, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and with the use of said firearms, shoot once ELMA BAULITE who was then holding her daughter GEMMA BAULITE, hitting and wounding GEMMA BAULITE at the abdomen, and as a consequence thereof GEMMA BAULITE died thereafter and also hitting ELMA BAULITE at the upper anterior right arm, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it due to the timely and able medical attendance given to ELMA BAULITE, which prevented her death. Appellant, pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on May 4, 1992. Trial ensued afterwards, with the People offering the testimonies of two witnesses and four items of documentary. The RTC convicted Castillo for the complex crime of murder and affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in believing Elma Baulite's supposedly improbable testimony and in rejecting his defense of alibi. RULING: The SC ruled that “having thoroughly examined and objectively evaluated the evidence and records before us, we hold that appellant indeed committed the crime alleged in the information beyond any iota of doubt.” The SC added that “there is nothing on record showing any improper motive on the part of Elma Baulite to testify mendaciously against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the crime committed. In the absence of evidence showing such motive, the logical conclusion is that the principal witness for the prosecution was not so actuated and that her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.” The SC further states that, “Where an accused's alibi is established only by himself and his relatives, his denial of culpability does not deserve any consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses. This bare consideration applies to supporting testimonies made by the friends of the accused. Where the distance did not render it impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime, the defense of alibi must preclude the possibility that the accused could have been physically present at that place or its vicinity at or about the time of its commission. Appellant has utterly failed to prove that fact or impossibility. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.


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CASE No. 05 People of the Philippines vs Francisco 105 SCRA 516 FACTS: Defendant-appellant is convicted by the trial court for the crime of Rape against the prosecuting witness, Mercedita Manito. During trial, the prosecution presented as their witness Mercedita Manito, the victim; Luciano Manito, victim's father; Dr. Fernando Viloria, the physician who conducted an internal examination three (3) days after the alleged commission of the crime of rape; and Lt. Vicente Sosa, the officer-incharge of the investigation. The defense on the other hand presented the accused, Ariston Francisco as their witness. Complainant, MERCEDITA MANITO's version of the incident follows: In the evening of January 28, 1972, At about 12:00 o'clock, she and her sister went home from a Coronation Ball. On their way, appellant and Ruby Poras, who were following behind, suddenly ran after them and overtook them. Appellant grabbed complainant's right hand and whirled her around several times and she shouted "Saklolo.! Saklolo.!". Complainant's younger sister, Roberta, ran away. Appellant then dragged her to a place where talahib grass grew, while Poras was beside them holding a knife. Appellant removed her panty, made her lie on her back, embraced her hard and sexually abused her. During the sexual intercourse, the complainant felt pain while Poras was beside appellant and was holding a knife. When appellant was through having carnal knowledge of her, Poras also took his own turn with her. Meanwhile, appellant stayed beside accused Poras holding an open knife. After Poras had subjected her to the same carnal treatment, complainant stood up but Poras again embraced her and forced her to lie down. The complainant fainted. Complainant declared on cross examination that appellant and Poras were able to penetrate her private part with their private organs; that she felt severe pain; and that appellant raped her once while accused Poras raped her twice. When asked whether she offered any resistance, complainant answered that she became very weak because of the force they used on her. When complainant was asked whether her private part bled, or whether she felt her private part bleed during and after she was raped, she answered: " I do not know." However, on further cross-examination complainant was asked whether she felt blood oozing from her vagina and she answered in the affirmative, further saying that the blood spilled on the ground and stained her dress (upper garment). During the incident, complainant stated that she was wearing a p antsuit with an upper apparel and panty. Her panty and pantsuit where taken by appellant, who refused to return them in spite of her demand. Complainant could not remember when she regained her consciousness but she was able to go home at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning, without panty and pantsuit but not naked from the waist down because her upper garment reached down to her thighs. When she arrived at their house, everybody was asleep, including her sister Roberta. Complainant went to sleep. At around 6:00 o'clock the next morning, January 29, 1972, complainant washed her stained upper garment because she was afraid the members of her family might discover what had happened to her. Complainant did not reveal a thing to anybody after the incident, nor did she relate the incident to her father Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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because appellant and Ruby Poras had threatened to kill her if she did. Finally, complainant revealed the occurrence to her elder sister, Estrella Manito, w ho received a report from their uncle, Maximo Manito, that appellant had told their uncle about what he had done to complainant. When her father confronted complainant, she told him that she had been raped. On cross-examination, complainant denied that she had a prearranged date with appellant to attend the coronation ball on January 28, 1972. According to her, she had never met appellant prior to January 28, 1972; the latter had never gone to their place; nor had visited her; nor had serenaded her; nor had courted her; and never had made amorous advances to her. 16 She saw appellant watching the dance at the entrance gate of the premises during the coronation bag and he was not formally dressed. Complain ant was investigated by Lt. Sosa, a police officer, at the police headquarters in Bongabon. During said investigation, she was with her father, Luciano Manito. She executed a sworn statement on February 1, 1972 (Exhibit "B") and another one on February 3, 1972 (Exhibit "3"). In her latter statement, complainant admitted that she had one sexual intercourse the year before with Cirilo Francisco, an uncle of appellant. She also declared that she did not bleed when she was abused by appellant and Ruby Poras. LUCIANO MANITO's testimony disclosed that, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of January 28, 1972, his daughter, Mercedita, asked for permission to attend the coronation ball at Camantigue. Mercedita went with her sisters Roberta and Estrelia. He advised his daughters to return at 12:00 o'clock midnight. Estrella returned with her husband around that hour. Luciano inquired from his daughter Estrella for the whereabouts of Mercedita and Roberta; Estrella told him that the two were still attending the coronation ball. When Roberta arrived alone at around 12: 00 o'clock midnight the father inquired about Mercedita. Roberta told him that Mercedita was still witnessing the coronation ball. He did not notice any more the arrival of Mercedita. At about 8:00 o'clock the next day, January 29, 1972, Luciano left for Lumboy Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, in order to work. He learned of the January 28, 1972 incident two days later while he was at Lumboy Roxas, through his daughter Estrelia. When he returned to Camantigue, Bongabon, on January 31, 1972 22 he confronted Mercedita about the matter and the latter admitted that she was abused by Ariston Francisco at midnight of January 28, 1972. Luciano noticed that Mercedita was weak and she complained that her body was painful. Luciano, Mercedita, and the husband of Estrella together went to the police headquarters and filed a complaint. Mercedita was investigated by Lt. Sosa. Thereafter, they went to the clinic of Dr. Viloria where Mercedita was examined. 25 DR. FERNANDO VILORIA , testified that: on February 1, 1972, he conducted an internal examination of Mercedita Manito and issued a medical certificate recording his findings of "three (3) old lacerations at the vaginal orifice-situated at 3, 5 and 9 o'clock." Aside from the lacerations, he found no injuries on the body of Mercedita. Dr. Viloria admitted that the lacerations could have been caused probably by sexual intercourse. On cross- examination he declared that the lacerations were very old and


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that it was possible that the lacerations were sustained by Mercedita prior to January 28, 1972. Lt. VICENTE SOSA , officer-in-charge of the investigation, narrated: In the morning of February 1, 1972, complainant, accompanied by her father, filed a criminal complaint for Rape in the Office of the Police of Bongabon. He then had complainant examined by Dr. Viloria, and thereafter interrogated her and reduced her statement into writing. On February 2, 1972, appellant was brought to the Office of the Police by a certain barrio official of Camantigue. In the presence of another investigator, Corporal Garbin, Lt. Sosa interrogated appellant, who admitted the commission of the crime. Lt. Sosa prepared appellant's statement, read to the latter the contents thereof, and asked him whether he acknowledged the contents. When appellant answered in the affirmative, Lt. Sosa caused him to thumb mark and sign the statement. Lt. Sosa brought appellant to Municipal Judge Garcia and left him there "to subscribe his affidavit and later the Judge called (Lt. Sosa) and informed (him) that there was no truth to the contents of the affidavit of Ariston Francisco." ARISTON FRANCISCO, accused-appellant, as sole witness for the defense, he set up alibi, claiming that at about 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 28, 1972, he was with his brothers, sisters and parents in their house, which is "far" from barrio Camantigue, that is, 4 more or less one kilometer" away. Appellant claimed further that he does not know Mercedita Manito and that the complaint she filed against him is untrue. He admitted, however, that he does not know of any reason why Luciano Manito or Mercedita Manito, both of whom he did not know, would entertain a grudge or illfeeling against him and charge him in Court. Appellant rejected his statement claiming that he signed it only because he was threatened by Patrolman Camacho of the Bongabon Police. Appellant narrated that before Lt. Sosa took his statement, Patrolman Camacho brought him (appellant) to the second floor of the municipal building of Bongabon, required him to expose his penis, and hammered his penis with half a hollow block. However, because appellant's penis receded before it was hit, it did not sustain any injury except for some bruises (gasgas) at the tip which left no scar. Appellant did not, however, complain to Lt. Sosa of the maltreatment he suffered at the hands of Patrolman Camacho. When Lt. Sosa investigated appellant, the former was alone in the room and the hollow block was lying on one side of the room. Aside from facts regarding his personal circumstances, appellant denied having supplied the contents of sworn statement prepared by Lt. Sosa, alleging that said statement was a fabrication of the investigator Lt. Sosa. He further denied having knowledge thereof because he does not know how to read, and he only affixed his signature because he was required to do so. ISSUE: 1. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the defendantappellant is unreliable, doubtful and insufficient to warrant his conviction of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.


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2. Whether the conviction of defendant-appellant is primarily based on the weakness of the defendant's evidence and not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. RULING: 1. According to the trial Court, it was fully convinced of appellant's guilt after "thoroughly and conscientiously" observing the demeanor and conduct of complainant on the witness stand and considering her "straightforward" testimony 'There is no question that on matters of credibility of witnesses, the conclusions of the trial Court carry great weight and are entitled to the highest respect by appellate Courts, hence, should not be disturbed in the absence of proof of misappreciation of evidence. However, there are certain facts of substance and value that militate against an affirmation of the finding of guilt in this case, particularly when the evidentiary rule is recalled that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with precipitate incredulity; and when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. For rape is an accusation, easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent." The foregoing flaws in the complainant's testimony on vital points crucially destroy her credibility. The improbabilities therein verily defy the "Test of reason." Her story lacks the stamp of absolute truth and candor. 2. The refusal of the Municipal Judge to subscribe to complainant's affidavit because of the falsity of its contents bolsters appellant's assertion on the witness stand that his answers were untrue. Besides, the prosecution failed to present Corporal Garbin to corroborate Lt. Sosa's testimony that appellant, in his Garbins presence, admitted to Lt. Sosa the commission of the crime. Neither did the prosecution present Patrolman Camacho to rebut appellant's assertions that he was maltreated. These witnesses, who could have strengthened the case for the prosecution, were not presented. As very aptly enunciated by then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in People vs. Dramayo "(I)t is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty." Added to this is the fundamental principle that conviction should rest on the strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense. The foregoing indispensable criteria have not been met herein. The prosecution. evidence is wanting in proof beyond reasonable doubt.


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CASE No. 06: United States of America vs Capa and Carino 19 Phil 125, 1291 FACTS: Defendants were charged with the crime of Lesiones Graves for inflicting injury, particularly on the arm, upon the prosecuting witness, Francisco Garcia. However, it was only Aurelio Carino alone appealed. The brief antecedents are as follows: Francisco Garcia came to Ciriaco Capucao's house to where defendants live for the purpose of getting a fighting cock. However, commotiom stirred between Garcia and defendant Capa resulting Garcia receiving a blow over his eye and was stabbed by a stick on his arm. Garcia then sought intervention from a doctor who dressed and treated his wound. On trial, however, to establish guilt or that the crime of Lesiones Graves were perpetrated by the said defendants, it was only the testimonies of the offended party, Aurelio Garcia and Ciriaco Capucao that were offered as evidence. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented, testimony of the offended and a named Ciriaco Capucao, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: In criminal cases the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt every essential element constituting the crime, and upon which the conviction and punishment is based. It was just as essential for the Government to prove that the offended party, by reason of the blow inflicted by the appellant, lost the use of the arm, or was hindered in the use thereof, as it was show that the appellant inflicted said blow. The offended party said that he was under the care of the doctor for eight days and that the exterior wound at the time of the trial was cured, but that the bones which have been fractured had not been cured; while the other witness stated that when he examined the injured party he saw a small wound on his hand. The best evidence as to the gravity of this wound was that of the attending surgeon. For some reason, which does not appear in the record, the doctor was not called as a witness. It is clear that this testimony does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the offended party had lost the use of his arm, nor was hindered in the use thereof, by reason of that blow. He himself admits that he was under the medical treatment for only eight (8) days, and it is difficult to see why the doctor would have abandoned this treatment and the care of his patient until his arm had been completely cured.


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CASE No. 07: People of the Philippines v. Hodges, 46 Phil. 502, 503 FACTS: Plaintiff charges defendant, C.N. Hodges of four separate cases of violation of Section of the Usury Law. The testimonial evidence of prosecuting witness Leopoldo Ortiz grounded the charges made by the plaintiff against defendant. Accordingly, defendant Hodges imposed unconscionable interests in its money lending tr ansactions. It is alleged that defendant received from Ortiz 1,800.00 as an interest on a 3,250 for the term of 1 year; 7,344 as an interest on a one-year loan of 13,856; 3,984.55 as an interest on a one-year loan of 15,713.63; and 300 as an interest on a three-month loan of 2,000.00 Trial Court found defendant guilty and there from appealed the judgment resulting to the consolidation of these four cases. At the trial of the cases, prosecution called for a number of witnesses to testify regarding defendant's character and reputation and their testimony was admitted over the objection and exception of his counsel notwithstanding the fact that his character had not been out in issue by the defense. ISSUE: Whether the court erred in admitting the testimony of the witnesses regarding the defendant's character and reputation. RULING: YES. The court erred in admitting the testimony regarding the character and reputation of the defendant notwithstanding the fact that his character had not been put in issue by the defense. It is elementary rule in criminal procedure that the prosecution is not permitted to touch upon the character of the accused in the original case and that it is only after the defendant has elected to put his character in issue by calling witnesses and adducing evidence in support that the prosecution is permitted to follow and disprove the evidence so offered. (I Jones Commentary on Evidence, 755-756) In the present cases the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that most of the character testimony evidently related to facts ante-dating the Usury Act, appears to have been its appreciation of the evidence largely thereon. Ruling out this testimony, as we must, there is practically no evidence against the accused except the testimony of the prosecuting witness, which, as we shall presently see, is of a most unsatisfactory character.


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CASE No 08: People of the Philippines v. Liera 82 SCRA 163 FACTS: Herein defendant-appellant, Liera, Lara and Guevarra, were charged for the crimes of Robbery in band with Homicide, for robbing the belongings pertaining to one Daniela Tindugan and killing his husband, and two (2) counts of Robbery in Band, thereafter robbing the belongings of it's neighboring houses, one of Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang, in the barrio of Bogo, Pagadian City. In the course of the trial, complaint against Marcos Liera was dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence while Carlito Lara was discharged to be utilized as state witness, leaving Antonio Guevarra ('DEFENDANT GUEVARRA' for brevity) as the defendant-appellant of the case before the trial court. Defendant Guevarra interposed the defense of alibi by stating that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was somewhere else, particularly at his uncle's house in Tukuran, Pagadian City and that he even presented his uncle, Gregorio Ibanez to corroborate his claim. He also interposed, through his Counsel de oficio, that there was conflicting testimonies given by Daniela Tindungan during investigation and her testimony stating that defendant Guevarra was one of those armed men who ransacked their place; and that the testimonies given by Carlito Lara stating that defendant Guevarra was one of the armed robbers during his testimony and the testimony which he has given to Lt. Silvestre Roda, states none of such fact; and that Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang failed to recognize any of the armed men who robbed them, thereby affecting the credibility of the witnesses ISSUE: 1. Whether defendant-appellant's alibi is with credence. 2. Whether the contention of defendant-appellant Guevarra, conflicting or inconsistent testimonies are without credence, meritorious. RULING: 1. We find that the alibi of the appellant does not deserve credence. It has been held that to establish an alibi, a defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place about the time of the alleged crime, but also that he was at such other place for so long a time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either before or after the time he was at such other place. Needless to state, alibi must be proved by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. In the instant case, Tukuran, the place where the appellant is claimed to have been when the crime was committed, and Bogo, where the crimes were committed, are within the municipality of Pagadian, both accessible to motor vehicles. In view of the proximity, we are inclined to agree with the Solicitor General that the defense of alibi is ineffectual especially when considered in conjunction with the positive identification given by two prosecuting witnesses. Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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2. Appellant's contention is without merit. The fact that Daniela Tindugan did not immediately name the appellant as on of the malefactors is understandable. She was in a state of shock and could not immediately associate faces with their names. The appellant points to an apparent conflict between the testimony of Carlito Lara and Lt. Silvetre Roda... This conflict is a minor detail which does not affect the credibility of said witnesses. Such fact might have slipped the mind of the witnesses. The fact remains that Lt. Rods was informed of the participation of the accused in the robbery so that he was investigated in connection with these cases and subsequently charged in court. Counsel de oficio also contends that the appellant cannot be found guilty of having robbed Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang in the absence of evidence that the appellant participated in its commission. Counsel makes capital of the testimony of Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang that they did not recognize any of the armed men who robbed them on September 11, 1967; much less point to the accused as one of the malefactors during the trial. Indeed, Tabita Alviar and Asuncion Gutang stated during the trial of the case that they did not recognize any of the armed men who robbed them on September 11, 1 967. Nor did they point to the accused as one of the malefactors. The record shows, however, that a conspiracy existed and the crimes were committed simultaneously one after the other and were perpetrated by the same group of armed men so that the identification made by Carlito Lara and Daniela Tindugan that the appellant was one of the robbers is sufficient. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.


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CASE No. 09 People of the Philippines vs. FELICIANO MUNOZ and JUSTO MILLORA 1981-09-10 | G.R. No. L-38016 FACTS: Feliciano Muñoz alias 'Tony' and Justo Millora alias 'Tito' of the crime of Murder committed as follows: "That on or about the 22nd day of August 1972 at San Carlos City in Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with firearms, conspiring together and mutually aiding each other, with evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one, Ricardo Depacina alias 'Carding', thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his head which mortal injuries caused the death of said Ricardo Depacina, alias 'Carding', as a consequence. The lower court found the accused guilty through the testimonies presented by the prosecution. The accused argued that the testimonies are inconsistent, thus the credibility of the witnesses is doubtful. ISSUE: Whether the witness for the prosecution established that the appellant Feliciano Munoz shot Ricardo Depacina to death through the testimonies of the witnesses. RULING: No. Feliciano Muñoz claims that the lower court erred in holding that the witnesses for the prosecution have established that he shot Ricardo Depacina to death. Apellant Muñoz points out that while prosecution witness Narciso Rosal testified on cross-examination that the incident in question occurred between 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 22, 1972, Dr. Silverio Petrasanta, who conducted a postmortem examination on the cadaver of the deceased between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same date, testified, on the other hand, that said deceased had lready been dead from 2 to 3 hours on that date. Hence, appellant Muñoz concludes that prosecution witness Narciso Rosal was not telling the truth. The alleged contradiction between the testimony of prosecution witness Narciso Rosal and that of Dr. Silverio Petrasanta is superficial because if Dr. Petrasanta examined the dead body of Ricardo Depacina after the latter had been dead for two hours, the time of death must have been at about 1:30 o'clock p.m. which coincides, more or less, with the testimony of Narciso Rosal that the victim was killed at around two o'clock in the afternoon. The apparent difference of thirty (30) minutes in their testimonies as to the time of death is a minor inconsistency which, as repeatedly declared by this Court, does not affect the witness' basic credibility.


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CASE No. 10 HONORATO MALIG and ANTONIO LACSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 1988-04-15 | G.R. No. L-71712 FACTS: That on or about the 15th and the 21st day of March 1983, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, accused Honorato Malig and Antonio Lacson, both duly appointed Senior Technical Property Inspectors of the Commission on Audit for Region III and as such conduct verification and post inspection of government infrastructure projects, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully request Celso R. Halili, President and General Manager of Halrey Construction Inc. who had a contract with the Provincial Government of Bulacan for the construction of Bocaue-San Jose Road (Bagbaguin Section) thru his employee to give P20,000.00 in connection with said contract wherein said accused had to intervene under the law in their official capacity in violation of RA 3019. The accused argued that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which are purely hearsay, self-serving and incredible. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. RULING: No. While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court "evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time," the same Rule also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like." We have carefully examined in detail the evidence adduced by both parties in the trial of the case under consideration, but WE failed to uncover any valid and cogent reason to suspect that the institution of this case has been improperly motivated. While it is true that the accused endeavored to question the sincerity and honesty of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the reason ventured by the accused in an effort to cash serious doubts on the credibility of said witnesses, is insufficient to overcome the probable value or weight of their testimonies which are properly confirmed by the documentary and circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case. All told, the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial evidence point to the guilt of petitioners-accused beyond reasonable doubt.


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CASE No. 11 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MODESTO DE ROXAS y RAZON @ "MODY," MARIO DE ROXAS y RAZON and PROTACIO ALILIO y DEL MUNDO @ "TACIO",PROTACIO ALILIO y DEL MUNDO @ "TACIO" 1995-02-15 | G.R. No. 106783 FACTS: "That on or about the 24th day of June, 1988, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Payapa Ilaya, Municipality of Lemery, Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another armed with bolos and a bladed and pointed instrument, with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with said weapons, suddenly, and without warning, one Criselda Mundin y Enriquez who at the time was in her third month of pregnancy, thereby inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds on the different parts of her body which directly caused her death and as a further consequences thereof, the foetus inside her womb died. Contrary to law." Only Protacio Alilio stood trial as his two (2) accused nephews were never apprehended. Appellant Alilio raised the defenses of alibi and denial. He testified that on 24 June 1988, at about 2:00 in the afternoon, he was at a chapel located at Arendatis, Payapa, Ilaya, Lemery. ISSUE: Whether the alibi and denials presented are enough to create doubt on the guilty of the accused. RULING: No. The denial and alibi of appellant Alilio are simply inadequate to overcome the positive identification of appellant Alilio and his two (2) nephews as the malefactors. Denials and alibis are fabricated with ease and rebutted only with difficulty. Simple denials, like alibis, are inherently weak defenses and cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses that the accused had committed the crime charged.


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CASE No. 12 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEODORO DE LA CRUZ Y TOJOS, ET AL., TEODORO DE LA CRUZ Y TOJOS 1946-02-21 | G.R. No. L-52 FACTS: At about 8:30 p. m., on July 25, 1945, while Dr. Gregorio B. Sison was closing the door of his drug store at 389 Dimasalang, Manila, four men armed with revolvers got near him, stuck revolvers over his ribs, pushed him inside the drug store, and ordered him and all other persons inside to lie down face downward. One remained to watch the door, another, who was manipulating his revolver several times, kept watch of the persons lying down, and the remaining two went upstairs. The one watching the door called several times the other watching the persons lying down, telling him to shoot their heads if they moved. The malefactors were able to get P200 from the cash register, P7,000 in bills, P500 in silver coins, and one pair of earrings with diamonds valued at P300, all located in one of the drawers in the kitchen. The victims positively identified the identity of the perpetrators. ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the victims are engouh to prove the identities of the accused. RULING: Yes. The analysis of the testimonies given in this case convinces us that appellant was conclusively identified as the robber who kept watch of the people inside the drug store while lying down; who, upon entering the drug store, was one of those who stuck a revolver at the ribs of Dr. Gregorio B. Sison; who, during the watch, was manipulating his revolver to the extent of dropping two bullets to the floor, and who was being named as Doro. The fact that the prosecution witnesses singled him out as the only one among the four robbers they could identify, it appearing that there were circumstances which made his identification possible, and that no unreasonable motive was shown why they should point him out, instead of any one of the three remaining gangsters, only serves to strengthen the credibility of said identification.


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CASE No. 13 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs GERARDO EXTRA, alias Handing G.R. No. L-29205 July 30, 1976 FACTS: Leovigildo Saligao, Barrio Captain of Putingbuhangin, San Juan, Batangas, appeared at the PC Detachment Station at Putingbuhangin, San Juan, Batan gas, seeking help from Sgt. Iglesias, Detachment Commander thereat, because according to him appellant Gerardo Extra alias Handing for no valid reason at all was threatening him with a firearm. Acceding the request, they proceeded to Putingbuhangin with Saligao indicating the way. Thereafter, the firing between Gerardo and group of saligao occurred. After the firing ceased and upon finding that appellant had steady escaped, they went to the aid of Leovigildo Saligao who was seriously wounded. Chief of Police Daniel B. Mendoza filed with the Municipal Court a complaint for "Frustrated Murder with Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority" against Gerardo Extra alias Handing. For his defense, accused presented an alibi. ISSUE: Whether the defense of alibi would prosper for the acquittal of the accused. RULING: The defense of alibi must be recalled that in order that an alibi as a defense may prosper, the evidence to support it must be clear and convincing as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, while the evidence as to his identification must be weak and insufficient. The unexplained flight of an accused from his native town and family following the commission of the crime, and abandonment of his business, particulars where t is surreptitious, coupled with his failure to communicate to the authorities his whereabouts, has been considered indication of consciousness of guilt. Indeed, the alibi of appellant "has all the characteristics of a story designed to fit the intended purpose of showing the whereabouts of the defendant to be in a place other than where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. Therefore, the trial court did not commit any error in finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.


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CASE No. 14 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALTAZAR ALAN ALITAO, HENRY OCCENA and WILFREDO APUNGAN (at large), BALTAZAR ALAN ALITAO and HENRY OCCENA. G.R. No. 74736 February 18, 1991 FACTS: Baltazar Alan Alitao and Henry Occena , both security guards of the Talisay-Silay Milling Company and a third person, Wilfredo Apungan, were accused of murder for the killing of Jason Concepcion y Esparista on or about February 24, 1981 in Talisay, Negros Occidental. The information alleged that "armed with a shotgun and bladed instrument (and) conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with intent to kill," they did "attack, assault, box, strike and stab the victim, Jason Concepcion thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds and other injuries on different parts of the body of the latter causing his death. The trial court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder without the presence of any aggravating nor mitigating circumstances and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua ,to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and severally. The amount of 30,000 for the death of the victim without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. Hence petition. ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in not acquitting appellants there being no evidence of conspiracy or of their individual culpability for the injuries sustained by the deceased. RULING: The existence of a conspiracy among the appellants and Wilfredo Apungan is further supported by the testimony of the-victim's brother, Ramon Concepcion, who declared that as the former was being taken to the hospital, he had identified the appellants and Wilfredo Apungan as his attackers. The Trial Court correctly admitted said testimony as either evidence of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae and an exception to the hearsay rule. Conspiracy is also inferentially established by the number and nature of the victim's injuries which, in the opinion of the medico-legal officer who issued and testified on the post-mortem report, were inflicted by different means or in instruments. WHEREFORE, as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellants. SO ORDERED.


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CASE No. 15 People of the Philippines vs Bolima et.al G.R. No. 96549 March 22, 1991 FACTS: Lelis and Bolima were both collectors in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Tabaco. Lelis were allegedly intruding upon Bolima’s territory in the collection of fees of incoming trucks. Because of controversy, Lelis was stabbed and mercilessly killed by several assailants. In due course, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, approved by the Provincial Fiscal, charging Carmelo Bolima, Leopoldo Britanico, Rogelio Britanico, Gomer Bolima and Domingo Britanico of the crime of murder allegedly committed.The court finds the accused guilty of the crime of Murder and for lack of evidence to support the conviction of accused DOMINGO BRITANICO, he is hereby ACQUITTED. Not satisfied therewith accused Carmelo Bolima, Leopoldo Britanico and Rogelio Britanico appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the court a quo committed the error. ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in disregarding or overlooking substantial facts and material circumstances which if properly appreciated could result in the acquittal of the appellants. RULING: No. While on the one hand, the appellants doubt the veracity of the testimonies of said prosecution witnesses that Leopoldo Britanico hacked Generoso Lelis, on the other hand, they give weight to the testimonies of the same witnesses that the place was dark.Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses were more apparent than real. The assault upon the person of Lelis did not occur in one place. In fact, the whole incident was ambulatory, occurring as it did in various places. Thus, while it is true that Atun testified that the place of the incident was dark, referring to the place where the bolos were sold, yet Nipolo said the place was well-lighted, as he was referring to the place in the supermarket where the victim ran and was pursued by his assailants. As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, suffice it to say that the same relate to minor matters. Rather than affect the credibility of witnesses, they are badges of their truthfulness and candor. WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 12, 1990 with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00. Costs against defendants-appellants.SO ORDERED.


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CASE No. 16 Tan vs Intermediate Court of Appeal G.R. No. L-68834 June 6, 1990 FACTS: Plaintiffs Policarpio Martos, Lourdes Martos and Victoria Martos de Aquino are the surviving children of the deceased Pedro Martos and Dalmacia Madali. Plaintiff Berlina Rodeo is the wife of Policarpio Martos. Policarpio, Victoria was informed only in the year 1975 by Policarpio and Lourdes of the mortgage of their inherited property to Felicito Tan for One Hundred Fifty Pesos. Said brother and sisters are co-owners of a parcel of coconut land. On January 28, 1968 Policarpio and Lourdes encumbered said property to Tan. On April 24, 1975, Policarpio Martos, Berlina Rodeo and Lourdes Martos, private respondents herein, filed with the Court of First Instance of Romblon, an action for recovery of real property with rescission and annulment of contract with damages against Felicito Tan The trial court rendered decision in favor of plaintiffs which was affirmed in toto by court of appeal. Hence,The motion for reconsideration filed by defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, was denied by respondent appellate court in its resolution, thus, this petition for review filed with the Court. ISSUE: Whether the questioned loan documents are binding and enforceable against respondents Policarpio Martos, Berlina Rodeo Martos and Lourdes Martos. RULING: YES. The fact that Policarpio Martos, with his wife Berlina Rodeo and Lourdes Martos did execute the application for loan, the real estate mortgage securing the loan of P2,400.00, the promissory note, and the supplement to real estate mortgage, has been established by the testimonies not only by the government officials whose presumption of regularity in the performance of duty has not been rebutted but also by the notary public before whom the notarized instrument was verified which is admissible as evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. All these unquestionably overrule the uncorroborated and self-serving denials of Policarpio Martos of his participation in the questioned documents and the improbable declarations of Berlina Rodeo that she signed the documents and thumbmarked them for Policarpio Martos, as requested by Felicito Tan without knowing that she was executing an application for loan. Furthermore, the notary public who notarized the documents, Lorenzo J. Morada, testified that all three private respondents appeared in his office in connection with their application for a loan with the PNB, which they personally presented to him together with two other documents-a real estate mortgage for P2,400 and supplement to real estate mortgage-for notarization.


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CASE No. 17 People of the Philippines vs. Tandoy G.R. No. L-80505, Dec. 4, 1990 FACTS: On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation, whereby Detective Singayan to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along Solchuaga St in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked “Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?” To this, Detective Singayan answered yes. Two P5.00 bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were exchanged for two rolls of marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscted from Tandoy and an information was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425. Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actully bet money and that, under the best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of the marked bills were inadmissible in court. ISSUE: Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills? RULING: No. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five specified instances. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as Xerox Copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy bust money was not indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of marijuana had been sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and the marijuana actually sold had been submitted as evidence.


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CASE No. 18: Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 431 FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime." According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children. Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits. Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez. ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by Tan Put establishing the validity of her marriage to Tee Hoon can be admitted in court to support her claim from the company of Tee Hoon's share. RULING: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s aff airs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.


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CASE No. 19: People of the Philippines vs. Castaneda 88 SCRA 562 (1979) FACTS: Edmundo Enriquez became a victim of a robbery-killing. He was beaten and stabbed on the different parts of his body which caused his subsequent death. His wallet containing P60.00, his wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, were all taken from him. Teresita Nobello, a deaf-mute, while walking along Taft Ave. and E. delos Santos Ave., allegedly saw the incident. When she reported it to the police, investigation and taking down of sworn statement took place but nobody was arrested. Castaneda was then arrested at the iceplant where he works, admitting the crime and pointed two others Juanito and Benedicto. He alleged that it started when they were drinking when they saw Enriquez (deceased) at the nearby table and Benedicto approached him and asked for money but instead Enriquez gave him a cigarette. When Enriquez passed along a dark alley, the accused and companions beat and stabbed (causing death) Enriquez with pipe and took the wallet containing P60, ring, watch and shirt. Teresita, as a witness, said Castaneda acted as a lookout while the others beat and stabbed the victim. RTC held that Juanito and Castaneda shall be punished with DEATH discrediting their respectivealibis. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting extrajudicial admission and testimony of lone evidence Teresita. RULING: No. Trial court is correct in its decision. Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible evidence against him and this rule is based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. The trial court is not bound to believe all that the witness has said, but it may give weight and credence to such portions of her testimony as it may deem worthy of belief and disbelieve the other portions of her testimony. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that a witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances, to be the truth. Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they may deem worthy of belief. In this regard, it would suffice to state that the trial court by reason of its proximate contact with witnesses, is in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false, and in the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb its conclusion that the said witness of the prosecution saw the incident in question.


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CASE No. 20 Ortigas vs. Lufthansa German Airlines G.R. No. L-28773, June 30, 1975 64 SCRA 610, 636-637 FACTS: Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which was filled with discrimination. During the trial, there were several postponements of the trial from both sides. Three hearings were postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the request of both parties, and 10 on the request of respondents. Due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the no-show of their European employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list due to his non-appearance in the day that the crossexam on him was to be finished and the judge moved for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no postponements were to be made again) Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a seat change to first class during the stop overs, he wasn’t given any. He was only given the option when he was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from Manila. ISSUES: 1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion for postponement on Sept 24, 1966. 2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his testimony was not finished 3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant pay indemnities. RULING: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages from 100k to 150k. 1. The case had been pending for about three years and had actually suffered during that period even more than the usually permissible number of continuances, quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule had been served on counsel the month previous. It must be assumed that due preparations and arrangements were to be made since the receipt of that notice to insure the presence in Manila for the expected witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not leave their respective stations and places of work to attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was enough time and opportunity for defendant to have made the corresponding adjustments in the assignments of its personnel so as to enable its witnesses to be in court.


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As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed because of the absence of evidence only when such absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it." This means that it must be shown to the court that due diligence had been exercised in either securing the presence of the evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof. Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well justified in denying the requested postponement. We cannot see any reason why, despite its having knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month before, defendant did not see to it that its expected witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible." 2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted harassment and embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule 132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to crossexamine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when crossexamination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the impugned action of the trial court relative to the testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the same, they claimed that even his direct testimony, without taking into account anymore his answers to the cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff, cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses in defendant's answer. Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a logical consequence of the previous order denying defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial, the next thing in order was to declare the presentation of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it was necessary to determine what evidence could be considered to be for the defendant. And so when counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically no alternative for the court but to grant the same. Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer any objection thereto. 3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered to so dictate. Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the company's self-interest at the expense of, embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part of the plaintiffs. These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.


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CASE No. 21 SAVORY LUNCHEONETTE vs. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG G.R. No. L-38964 | 1975-01-31 FACTS: September 27, 1972, the Savory filed a complaint charging LAKAS PILIPINO, with unfair labor practice for having violated certain provisions of Republic Act 875 (Industrial Peace Act). To sustain its charges, petitioner presented Atty. Emiliano Morabe as a witness. Atty. Morabe had allegedly taken charge of the labor-management problems of the petitioner and had thereby acquired first-hand knowledge of the facts of the labor dispute. Accordingly, the cross-examination of Atty. Morabe was re-scheduled for several times, but when such date arrived, Atty. Amante did not appear and so the cross-examination was once more transferred to March 17, 1973, with the warning from the court that "should the respondents still fail to cross-examine Atty. Morabe, the right to cross-examine him will be deemed waived." Atty. Morabe succumbed to a heart attack on March 31, 1973. On April 12, 1973, LAKAS PILIPINO filed a motion to strike out the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe from the records on the ground that since cross-examination was no longer possible, such direct testimony "could no longer be rebutted." On June 14, 1973, private respondents filed another motion seeking the recall of petitioner's witness Bienvenida Ting for further cross-examination. Mrs. Ting was presented as a witness by the petitioner on March 27, 1973 and was cross-examined by the private respondents on June 4, 1973. In an Order dated May 3, 1974, respondent court granted the two motions. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order but the same was denied in a resolution en banc dated July 5, 1974. ISSUE: Whether respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion when the latter ordered that the direct testimony of its principal witness, Atty. Morabe, be stricken off the record. RULING: The SC ruled that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Rules on Evidence Case Digests

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RULES on EVIDENCE Case Digest Compedium-Von

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