1. Samalio vs CA
TOPIC: DUE PROCESS Facts: Augusto R. Samalio was formerly formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration Immigration and Deportation. A passenger, Weng Sai Qin arrived at NAIA and was subjected to interrogation because an employee at NAIA suspected that her passport was fake. fake. She was brought to Mr. Samalio. While in the the interrogation room, Ms Weng flashed a $500 bill and Mr. Samalio grabbed the money. The case is now in the court because Ms Weng’s passport did not bear an arrival stamp which was the main reason why wh y she bribed Mr. Samalio. The Bureau of Imigration and Deportation commenced an administrative case case against petitioner Augusto R. Samalio for dishonesty, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful disgraceful and immoral conduct. He was found guilty and was dismissed from service. Issue: Samalio claims that he was was not accorded due process of law because there were no witness or evidence presented against him. Ruling: There was no violation of due process. process. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. In this case, petitioner was heard through the th e various pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer and two tw o motions to dismiss,as well as other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal. 2. ONG CHIA VS REPUBLIC
TOPIC: Are the rules in formally formally presenting evidence applicable to naturalization cases? cases? Facts: Ong Chia was born in China but he came to the country when he was a boy and stayed here since then. At age 66, he filed a petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen. He thereafter testified as to his qualifications and presented witnesses to corroborate the facts which will admit him the Filipino citizenship he longs for. Accordingly, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. However, theSta theState, te, appealed to the CA annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinent documents for naturalization naturalization which contends that petitioner failed to support his petition with the appropriate documen docu mentar tary y evid ence enc e for h is naturali naturalizat zation ion which which revers reversed ed the same. same. Ong C hia cont ends t hat t he appellate court erred in considering the documentswhich had merely been annexed by the State to its appellan appe llan t's brie f an d, on the basis basi s of o f wh ich, justified just ified the revers reversal al of of the the trial trial court' court'ss decis decision. ion. Not having having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere scraps of paper. ISSUE: Whether the documents annexed to the State’s State’s appellant briefs be considered as evidence even if they were not formally introduced as evidence? Ruling: Yes. The documents should be considered as evidence,therefore Ong Chia’s contention must fail. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, S.34)now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for natu natura rali lizat zatio ion. n. Under Rule 143 of th e Rules o f Court which provides th at — ―These — ―These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases notherein provided for,except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient .‖ The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."In the case at bar, Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental fundamental right right to procedural procedural due due process. process. However, However, the the Supreme Supreme Court is is not no t p ersuad ers uad ed. ed . Rulin Rul ing g tha t hat, t, the reason for the rule prohi biting th e admissio n of ev idence which has not been form formal ally ly offe offere red d is is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. 3. BANTOLINO VS COCA COLA BOTTLERS, INC TOPIC: Are administrative bodies strictly strictly bound by the rules rules of evidence? Facts: Bantolino, et al were employees of Coca Cola. They filed a case against their employer for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter sided sided with the employees and ordered ordered their reinstatement and payment of backwages. He further added that despite the negative declarations of Coca Cola as to their relationship with the complainants, the testimonies of the complainants are more credible to prove the existence of employeeemployer relationship. This was was affirmed by the NLRC. NLRC. But the CA modified the ruling because accordingly to them, the affidavits of the complainants should not be given probative value because they were not subjected to cross- examination, they were not affirmed and therefore it is hearsay evidence. Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies like the NLRC should be strictly strictly bound in the rules of rules when presenting evidence? Ruling: No. The argument that the affidavit affidavit is hearsay because the affiants affiants were not presented for cross examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be b e reached on the basis b asis of position papers only. It is not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross examined by counsel couns el of the adverse party To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature n ature of the proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. They are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively without regard to technicalities technic alities of law and procedure all in the interest of due process.
4. PEOPLE vs . GALLENO,
Facts: On August 16, 1994, Evelyn Obligar, a five year year old girl, together with her brother was left alone in in their aunt Penicola’s house. The Accused-appelant Joeral Galleno, a 19, year old, took advantage of the situation, and sexually molested Evelyn. The incident resulted to a lacerated vagina which caused a profuse bleeding and pain to the victim. The victim was subjected to series of examination, one of the doctors affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument inserted into the vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina. Another Doctor
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."In the case at bar, Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental fundamental right right to procedural procedural due due process. process. However, However, the the Supreme Supreme Court is is not no t p ersuad ers uad ed. ed . Rulin Rul ing g tha t hat, t, the reason for the rule prohi biting th e admissio n of ev idence which has not been form formal ally ly offe offere red d is is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. 3. BANTOLINO VS COCA COLA BOTTLERS, INC TOPIC: Are administrative bodies strictly strictly bound by the rules rules of evidence? Facts: Bantolino, et al were employees of Coca Cola. They filed a case against their employer for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter sided sided with the employees and ordered ordered their reinstatement and payment of backwages. He further added that despite the negative declarations of Coca Cola as to their relationship with the complainants, the testimonies of the complainants are more credible to prove the existence of employeeemployer relationship. This was was affirmed by the NLRC. NLRC. But the CA modified the ruling because accordingly to them, the affidavits of the complainants should not be given probative value because they were not subjected to cross- examination, they were not affirmed and therefore it is hearsay evidence. Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies like the NLRC should be strictly strictly bound in the rules of rules when presenting evidence? Ruling: No. The argument that the affidavit affidavit is hearsay because the affiants affiants were not presented for cross examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be b e reached on the basis b asis of position papers only. It is not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross examined by counsel couns el of the adverse party To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature n ature of the proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. They are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively without regard to technicalities technic alities of law and procedure all in the interest of due process.
4. PEOPLE vs . GALLENO,
Facts: On August 16, 1994, Evelyn Obligar, a five year year old girl, together with her brother was left alone in in their aunt Penicola’s house. The Accused-appelant Joeral Galleno, a 19, year old, took advantage of the situation, and sexually molested Evelyn. The incident resulted to a lacerated vagina which caused a profuse bleeding and pain to the victim. The victim was subjected to series of examination, one of the doctors affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument inserted into the vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina. Another Doctor
disclosed that the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage. But then, Galleno interpose the defense of denial. He testified that the bleeding started when he accidentally inserted his finger into the vagina of the child when he cajoled her by throwing her up and down. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail fin gernail was long and the child was not n ot wearing any underwear. Contention of accused: He contends that the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended party, is not impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada herself testified that Evelyn told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. Issue: WON the testimonies of the medical doctors is to be given credence when the same failed to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration in the victim’s vagina. Held: As a general rule, witnesses must state state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the th e victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially especially the victim herself. In other words, the the trial court did not rely rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina.. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.
5. People vs Calumpang
Facts: Calumpang and Omatang were charged for murdering the Catipay spouses. The prosecution presented three witnesses. One of the witnesses was Magno Gomez who was with the Spouses Catipay when wh en they were allegedly hacked by Calumpang. Magno Gomez claimed that he eye- witnessed the murder murder of the Spouses and scared that Calumpang would attack him, he ran away. He did not report the incident to neighbors and reported the incident a day after the incident for fear of his life. The defense also presented witnesses to prove that Calumpang and Omatang Omatang were with them at the time time the murder happened. In short, they had alibis. The
RTC convicted Calumapang and Omatang based on the testimony testimony of Magno. Calumpang appealed alleging that the RTC made a mistake in believing Magno’s testimony when he was a principal suspect himself and his testimonies were full of inconsistencies. inconsistencies. They further allege that the trial court erred in disregarding their evidence because it was an alibi defense. Issue: Whether the trial court COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE MISTAKE IN CONCENTRATING ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE VAGUENESS AND WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUT ION’S LONE EYEWITNESS? Ruling: Yes. The testimony of the lone witness Magno is full of inconsistencies. We find that the trial trial court overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable favo rable to the accused and disregarded several significant facts and circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez,. While Magno claimed to have witnessed witnessed the gruesome killings, killings, the records show that serious serious discrepancies attended Magno’s testimony in court and his sworn statement, ex ecuted during the preliminary examination. In the case, there seems to be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Magno’s actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. Magno’s claim that he intended to go to the authorities an d report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the — such circumstances stand, however, Magno gave a different version of how the murders happened. On the part of the appellants’, their defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants’ presumed innocence stands. Therefore, they are acquitted on all charges.
4. PEOPLE vs. GALLENO July 2, 1998 I. FACTS:
Joeral Gallano was charged with Statutory Rape, committed against Evelyn Obligar (5 y/o). The prosecution presented three expert witnesses whose testimonies Gallano Gallano contend to be not impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina, hence, he should be acquitted.
II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses as to the occurrence of carnal knowledge should result to the acquittal of the accused. III. RULING:
No. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
5. PEOPLE vs. CALUMPANG March 31, 2005 I. FACTS:
Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts of murder, committed against Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The RTC dismissed the alibi defense of the defendants because it was weak and then convicted the defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno Gomez who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of the two victims. The defendants appealed, contending that the testimony of Magno is unreliable and that the trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi on the ground that it was a weak defense. The Supreme Court in deed found that the testimony of Magno as to the occurrence of the killing is unreliable. II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of an accused. III. RULING:
Yes. Appellants’ defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants’ presumed innocence stands.
6. HEIRS OF SABANPAN vs.COMORPOSA August 12, 2003 I. FACTS:
Theheirs of Sabanpan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages against Comorposa, et al.. The MTC ruled in favor of the Heirs, but it was reversed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment, ruling that Comorposa, et al. had the better right to possess the subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of the petitioners’ witnesses being self -serving. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, contending that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence. II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by the CA. III. RULING:
NO. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
7. PEOPLE vs. ROBERTO NEGOSA August 25, 2003
I. FACTS:
Roberto Negosa was charged for two counts of rape, committed against Gretchen Castaño. As to the second count of rape, Gretchen testified on direct examination that the penis of the appellant was able to penetrate her vagina. However, on cross examination, she testified that she and the appellant were wearing short pants and underwear. Hence, it was physically impossible for his penis to penetrate her vagina. The RTC convicted Negosa for statutory rape and for acts of lasciviousness in lieu of a second count for rape. Negosa then appealed, contending that the trial court should have not believed the inconsistent testimony of the victim. II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the inconsistent testimony of the victim is sufficient to acquit the accused. III. RULING:
No. The trial court disbelieved Gretchen’s testimony on the second count of rape that the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of the victim’s loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchen’s credibility and the probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness’ testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case. 8. PEOPLE vs MATITO February 24, 2004
I. FACTS: Ferdinand Matito was charged for murder, committed against Mariano Raymundo, Jr. before then RTC. The prosecution was able to present the following during the trial: testimony of the widow that her husband, prior to his death, declared that it was appellant who had gunned him down; the presence of nitrate powder on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant; the bitter quarrel that ensued between him and the victim after the latter had cut off the former’s water supply; the deni al by Matito of the request of his
neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and hours before the victim was killed, the threatening remarks of appellant to the former’s daughter. The RTC convicted Matito as charged. II. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. III. RULING: Yes. Circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may be the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free." 1 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter in weight and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The combination of the circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
9. PEOPLE vs. SEVILLENO March 10, 2004 I. FACTS: Paulino Sevilleno was charged for rape with homicide, committed against Virginia Bakia. The RTC convicted appellant based on the following circumstances presented by the prosecution: appellant invited the victim to watch a "beta-show"; victim and the appellant proceed to a sugarcane field in Campo 9, Hacienda San Antonio, the place where the corpse of the victim was found; the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and without the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms; the right portion of appellant’s face and neck have scratch marks on it; the multiple scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his face and ears were all caused by human fingernails; the victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions and hematoma on different parts of her body and was strangled resulting to her death which indicated that there was a struggle and the victim vigorously put up a fight against her attacker. Sevilleno appealed, contending that the scratches on his face do not prove that they were inflicted by Virginia, much less that he committed the crime. II. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. III. RULING: Yes. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.These, the prosecution were able to establish. While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evid ence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
#10 People vs Darilay Facts:
Appellant, who was then 15 yrs. old, raped and killed minor Marilyn Arganda. Marilyn and her younger sister Ailyn were on their way home after buying tinapa from a store about half a kilometer away from their residence when they met Darilay who was then inebriated. Suddenly, said appellant strucked the two siblings with a piece of wood which left them unconscious. He left Ailyn under such state but so unfortunate for Marilyn who was carried to a grassy part and was repeatedly raped and eventually killed by said appellant. The appellant was charged of attempted murder and also with special complex crime of rape with homicide for the acts committed against Ailyn and Mailyn respectively. The appellant asserts that there was no eyewitness to the rape and killing of Marilyn; only Ailyn whose testimony is insufficient and doubtful. He contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped the victim and killed her on the occasion or by reason of the said rape. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that as gleaned from the evidence on record and the findings of the trial courtin its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove that the appellant raped the victim and killed her on the occasion or by reason of said crime. Issue:
Whether or not the absence of direct evidence to prove the guilt of the accused warrants his acquittal thereof. Ruling: NO.
The Court agrees with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. We are convinced that, based on the evidence on record and as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape. Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex crime. First. The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn and Marilyn while the two were walking home after buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice with a piece of wood on her back and boxed the left side of her face, rendering her unconscious. The appellant also struck Marilyn with a piece of wood on the back. After dragging Ailyn to a grassy area, he left her there. Second. When Ailyn regained consciousness, Marilyn and the appellant were nowhere to be found. Third. The torn dress, the pair of panties, and a slipper were found about 15 meters away from where the two young girls were waylaid by the appellant. Fourth. The appellant testified that he himself accompanied the policemen and pointed to the place where Marilyn’s body was dumped, completely naked, with blood oozing from her nose and vagina. We are convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn across the river where he killed her to prevent her from revealing to the authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid her body under the bushes and trees to thus prevent police authorities from discovering that he killed Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by reason of the rape. The killing of a child, barely 9 years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant is guilty of rape with homicide because the latter crime is used in its generic sense.
#11
Ayala de Roxas vs Case Facts:
Appellant Edwin Case filed a petition before the Land Registration for claim of a right of way through a passage along the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas which is bounded on the north by the Escolta and on the east by the Estero de Sibacon. Case owns the two adjoining properties lying in the rear of appellee’s premises, and being the dominant tenement, for the benefit of which the easement is claimed. It also adjoins the rear of that to the west to which the only ingress appears to have been at that time through this passageway. The claim of the appellant is not that the right of way exists by necessity but simply that it arises by prescription, founded not on any written instrument but on immemorial use alone. The appellant, however, here makes the additional point that since the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure in these Islands, an immemorial prescription does not call for the same proof as under the Spanish procedure. The third Partida, after stating the various definite periods applicable to continuous servitudes, says that discontinuous servitudes have no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men can not remember its commencement. Issue:
Whether or not immemorial use or vested right over a servitude can be established by mere evidencelike the testimony of witnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their elders, as required under the Spanish Code . Ruling: NO.
The Court held that there is no vested right in a mere rule of evidence. (Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500.) But the point would be whether this requirement of the Spanish law is not substantive rather than evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. If substantive, then the appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely a matter of procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced by the corresponding provisions of our new code. We find therein no equivalent provision, other than subsection 11 of sect ion 334, establishing as a disputable presumption ―that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership.‖ The use of the passage proved in this case can not be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should have been offered. The Court is of the opinion that in order to establish a right or prescription something more is required than the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should be the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide. 12. HOMWOWNERS SAVINGS VS. DAILO
Facts: Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtained a loan from Homeowners Savings and executed a mortgage as security. Marcelineo eventually died and survived by his wife MIguela. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, Homeowners instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Miguela claimed that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale,. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Issue: Who has the burden of proof. Ruling: The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan ob tained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory
13. AZNAR BROTHERS VS. AYING
Facts: Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy- on’s eight children, The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war. All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Aznar, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Issue: Who has the burden of proof. Ruling: The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinog’s (heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already learned of the existence of the ExtraJudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale; and Laurencio Aying’s (heir of Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law. Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution of the subject document. In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a
preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff’s claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor. 14. BAUTISTA VS. SARMIENTO
Facts: Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento were charge with estafa by complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of issuficincy of evidence against them but it was denied. Later they were still convicted of the said crime.
Issue: Whether in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.
Ruling: There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe. When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed — the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back. A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.
15. Rivera v CA Facts: Esmundo Rivera filed an ejectment case against Peregrino and Merlinda Mirambel alleging that they constructed their house in his land as indicated by a private survey. HE presented the following evidence: private survey commissioned by Rivera which was not properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands, a letter of the district land officer to Rivera informing him that his application cannot be given due course because of a prior application. MTC ruled in favor of Rivera because he preponderably established his cause of action. RTC reversed decision of MTC because the houses of the Miramblels were built outside the land of Rivera and located in a public land. Rivera appealed to CA saying that RTC's findings lack evidentiary support. CA found that both decisions are not supported by substantial evidence. According to CA there should be a field survey directed by the court or ocular inspection of the subject premises, and not just rely on the sole survey conducted by Rivera which is self-serving if without thorough verification. The letter does not prove anything.
Issue: Whether Rivera was able to prove the fact that Mirambles are within his property.
Ruling: No. Basic is the rule in civil cases that ―the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.‖ By ―preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.‖ In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.
The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of Appeals that the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determi ne with certainty whether the private respondents’ houses were inside the petitioner’s titled property. As noted by Respondent Court, private respondents’ claim that their houses were built on public land is not convincing because petitioner has a transfer certificate of title over the same parcel of land. Likewise unconvincing is the private survey commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of private respondents encroached on his property. The reliability of the survey would have been indubitable had it been properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands or by officials thereof. ―Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates[,] the party having the burden of proof f ails upon that issue.‖ Therefore, as ―neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.‖
16. Benares v Pancho (complainant) gr 151827 April 29, 2005 Facts: Since 1964-1984, Complainants are workers of the sugar cane plantation, named Hacienda Maasin II, owned and managed by Josefina Benares. Complainants alleged to have been terminated without being paid termination benefits by Benares in retaliation to what they have done in reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their working conditions viz-a-viz wages and other mandatory benefits. The complainants filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims before the LA. The labor arbiter dismissed the case for failure of the complainants to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding their dismissal and prove their entitlement of monetary awards. The NLRC held that Pancho et.al are regular seasonal workers and they were illegally dismissed for failure of Benares to prove that there was just or authorized cause in the dismissal of the complainants. In Bernades' appeal to CA, she also questioned NLRC's general statement to the effect that the payroll she submitted is not convincing, she asserts that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not just one, and that the NLRC did not even bother to explain why it found the payroll unconvincing. She also said that NLRC should have remanded the case to LA since there are gray areas of facts. Issue: Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when they it declared that Pancho et. al are regular employees and there was illegal dismissal. Ruling: NO. 1st. Petitioner next underscores the NLRC decision’s mention of the ―payroll‖ she presented despite the fact that she allegedly presented 235 sets of payroll, not just one payroll. This circumstance does not in itself evince any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as it could well have been just an innocuous typographical error.
2nd: In this case, petitioner argues that respon dents were not her regular employees as they were merely ―pakiao‖ workers who did not work continuously in the sugar plantation. In support of her allegations, petitioner submitted ―cultivo‖ and milling payrolls. The probative value of petitioner’s eviden ce, however, has been passed upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents’ complaint because their ―position paper is completely devoid of any discussion about their alleged dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof,‖ the ground for the dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are regular employees. According to petitioner, however, the NLRC’s conclusion is highly suspect considering its own admission that ther e are ―gray areas which requires (sic) clarification.‖ She alleges that despite these gray areas, the NLRC ―chose not to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter….as this would unduly prolong the agony of the complainants in particular.‖
Petitioner perhaps w ittingly omitted mention that the NLRC ―opted to appreciate the merits of the instant case based on available documents/pleadings.‖ That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the labor arbiter for clarificatory
proceedings and instead decided the case on the basis of the evidence then available to it is a judgment call this Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the NLRC abused its discretion in so doing. xxx It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 17. Mercedes Duduaco v Judge Lily Lydia Laquindanum Facts: Mercedes charged the judge with grave misconduct, abuse of discretion, and gross ignorance of law, it was filed 8 months after the cited incident: Mercedes is the manager of Toyota Service Center where respondent brought her vehicle for repairs and replacement of parts due to a vehicular mishap. The service advisor told respondent that her vehicle will be released upon payment of deductible franchise, respondent refused saying that it should be paid by the insurance company. She asked to speak with the manager Mercedes but the latter was in a meeting. It was explained to respondent that the payment of the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company but the respondent got angry. Upon being told that Mercedes was in a meeting, respondent got angry and said that she was a judge and she should have a preferential treatment over the meeting. She was referred to Saragoza and Yñez but when no agreement was reached, she suggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before she would pay. Upon presentation, she paid the amount under protest but refused to sign a blank form which is release of claim with subrogation. They told her that she cannot get the car unless she signs the form. She did not sign it so she left without her car. She filed a case for replevin, damages, and atty fees against the service center. The Investigating Justice of CA recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. OCA adopted it and added a 10k fine against Mercedes for filing a harassment suit. Issue: Whether the suit is a harassment suit and whether the judge should be penalized. Ruling: No. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. In this case, respondent’s refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund. We agree with OCA’s recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event transpired on June 23, 2001, which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief. Significantly, she also went to respondent’s office and apologized.
18. STATE PROSECUTORS vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO 236 SCRA 505
Facts: The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. Judge Muro dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
Issue: Whether the judge may take judicial notice of a statute before it becomes effective.
Ruling: No. Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. Judicial notice is not equivalent to judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law not yet in force and hence still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.
19. FULE v. COURT OF APPEALS , 162 SCRA 446
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of a violation of B.P. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, on the basis of a stipulation of facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during pre-trial which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. On appeal the respondent appellate court upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether the conviction, based solely on a stipulation of facts which was not signed by either the petitioner or his counsel, was proper.
Ruling: The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by -the Rules, renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the stipulation of facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering the lack of the required signatures, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt. 20. SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 117728 June 26, 1996
Facts: Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Tolosa spouses alleging that spouses Tolosa failed to pay the installments due on the purchase price of jeepney despite several demands. Later on, Servicewide amended its complaint and included Garcia as defendant alleging that the Tolosa spouses, without Servicewide's knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney sought to be recovered. Bartina filed a compliant-in-intervention claiming that the vehicle subject of the complaint was sold to her by Binan Motors owned by Eduardo Garcia and that the vehicle was in her possession when it was seized by the sheriff and thereafter turned over to Servicewide. Later, Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors, with the assistance of their respective counsels, moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention. They alleged that they had "arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims.‖ The decision was rendered by the trial court and included Garcia liable to servicewide. Issue: Whether an offer to compromise be considered an admission of liability in civil cases. Ruling: No. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is no t an admission of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission of liability on the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else.The policy of the law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third parties are not in any way affected thereby. 21. DALANDAN VS. JULIO 10 SCRA 400
Facts: Clemente Dalandan, filed a civil case against Victoria Julio alleging in their complaint that what transpired between the former and Victorina Dalandan is not a facto de retro sale but an equitable sale. Victoria Julio filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the court. Clemente Dalandan went to the SC saying that upon filing of the motion to dismiss of the other party it is deemed that they admitted that the transaction was really an equitable sale. Issue: Whether the filing of motion to dismiss was in effect admitting the allegation that it was an equitable sale. Ruling: As the trial court correctly pointed out, "such allegation of 'equitable mortgage' in the complaint is a mere conclusion of plaintiffs (appellants) and not a material allegation, so that the same cannot be deemed admitted by defendants (appellees) who file the motion to dismiss". As a rule, the complaint should contain allegation of ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Neither is it proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated, or incorrect inferences from facts stated, for they are not the ultimate facts required by law to be pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far as they are correct they are useless, and when erroneous, worse than useless. And to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and no other should be considered.
The allegation of nullity of a judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not a material allegation, is not deemed admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss.
Northwest Orient Airlines v. CA 241 SCRA 192 [1995]
FACTS In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agenc y Agreement was entered into by plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. (Sharp), through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages. The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of summons against Sharp at its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the judgment became final and executory. Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring th at the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp. The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the merits. Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer motion, holding that the foreign judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence, this appeal by Northwest. ISSUE: Whether or not foreign judgment in the Japanese court need to be proved as evidence in the Philippine courts. RULING "A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment ma y, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under
Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ine ffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upo n a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Appl ying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in, the Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case o f a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a cop y of the summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or at least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or any of its officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the
other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, wh ich in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve th e same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine law holds no water. Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of JAPAN, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
23. G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967 CITY OF MANILA vs. GARCIA et al. Facts
The City of Manila is an owner of parcels of land. In the said lots were illegal settlers who were later directed to vacate the area for the expansion of the Epifanio dela Cruz Elementary School. The defendants, however, refused; hence, the suit for recovery of possession. At the trial, the City presented Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board, stating that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, for the construction of an additional building of the said school. The court ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, the trial judge revised his views, and ruled in favor of the City by citing the same Exhibit E. Issue
Whether the trial court properly found that the cit y needs the premises for school purposes. Ruling
Yes. A court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. Elimination of Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because he was duty bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
24. G.R. No. L-18247 August 31, 1963 GALLEGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts
Gallego, in view of holding a religious meeting at the public market without the required permit, was convicted of slight disobedience of an agent of a person in authority. He however assailed the decision of the court by contending that there is no proof of the existence of an ordinance in force requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting; and claims that it is error for the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo when the trial court itself allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance. Issue
Whether or not the Court may be prohibited in taking judicial notice of an ordinance. Ruling No. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to petitioner's contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places."
Besides, it is not true, that the trial court did not take notice of the ordinance in question. For the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to secure the necessary permit" with obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, it was held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial court took notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 of the Municipality of Lambunao.c 25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CA August 18, 1997
I. FACTS:
The RTC after hearing adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Josefa Gacot. The Sol Gen appealed to the CA, contending that the land was previously declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on 20 October 1950 following an order of general default. A rehearing of the case was conducted. However, the Government failed to present the said order of Judge Garlitos in
evidence. Thus, the CA ruled in favor of Josefa Gacot for the reason that the order of Judge Garlitos was not offered as evidence, and it cannot take take judicial notice of such judgment. II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of the order of Judge Garlitos. III. RULING:
Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure and jurisprudence, do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of evidence which is not formally offered, and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel. #26 Tabuena vs Court of Appeals Facts:
Juan Peralta Jr., the half-brother of petitioner, sold a parcel of land to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines and upon his request, the subject land was conveyed to him by Damasa, Peralta’s mother. The latter, however, requested that she be allowed to stay in said property to which Tabernilla agreed on the condition that she will pay all realty taxes. Damasa remained on the said land until her death following which the petitioner, her son took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own. The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the court, in arriving at its factual findings, motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. Issue:
Whether or not decisions/factual findings may be drawn from evidences which are not formally offered. Ruling: NO.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where
such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case. The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court. Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
27. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG AND ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents. FACTS:
This case consists of consolidated petitions the main subject of which is the highest seat in the government, the Office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies he resigned as President or that he suffered from a permanent disability. He contended that the Office of the President was not vacant when respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath as president. To overturn his claim, the prosecution presented the Angara Diary which contains direct statements of petitioner: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and his statement, "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this — it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go." In G.R. No. 146738, some of the ISSUES the petitioner raised and argued are the following: 1. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY (AD) IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA; 2. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE. RULING: AS TO THE ISSUE ON HEARSAY: 1. The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the case at bar. Petitioner cannot complain that he was not furnished a copy of the diary since the same was frequently referred to by the parties and three parts thereof were published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the 2 nd and 3rd parts of the diary. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming that the AD was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the Hearsay Rule (HR). Evidence is called HR when its probative face depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding HR: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.
Not all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cited an authority who explained why admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule: "Wigmore, after pointing out that the party's declaration has generally the probative value of any other person's assertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the party's statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponent's own declaration, and 'he does not need to cross-examine himself.' Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rules is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion. In the case at bar, the AD contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON ADMISSIONS:
It was argued that the AD is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. An authority explained that the "basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner's silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON RES INTER ALIOS ACTA:
The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided." Again, petitioner erred in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. In the case, Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin." (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I've listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)" Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their neg otiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). "What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal."
INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS: ANEXCEPTION TO HR
These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: 21 a. Statements of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. REASON FOR BEING AN EXCEPTION: It may be used to prove state of mind or knowledge: where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity. In the case, the AD contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner's intent to resign.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON AUTHENTICATION AND VIOLATION OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE (BER):
Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated: A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate original of the diary. The "Best Evidence Rules" should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry. The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, "[w]hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." The court held that petitioner's contention is without merit. With regard the BER, the Court stated that it was true that it relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: ―Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.‖ With regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132.
Petitioner cites the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution "the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument . . . (this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum. He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had ―been given an opportunity to inspect" the AD but did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.
28. ATTY. JOSE R. ORTIZ, vs. LARRY DE GUZMAN,
FACTS: Atty. Ortiz's initial investigatio n4 revealed that on various dates, respondent demanded and received cash bond deposits in violation of standing regulations of this Court. After issuing either fake receipts or unauthorized provisional receipts, he then overstepped the limits of his authority by ordering jail officers to release the accused in each of the following cases:
Parties
Case No.
Provisional Receipt Date Fake Receipt No. Issuance
of
PP vs. Orlando Barlaan
31-10609
8903326
8/20/1998
P 5,000.00
PP vs. Nympha Magalona
31-42077-82
Prov. Rec.
undated
26,000.00
PP vs. Bernadeth A. Ramos
31-42823
8903327
7/24/1998
15,000.00
PP vs. Rolando Noynay
31-14170
13490965
11/22/2000
3,000.00
PP vs. Florence Pua
31-107377
written notice
undated
5,000.00
PP vs. Dandy L. Dimapiles
31-110282 & 35279
Amount
4,000.00
According to Atty. Ortiz, the falsifications committed were apparent after comparing the fake receipts with the original receipts duly issued by the property division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court. De Guzman was also caught in an entrapment operation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation. Together with another court employee, he was caught extorting P5,000 from a winning party litigant for the implementation of a certain court decision. Atty. Ortiz was ordered to submit additional evidence, and Larry De Guzman was ordered to make a comment on the allegations against him. But none was heard nor received from De Guzman during the formal investigation. ISSUE: Whether respondent's silence may be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
HELD: It is noteworthy that throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities given to respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent's refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first opportune time . 15 For his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an admission of guilt. We are therefore inclined to believe that the respondent is guilty of all the charges against him. 29. PEOPLE, vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants. DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON
FACTS: During the trial of this case before the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes, one of the accused, was discharged thereof to testify as a witness for the prosecution. The facts, according to Reyes, are summarized as follows: Sometime in the evening of 16 October 1950, Eulogio SERRANO, Cenon Serrano (alias PIPING), Domingo CADIANG, Saniago YUMUL, Filemon CENZON, and Anastacio REYES gathered in the house of SERRANO at Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga. There, the men conspired to have one Pablo NAVARRO killed for allegedly inducing and prompting people to testify on the maliwalu massacre and to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David for help. The plan was to lure NAVARRO to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. In pursuance of the plan, the group of men (except SERRANO) for several days waited for NAVARRO and tried to induce him to go drinking with them. On the 20th, the group were able to spot NAVARRO at a gambling casino and there had drinks with them. One Simplicio Manguerra also joined the drinking spree. The spree began at about 1pm. After drinking about six bottles of liquor, the group were able to convi ce NAVARRO to go to San Fernando to have a ―good time‖. On board a jeep, they headed on to San Fernando, still with bottles of liquor, drinking as they travelled. Eventually, when NAVARRO was drunk enough, PIPING ordered the jeepney driver to head on to Dolores, Bacolor. There, they went to the house of one BENJAMIN TOLENTINO. There, the group repeated beat NAVARRO (while his hands were tied) thru the orders of PIPING. He was left hands tied, and beat up at the post behind the stockade. MANGUERRA, on the other hand was ordered killed by PIPING. By 5pm, PIPING headed on to the house of SERRANO to report to him that the victims were already in Dolores. In the afternoon of that same day (October 20) SERRANO went to TOLENTINO and there confronted NAVARRO. Manalo, a civilan guard of the house allegedly heard Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo?” Navarro answered that he was not the one. SERRANO (accompanied with a different group of men) took NAVARRO to Potrero, Bacolor. And there killed him. His body was buried in a pit. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, NAVARRO’s body was placed in a sack and thr owninto a creek. His body was found on 6 December 1951. The accused denied all allegations and presented different alibi’s.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lone testimony of Anastacio Reyes is sufficient to prove the conspiracy between the parties.
RULING: In this case, YES.
The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration ," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
#30 [G.R. No. 123542. June 26, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BULOS, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Both Nancy Cordero and Rogelio Bulos are stay-in-workers for spouses Mario and Delia Fariolan in Davao. Nancy was the cook and general househelp while Rogelio worked as a truck helper for the business of Mario Fariolan. On December 3, 1992, the Fariolans were out of the house, Nancy was in her room folding laundry when Rogelio suddenly entered, locked the door from inside, and closed the window. She attempted to flee but Rogelio grabbed her and threatened her with a hunting knife. Rogelio raped Nancy . Before he left her, Rogelio threatened Nancy not to report the incident to anyone. Rogelio and the combined testimonies of Mario Fariolan, the employer of both, and Conrado Perido, sought to establish that Rogelio was not at the Fariolans' house on the afternoon in question but was vacationing in Cotabato where he stayed at Perido's house. On rebuttal, Merson Cordero, a brother of Nancy, also worked as helper at the rice mill of the Fariolans, testified that Rogelio in fact left the Fariolans’ house only on December 4, 1992, after he had already rap ed his sister; he returned only on December 14, 1992, the day he was also arrested. Cordero also said that the accused in fact offered marriage to Nancy, that the Fariolan spouses actively persuaded Nancy to accept the offer of marriage, and that Nancy refused. Because Nancy turned down the accused's offer of marriage, the Fariolans informed Cordero that he cannot work for them anymore. ISSUE: Whether Rogelio is guilty of the crime of rape and Whether the offer of Marriage in rape cases is an admission of guilt. HELD:
1. Yes. Nancy's statements are corroborated by the medical certificate, which confirmed the presence of healed vaginal lacerations. When testimony of rape is supported by physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal knowledge. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 2. Yes. The Court takes into consideration the flight of Rogelio the day after the rape, and his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had been reported to the authorities . As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the offended party is an admission of guilt.
#31 G.R. No. 136975. March 31, 2005 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. HANTEX TRADING CO., INC., FACTS: Hantex Trading Co. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines engaged in the sale of plastic products. It imports synthetic resin and other chemicals for the manufacture of its products. Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that Hantex had imported synthetic resin amounting to P115,599,018.00 but only declared P45,538,694.57. Bienvenido G. Flores, Chief of the Investigation Division, and Lt. Leo Dionela, Lt. Vicente Amoto and Lt. Rolando Gatmaitan conducted an investigation. They relied on the certified copies of Hantex’s Profit and Loss Statement for 1987 and 1988 on file with the SEC, the machine copies of the Consumption Entries, Series of 1987, submitted by the informer, as well as excerpts from the entries certified by Tomas and Danganan. Administrative hearings were conducted on the respondent's protest to the assessment. During the hearing, the IIPO representative presented the photocopies of the Consumption and Import Entries and the Certifications issued by Tomas and Danganan of the Bureau of Customs. Hantex wrote the BIR Commissioner questioning the assessment on the ground that the EIIB representative failed to present the original, or authenticated, or duly certified copies of the Consumption and Import Entry Accounts, or excerpts thereof if the original copies were not readily available. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the final assessment of the petitioner against the respondent for deficiency income tax and sales tax for the latter's 1987 importation of resins and calcium bicarbonate is based on competent evidence and the law Held: Yes.The 'best evidence envisaged in Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, includes the corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer who is the subject of the assessment process, the accounting records of other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business, including their gross profit and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper, document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other taxpayers who had personal transactions or from whom the subject taxpayer received any income; and record, data, document and information secured from government offices or agencies, such as the SEC, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff and Customs Commission.
The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and data in the person of the taxpayer. It places no limit or condition on the type or form of the medium by which the record subject to the order of the BIR is kept. The purpose of the law is to enable the BIR to get at the taxpayer's records in whatever form they may be kept. Such records include computer tapes of the said records prepared by the taxpayer in the course of business. In this era of developing information-storage technology, there is no valid reason to immunize companies with computer-based, record-keeping capabilities from BIR scrutiny. The standard is not the form of the record but where it might shed light on the accuracy of the taxpayer's return.
# 32 SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15, 1973 and were blessed with 2 children. It was on 1983 when Fernando left his family and since then never returned. It was until 1987 when Filipina filed a petition for legal separation but later amended into a petition for separation of property which was granted by the court. She then later filed a petition for legal separation on the grounds of abandonment and physical violence against her husband, which was granted by the Court. It was in 1992 when Filipina filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity citing habitual alcoholism, refusal to live with her without just cause, and refusal to have sex with her. The trial court denied her petition since her grounds do not constitute psychological incapacity of her husband. Such decision was denied by the appellate court. On appeal to the supreme court, she alleged lack of marriage license as her new ground for nullification of her marriage attaching therein mere photocopies of their marriage license and marriage certificate. ISSUE:
Whether or not her presentation of new ground on appeal, and admitting as evidence a mere photocopy of document if admissible. HELD:
The Supreme Court granted such petition for annument. Although litigants cannot raise an issue f or the first time on appeal, but in a number of instances, the court have relaxed observance of procedural rules. Certain rules ought not to be applied with rigidity. A marriage license is a formal requirement and its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. It is clear on the evidence presented that the issuance of marriage license and marriage certificate was on September 17, 1974 but the celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973 which also what was written on the birth certificates of their 2 children. Since the documents presented were just photocopies of the original, the Court ruled that although the marriage certificate and other pieces of documentary evidence were only photocopies, the fact that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution, means that these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner’s testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. Therefore, having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
No. 33. Heirs of Teodoro De La Cruz vs CA et al. Facts: The heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz allegedly bought from Felomino and Gregorio Madrid 3 lots in Isabela sometime in 1959. The Madrid brothers allegedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Teodoro dela Cruz. Consequently, Teodoro and his heirs had been in possession of the land since 1959 but they found out on 1968 that a Torrens Title in the name of the Madrid brothers were issued on the subject lands. The dela Cruz filed a
petition for reconveyance. The Madrid brothers denied having executed the Deed of Sale and alleged it to be falsified. They also claim that the Dela Cruz’s possession of the land was illegal. The orig inal copy of the Deed of Sale was said to be lost, thus only a photo copy was presented during trial. To prove due execution of the Deed of Sale, the Notary Public’s testimony that his signature in the Deed of Sale was genuine was offered. The Madrids did not object to the admissibility of the photocopy. Despite this, the trial court ruled that the photo copy was inadmissible. By the allegations of the Dela Cruz, a duplicate carbon copy was in Teodoro’s possession. No proof was presented as to the loss or destruction of the retained copy by the Notary public, or the duplicate copy held by Teodoro. It was then held that there was no valid sale by the Madrids in favor of Teodoro resulting to the dismissal of the case. On appeal to the CA, the CA held that the photocopy was admissible but has no probative value, so still the trial court’s decision was upheld. The CA held that despite the Notary Public’s testimony, the Deed of Sale is not trustworthy. The alleged surviving witness to the Deed Of Sale was not presented to corroborate the Notary Public’s testimony. Issue: 1. Whether the photocopy of the Deed of Sale is inadmissible as evidence. 2. Whether the same has probative value. Ruling: The photocopy of the Deed of Sale is admissible as evidence but has no probative value. Nonetheless, the petitioners’ appeal was granted because their possession was never questioned by the Madrids. Not even a written demand to vacate was issued. Despite being owners of land covered by TCT’s the Madrids were adjudged guil ty of laches. All original copies must be accounted for before secondary evidence may be introduced. The Notary Public who signed in the Deed of Sale testified that there were five copies made. None among the five were presented. Although the Dela Cruzs claim that the National Archives does not have among its copies these documents, this claim was not supported by any certification from the same office. However, despite the original not having been presented, the respondents failed to object as to its admissibility. The Notary Public was not even cross examined. Thus, the photocopy has become primary evidence. However, despite its admissibility, it holds no probative value regarding the sale it was intended to prove. The photocopy which was alleged to be have been copied from one of the Deed’s carbon copies, was unsigned by the parties and was not even dated. The Notary Public failed to verify the Deed from his own records. Taken together, these casts serious doubt on the due execution of the Deed of Sale.
No. 34 Salvador Dela Rama vs Rafael Ledesma
Facts: Dela Rama is one of Inocentes Dela Rama Inc.’s incorporators. Ledesma is Dela Rama’s nephew. The Dela Rama Inc claimed from the Philippine War Commission war damages. Dela Rama Inc. was paid in two installments. After the first installment was paid, Dela Rama sold 140 shares that he owns in Dela Rama Inc. to Ledesma. There was an alleged understanding that De la Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due on his 140 shares which Ledesma promised to deliver to him upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission of the United States. Subsequently, new certificates of stocks were nd issued in Ledesma’s name. When the 2 installment was paid to the corporation, it was distributed to its nd stockholders on record. Upon Ledesma’s receipt of the dividends paid on the 2 installment of the war damages, Dela Rama demanded the return of his shares. Ledesma refused so Dela Rama filed a collection case against the former. On his answer, Ledesma denied the existence of the agreement accompanying the sale of shares of stocks. Ledesma raised as defenses that the indorsement by De la Rama of the Stock Certificate in question without qualification or condition constituted the sole and exclusive contract between the parties and to allow De la Rama to prove any alleged simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. In reply, Dela Rama alleged that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties, does the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply. The agreement was also no longer executor thus, not covered by the Statues of Fraud. The trial court did not allow Dela Rama to introduce parol evidence to prove the existence of the agreement upon which, the sale of his shares of stocks was conditioned upon.
Issue: Whether Parol Evidence is admissible to prove the existence of an alleged agreement that accompanies a sale but not put into writing. Ruling: No. Dela Rama is not allowed to introduce Parol Evidence to prove the alleged agreement accompanying the sale of his shares of stocks to Ledesma. It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.
No. 35
Espidiona Canuto vs Juan Mariano Facts: Canuto executed a Deed of Sale of land in favor Mariano reserving the right to repurchase within one year from the date of sale. One year lapsed and Canuto failed to exercise the right to repurchase. When Mariano claimed absolute ownership over the land subject of the sale, Canuto alleged that she be given an extension to repurchase. Canuto claims that Mariano agreed but the latter failed to appear at the place and time agreed upon to receive the money for the repurchase and for executing the necessary Deed of Repurchase. Canuto then filed a case to compel Mariano to receive the purchase money and execute the necessary documents. To prove the alleged oral extension of the period to repurchase, one witness who was alleged to be present when Mariano agreed to extend the time was presented. The trial court ruled that Canuto may exercise her right to repurchase. Mariano appealed asking that parol evidence may not be introduced to prove the alleged extension of time within which, Canuto may exercise her right to repurchase. Issue: Whether parol evidence may be introduced to prove the alleged extension of time within which, Canuto may exercise her right to repurchase. Ruling: Yes, considering the circumstances. Refusal by the vendee of a valid tender or offer of purchase price in the exercise of the vendor’s right to repurchase preserves the vendor’s right to repurchase. The defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within the extended period, and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself. The SC citing the cases of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), ruled that that a bona fide offer or tender of the price agreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the party making it, without the necessity of making judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is refused. The case of and in the case of Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil. Rep., 362) was further cited holding that in such cases when diligent effort is made by the vendor of the land to exercise the right to repurchase reserved by him in his deed of sale "and fails by reason of circumstances over which he has no control, we are of the opinion and so hold that he does not lose his right to repurchase on the day of maturity." 36. Lechugas vs. CA Facts: Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent ―the Loza’s‖. Another case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiff’s vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims. Issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner. Ruling:
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court… the parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigatio n against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in
the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.
37. People vs Francisco Facts:
Francisco , who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention prisoner. On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house. After a few moments, the seargent (Pimentel) heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met Francisco’s wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found Francisco to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead. Wife testifies against Francisco, which the latter questioned. Issue: Whether testimony of the wife is admissible Ruling: Admissible
The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be waived. Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner. It is wellestablished that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse’s competency must be made when he or she is first offered as witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the admission of the spouse’s testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that the witness’s testimony is not admissible even with the other spouse’s consent.
Clearly, if the statute provides that a spouse shall in no case testify against the other except in a prosecution for an offense against the other, the failure of the accused to object does not enable the state to use the spouse as a witness.
38. Ordono vs Daquigan Facts:
Avelino Ordoño was charged with rape having raped his daughter, Leonora. In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa. Catalina manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoño because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoño. Avelino Ordoño, invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoño's motion for the reconsideration of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether marital disqualification applies Ruling: It does not apply.
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital discord? There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation. 39. Tan vs CA Facts:
Tan Kiat, in his complaint averred that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan Ke h in built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over to Tan K iat the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 35656 and, in addition, executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for a duration of forty (40) years. However, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of Tan Kiat and that Remigio would execute the proper documents of transfer in favor of Tan Kiat should the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject properties. TCT No. 35656 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 53284 was issued in the name of Remigio. Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of private respondent to further safeguard the latter’ s interest on the subject properties, but private respondent never paid any rental
and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio was killed. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of Tan Kiat’s ownership of the subject prop erties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to Tan Kiat who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to convey the subject properties despite repeated demands by Tan Kiat. In fact, petitioners had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under TCT No. 117898. Thus, the filing of the complaint for recovery of property. Petitioner’s claim prescription Tan Kiat alledges he acquired property thru sale. Issue: Whether evidence is admissible Ruling: Inadmissible
Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the subject properties. On the other hand, Tan Kiat relies simply on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the ―Dead Man’s Statute‖ fou nd in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: ―Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.‖
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD
FACTS:
Petitioners Carolina, Dolores and Cesar sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother Ricardo. They claimed that they were the only heirs of the deceased as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no legitimate o illegitimate descendants or ascendants. As such, Cesar was then appointed as the administrator of the estate. Sometime later, private respondents Honoraria, Cecilia and Marian Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the special proceeding. In their motion, they alleged that Honoraria, the widow of Jose Libunao, had been the common-law wife of Ricardo for twenty seven years and that during the said period their union had produced two children: Cecilia and Marian. Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian,s filiation, presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971 and had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park. With this, petitioners claimed that Cecilia and Marian Abad, who were born in 1948 and 1954 respectively, are not then the illegitimate children of Ricardo, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. They likewise submitted the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof thereby rendering him to incapable of fathering a child.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented and submitted by the petitioners are admissible.
RULING:
The pieces of evidence are inadmissible. The Court ruled that the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 was not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there was no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. Moreover, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park showed that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado. The Court ruled further that As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was inadmissible and the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. Petitioners did not dispute that the affidavit met the first four requisites. They asserted, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forgot that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
41. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA
Facts:
Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were guilty for the murder Silvino Daria. The records of the case show that between 8 and 9 in the evening, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making rope in the annex of their house, while the wife, four meters away, was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria was using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the night was bright because of the moon overhead. Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw Brioso and Taeza herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each accused point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers.
The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted by Mariano Taeza.
The two accused appealed the conviction alledging that the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the ph ysical identity of the accused.
Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible
Ruling : Evidence admissible
There is no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by. But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved when both the said accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and each su bsequently fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon that could have been carried concealed in his person. Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and straightforward" identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria. Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
42. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.NARCISO DE GRACIA and RAYMUNDO SORIMA
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte charged accused Alfredo Salva, Narciso de Gracia, and Raymundo Sorima with the crime of murder for the killing of one Ernesto Flores. The two accused, Narciso de Gracia and Raymundo Sorima, arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Hence, trial proceeded against them. At the hearing, the prosecution established that: All accused are tired farmers that upon reaching home sought to acquire rice for credit in a store. The store owner refused which made Salva claim that he woul d do a ―paregla‖ (to kill). Some time later, Ernesto Flores passed by on his way to the nearby seashore, and upon reaching the place where the accused were seated, he greeted them "Good evening". Without returning the salutation, de Gracia suddenly held Flores' left arm and Sorima the latter's right arm, Sorima ordering Salva to stab the passerby. Apparently recognizing that Flores is not their intended victim, Salva said to his companions: "He is not the one." But Sorima replied: "Never mind. You said it is `paregla.'" Salva then thrust his hunting knife, into Flores' abdomen. Flores shouted for help, causing all three accused to scamper away. Out of fear, Silma and Gac-ang went inside the latter's house and locked themselves in. Ernesto Flores rushed away in the direction of his father's house, shouting for help ("tabang"). Kauswagan Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin, who was then reading a newspaper in his house, was attracted by these shouts. He immediately got his rifle, went down and followed Flores, finally overtaking him in the back stairs of his father's house, sitting by the stairs but supported by his two brothers, and with his intestines protruding out of his abdomen. Upon Agawin's inquiry as to what happened, Ernesto Flores spontaneously declared that Alfredo Salva stabbed him while "Naring" (de Gracia) and "Mundo" Sorima were holding his arms. Agawin ordered his own brother to get his jeep and rush Ernesto to the hospital in Iligan City, about 20 kilometers away. In the hospital, Flores died. Agawin testifies in court Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible. Ruling: Evidence Admissible Accused contends that the testimony of Vice-Mayor Nemesis Agawin regarding Ernesto Flores' dying declaration had not satisfied the requirements of an ante mortem statement since the declarant had not made it under the consciousness of an impending death, nor had the statement fulfilled the requirements of res gestae, because said declaration was neither natural nor spontaneous, or unreflective and instinctive, but rather it was made in reply to a question asked from the declarant; and the prosecution not having specified the purpose for which Agawin's testimony was offered, the same is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. The trial court in admitting the testimony of Vice-Mayor Agawin regarding Flores' dying declaration, wherein he identified accused as his assailants. It is believed that the circumstances under which the victim made such identification have fulfilled the requirements of either an ante mortem statement or as part of the res gestae. Judged by the nature and extent of the injury inflicted (deep stab wound on the abdomen, causing his intestines to protrude), Flores could not ignore the seriousness of his condition, and it is safe to infer that the deceased made the declaration under the consciousness of impending death. The same identification may also be considered as part of the res gestae, since it was made immediately after the stabbing incident and appears to be natural and spontaneous, and made before the deceased, who had no enmity toward appellants, could contrive or devise a plan to incriminate them. There was no necessity for the prosecution to specify the purpose for which it offered Agawin's testimony, for said purpose was self-evident. Besides, the defense failed to object on time to its presentation in the trial court. Hence, the trial court correctly admitted said testimony.
41. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VERSUS JUAN BRIOSO 37 SCRA 336 FACTS: On December 23,1996 between 8 and 9 in the evening, Cecilia Bernal, a niece and a neighbor of the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall and saw accused-appellant Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was 6 meters away. His suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witness each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Darias house. Two detonations followed, and therafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for help saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband’s side and he told her he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Daria expired one hour later. Both accused gives alibi as defense. Mariano Taeza testified that he was at the barrio clinic of Tiker playing the guitar with Antonio Daria(Son of the victim), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais but none of them corroborated his testimony. Juan Brioso, testifies that he was in Sitio Catungawan, Barrio Basbasa, Tagum on December 23, 1996 in his cousin Nestorio Flores to cut and mill sugarcane and never leave the place where they were milling which lasted up to 2 in the morning of the following day. Nestorio Flores was presented to corroborate the alibis of brioso but the trial court found inconsistency with that of Brioso’s testimony. The CFI convicted the two accused for murder. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder. RULING: The testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death,considering that he died only one hour after being shot. It has been repeatedly held that in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if uncorroborated. It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons mentioned by the accused but they are not presented. The defense of alibi is so weak that in order to be believed there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Mariano Taeza was so near the victim's house that it was easy for him to be there when the shooting occurred. Evidence also shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers and only a two-hour walk. The place is also accessible by motor transportation, although motor vehicles are allegedly rare in the said place. As in the case of Mariano Taeza, it was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at the locus criminis at the time the crime was committed. WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of the indemnity is increased to P12, 000.00.
42. PEOPLE VERSUS DE GRACIA 18 SCRA 197 FACTS: At around 5 o'clock p.m., 13 May 1961, Paterno Silma and Esperidion Gac-ang, together with accused Alfredo Salva and Raymundo Sorima met and were joined by accused Narciso de Gracia in the store of one Peling Landi in Barrio Tacub where Salva treated his companions to beer and tuba. After rounds of drinks, the five men left and proceeded to the store of Pedro Lacida where Sorima tried to secure rice on credit. Lacida's wife, however, refused. Seemingly resenting Mrs. Lacida's refusal, Sorima said that he will go on "paregla" (meaning he will kill somebody). To avoid trouble, Silma and Gac-ang repaired to Gac-ang's house, leaving the three accused at the store. Between the hours of nine and ten o'clock in the evening of the same day, 13 May 1961, while Silma and Gac-ang were conversing in the balcony of the latter's house, they saw Salva, Sorima, and de Gracia seated by a tree near the road a short distance away. Sometime later, Ernesto Flores passed by on his way to the nearby seashore, and upon reaching the place where the accused were seated, he greeted them "Good evening". Without returning the salutation, de Gracia suddenly held Flores' left arm and Sorima the latter's right arm, Sorima ordering Salva to stab the passerby. Apparently recognizing that Flores is not their intended victim, Salva said to his companions: "He is not the one." But Sorima replied: "Never mind. You said it is `paregla.'" Salva then thrust his hunting knife into Flores' abdomen. Flores shouted for help, causing all three accused to scamper away. Out of fear, Silma and Gac-ang went inside the latter's house and locked themselves in. Ernesto Flores rushed away in the direction of his father's (Santiago Flores) house, shouting for help ("tabang"). Kauswagan Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin, who was then reading a newspaper in his house, was attracted by these shouts. He immediately got his rifle, went down and followed Flores, finally overtaking him in the back stairs of his father's house, sitting by the stairs but supported by his two brothers, and with his intestines protruding out of his abdomen. Upon Agawin's inquiry as to what happened, Ernesto Flores spontaneously declared that Alfredo Salva stabbed him while "Naring" (de Gracia) and "Mundo" Sorima were holding his arms. Agawin ordered his own brother to get his jeep and rush Ernesto to the hospital in Iligan City, about 20 kilometers away. Flores died due to loss of blood three hours after admission in the hospital. Appellants contend that the testimonies of prosecution's eye-witnesses to the stabbing of deceased Ernesto Flores are highly incredible, inherently improbable, absurd and inconsistent. Appellants also contend that the testimony of Vice-Mayor Nemesis Agawin regarding Ernesto Flores' dying declaration had not satisfied the requirements of an ante mortem statement since the declarant had not made it under the consciousness of an impending death, nor had the statement fulfilled the requirements of res gestae, because said declaration was neither natural nor spontaneous, or unreflective and instinctive, but rather it was made in reply to a question asked from the declarant; ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused for the crime charged. RULING: Inconsistency in the testimony of witnesses, if only minor details, reinforces rather than weakens their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see differently some details of a startling occurrence. The declaration by the victim immediately before his death satisfied the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of the injury inflicted (deep stab wound on the abdomen, causing his intestines to protrude), Flores could not ignore the seriousness of his condition, and it is safe to infer that the deceased made the declaration under the consciousness of impending death. The identification made by the victim may also be considered as part of the res gestae although it was made in reply to a question asked of him, since it was made immediately after the stabbing incident and appears to be natural and spontaneous, and made before the deceased, who had no enmity toward appellants, could contrive or devise a plan to incriminate them.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of the accused Raymundo Sorima and Narciso de Gracia for the crime of murder is upheld.
43. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs GREGORIO LARA
Facts: Querido, accompanied by four other persons, planted himself at the crossing immediately in front of the Lara’s house and began to entertain his companions by speaking insulting words of and to Lara. These expressions were to the effect that a concubine to whom Lara was supposed to be devoted had been, enticed away by some other person. That same night an employee of the Bureau of Lands, named Rufino Roque, had occasion to stop in La Paz upon an official errand and, being acquainted with Gregorio Lara, he s topped at the latter’s house as a guest for the night. Being an employee of the Bureau of Lands. Roque carried a revolver. Lara, meanwhile, had emerged from his house with pistol in hand, and reaching the center of the street, he found that his entertainers had all disappeared. Seeing this, he discharged his pistol into the air, as a sort of warning against a repetition of the incident; and instead of going immediately indoors again, he turned into the street and went in an easterly direction, being desirous, so he says, of ascertaining from his neighbors the identity of the members of the party. Querido jumped out from behind and threw his arms around Lara in an effort to pinion his hands and get possession of the pistol. Lara at once attempted to free him self from his assailant and succeeded in breaking Querido’s hold. At the same time he turned so as to confront Querido, and the struggle for the possession of the revolver was continued. In the course of this struggle, Lara was able to shoot Querido but somehow Querido, being a man of strength, was able to grab the head of Lara Roque followed after hearing the shots. His first effort of course was directed towards the recovery of the pistol, and his movements towards this end were apparently interpreted by Querido as of an unfriendly nature. At any rate Querido at once threw his unoccupied arm around the neck of Roque and held him prisoner in the same manner as he was already holding Lara. At this moment Mariano Dolor came upon the scene, where he found Querido holding both Lara and Roque firmly with his arms around their respective necks, while he appeared to be supporting himself by leaning upon their shoulders. Querido then freed his prisoners, and all went together to the municipal building, for the purposes of the official investigation. On the way thither Querido, weakened by the wound he had received, needed assistance, and Lara assisted others in supporting him as he walked. Qurido died in 3 days.In this interval he signed two written statements concerning the homicide. The first of these statements was made before the justice of the peace. Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible Ruling: Not admissible The document would hardly be admissible as a dying declaration, since it does not appear that the declarant then really thought that death was certain. His words on this point were these: ―Perhaps I am going to die very soon, justice.‖ However, the statement was introduced in evidence, apparently without objection, and on examination it will be found to contain nothing prejudicial to Lara aside from the fact (which is admitted) that Lara did that shooting. The declarant added: ―We were able to take from the hands of Lara the revolver which a friend had lent him.‖ In a later statement, signed by Querido in the presence of E. Parado and Feliciano Fariñas, after he had given up hopes of life, he stated in substance that Lara entertained rancor towards him because he (Lara) suspected that the declarant had induced his concubine to seek another man. There is nothing in either of these statements that throws any light upon the immediate circumstances of the shooting, additional to what is revealed by the testimony of the living witnesses. The failure of the declarant to state any fact unfavorable to the accused with respect to the conditions under which the shot was fired strongly confirms the contention of Lara that it occurred while the two combatants were struggling over the pistol.
Note: Lara was acquitted for self defense. It has been ruled that Querido’s strength was superior over Lara’s gun. And also Lara must shoot before Querido can take over the gun. 1 dissentor in the case.
44. THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN DE LA CRUZ, ET AL Facts: A band, composed of not less than five persons, two of whom, the accused in this case, were armed with revolvers, one with a bolo, and there others with clubs, entered the town of Jaen, where they met one Fortunato Jimenez who, with his wife and sister, was on his way to visit a neighbor's house. With threats of violence the band obliged Jimenez and his party to return to his house, and upon arriving there, Timoteo Dizon, one of the band, went up into the house with Jimenez, and threatening him with a revolver, demanded P500. Jimenez had no money, but was compelled to give up his watch, and at that moment, the accused Pio Yesma entered the room, and demanded that, if Jimenez would not give the P500, he give at least whatever money he had. Jimenez insisted that he had no money and the robbers left the house. Just before the band encountered, Jimenez and his party, they had captured another resident of the town, named Delfin Esquivel, who was compelled at the point of a revolver to accompany them together with Jimenez and his party, and was left downstairs under guard together with the women to Jimenez's party, when Jimenez himself was taken upstairs, and when the band left the house, was thrust inside together with the women, and ordered to stay there and to make no noise. A short time thereafter, the Constabulary forces surprised and attacked the band, killing Dizon and wounding another member of the band. The watch was found upon Dizon's body, and his corpse was identified by Jimenez as that of the person who had first gone up into the house and demanded P500.
The band were convicted of the crime of robo en cuadrilla (robbery in an armed band), which were conclusively established by the testimony of the witnesses at the trial, fully established their guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, and we find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused. Accused set forth there defences and one of them is : The trial court erred in admitting ante-mortem statements made by Timoteo Dizon in the presence of the accused, and at the time uncontradicted by them, for the purpose of identifying the appellants and establishing their participation in the commission of the crime. Issue: Whether evidence is admissible Ruling: Evidence inadmissible The court agrees that the trial court erred in admitting the ante-mortem statements of Timoteo Dizon, for the purpose of identifying the appellants as members of the band. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial court were an alleged extra-judicial declaration made by the bandit Timoteo Dizon, a few hours before his death, wherein he confessed his guilt of the robbery on the night in question, and stated that the accused were members of the band. The evidence
further discloses that this confession was made to the provincial fiscal and an officer of the Constabulary, and that, although the accused were there present, under arrest, charged with the commission of the crime, and heard the dying man charge them with being members of the band, kept silent and did not attempt to deny the charge. Dying declarations or affirmations, made not under the sanction of an oath but a solemn sense of impending death, are sometimes accepted as evidence, though made extra-judicially and without cross-examination, the declarant not being regarded as a witness whom the defendant is entitled to meet face to face; but the admission of such declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder, and must proceed from the very person alleged to have been killed. So the acts or declarations of a conspiring are sometimes admissible as evidence against his co-conspirators, the acts or declarations of each of the conspirators being regarded as the acts or declarations of all. But the ground for the admission of such evidence clearly requires that such acts or declarations must have been made during the progress of the conspiracy and in pursuance of the ends for which it had been formed, and not after the transaction had ended; and further, before such evidence can be admitted it must appear by competent evidence that the conspiracy actually existed and that the accused were members of the conspiracy.
43. People v Lara
Facts:
The deceased, Juan Advincula, was, a resident of the barrio of Salitran, in the municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite. About 3 weeks to being shot by the accused, Advincula was awakened in the nighttime by the barking of his dog. Advincula arouse and went out to find Lara, the accused in his yard. He scolded Lara supposing that the latter had designs upon the chickens in the stable. So strong was this impression in the mind of Advincula that he reported the incident the same night to the municipal authorities. One afternoon, while Advincula was going home, he met the accused. The two got into an arguement which resulted to Lara getting out a gun and shooting Advincula in the left shoulder. There were no witnesses to this confrontation and what transpired on that afternoon was based solely on Advinculas statements after the shooting. After being shot, Advincula sought help in the house of a neighbor, one Felix Ramirez. Advincula found the family of Ramirez sitting at the table eating their evening meal; and he told them that he had been shot by the Lara at the same time exhibiting the bloody stain on his left side. Ramirez at once called the barrio lieutenant, one Ciriaco Reyes; and upon the arrival of the latter, Advincula repeated his account of the occurrence, adding that he was weak from the pain resulting from his wound and that he would not survive. The next day the justice of the peace of the municipality, one Restituto Paman, took Advincula's affidavit (Exhibit C), in which the declarant reiterated what he had told the lieutenant, but upon this occasion he said he felt better and he indicated to the justice of the peace that he thought he would not die of the wound. On the next day Advincula was taken to the Philippine General Hospital in the City of Manila where he remained for three weeks, at the end of which time he was discharged. In a few days, however, the bullet, which had never been extracted from the shoulder, begun to make trouble again, and Advincula was taken back to the hospital, where blood poisoning from the internal wound soon developed and later on, Advincula died.
Issue: declarations.
Held:
WON the statements of Advincula regarding Lara as the one who shot him can be admitted as dying
The statement made to Ciriaco Reyes, the barrio lieutenant, in the house of Felix Ramirez, was in our opinion admissible as a dying declaration, because when this declaration was made the deceased was weak, complained of the pain which he was suffering from the wound and stated that he would not survive. It is true that the deceased lived for nearly six weeks after that statement was made, and in this interval recovered, to external appearances, almost completely from the wound. Nevertheless it appears that in the end the deceased died from the same wound; and the admissibility of the first declaration depends upon the state of mind of the deceased when the declaration was made, and not upon the length of time that elapsed between the infliction of the wound and the declarant's death. This statement supplies ample proof that the accused was the author of Advincula's death. It was not a dying declaration with regard to the affidavit (Exhibit C) given to the justice of the peace by the deceased on the day after the fatal injury was inflicted, for the reason that when that declaration was made the deceased indicated that he was under the impression that the injury would not be fatal.
44. US v Dela Cruz
Facts: Timoteo Dizon together with a band had just committed robbery in two houses. Shortly after they left the last house that they robbed, the band was surprised by Constabulary forces which attacked the band, which resulted to the wounding of a member of the band and in the mortal wounding of Dizon who later died in custody due t o the said wound. The accused appellants were convicted of the crime of robo en cuadrilla (robbery in an armed band), and the facts above set out, which were conclusively established by the testimony of witnesses at the trial.
The accused appellants were also convicted based on the ante-mortem statements of Timoteo Dizon, for the purpose of identifying the appellants as members of the band. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial court were an alleged extra-judicial declaration made by the bandit Timoteo Dizon, a few hours before his death, wherein he confessed his guilt of the robbery on the night in question, and stated that the appellants were member s of the band. The evidence further discloses that this confession was made to the provincial fiscal and a n officer of the Constabulary, and that, although the appellants were there present, under arrest, charged with the commission of the crime, and heard the dying man charge them with being members of the band, they kept silent and did not attempt to deny the charge.
Issue: WON the dying declarations of Dizon regarding the membership of the accused appellants in the band, made under the solemn sense of impending death is admissible to prove said membership of the accused in the band which committed the robberies.
The trial court erred in admitting the ante-mortem statements of Timoteo Dizon, for the purpose of Held: identifying the appellants as members of the band.
The acts or declarations of a conspiring are sometimes admissible as evidence against his co-conspirators, the acts or declarations of each of the conspirators being regarded as the acts or declarations of all. But the ground for the admission of such evidence clearly requires that such acts or declarations must have been made during the progress of
the conspiracy and in pursuance of the ends for which it had been formed, and not after the transaction had ended; and further, before such evidence can be admitted it must appear by competent evidence that the conspiracy actually existed and that the accused were members of the conspiracy. (Bishop's Criminal Procedure, Vol. I, sec. 1248, and many cases there cited.) The declaration under consideration was made after the transaction to which it referred was at an end, was not made in pursuance of the conspiracy, and was clearly inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the defendants were co-conspirators with the defendant. It is suggested, however, that while the statements in question were inadmissible as proof of the truth of their contents, they might have been received for the purpose of showing that, when they were made in the presence of the defendants, they made no attempt to deny them, and by their silence admitted their truth. We do not doubt that silence may sometimes be equivalent to the admission of the truth of statements made by one person in the presence and hearing of another, when these statements have been made under such circumstances that the natural impulse of an innocent person hearing such statements would impel him to deny their truth if they were false. But it must appeal that there was a proper opportunity for reply and that the surroundings were such as to render a denial expedient and proper; and the right of a defendant in all criminal prosecutions "to be exempt from testifying against himself" clearly prohibits any inference of guilt from the silence of an accused person who has been arrested and charged with crime. The statements in question were made after defendants had been arrested, and in the course of an official investigation which was being conducted by the provincial fiscal, and under these circumstances, proof of the fact that the statements were made in the presence and hearing of the defendants, and that they kept silence and failed there and then to deny their truth, could in no event support the inference that by thus keeping silence they implicity admitted the truth of the facts alleged by the declarant.
45. THE UNITED STATES vs. DALMACIO ANTIPOLO
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with the murder FACTS: of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he has appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected upon the following ground that she is not competent to testify under the rules of procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party. Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore, the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage. These propositions were rejected by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to the testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this objection counsel took exception and made in offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is sufficient at this time to say some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they purported to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his injuries were due to a fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: "Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties."
ISSUE: WON the marital disqualification applies to a dying declarations made by either spouse.
HELD: NO. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement. The wi fe may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be granted.
46. MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, and BENEDICTO GONZALES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ROSALINA RIVERA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA,
# 47 EVIDENCE G.R. No. L-9113 BENITO LOPEZ, administrator of the estate of Marcela Emradura, deceased , plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS VALDEZ, defendant-appellant. FACTS:
This is an action begun by Benito Lopez, the administrator of the estate of Marcela Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of possession of the land. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant went to the Supreme Court assigning as error the procedure adopted by the court when objections were interposed by counsel for defendant to questions designed to adduce evidence of the contents of written documents when the destruction or the loss of the documents had not been properly established. It appears from the record that Lopez(plaintiff-appellee) relied on certain written contracts entered into between Valdez(defendant-appellant) and Marcela Emradura(the deceased) during her lifetime to prove the cause of action set out in the complaint. The documents themselves were not produced and when counsel for appellee sought to prove by certain witnesses the contents of these documents, without presenting facts justifying secondary evidence with reference thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection that the evidence was incompetent and improper as the documents themselves were the best evidence. Several of these objections were made, to each of which the court, without a decision on the objections, stated: ―The objection of Mr. Reyes will be taken into consideration.‖ The witnesses were thereupon allowed, over the exception of appellant, to answer the questions to which the objections were interposed. A decision on these objections was thus left in abeyance and the trial terminated without a resolution of the questions p resented. In spite of that the trial court in its final decision took into consideration the secondary evidence thus introduced and based its decision thereon. ISSUE: Was the procedure valid?
