Rawls – Political Liberalism Priority of right in political liberalism Seems to imply conception of justice as purely involving right not using ideas of the good exxept exxept purely purely instrumental or those that are are a matter of personal choice But he sees them as complementary ‘no conception of justice can draw entirely pon one or the other but must combine both! "# $ %istinguishes between political conception of justice and a comprehensive comprehensive moral doctrine &i'e' religious one( )eatures of a conception of justice* #( +oral +oral conception conception wor,ed wor,ed out out for a speci-c subject subject . /he basi basic c struct structur ure e of a consti constitut tution ional al demo democra cratic tic regi regime me 0( acception acception the political political conception conception doesn!t doesn!t presupp presuppose ose a comprehensive comprehensive moral doctrine . mer merely ely the the basi basic c str struc uctu turre 1( it isn!t formulated formulated in terms terms of a comprehen comprehensive sive doctrine but in terms terms of fundamental ideas so basically it is a matter of scope ‘the range of subjects to which a conception applies! conception is general when it applies to a wide range of subject conception is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life $$ Political liberalism is a political conception of justice for the main instituions of life . a2rms a2rms basic basic rights rights and and liberti liberties es assign assigns s them them a certain certain priority priority political conception must draw upon ideas of the good but the main 3uestion is to what extent main restriction would seem to be that the ideas of the good must be included if #( they can be be shared shared by citi4ens citi4ens who are are free free and e3ual e3ual . this this can can be dodg dodgy y as as it opens opens up pos positi itive ve libe liberty rty 0( they don!t presuppose presuppose any particular comprehensive comprehensive doctrine doctrine . but sure surely ly they they do do by limiting limiting what compreh comprehensiv ensive e doctrin doctrines es are are allowed so its restrictued by the priority of right
this means that admissible ideas of the good must respect the limits of and serve a role within the poltical conception of justice "0 Goodness as Rationality -ve ideas of the good in justice which meet these conditions* #( ideas of goodness as rationality 0( idea of primary goods 1( idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good 5( idea of the political virtues 6( idea of the good of a well.ordered political society . .
rationality is ta,en for granted by pretty much every political conception of justice this supports the idea that members of a democratic society to at least some expent a rational plan of life in light of which they schedule their important endeavors and allocate their various resources
given this – any wor,able political conception of justice is to serve as a public basis must count human life and ful-lling basic human needs and purposes as good and endorse rationality as a basic principle of political and social organisation goodness as rationality provides part of a framewor, serving two main roles #( helps identify a list of primary goods 0( relying on an index of primary goods enable us to specify aims or motivations of parties in the original position §3 Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparison idea of goodness as rationality is to provide part of a framewor, for an account of primary goods . has to be combined with a conception of citi4ens as free and e3ual conception of persons as a poltical conception not part of a compregensive doctrine conception of persons with rationality and basic facts of the human condition that provides re3uisite bac,ground for specifying citi4ens needs . this allows us to come up with a list of primary goods 0 conception of primary goods! role is* basic feature of well.ordered political society is that there is a public understanding about the ,inds of claims it is appropriate for citi4ens to ma,e about 3uestions of justice
justice as fairness can then hold that ful-lment of claims related to those needs is advantageous . so it is improving the circumstances of citi4ens ‘an e7ective political conception of justice includes then a political understanding of what is to be publically recognised as citi4ens needs and hence as advantageous for all! problem being that where there are con8icting concpetions of the good how is it possible to wor, out what claims are appropriate9 ‘government can no more act to maximise the ful-lment of citi4ens! rational preferences or wants: or to advance human excellence or the values of perfection than it can to advance catholocism! political liberalism therefore loo,s for an account that is independent of any particular omprehensive doctrine 1 conception of primary goods addresses this problem . rests on identifying partial similarity in citi4ens! permissible conceptions of the good . i'e' conceptions that don!t violate the principles of polticial justice two things su2ce for a shared idea of rational advantage* #( citi4ens a2rm the same political conception of each as free and e3ual 0( permissible conceptions of the good all re3uire roughly the same primary goods ‘the same basic rights libertie and opportunities and the same all. purpose means! these claims count as appropriate claims list of primary goods #( right and liberties 0( freedom and movement and free choice of occupation against a bac,ground of opportunity surely $ can!t just go and be a doctor tomorrow9 $ don!t have a right to a job 1( powers and perogatives of o2ces and position of responsibility in political economic institutions 5( income and wealth 6( social base of self.respect these are mostly based in instutions $;
$ntroduction of primary goods forms the basis of interpersonal comparisons . based on objective features of citi4ens! social re3uirements recognise the limits of the political and the practicable #( limits of justice as fairness as the focus of an overlapping consense 0( respect the constraints of simplicity and availability of information to which any practicable political conception is subject Sen and s,ill 0( variations in physical capacities and s,ills . includes illness and accident 1( variations in citi4ens! conceptions of the good 5( variations in tastes and preferences given assumption that everyone has capacity to be a normal cooperating member of society &is this a good assumption9 Principles of justice are satis-ed if none of these variations among citi4ens are unfair and give rise to injustice ;ariations in moral intellectual capacities are above the line of essential minimum capacity . it is handled by social practices of 3ualifying for positions and free competition against bac,ground of e3ual opportunity . variations in physical capacity can put people below the line . but allocation of money to treatment aims at restoring people above the line variations in conceptions of the goo . justice as fairness is fair to the conception of the goods . even though not all conceptions have the chance to 8ourish
variations in preferences and taste . seen as our own responsibility . something we must learn to deal ith
;$ ?se of primary goods assumes that by the virtue of their moral powers citi4ens have some part in forming and cultivating their -nal ends and preferences $t isn!t an objection that an index doesn!t accommodate those with unusual tastes . it is unreasonable for people to hold such preferences and simply re3uire them to ma,e out the best they can . ‘we don!t view citi4ens as passive carriers of desires . moral power to r@form revise and pursua a conception of the good hodling people responsible is reasonable only under certain assumptions . assume that citi4ens can regulate their preferences and ends in light of their expectations of primary goods
"5 Primary Goods as Citizens’ needs isn!t impossible to permit all conceptions of the good but basic instittuons ‘allow su2cient space for ways of life worthy of citi4ens devoted to support! . how are we judging the worthy ones9 Rejects the idea of maximising overall wellbeing %oesn!t try to estimate the extent to which individuals succeed in advancing their way of life %oesn!t try and judge intrinsic worth of their ends Rights liberties and opportunities as primary goods are clearly not basic values of life even though they are essential 2 primary goods specify what their needs are when 3uestions of justice arise political conception allows us to wor, out what primary goods are needed index not intended to approximate an idea of the good speci-ed by a comprehensive conception s,ipping to important 3uotes
citi4ens as free and e3ual are to be at liberty to ta,e charge of their lives and each is expected by others to adapt their conception of the good to their expected fair share of primary goods surely though many aspirational ways of thin,ing don!t -t with a ‘fair share!
many liberal thoughts are that the state musn!t favour any comprehensive doctrine e3ually common theme of critics of liberalism that it is arbitrarily biased for one form or anoher of individuals neutrality needs to be in the discussion of the permissible conception of the good and of political virtues can be de-ned in di7erent ways &neutrality( . procedural – reference to a procedure that can be legitimated or justi-ed without appealing to moral values – or – because justi-cation re3uires some values can be justi-ed with respect to natural values justice as fairness isn!t procedurally neutral . principles of justice more substantive than procedural values as is its conception of societies . it focuese on -nding the overlapping concepnsus . common ground . but common ground isn!t necessarily neutral ground so there . . . . .
can be neutrality of aim rather than neutrality of procedure institutions can be endorsed by citi4ens general might mean* state ensures for all citi4ens e3ual ops in advancing any coneption of the good not to do anything to favour a comprehensive doctrine not to do anything that means people are more li,ely to pic, a certain doctrine
but says that priority of right exludes the -rst as it only allows permissile conceptions of the good second meaning $ L$/AR
‘thus justice as fairness includes an account of certain political virtues – the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance of reasonableness and the sense of fairness! so the ideas of the good may be incorporated to political conception of justice where they are poltical ideas this is compatible with liberalism as tied to principles of justice and forms of conduct and judgement and conduct is essential so if a regime ta,es steps to strengthen toleration and trust it does so to strengthen and sustain fair social cooperation between free and e3ual citi4ens not as part of a comprehensive doctrine
this will do but got was it shit note ta,ing S?++
Liberals might try and say EGPA this is a non neutral idea of what the good life is &i'e' plugging being heterosexual( But this isn!t careful enough %evlin didn!t justify his argument on the idea that heterosexuality is good or homo is o7ensive $t was that decrim would be harmful =is argument could thus be framed in terms more congenial with the neutrality constraint i'e' liberals themselves recognise that the state shouldn!t be neutral between all conceptions of the good but between permissible conceptions of the good devlin would say that decrim would be impermissible because it threatens social cohesion necessary to maintain stability one does not have to establish that a prohinition on homosecuslity violates the neutrality constraint in order to establish a persuasive case against such a provision emphasises a ,ey point that not only must the objectives of legislation ne beutral but the means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably justi-ed prohibitions on homo fail this because %evlin doesn!t show evidence that harm would be done also doesn!t show that education is not a better way round &i'e' some mid point( also there is a re3uirement of proportionality – that it has to outweigh bene-ts and costs the neutral state could justify loads of things based on values that you couldn!t reasonably reject li,e public safety &tra2c laws eg( but this isn!t actually the case oif a similar level of public safety can be achieved not with such stringent tra2c controls public reason demands that there be a proportionality between the e7ects of the measure and the objective in 3uestion the coercive power of the state ins!t necessarily legit when it is consistent with the re3uirements of the neutrality constraint the government must consider a diverse range of concerns wihich the neutrality constrain itself is silent about
