01 - Rawls' Political Liberalism (Van de Putte)

___ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ ___

___ ______ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ _

Rawls’ Political Liberalism. Foundations and Principles 1 André Van de Putte

I.

Pluralism and Reasonable Reasonable Pluralism as Context

Theory ry of Just Justic icee, Sinc Sincee the the publ public icat atio ion n of A Theo Rawls has not ceased to reflect on the range and Political Liberalism Liberalism signif significa icance nce of his theory theory.. Political presents the (provisional?) results of his ongoing considerations.2 Rawls Rawls situat situates es politic political al libera liberallism within within the issue issue of religi religious ous plural pluralism ism.. Accordin cording g to him, him, politi political cal libera liberalis lism m began began when when the conflict between religions and conceptions of truth was taken seriously rather than in the efforts to limit the absolute power of princes (xxiv-vi). He endeavours to find an answer to the question how an honest society of persons can be viable when ther theree is deep deep divi divisi sion on on matte matters rs of reli religi gion on.. What What can societ society’s y’s founda foundatio tion n be when when social social unity can no longer ground itself in a consensus on truth, truth, on a genera generall and comprehe comprehensi nsive ve relireli3 gious doctrine? With With this, this, howeve however, r, the contex contextt of politic political al libera liberalis lism m is only only partly partly outlin outlined. ed. Accord According ing to Rawls, this context is determined in part by the accept acceptanc ancee of an episte epistemol mologi ogical cal datum datum which which caused caused the soluti solution on propos proposed ed by the Enligh Enlighten ten-ment for the problem of pluralism to fail. Indeed, it is apparently impossible to rationally devise a secula secular, r, compre comprehen hensiv sivee doctri doctrine ne which which would would adequa adequately tely convin convince ce everyo everyone ne and thereb thereby y become the foundation of society. The “burdens of judgement,” the many hazards involved in the use of reason, imply that different people will determine what they consider to be the relevant facts, values and arguments in different ways (xviii; 55f.) People make judgements about moral truths, “all things things consid considere ered: d: that that is, taking taking into into consid considereratio ation n what what they they see see as all all rele releva vant nt mora morall and and each poli politi tica call valu values es and and all all rele releva vant nt facts facts (as each doctrine doctrine determines determines)” (xx, itali italics cs mine mine). ). What What

results is that comprehensive doctrines, which can only only exerci exercise se their their power power of convic convictio tion n among among those who share the same principles or points of depa depart rtur ure, e, can can no long longer er be meas measur ured ed by the the same standard. Rawls’ formulation of the problem, therefore, is determined more by reasonable pluralism than by plur plural alis ism m as such such (63-66; 144; 179). The The ‘dis ‘dis-sensus sensus’’ which which define definess the proble problem m of politic political al liberalism is not primarily rooted in self-interest, irra irrati tion onal alit ity y and and bad bad fait faith. h. Rath Rather er,, it is a ‘dis ‘dis-sensus sensus’’ betwee between n reason reasonabl ablee people people who, who, even even after after painst painstaki aking ng and ration rational al reflect reflection ion,, cannot cannot reach a consensus on the truth. In Rawls’ opinion, such reasonable pluralism is not a passing contingency of history. Instead, it is the normal result of human reason operating within the framework of the free free instit instituti utions ons which which develo developed ped in the consti constitut tution ional al regime regimess after after the wars wars of religi religion on Rawls is well well aware, aware, of course course,, (xvi; xxiv; 36-37) 36-37) . Rawls that much division has its roots in bad faith, etc. The phen phenom omen enon on of viol violen ence ce,, which which has has (55). The traditionally played an important role in political philosophy, philosophy, does not, however, define the problem at issue in his ideal theory. It is the task of the non-ideal theory to determine how one must deal with those who choose violence. It is for this reason reason that that Rawls Rawls only only cursor cursorily ily sugges suggests ts that that societies should contain irrational, comprehensive doctri doctrines nes in order order to preven preventt them them from from underundermini mining ng the the unit unity y and and just justic icee of the the soci society ety in question (xvii; 64, n. 19) . It is a fact, nevertheless, that, even in societies where where the people people are not violent violent and unreason unreason-able, comprehensive doctrines are still too diverse to be able to serve as public frames of reference. As a result, the ideal of a political community, a community united around one and the same comprehen prehensiv sivee doctri doctrine, ne, has become become the defini definitiv tivee

________________ ________________________ _______________ _____________________ _________________________________ _______________________________________ ________________________ ____ Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995) (1995)3, 3, p. 107

___ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ ___

political political utopia utopia (37f.; 63; 146) . Only an aggressive and sectarian use of the powers of state would be able to realise such an ideal in the societies which have emerged since the wars of religion (10; 154) . Consequently, after the state ceased to be confessional, it meant that it could not be philosophical either (154).4 This does not mean that for Rawls people are indifferent with regard to the search for the good or the the mean meanin ingf gful ul.. What What is defi defini nitiv tivee for for the the proble problem m of politic political al libera liberalis lism m is the princi principle ple that people do affirm a particular comprehensive doctrine and conception of the good and take it seriously (12; 100; 150) . It is precisely because they do so that that they they cann cannot ot endu endure re the the idea idea that that a compre comprehen hensiv sivee doctri doctrine ne would would be forced forced upon upon them them by the the stat statee (63-65). Reasonable Reasonable pluralism, pluralism, theref therefore ore,, does does not imply imply the disapp disappear earanc ancee of 5 comprehensive doctrines. It is true that they can no longer longer consti constitut tutee the core core of public public politi political cal cult cultur ure, e, but but they they find find their their plac placee in the the back back-ground culture of civil society, in the social and private worlds of human persons (14).6 II. The 1.

Idea of a Political Conception of Justice

A Problem of Modernity Modernity

For For Rawl Rawls, s, howe howeve ver, r, a soci societ ety y is not not poss possib ible le without a publicly shared conviction on a number of substantial values. Every society needs a public basis of justification, a “framework of deliberation” (368) for for settli settling ng fundam fundament ental al politic political al problems. In every society, for that matter, individuals allow for (conflicting) rights and claims. Every society in one way or another must solve the proble problem m of interp interpers ersona onall compar compariso isons ns and dete determ rmin inee whic which h of the the citi citizen zens’ s’ claim claimss to reresour source ces, s, righ rights ts and and free freedo doms ms have have weig weight ht and and whic which h do not not (209). A publ public ic unde unders rsta tand ndin ing g is necessary, a sort of political philosophy that not only only determ determine iness which which claims claims the citize citizens ns can validate but also why such claims can be validated (179). In a traditional political community, the

___ ______ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ ____ ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ _

curren currentt compre comprehen hensiv sivee concep conceptio tion n of the good good functions as such a public philosophy. A community nity in whic which h ther theree is a cons consen ensu suss on the the exexistenc istencee and recogn recognisa isabil bility ity of a cosmic cosmic order, order, a natural law, has a criterion of validity and invalidity at its immediate disposal whereby the claims of its members can be evaluated. Insofar as the mores of such a community are understood as the expres expressio sions ns of the aforem aforement ention ioned ed natura naturall law, law, de facto as such a the tradition will present itself de criter criterion ion.. In a plural pluralist istic ic society society,, howeve however, r, no particular conception of the good can function as a crit criter erio ion n of eval evalua uati tion on.. Neve Nevert rthe hele less ss,, many many comp compre rehe hens nsiv ivee doct doctri rine ness dema demand nd the the righ rightt to exist in such a society and the citizens’ claims are extremely diverse. That is why one of the most significant problems which confronted modernity consisted in finding a publicly shared understanding ing of what what the the “nee “needs ds”” and and “goo “good” d” of huma human n persons might be, and the way in which this good ought ought to be justly justly shared shared..7 It had had to dete determ rmin inee which comprehensive comprehensive doctrines it could tolerate as acceptable (195) and at the same time establish the limits of its tolerance and pluralism. Several solutions solutions seemed possible: possible: postpone the evaluaevaluation of “revealed preferences” and try to combine and co-ordinate them in a purely procedural manner or try, as in Utilitarianism, to unite around a rather rudimentary and abstract understanding of the human person. We should understand Rawls’ political liberalism as yet another solution for this problem of modernity. 2.

The Political Political Character Character of the Conception of Justice

The conflicts conflicts between between comprehens comprehensive ive doctrines doctrines confront confront modern society with a practical practical problem: society needs to find a foundation which can be justified for all and which can meet with the appr approv oval al of peop people le who who are are deep deeply ly divi divide ded d on matt matter erss of conv convic icti tion on.. Such Such conf confli lict ctss “set “set the the stage for the idea of reasonable justification as a practical and not as an epistemological or meta-

________________ ________________________ _______________ _____________________ _________________________________ _______________________________________ ________________________ ____ Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995) (1995)3, 3, p. 108

___________________________________

physical problem.” (44). Since no comprehensive doctrine can ever meet with the approval of all, then, according to Rawls, only something from a different order, a political conception of justice, can continue to function as the foundation of society. A political conception of justice differs from a comprehensive doctrine in “scope” or “the range of subjects to which [it] applies” as well as in content (13; 175). It retreats to the limited domain of the political by: 1) restricting its applicability to the basic structure of the society; and 2) presenting itself as autonomous and therefore not presuming the acceptance of any particular comprehensive doctrine. At the same time, however, it tries to establish itself on fundamental ideas which are implicitly present in the public political culture of a democratic society and contain nothing which might provoke controversies with comprehensive doctrines.8 Unlike the principles of comprehensive doctrines, a political conception of justice is not generally applicable to every sphere of life (e.g. on the internal organisation of churches and associations), nor does it imply a comprehensive conception of everything that is of value in human life: ideals of personal life and character, or of family, friendship and other relationships.9 Yet insofar as it asserts the ideals, principles and norms which express political values, it is a moral conception (12). 3.

The Substantial Character of the Political Conception of Justice

In Rawls’ vision, then, the political conception of justice is not merely procedural, but substantial (192). It must create the possibility for distinguishing between the (valid) needs and (subjective) desires of persons as citizens, while at the same time excluding certain comprehensive doctrines as unacceptable. Its neutrality does not rest in the fact that it refers exclusively to neutral procedural values such as impartiality, consistency in application, provision of equal opportunity to the parties involved to plead their case etc., nor that

___________________________________

it has no particular conception of the good beyond the instrumental (191). It is not a procedural regulation which understands people’s various subjective desires to be ‘revealed preferences’, taking them for what they are and endeavouring only to co-ordinate and arbitrate their fulfilment. Rather, its neutrality lies in the fact that it does not attempt to disseminate or give preference to any particular comprehensive doctrine;10 that it does not ground itself in a particular comprehensive doctrine and that it avoids implying elements which are controversial and which would be considered as untrue by reasonable comprehensive doctrines (xix-xx; xxviii). By restricting its points of departure to those which everyone can share as reasonable, it endeavours to find a common ground which is more than a “procedurally neutral ground.”11 As a substantial conception, it gives expression to pure political values, to the ideal of citizenship, and affirms the superiority of certain (political) virtues (194). It is precisely for this reason that Rawls ascribes the right to educate individuals to the state. It is true, however, that such an education is political, i.e. an education in political virtues which can be shared by free and equal citizens.12 Education in human perfection, as it is interpreted by various religions and comprehensive doctrines, continues to be reserved to the churches and organisations concerned. The state is only entitled to educate people in citizenship.13 The state can only step in “to strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that sustain fair social coperation between its citizens regarded as free and equal.” (195). At the same time, its educational task does not turn it into a political community which in turn educates its members in human perfection. 4.

Political Liberalism and Comprehensive Liberalism

Political liberalism with its political conception of justice should not, therefore, be confused with comprehensive liberalism which expounds auton-

________________________________________________________________________________________ Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 109

___________________________________

omy and self-realisation as the ideals of human perfection. It has to be distinguished from the liberalism of Mill, Hume, Kant, Dworkin and Raz, but also from the liberalism of A Theory of Justice in which the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism has not yet been made (xv-xvi; xxvi-xxvii) . Rawls reinterprets “justice as fairness” as a purely political conception of justice. The fact that the political conception of justice must obtain the support of several (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines implies that it cannot put itself forward as a rival on their terrain (xviii-xxi; xxviii) . As a result, it will not be able to present itself as (metaphysically or religiously) true, but rather as a specification of the reasonable at the level of content (94). By distinguishing his political liberalism from comprehensive liberalism, Rawls, who labels his political philosophy as the defence of reasonable faith in the possibility of a just constitutional regime (101; 172), is able to defend the institutions of such a society without being obliged to accept a comprehensive liberal ethos (199-200). Furthermore, political liberalism demands that the supporters of comprehensive liberalism should tolerate different life styles, which they might have rejected on the basis of their comprehensive liberalism, but which have not gone beyond the boundaries of tolerance as defined by political liberalism. The supporters of comprehensive liberalism are not permitted to impose their particular understanding of autonomy, self-realisation and tolerance on everyone. Should they do so, they would be behaving in an unreasonable way and, as would be the case with any “fundamentalist” in his or her efforts to establish a (liberal) political community, would become guilty of sectarian use of the powers of state. As a result, the existence and stability of a well-ordered, politically liberal society places heavy demands on its citizens.14 While they continue to affirm the truth and superiority of their particular comprehensive doctrine, they have to be prepared to moderate themselves and rely on the political

___________________________________

conception of justice when it comes to fundamental political questions. III.

The Idea of the Reasonable

While political communities present themselves under the banner of ‘the true’, pluralist societies can only present themselves under the banner of ‘the reasonable’.15 The turn towards the reasonable is rooted neither in scepticism, as if the human person were incapable of truth, nor in indifference, as if truth were unimportant. It has its roots, rather, in the ethical incentive to maintain societal organisational principles where fundamental political matters are concerned, principles which can be accepted by everyone as reasonable or, at the very least, not dismissed as unreasonable.16 Since there is no longer a comprehensive doctrine, which, politically speaking, refers to an external, transcendent authority or to a natural order, the citizens, now free because they are no longer bound to a point of view “external to their own point of view,”17 are left with no other option than to develop, by mutual agreement, a foundation for social living which everyone can accept as reasonable. In a pluralist world, society can no longer appear to be answerable to some sort of divine command or natural order (22f.) Its order can only appear as the result of a fair agreement between individuals who, proceeding from their motivation to live together, approach each other as reasonable, rational, free and equal individuals who, under such an agreement, allow themselves to be led by their common practical reason (97-98). This fact is sufficient grounds for Rawls to return to the idea of the social contract and to present18 the conception of justice as the result of a procedure of construction in which fairly and symmetrically balanced, rational parties, motivated by their desire to find a free and transparent ground of consensus in political life and representing free, equal, reasonable and rational persons, come to an agreement acceptable by all, on


___________________________________

a conception of justice for a well-defined object, namely the basic structure and regime of a democratic society together with the related rights and obligations of the citizens. Rawls does not claim that this constructivist method is universally applicable as a way of representing all moral values (125-26). As an example of ‘pure procedural justice’, however, the original position is especially suitable for modelling the situation of citizens who (can) no longer see themselves as bound to already given principles of justice and who can only resort to their own reason for defining fair terms of cooperation. Those who would like to use this method for different situations will have to adapt the procedure’s lay-out in each and every case to the nature and goal of the object for which principles are being sought (262). The point of the idea of the reasonable is, therefore, that once we accept the fact of reasonable pluralism, the idea itself becomes more suitable as a foundation for the public justification of a constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth. For that matter, it creates the possibility of reaching a consensus in a manner no longer realisable by the concept of the truth. (94; 129) . All of this does not exclude the possibility that individuals or groups might consider a political conception true from the perspective of their comprehensive doctrine (126-29; 151-53) . To speak of the truth of the political conception is, however, to speak from within a comprehensive doctrine (95-96; 126) . Even a political conception cannot present itself as true IV.

Political Justice and the Basic Structure of Society

As has been already pointed out, a political conception is political primarily because it is only applicable to the basic structure of society. In Rawls’ opinion, there is a close relationship between the idea that the basic structure is “the first subject of justice” on the one hand, and the way in which the constructivist procedure and a politi-

___________________________________

cal conception ought to be conceived on the other (271f.). Since this problem pertains to Rawls’ method, we will not explore it further at this point, but limit ourselves instead to a number of remarks concerning his understanding of the basic structure of society. In the first place, Rawls cannot be accused of misunderstanding the social character of being human (xxix).19 The individual does not have a prior identity, nor does he or she choose a society from the outside (40-41; 221f.). For this reason, the question which the parties in the original position must answer is not whether or not they intend to establish a political society but, rather, how that society can be reasonably ordered, knowing that those whose interests they promote are indissolubly bound to the society in which they will grow into the persons they are going to be (68; 263f). The alternatives with which the parties in the original position are confronted are not “opportunities to join other societies, but instead a list of conceptions of justice to regulate the basic structure of one’s own society.” (277). The basic structure of a society is the ordering of the fundamental political, social and economic institutions which form a unified system of social cooperation which exists through time. The basic structure thus creates the framework of society. It assigns fundamental rights and obligations, and shapes the division of advantages, and thereby the inequalities which arise from social cooperation, (11-12; 258). When the principles which regulate the basic structure have regulative primacy over other principles which apply, for example, to the internal life of groups and families and to personal life, then it is because and to the extent that the basic structure provides the framework in which the life of such groups and persons is lived. This regulative primacy does not mean that the principles themselves have priority within the groups in question, but rather that such groups must respect the principles of the framework within which they operate in the way they organise themselves and pursue their goals (257-59).


___________________________________

In order to understand the conception of the basic structure one needs to consider the fact that for Rawls, a society is characterised by a significant component of ‘pure procedural justice’. The basic structure is “the framework for a self-sufficient scheme of cooperation for all the essential purposes of human life, which purposes are served by the variety of associations and groups within this framework.” (301). This implies that free interactions between individuals are those which will ultimately define the distribution of goods. Agreements, such as the establishment of an association, come about, however, within the basic structure from which it is impossible to escape and by which they are ultimately defined. At the same time, such agreements, and the distribution which results from them, can only be justified if the basic structure is itself justified. It is the basic structure, after all, which determines background justice as a whole. For Rawls, interpersonal relations can be just in themselves while the situation is nevertheless unjust from the social perspective (266). Rawls thus distinguishes between two types of social rules: (1) those which define the social background while they also define the mechanisms which attempt to correct the unavoidable tendency to depart from background justice, and (2) those which directly govern transactions between individuals and groups, guard against violence, and ensure the absence of fraud. The first set of rules intends “to secure just background conditions against which the actions of individuals and associations take place,” (266) while the second set is directly applicable to individuals and groups and ought to be followed in private transactions (268-69; 284; 288) . Rawls’ liberalism, therefore, is not a laissez faire liberalism which believes in the spontaneous harmonising effects of an ‘invisible hand’. On the contrary, Rawls sees the opposite type of ‘invisible hand’ at work: Even if everyone acted without deceit or violence, the countless variety of separate interactions would still lead, via a variety of unfamiliar paths, to an erosion of background

___________________________________

justice. With the passage of time, certain individuals would face disadvantage, reduced freedom and inequality (267; 284). In this sense, the basic structure defines the life and lot of the individual in a fundamental way. From the point of view that individuals are free and equal, a perspective we will discuss below, the lot of the individual appears as an historical contingency. The political conception then formulates principles in order to deal with these contingencies from the perspective of freedom and equality so that a voluntary and harmonious society, free of resentment and humiliation, might be given a chance.20 While Rawls favours a self-regulating society, in as far as it is possible, politics continues nonetheless to be a necessity, and not only as a means to guarantee the safety of individuals and overcome their tendency towards unfairness and aggressive behaviour (284). Politics must also continue to guarantee background justice. Towards such a political intervention in the basic structure, the political conception of justice formulates a structural ideal in the light of which institutional processes need to be limited and the accumulated results of individual transactions continuously adapted (285).21 V. The

Political Conception of Justice as Public Reason

1.

The Limited Bearing of the Political Conception of Justice

As a conception for the basic structure of society, Rawls’ political conception of justice does not contain guidelines for every sort of political, economic and social question with which lawgivers might find themselves confronted (156; 230) . It limits itself, rather, to the two elements he distinguishes in the basic structure itself: the constitutional essentials and questions of fundamental justice. Only in deliberations on questions such as these are the citizens obliged to let themselves be led by the political conception as if by a constitutional guideline (44; 137-38). They are free to


___________________________________

decide on other political issues from the standpoint of their comprehensive doctrines, engaging in political power plays and political compromise (214f.; 230; 246) . Rawls clearly does not exclude comprehensive doctrines from the political debate. An (overlapping) consensus on the political conception of justice must withdraw the most fundamental and urgent questions from the political game of the majorities, thereby providing the possibility of a free and voluntary society. Rawls considers a more comprehensive consensus unnecessary. As long as a consensus exists on the constitutional essentials and fundamental questions of justice, the basic trust or ‘civic friendship’ between citizens will be maintained and the virtues of cooperation promoted. A clash between comprehensive doctrines on other matters will not destroy the society because its citizens can at least have faith in the fact that the fundamental framework of the society is based upon principles accepted as reasonable by all (86; 163; 253; 284; 36263). 2.

The Ideal of Public Reason

The political conception of justice formulates principles which specify the constitutional rights and obligations within the principal institutions and regulate background justice so that the advantages resulting from the contribution of each individual will, in the long run, be fairly distributed (16). At the same time it indicates the virtues and obligations which are necessary in order to regulate the behaviour of citizens towards one another (11-12). The political conception as such formulates a principle of legitimacy that determines the rules according to which citizens, as a body, can exercise justifiable force against one another (137, n. 5). Since it is not enough to simply formulate principles of justice for the basic structure, it also formulates an ideal of public reason (212f). Because such principles must also be applied, the political conception of justice must formulate guidelines on what can be considered a

___________________________________

valid application: guidelines for public inquiry, principles of reasoning, rules of evidence which citizens are obliged to follow when deciding on the utilisation of substantive principles in laws and policies (224). In a similar manner to the political conception in the strict sense and its principle of legitimacy, the values of public reason must be the subject of an agreement accepted by free and equal citizens as reasonable (137). All three dimensions are ‘companion parts’ of one single agreement in the original position. It would be considered unreasonable if all three were enforced according to the criteria of a comprehensive doctrine, criteria which would be experienced as obscure and esoteric (225-26). The ideal of public reason also demands that in making decisions on fundamental political questions one holds to the criteria and procedures of common sense and, where necessary, to those of science, insofar as the latter are not controversial. Only when this precondition is satisfied can a shared public basis of justification exist and the political conception be complete (225). 3.

Public Reason and the Ideal of a Transparent Society

What Rawls is implying with respect to his ideal of a well-ordered society now becomes clear. He envisages a society in which both the principles and their application are in the public view and can be accepted by all as reasonable, i.e. a society characterised by absolute transparency. He does not envisage a society which can only operate if its principles or their application remain hidden and unexpressed, the very existence and social organisation of which citizens can only accept on the grounds of ideological illusions and delusions (68-69). Rawls’ ideal society is one in which the members can and are willing to give public reasons for what they say and do with regard to fundamental political questions. This ‘logon didonai’ translates into Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’,


___________________________________

without which a well-ordered society cannot exist.22 It demands that citizens adhere to the political conception of justice and respect the limits of public reason. In other words, it requires that citizens follow a specific form of public discourse and argumentation.23 It is only by adhering to the limits of public reason with respect to fundamental questions that citizens can honour the moral ideal of citizenship and exercise power over one another in a legitimate manner. As such, the criteria and methods of public reason are associated with “the nature (the aim and point)” of a democratic society, just as the nonpublic reasons of associations and churches point to the “nature (the aim and point)” of the associations and churches in question (220-21).24 An important implication of Rawls’ conception of public reason and of his understanding of the duty of civility is that he assumes that citizens in a constitutional democratic regime are “officers.” Just as officers (law givers, members of the executive and judicial authorities) are obliged to let themselves be led by publicly accepted and acceptable rules, so must citizens allow themselves to be led by the political conception of justice and public reason. Citizens exercise power over one another. Consequently, for Rawls, voting cannot be a private or personal matter in which one casts one’s vote according to one’s preferences and interests, one’s “dislikes and hatreds,” or what one considers right and true from the perspective of one’s own comprehensive doctrine (219-220). The ideal of public reason does not imply, however, that only one, single, reasonable answer is possible for every fundamental political question. There is a certain indeterminability in the principles of justice and in public reason. Where a variety of interests and social positions are at work, political values can be weighted or combined in a variety of ways.25 There is no reason, for that matter, why the ‘burdens of judgement’ would not play a role in specifying the political conception thereby preventing complete agree-

___________________________________

ment (121). The point of the idea of a well-ordered society is not that citizens have to reach the same conclusion, but that they have to appear in public as interpreting the same political conception. It is sufficient that citizens can honestly consider their vision of a certain problem to be grounded in political values which they can expect everyone to accept. In a society which honours public reason, therefore, it might be necessary to vote at certain moments. A well-ordered society need not necessarily be characterised by a rigid and deadening unanimity. For Rawls, however, the indeterminability of public reason is not a sufficient argument for dismissing public reason altogether and simply thinking and acting out of the non-public reason of a comprehensive doctrine (240-41). Even if the ideal of public reason does not lead to complete unanimity, it still has a disciplining effect on public discussion (226-27). It forces those who participate in the discussion to refer to the principles which they can expect everyone to accept as reasonable, thereby evading the raw power politics of majority rule.26 VI. The 1.

Idea of a Well-ordered Society

The ‘Full Publicity Condition’ of the Political Conception of Justice

In Rawls’ vision, a well-ordered society is a society which is publicly regulated by a conception of justice. In such a society, citizens publicly accept this conception for the entire basic structure. Moreover, the conception of justice, together with its full justification, is essentially public (6667). This fully public justification bears reference to the set of arguments developed by Rawls in elaborating justice as fairness; why he operates as he does and not otherwise.27 Rawls admits that it is perhaps too much to suggest that such a full justification should become public knowledge, since most people have little interest in reflection. For this reason it might be sufficient if it were available to the public so that whenever individu-


___________________________________

als wish to reflect, the full justification would be present in the public culture. The reason Rawls emphasises this strong point, nevertheless, is because it corresponds to the idea of a public conception for reasonable and rational citizens who are free and equal and clarifies one of the ideals which stimulate his thought. For Rawls, citizens as “enlightened” persons ought to understand the organisation and principles of society as linked in a clearly defined way with a conception of society and person, and should act and want to act out of this political philosophy, based upon the insight that the principles in question are those which can be accepted as reasonable in the original position. A well-ordered society, then, is not only regulated by the two principles of justice, but by a full conception of justice. Such a conception does not only secure the minimum conditions for effective social cooperation by restraining individual and group egoism, nor is it simply embodied in the institutions, but rather, in and through the realisation of a fully public conception of justice, it presents the individual with a fully articulated ideal of citizenship, thereby stirring his or her desire to embody the ideal (11; 43) .28 Only when the ‘full publicity condition’ is fulfilled can the political conception perform an educational role (71). 2.

The Full Autonomy of Citizens

When citizens take this ideal upon themselves and consciously act out of this awareness, they realise their full autonomy (68). Rawls’ concept of ‘full autonomy’ is reminiscent of Kant’s concept of autonomy: submission to the universal law of reason which one imposes on oneself as a reasonable being. There remains something of a difference, however. The ideal of autonomy for Rawls is still a (limited) political ideal and not an ethical one: it is the autonomy of the individual as a citizen who consciously and freely desires to live in society with others according to principles

___________________________________

which everyone can accept as reasonable (77-81; 98-99). Citizens realise their autonomy when they consciously act out of principles of justice which specify the fair terms of cooperation which they would impose on themselves if they were participants in the original position (77-78). 3.

The Goal of a Well-ordered Society

In a well-ordered society, citizens share and accept a conception of justice. When they all consciously adopt this conception, they share a goal, “not to mention other ends,” to support just institutions and give each other justice (201-02); to furnish one another with fundamental freedoms and rights as well as the “all-purpose means” (income and the social foundations for self-respect) which ensure that everyone has the opportunity to adequately develop his or her moral capabilities and follow his or her conception of the good. This is not a goal, however, in the sense of comprehensive doctrines because it does not stretch beyond the society itself nor transform it into a political community. According to Rawls, a well-ordered society is to be strictly distinguished from a political community, as well as from, more broadly, associations, precisely because it does not have a final goal in the sense that persons or associations have goals, i.e. goals which have a place in comprehensive doctrines, goals which give the community its raison d’être. As a consequence, a democratic society has no grounds for offering different membership entitlements to its constituents depending on the estimated value of their potential contribution to the society and its goal (276). Associations can do this, certainly in a well-ordered society in which the framework of the basic structure guarantees the political equality and freedom of its citizens. When democratic societies sometimes formulate goals in the preambula of their constitutions, these should only be of the sort that are instituted or authorised by the principles of justice and fall under public reason (177; 232) .


___________________________________

It is evident once again that Rawls envisages the political society as a framework. People, for him, only contribute to associations within the basic structure and not to the society itself, with consequence that, for the society, the value of citizens always remains equal (80-81; 279-80) . Without the conceptions of the good which people carry, which inspire them to associate with one another with a particular project in mind, the just social institutions of a well-ordered society would have no point (334). In this sense, the well-ordered society does not offer a meaning for life. It ensures justice and considers the protection of its members’ conceptions of the good, and the development of a capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good, as conditions of the good, but not as the good itself. As we have already noted, however, the members of a well-ordered society do have a common goal, albeit in a different sense, namely the goal of establishing a just framework. This is enough to make a well-ordered society into more than simply an aggregate of individuals who only cooperate for their own advantage. It is enough to make it into more than merely a “private society” which would be nothing more than a means or resource for individual advantage without possessing its own significance or good (Nozick). 29 VII. The

Reasonableness and Rationality of Persons

As explained above, a pluralistic society presents itself as marked by the reasonable through its effort to find a foundation acceptable to all. Rawls’ idea of the reasonable, of which the political conception of justice, in terms of content, is the specification, is a complex idea (94). It expresses itself in the two aspects of the reasonable with the addition of the principles of practical reason and the conceptions of society, person and the publicity of the political conception (or of a well-ordered society) which are themselves ideas of practical reason and specify the framework

___________________________________

within which the principles of practical reason are applied (xx; 94; 104) . 1.

The Two Aspects of Reasonableness as Virtues of Persons

Reasonableness, for Rawls, is a virtue of persons engaged in social cooperation with their equals (48). It is not an epistemological idea, but rather a particular form of moral sensibility that is given expression in the desire to cooperate fairly with others according to fair terms of cooperation which they can accept as reasonable. It is not the sum total of moral sensibility, but simply a part of it, one which reflects the idea of fair social cooperation and the ideal of a democratic citizenship embracing the idea of public reason (51; 62). Reasonableness is an essential component of Rawls’ conception of persons, one which is itself part of the idea of the reasonable, although it is also given distinct mention in the aforesaid idea of the reasonable. As I hope to show, the reason for this lies in the fact that reasonableness does not only refer to a characteristic of persons as Rawls understands them, but at the same time points to the moral motivation out of which the political conception is constructed. Thus for Rawls, reasonableness entails two aspects. In the first place, it embraces a readiness to propose general justifiable principles and norms as fair terms of cooperation, and then to adhere to them where it is certain that others will do the same. Reasonableness, then, is not altruism: “Reasonable persons, [...] are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others in terms all can accept.” (50). The second aspect of reasonableness comes to the fore in a readiness to accept the ‘burdens of judgement’ and thereby accept that what one can justify as reasonable for others is limited. Reasonableness as such is the acceptance of reasonable pluralism. What characterises a reasonable person is the fact that he or she can


___________________________________

affirm his or her comprehensive doctrine as true (reasonable) while understanding it, nevertheless, as one among many, thereby recognising that personal truth can have no claims on others beyond those which they ascribe to it, free from imposition by political force. As such, reasonableness is tolerance understood as virtue; it is a positive disposition rather than a pragmatic selfresignation to what one considers untrue but cannot change. It is not submission to the brutal forces of the unreasonable. Such resignation would produce nothing more than a modus vivendi, certainly not a well-ordered society in which individuals consciously choose to live according to rules recognised by all as reasonable. This ‘will to reasonableness’, with both its aspects, is the driving moral motivation of Rawls’ political liberalism and as such constitutes the first element of the idea of the reasonable. It might be suggested that Rawls does nothing more than respond to the question of the political implications of this will to live with others who do not share our comprehensive doctrine for the ordering of society’s basic structure. Such a disposition, however, would be insufficient to come to a specification of the reasonable in terms of content. It is for this reason that the idea of the reasonable embraces different substantial and empirical elements which must help determine the purpose to which this ideal of citizenship obliges citizens. 2.

Society as a Fair System of Cooperation

Reasonableness, as has already been suggested, refers to Rawls’ idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. While this idea is the “fundamental organising idea” of Rawls’ theory, it should be understood together with two “companion fundamental ideas”: the idea of the person as a citizen, which will be developed below, and the idea of a well-ordered society, which has already been discussed (14f; 35). Rawls contrasts the idea of a society as a

___________________________________

system of fair cooperation with that of a society understood as a socially co-ordinated activity, efficiently organised towards a particular goal, by some authority or another. In so doing, he wants to emphasise the fact that, in his conception, society is a system of cooperation existing in and through the express will of its citizens. The idea of such a society includes, therefore, the idea of fair terms of cooperation, of honest, publicly recognised rules which the participants can accept and consider to be “properly” regulative of their behaviour (16). The concept is thus one of a society in which citizens cooperate voluntarily without resentment because they experience it as fairly organised, i.e. as giving expression to the idea of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity, which has always had an important role to play in the tradition of social contract thinking, expresses the idea that fairness consists in mutual and actual recognition and respect. The phrase ‘fair system of cooperation’ might perhaps give rise to the suggestion that we are dealing with the idea of society as a “purposive association” (42, n. 44). But as has already been shown, in Rawls’ vision society does not have a goal, being merely the framework within which individuals, together or alone, endeavour to realise their conception of the good. Rawls’ idea of society, therefore, does not only embrace the idea of fair cooperation, but also that of rational advantage, the good which those engaged in the process of cooperation endeavour to obtain for themselves. The point of interest in the concept of a fair scheme of cooperation is not the goal realised in the process of cooperation. Rather, it is the quality with which citizens cooperate and the outcome of their cooperation, namely “a just basic structure ... realising principles of justice and providing citizens with the all-purpose means to meet their needs as citizens.”(42, n. 44). It is important, therefore, to be on one’s guard against a utilitarian understanding of fair cooperation and mutuality. They do not denote a “mutual benefits society” in which mutuality is understood as


___________________________________

mutuality of self-interest, as if citizens were to extract mutual advantage from one another’s presence. Such a mutuality of achievements is not what Rawls intends. On the contrary, he proposes a mutuality in which the members of society concede the status of citizen to one another, ascribing mutual rights and means, as well as imposing obligations on one another. 3. Persons

as Reasonable and Rational

In his concept of society, then, Rawls presents the idea of a community of citizens, each having their own personal life project, goals and expectations, yet at the same time prepared to recognise one another, conceding to one another the necessary means and space to realise their personal good insofar as this does not come into conflict with the fair rules of social cooperation (16; 177). Such an idea of society implies a particular idea of ‘person’. It would hardly be convincing if one could not imagine persons as having the capacity for a “sense of justice,” a capacity for a conception of the good, and as actually possessing a conception of the good (52). On the basis of the first capacity, Rawls ascribes reasonableness to persons; on the basis of the second capacity, he ascribes rationality. The idea of the reasonableness of persons has already been sufficiently clarified. It remains necessary, however, to say something more about the rationality of persons. Rawls’ conception of society includes, as indicated above, the idea that persons, at least intuitively, possess a life project, a personal conception of the good in light of which they organise their lives. To say that persons are rational is to say that whatever their goal might be, they will (normally) strive towards it in an intelligent manner (48-49, n. 1) . Thus, among the points of departure of political liberalism is the fact that human life and the fulfilment of fundamental human needs and goals are, on the whole, good, and that rationality is a good (“goodness as rationality” 176-68) and as such a fundamental

___________________________________

principle of political and social organisation. Rationality is, therefore, the capacity of actors to deliberate on the best way to achieve their goal (good) and/or the best arrangement of their goals. Unlike reasonableness, which always turns one towards others, rationality is not public. While reasonableness lies within one’s capacity to intelligently apply the reasonable principles of practical reason (the principles of fairness, justice, truthfulness, tolerance, faithfulness etc.), rationality lies within one’s capacity to understand the rational principles of practical reason (the principles of efficiency, selecting the most probable alternative, etc.) (83). Such rationality, however, does not denote egoism. The conception of the good, as has been explained, can include all kinds of affections for persons and groups whereby their good is identified with one’s own good (51). 4.

The Relationship between Reasonableness and Rationality in Political Liberalism

For Rawls, rationality and reasonableness are two distinct and independent, yet complementary, characteristics of persons. Their combination determines the form in which the problem of justice presents itself to us. Persons have the capacity to have a sense of justice, but simultaneously live oriented towards their own personal conceptions of the good. Of course, if people were always altruistic, the problem of justice would not arise, or if it did it would arise in a different form. At the same time, if people were only characterised by rationality, they would lack any orientation towards fair cooperation. What for us is more important than the aforementioned complementarity is the fact that reasonableness has priority over rationality, or in other words, right has priority over good (25, n. 28; cf. also 339-40; 367) . On the basis of his or her reasonableness, a person is prepared to submit his or her pursuit of the good to the fair rules of cooperation.30 The priority itself expresses the underlying moral motive which constitutes Rawls’


___________________________________

point of departure.31 The priority of the reasonable, however, does not mean that the rational should be derived from the reasonable. Such would lead us into conflict with the independence of both. What it does suggest is that the conception of justice has its roots in the will to reasonableness which finds its ground within itself and cannot be deduced from rationality.32 As with Kant, there can be no question for Rawls of a deduction of morality. Morality,33 in this case reasonableness, can only depart from itself in its endeavour to discover what it contains. The analogy, however, should not mislead us. Where Rawls is concerned it is not the moral will as such which constitutes the moral point of departure of the political conception but rather the (political) will to achieve fair cooperation in a situation of reasonable pluralism and to arrange communal political life according to terms which others cannot reject as unreasonable (124). Some have tried to demonstrate that a deduction of justice (reasonableness) from the rational can be found in Rawl’s A Theory of Justice. This book, no doubt, contains a number of suggestions in this sense, especially in its use of rational choice theory (53, n. 7) . Even then, however, an attentive reader would have noticed that, while the parties in the original position do indeed embody the aspect of rationality, the aspect of reasonableness is present from the very beginning (thus not deduced) in the limitations to which the original position submits rational deliberations, namely, the reasonable conditions of symmetry and equality, the restriction on information and above all the procedure and line of thought as a whole (53; 104). In the original position, reasonableness and rationality are modelled in two different places. One should not forget, for that matter, that the original position is a “device of representation” and is not a description of moral reality as such. One cannot, then, point to Rawls’ description of the parties in the original position in order to conclude that Rawls understands the human person as purely rational. In reality, he

___________________________________

understands the human person to be reasonable and rational at the same time (104), as having both the capacity to form a sense of justice and the capacity to form a conception of the good. VIII.

The Freedom and Equality of Persons

Rawls attempts to discover what the will to reasonableness, “the conception-dependent desire to act in ways worthy of a reasonable and equal citizen,” implies politically. Such a moral intention is not yet capable in itself of leading to a specification of the reasonable in terms of its content. As has already been noted, it is for this reason that the idea of the reasonable embraces the aforementioned reasonable and rational principles of practical reason, as well as the ideas of person, society and the public role of the political conception (or of a well-ordered society). We have not yet examined the origin and range of these ideas, however, nor have we explored freedom and equality which, next to reasonableness and rationality, characterise Rawls’ vision of persons. 1.

The Political Character of the Ideas of Person and Society

As indicated earlier, the political conception of justice presents itself as autonomous, not as the application of a comprehensive doctrine to the political. On the contrary, it presents itself as rooted in the fundamental political ideas which have emerged slowly and largely implicitly within the public political culture of the democratic societies which came into existence after the wars of religion.34 In starting out from these ideas, the political conception of justice connects with ideas which citizens of a democratic society have in common, in spite of their ideological differences, ideas which can form the basis of an (overlapping) consensus. The autonomous character of the conception does not mean, therefore, that it is an a priori conception with its origin in


___________________________________

practical reason alone. Rawls’ political liberalism situates itself within the liberal tradition and thereby associates itself with the educated common sense of that tradition. This applies both for the ideas of society and well-ordered society, as well as for the idea of persons as moral beings characterised by reasonableness, rationality, and a capacity to develop a sense of justice and a conception of the good. Two important characteristics of Rawls’ understanding of the person have yet to be mentioned: freedom and equality. An examination of both these ideas will give us the opportunity to stress something that applies to all the ideas we have just listed, namely that they are all ‘political ideas’, i.e. normative concepts (18, n. 20) which develop in a liberal political culture, ideas which do not belong to a comprehensive doctrine but do belong to a conception of social and political justice (28). They show how citizens should (have begun to) consider themselves, each other and society in a pluralistic world. The role of the conceptions of person and society in a conception of political justice is distinct from their role in a personal or associational ideal or in a religious way of life. Just as a pluralistic society can no longer base itself on a comprehensive doctrine, it is equally unable to base itself on the conceptions of society and person which form part of such philosophical or religious ideals. Should such conceptions obtain a political form nonetheless, they would threaten the very possibility of a free and willing cooperation between persons with different conceptions of the good (369). All those who did not share such conceptions would no longer recognise themselves in such a society and would ultimately be excluded by it as secondclass citizens. The fact that such ideas are political ideas means that the conception of the person is a specification of the ancient concept of person35 under the influence of the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. According to the ancient concept, a person is someone who is able to be a

___________________________________

citizen, to participate and play a role in social life, and to exercise rights and obligations in so doing (18; 179). The characteristics which specify the conception of person, for Rawls, are not rooted in a comprehensive, metaphysical-philosophical understanding of the person, even less in a scientific description of human nature. They are political characteristics which only reveal those aspects of persons which are significant from the perspective of the idea of society understood as a fair system of cooperation. They reveal what must be presumed with regard to persons in order for them to cooperate in the system of fair cooperation, namely, the capacity to adhere to the reasonable rules of cooperation and the capacity to rationally follow one’s personal conception of the good (20). In a similar sense, freedom and equality are characteristics of a political conception of the person. They bear a special significance within Rawls’ theory because the idea of searching for a basis of justification is related in a very particular way with the concept of citizens as free and equal persons. Indeed, Rawls never tires in pointing out that the principles of justice (must) give expression to that which is implied in the idea of the equality and freedom of persons (9 et passim). 2. Freedom

and Equality as Political Ideas

The (political) ideas of freedom and equality are related to the will to achieve a fair society in spite of ideological conflicts. We have already pointed out that the search for such an agreement presumes that citizens do not consider themselves bound to prior and exterior principles of justice. In this sense citizens conceive of themselves and each other as free. For Rawls, however, this does not imply a metaphysical position on the human person, as if he or she could ever choose a conception of the good in complete license and live his or her life thereby (221-23).36 Rather, the meaning of freedom is purely political, that is, a (political) assumption which it is necessary to


___________________________________

make in this situation. The “freedom” of persons expresses the fact that they are politically free to form, revise and aspire to a conception of the good, and to deliberate and reach agreements with others in accord with such a conception insofar as they submit to reasonable constraints. It expresses nothing other than the political recognition of the fact that conceptions of the good belong to the non-public sphere, and do so in such a way that one can accept and reject them without losing one’s public identity. It reveals, moreover, that persons are entitled to make claims on society because they are citizens. They are not obliged to justify such claims by pointing to the comprehensive doctrines to which they adhere, or to the duties and roles they fulfil in society, or to their membership in certain groups (32-33). The conception of freedom ultimately includes the idea that persons are not indentified by weakness of character, but rather that they can bear responsibility for their conception of the good and can adapt it to what they can reasonably expect on the basis of the conception of justice. Indeed, without such an assumption, the idea of a (well-ordered) society would be meaningless. Persons are conceived as equal in the same political sense. One of the points of departure of the political conception is that persons equally posses the two moral capacities, as well as all the other capacities which make it possible for them to be normal and cooperative members of society. In fact, it is these very characteristics which define persons as partners in the system of fair cooperation and qualify them as subjects of social justice.37 Here too it is not being suggested that from the perspective of a comprehensive standpoint or a conception of the good one cannot point to inequalities between persons, only that they are politically irrelevant and can vanish under the “veil of ignorance” (79-80). Even if one’s personal comprehensive doctrine should deny equality, one would still be obliged to meet the representatives of other doctrines as one’s

___________________________________

equals if one desired to reach an agreement with them. IX.

Higher-order Interests and Primary Social Goods

The conception of the person is a political conception because it only takes into account those characteristics which are important for their status as citizens and for the determination of their rights and obligations within the basic structure. It is only as such persons that individuals in the original position are represented by the parties. The argumentation for the principles in the original position is thus based on a well-defined conception of person and society, and not merely considerations of rational advantage alone 38 (299). It is indeed the case that the parties in the original position, limited as they are by the constraints of symmetry and by the veil of ignorance, rationally endeavour to defend the interests or good of their clients. The interests in question, however, do not propose to encompass all the interests or the comprehensive interest of such persons, only their higher-order interests, their interest as citizens, as normal, cooperative members of society understood as a fair system of cooperation. For persons understood in this way, it is important that they be given opportunities to follow their (permissible) conception of the good and to develop their capacity to have a sense of justice and a concept of the good. Their capacity to become fully-fledged members of society depends in fact on their fulfilment of these higherorder interests. These interests alone are rationally defended by the parties in the original position. The significance of the primary social goods ought to be situated within this context. Rawls introduces them in order to solve a problem presented by the introduction of the veil of ignorance in the original position (75-76). The parties do not know the conception of the good of those who provide their mandate, and even the realisation that they are interested in developing their


___________________________________

capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good remains formal. The question remains how the parties can come to a rational agreement on specific principles that are better than the other available alternatives in order to protect the interests of the people they represent. The introduction of the idea of primary goods resolves this problem. The parties evaluate alternative conceptions of justice by examining how good they are at guaranteeing the primary social goods that are considered essential for the realisation of higher-order interests. In order to identify the goods in question, Rawls asks himself which social background conditions and all-purpose means are necessary in order to develop and exercise the two moral capacities and to effectively realise conceptions of the good which differ from one another at the level of content. Such an index of goods does not only point to the idea of goodness as rationality, but also and above all to the political idea of the person as a free and equal citizen. It reveals what citizens need when they are understood as such persons and as fully cooperative members of society over an entire life time. In order to define this index, Rawls has to appeal to certain (empirical) insights into the “basic facts of social life and the conditions of human growth and nurture” (177-78) and assume, at the same time, that there is a certain similarity between citizens’ conceptions of the good, i.e. that their conceptions of the good, no matter how varied, demand more or less the same primary goods (fundamental rights, freedoms and chances together with the same all-purpose means such as income and the social bases of self-respect). These very goods provide the solution to the practical political problem of interpersonal comparisons discussed earlier. They offer a “practicable public basis of interpersonal comparisons based on objective features of citizens’ social circumstances open to view.” (181). Such are the goods which everyone can reasonably consider to be definitive of what can be understood as the fulfilment of the fundamental needs of persons as

___________________________________

citizens, as being of advantage to everyone as citizens. As a part of the political conception of justice, the theory of primary goods suggests that claims to such goods are the only appropriate claims (178-79). It likewise suggests why this is so, why “strong feelings and aspirations”, for example, are not grounds for the appropriateness of the claims (190). According to Rawls, moreover, such an index of goods would respect the limits of the “practicable” and satisfy the “constraints of simplicity and availability of information” which are always important in matters of politics (182). Thus, even the conception of what is good and advantageous for all is political, i.e. not a conception belonging to a comprehensive doctrine. The index of primary goods cannot be understood as a compromise or the striking of a fair balance between what the various actual comprehensive doctrines consider to be good, any more than the political conception of justice (39-40). “The thought is not that primary goods are fair to comprehensive conceptions of the good associated with such doctrines, by striking a fair balance among them, but rather fair to free and equal citizens as those persons who have these conceptions,” (40). In a similar way to the political conception of justice, the notion and the index of primary goods is elaborated as “free-standing.” One arrives at it “from within” (40), taking the ideas of person and society as points of departure. The primary goods, then, do not define the fundamental values of human life (188). They specify instead what persons as citizens need when questions of justice arise. They are a “construct” elaborated within a political conception of justice and not within a comprehensive doctrine. The thought is that this construct offers the best available standard of justice for competing claims, one which is generally acceptable to citizens (188). Here too it is Rawls’ hope that to the extent that such ideas belong to the political culture of democratic societies and are shared by many, the idea and the index of primary goods might become the focus of an overlapping consensus.


___________________________________

X.

Political Ideas as Ideas of Practical Reason

In presenting the political ideas of society and person, Rawls not only affirms that they developed historically in the public political culture of democratic societies, he also indicates that they are ideas of practical reason (39-40). How then should this simultaneous appeal to history and reason be understood? It has been established that in a pluralist context individuals can no longer depend upon an available comprehensive doctrine of the truth. Freely motivated by their will to reasonableness, they must determine for themselves what they see as reasonable. All they can rely upon is their reason, which for Rawls as well as Kant is “selforiginating” and “self-authenticating”39 and thus the only authority qualified to say what is reasonable (100; 120, n. 26). The reasonable and rational principles which practical reason finds within itself are, nevertheless, insufficient to reach conclusions. It still needs the conceptions of society and person etc. which, according to Rawls, reason develops as a complement to the reasonable and rational principles of practical reason. These principles reach expression in the thinking and judging of persons who apply them in social and political practice when they pattern their intentions and actions towards other people. As such, they include clues as to the nature of the agents who use them in practical argumentation and the nature of the practical problems and questions to which the principles of practical reason are applicable (107). It is in this sense that the conceptions of society and person are conceptions of practical reason.40 They are constituted as they are because of their relationship with the (reasonable and rational) practical principles of reason. One has to assume that persons who engage in practical reason with others can be reasonable and rational, as well as free and equal. These ideas furnish the idea of the reasonable with the minimal substance necessary to specify it at the level of content within a conception of justice. Without

___________________________________

such ideas, the principles of practical reason have no point (108-110). Only by starting out from an amalgamation of the principles of practical reason with the appropriate conceptions of person, society and well-ordered society, and not from practical reason as such,41 can Rawls discover what people must commit themselves to (at the level of content) if they desire to be reasonable in a situation of reasonable pluralism (107; 115-16) . Since the ideas in question have their origin in practical reason, they are abstract and stylised when compared with similar ideas from comprehensive doctrines. They are not comprehensive descriptions of the nature of the human person and society. Rather, they are normative ideas (18, n. 20) which, because of their point of departure, emphasise certain aspects of society and person, and ignore others. They are abstract (idealised) in the sense that a perfect competitive market and a general economic equilibrium are abstract propositions of reason (46). As noted above, it is their profound conflicts on questions of truth that have forced people to divert into the domain of the reasonable and thus the domain of abstraction. Such abstraction is not an end in itself, but rather the only way to pursue a substantial public discussion when more particular, shared insights are absent. For Rawls, a pluralistic society can exist without a comprehensive and inclusive doctrine. It cannot, however, do without abstract ideas and conceptions if it wants to achieve more than a procedural consensus. Consensus can only be found in ideas which abstract from everything that might constitute the basis of a controversy and impose themselves as reasonable on common practical reason. Yet for Rawls, abstraction does not imply inclusivity or comprehensiveness. The self-same conflicts which evoke the abstraction prevent it at the same time from becoming inclusive or comprehensive. This sheds a particular light on the way in which a political conception of justice functions as the foundation of society and as public reason in a pluralistic society. It is


___________________________________

not a meta-doctrine understood as an even more comprehensive doctrine which, from its position of higher truth, can put all constituent truths in their place (xviii; 60-61; 174) . It can only function as the foundation of society by establishing itself in the distinct domain of the political. In this context one might ask oneself whether it is not implied in Rawls’ thinking that the (historical) move towards reason at the beginning of modern times simultaneously signified the constitution of the political as a distinct (no longer comprehensive) sphere of reality, having its own object and being dominated by its own specific (political) criteria. When Rawls proposes that the conceptions of society and person are ideas of practical reason while belonging, at the same time, to the political culture of democratic societies, he is really suggesting that over the course of their history these societies developed such ideas as implications of their efforts to discover a reasonable foundation for society. According to Rawls, the citizens of democratic societies started to share these ideas, at least implicitly, when they endeavoured to reach a mutual agreement via political discussion. Rawls puts himself forward as the one who made these implicit ideas explicit and, at the same time, as the one who pointed out and articulated their internal cohesion and origin in practical reason. This leads us to a number of considerations concerning the status and method of Rawls’ theory. Since such an interesting topic would demand a completely separate study I will limit myself here to a few general remarks. XI.

Rawls’ Method

At the beginning of this study, the context which was definitive for Rawls’ presentation of the problem was sketched. One element of that context, however, has yet to be discussed, namely the fact that the public political culture of a democratic society is itself characterised by profound conflicts. Such a society does not have a clear insight into itself and is particularly ignorant as to

___________________________________

how it must solve the conflict between liberty and equality, between the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns (4-5; 9; 46; 338; 368-69) . Rawls’ plan is to resolve the impasse by showing how social institutions should be arranged if they are to conform to the freedom and equality of moral persons (338). To this end, he endeavours to specify a standpoint out of which the principles of “justice as fairness” can emerge as more appropriate than others for the realisation within the basic structure of the idea of citizenship of free and equal persons and thus as better corresponding to the implicit ideas shared by all (5). Rawls’ constructivism, and in particular the original position as a “device of representation” and an “artifice of reason,” should be situated at this point (27; 75). In this original position Rawls represents, in a model, all the relevant requirements for correct practical reasoning in questions of social justice in a pluralistic society (90; 102-03). He models therein what the citizens of a liberal society consider to be fair conditions and acceptable restrictions on motivations for parties, which, as representatives of reasonable and rational, free and equal persons, are obliged to specify fair terms of cooperation. The material for the “lay out” of Rawls’ model is provided by the above mentioned principles and ideas of practical reason which citizens of democratic societies at least implicitly share. In this way, Rawls’ procedure openly “simulates” all the relevant criteria of correct reasoning which are applicable to the principles and norms of political justice. 42 Of course, the correct explanation and adequate modelling of these ideas then becomes decisive. In building and reviewing his model, Rawls must ask himself: whether citizens are fairly represented in the original position (the symmetry and equality of the parties is important here); whether the parties are indeed rationally solicitous of the essential interests of persons as citizens (reference to higher-order interests and to primary social goods is important here); and whether the parties make choices on the basis of


___________________________________

what citizens consider to be appropriate reasons (here the “veil of ignorance” prevents inappropriate reason from being called upon, given the goal of presenting persons as free and equal). Furthermore, the review demands that we ask ourselves whether a political society regulated by a political conception of justice would be stable “in the correct way” and above all that we ask ourselves whether “on due reflection” we would be able to accept the principles and consequences of such a conception of justice. In our review of the model we need to be in a position to say that a pluralistic society’s conception of justice, better than any other, binds our “considered convictions” together at all levels of generality into one coherent vision (8-9; 45). The central idea of political constructivism remains that when we can confirm that the original position is being modelled in an adequate manner, the principles of justice chosen by the parties can be considered as the most evident specification (at the level of content) of the idea of the reasonable (xx). The “persuasiveness” of the political conception is thus bound to the extent to which the political ideas shared by all and the “considered convictions” are presented in a convincing way rather than to the sheer logical power of the deduction of a conclusion from the premises (45; 242).43 XII.

Conclusion

We have already stated that Rawls situates his political liberalism within the liberal tradition. The practical meaning of so doing now becomes clear. Rawls presents his theory as a resource for public reflection and self-clarification of that tradition (26). He hopes thereby to bring the pro-

___________________________________

cess of reflection, which has occupied the liberal tradition for a considerable time, to some conclusion. One might also speak here of a hermeneutic turn in Rawls’ thought. His political philosophy does not withdraw from the world, nor does it claim to discover the truth by its own methods of reason, “apart from any tradition of political thought and practice.” (45). Rawls recognises that philosophical argumentation on its own is probably not in a position to lead to agreement (53). For this reason he considers it more fruitful to seek out “bases of agreement” which are implicit in the public culture of democratic societies and, more particularly, in their underlying conceptions of the person and of social cooperation. It is perhaps true that such “bases of agreement” are obscure and can be understood in a variety of ways. Rawls endeavours to show, however, precisely how such concepts can be understood, and how the notion of the original position can be used to connect them to certain principles of justice which themselves belong to the tradition of moral philosophy (338-39). Rawls is not seeking to give foundation to our moral insight; instead he sees the task of philosophy as consisting in showing the “coherence” of these insights with other ideas, thereby bringing order to our convictions, from the most general to the most particular (45; 123-25) . The original position plays a central role in this reflection. It must contribute to our attainment of an unimpeded vision of the demands of justice, if society is conceived as a scheme of fair cooperation between free and equal, reasonable and rational persons (26). Carried by the fundamental ideas of the liberal tradition, Rawls’ political philosophy must bring this tradition to unity and consensus.

Notes 1. This study is a revised and enlarged version of an article which originally appeared under the title Rawls’ politiek liberalisme. Enkele notities, in J. VERSTRAETEN, B. PATTYN (eds.), Ethiek en Politiek. Liber amicorum Mgr. Guido Maertens. Groot-Bijgaarden, Scoop/Overlegcentrum voor Christelijke Ethiek, KU Leuven, 1995, p. 106-124.


___________________________________

___________________________________

J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism (John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, 4). New York, 1993. The page numbers in brackets refer to this edition. 3. For Rawls, the truth means the metaphysically or religiously grounded (153). 4. One might think of a Marxist state dominated by a metaphysics of history or a Nationalist state dominated by the pseudo-religion of the nation or the Volksgeist . 5. In Rawls’ opinion, a comprehensive religious and/or philosophical doctrine is in principle “general” because “it applies to a wide range of subjects (in the limit of all subjects)” and “comprehensive” because “it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life” both personal and private. Rawls distinguishes between comprehensive doctrines which are “fully comprehensive” and those which are “only partially comprehensive”. The former “covers all recognised values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought” while the latter is “rather loosely articulated.” (13; 175). In addition, a comprehensive doctrine also implies a conception of the good. “A conception of the good ... consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to realise for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups and associations” whereby “the flourishing of the[se] persons and associations” also becomes a part of our conception of the good. “A view of our relation to the world – religious, philosophical, moral – by reference to which the value and significance of our ends and attachments are understood” is also adjoined to such a conception of the good. (See 19-20; 59-60; 74; 81; 108). 6. The public political culture consists of the entirety of the political institutions of a constitutional regime, the public tradition of their interpretation, and the historical texts and documents upon which they base themselves (p. 13-4). The “background culture” is that of civil society, of daily life with all its associations. It would be wrong, therefore, to consider this ‘private’ in the strict sense of the word. It is only ‘non-political’. (Cf. 220, n. 7). 7. It would be wrong to imagine that political liberalism does not have a conception of the good. As we shall explain shortly, it is a matter of a political conception of the good. 8. In particular, two coercive characteristics determine the specificity of the political relationship. In the first place, it concerns a relationship between individual persons as mediated by the basic structure of society. Individuals are an inseparable part of such a society; they cannot escape it. Secondly, the relationship in question is characterised by the assertion of a politically coercive force. In a constitutional, democratic regime, the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body over the same citizens as individuals or members of groups constitutes such a force. 9. (xxvii-xxix; 13; 152, n. 17; 175). See also in this regard p. 257-65 wherein Rawls distinguishes his contract theory at this level from utilitarianism, perfectionism and intuitionism. While for Rawls the primary structure constitutes the touchstone of the principles of justice as fairness, the principles of utilitarianism, for example, are applicable to every sphere of life. They can only lead to specificity in their application. 10. (193) Rawls distinguishes “neutrality of aim” from “neutrality of effect” the latter of which he considers impracticable. A liberal political conception of justice cannot be neutral in the sense that it would have no advantageous or disadvantageous effects on comprehensive doctrines and their ability to attract supporters. Should certain reasonable and valuable comprehensive doctrines disappear as a result of the liberalisation of society, this does not imply dishonesty towards them on the part of the prevailing political conception. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to maintain a comprehensive doctrine in a manner which is consistent with a democratic political conception of justice (See 193-94; 197-200). 11. It should be emphasised here that one would miss the point of Rawls’ idea of a political conception of justice if one were to see it as a (fair) compromise, as a (fair) balancing of different actual comprehensive doctrines. This would run counter to the “free-standing” character of the political conception of justice which has its own grounds in the political conceptions of society and person which we have yet to discuss. 12. Insofar as they are valued for different reasons within specific comprehensive visions, Rawls does not exclude the possibility that certain political virtues are, at the same time, non-political virtues (195 n. 29). 13. See p. 199-200 where Rawls offers a more concrete articulation of the requirements the state can impose on the education religious sects might want to provide their children. 14. We cannot explore Rawls’ understanding of the problem of stability in this study. Rawls is not only in search of a just foundation for cooperation between free and equal persons, the conception itself must be stable, i.e. having the support of people who simultaneously entertain a comprehensive doctrine. What lies at the heart of the problem is: 1) whether individuals in a well-ordered liberal society acquire an adequate sense of justice to conquer the 2.


___________________________________

___________________________________

tendency to injustice, and 2) whether an overlapping consensus is possible on such a conception of justice, i.e. whether individuals are in a position to include a political conception of justice in their comprehensive doctrine and thus give it their support. 15. There are also comprehensive doctrines which present themselves as bearing the emblem of ‘the reasonable’ (eg. Kant). ‘The reasonable’ in Rawls, however, should not be understood in the comprehensive sense, but rather in the limited, politically constructivistic sense. ‘The reasonable’ is not advanced as the highest and ultimate value in life as such, but rather as the appropriate value for the political domain. 16. As a comprehensive doctrine, scepticism would meet with resistance from other comprehensive doctrines and therefore make an (overlapping) consensus impossible. For Rawls’ treatment of the problem of scepticism and indifference see p. 62-63; 150-54; 171-72. 17. Rawls refers to the kind of freedom intended here as “rational autonomy.” It is only one aspect of freedom as such and differs from “full autonomy.” (Cf. 72-77). 18. The fact that we are dealing here with presentation distinguishes Rawls’ political constructivism from moral constructivism (Kant) in which the order of moral and political values is understood as constituted by the principles and conceptions of practical reason. Political constructivism distances itself from such a proposition because it considers it, as a metaphysical proposition, to be a hindrance to the establishment of an (overlapping) consensus of comprehensive doctrines. Should “justice as fairness” ever come to rely on the proposition that political values are constituted by practical reason, then it would never find support from all those who are convinced of the existence of an “independent order of moral values.” Here we find an example of the way in which Rawls — faithful to his ‘precept of avoidance’ (29 n. 31) — endeavours to avoid taking sides in controversial philosophical issues. (On this theme see 90-101) 19. The fact that an individual is indissolubly bound to his or her society is essential for Rawls’ presentation of the problem. If the parties in the original position had known that those whom they were representing were free to walk away from their society at any moment, and without difficulty, they would perhaps have reached a different agreement. In this regard, see Rawls’ treatment of the right of emigration (136 n. 4; 277). 20. (271; 303) Rawls explicitly suggests that such contingencies only appear as contingencies from within the “Kantian” conception of the person as free and equal. In this way, he sees his liberalism as a further realisation and expansion of the implications of a purely political, constitutional recognition of the freedom and equality of all individuals towards the basic structure (265; 271). He points out, moreover, that the goal is not to eliminate all contingencies from social life. Some remain unavoidable (273). 21. (259; 281) It is a question, therefore, of a structural ideal which does not impose a defined pattern of distribution (283-84). 22. It should be noted that for Rawls, the recognition of public reason is a moral demand and not a legal one (213; 253). It only applies, moreover, when citizens enter the public forum, exercise force over one another and make decisions (e.g. via ballots) on constitutional essentials and fundamental questions of justice. It does not apply in the “background culture” where individuals are free to evaluate matters from the perspective of their comprehensive doctrines (215; 221). 23. Rawls does not exclude the possibility that it might sometimes be necessary to affirm certain aspects of one’s own comprehensive doctrine in public discussion, even if one is dealing with fundamental political matters (152-53; cf. also 247f). 24. Note the reference here to Rawls’ particular understanding of the nature of things. In order to understand Rawls’ method, one needs to be aware of this perspective just as one needs to allow for the frequent use of terms such as “appropriate” and “fitting.” 25. (226; 237; 240) From this perspective one can also read Rawls’ considerations on the specificity of the overlapping consensus and the width of the range of liberal conceptions defining it (167-68). 26. Rawls’ thought is clearly influenced here by the constitutionalism which characterises the political establishment in the United States of America, particularly the role played therein by the Supreme Court. For Rawls, the Supreme Court, as guardian of the foundations of the republic, is the exemplar of public reason (215-18). This does not prevent him, however, from emphasising the difference between the ideal of public reason as it applies to citizens, the judicial and executive authority, and the Supreme Court (230-40).


___________________________________

___________________________________

27. It

is important, especially with an eye to further explanation, that we clearly distinguish the three standpoints to be found in Rawls’ theory: that of the parties in the original position, that of the citizens in a well-ordered society and that of Rawls, i.e. “we, you and me who are elaborating justice as fairness and examining it as a political conception of justice.” (28). Any incapacity to make this distinction can only lead to serious misunderstanding. The first two are part of Rawls’ theory and are specified by “us” on the basis of fundamental ideas taken from the political culture. The difference between them lies in the idea that a well-ordered society of citizens can really exist. It is the expression of the ideal implicit in the political culture. The standpoint of the parties, on the other hand, is artificial, just like the original position as a whole. It is a model set up “by you and me” in elaborating justice as fairness. The nature of the parties thus depends entirely on “us.” The rational autonomy of the parties, therefore, far from being a complete description of the nature of the citizens, is an abstraction. The standpoint of “you and me” is determinative for the development and evaluation of justice as fairness. It is at this level that the test of reflective equilibrium takes place: how well the vision as a whole articulates our considered convictions at all levels of generality (i.e. both our broadly implicit ideas of society and person and our more specific moral convictions on concrete cases). In order to arrive at a well-tuned “justice as fairness”, “due examination” together with continual “adjustment and revision” are necessary until one achieves a reflective equilibrium. 28. On the basis of his “moral psychology,” Rawls assumes that whenever individuals grow up in circumstances of reasonableness, they will also develop a desire to behave reasonably themselves. Perhaps Rawls has not given enough attention to the darker side of the human psyche. Should his moral psychology appear to be at fault, it becomes obvious that his apology for the possibility of a constitutional regime must encounter difficulties as well. 29. 40f.; 146,n. 13; 201-02. For the comparison with Nozick see 262-65. 30. The priority of the reasonable over the rational is manifest throughout Rawls’ entire theory. On every level of the “four-stages sequence,” “the reasonable frames and subordinates the rational.” This takes place, in the first place, at the level of the original position where the parties are subjected to “reasonable constraints”. Secondly, it occurs at the constitutional, legislative and juridical levels respectively. On the constitutional level, the rational considerations of the parties are restricted by the principles of justice. On the legislative level they are restricted by the same principles together with the constitution. On the juridical level they are restricted by the conception of justice, the principles of the constitution and the laws (338-39). 31. “The point is though that in setting out justice as fairness we rely on the kind of motivation Scanlon takes as basic.” (emphasis mine) Here Rawls connects both aspects of the reasonable with Scanlon’s ‘principle of moral motivation’ (49-50, n. 2) which denotes “a basic desire to justify our actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject” or, in other words, “the conception-dependent desire to act, in ways worthy of a reasonable and equal citizen.” (85, n. 33). The two aspects of the reasonable are two connected expressions of this desire. “To accept the connection between the two aspects of the reasonable and Scanlon’s principle is to include this form of motivation in the concept of the reasonable from which justice as fairness starts.” (49, n. 2). We should examine Rawls’ distinction between three sorts of desire from this perspective together with his rejection of the Humean theory of motivation (81-86; cf. also 104-07). 32. “The disposition to be reasonable is neither derived from nor opposed to the rational but it is incompatible with egoism and it is related to the disposition to act morally.” (48-49, n. 1); Cf. also 306, n. 21. 33. Rawls frequently relies on Kant. His Kantianism, however, reveals unusual characteristics which we cannot delve into here. In Political Liberalism he even proposes that his purpose is to detach Kant’s doctrine from its “background in transcendental idealism” (285). 34. (13; 195; 223). For Rawls, it is common fact, distinctive of democratic societies, that when they have worked well over a long period of time, certain fundamental ideas develop, at least implicitly, in their political culture which provide an appropriate point of departure for the political conception of justice of a constitutional regime (38, n. 41). 35. The difference between concept and conception can already be found in A Theory of Justice (p. 3f). A concept is the meaning of a term. A (particular) conception also embraces the principles necessary to apply it. Rawls offers the following example: the concept of justice applied to an institution means that the institution in question, among other things, does not make arbitrary distinctions between persons in granting fundamental rights. A conception, on the other hand, also includes the principles and criteria for deciding which distinctions are arbitrary.


___________________________________

___________________________________

36. Some

have suggested that in spite of this Rawls does use a particular metaphysical conception of the human person, namely the conception that no metaphysical doctrine is necessary in order to infer political principles of justice or alternatively that the conception of the person he uses embraces a particular metaphysical position in any case. In response to these criticisms Rawls follows his well-known “precept of avoidance.” He does not deny that the critique might be correct but notes: 1) that there is no generally accepted understanding of what a metaphysical doctrine is, and 2) that should he in fact be using a particular metaphysical doctrine of the person, such a doctrine would be so general that it would not run counter to other metaphysical doctrines and would thereby avoid being drawn into the controversies which traditionally divide philosophy. 37. Of course, this leaves open the question as to the demands of justice with respect to human beings who are insufficiently endowed with the characteristics of reasonableness and freedom and who are not mutual partners in the process of cooperation, or with respect to animals and the rest of nature which are unable to be partners in the process of cooperation. What is said will have to make it quite clear that Rawls treats such persons, beings and things as mere “problems of extension.” (See xxvii-xix; 12; 20f; 182f; 244f). 38. In an analogous way, Rawls proposes that his conception of a constitution is not founded primarily on principles of justice, nor on “basic (or natural) rights, but rather on the conceptions of person and society (339). 39. Compare with what has already been said concerning the deduction of morality. 40. By way of comparison: conceptions of person and society also exist in hierarchical (traditional) societies but they are not in this instance ideas of practical reason. They do not possess the form demanded by practical reason nor do they define the context in the way practical reason does. They respond to the question of the nature of social cooperation from within a comprehensive doctrine and envisage persons, as defined by their comprehensive doctrine, as different and unequal, not as free and equal (109-110). 41. “There is no such thing as the point of view of practical reason as such.” (115-16). 42. Rawls’ terminology requires some attention here. He not only refers to “simulating” (27), “modelling” (103-4) and “lay out” (103), he also uses the theatrical metaphor of “role playing” (27) while at the same time emphasising the visualisation of the data: “all the relevant criteria are open to view” (102), or further “The initial situation is an attempt to represent and to unify the formal and general elements of our moral thought in a manageable and vivid construction in order to use these elements to determine which first principles of justice are the most reasonable.” (275). 43. One must understand Rawls’ distinction between “the order of deduction” and “the order of support” from this perspective (242, n. 32).


01 - Rawls' Political Liberalism (Van de Putte)

Recommend Documents