"Palamas Among the Scholastics" Logos 55 (2014)

Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies Vol. 55 (2014) Nos. 1–2, pp. 175–220

Palamas among the Scholastics: A Review Essay Discussing D. Bradshaw, C. Athanasopoulos, C. Schneider et al., Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy (Cambridge: James and Clarke, 2013) Christiaan W. Kappes, J. Isaac Goff, and T. Alexander Giltner

Sigla NB, unless otherwise cited, English translations and emphases in bold are our own, while we also modify some English translations. Acta Graeca

Quae supersunt Actorum Graecorum Concilii Florentini. CFDS Series B, vol. 5, books 1–2, ed. J. Gill (Rome: PIOS, 1953). Acta Latina Acta Latina Concilii Florentini. CFDS Series B, vol. 6, ed. G. Hofmann (Rome: PIOS, 1955). Ad Thalassium Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium. Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca 22, ed. C. Laga and C. Steel (Turhout: Brepols, 1990).

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Amb.

BAV Caritas

CFDS

CUP Capita 150

Chrestou

“De distinct”

DSSB

“First Antir”

Lectura

Kappes, Goff, and Giltner

Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Iohannem. Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca, 18, ed. Edouard Jeauneau, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988). Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana. J. Isaac Goff, Caritas in Primo: A Historical Theological Study of Bonaventure’s “Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Ss. Trinitatis” (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2014). Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scriptores Series B, ed. G. Hoffman and M. Candal (Rome: PIOS, 1942, 1952). Cambridge University Press. Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters (Capita 150), ed. and trans. R. Sinkewicz (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1988). Gregory Palamas, Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράμματα, 5 vols., ed. P.K. Chrestou (Thessaloniki: Ethniko Idrima Erevnon, 1962– 1992). Titus Szabó, “De distinctionis formalis origine bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica,” in Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda, ed. Charles Balić (Rome: Antonianum, 1951), 379–445. Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, 9 vols. (Quarrachi: Ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1901). Mark Eugenicus, “First Antirrhetic on the Distinction between Essence and Energy: First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps,” ed. M. Pilavakis (PhD diss., University of London, 1987). John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A, 2 vols., eds. A. Wolter and O. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: Bookmasters, 2004).

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George-Gennadius Scholarius, Oeuvres Complètes de Georges Scholarios, 8 vols., ed. L. Petit, X. Sidéridès, and M. Jugie (Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse, 1929–1935). Ord. John Duns Scotus, Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum opera omnia. Opus Oxiense, 14 vols., ed. C. Balić, M. Bodewig, et al. (Vatican City: Polyglott, 1950–2013). OUP Oxford University Press. GLIH J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Palamas Transformed: Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium,” and Georgi Kapriev, “Lateinische Einflüsse auf die Antilateiner. Philosophie versus Kirchenpolitik?,” in Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500, ed. M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel (Paris: Peeters Leuven, 2011), 263–272; 385–395. PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca (Paris: Migne, 1862–1866). PP John Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon. Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Medievalis, 161– 165, five vols., ed. E. Jeauneau (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996–2003). PIOS Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum. ScG Thomas Aquinas and Sylvester Ferrariensis, Summa contra Gentiles. Commentari Ferrariensis. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici opera Omnia, vols. 13–15 (Rome: Riccardi Garroni, 1926). “Second Antir” Manuel Kalekas, “Second Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps,” ed. M. Pilavakis (Athens, Ph.D. diss forthcoming). S.Th. Summa Theologiae. SVTQ St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly.

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Theo dogmatica Martin Jugie, Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia Catholica dissidentium, vol. 2 (Parisiis: Letouzey et Ané, 1933). Tomo Sinodale Neilus Cabasilas and Philotheus Kokkinos, Τόμο̋ κατὰ τοῦ μοναχοῦ Προχόρου τοῦ Κυδώνη, in Gregorio Palamas e oltre: studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del xiv secolo bizantino. Orientalia Venetiana 16, ed. A. Rigo (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2004), 1–134. Triads Gregory Palamas, The Triads. The Classics of Western Spirituality: Gregory Palamas, ed. J. Meyendorff, trans. N. Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983).

Introduction Scholars show ever-increasing interest in the “essenceenergies” distinction of Gregory Palamas. This essay confronts unresolved difficulties that persist in spite of David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (2004) and its virtual sequel, Divine Essence and Divine Energies (2013). In the latter compilation of essays, Bradshaw dialogues with critics discussing patristics, medieval theology, and modern philosophy. Our present essay confronts three major themes of the two aforementioned books: (1) Palamas’ place in the general history of philosophy and theology; (2) Palamas’ singularity vis-à-vis the essenceenergies distinction; and (3) Palamas’ unparalleled distinction among Latins. The essay compares primary Orthodox sources, such as Palamas and Mark of Ephesus, to primary Latin sources, such as Bonaventure of Bagnoregio and John Duns Scotus. Furthermore, this essay critiques Bradshaw as well as classic Renaissance and Enlightenment schoolmen, to offer a global perspective of Palamas’ historical role within the context of forgotten or ignored historical chronicles that challenge


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present historical narratives. It ends by suggesting areas of further investigation to arrive at a satisfactory description of Palamas’ historical role in East and West. The question of the so-called “real distinction (pragmatikê diakrisis)” between God’s essence and his energies continues to inspire lively debate and discussion, as evidenced in the recently published Divine Essence and Divine Energies (hereafter, DEDE). In view of the popular and scholarly success of David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West (hereafter, AEW)1 and the more recent book of 2013 we provide a careful read of this eclectic collection of essays, offering an historically based and selective critique, along with a constructive corrective, to the book. We also intend to weigh specific strengths and weaknesses of the work on two outstanding points summarized by a co-editor, Christoph Schneider, within his introduction: 1) For most contemporary Orthodox theologians the distinction between the divine essence and energies belongs to the very core of the Orthodox tradition and has no direct equivalent in the West (DEDE, 9). 2) David Bradshaw, Constantinos Athanasopoulos, and Nikolaos Loudovikos share the view that the essence-energy distinction is a key doctrine in the Orthodox tradition that is without parallel in the West (DEDE, 10). We begin our critique by including an additional point of Bradshaw (hereafter, B.) within his original work (AEW, x–xi), wherein he clearly desired a future place in “the history of philosophy” for Palamas. In fact, B.’s desire inspires our own effort to respond to AEW and its virtual supplement in DEDE. 1. An Eclectic Approach to Palamas The essays in DEDE are interesting in and of themselves. B.’s in-depth philological study of energy (energeia) in AEW provided strong foundations for arguments on behalf of Pala1

David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (New York: CUP, 2004).

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mas. Furthermore, B.’s philosophico-theological chronicle of “energy” from Aristotle to Palamas evoked even begrudging praise from B.’s most ardent critics. Nonetheless, upon B.’s comparison between Aquinas and Palamas, he predictably provoked reactions to his critical positions. DEDE reflects a scholarly attempt to further B. claims with recourse to diverse methods of reading much of the same source material in AEW. Besides, DEDE attempts to provide B. with critical comments from scholars about AEW, especially vis-à-vis Palamas’ fundamental metaphysical positions.2 In chapter one of DEDE (published 2013), B. summarizes his understanding of the essence-energies distinction to set the stage for his interlocutors’ subsequent chapters. Actually, the first chapter is merely a reprint of an article published in 2006.3 B. read aloud his 2006 article to the audience at the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies on 5 December 2008.4 By reprinting an antecedently published article, the editors mean to provide the reader of 2013 with an abbreviation of AEW. Therefore, the reader should not expect new developments. Nevertheless, the original 2006 article was an excellent summary of AEW.5 One of B.’s important observations (DEDE, 28) attributes Palamas’ orphan status in the history of theology and philosophy to a neglect among scholars to contextualize Palamas within the “history of philosophy” and biblical theology. We agree and, for this reason, “the historical reception” of Palamas ought to be a predominant scholarly concern to fill the void à propos Palamas’ historic contribution. After all, a subtle and highly metaphysical school adopted

2 We intend “metaphysical” to describe being beyond Aristotle’s categories of being and, thus, a “transcendental science” leading to knowledge of attributes characteristic of necessary, infinite being. 3 David Bradshaw, “The Concept of the Divine Energies,” Philosophy and Theology 18 (2006): 93–120. 4 David Bradshaw, “The Concept of the Divine Energies in Eastern Orthodoxy” (a colloquium on David Bradshaw’s book Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, University of Cambridge, filmed May 12, 2008, 2:33:37, posted 2009, http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/ 517136). 5 Ibid. See his presentation at: 10:30–1:10:33/2:33:26.


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Palamism.6 From Neilus Cabasilas to Mark of Ephesus and Gennadius Scholarius,7 Palamism constituted a controlling idea for doing Byzantine theology. If part of DEDE’s purpose is to accede to B.’s understandable hope to win Palamas a seat within the history of theology and/or philosophy, DEDE’s weakness regrettably leaves this task undone. Since DEDE (2013) repackages B.’s summary (2006) of AEW (2004), it will strike the reader as dated and woefully uncreative. Distressingly, current well-established studies seem to be incorporated only tangentially into a volume that nobly intends to take the essence-energies discussion to a new level. One typical example occurs within B.’s discussion of Basil’s notion of epinoia. Though B. is unique to cite a revolutionary study on Palamism in concluding remarks,8 B.’s pre6

Recent studies catalogue peculiar intellectual currents within the Palamite school. See Antonis Fyrigos, “Tomismo e antitomismo a Bisanzio (con una nota sulla Defensio S. Thomae adversus Nilum Cabasilam),” in Tommaso d’Aquino (†1274) e il mondo bizantino, ed. A. Molle (Venafro: Edizioni Eva, 2004), 27–72; Marcus Plested, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2012); J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or Modus Sciendi and Dignitas Hominis,” in Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen, ed. A. Speer and P. Steinkrüger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 333–410. We omit critiquing DEDE in light of the latter two studies, since they are contemporaneous with DEDE. Aquinas’ incorporation into Palamite theology is now established, the fact of which B. will need to address in his East-West paradigm. 7 Modern Catholic apologists co-opted Scholarius, inciting contemporaneous Orthodox to exclude Scholarius from “Orthodoxy.” Contrariwise, Mark Eugenicus deliberately designated Scholarius his successor to synthesize Latin and Scholastic material to defend Orthodoxy, following explicit examples of Palamas (partim), Macarius Makrês, Joseph Bryennius, and Mark, who eagerly absorbed Latin sources. See Christiaan Kappes, “A Provisional Definition of Byzantine Theology contra Pillars of Orthodoxy?,” Nicolaus 40 (2013): 187–202. Mark’s use and alotted authority to Latins is discussed in: Georgi Kapriev, “Lateinische Einflüsse,” in GLIH, 391–392. Mark adapted Aquinas’ S.Th. for a defense of the resurrection and for defending divine mercy vis-à-vis hell. See J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 368–70. 8 See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 265–266. Basil’s ἐπίνοια is derived from Stoic logic, complicating the field of distinctions on the question. For instance, the intention/concept of a common botanical “seed” contains the

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sentation (2006) of Basil’s Stoic notion (kat’epinoian) of the essence-energies’ distinction falls rather flat. Is there little new from AEW’s release (2004) to DEDE (2013)? The reader would greatly benefit from knowing that Basil’s use of epinoia stems from the Stoa, not from a Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian origin.9 Additionally, Palamas’ intentional avoidance of Basil ad litteram (viz., omitting Basil’s “kat’epinoian”) should be cause for deep pause.10 Another illustration hints at possible signs of stagnation within DEDE. Since Reinhard Flogaus’ and J.A. Demetracopoulos’ coeval discovery (2006/2007) of Palamas’ textual dependence on Augustine’s De Trinitate,11 no real attempt occurs throughout DEDE to integrate this startling turn of events.12 One can worry that the radically anti-Augustinian intrinsic notion of “quality.” Stoic conceptualization suggests a virtual or real distinction à propos ἐπίνοια as applied to God, among the triple use of κατ᾽ἐπίνοιαν in Basil’s Contra Eunomium. See J.A. Demetracopoulos, “The Sources of Content and Use of Epinoia in Basil of Caesarea’s Contra Eunomium I: Stoicism and Plotinus,” βυζαντινά 20 (1999): 10–27. NB, Basil uses ἐπίνοια similar to the Stoic Paraphrasis Themistiana. See J.A. Demetracopoulos, “Glossogony or Epistemology? Eunomius of Cyzicus’ and Basil of Caesare’s Stoic Concept of Epinoia and Its Misrepresentation by Gregory of Nyssa,” in Gregory of Nyssa; Contra Eunomium 2: An English Version with Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15–18, 2004), ed. L. Kariková, S. Douglas and J. Zachhuber (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 395–397. 9 Demetracopoulos, “The Sources,” 33–39. 10 “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 268, 278–279. 11 See Reinhard Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther ein Beitrag zum ökumenischen Gespräch. Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie 78 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997); John A. Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνο̋ καὶ Γρηγόριο̋ Παλαμᾶ̋. Τὰ προβλήματα τῶν ἀριστοτελικῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τῆ̋ τριαδικῆ̋ ψυχοθεολογία̋ (Athens: Parousia, 1997). 12 See DEDE, 45–49. Augustine’s nascent doctrine of actually infinite notions within the divine mind serves a metaphysic of plurality in unity. See Augustine of Hippo, De ciuitate Dei. Series Latina 48, in Corpus Christianorum Patrum Latinorum 0313, ed. B. Dumbart and A. Kalb (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), 375: Nor are there many, but there is one wisdom, in which are certain [items] of an infinite nature [belonging] to such [a wisdom], which wisdom [has the nature] of a treasure trove of the finite, i.e. of intelligible things, in which are all invisible and incommutable


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conclusions of AEW provide little lebensraum for any such project. Palamas’ sources and tradition (e.g., Nicholas Cabasilas13 and Mark of Ephesus) narrate the incorporation of Augustine rationes of things, even of visible and mutable things, which were made through that self-same wisdom […] And thus, an infinity of number is still not incomprehensible for Him, whose understood items (intellegentiae) are not a collective quantity [of numerical items], even if number is of no account with respect to infinite mathematical numbers. (De ciuitate Dei, 11, 10, line 74; 12, 19, lines 14–15). NB, Augustine likely uses Porphyry, who unified Plotinus’ threefold Hen univocally, so that Proclus and Damascius fiercely criticized him (cf. supra, n. 10). Bonaventure’s reception of Augustine’s divine ideas (c. 1254–7) cedes (implicit) priority to Maximus Confessor (see note 18 below) and Ps.Dionysius, explicitly prioritizing Damascene on divine infinity. Hence, Bonaventure situates Augustine’s understanding of infinity of the divine ideas within the prior and conceptually broader affirmation of the actually intensive infinite of the divine essence itself. See J. Isaac Goff, Caritas. Cf. De scientia Christi, qq. 1–2, in DSSB, 5: 3–10. In the first question’s conclusion Bonaventure simply quotes Augustine and concludes, “on the basis of such testimony we are compelled to posit and say that God knows an infinite [number of items].” Then, Bonaventure reasons: Therefore, because knowable [items-objects] are not limited to actually existing beings, but also include potential beings and since one can affirm an infinity of items in potential, so also it is fitting to affirm that God knows an actual [numerical] infinity of items. Bonaventure’s disciple, Scotus adapts this in Lectura I 2.80: Numerical plurality requires a greater perfection, and infinite [plurality] an infinite perfection. Yet, the intellection of many items distinctly is of greater perfection than intellection of but one item […] Therefore, intellection in act (actu) of infinite items requires an infinite perfection. Yet, He, Who is the one first understanding and effecting via a unique intellection, understands actually (actu) and distinctly infinite items […] Therefore, this is actually the character of an infinite perfection. 13 E.g., he cites Augustine in his Life in Christ. See Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, “Nicholas Cabasilas et le Palamisme,” in Gregorio Palamas e otre. Studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del XIV secolo bizantino. Orientalia Venetiana 16, ed. A. Rigo (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2004), 201– 202. Cabasilas also cited the quasi-Augustinian, Anselm of Canterbury, for aspects of his soteriology. See John A. Demetracopoulos, “Échos d’Orient –

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and Latin sources into the history of Byzantine theology/ philosophy.14 The once celebrated (though today obnoxious) figure of Augustine in Palamite theology must be confronted in order to give Palamas his rightful place.15 Failure to engage the historical Palamite tradition risks harsh criticism, for it happens to parallel traditional Protestant approaches to theology, wherein post-apostolic, exegetical and hermeneutic traditions of scriptural study are ignored because of “superstitions” imputed to patristic authors. We will explore below whether the contributors of DEDE transcend familiar postReformation approaches that pay little heed to “a tradition of reception” of an authority into historical (Byzantine) Christianity. Here, our investigation is not directed primarily to B., but rather to DEDE as a whole. Has DEDE advanced the quesRésonances d’Ouest. In Respect of: C.G. Conticello – V. Conticello, ed., La théologie byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIIIe–XIXe S.,” Nicolaus 37 (2010) : 70–71. Cf. Yannis Spiteris and Carmel Conticello, “Nicola Cabasilas Chamaetos,” in La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, ed. C.G. Conticello and V. Conticello (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 326–328. 14 See Christos Arampatzis, “L’onore e l’autorità di s. Agostino nella letteratura teológica tardobizantina,” in Sant’Agostino nella tradizione cristiana occidentale e orientale, ed. L. Bianchi (Padua: San Leopoldo, 2011), 261– 274. 15 After Palamas, Mark of Ephesus more effectively integrated Augustine into Byzantine theology. See George Demacopoulos, “Augustine and the Orthodox: The West in the East,” in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. A. Papanikolaou and E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s, 2008), 15–18. Mark’s third ex professo work on the essence-energies argues: So God possesses all these [attributes], just like natural properties (φυσικαὶ ἰδιώματα), and operations (ἐνέργειαι), after which manner [God] produces the act of operation. Yet, God possesses nothing like specific differences (διαφοραί), neither perfections, as if in fact qualities, nor accidents (συμβεβηκότα). For this reason too He Himself is precisely all the items that he possesses […] Wherefore, God possesses all these very [attributes] and they are items properly pertaining to Himself, and for that fact these items are God! (“Second Antirrhetic,” 12, lines 15–18) Subsequently, Mark condemns Manuel Kalekas, OP, for impiously trying to force a dichotomy between Palamite and Augustinian metaphysics based upon the Fathers. Consequently, the culmination of the Palamitico-Orthodox tradition rejects anti-Augustinianism.


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tion of Palamas to a new level since 2008 or has it failed to incorporate relevant scholarly findings to keep pace with current research? 2. Anti-Western Approaches Constantinos Athanasopoulos has written the second chapter rather irenically (excepting polemical anti-Augustinian comments like unto B.). Though cautious toward B.’s presumed East-West metaphysical divide, Athanasopoulos uncritically paints “the West” as reductively Augustino-thomistic in B.’s image (AEW, 264, 267). Even if Thomism ebbed and flowed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it petered out during the Enlightment. Thomism’s nineteenth-century revival (especially after Pope Leo XIII)16 still colors non-specialist, contemporary misconceptions about Medieval Latin theology. Latin Scholasticism tended toward eclecticism from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries.17 For instance, the Franciscan school was built on utterly different metaphysical foundations from those of Albert the Great (d. 1280) and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274).18 Though contemporary theology (as Palamism) is correct principally to confront Aquinas, it anachronistically 16

J. Weisheipl, “The Revival of Thomism. An Historical Survey,” in New Themes in Christian Philosophy, ed. R. McInerny (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 164–177. 17 E.g., Charles Lohr, Stephen Brown et al., A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Garcia and T. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 18 Importantly, the rediscovery of the centuries-lost (terminus post quem c. 1298) MSS of Bonaventure’s De mysterio Trinitatis and De scientia Christi definitively confirmed this in the 1870’s. Naturally, scholarly literature was bound to a new reading of Bonaventure. Additionally, granted the De mysterio Trinitatis dates quite early (c. 1255–7), Bonaventure appears exotic, utilizing Nazianzen (likely via Rufinus), Maximus the Confessor (via Eriugena), Ps.-Dionysius, and Damascene (via Cerbanus and Burgundio of Pisa). These authors guide Bonaventure’s alternative reading of Augustine through a Maximian lense. Consequently, Bonaventure is a case of Palamismus in fieri or a pre-Palamite anticipation of the essence-energies distinction. For an emphatic treatment and definitive textual proof of dependencies, see Goff, Caritas as well as T. Alexander Giltner’s forthcoming presentation on the Maximian influence in the West of Scottus Eriugena, which will be demonstrated at the Symposium of Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Saint Louis University, June 16–18, 2014.

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tends to read back into medieval philosophy and theology Aquinas’s present celebrity, even his supremacy.19 Thus, an uncritical embrace of B.’s admittedly provisional East-West paradigm (see AEW, x–xi)20 naturally limits authors from expanding the conversation about Palamism to new frontiers. As long as “medieval Scholasticism” is forced into the Procrustean bed of neo-thomist historical narratives, contemporary non-medievalists will continue to miss the mark in their attempt to compare and contrast East-West philosophy and/or theology. Contra Thomism, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (d. 1274) and Scotus are heavily biased toward Greek patristic readings over and against Augustine’s simplicity criterion for the essence-energies distinction.21 This fact accounts for the odd Franciscan tradition of reception of Augustine in contrast to a more classically Aristotelian interpretation, as exemplified in Dominican theology.22 These points are supremely relevant for this chapter, given Athanasopoulos’ marvelous assertion: 19

After double condemnation (1277) by local ecclesiastical authorities, some of Aquinas’ theses were quite contested until his canonization (1323). Thus, wholesale adoption of Aquinas was rare. His apotheosis eventually augured the development of “orthodox Thomism,” which allowed integral adoption of his tenets and system. In 1346 Pope Clement VI publicly recognized Aquinas’ teaching had transcended the confines of the Dominican Order, encouraging the Dominican general chapter to forbid any friar from daring to depart from Aquinas. See W. Wallace, A. Weisheipl, and F. Johnson, “St. Thomas Aquinas,” in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. B. Marthaler et al. (Washington, DC: Thomson Gale, 2003), 14: 23. 20 B. references no primary or secondary literature (save Guichardan infra) related to either Bonaventure or Scotus (AEW, 285). Though B. provides no particular assessment of Franciscan theology, he cites V. Grumel, “Review of Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot et Georges Scholarios devant le problème de la simplicité divine,” by Sébastian Guichardan, Échos d’Orient 34 (1935): 84–96. Guichardan and Grumel are neo-Thomists unconcerned with Scotus, yet Grumel pummelled Guichardan’s apologetic read of patristic authors contra Palamism. 21 Scotus explicitly subjugated Augustine’s metaphysics of divine simplicity to Damascene. See Christiaan Kappes, “The Latin Sources of the Palamite Theology of George-Gennadius Scholarius,” Rivista Nicolaus 40 (2013): 71– 114. 22 Bonaventure avers that divine simplicity implies God as most perfect, containing every befitting perfection in the most perfect manner, each according to its proper ratio. Thus, Bonaventure affirms divine being as fully in itself (in se). It is not susceptible to addition or diminution either accidentally


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I have to observe that looking at the East and some of its most profound contributions to the understanding of Orthodox dogma and Aristotelian metaphysics through a Western and culturally embedded Augustinian filter has never produced a clear and accurate estimate of the value of the East. And how can any such attempt produce anything good, when it is based on a disregard of the fact that Palamas and his faithful disciples have condemned in the strongest of terms the works and ideas of Augustine as sources of heresy? (DEDE, 56) This gratuitous assertion and anti-Augustinian paragraph would be more appreciable were there a citation from primary or secondary literature about Palamas’ or his “faithful disciples’” alleged anti-Augustianism.23 Perchance a slip of the pen, in the following paragraph (DEDE, 56), has the author anachronistically citing Photius of Constantinople (Mystagogia) as “proof” of the claim that the “Palamite” tradition is irreconcilable to Augustine. We have already referred to Congourdeau’s study indicating a solid reference for the Augustinian influence on the Palamite Nicholas Cabasilas (let alone

or unitively. Conversely, Bonaventure argues divine being (quia revera aliquid respondet ex parte Dei) “contains” an “infinite infinity” of distinct perfections and ideas prior to any finite mental activity. Cf., De mysterio Trinitatis, in DSSB, 5: 70a–71a, 73b (q. 3, a. 1, conc., ad 13); De scientia Christi, in DSSB, 5: 3–10 (qq. 1–2). In order to maintain his account of divine simplicity and infinity (summe simplex et simpliciter summa), while avoiding any attribution of discrete parts to the divine being, Bonaventure utilizes common distinctions characteristic of the Franciscan school; namely, formal distinction, disjunctive transcendentals and, implicity, conceptual univocity. See Goff, Caritas and “De distinctionis,” 379–445. Bonaventure sets himself, and the entire Franciscan school post, apart from Dominican simplicity and infinity criteria. Aquinas and Bonaventure negate any aptitude for composition within divine simplicity, thus implying absolute necessity of essence and existence. Cf. S.Th. I, q. 3. See too Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (New York: OUP, 1999), 44–45. Aquinas’ Aristotelico-simplicity constitutes a “controlling idea” to close the door to any consideration of Scotism. 23 Conversely, Palamas names Augustine “a wise and apostolic man.” See Michele Trizio, “‘Un uomo sapiente ed apostolico.’ Agostino a Bisanzio: Gregorio Palamas lettore del De trinitate,” Quaestio 6 (2006): 131–189.

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Palamas).24 Furthermore, we have indicated Mark of Ephesus’ explicitly Augustinian approach providing canonical weight to Augustine’s influence. Truly, Augustine’s writings made a positive impression on the Palamite tradition, but all this is lamentably ignored in DEDE.25 Nonetheless, we cite partial support for Athanasopoulos’ claim. We note that the Constantinopolitan Synod of 1368, condemning propositions of the Byzantine Thomist Prochorus Cydones, rejected theologoumena derived from Augustine’s De Trinitate.26 Accordingly, the reader may indeed develop a historically rooted and canonically sanctioned anti-Augustinian narrative via the Synodal Tome,27 likely authored by Neilus Cabasilas and Philotheus Kokkinos.28 Still, this demands the skilled reader to nuance

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Cabasilas is quite relevant, for Athanasopoulos references his own previous study thereof: DEDE, 64, n. 1. Athanasopoulos implies Cabasilas’ allegedly anti-Augustinian sentiments. 25 See Michele Trizio, “Alcuni osservazioni sulla recezione bizantina del De Trinitate del Agostino,” in P. Ermilov/A. Rigo, Byzantine Theologians: The systematization of their own Doctrine and their Perception of Foreign Doctrine (Rome: Università degli studi di Roma “Tor Vergata,” 2009), 143–168. 26 See Antonio Rigo, “Testi I. Il Tomo sinodale del 1368” and Neilus Cabasilas and Philotheus Kokkinos, Τόμο̋ κατὰ τοῦ μοναχοῦ Προχόρου τοῦ Κυδώνη, in Tomo Sinodale, 87–89; 119–120, lines 565–573: “Again, after [Prochorus’] writings were read, he was discovered saying that, ‘there does not exist that famous light of metamorphosis [of Moses], which the just will eventually enjoy, but the wicked will see too this light [of Moses].’ Additionally, he bears alleged witness to Augustine, having misunderstood the precise literal contents of the same [Augustine, De Trinitate 1.13.28].” NB, Kokkinos (with Cabasilas) refuses to assign blame to Augustine. 27 Again, B. avoids this lacuna in AEW, 227–229, when confronting Augustine’s putative kainotomia vis-à-vis theophanies and cites the important study of Bucur (DEDE, 207). 28 For a scholarly anti-Augustinian polemic, see Bogdan Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” SVTQ 52 (2008) 67–93. Bucur does not cite the Synodal Tome (1368). Plausibly, Augustine’s theology of theophany exposes an Achilles’ heal vis-à-vis prior Latin and Greek tradition. Nonetheless, one may legitimately distinguish between Augustine’s “reverent reading (lectio reverentialis)” within Palamite tradition vs. Augustine’s real mens (phrônêma). Presently, Byzantines are thought to have ignored Augustinian theophanic exegesis. See Andrew Louth, “The Reception of St. Augustine in Late Byzantium,” Nicolaus 40 (2013): 123.


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reception of Augustine in Palamas and Palamite tradition, hardly necessitating any rejection thereof grosso modo.29 3. A Thomistic Approach to Palamas and AEW In chapter four, Antoine Lévy bravely challenges B.’s reading of the essence-energies distinction. Lévy’s contribution is most welcome, since it provides an antagonistic and predictably Thomistic defense against B.’s critique. Though Lévy strikes afoul of Orthodox and anti-Augustinian contributors, he advances little beyond points of his original thesis (2006) in his impressively hefty tome.30 Similar to his recent article, Lévy insists on an interpretation that stretches Palamas to fit him into the painful Procrustean bed made for Aquinas’ height.31 Although Lévy formerly argued from the mistaken assumption that Palamas was the author of a work that Philotheus Kokkinos had actually composed, this mistake has been felicitously corrected in his more recent article. Nonetheless, he continues to insist on Palamas’ crypto-Thomist metaphysics of the analogy of being. Plainly, this cannot be based on any textual dependence upon Aquinas nor upon any actual phrase of Palamas penning “kat’epinoian.”32 Instead, Lévy refracts Palamism through a Thomistic prism of light from emperor John VI and Philotheus Kokkinos, both idiosyncratically Thomistic Palamites. Albeit one might object that 29 Contemporary Orthodoxy’s emphasis on Palamas and his school supports present reception of Augustine. Prior to Palamas, Augustine’s canonical standing in Orthodoxy, though positive, was relatively weak. See Peter Galadza, “The Liturgical Commemoration of Augustine in the Orthodox Church: An Ambiguous Lex Orandi for an Ambiguous Lex Credendi,” SVTQ 52 (2008): 111–130. 30 Antoine Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d’Aquin. Aux sources de la querelle palamienne. Bibliotèque Thomiste 59 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 33. 31 Lévy argues analogy of the concept of being in Palamas because of his disciples’ interpretations (e.g., John VI). See Antoine Lévy, “Lost in Translatio? Diakrisis kat’epinoian as a Main Issue in the Discussions between Fourteenth-Century Palamites and Thomists,” The Thomist 76 (2012): 438– 441. 32 For the singular alleged exception, see “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 278–279.

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Lévy’s claim is beyond textual support within Palamas, Lévy still introduces a serious consideration; namely, John VI and Kokkinos currently form the inchoate membership of an Orthodox “tradition of reception” of Aquinas. Still, this point was made antecedently. Regrettably, Lévy was evidently unaware of a pioneering 100-page study, engaging primary texts and philological points in the opera of Palamas, John VI, and Kokkinos. The reader would be justly dissatisfied at this hulking lacuna.33 Though contemporary Orthodox dispositions are infortuitous to augur Lévy’s strategy success, we rejoice that Lévy concurs with previous studies indicating a Palamitico-Thomist tradition. Still, John VI and Kokkinos are weak figures (i.e. neither saints nor momentous canonical authorities) to evoke sympathy toward Thomism from contemporary Orthodoxy. Should Lévy eventually happen upon other studies on the Palamite tradition, we await a more satisfactory historical conclusion than assuming “almost unanimous rejection of St. Thomas Aquinas’ theology by the Orthodox Church (DEDE, 97).”34 Despite the clear vulnerability of Lévy’s position, he makes some excellent points in his critique of B. Whenever B. restricts himself to historical and philological research into particular vocabulary and exegesis of patristic texts, Lévy’s silence bespeaks his consent to the high quality of B.’s research (DEDE, 101). Conversely, Lévy’s salient points attack B.’s obvious weaknesses; namely, historical generaliza33

We state this confidently, for Lévy’s “Lost in Translatio” neglects citing “Palamas Transformed.” 34 Characteristically Latino-Scholastic doctrines of (a.) philosophical necessity of the filioque and (b.) Aristotelian divine simplicity were normally suspected or rejected. Conversely, Orthodox scholars acknowledged “Byzantine Thomism” in the 1980’s. See Macarius Mackrês, Macaire Makrès et la polémique contre l’Islam, ed. A. Argyriou (Vatican City: BAV, 1986), 65– 84 (Oratio, 12, lines 202–212). In his quasi-thomistic exposition, Makrês designates a virgin best disposed for divinization or “seeing the divine light.” See ibid., 310 (i.e., De virginitate, 2, lines 8–9). Makrês borrowed partially from Cydones’ translation of ScG III.136 (cf. De virginitate, 4, line 44). Macarius professes Palamism and Hesychasm in Makrês, Vita seu laudatio Maximi Athonitae, in Μακαρίου Μακρῆ συγγράματα. Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα καὶ Μελέται 25, ed. A. Argyrou (Thessaloniki: Κέντρο Βυζαντινῶν Ἐρευνῶν, 1996), 155–165 (Vita, 28, line 540 – 31, line 594).


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tions (always terribly risky in contingent matter). For example, Lévy makes a skillful parry against B. citing the oft-neglected critical editions of Barlaam the Calabrian.35 Lévy levels his accusation against B.’s characterization of Latino-Aristotelianism, challenging B. on his own “history of philosophy.” Lévy notes that B. historically aligns himself with none other than Barlaam, the first known “Orthodox” to attack the Latin “craze” for Aristotle as the West’s own undoing. Though this sally strikes only an ad hominem blow, it does hint at a potential fallacy underlying AEW; namely, uniformity of Aristotle’s reception among Schoolmen. Therefore, B.’s history of philosophy, wherein he collapses (similar to neoThomism) all significant Western theology into a simplified Augustinianism, subsequently and wholly transformed into Aristotelico-Thomism in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, underscores inaccuracies and presumptions reminiscent of the Calabrian’s specious rhetoric against an older model of a straw-man-Aquinas.36 Levy challenges B.’s interpretation of Aquinas but is he convincing? B. easily responds to Lévy’s arguments in defense of Aquinas from the panoply of analytico-thomistic analyses and a multitude of disparate reads of Aquinas at his disposal (DEDE, 271). Certainly, a problem with Thomistic studies (after many decades of ever increasing scholarship) is the plethora of interpretations of him. Similarly, Palamas’ burgeoning popularity has begun to reap its own dried fruit of scholarly disagreement.37 On both accounts, might fragmentation be the natural result of intentionally avoiding and diverging from each school’s “tradition of reception” of their respective doctor? Are Thomists and Palamites of yore without understanding of the logical and metaphysical stakes in their 100-year polemic? The fundamental differences distinguishing 35

Barlaam Calabro, Opere contro i Latini, introduzione, storia dei testi, edizione critica, traduzione e indici. Studi e Testi 347–348, 2 vols., ed. A. Fyrigos (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998); Calabro, Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica: on un’edizione critica delle epistole greche di Barlaam, ed. A. Fyrigos (Rome: Antonianum, 2005). 36 See Fyrigos, “Tomismo,” 31. 37 See Anna Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: OUP, 1999), 8–27.

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medieval and Renaissance Thomists from Palamites seem to be quite pronounced. We cannot pretend to add much to the present thomistico-Palamite debate, save to note a curious lack of reference to an entire rich history of the reception of Palamas in the East and West. Did post-Capreolus, orthodox Thomists in the West and post-Cydonian, Byzantine Thomists in the East,38 get Aquinas wrong?39 Let the reader note that the entire orthodox Thomist tradition, culminating in its universal call for condemnation of Palamas at the Council of Florence,40 did not find Lévy’s view very obvious. In order to embrace Lévy’s optimistic reconciliation between Aquinas and Palamas, the reader must do violence to the entire orthodox Thomistic tradition from Cydones (ScG graece, 1354) until the Council of Florence (1438–1439). Consequently, we think it unlikely that Lévy’s own benign novelty (viz., kainotomia) will convince contemporary Orthodox readership. 4. Anti-Scotistic Neo-Palamism In chapter five, Nikolaus Loudovikos provides an interesting contribution completely absorbed in refuting fellow con38

E.g., accusations of multiplying “divine beings” occur repeatedly in: Manuel Kalekas, De essentia et operatione, in PG, 152: 283–428. Palamas allegedly puts God into the genus of a being (ens commune), composed of act and potency; ibid. 353B-C. 39 Dominicans and Thomists objected to Palamas’ metaphysics of the godhead, parallel to Scotus’ “violation” of divine simplicity. See Francis Silvestris, Commentari Ferrariensis, in ScG, 13: 100–101. Modern neo-Thomists generally repeat traditional accusations against Scotus (as against Palamas), accusing him of pantheism and anthropomorphism. See Reginald GarrigouLagrange, The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas’ Theological Summa, trans. B. Rose (London: B. Herder, 1955), 6, 249–251; Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, ed. and trans. J. Bastible (Rockford, IL: TAN, 1974), 29. Cf. Theologia dogmatica, 2: 74. 40 Thomistic calls for condemnation were in 1437 by: Andreas Escobar, De graecis errantibus. CFDS, 4.1: 83 (section 94, lines 3–4); in 1438 by John Lei, Tractatus Ioannis Lei O.P. De visione beata Nunc primum in lucem editus. Introductione –notis –indicibus auctus. Studi e Testi 228, ed. M. Candal (Vatican City: BAV, 1963), 83–84, 193; in 1439, by John Montenero in: Acta Graeca, 2: 346–350; by Andreas of Santa Croce in: Acta Latina, 177; in 1441 by John Torquemada, Apparatus super decretum Florentinum unionis Graecorum. CFDS, 2.1: 86 (section 102, lines 30–34).


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tributor, John Milbank. Loudovikos’ initial concern is to uncover the real Palamas, who is assertedly misunderstood by those in the geographical and intellectual milieu of “the West.” Meanwhile, he laments Orthodox near-univeral misunderstanding of the real Aquinas, just as handicapped as “Western” interpreters of Palamas. Naturally, Loudovikos proposes his remedy to this universally lamentable situation. Chiefly worrisome for Loudovikos is the possibility of fundamental agreement between Duns Scotus and Palamas (DEDE, 122). Unfortunately, we can only regret that Loudovikos is forced to confront a pseudo-Scotus, who emerges from Milbank’s spirited condemnation of the Subtle Doctor. We regret that Loudovikos shows unfamiliarity with the real Scotus and his sources since Scotus’ approach to his doctrine of divine infinity and the formal (viz., quasi-real), essence-energies distinction; viz., ad intra or perfections (DEDE, 123–124), matches Palamas’. Auspiciously, Loudovikos lists Palamas’ authorities (among others) as: the Cappadocians, Maximus the Confessor, Ps.-Dionysius, John Damascene, and the sixth Ecumenical Council. Similarly, Scotus established his theologic relying upon (1) Bonaventure’s read of the Cappadocians and Maximus,41 (2) a parallel read of Gregory Nyssa (indirectly via Damascene)42 and Gregory Nazianzen (indirectly via Bonaventure)43 on the divine essence, (3) the use of Ps.Dionsyian unitive containment,44 and (4) Scotus’ principal 41 The formal distinction has been long traced to Bonaventure. See “De distinctionis,” 380–445. 42 See Richard Cross, “Gregory Nyssa on Universals,” Vigiliae Christianae 56 (2002): 372–410; Cross, “Two Models of Trinity?,” Heythrop Journal 43 (2002): 396–399. Scotus employs Damascene’s term describing immaterial substance as genus generalissimum. See Ord. I, d. 8, pars 1. q. 3. 2–6. The apparatus criticus betrays Scotus’ direct knowledge of Damascene (γενικώτατόν ἐστι γένο̋) through Robert Grosseteste. Cf. John Damascene, Institutio elementaris, in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos. Patristische Texte und Studien 7, ed. B. Kotter (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 24 (ch. 7, line 34 = PG 95, 107). 43 For the texts of Nazianzen and Maximus that influenced Bonaventure, see Goff, Caritas (cf., supra, note 19). 44 See Jan Aertsen, “Being and One: the Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus,” in John Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308): Renewal of Philosophy, ed. E.P. Bos (Amsterdam: Radopi B.V., 1998), 25–26:

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psychological analogy for the energies, namely, the formal difference between will and intellect in the divine essence. This last point puts Scotus in an exact parallel with Palamas’ own visage of this psychological distinction. If Palamas hints at the Sixth Ecumenical Council,45 Scotus himself might have had recourse to the Lateran Council (649), the theological authorship or inspiration of which is virtually the same. 46 As

1)

Dionysius makes clear that all beings are in God, not as in created things in a plurality but unitively. 2) Scotus framed Dionysian unitive containment in the discussion of the relation between God and his attributes. 3) One of these is the relation between being and the convertible transcendentals. 4) Perfections are not unitively contained as altogether identical, only to the extent that they are one res. 5) Union presupposes distinction among really distinct attributes. 6) Unitive containment-distinction presupposes “a minor real difference,” not constituted by the intellect. 7) Scotus calls a “formal” distinction that which exists between different formalitates or realitates, i.e. not things but quiddities independent of the intellect. 8) The model of “unitive containment” connects real identity with a formal non-identity, viz., features that hold for the relation between being and the convertible transcendentals. 9) Scotus affirms that the transcendental one expresses some other res than being, provided that “thing” is understood in the sense of realitas. 45 Loudovikos’ citation is unpropitious (DEDE, 124), for Palamas dubiously made authentic use of the 6th Ecumenical Synod, though the Palamite school employed this topos rather abundantly. Palamas erringly cites the Synod in: Gregory Palamas, Against Akindynus, 2, 10, 38. Chrestou’s edition (to which Loudovikos refers) notes in locus citatus: “fontem non inveni.” Palamas actually cites Photius of Constantinople, who condemns erroneous persons for believing that Christ’s two natures have one operation (mia energeia). Cf. Loudovikos’ appeal to “Christ’s theandric energy [sic]” (DEDE, 127); Photius, Amphilochia. Epistle 1, in Photii patriarchae Constantinopolitani Epistulae et Amphilochia. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, ed. B. Laourdas and L. Westerink (Leipzig: Teubner, 1983), 1: lines 345–352. Loudovikos’ authority Eugenicus cites the 6th Ecumenical Synod frequently (e.g., “Second Antirrhetic,” 15, 31, 40). 46 The synodal texts were available in Latin and Greek, the latter of which represents the original language. Scotus too associates activities naturaliter in an increate essence, which spring forth ex natura rei. Cf. Martin I, Maximus Confessor et al., Concilium Lateranense a. 649 celebratum. Acta con-


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his doctor Bonaventure, Scotus prioritizes Greek sources over and above Augustine, making his famous formal distinction between God’s essence and energies (ad intra).47 Although we await the occasion for Loudovikos to encounter the real Scotus, he lucidly argues Palamas’ distinction within the Godhead. Loudovikos wisely argues that the energies must have “ontological identity” with the essence. For this reason he is sure to reject the suppositions of Martin Jugie,48 Rowan Williams, and John Milbank that Palamas “particularizes” divine items (DEDE, 125). Ostensibly synoptic with Aquinas, these authors seem unwilling to grant “partial forms,” “entities,” or “formalities,” all of which connote nonsubsistent distinct perfections in the Godhead.49 Blissfully, ciliorum oecumenicorum Series 2, ed. R. Riedinger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984), 1: 125: Yet, if […] there was a created operation (conditam operationem; κτιστὴν ἐνέργειαν) of Christ […] then [the imprudent Theodore] does not confess along with us that the very same [Christ] is also uncreated (increatum; ἄκτιστον). This is not that the same Christ is God and man by natural necessity (naturaliter), but only that He is pure man, because He is not uncreated according to [this] nature (secundum naturam; κατὰ φύσιν); i.e. He does not possess in Himself by natural necessity (naturaliter; φύσει) an “increate” operation (increatam operationem; ἄκτιστον ἐνέργειαν). 47

Milbank concedes this point (while loathing Scotus; cf. DEDE, 180), which was previously made in: Christiaan Kappes, The History of a Dialogue, in L’Osservatore Romano: Weekly Edition in English 45, n. 24 (13 June 2012): 9–10. Scotus clearly parallels Palamas on reading Damascene, noticed prior by George-Gennadius Scholarius (scripsit 1445–1458). See Kappes, “The Latin Sources,” 110–112. Milbank’s authority states this with respect to Scotus’ read of Ps.-Dionysius in: Aertsen, “Being and One,” 25– 26. 48 Jugie sees Palamas as a Scotist in: Theologia dogmatica, 2: 148: “On the question [of Palamism], Scotism is as if Palamism in fieri.” 49 Loudovikos appeals to the saintly and canonical authority of Mark Eugenicus, who calls the “gifts (χαρίσματα)” non-subsistent perfections/ formalities (καθ᾽αὐτὰ ὑφεστῶτα). By implication, these are infinite perfections of the Spirit ad intra. Yet, their mental content cannot be grasped fully by a creaturely intellect because of the divine perfections’ infinite mode of existence. Still, the finite subject may grasp in some way each gift (intuitively?). See Acta Graeca, 2: 348. Mark coincides with scotistic doctrine of formalities in the godhead. See Ord. I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, n. 390): “I

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Loudovikos shows himself to be a “subtle doctor” after all. When subsequently rejecting parallelism between Scotus and Palamas, he declares: It is really difficult, after all these texts [of Palamas], to speak of any “Scotist” formal distinction or separation, as some sort of fundamentum in re, in Palamas, as Milbank so persistently claims against me, though without bringing any textual evidence. (DEDE, 126) Truly, Scotus and Palamas parallel each other.50 Unlike Aristotelico-Thomism, Scotus and Palamas reduce divine simplicity to a real inseparability criterion whereby it is absolutely impossible (de potentia Dei absoluta) to separate any given energy from the essence.51 Both reject nominalism and analogical concept of being, employing either Stoic or formal distinctions, for no other historical or logical competitors exist. Loudovikos’ emphasis on the divine essence as a quasi-cause of the excrescences (alias “essential idioms”) is also scotistic doctrine (DEDE, 126).52 Scotus and Palamas assume a positive understand [that it exists] thus: ‘really (realiter),’ because in no way [does this entitas exist] through an act of the considering intellect [viz., a logical second intention]. Nay, such an entity (entitas) would be there, if no considering intellect were present; and thus would be there were there no intellect ever to consider it. I declare ‘that it exists prior to every act of the intellect.’” 50 Scotus and Palamas were traditionally condemned together for isomorphic doctrine (e.g., errors of Gilbert Porretanus; viz., making a distinction between “God” and “His Divinity”). See C. Duplessis and D’Argentre, ed., Collectio iudiciorum de novis erroribus, qui ab initio duodecimi seculi post Incarnationem Verbi, usque ad annum 1632 (Paris: Andrea Cailleau, 1727), 1: 286a, 323a–b; Dionysius Petavius, De theologicis dogmatibus (Venice: Andrea Poleti, 1745), 1: 77a–b. Petavius (d. 1652) pairs Scotus with Palamas’ distinction with exact metaphysical parallels via primary sources. Hereafter, Thomasian theology textbooks correctly note metaphysical equivalency between Scotus and Palamas. E.g., Virgil Sedlmayr, Columban Paruckher, and Boniface Selzer, Deus unus in se et attributis suis scholasticodogmatice expensus (Ratisbonne: John Baptist Lang, 1735), 46–47. 51 E.g., Ord. II, d. 1, qq. 4–5, n. 200. Cf. Triads 2, 3, 15; 3, 1, 34; 3, 2, 13. 52 E.g., Ord. I, d. 26, un., n. 28: “The persons have the character of relations of origin, because these two [relations of origin] spring up (pullulant [= πέφυκε]) in the circumstances of the divine essence, since firstly there is a


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notion of divine infinity, the very ground for infinite modes of perfection. Both value the disjunctives of being (createincreate, finite-infinite, etc.), which favor univocal understanding of being. Scholars interpret both within their respective traditions (even among moderns) to univocate the Dionysian proodoi and Damascenian energeiai emanating from the divine essence.53 Both hold for a doctrine of the logoi in the divine essence.54 Thus, at least with respect to ad intra metadouble divine fecundity in the essence, inasmuch as intellect is infinite and will infinite […]” See Capita 150, 135, lines 15–25. Palamas admits that attributes “spring forth (πέφυκε),” yet both authors also profess that will does not create by nature, for it chooses freely, not necessarily, to create. 53 Many agree on this interpretation of Palamas. See Kalekas, De essentia et operatione, in PG, 152: 299A-D; “First Antirrhetic,” 166–167; 205: “Also, the divine Maximus in his scholia on Ps.-Dionysius, declares: “Hence, an emanation (πρόοδόν) is the divine energy (τὴν θείαν ἐνέργειαν), which [same energy] produced every substance. (lines 21–23)” Cf. Bradshaw (AEW, 269); Rowan Williams, The Philosophical Structure of Palamism, Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977): 36–37. 54 Scotus divides divine knowledge into two quasi-moments pace his own essence and finite contingent beings: (1) first God knows his own necessary essence and all possible-contingent essences insofar as they are knowable essential structures: esse intelligibile; (2) then, God’s will freely acts with respect to a given knowable essence-structure-state of affairs, marking a given object of his will acting with voluntative being: esse volitum (= θέλημα). Both are known in virtue of God’s omniscience, which is really identical to his essence. However, the esse intelligibile are absolutely necessary as objects of God’s infinite knowledge arising from nature, while the esse volitum are effects of the divine will resulting in contingent finite existences standing outside their divine cause. Thus, Scotus holds that God knows the inclusive infinite number of contingent-finite essences in two modes: actual infinity in esse intelligibile and potential infinity in esse volitum. See, Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, (Edinburgh: Edinbugh University press, 2008), 489–495; Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005), 55–85. These contingent essences map onto the Maximo-Palamite doctrine of the λόγοι, in which finite essences are known, approved, and willed by God. Bonaventure’s doctrine of the divine ideas (rationes aeternae-exemplaria) is concentric with the scotistico-Palamite theory of the λόγοι in DSSB 5: 5a: There is in God cognition of approbation, vision and intelligence. Cognition of approbation is of good entities alone and is finite. Cognition of vision is of evil and good, but is of finite things insofar as they are realized in time; for it is of only those things which were, are or will be. Cognition of intelligence is of an infinite

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physics of God, both mirror one another remarkably. 55 Further parallels are readily available.56 Even if we can only wish that Loudovikos might directly avail himself of Scotus, he is correct to suggest that Milbank’s arguments are not as well developed.57 Thus, Loudovikos is justified in his rejection of Milbank’s parallels from a modest number of things, insofar as through this knowledge God knows not only future events, but also knows possible items; possible items, however, to God are not finite, but infinite. (De scientia Christi, q. 1, conclusion) Next, Bonaventure clarifies that within the divine noetic realm of finite essences (exemplary ideas, logoi), one must distinguish between God’s knowledge of mere possibles, which is of an infinite number of items, and those items that he calls, per Ps.-Dionysius, “predefinitions” (praedefinitiones; προορισμοί) which stem from the will of God (De scientia Christi, q. 2, conclusion [DSSB 5: 8b]). 55 NB, for differences with infinity, negations, and participation, see Triads, 1, 1, prologue. The θελήματα and βουλήματα (per Maximus) simply coincide with res volitae of Bonaventure and Scotus. 56 See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 369. Mark affirmed that God is “pure actuality (actus purus)” in an explicitly Aristotelian sense. As Scotus, Mark first justifies the positive essential infinity of God, then quasiderivative items naturally following it (ἡ θεία οὐσία ἀπειράκι̋ ἀπείρω̋ ὑπέρκειται, ἡ δὲ θεία ἐνέργεια ἀπειράκι̋ ἄπείρω̋ ὑφεῖται). See “First Antirrhetic,” 195, lines 2–3. Τhe lack of “potency” in God follows from the fact that God is perfectly “in act” and, thus, His essence -in virtue of its actuality- springs forth (πέφύκε) natural and co-essential activities or “characteristic energy.” See “Second Antirrhetic,” 9, lines 15–20. Inspired by Damascene and Ps.-Dionysius, Scotus subtracts all imperfections in an accident, retaining what is conceptually indifferent to finitude or infinity. Before his eyes is ch. 48 of Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa. See Reportatio I-A, d. 8, n. 109 and especially: But formal intensive infinity and fundamental [infinity] are together there in the divine essence qua essence, and for this reason it is called, per Damascene, a “sea.” Still, formal [infinity] only (not fundamental [infinity]) is in every other perfection [not only in the will] unqualifiedly; for each one has its own formal perfection from the infinity of the essence just as from a root and foundation. (Ord., IV, d. 12, q. 1, n. 124) 57

His works are bereft of primary or secondary literature on Scotus. E.g., Nicholaus Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology of Being as Dialogical Reciprocity, trans. E. Theokritoff (Brookline: Holy Cross, 2010).


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sampling and a clear misconstruction of scotistic doctrine. Unexpectedly, however, Loudovikos cites the worst possible authority to defend a distinction of reason (kat’epinoian) in Palamas, whereby he invokes Mark of Ephesus to stretch the hopelessly univocal Palamas upon the painful Procrustean bed of Thomism (DEDE, 226–227):58 Concerning Palamas [d. 1357], I think that it is clear enough that he would not endorse either a real or a formal distinction between essence and energies, in the sense given to these terms by Milbank. This is why great Palamists of the next generation [sic] after Palamas, such as Markus Eugenicus [d. 1444],59 following an analogous Palamite expression in his fifth treatise Against Gregoras,60 without any hesitation and 58

Assymetrically, Loudovikos cites Irineós Bulovič, Τὸ μυστήριον τῆ̋ ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι […] Ἀνάλεκτα Βλατάδων 39 (Thessaloniki: Πατριαρχικὸν Ἥδρυμα Πατερικῶν Μελετῶν, 1983), 155–159. For Bulovič, Mark opposes a distinction κατ᾽ἐπίνοιαν. Within the pages cited, Mark opposes the Thomist, Manuel Kalekas, OP, condemned for proposing a distinction in God merely according to reason (κατὰ λόγον). See Bulovič’s principal MS citations, in: “First Antirrhetic,” 171–172, 177–179, 212, 219–223. This treatise embodies Mark’s first colossal attack against Thomism, analogous predication, and a Latino-Scholastic distinction of reason. 59 Mark studied Scotism, feasibly citing a Scotist against his Dominican interlocutor during the debates at Florence (1439). His study of Scotism was with his ex-student Scholarius. See J. Monfasani, “The Pro-Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy,” in Byzantine Theology and its Philosophical Background, ed. A. Rigo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 165–168. For Mark’s scotistic metaphysics at Florence, see Acta Graeca, 2: 267. “Basil’s” Epistle (as Mark supposes) may be from Nyssa, whose predication (in relation to Scotus) is relevant to the discussion. On authorship, see Cross, “Gregory Nyssa,” 372–374. Authors suggest the scotistic formal distinction might bridge Palamite and Scholastic metaphysics. See Steven Runciman, The Last Byzantine Renaissance (London: CUP, 1970), 82; David Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective,” SVTQ 32 (1988): 335. Circumstantial evidence suggests Scotism, since one does not find “Basil” in his two antirrhetics against Kalekas in the 1430’s, in Neilus on the Holy Spirit or hesychasm, in Palamas, or likely in Bryennius. Mark’s Cappadocian-based concentric interpretation with Scotus appears only in 1439. 60 This use of a distinction according to reason (λόγου χώριζοντο̋ […] τὰ ἀχώριστα) merely refers to Palamas’ “inseparability criterion,” wherein the

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without encountering any objection, used the term kat’epinoian (i.e. made by mind) in order to describe this distinction-in-identity between essence and energies in the Palamite oeuvre (DEDE, 127). Now the singular use of epinoia in Palamas’ metaphysical reasoning was previously identified and elaborated upon as cited by B.61 Taking into account philology and source texts, Palamas’ singular use of epinoia is conceptually equivocal to its homonym in Thomism, betraying Palamas’ penchant for Stoic semantics. So, Palamas’ unique phrase actually refers to a Stoic mental process, whereby the mind performs a sort of reduction (reductio) from an effect to its cause(s).62 Thus, the phrase refers to psychical acts, which hardly justifies a merely mental distinction within the godhead.63 Much less can this hapax legomenon exercise hegemony as the controlling idea for Palamite metaphysics amid a plethora of phrases and vocatwo mentally distinct items (e.g., wisdom and essence) can be distinguished by the mind, but are really impossible to separate. 61 See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 279. 62 This hearkens to the metaphysico-theological method of reduction so prevalent in Bonaventure, who understands (as Palamas) reduction as the process of mentally tracing back a dependent or originated being to its cause. Bonaventure distinguishes incomplete (resolutio semi plena) from complete resolution (resolutio plena). Thus, for any category of being, the item under consideration is understood in its relation of origination (e.g., accidents and operations to substance, substance to transcendental properties of being). In an incomplete resolution the mind arrives at knowledge of predicamental relation within the categories and/or the relation of substance to the transcendental determinations of being implicit in every concept. In a full resolution, the mind goes beyond the transcendental determinations of being to consider being in its divine cause. Bonaventure’s Trinitarian theologic achieves resolutio plena, tracing back all reality to the divine being and likewise, in the godhead itself, to the Father, the divine primordial “cause” and “fontal source” whereat the mind finds rest and a full reductio. Thus, all reality of faith is reduced to the charity of the Father. See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 8, a. unicus (DSSB 5: 112a–115b) and De reductione artium ad theologiae (ibid. 5: 317–325); Gregory LaNave, “Bonaventure’s Theological Method,” in Companion to Bonaventure, ed. J. Hammond, J.A. Wayne Hellmann and J. Goff (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 114–115; Guy-H. Allard, “La technique de la ‘reductio’ chez Bonaventure,” in S. Bonaventura 1274–1974, ed. J. Bougerol (Rome: Grottaferrata, 1974), 2: 395–416. 63 “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 279.


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bulary indicative of some kind of “real distinction” (ex parte rei) in Palamas. Loudovikos does make an important point that the Incarnation merits emphasis in authentic Palamism as central to the diffusion of the divine energies in creation. We support Loudovikos’ laudable embrace of Maximus’ theologoumenon, the central thesis of which is the absolute predestination of the incarnate Christ.64 More uncomfortably, however, Loudovikos speaks of “Christ’s theandric energy” while contemplating Jesus’ two natures (DEDE, 127).65 Charitably, the reader should not overly scrutinize the monoenergistic implications of this phraseology, for Loudovikos considers Maximus his hero.66 Loudovikos hopefully affirms the implication of his judgment that the divine energies and logoi in Maximus are not concentric ideas and, thus, constitute a case of non-formal identity (viz., non-concentric concepts apprehended directly from the essence) among noetic items concomitant within the divine essence.67 Confessedly conciliatory toward Aquinas, 64 See Ad Thalassium, 73–81 (q. 60, lines 5–145). Scotists accord completely. See Maximilian Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ: Blessed John Duns Scotus and the Franciscan Thesis (Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2006), 30–55. 65 See Maximus, Concilium Lateranense a. 649, 124 (lines 20–22): “He admits proof of his impiety, having defined in every way that, ‘there exists one energy of Christ’s divinity and humanity.’” 66 Pace Sophronius of Jerusalem, Maximus Confessor, Lateran Council (649), and Constantinople III (681), this expression suggests monoenergist leanings. See Pauline Allen, introduction to Sophronius of Jerusalem and the Seventh-Century Heresy. The Synodical Letters and Other Documents, ed. P. Allen and H. Chadwick (New York: OUP, 2009), 30–40. 67 Milbank already observes this. Loudovikos would benefit greatly from direct knowledge of Scotus as opposed to Milbank’s Ps.-Scotus (DEDE, 166):

[Loudovikos] declares that the Palamite distinction of essence from energy (and so of Logos from logoi) is not a Scotist-type “formal distinction,” he disproves himself in the very next sentence by declaring that “this distinction here is not a separation [per Milbank] but an expression of the fundamental distinction between will and essence in God which is not of course a separation either.” This suggests that while the distinction is made purely kat epinoian

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Loudovikos postulates the range of the terms “processions,” “participations,” and “logoi of beings” as sufficiently overlapping species to place them under the absolute genus of “energies.” Then, he locates their unifying principle in their resultant reality as operations of the divine will. Perchance, Loudovikos lacked space to argue his full case, since “energy” in God (should no ulterior distinction in the genus “energy” be forthcoming) would consequently fail to denote “essentially necessary ad intra attributes” that spring (pephyke) from the infinite essence (according to the Palamite school). Were this the case, Palamas’ God would be strange indeed, willing his very attributes into existence!68 Consequently, Loudovikos’ approach is uncongenial to understand the Palamite tradition (to which he alludes) and, infelicitously, remains impotent to reconcile Aquinas to Palamas. Lastly, Loudovikos concludes: So what we need is not the happy but simplistic recognition, made by both David Bentley Hart69 and Anna according to Palamas, it must have some sort of fundamentum in re […]” John Milbank, “Commentary: Ecumenical Orthodoxy – A Response to Nicholas Loudovikos,” in Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, ed. A Pabst and C. Schneider (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 160. 68 A confused metaphysic makes no intrinsic distinctions between various energies, whether ad intra or ad extra (cf. DEDE, 129–131). Loudovikos might be read to believe infinity, goodness, etc., are eternal products of divine will. If “will” is productive of the energies tout court, then absolute metaphysical necessity for energies to be products of essence qua infinite disappears. Though θελήματα and βουλήματα are uncontroversially products of divine will, strange metaphysics are textually arguable, for Palamas’ eternal energies include those distinct from God ad extra (besides uncreated light). See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 273. 69 Laudatory reference to Hart risks Scotism, for Hart too supports Nyssa’s positing of positive divine infinity and the disjunctive transcendentals. This normally impels one toward univocity. See David B. Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 193–194. Hart mollifies anti-scotistic attacks, rejecting putative ontologism from misreads by Heidegger and his school (who rely upon a ps.scotistic source). We have encountered one substantial criticism, whereat Hart is without support from a primary or secondary source. He assumes


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Williams … that Thomas and Palamas basically say the same thing; we need to try to establish a complementarity between them (DEDE, 148). Granted Loudovikos’ Thomist pedigree, orthodox Thomists and Palamites had been mutually acquainted since Cydones’ translation of the ScG (1354), through the Council of Florence (1438–1439), until the fall of the Polis (1453).70 Ergo, the greatest contribution that a conciliatory theologian can provide to the contemporary reader consists in explaining how fundamental tenets of Latin and Greek Thomists, in opposition to stringent Palamites, have been fundamentally in error for centuries. Too often modern ecumenical approaches to a Palamitico-Thomasian semantic equivalence implicitly negate the entire philosophico-theological tradition of saints and doctors, respectively, as “medievals” having “misunderstood” the real Aquinas. Were pertinacious Thomists and unadulterated Palamites so mistaken for more than a century? Is it only now that moderns have understood something beyond the borders of univocity, analogy, and equivocity? If we reject the irreconcilability of Palamism according to (1) fourteenthfifteenth century medieval and Renaissance Thomists, (2) seventeenth-eighteenth century Thomasian theologians, and (3) nineteenth-twentieth century neo-Thomists, then contemporary late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century Thomists alone understand thomistico-Palamite questions. Tenacious Thomists and pledged Palamites are unlikely to surrender their academico-historical traditions for good-natured hearty appeals to reconciliation. Either toleration or continued division must reign.

Scotus holds (as Ockham) that God can create worlds “alien to his own nature”(ibid. 256). This will be found nowhere in the real Scotus. 70 Scholarius, often dismissed as a Thomist, worries about the consequences of Aquinas’ philosophy of divine names-attributes in: OCGS, 6: 283. Scholarius later associated Latin theology (viz., Aquinas) to anti-Palamism in: OCGS, 5: 1–2. He asserts in his preface to his epitome of the ScG that Aquinas’ essence-energies doctrine (as the filioque) constitutes an irreconcilable difference between the Latin and Greek churches.

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5. Anti-Palamite and Anti-Scotistic Radical Orthodoxy In chapter seven, John Milbank issues his scotistic challenge to B. Even if “Milbank” has become synonymous with “controversy,” he accurately recognizes that medieval Latin tradition includes more than just Augustino-Aristotelico-Thomism. Milbank’s polemics seek to position Aquinas as the last authentic theologian (contra Scotus and Palamas). Yet, he puts Aquinas at odds with the Dominican tradition and orthodox Thomists by conceding that Scotus is more logically rigorous (DEDE, 200). Milbank surrenders to analytic criticism and admits that Aquinas’ genius lies principally in his affirmationnegation theology that does not resolve the “paradox” of divine being (in its existence and essence).71 Hence, he invokes ps.-Dionysian tensions or affirmation-negation statements that characterize the Areopagite (e.g., God is “good” and “beyond all good”). As does his school, Milbank throws in the towel on Aquinas; namely, Thomas’ logic of analogy is rationally contradictory and, thus, celestially mystical.72 Instead, Milbank elevates Scotus to the real logician and, thus, an unmysterious rationalist (undoubtedly driving Dominicans into fits of madness).73 Consequently, for Milbank, a demythologizing Scotus signals medieval theological decline. Lastly, Palamas too must be banished to the sixth circle of the Inferno,74 for he

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See John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox versus Dialectic (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 72 Ibid., 164. Milbank makes this point quite boldy, defending Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa for admitting that analogy violated the law of non-contradiction (in the face of Scotism) to defend “divine paradox.” 73 Milbank’s anti-scotistic authority (DEDE, 168) completely concedes the fact that Thomism’s logic is contradictory. See Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,” Modern Theology 21 (2005): 557–558. 74 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, in Tutte le opere, 4th ed., ed. I. Borzi, G. Fallani, et. al. (Rome: Newton, 2010), 86 (Canto X, lines 13–15). Milbank might place Scotus with Epicurus (and heretics), since he doubts the certainty of philosophical proofs for the immortality of the soul!


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sufficiently partook of the forbidden fruit of Franciscan subtlety:75 [Palamas] never suggested anything like a “real distinction” in God between the reserved “essence” and the shared “energies.” The question is whether he nonetheless admitted a kind of “formal distinction” between the two, if we define a formal distinction as roughly “a kind of latent division within a real unity, permitting a real if partial separation on some arising occasion.” This mode of distinction is most of all associated with John Duns Scotus, Palamas’ near contemporary in the West. I shall contend below that Palamas did indeed make a distinction within God along these lines and that to do so was to compromise the divine simplicity to a dangerous degree (DEDE, 166). Doubtless, for both Palamas and Scotus, a “partial separation” of any quasi-attribute (symbebêkôs pôs)76 or quasi-perfection from divine essence is absolutely impossible and mentally unthinkable.77 Surprisingly, Milbank fails to understand 75

Milbank makes this point orally in: “The Concept of the Divine Energies in Eastern Orthodoxy.” Milbank rhetorically laments the fact that he cannot compliment Palamas as a crypto-Scotist. 76 For the patristic origins of this term, see Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνο̋ καὶ Γρηγόριο̋ Παλαμᾶ̋, 54. The crypto-Scotist, Hervaeus, entertained this language to speak about divine quasi-attributes. The Palamite Scholarius adopted Hervaeus into Byzantine theology for this reason. Though Hervaeus rejected univocity, its very use necessitates the formal distinction to avoid pantheism. See Kappes, “The Latin Sources,” 103. 77 Richard Cross is an authority here but Milbank summarily dismisses the analytico-friendly Cross as an anachronistic scholar via one comment within one footnote (DEDE, 168). Milbank ignores Cross’ patristico-contextual work and extensive academic publishing in the field of Medieval Studies, demonstrating his historical sensitivities. See instead Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 255. Palamas forcefully rejects any potential division in: Capita 150, 178: The Akindynists do not accept nor are they capable of knowing the indivisible distinction in God (τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀδιαίρετον διαίρεσιν), even when they hear us saying of the divided union (διῃρημένην ἕνωσιν) in accord with the saints, that one aspect of God is incom-

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this ontological aspect of the formal distinction.78 Next, he calls it a “latent division.” In this respect, he once again misses the mark completely. The distinction is mentally and conceptually clear to the mind (e.g., goodness ≠ wisdom). Each concept denotes some non-concentric aspect with respect to its comparative conceptual item. What is more, the root or cause of the mentally non-concentric concepts (i.e. a first intention) is directly based upon a fully actual distinction (neither separation, nor division, nor something “latent”) within the limits of the object itself. Hence, even if unlimited, the divinity views itself (epoptikê) as actually productive of distinct necessary items (e.g., goodness, wisdom) and contingent items (e.g., an actual infinity of possibly creatable items or logoi).79 Because prehensible and another is comprehensible […] For they do not know that God is indivisibly divided and united divisibly and experiences neither multiplicity nor composition. (Capita 150, sec. 82) Nonetheless, the scotistic distinction is “real” (in unscholastic terms) to the extent that the distinction is actually (not latently) within the object in question. Elsewhere, inconsistencies exist in Palamas. See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 276. 78 Milbank´s authority (DEDE, 190) affirms this in: Aertsen, “Being and One,” 25–26 (cf., supra, note 47). 79 This constitutes another Franciscan-Palamite parallel. The quasi-Scotist, Hervaeus Natalis, adopted the formal distinction and bequeathed it to Byzantium in Greek translation (via Prochorus Cydones). See Kappes, “The Latin Sources,” 71–114. Hervaean scholars note that the distinction of the persons and attributes (within God’s self-vision) constitutes a refined form of Greek έποπτεία or divine metaphysics. See John Doyle, Introduction to A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) the Doctor Perspicacissimus on Second Intentions, Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 44 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), 2: 12. Stoic metaphysics/ theology is perpetuated in Origen and the Cappadocians, early developed in sync with hesychasm by Evagrius Ponticus. See Susanna Elm, “Evagrius Ponticus’ Sententiae ad Virginem,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 45 (1991): 107–109. The Palamite school naturally embraced hesychastic ἐποπτική to understand the essence-energies distinction. Palamas surpasses the Stoic threefold division of science (bypassing ἡ φυσική): Wisdom comes to man through effort and study […] [The Lord] appears in one way to the ethical man (τῷ πρακτικῷ), yet in another to the contemplative (τῷ θεωρητικῷ) and to the theological man (τῷ ἐποπτικῷ) in one way, and yet another way to the zealous


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these items are not actually accidents, they do not compromise divine simplicity, yet are essential to the definition of thispossible-being. Contrafactually, were “goodness” completely removed from “infinite essence,” then a non-good essence would result. This makes no logical sense and is not a really possible being. Therefore, infinite essence necessarily includes goodness and, as such, is inseparable from infinite essence. Given Milbank’s misrepresentation of Scotus, Loudovikos (unacquainted with the real Scotus) is justified in rejecting Milbank’s Scotus. Elsewhere Milbank hits the mark in that both Palamas and Scotus appeal to the distinction of powers within the soul as a case of distinctions that really exist within a simple object (DEDE, 167).80 Happily, Milbank is correct to note that Scotus applies “literally” Augustine’s divine psychology as something parallel to human psychology. Auspiciously, Palamas uses Augustine in a similar fashion with respect to analogizing human and divine psychology.81 Both theologians find their ulterior justification in Maximus’ theology as exposited in the analogical parallel between “divine nature” and “divine operation” as mirrored in “human nature” and “human operation” of the Christ.82 Palamas rightly appeals to the foundation of a or to those become divine. There are numerous differences in the divine vision itself (τὴν θείαν ἐποψίαν) […] but to Moses He appeared “face-to-face (ἐν εἴδει) and not through enigmas.” […] Recall the testimony of Maximus: “Deification is an enhypostatic.” (Triads, 3, 1, 28) Mark Eugenicus too argues ad intra distinctions via Basil’s appeal to the divine ἐποπτική and ἐνεργητικὴ ἐξουσία. See “First Antirrhetic,” 169, lines 25–27. Scholarius follows suit: OCGS, 3: 215, line 11. For the definitive study on epopteia, see Theo Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie: Die Entdeckung der Subjecktivität (Darmstadt: Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 138–151. 80 Cf. Triads 3, 2, 22 and Ord. IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 6. 81 See Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνο̋ καὶ Γρηγόριο̋ Παλαμᾶ̋, 85–94. Palamas’ terms for divine psychology rely on texts from Augustine and Maximus, particularly on the notion of διάνοια. 82 Palamas’ Augustino-psychological tradition (see Capita 150, ch. 36–37) culminates in the authoritative Palamite: Mark Eugenicus, Διατί ἡ Θεότη̋ Μονὰ̋ καὶ Τριά̋, in ΜS Medicaeus Laurentianus Plut. 74, folio 264v, partially edited in Theologia dogmatica, 2: 259:

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metaphysical distinction between a nature and its operations as rooted in Constantinople III. Scotus might easily draw from the same background with recourse to the self-same Maximus, or his theological tenets, ratified at the Lateran Council of 649. Both loci/topoi are authoritative for Orthodox and Roman Catholics and serve to bolster this theologic’s aforesaid distinctions. Unsurprisingly, then, Kokkinos posteriorly forced Prochorus Cydones to read Maximus, the Sixth Ecumenical Council, and Damascene’s logic in order to rehabilitate him from his “Akindynist” mental distinction, made between the divine nature and its attributes.83 Time and again, though absent within DEDE’s thematic, the rallying point for Franciscan and Palamite schools is positive divine infinity.84 Scholars accept in bulk that pagan philosophical and paganistico-Christian philosophical notions of infinity up to Plotinus generally denote “imperfection” of whatever sort.85 Surprisingly, there is little interest in exploring Franciscan and Palamite ulterior development of the highly original Christian emphasis of divine infinity, as exposited in

For our mind (νοῦ̋), being made according to God’s likeness (εἰκόνα), naturally (φυσικῶ̋) possesses the internal word (λόγον), which dwells within itself, and it has products (προϊόντα) from its very self and spirit has a co-product (συμπροϊόν), itself paired synchronously along with internal word (τῷ λόγῳ). In respect of the paradigm of an image (εἰκόνο̋), and in this very manner, do I declare this in respect of God Himself. (folio 263v) Pace hesychasto-Palamism psychology, Augustine and Nyssa’s psychologies form the base. See Georgi Kapriev, “Die nicht-psychologische Deutung des Menschen bei Gregorios Palamas,” Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12 (2006): 187–198. 83 See Rigo, “Testi” and Cabasilas and Kokkinos, Τόμο̋, in Tomo Sinodale, 34; 313–314, lines 384–427. The synod of 1351 already cited both Fathers (cf. PG 151: 727–729). 84 Radical Orthodoxy argues Scotus’ infinity leads to inexorable decay, even Nietzsche’s nihilism. See Michael Hanby, “Augustine Beyond Western Subjectivity,” in Radical Orthodoxy, ed. J. Milbank and C. Pickstock, J. Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 109. 85 See Leo Sweeney, Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought, 2nd ed. (New York: Lang, 1998), 167–168.


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the Cappadocians (especially Nyssa).86 This positive notion is often maladroitly assumed to be a borrowing from Plotinus. Alas, far too many diverse items (Nous, matter, etc.) are “infinite” for Plotinus to hope to justify such a simplistic reductionism.87 Even if there seems to be minimally dual significata for “the infinite” in Plotinus, none of his definitions do the heavy lifting to raise Plotinian infinity to the level of the Cappadocian notion of an immense, unique, and infinite universal or “sea of infinite being,” namely, the divine essence itself.88 Byzantine tradition continued to emphasize (and even exaggerate)89 this purely Christian philosophical value,90 even serving as the foundation for Bonaventuro-scotistic and Palamite 86

See Ekkehard Mühlenberg, Die Undenlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der Klassischen Metaphysik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), 103–104. Nyssa provided the foundation for ulterior Greek negation of “concept formation” vis-à-vis the divine essence. See Lenka Karifková, “Infinity,” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory Nyssa, ed. L.F. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 423–426. The logico-metaphysical drive toward univocity, stemming from necessary components of infinity and transcendental disjuncts, is argued in: Frederick Sontag, “Infinity and Univocity,” The Review of Metaphysics 6 (1952): 219–232. 87 Sweeney, Divine Infinity, 171–219. 88 See Trinitarian predication in: Gregory Nazianzen, Discours 31. Cinquième Discours théologique: Du Saint-Esprit, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 (Discours théologiques). Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes. Sources chrétiennes 250, ed. P. Gallay and M. Jourjon (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978), 300–314 (nos. 12–20); In Theophania & In sanctum pascha, in PG, 36: 317B; 625D: “Ὅλον γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συλλαβὼν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, μήτε ἀρξάμενον, μήτε παυσόμενον, οἷόν τι πέλαγο̋ οὐσία̋ ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον, πᾶσαν ὑπερεκπίπτον ἔννοιαν, καὶ χρόνου, καὶ φύσεω̋.” These constitute the direct sources for Damascene’s Trinitarian predication and infinity. 89 “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 279–290. Palamas states (Triads 3, 2, 7) that the gap between the co-eternal energies and the essence is insurmountable, for the essence “stands infinitely infinite times (ἀπειράκι̋ ἀπειρῶ̋) higher.” 90 E.g., this hyperbole exists in a common source for Bonaventure and Palamas, viz., Maximus in: Ad Thalassium, qq. 56, 60, 63. Bonaventure imitated this triple formulation of infinity in Eriugena’s Latin translation. This unique formulation, hereafter unknown until Bonaventure, occurs minimally three times in the PP: I 517B; II 525A; II 586C. For initial discoveries and research into the textual and conceptual overlaps between Bonaventure, Eriugena, and Maximus, see Goff, Caritas.

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metaphysics.91 All the same, there is precious little interest in the fact that Franciscan and the Palamite schools both explicitly root their metaphysics in a positive notion of divine infinity. This point is at least obliquely conceded in Radical Orthodoxy, whereupon they blame scotistic metaphysics on Bonaventuran philosophical “perversity” (DEDE, 191).92 Indeed, Bonaventure was himself obsessed with infinity, which he confronts as a positive entity, along with a clear sense of unitive contain91

Palamas cites Maximus explicitly in: Capita 150, 178 (ch. 82, lines 34–35; NB, Sinkewicz marks this “fontem non inveni”). Just prior, Palamas references a generic man who cannot distinguish between the geometric body vs. its natural properties. A universal, instantiated as “a nature,” cannot (de potentia Dei ordinata) be really separated from its natural properties (e.g., as a line from a triangle, and presumably quantity from hypostasis). As these properties are inseparable from their natures (lest the object be mentally absurd and really destroyed), a fortiori the divine energies and essence are too. N.b., Palamas avoids any distinction “kat’epinoian,” though Basil’s example of a seed and its properties is apt here. Why? Palamas above appeals to Maximus (cf. Maximus, Centuries on Charity, in The Philokalia, vol. 1, ed. G. Palmer, P. Sherrard, and K. Ware (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 64 (bk. 1, sec. 96). Palamas’ notion of infinity (in the midst of plurality) cannot be merely conceptual (as he likely understood Basil) in God but necessitates a real difference. For other Maximian hyperbolic appeals to the positive notion of divine infinity (≈ ἄπειρο̋ ἀπειράκι̋), see also: Triads 1, 3, 22; 3, 2, 7–8; 3, 2, 21; 3, 3, 14; Chrestou, Homily 41, 4. Most importantly, Capita 150, ch. 82, appeals to Maximus, Ambigua ad Thomam una cum Epistula secunda ad eundem, question 1, 25 in Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca , 48, ed. by B. Janssens, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), and his notion of plurality in unity (i.e. trinity-unity). Palamas overplays his hand, for Maximus denies any “division (διαίρεσι̋)” and admits only “distinction (διάκρισι̋).” See too Triads 3, 3, 8: “Maximus says this: ‘beginningless actions (ἄναρχα ἔργα) of God are immortality and infinity (ἡ ἀπειρία) and reality (ἡ ὀντότη̋) and as many [actions] considered essentially (οὐσιωδῶ̋) surrounding God (περὶ τὸν Θεὸν).’” 92 Pickstock, “Duns Scotus,” 546: It is now regarded as a demand of rigour that one keep a “transcendental” universality strictly distinct from “transcendent” height and spirituality, logical abstraction from spiritual ascesis. This is what Duns Scotus achieves by reading ps.-Dionysius and Augustine in his own fashion, which was sometimes alert to ambiguities within their texts, and at other times seemingly almost wilfully perverse. His new and explicit deployment of perfection terms as “common” both to God and creatures was nonetheless anticipated by Bonaventure.


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ment, and the formal distinction within his opera. Even his reading of Augustine, like unto Scotus, is colored by his Greek prejudice.93 Independent of Franciscan influence, Palamas forms a coaxial theologic with Bonaventuro-Scotist metaphysics. He too piously obsesses on divine infinity as part and parcel of his justification for his distinctions within the Godhead. Yet, who provides the common root for such metaphysical uniformity between two topically and linguistically divergent traditions? Clearly, the transcendental disjunctives of being (all being is either “created” or “uncreated,” either “finite” or “infinite,” either “participated” or “unparticipated,” etc.)94 form a common value between the two schools.95 Yet, the common 93

Bonaventure consistently founds infinity upon the Damasceno-Nazianzen notion of positive infinity, calling divine being an “uncircumscribed sea of infinite substance.” After affirming absolute infinity is a co-extensive and absolute property of the divine essence, Bonaventure then incorporates the Augustinian notion of divine infinity and, by implication, simplicity. This best explains the manner in which Bonaventure argues for the possession of an actual infinity of divine ideas in his De scientia Christi, serving to render Augustinian divine simplicity, contrary to Aquinas, in its Franciscan reception intrinsically open to Greek patristic demands of divine being’s actual unitive containment of every perfection in the highest mode, namely, infinite perfection. See I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, conclusion (DSSB 1: 769b); I Sent., d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, conclusion (ibid. 1: 804a); De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 4, a. 1, nn. 2, 5 (ibid. 5: 79a). 94 See this metaphysical principle boldly dividing all beings (besides the God-man) into one of two disjunctives in: Theodoret of Cyrrhus (Ps.-Justin), Expositio rectae fidei, in Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi, vol. 4, 3rd ed., ed. J. Otto (Jena: Mauke, 1880), (Morel p.) 374, sec. D, lines 1–2: “We shall discover that all being is divided into create and increate (Εὑρήσομεν γὰρ ἅπαντα εἴ̋ τε κτιστὸν καὶ ἄκτιστον διαιρούμενα).” Theodoret (d. c. 457) capitalized upon the disjunctive transcendentals exposited by Nyssa. Palamas exploits disjunctives “participated-unparticipated,” which are in Maximus clearly in Amb. 41, constituting a fivefold division of all things. Maximus’ canonical authority blesses Palamas’ obsession with the disjuncts, culminating in Palamite adoption of a fuller list of disjunctives from Bonaventura graecus in Scholarius (1445). 95 Eriugena follows Maximus’ framework of the disjunctive transcendentals as a starting point, i.e. the second division of natura universa (creat et non creatur; creatur et creat; nec creat nec creatur; creatur et non creat). When the former two are split vertically from the latter two, they elucidate “uncreated nature” and “created nature” respectively. Furthermore, Eriugena ruminates rather extensively on Maximus’ fivefold division twice in the PP

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notions of positive infinity and disjunctive transcendentals force us to a common doctrinal source in Nyssa,96 followed by textual dependence on Maximus the Confessor,97 Ps.-Dionysius, and the final common apostle of the transcendental disjunct-infinity dyad, the Damascene. Unfortunately for Radi(II 530Bff. and PP V 892Dff.). Like Maximus, Eriugena locates the overcoming of this division in the mystery of the Incarnation and divine love (PP I 449A-B). Similarly, the division between participatum-imparticipatum is upheld by Eriugena (PP II 617A–617C); Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenea Homilia super ‘in principio erat verbum’, n. 13 in Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Medievalis 166 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). For Eriugena on the infinite-finite, cf., supra, note 18. 96 Nyssa is idiosyncratic, though divine infinity is arguably common to the Cappadocians. Nyssa divides all being into disjunctive transcendentals from his meditation on Christ as the juncture of “create” and “increate” natures. This division pervades several works, especially: Gregory Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, ed. W. Jaeger (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1.1: 113: Have we not come to know these distinctions of being in division (ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ὄντων τὰ̋ διαφορά̋)? […] Indeed, we say that is “knowable (νοητὸν).” And again we grasp another distinction from “the knowable (τοῦ νοητοῦ),” divided into what is “create” and “increate” (εἰ̋ τὸ κτιστὸν καὶ ἄκτιστον διαιρουμένην). And we have logically defined that the Holy Trinity is, on one hand, of an “increate” nature (τῆ̋ μὲν ἀκτίστου φύσεω̋), and on the other hand, that all such [beings] posterior to that [Trinity] are said to be of a “create” nature (τῆ̋ δὲ κτιστῆ̋) […] (Contra Eunomium, bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 295, lines 1–8) Nyssa is the intellectual well from which Damascene and Scotus draw a positive notion of infinity in: Cross, “Gregory Nyssa,” 272–324. 97 The clearest example of the disjunctive transcendental in Maximus is Amb. 41, where Maximus explicates his fivefold division of all things (Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor [London: Routledge, 1996], 156): “The first of these divides from the uncreated nature the universal created nature, which receives its being from becoming. For they say that God in his goodness has made the radiant orderly arrangement of everything that is, and that it is not immediately plain what and how it is, and therefore the division that divides creation from God is to be called ignorance. For what it is that naturally divides these one from another, so that they may not be united in a single essence, since they do not have one and the same logos, they grant to be ineffable.”


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cal Orthodoxy, their accusations against Bonaventuro-Scotism are truer than they might imagine. Bonaventure was not only a missionary of positive infinity and unitive containment of the divine attributes, but takes his inspiration from Nazianzen, ps.Dionysius, Maximus Confessor latinus, and the Damascene, as far back as the early 1250’s;98 Bonaventure does anticipate Scotus, but in a patristic fashion and in the image of Maximus with his triple infinity formula à propos divine being.99 Naturally, Bonaventure drew from available translations of Maximus, which he employed in Paris through the latent translation of John Scottus Eriugena (d. c. 877).100 It is for these reasons, and a host of others, that the last great Orthodox of the Palamite school approvingly cited Bonaventure’s list of disjunctive transcendental attributes in Greek, for this list of disjuncts seamlessly expands and harmoniously develops the theological insights of the Palamite school on the divisions between “create” and “increate” being.101 98

See Bonaventure, Commentaria in Sententiae (1252–53); De scientia Christi (1254); De mysterio Trinitatis (1255–7). 99 See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 3, a. 1, ad. 13 (DSSB 5: 73b): “pro eo quod infinitum, eo quod infinitum divinum esse est infinitissime infinitum.” For Bonaventure’s Greek sources, cf., supra, note 18. 100 See Ad Thalassium (trans. J. S. Eriugena), q. 60: “Hoc est omnino mysterium secula circumscribens et superinfinitum et infinite infinitum ante secula subsistens magnum dei manifestatum consilium, cuius angelus factus est ipsum iuxta essentiam dei uerbum.” Eriugena enjoys longstanding acceptance as a crucial link between the East and the West, providing the definitive translation of ps.-Dionysius’ corpus until the 13th century and translations of Maximus’ Ad Thalassium, Amb., and Nyssa’s De opificio homini. Moreover, Eriugena includes numerous translations of the Cappadocians within the Periphyseon, the availability of which was widespread until his ultimate condemnation in 1225 by Honorius III. This justifies Eriugena as orientale lumen in Marie-Dominique Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, 3rd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1976). For discussions on Eriugena as conduit of the East, see B. McGinn and W. Otten, ed., Eriugena: East and West, (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The breadth of Eriugena’s influence as a theologian and conduit of Eastern patristic theology is still largely neglected. 101 See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 1, a. 1, nn. 11–20 (DSSB 5: 46b–47a): “Item, si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio […] Item, si est ens respectivum, est ens absolutum […] Item si est ens diminutum seu secundum sive secundum quid […] Item si est ens propter aliud, est ens propter se ipsum […] Item, si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam […]”;

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From the information provided, it should be obvious that B.’s provisional historical narrative would benefit greatly from taking into consideration the Bonaventuro-scotistic school, which has already been established in the history of philosophy. Furthermore, DEDE failed to broach the subject of the Palamite tradition to which explicit references were made. 6. Milbank’s False Dichotomy: Palamas and Scotus on Participation In his screed against Scotus, Milbank fails to inform his reader that there exists precious little by which to judge Scotus on the question of participation (DEDE, 200). Milbank draws attention to only one of the two known paragraphs to us about Scotus’ musings on participation: Scotus’ approach is in one sense more rationally rigorous than Aquinas, yet at the risk of subordinating God to esse, by too much regarding the participation of the finite in being as a literal “segment”: this risks either the notion of finitude as outside the reach of divine omnipresence, or else pantheistic immanence (as will arrive with Spinoza) if one takes the share of being to be also a share of infinitude (DEDE, 200). Presently, Scotus’ extant works contain too little on the subject to evoke such a reaction from Milbank, who greatly overplays his hand on Scotus.102 Duns has no “doctrine” of participation to speak of. Ergo, one must refrain from saying too much on the subject, though his disciple Francis Mayron fully developed the notion of participation, potentially reflecItinerarium ch. 3, n. 3 (DSSB 5: 304ab; scripsit 1259); Collationes in Hexaemeron, ch. 5, 28–29 (ibid. 5: 358b–359a; composed 1273). Cf. GeorgeGennadius Scholarius: “ὡ̋ ὅταν αὐτὰ τῷ ἀπολελυμένῳ καὶ μὴ ἀπολελυμένῳ ἢ ἀναφορικῷ διακρίνωσι, τῷ ἀδιακρίτῳ καὶ διακεκριμένῳ, τῷ πρὸ̋ ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸ̋ ἄλλο, τῷ ἔκ τινο̋ καὶ τῷ οὐκ ἔκ τινο̋, τῷ μεθεκτῷ καὶ οὐ μεθεκτῷ καὶ τοῖ̋ τοιούτοι̋, ἃ πάντα ἀντιφατικά εἰσι.” (OCGS, 6: 282, lines 22–26; scripsit 1445) 102 Cf. Ord. I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 2, n. 37–38. NB, Scotus’ other brief allusion to participation is Reportatio II, 16.1.


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ting the logic of his master.103 Finally, it is exasperating that (self-styled) “non-anachronistic” historical theology absolutely neglects speaking about scotistic doctrine of participation with reference to Jesus and Mary. It can only be hoped that Scotus and Palamas, along with their maximalist Mariological traditions, will eventually be consulted for instances of participation in concreto or in facto esse. Until Mariology becomes part and parcel of the discussion of human nature’s capacity to participate in the energies, absolutely no author may pretend to plumb the depths of participation as possible to human nature.104 Summarily, Scotus and Palamas are not so distant from one another (though Scotus is systematic, while Palamas is inconsistent, perhaps due to literary genre and apologetic thrust). While both missionaries of divine infinity hold for the absolutely imparticible nature of the divine essence, Scotus sounds, naturally, more professorical.105 Palamas employs bombastic, 103

Francis is relevant and nearly contemporaneous with Scotus. Francis logically developed scotistic doctrine of participation. Milbank is guessing, or projecting, what Scotus might say. Mayron is relevant to Milbank and to Byzantium since Scholarius approved of him. See OCGS, 2: 223; 6: 179– 180. Moreover, no one questions the robust doctrine of participation in Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum and De triplici via. 104 For an attempted remedy of this gaping lacuna, see: Christiaan Kappes, The Immaculate Conception: Why Thomas Aquinas Denied, While John Duns Scotus, Gregory Palamas, and Mark Eugenicus Professed the Absolute Immaculate Existence of Mary (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2014). 105 See Reportatio I–A 36.4, n. 27: The infinity of the divine essence is more perfect than any other infinity; i.e. infinites of thinking (cognoscendi) perceptibles (cognitorum), or of notions (rationum). Yet, He comprehends the infinity of His own essence from the nature of the object (ex natura rei). Therefore, he is able to comprehend any other infinity and, consequently, if there is even an idea (idea) that is perhaps a thought-object (obiectum cognitum) (since He comprehends infinite objects), then there are infinite ideas (ideae) in the divine mind. If too an idea perhaps exists as a thought-object, since the former are infinite and are in respect of Himself as infinite, and in such wise, the same follows as before, since the ideas are infinite. However, granted namely that the infinity of the essence is more perfect than whatsoever other infinity, as of thought-object, or

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mystical language. Scotus frequently follows his master Bonaventure, yet in a more logically rigorous and “perfective” fashion.106 Bonaventure too anticipates Palamas through his adoption of the disjunctives of particible-imparticible, as Palamas himself draws this from his Ps.-Dionysian and Proclean repertoire.107 Consequently, the reader now has sufficient indications to see that Milbank does not have the last word on participation in the Franciscan school.

whatsoever other items, then it is obvious that His infinity, which is the character of the [divine] essence, is utterly first and unparticipated. Yet, another infinity is by way of participation, for the infinity of the essence is a quasi-cause of infinity of objects existent in thought (in esse cognito). Whence the infinity of other items is by means of a return (reductio) to the infinity of the essence. Bonaventure earlier expresses the same doctrine in his analysis of the created intellectual perfection of Jesus: “And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and on account of this finite, howeversomuch it is united to the Word, it does not comprehend infinity […]” (De scientia Christi, q. 7, conc. [DSSB 5: 40a]) 106 Paul VI, quoting Pius X, calls Bonaventure “the second leader of Scholasticism”: It is universally recognized that John Duns Scotus surpassed the Seraphic Doctor […] The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council […] prescribed: “Philosophical subjects are to be taught in such a way that the students are led to acquire a solid and coherent knowledge of man, the world and God, based upon the patrimony of perennially valid philosophy.” See Paul VI, Alma Parens (Acta Apostolica Sedis 58 [1966], 609–614), as translated by Stefano Manelli, Blessed John Duns Scotus: Marian Doctor (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2011), 103–110. This perennially valid philosophy certainly includes the Franciscan School. John Paul II gave the same academic judgment to the Commissio Scotista in 2002, calling Scotus the “perfecter of Bonaventure.” See Manelli, Blessed John Duns Scotus, 111–113. Thus, Scotus enjoys weighty canonical approbation in the Latin Church. Bonaventure and Scotus form part of the “perennially valid” school of theology and philosophy, relevant to ecumenical discourse. 107 Proclus provides a more satisfactory source than Ps.-Dionysius in many cases. See “Palamas Transformed,” in GLIH, 278.


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7. Bradshaw: “A Reply to Critics” In chapter ten, Bradshaw replies to his supporters and critics. À propos Athanasopoulos, B. offers no corrective to note Palamas’ and his school’s pro-Augustinian theology (DEDE, 256–258). This will strike the reader as entirely unsatisfactory. The reception of Augustine in the East is clearly relevant to AEW, considering the significant space accorded to B.’s anti-Augustinian criticisms. Should we find that the entire Palamite tradition reveals a positive, synoptic embrace of Augustine, a dynamic “history of philosophy” emerges in the East. Palamas’ example and authority provided a strong canonical basis for ulterior Palamite “reception of Augustine.” Next, B. correctly rejects Loudovikos’ unnatural attempt to graft a distinction of reason onto Palamas. B. fittingly refers to Damascene’s own use of kat’epinoian as denoting a mental distinction that the mind makes between “body” and “soul.” Transparently, Damascene refers to a real distinction, which likely betrays Stoic sources.108 Disappointingly, B. is content to omit supposedly related passages in Palamas’ opera that presumably connect him to Damascene’s logic. Really, Palamas’ avoidance of kat’epinoian in Basil and Damascene might portend two completely diverse conclusions: (a) Palamas recognizes Stoic logical terms and concepts and wishes to avoid a “real distinction” in the sense of Basil’s seed-quality and Damascene’s soul-body examples; (b) Palamas misinterprets Basil and Damascene’s epinoia from its authentic Stoic sense, as if only a distinction of reason. Thus, Palamas avoids “epinoia,” for a fullfledged “real distinction.” Until B. provides an in-depth investigation of epinoia in Basil, Maximus, Damascene, and Palamas, B.’s appeal to Damascene could turn out to be a double-edged sword (DEDE, 259). Additionally, we await future research to shed light on the ambiguity that persists in B.’s and Loudovikos’ categorization and hierarchical order assigned to: logoi, energies, predeterminations (proorismoi), divine volitions (thelêmata, 108

For the Damascene’s Stoic sources on human nature, see Richard Cross, “Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus,” Mediaeval Studies 62 (2000): 69–124.

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boulêmata), powers (dynameis), etc. Logically, we will be referred to AEW for assistance. Still, the logico-metaphysical hierarchy and/or inter-relations of the items signified by the aforementioned terms remain unclear. We must hope for clarification in B.’s future investigations. Contra Milbank, B. correctly notes that his interlocutor makes “sweeping historical claims,” while providing only “casual” supporting references for persons such as Scotus. Furthermore, B. properly orientates the reader to the source of Milbank’s claims, as do we; namely, his a priori denigration of Bonaventuro-Scotism as the prelude to Spinoza. This prejudice colors many a figure that Milbank evaluates, the corollary of which necessitates a rejection of Palamas. However, in B.’s rejection of Milbank, we suspect that perhaps Scotus was tossed too. At the 2008 colloquium, Milbank noticeably surprised B., forcing him to consider the fact that the distinctions between the soul and its faculties in Scotus parallel in detail Palamas’ own understanding of the same. Dolefully, this revelation has not resulted in a supplementary study comparing Scotus to Palamas. This, we suggest, would be a momentous means to further B.’s philosophical efforts to collocate Palamas accurately within the general history of philosophy and theology.109 Contrariwise, neo-Palamite theological obfuscation of such attempts to compare Bonaventuro-Scotism and Palamism merit a hefty charge indeed: namely, that Palamas’ celebratory monopoly on the essence-energies distinction may only be maintained at the price of blindly asserting a priori denials of parallelism between Franciscan and Palamite tradition. Conclusions DEDE would have profited from the myriad of sources that refute the antiquated Western-medieval, Augustino-Aristotelico-Thomistic narrative and provide numerous avenues to link Western medieval schoolmen to Eastern patristic sources. 109

We must mention: Georgi Kapriev, Philosophie in Byzanz (Würzburg: Könighausen un Neumann, 2005), 249–345. Kapriev has already notably included Palamas and his school in the history of Byzantine philosophy.


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As amply demonstrated, some traditional Western thinkers give proper reverence to Augustine, yet prioritize Eastern figures like the Cappadocians, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, and Damascene concerning divine metaphysics over/against the received Augustinian triumphal procession amongst modern scholars. Moreover, and more importantly, far from denigrating Augustine, these thinkers actually situated their read of Augustine on divine life and psychology within this broader theological and primarily Eastern framework. The fact is, the West – particularized in the Franciscan lights of Bonaventure and Scotus – accessed important early Eastern sources, particularly through the Carolingian thinker and translator Eriugena, and, moreover, greatly utilized them. This occurs principally in descriptions of the divine ideas, the disjunctive transcendentals, and the positive view of divine infinity. Even distinctions between God’s essence and his energies (“perfections,” “theophanies,” etc.), far from being the sole property of the Palamite tradition, have distinct and significant parallels in the West. One may legitimately wonder how such a cornucopia of sources and incredible parallels have been bypassed. The instinctive dismissal among historians, theologians, and philosophers of both East and West, out of loyalty to entrenched but incomplete and oftentimes misleading narratives, remains deeply problematic and will continue to obfuscate any attempt to properly reconstruct the motion of medieval theology, inasmuch as such reconstruction is possible. Contra B., Athanasopoulos, and Loudovikos: the Latin theological tradition, at least in the Franciscan school, reserves a place for Eastern metaphysics and theology and shows remarkable harmony with the insights of the Cappadocians, Maximus, and Palamas. In light of the textual evidence presented above, the two key points summarized by Schneider in his introduction to DEDE have been presently challenged and demand reconsideration across a broader horizon of theological and philosophical cross currents between East and West. Historical and systematic theologians, as well as philosophers and historians of philosophy, have yet to specify the actual historical, textual, and conceptual dependencies, similarities, and divergences between East and West. Only thereafter will

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we be able to assess adequately where true differences lie and where possibilities for mutual enrichment and even correction exist. Palamas’ role within the history of philosophy and/or theology was chronicled by Byzantine authors and within Palamite tradition. We have given indications of this but until Palamite reception of their master is fully exposited, little more can be definitively said. Dominicans of the fifteenth century (e.g., Torquemada) had things to say on Palamas and his school, few of them positive. Naturally, this encouraged famous authors of the seventeenth century (e.g., Petavius) to discuss Palamas’ “minor role” in the history of theology. Palamas, however, was catalogued as a less subtle or feeble imitator of scotistic metaphysics. Doubtless, Palamas holds greater importance for late Byzantium than previously accredited by Thomasian authors. First, Palamas gave Augustine’s opera in Greek an authoritative “nihil obstat” for Byzantines. Secondly, Palamas’ school ushered into Byzantium a synthetic project of harmonizing Latin authors (especially Augustine and Aquinas) with Byzantine theology and Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, Palamas and his school remain opaque figures in scholarship vis-à-vis the Franciscan tradition. Only by comparing common historical sources, thematics, and theological premises and conclusions can contemporary scholars secure for Palamas his claim to originality, independence, or his putative monopoly on the essenceenergies question. As it stands, thomistic, Thomasian, and neothomistic chronicles all agree that Palamas is little more than an ill-conceived son of Scotus. In order to rescue Palamas from his traditional place in the history of Western theology/ philosophy, it is incumbent on today’s scholars to outline the points of agreement and contrast between the Franciscan and the Palamite traditions. The results of such an effort might finally seat the real Palamas in his proper, and potentially significant, place in the story of theology, philosophy, and even Christianity.

"Palamas Among the Scholastics" Logos 55 (2014)

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