public diplomacy - mark leonard

www.fpc.org.uk T h e F o r e ig ig n P o l i c y C e n t r e i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t t h i n k - t a n k launched by Prime Minister Tony Blair Blair (Patron) (Patron) and former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (President) to examine the impact of globalisation globalisation on foreign an d d omestic policy. policy. The Centre has d e v e l o p e d a d i s t i n c t iv iv e r e s e a r c h a g e n d a t h a t e x p l o r e s t h e strategic solutions solutions needed to tackle issues issues wh ich cut across borders – focusing on the legitimacy as w ell as the effectiveness effectiveness of policy. p ublications The Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Centre has p rodu ced a range of publications by key thin kers on su bjects bjects relating to the role of non-state actors in policymaking, the future of Europe, international security and identity. These includ includ e: The Post-Modern Post-Modern S tate and the W orld Order by Robert Cooper, N etwork Europe Europe a n d Going Public by Mark Responsibilities by Michael Edwards, Leonard, NGO s R ights and Responsibilities Br o w n , Trading After Multiculturalism Multiculturalism b y Y a s m i n A l i b h a i - Br Identities b y W a l l y O l i n s a n d Third Generation Corporate Simon Zad ek. Citizenship by Simon

The Centre runs a rich and varied events programme at The Mezzanine in Elizabeth Elizabeth Hou se – a forum w here representatives from NGOs, think-tanks, compan ies and gov ernmen t can interact interact with speakers who includ includ e prime ministers, Nobel Prize Prize laureates, global corporate leaders, activists, media executives and cultural cultural entrepreneurs entrepreneurs from around the world. The Centre’s Centre’s quarterly m agazine, Global Thinking , is a regu lar o u t l e t f o r n e w t h i n k i n g o n f o r e ig ig n p o l i cy cy i s s u e s . F e a t u r e s include profiles, exclusive interviews with decision makers, and opinion p ieces ieces by the Centre’s Centre’s perm anent staff and associated associated authors. The Centre Centre runs a unique internship programm e – the UK’s UK’s only route for n ew grad uates into the foreign policy arena.

About the authors

Public Diplomacy

Mark Leonard Leonard is Director of The Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Centre. H e has

w r i t t e n w i d e l y o n E u r o p e a n I n t e g r a t i o n a n d l e g it it i m a c y i n c lu lu d i n g h i s a c cl cl a i m e d p a m p h l e t N etwork Europe Europe (Foreign Policy Centre 1999) and The Pro-European Reader (with Dick Leonard, Palgrave 2002). 2002). His work on “Rebranding Britain” led to an international debate on branding coun tries and inspired the Foreign Secretary to launch Panel 2000, a taskforce to advise him on p romoting Britain Britain abroad. Mark has bu ilt on this with influential influential studies on pu blic blic diplomacy including the report Vidhy a Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society (with Vidhy A l a k e s o n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y C e n t r e 2 0 0 0 ). ). M a r k w r i t e s a n d broadcasts extensively extensively on British, ritish, European and International Politics. He has acted as a consultant on identity for foreign governments and private companies. Mark Mark p reviously reviously worked as senior researcher at the think-tank Demos and as a trainee journalist at The Economist . Catherine Stead , the project director for for the p ublic diploma cy

research, research, was seconded to The Foreign Foreign Policy Centre from the British Council. Prior to that she spent three years working for the British British Cou ncil in the Baltic Baltic States. States. She has ten years experience of condu condu cting cting p ublic diplomacy in the field. field. Conrad Smewing joined th e Foreign Policy Policy Centre as Mark

Leonard’s assistant after completing an MPhil in International Relations Relations at th e University of Cambrid ge.

M ark Leonard Leonard w ith Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing Smewing

About the authors

Public Diplomacy

Mark Leonard Leonard is Director of The Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Centre. H e has

w r i t t e n w i d e l y o n E u r o p e a n I n t e g r a t i o n a n d l e g it it i m a c y i n c lu lu d i n g h i s a c cl cl a i m e d p a m p h l e t N etwork Europe Europe (Foreign Policy Centre 1999) and The Pro-European Reader (with Dick Leonard, Palgrave 2002). 2002). His work on “Rebranding Britain” led to an international debate on branding coun tries and inspired the Foreign Secretary to launch Panel 2000, a taskforce to advise him on p romoting Britain Britain abroad. Mark has bu ilt on this with influential influential studies on pu blic blic diplomacy including the report Vidhy a Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society (with Vidhy A l a k e s o n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y C e n t r e 2 0 0 0 ). ). M a r k w r i t e s a n d broadcasts extensively extensively on British, ritish, European and International Politics. He has acted as a consultant on identity for foreign governments and private companies. Mark Mark p reviously reviously worked as senior researcher at the think-tank Demos and as a trainee journalist at The Economist . Catherine Stead , the project director for for the p ublic diploma cy

research, research, was seconded to The Foreign Foreign Policy Centre from the British Council. Prior to that she spent three years working for the British British Cou ncil in the Baltic Baltic States. States. She has ten years experience of condu condu cting cting p ublic diplomacy in the field. field. Conrad Smewing joined th e Foreign Policy Policy Centre as Mark

Leonard’s assistant after completing an MPhil in International Relations Relations at th e University of Cambrid ge.

M ark Leonard Leonard w ith Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing Smewing

First published in 2002 by The Foreign Policy Centre The Mezzanine Elizabeth Elizabeth H ouse 39 York Road London SE1 7NQ Email [email protected] [email protected] .uk www.fpc.org.uk ©The Foreign Policy Cent re 2002 All rights reserved ISBN 1-903558-131 Cover by David Carroll Typesetting by Rory Fisher

Public Diplomacy Acknow ledgement s

vii

1. Int roduct ion: W hy Public Diplomacy?

1

2. The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy News Management Strategic Communications Relationship Building

8

3. Compe ompetit titiv ive e and and Co-op o-oper erati ative ve Publi ublic c Dipl Diplom omac acy y Co-operative Diplomacy Competitive Diplomacy

22

4. Keeping our head in a crisis Rapid Reaction and Surge Capability Internal Co-ordination Co-ordination International Co-ordination Co-ordination Reconciling Long and Short-term goals

31

5. Beyond eyond propag propagand anda: a: working working in a comp omplex lex informa information tion environment Understanding Understanding t he t arget audience Beyond one-way communications Engaging the emotional as well the rational Proving your relevance

46

6. Diplomacy Diplomacy by stealt stealt h: working wit h others to achieve achieve our goals 54 NGO Diplomacy Diaspora Diplomacy Political Party Diplomacy Brand Diplomacy Business Diplomacy

v

7. Assessing t he spect rum of UK inst it ut ions Three Dimensions of public diplomacy Co-ordination and planning Strategic Differentiation Evaluation Mulilateral Diplomacy: A Case Study

72

8. Conclusions: A Public Diplomacy St rat egy

95

Appendix I. Public Diplomacy on t he ground: 113 a study of UK public diplomacy in the Unit ed States of America, France, Poland,Ind ia, Sout h Africa, and the Unit ed Arab Emirat es

Appendix II. Niche Diplomacy: How Norway uses scarce resources to punch above its weight

169

Appendix III. Global Brands

178

Appendix IV. The main interviewees for the project

183

Acknowledgements This report is the conclusion of a two-year research p roject, and i s t h e p r o d u c t o f m a n y p e o p l e ’s i d e a s , h a r d w o r k a n d e x p e r i e n ce . W e g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d g e b o t h t h e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t a n d i n t e l le c t u a l e n g a g e m e n t o f t h e f o l l o w i n g organisations, who m ade this research project p ossible: The British Coun cil, The Royal Norweg ian Ministry of Foreign A f f a ir s , B BC W o r l d S e r v i ce , t h e D e s i g n C o u n c i l, a n d t h e Embassy of the United States of America in London . This report builds on the interim report, Going Public, which I cowrote with Vidhya Alakeson. The research process has only been mad e possible through th e generosity of the British Coun cil who first seconded Liz Noble and then Catherine Stead to the Foreign Policy Centre to d irect the research and fieldwo rk on th is project. Liz laid the foundations for the field w ork, while Catherine travelled to the four corners of the earth gathering data an d ideas with considerable élan. Two other peop le have played a nodal role in m anaging th is process: Conrad Smewing tirelessly drafted sections and gathered source material, while Laura Demetris conducted vital research, identified key contacts in the relevant countries, co-ordinated w ith different p artners and mastermind ed the international travel plans. Adam Higazi also helped gather m aterial for the append ices. We would like to thank all those whose contributions of time, p r a c t i ca l s u p p o r t , i n fo r m a t i o n a n d i d e a s m a d e t h i s r e p o r t p o s s i b l e . O u r p r o j e ct s t e e r i n g g r o u p , c h a i r e d b y t h e e v e r encouraging Sir Michael Butler, included figures with much experience of public diploma cy: HE Tarald Brautaset, Andr ew F o t h e r i n g h a m , J o n a t h a n G r i f fi n , F r i t z G r o o t h u e s , F r e d

Acknowledgements

vii

Martenson, Dame Pauline Neville Jones and Patrick Spaven. They provided direction and helped shape the final form of this report. Edm und Marsden wh o was the original inspiration for the project also provid ed very h elpful feed-back on this report. The staff of the Foreign Policy Centre hav e all come together to make this possible – particular thanks m ust go to m y assistant Phoebe Griffith for her ideas on th e structure of the rep ort and Veena Vasista, my d epu ty, for steering the Centre so effectively while I was engrossed in various d rafts. All those who helped to m ake the case study visits happen, in particular Edmu nd Marsden, British Coun cil India, John Tod, British Coun cil France, Richard Morgan, British Embassy Paris, Xavier North, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Robert Sykes, British Cou ncil Gulf States, Tim Gor e, British Cou ncil Dubai, H E Ann Gran t and N ick Shepp ard, British High Commission South Africa, Robert Peirce, British Embassy Washington, Teresa Evans, British Consu late-General Boston, Sara Everett, British I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i ce s N e w Yo r k , J er e m y E y r e s a n d I w o n a K o ch e l , Br i t i sh C o u n c i l P o l a n d , J o h a n M e y e r a n d O y v i n d Stokke, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is imp ossible to list all the peop le that we interviewed or wh o took part in focus groups and discussions, but in Appendix IV, we list some of the main people wh o were interviewed.

Mark Leonard, The Foreign Policy Centre, London June 2002

viii

Public Diplomacy

1. Introduction: Why Public Diplomacy? Public Diplomacy: Definitions “ Public diplomacy differs from tradit ional diplom acy in th at it involves interaction not only with governments but primarily with nongovernmental in dividuals and organisations. Furth ermore public diplomacy activit ies often present many dif fering views represented b y private American individuals and organizations in addition to off icial government views” (Edwar d Mu rrow , 1963, speaking as director of USIA) “ Public Diplomacy seeks to promot e the n ational in terest of the Unit ed States through understanding, informin g and influ encing fo reign audiences.” Planning grou p for integratio n of USIA into the Dept. of State, June 20, 1997) “ I conceive of pub lic diplomacy as being t he publi c face of t raditi onal diplomacy. Traditi onal di plomacy seeks to advance th e int erests of the United States thro ugh pri vate exchanges wit h fo reign government s. It works very much in coordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomatic effo rt.” (Christopher Ross, at Brookings/Harvard Forum, January 16, 2002) “ The purpose of public diplomacy is to influence opinion in target countries to make it easier for the British Government, British companies or other British organisations to achieve their aims. The overall image of Britain in t he country concerned is of great impo rtance – but th is is not to say that it is the only factor. The most im portant factor will usually be the actual policies of the British Government and the terms in which they are announced and explained by M inisters. In most count ries a broadly internationalist posture will be positive. A narrow and open pursuit of national interests at the expense of others will be negative. For example, the Government’s handling of the beef crisis in the summer of 1996 had a negative effect not only on Britain’s ability to get i ts way on other EU issues, but also on the view taken of Britain in many non-EU countries.” (Sir Mi chael Butler, for mer British permanent representative to t he European Union, 2002)

Introduction: Why Public Diplomacy?

1

It took the traged y of September 11th for the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ to rise once again to the top of the international political agenda . After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had lost its urge to sp read its values and messages to the four corners of the world, and gradu ally run down many of the propagan da and information tools which it had relied on so heavily during th e cold w ar – emasculating the USIAand p aring the Voice of America and Radio Free Europ e dow n to almost residual proportions. In developing countries and former comm unist states, no real attempts were mad e to build a p opular consensus for liberal democracy, and reformist governments were expected to persua de their citizens to swallow the bitter pill of structural adjustment without much sugar-coating. Today policy-makers are still trying to come to term s with the d epth of hostility to America and the West. Of course it is not just a problem o f commu nication. Poverty, exclusion from the world economy, dou ble-standard s on trade and d emocracy (particularly the West’s supp ort for discredited and repressive regimes), the predatory behaviour of some western multinationals and a range of policy positions on issues from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the sanctions against Iraq all fuel tensions. But it is equally clear that commu nication and building relationships d o have a p a r t t o p l a y i f w e a r e g o i n g t o a v o i d s l ip p i n g i n t o a b a t t l e between the West and the rest. There is a dou ble challenge: showing that w hat you rep resent is more attractive than the alternative, and keeping you r coalition together – which is no longer as easy as it once was during the Cold War. Ironically, it is the end of the Cold War wh ich has mad e pu blic diplomacy more imp ortant: the spread of democracy, the media explosion and the rise of global NGOs and protest movements have changed the nature of power and put ever greater

2

Public Diplomacy

constraints on the freedom of action of national governm ents. This means that – even more than du ring the Cold War – we need to invest as much in communicating with foreign p ublics as with the governm ents that represent them if we are to achieve our objectives. There are many examp les of issues where the attitud e of overseas publics plays a determining role in the government’s ability to pur sue its foreign policy objectives. The Afghan an d Kosovo conflicts saw pow erful military coalitions risk d efeat, not in the field, but in the med ia battleground for public opinion. In Rwand a ethnic conflict was mobilized th rough inflamm atory radio broad casts rather than military comm and chains. The global anti-capitalist demon strations have illustrated a n ew diplomatic environment w here state and non -state actors compete for the public’s attention. During the British BSE crisis the French government, in breach of EU law, banned British beef largely in response to p ublic fears abou t its safety. In a global economy, countries compete against each other for investmen t, trade, tourists, entrepreneu rs and highly skilled workers. In each of these cases perceptions of Britain and other countries combine to create an enabling or d isabling backdr op for each s i t u a t i o n . I t i s cl e a r t h a t p r o p a g a n d a w i l l n o t p e r s u a d e populations in reluctant countries to support the war against terror – but perceptions of Western m otivations as imp erial or self-interested can dam age chances of success, and d ivergent national debates can cause tensions which could eventually break up the international coalition. Independent or national sources of news will not block out calls to arms from tribal radio stations, but they can act as a counterweight by presenting a calm ov erview of the ongoing tensions and giving access to information which may be of critical importance (Rwanda had only 14,000 phon es but some 500,000 radios). Promotiona l

Int roduct ion: Why Public Diplomacy?

3

campaigns for British beef have a limited impact on the fears of consum ers, but work to sh ow the qu ality of British science and the integrity of our vets did p lay a role in assuag ing the French p u b l i c ’s s u s p i c io n . A n d m a n y s t u d i e s h a v e s h o w n t h a t campaigns to change the perceptions of countries like Ireland, Spain or New Zealand can create a premium for products and services as well as playing a role in attracting investment an d tourists. The American academic Joseph N ye has argued that the p ower o f a t t r a ct i o n c a n b e a n i m p o r t a n t c o m p l e m e n t t o m o r e traditional forms of power based on economic or military clout. He d raws a distinction betw een ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power: “Soft pow er works by conv incing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that prod uce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the agend a in wa ys that shap e the preferences of others”. Because most of the messages that people pick up about a country are beyond the control of national governmen ts books, CDs, films, television program mes, brand s or consumer products with national associations, events, etc. - the activities of g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o t h e r o r g a n i s a t io n s a r e g o i n g t o h a v e a n impact at the m argins, seeking to clear path s and give impetus to the m ost positive messages for mass au diences while working directly on niche aud iences. This report explores how coun tries could work to correct the negative perceptions prod uced by the marketplace and h arness the pow er of other actors to increase their own voice on the world stage. It is based on a two-year research programm e that e x p l o r e d h o w s o m e o f t h e l a r g e s t i n d u s t r i a l i se d c o u n t r i e s (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) conduct public diplom acy. It also looked at the p ublic diplomacy of Norway, a country th at has used pu blic diploma cy to good effect. The

4

Public Diplomacy

research included of interviews with senior policy-makers in a num ber of organisations representing those coun tries abroad. It explores how public diplomacy works in practice in six case stud y coun tries (Ind ia, South Africa, United States, France, Poland, the United Arab Emirates) where w e have conducted our own q ualitative research through focus groups and interviews with youn g professionals, as well as drawing on q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s e a r ch c a r r i e d o u t b y M O R I f o r t h e B r i t is h C o u n c i l. W e h a v e s u p p l e m e n t e d t h i s w i t h i n t e r v ie w s w i t h experts in academ ia and the commu nications indu stries. In the chapters that follow we dr aw a nu mber of imp ortant conclusions. First we argue that there is not a sufficient commitm ent of resources to this new typ e of dip lomacy. All governm ents pay lip-service to the way tha t the rise of global commu nications, the spread of democracy, the growth of global N GOs an d th e d evelo p m en t of p ow erfu l m u ltila ter al organisations have changed the natu re of pow er within societies, and altered the craft of governm ent and diplomacy. But these changes hav e not been ad equately reflected in the way that governm ents as a whole deploy their resources, or the way that foreign services in particular organise themselves and relate to the institutions they fund . Joseph N ye makes this point very stron gly, “If you look at expend itures in the American bud get, we spend abou t 17 times as much on m ilitary hard p ower as we d o on all our foreign representation, the State Department bud get, foreign aid as w ell as the Voice of America and all the exchange program s lump ed together. There is something wr ong with th at picture”. The picture in th e UK is very similar, with th e Ministry of Defence r e c e i v i n g 1 8 t i m e s t h e a m o u n t o f t h e F C O ( £ 24 . 2 b i ll i o n compared to £1.3 billion). The investment in public diplomacy is dw arfed by the return s that come from successful work – and


5

the cost of failure. For exam ple, the 200,000 foreign stud ents th at the British Cou ncil works to attr act every year ear n £5 billion for British higher edu cation. Equally, the disastrous imag es that came out of Foot and Mouth h ave already cost an estimated £2 billion in lost tourist revenu e. Bu t i t g o e s b e y o n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n s p e n d i n g o n reactive military p ower an d preventative diplomacy. Diplomatic institutions need to move beyond the old mod el of bolting on a few new u nits and r ecruiting a couple of extra staff from N GOs – changes which are essentially cosmetic. Instead, what is needed is a fundam ental re-balancing of the dip lomatic offer and a larger investment in it. Foreign services must transform themselves from being reporters an d lobbyists on reactive issues to shapers of public debates around the world. There are a num ber of key lessons that we draw : • Governments do not pay enough attention to the way that stories will be received abroad . The main way to engage with mass aud iences in other countries is not through embassies on the ground , but by working through foreign correspondents in your own capital. • Western governments are competing with each other in 200 countries wh en they ha ve bilateral interests in just a fraction o f t h a t n u m b e r . Th i s u n h e l p f u l c o m p e t i t io n u n d e r m i n e s objectives in developing coun tries while preventing a prop er f o cu s o f r e s o u r c e s o n t h o s e c o u n t r i e s w h e r e t h e y h a v e a bilateral interest. • Governments need to change the tone of public diplomacy so that it is less about winning argu ments and more about engagem ent. In an environm ent where citizens are sceptical of governmen t and sensitive abou t post-colonial interference,

6

Public Diplomacy

p u b l ic d i p l o m a c y i n s ti t u t i o n s n e e d t o b e m u c h m o r e interactive - bu ilding long-term relationsh ips a nd und erstanding target groups rather than d elivering one-way messages. • Conspicuous Government involvement in public diplomacy can be counter-productive. Governments are not great persuad ers. By working throu gh parties that people will trust – from N GOs and Diasp oras to brand s and p olitical parties – they are more likely to build tru st and achieve their objectives than by acting as spokespeop le themselves. • Foreign services and p ublic diplom acy institutions need to b u i l d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r i s e s in t o t h e i r p l a n n i n g b y d e v e l o p i n g g r e a t e r b u d g e t a r y fl e x ib i l it y . a n d p u b l i c diplomacy SWAT teams that can be m obilised at very sh ort notice. • All countries need to prove their relevance - rather than take it for granted. For examp le, survey data show s that even where people have positive feelings about Britain, the fact that they see it as a country in d ecline means that th ey will turn to others about w hom th ey feel less favourab le. • Public diplomacy should be focused on the countries which are most relevant to ou r interests - not those which are easiest to influence. We argue for a new type of mu ltilateral public diplomacy – retooling em bassies to become lobbying and policy-exchange organisations; creating an infrastructure to link u p political parties and NGOs across borders to create a common p olicy space; and planning p roactive commu nication campaigns.


7

2. The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy The phrase ‘public diplomacy’ is often used as a eup hemism for propagan da. Journalists have portrayed it as a crude mechanism for delivering messages that m ay or m ay not reflect the facts. N a o m i K l ei n ’ s v i t u p e r a t i v e p i e c e fo r The Guardian i s n o t un typical: “It’s no coincidence that the p olitical leaders most preoccupied w ith branding w ere also allergic to democracy and diversity. Historically, this has been th e ugly flipside of p o l i t i c ia n s s t r i v i n g f o r c o n s i s t e n c y o f b r a n d : ce n t r a l i s e d i n f o r m a t i o n , s t a t e -c o n t r o l l ed m e d i a , r e - e d u c a t i o n c a m p s , purging of dissidents and much worse.”

Public diplomacy is based on the p remise that the image and reputation of a country are pu blic goods w hich can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. Work on p articular issues will feed off the general image of the country and reflect back on to it – in both p ositive and negative d irections. For example, Britain’s repu tation for tradition w ill help h eritage brand s such as Asp rey’s sell their prod ucts, and th eir advertising campaigns w ill also reinforce Britain’s repu tation as a heritage nation. Equally N orway’s reputation for work in international mediation will help persuad e the d ifferent factions in Sri Lanka that they are an honest broker, which will in turn add to their reputation for peace.

I n f a ct p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y i s a b o u t b u i l d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s : understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and p e o p l e s ; c o m m u n i c a t i n g o u r p o i n t s o f v i e w ; c o r r e c t in g misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find comm on cause. The d ifference between p ublic and trad itional diplomacy is that public diploma cy involves a much broad er group of

There is a hierarchy of impacts that pu blic diplomacy can achieve:

Image 1: The Circle of Public Diplomacy

• Increasing peop le’s appr eciation of one’s country (creating positive percep tions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same p erspective)

Image

Issue

8

peop le on both sides, and a broader set of interests that go beyond those of the government of the day.

Public Diplomacy

• Increasing peop le’s familiarity with one’s country (making them think about it, up dating their images, turning arou nd unfavourable opinions)

• Engaging people with one’s country (strengthening ties – from education reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our p roducts; getting to understand and subscribe to our values)

The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy

9

• Influencing peop le (getting companies to invest, pu blics to back our p ositions or p oliticians to tu rn to u s as a favoured partner)

• Proactively creating a n ews agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions

In order to achieve these goals, governm ents need to be clear that pu blic diplomacy cannot be a one-dimensional process of delivering messages.

• Building long-term relationships with pop ulations overseas to win recognition of our values and assets and to learn from theirs

One w ay of conceptualising pu blic diplomacy is as a grid of three rows and three columns.

Each of these d imensions operates according to a different timescale. Reactive news takes place in hours an d d ays, proactive commu nications and perception changing activity is planned in weeks and months, while building relationships can take years b e f o r e it g e n e r a t e s a r e t u r n . T h e d i m e n s i o n s a l so d e m a n d different skills and organisational cultures. News management needs to be flexible, reactive and plugged into the government machine. Proactive communications demand s highly developed commu nications skills, strategic planning and the bud gets, resources and the expertise to organize events that can capture the imagination. Building relationships d epends on earning high levels of trust, creating a neutral and safe environment, and can often best be done at one remove from govern ment.

Table 1: The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy Purpose

Reactive (hours and days)

Proactive (weeks and months)

Relationship building (years)

Political/ Military Economic Societal/ Cultural

On on e axis are the spheres on w hich it is played out: political/military , economic a n d societal/cultural . These will c a r r y d i f f e r e n t w e i g h t a t d i f fe r e n t t i m e s , a n d i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. For examp le in a develop ed coun try like Singapor e economic messages will be importan t; in Pakistan political messages will matter more; in Zimbabwe messages about British diversity will act as a counterweight to allegations of racist imperialism; while in Europ ean Union countries like France and German y all three spheres will be important. Events like September 11th can obviously change the priority of different issues and put the political/ military sphere at the top of the agend a in all countries. In each of those spheres, we can characterize three dimensions of public diplomacy activities:

Each country ha s a different set of institutions to man age its pu blic diplomacy strategy. Some are part of governmen t, others are indep enden t. Each will have its own mission and p riorities, b u t i n o r d e r t o p r a c t i ce p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y e f fe c t iv e l y , i t i s important to examine the institutions as a spectrum and see whether there are gap s between the institutions which are not yet filled. In chapter seven, we examine the UK institutions in this way and set out some lessons for how the spectrum can be improved , but first let us examine the three dimensions.

• Reacting to news even ts as they occur in a way that tallies with ou r strategic goals 10

Public Diplomacy


11

News M anagement The first dimension is the m anagement of communications on d a y - t o -d a y i s s u e s , r e fl e c t in g t h e g r o w i n g n e e d t o a l i g n commun ications with trad itional diplomacy. The need to ally comm un ications with trad itional diplomacy is d e s c r ib e d b y t h e U S d i p l o m a t , C h r i s to p h e r R o s s , w h o w a s brought back from retirement to mastermind public diplomacy with the Muslim world: “I conceive of public diplomacy as being the pu blic face of traditional dip lomacy. Traditional diplomacy seeks to advan ce the interests of the United States through private exchanges with foreign governmen ts. Public diplom acy s e e k s t o s u p p o r t t r a d i t i o n a l d i p l o m a cy b y a d d r e s si n g n o n gover nm ental a ud iences, in ad d ition to g overn men tal a u d i e n c e s, b o t h m a s s a n d e l it e . It w o r k s v e r y m u c h i n c o ordination with an d in parallel to the traditional diplomatic effort.” This imp lies that em bassies must p lan pu blic diplomacy strategies for all of the main issues they d eal with – and explore the comm unications angles of all their activities. This job is comp licated by th at fact that it is increasingly d ifficult to isolate different news stories for different au diences, foreign and d omestic. Although most TV, radio and p rint media are still created with a national or local audience in m ind, their networks of foreign correspond ents will ensure that messages do get transferred from one region to anoth er. As Secretary of State Colin Pow ell put it: “During Desert Storm w e really were seeing this 24-7 phenomenon , at least in my jud gment, for the first time … I used to tell all of the mem bers of my staff, ‘Remember, w hen we are out there on television, communicating instantaneously around the w orld, we’re talking to five au diences.’ One, the reporters wh o ask the question – imp ortant aud ience. Second audience, the American people wh o are w atching. The third aud ience, 170 capitals who may have an interest in what the

12

Public Diplomacy

subject is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy. It was a unique situation to know that your en emy was getting the clearest indication of your intentions by watching you on television at the same time you were giving that m essage. And fifth, you were talking to the troop s. Their lives were on the line.” Parad oxically, so called ‘dom estic stories’ like the race riots in Oldham and Burnley, or the outbreak of Foot and Mouth in Britain, or the su ccess of Le Pen in the Fren ch elections are often as impor tant as ‘foreign policy’ stories in making an impa ct on others. Alastair Campbell, the Director of Communications in 10 Down ing Street, described this vividly in an interview with th e auth ors: “in relation to Foot and Mou th there w as this collision between d omestic and foreign audiences. Part of our message, once we’d focused on it as a crisis man agemen t issue being led from the top, was th at the Prime Minister was involved, sleeves rolled u p, talking to the farmers regu larly…. I admit that th is didn’t cross my mind, you get these dramatic pictures of the Prime Minister wearing yellow suits and walking aroun d a farmyard, an d in America they think ‘Christ! He’s got to wear a yellow su it! And he’s the Prime M inister.’ Because th at’s all they’re seeing. Our m edia will only ever give a narrow context, go further abroad it gets even narrower. And so, that is the kind of thing you ’ve got to really think carefully abou t”. As well as u nforeseen crises, there are pred ictable dom estic events which come up every year an d can play ou t badly in other coun tries. Examples include the release of the British Crime Survey w hich frequently results in erroneous stories such as, “Crime in London is worse than N ew York”, or the start of the Norwegian whaling season which results in acres of negative press coverage around the world (for Norwegian public diplomacy strategy, on whaling and other issues, see App endix


13

II). The domestic departments involved in these issues need to prov ide the foreign service with the no tice and the information they need to contextualise the stories.

Strat egic Communications Governments have trad itionally been good at commu nicating their stances on particular issues, but less effective at ma naging perceptions of the country as a whole. One of the reasons for this is the fact that d ifferent institutions have been respon sible for dealing with politics, trade, tourism, investment an d cultural relations. But on man y issues, it is the totality of messages w hich people get about the UK which will determine how they relate to us. This is the second d imension of pu blic dip lomacy: the strategic messages we p romote abou t the UK. Sir Michael Butler, who was previously the British Permanent Representative to the EU, argues that perceptions of the country generally w ill shape the d iplomatic environment: “We need to have a broad ima ge which is favour ably perceived in the key countries where w e are based. If your governm ent is perceived as self-interested, reactionary and un helpful, it will seriously hamp er your ability to get your way – as the US is finding a t the moment.” And unless there is a lot of work done over a long period of time to create a more positive context, all attempts at c o m m u n i c a t i on s w i ll b e v i e w e d w i t h a d d e d s u s p i c io n . A n official in the White H ouse confessed to m e, “We haven’t mad e any attempts to commu nicate with ordinary Arabs u nless we are bombing th em or imposing sanctions on them – I wouldn ’t like us if I were them.” In the economic realm, the power of national perceptions is even clearer. As prod ucts, investm ent environm ents and tou rist destination s become mor e alike, it is becoming difficult to differentiate oneself in terms of qu ality alone. Tapp ing into a

14

Public Diplomacy

d e e p e r s e n s e o f i d e n t i t y c a n h e l p c o m p a n i e s d i f fe r e n t i a t e themselves from their competition. Opinion surveys show that three quarters of Fortune 500 companies actually see ‘national identity’, or place of origin, as one of the key factors that influence their d ecisions about bu ying goods and services. Many consumer comp anies have bu ilt on this insight. In the 1990s, the G e r m a n A E G ( A l g e m e i n e E l e k t r i s ch e G e s e l l s c h a f t ) r a n a p u b l i ci t y ca m p a i g n i n Br i t a i n w h i c h w a s b a s e d a r o u n d redefining their initials as ‘Advanced Engineering from Germany’. The centrepiece of their ad vertising camp aign was t h a t i t w a s a ‘G e r m a n ’ c om p a n y , a n a t i o n a l i m a g e t h a t represented brand quality. Strategic communication is different from relationship-building. It is a set of activities more like a po litical camp aign: setting a num ber of strategic messages, and planning a series of activities over a year or so to reinforce them. This is what Cha rlotte Beers d e s c r i b e s a s m a g n i f i c a t io n : “ A n i m p r e s s i v e e x a m p l e w a s d e l i v e r ed b y t h e t e a m i n E C A w h e n t h e y a r r a n g e d t o s e n d stunn ing photograp hs of Groun d Zero by Joel Meyerowitz to open in 20 countries….What I app reciate so mu ch about this program is that it gives us an aud ience beyond the government officials and elites - the young and people in sm aller town s as the exhibit travels to cities around these countries and reaches others through very good p ress coverage. That’s what w e mean by mag nifying the results from a single event.” It is important for all the pu blic diplomacy organisations to have a stake in the totality of messages which are put ou t about the country, and a sense of how they can co-operate on prom oting them. Chris Powell, the chairman of advertising company BMP DDB Needham argues that these messages must be simple: “Have very few, preferably one, message. People are exposed to The Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy

15

thousand s of messages every day. They probably recall only a tiny fraction of these. The task is to cut thro ugh this fog by imagination and repetition. A contrast between diplomacy and advertising is that in ad vertising an enormous amount of work goes into the prepara tion – boiling ideas dow n into very, very simple concepts, and then repeating that m essage over and over again until we are all thoroughly bored w ith it. When you are so bored w ith it that you feel like giving up , the listener m ay just have beg un to register the messa ge. So stick at it. The Drink Drive campaign h as been going for years and is as relevant today as it has ever been because th e message is simple, clear and logical.” But to what extent is it possible to hav e a single message that u n i t e s a l l t h e d i f fe r e n t p l a y e r s – f r o m t h e B r i t is h T o u r i s t Auth ority to the Foreign Office? And how relevant w ill it be to different aud iences, from citizens in th e Midd le East to potential investors in Au stralia? Many countries have shown the power of having a clear national narrative which can unite the different stakeholders. The m ost famous examp le is probably Spain, wh ere Miro’s Espana image s i g n a l e d a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s h e d t h e g h o s t o f Fr a n c o a n d become a modern, European democracy. There are two key dan gers in not creating a clear narrative. One is the idea of discordant m essages. In th e case of Britain, it wou ld ap pear strange if the British Council heavily promoted the UK as a mod ern, mu lti-ethnic and creative island, w hile the British Tourist Authority simply re-iterated national stereotypes about tradition, ceremony and history. One solution to this conundru m that has been prop osed is to make a virtue of the parad ox and develop an iden tity around th e idea of dyn amic tradition – playing on a binary identity which was famously d escribed by l i fe - s t y l e g u r u P e t e r Yo r k a s “ p u n k a n d p a g e a n t r y ” . I t is

16

Public Diplomacy

however important to remember that there are ‘givens’ in how we are seen abroad. If the ‘dynamic tradition’ positioning is adopted , the survey data shows that our promotional efforts will need to be weighted toward s the dynam ic end of the spectrum as that is the area w hich people are m ost sceptical about. There is a dan ger in this idea of articulated p ositioning. When Robin Cook established the P anel 2000 taskforce to advise him on the projection of Britain overseas, it debated long and hard which messages should be p romoted before deciding on a list of f i v e m e s s a g e s ( r e l i a b i li t y a n d i n t e g r i t y , c r e a t i v i t y a n d innovation, Britain’s heritage, free speech and fair play and o p e n n e s s t o t h e w o r l d ) w h i ch r o u g h l y c o r re s p o n d e d t o t h e interests of the five main pu blic diplomacy institutions and allowed the different partners to carry on performing as they had don e before. I have written elsewhere abou t the fact that perceptions of Britain are out of da te and have set ou t a strategy to attempt to turn th em roun d in Britain™ – the report wh ich launched an international furore about ‘Rebranding Britain’. But there are also pitfalls for any coun try surrou nding national branding. Many peop le have attacked the idea that something as complex as a national id entity can be ‘sold’ in the same way a s soap powd er. This is obviously true, and clumsy attempts to market countries – even in specific sectors such as tourism – run the risk of reducing the excitement and diversity of a national culture to a homogenous, antiseptic commodity. The clearest example of this is the attemp t to sell beach holid ays: one image of a white beach and some blue sea is practically indistinguishable from another. When th is happen s, the net effect of brand ing is not to add value bu t to detract from it as the key differentiator in this sort of commodified market w ill be price.


17

People have also pointed out that the only way to fully manage a national bran d is to have a totalitarian state, as most of the impr essions that people get of a coun try come from things outside govern ment control – such as m eeting British people, buying British p rodu cts and services, watching films, reading n e w s p a p e r s e t c . B ec a u s e t h e ‘c a r r i e r s o f t h e b r a n d ’ a r e s o diverse, any attemp t to sell a country that d oes not reflect the reality of that country is doom ed to be und ermined by p eople’s actual experience. This reflects the fact that the m ost successful perception-changing campaigns have been carried through by countries that had undergone dramatic and genuine change – for examp le Spain after Fran co or Ireland in th e 1990s – and rooted in a commonly own ed national story.

Relationship Building The third dimen sion of public diplomacy is the most long-term: developing lasting relationships with key individuals throu gh scholarships, exchanges, training, semina rs, conferences, building real and v irtual networks, and giving people access to med ia channels. This differs from th e usu al diplomatic practice of nurtu ring contacts as it is about developing r elationships between p eers – politicians, special advisers, business people, cultural entrep reneur s or academics. This can take place across the three spheres of public diplomacy and is aimed at creating a common an alysis of issues and giving people a clearer idea of the motivations an d factors effecting their actions so that by the time they come to d iscussing individ ual issues a lot of the background work has been d one already. It is importan t not just to develop relationships bu t to ensure that the experiences which peop le take away are positive and that th ere is follow-up afterwards. Building relationships is very different from selling messages because it involves a genuine exchange and means that peop le are given a ‘warts and all’ picture of the country.

Research by th e British Tourist Auth ority showed that p eople w h o c o m e t o t h e U K i n v a r i a b ly r e p o r t t h a t t h e y l e a v e t h e country with a more p ositive impression of it than wh en they arrived . Joseph N ye makes this point eloqu ently: “It is not that the student goes back converted but they go back with a mu ch more soph isticated idea of our strengths and weaknesses. You complexify their thinking. So they will go back and be critical of American policy on Israel or they w ill go back and be critical of American policy on capital punishm ent. But they w ill have a deeper u nderstand ing of why it is that Americans treat gun control differently than Europeans. This may grow out of the fact that I spent tw o years as a student in Britain right out of college. It took me about a m onth to realise, ‘My God, these p eople are strange!’ At the en d of tw o years I th ough t I can see Britain’s faults and I can see Britain’s greatness and they are all mixed u p together. I think it was in Britain’s interests that I would develop a nu anced view of Britain rather than either an Angloph ilic idealisation or an Anglophobic characterisation. And I think that aspect of soft pow er is prob ably most effective.” C h a r l o t t e B e e r s , t h e U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e fo r P u b l i c Diplomacy in the United States, points to the staggering su ccess of the Fulbright scheme w hich has been taken u p by ov er 200 current or former head s of state: “Coming from the p rivate s e c t o r , i t ’s h a r d t o f i n d a n y t h i n g c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e s h e e r p r o d u c t i v i t y o f o u r F u l b r i g h t a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l V is i t o r exchanges. The $237 million w e will spen d in 2002, for some 25,000 exchan ges, is magn ified by the 80,000 volun teers in th e U.S. and matching supp ort from many countries like Germany and Japan. Considering that some 50 percent of the leaders of the International Coalition were once exchange visitors, this has got to be the best buy in the government.” Relationship building h as traditionally been seen as a p rocess that mu st be conducted face to face and on a personal level. The

18

Public Diplomacy


19

most effective instruments for building enduring relationships are scholarships, visits and other exchange programmes that require complex complex planning and administration administration and come with a h i g h u n i t c o s t . Bu t a s s o c i e t i e s b e c o m e m o r e o p e n a n d pluralistic, particularly in large transitional economies where the target aud iences number several millions, this traditional mode of working is unlikely to reach the critical mass of people necessary to significantly significantly affect the opinions an d choices of those audiences. To what extent will the new information and commu nication technologies enable the relationship relationship building p rocess to be scaled scaled u p to include m uch larger group s of people? In In India, the British ritish Cou ncil has identified a su ccessor ccessor generation tar get aud ience of 7 million million p eople aged b etween 20 and 35, nearly 90% of whom live in 25 cities, whose profile suggests that at different stages of their their education and early working lives they would be receptive to the Cou ncil’ ncil’s information an d edu cational cational services. At present th e Council operates in 11 cities cities and at an y one time provides services to about 120,000 members and visitors to their libraries libraries and information centres.

The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme invites young college and university graduates from overseas to participate in international exchange exchange and f oreign language education t hroughout Japan. The The programme has earned a high r eputat ion, bot h in Japan and overseas overseas,, for its effort s in human and cultural exchanges, and has become become one of the largest cultural exchange programmes in Japan. The program offers college college and un iversity iversity gr aduates the opport unity t o serve serve in local local government organizations as well as public and private junior and senior high schools. Begun in 1987 with the co-operation of the governments of the part icipating countries, the programme h as grow n up year by year. year. The number of JET participants who are currently w orking in Japan Japan has reached over 6,000 and and t he numb er of ex-JE ex-JET participant s fro m approximat ely 40 countri es totals around 30,000. 30,000. The JE JET Progr Progr amme also also includes a great deal of follow -up and netw ork build ing. For For example, the JET JET Alumni Association Association i s int ended to streng then the “ bonds of f riendship” developed by former part icipants. With o ver 44 local Chapters in 11 countries, it currently enjoys a membership of over 10,000 10,000 individu als. als.

The Council is now planning to u se new app roaches to online online and distance learning learning and a specially specially developed on line line library to extend its services to a m uch larger clientele. clientele. The quality of the engagem ent with this larger aud ience will will not be of the same order as that achieved through m ore traditional traditional and expensive f a ce ce t o f a c e p r o g r a m m e s – w h i c h w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p l a y a n impor tant role in India. Howev er, by increasing increasing to at least 300,000 over a three year period, the number of people in regular contact with th e Coun cil either face to face face or online, the Cou ncil believes that it w ill achieve achieve the critical critical mass necessary to affect affect attitudes and choices choices among the w ider target groups in key cities.

20

Public Diplomac Diplomacy y

The Three Three Dimensions of Public Public Diplomacy Diplomacy

21

3. Competitive and Co-operat ive Public Diplomacy There are some parts of the world w here Western countries countries have a clear and incontrovertible national interest in carrying out bilateral public diplomacy work. In these countries – the world’s largest econom econom ies and m arkets, regional powers like Nigeria or South Africa, coun coun tries of emerging strategic importan ce – they compete w ith others for access to markets, for investment, for political influence, for tourism, for immigration talent, and for a host of other things w hich will bring direct benefit benefit to them a l o n e . T h i s i s o f t e n a competitive zero-sum game. In these countries, there will always be a n eed for m ultilateral activities activities o n p a r t i c u l a r is is s u e s ( fo fo r e x a m p l e E U w o r k o n p r o m o t i n g multilateralism multilateralism in the Un ited States, States, or work in Pakistan on maintaining th e coalition coalition against terror) but because of the strong bilateral interests it it will be important for m any p ublic dip lomacy activities to be explicitly explicitly associated w ith Britain, Britain, or whichever country is promoting itself. itself. But th ese are not the only p laces where countries like the UK have an interest interest in d oing pu blic blic diplomacy work. In the rest of the world, there is a clear interest interest in carrying out w ork that prom otes stability, stability, economic development, hum an rights and good government. H owever, that interest differs differs from a bilateral bilateral interest in one key resp ect: it is not a uniqu ely British British interest but is rather an indivisible interest of all Western countries. There is little little purp ose, for for instance, in the UK competing for inward investment from Malaw i, and little little more in competing w ith the

22


French or the Americans to be its most influential ally. These are countries where public diplomacy should be co-operative. I n t h i s ch ch a p t e r , w e a r g u e t h a t i t i s i m p o r t a n t f o r p u b l i c diplomacy strategies to reflect reflect this situation, situation, and to mak e a clear distinction distinction between ‘competitive’ and ‘co-operative’ co-operative’ pu blic diplom acy. The The natu ral interest of any institution is to compete for power and influence wherever it can, can, and to expand th e scope of its activities activities as much as resou rces allow. allow. But we arg ue in this report that it makes sense to choose the countries for competition according to clear criteria, and to prioritise resources accordingly. Some Some p eople will argue that it is d iffic ifficult ult to have a black and white picture of where our interests lie, lie, and that attempts to p rioritise rioritise are often often confounded by history (who would have p ut Afghanistan, Sierra Sierra Leone, Leone, or Rwanda in their priority list?). But we are explicitly not arguing for a withdrawal from developing coun tries – on the contrary w e call for a consolidation of resources into a co-ordinated co-ordinated mu ltilateral ltilateral programme and an end to damaging competition. competition. It It is true that there will always always be shad es of grey – and a need for a regu lar review of countr ies’ priorities – but that cannot act as an argum ent against trying to create a framew framew ork for defining priorities.

Co-operative public diplomacy In most parts of the world there is no advan tage in making civil s o c i et et y - b u i l d i n g a c t i v i t y , p r o m o t i n g g o o d g o v e r n a n c e o r prom otion of Western values, an activity explicitly explicitly originating from Britain. It is not just that it could b e better and mor e e f fi fi c ie ie n t l y c a r r i e d o u t m u l t i la la t e r a l l y ; t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t disadvantages in conducting this activity activity und er an umbrella of national self-promotion. self-promotion. In the first place, by divorcing activity activity designed to prom ote democracy, human rights and the ru le of law from a countryCompetitive and Co-operative Public Diplomacy Diplomacy

23

specific context, you also d ivorce it to an extent from a n eocolonial context that is da mag ing to its effectiveness. effectiveness. Bilateral Bilateral British ritish attemp ts to prom ote democratic reform reform in Zimbabw e, or French attempts to do the same in its own former colonies like A l g e r ia ia , u n a v o i d a b l y r u n i n t o t h e r h e t o r i ca ca l l y p o w e r f u l response that colonial control is is being re-exerted re-exerted throu gh the back door of hum an rights un iversalism. iversalism. Removing Removing the n ational brand ing from this work retains all of its usefulness to the West, and increases its effec effectiveness tiveness by sid e-stepping th e sensitivities sensitivities that understandably surround it.

Table 2: Competitive and Co-operative Public Diplomacy Countries Targeted

Interest

Mode of operation

Competitive

G20

Political influence

(roughly 50 countries)

EU 15 + Accession

Military co-operation

Bilateral (on issues specific to us)

Top 20 Tourist, Trade and Investment Partners

Investment

P5

Tourism

Co-operative (roughly 140 countries)

A second, and equally damaging, aspect of attempting to carry out this kind of vital Western public diplomacy bilaterally is that it can lead to ‘great game’-style competition for influence which detracts from the good su ch work could be d oing. The The French or the British British essen tially attempt to create ‘zones of influence’ in the developing w orld – zones that centre naturally on the former c o l o n i a l em em p i r e s , a n d w h i c h s e e m j u s t i f ie ie d b e c a u s e o f a n emphasis on the importance of historical links for country prioritisation in the calculations of, for instance, the British Council. This This agenda of competition competition is an institutional institutional hangov er from colonial days (or in the case of the United States a result partly o f self-proclaimed self-proclaimed exceptional status) an d is, objectivel objectively y speaking, absurd . Despite increased increased co-operation on substantive issues (for (for examp le, the co-operation on Africa initiated initiated by Robin Cook and H ubert Vedr ine) there is still a good d eal of competition on p ublic diplomacy. Part of this is is simply to do with institutional rivalry between the BBC BBC World Service Service and RFI or betw een d ifferent ifferent p osts – some of it has also to do with the fact that the BB BBC’s C’s impact has in the p ast been measu red by its global global aud ience ience figure rather than its reach reach am ong target audiences.

24


Trade

NATO

Coalitions in IGOs

Diaspora Links

Policy exchange

All other developing countries

Promoting democracy, good governance, human rights, regional stability

Multilateral (on issues we share with others)

Multilateral

Some examples of this dama ging competition in public diplomacy come from Western involvement in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. The International Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director Robert Templer claims claims th at the rebuilding of Afghanistan has exhibited exhibited “a conspicuous failure failure of pu blic diplomacy.” It is vital for for the success of the Loya Jirga Jirga process that it have the su pp ort of the people, a vital prerequisite of which is effective dissemination of information abo ut th e process itself. itself. Yet, Yet, Temp Temp ler argues, the UN h a s n o i n d e p e n d e n t r a d i o s y s t e m i n p l a ce ce i n A fg fg h a n i s t a n (placing it a step behind , for instance, the Iranians an d th e BB BBC World Service) and has been slow to publish information on how the Loya Jirga Jirga will be condu condu cted or wh at its aims will be. Templer argues that man y Western nations have concentrated on slapping country brand ing on their (much-needed) (much-needed) aid and assistance in a competitive fashion that has the dangerous side effect effect of robbing the fledgling central Afghan a dm inistration of profile, legitimacy legitimacy an d, u ltimately, stability. The The French, for example, have proud ly reopened the Lycee in Kabul and played on old links to to Ahmed Shah Massoud Massoud in an attempt to promote their influence influence in the area. They also und ermined th e un ifying ifying symbolism of the return of the old King, Zahir Shah, Shah, by very publicly publicly receiving receiving the Defence Defence Minister who ha d chosen to snub

Competitive and Co-operative Public Diplomacy Diplomacy

25

the King by being in Paris at the time of his return . This kind of political jockeying is highly damaging to the broad Western interest in Afghanistan and in failed states generally. The Voice of America, the BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle and RFI compete for aud ience, for frequency, and for influence in the developing world when this brings miniscule additional b e n e f i t s t o t h e n a t i o n s c o n c e r n e d ( t h e U S , U K, F r a n c e o r German y). The VOA – bolstered by a large v ote of fund s from Congress in the wak e of September 11th – has been bidd ing for p r e s e n c e o n F M f r e q u e n c i e s in S o m a l i a a g a i n s t t h e W o r l d Service, and is in dan ger of causing price inflation throu gh the large amounts they are paying for FM frequencies in the Arab World. Wh ile it is clear tha t that th e BBC World Service has ver y different editorial values from VOA, and that it would d amage its reputation for ed itorial ind epend ence if it were to join forces with it on prod uction, it is imp ortant to ensure th at competition between the two services is always worthw hile – and that it does not simply result in precious resources being squand ered in a bidding war for frequencies. These concerns about ed itorial values do n ot, however, apply to other European services. It seems p erverse for the BBC to be in comp etition with RFI in Francophone Africa, rather than joining forces and creating a E u r o p e a n s e r v i c e w h i c h c o u l d s e r v e t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t io n s equally well and p roduce m odest savings for France and Britain. Consequently, instead of running competitive public diplomacy progr amm es in the large majority of countries that do not h ave significant bilateral relations with the individual Western governments, the West should combine its resources and coordinate efforts on th is kind of activity. If the activities of the World Service, and of the British Council in many places, amount to at the least a Western p ublic good, then they should be harnessed as a m echanism that encourages contribution from all the governments of the West. 26

Public Diplomacy

This would be easiest to organize – at least initially – w ithin the European Un ion. Tony Blair could u se the Danish EU sum mit this Autumn to suggest that the European Union develops a plan for co-operatively funded and executed p ublic diplomacy activity in the vital majority of the world’s countries wh ere the members of the European Union h ave no differentiated interests, but instead a pressing communal need. In the mean -time it would be sensible to create a more informal system of burden-sharing within the Western governments, where the British contribution wou ld be th e existing World Service an d British Coun cil ‘good governa nce’ activities in developing countries, and where other countries would agree to contribute complementary activity in kind or cash funding. Britain shou ld take a lead by deliberately down -grading the ‘Britishness’ of its activities in those countries and consulting allies at country level. This would bring the World Service, and also much British Council activity, into a culture that emphasises the importance of programm es for the host country, rather than the donor. This would go some way, at least, toward divorcing pu blic diplomacy activity in the d eveloping world from a ‘great game’ model of interests, which it is the accepted du ty of the FCO to manage and p ursue.

Competitive Public Diplomacy A v ery impor tant corollary of removing the British flag from pu blic dip lomacy activity in the ma jority of countr ies is that it a f fo r d s a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t r u l y e f fe c t iv e p r i o r i ti s a t io n o f resources in the remaining 50 or so bilaterally targeted countries. N o r w a y i s o n e c o u n t r y t h a t h a s e x p l i ci t ly r e c o g n i s e d t h i s . Instead of attempting to gar ner influence with pu blics in every country where it happ ens to have an embassy, the Norwegian government has concentrated all its pu blic diplomacy activity on w hat it regard s as its six key coun try au diences: the US, the Competitive and Co-operative Public Diplomacy

27

UK, Germany, Russia, Japan and France (see Append ix II). The UK has more global aspirations than Norw ay, and so w ould seek to spread its influence more wid ely than a Spartan six countries, but th e central idea of clear prioritisation for bilateral public diploma cy is a good one. Prioritisation is a thorny issue, and one mad e harder by th e Foreign Office’s reluctance to admit to any country that it is not, in fact, central to the UK’s foreign policy in one w ay or another. I n s o m e a r e a s t h e U K ’s p r i o r i t i e s a r e c l e a r e r t h a n o t h e r s . Economic relations, under the remit of Trade Partners UK and Invest UK, are reasonably easy to quan tify and hence prioritise. It is uncontentiou s that the UK should actively promote its prod ucts and businesses bilaterally amongst th e largest markets, a n d t h e l a r g e s t e co n o m i e s , in t h e w o r l d – a t t h e s a m e t i m e includ ing some of the most p romising emerging markets. The members of the G20 and the EU, for instance, would m ake a good centr al core of countr ies to concentra te up on. Equally, in terms of European political influence, the UK has a clear interest in developing political links and political influence with some of the most importan t EU accession countries. The Britain Abroad Task Force, for instance, has recently add ed th e Czech Republic and Hu ngary to its original target list of 18 countries (wh ich a l r e a d y i n c lu d e d P o l a n d a n d T u r k e y ) . Im p o r t a n t r e g i o n a l pow ers like Nigeria, South Africa and Ind onesia wou ld also be central candidates for targeted bilateral relations for any country whose interests were p rojected on a global stage. This kind of prioritisation is, of course, already carried out by UK pu blic diplomacy institutions, but th e criteria u sed are often not sufficiently clear-eyed for the pu rpose. One exam ple is the British Cou ncil’s determ ination of country importance based on historical, as well as political and econom ic, grounds. This idea of rating a countr y’s impor tance as a target for British pu blic 28

Public Diplomacy

diplomacy w ork based in part of the extent of its historical links with th e UK is code, in m ost cases, for its colonial links an d can lead to d ecisions being mad e on the basis of our interests in the nineteenth century rather than tod ay’s pressing needs. But the most d amaging criteria applied to p rioritising countries, and one that is a central part of, for instance, the British Cou ncil and the World Service’s calculations regar ding future a ctivities, is that of “potential impact”. Potential impact is judged on the b a s i s o f “ d e m a n d f o r s e r v ic e s a m o n g t a r g e t g r o u p s ” a n d “competing influences”. But these seemingly inn ocuous criteria are in danger of pu tting the cart before the horse and acting as a justification for the statu s quo. There is a dan ger that d ecisions are taken not to prioritise key mark ets because the traditional pu blic d iplomacy tools (English-language tu ition, ed ucational reform, radio) are unlikely to work, rather th an d efining the priority countries according to objective criteria and devising strategies for making an imp act in these conditions. The division of the spectrum of public diplomacy activities into d i f f er e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n h a v e n e g a t i v e r e s u l t s i n t h e s e situations, because each institution calculates its priorities in terms of what it thinks it can achieve through its own bu nd le of activities, rather than tailoring activities to the countries where it is vital that public diplomacy impact be achieved. One clear example of this concern with the ability to make an impact is the telling lack of pub lic diplom acy work b y the British Coun cil in the USA, the richest and the most p owerful country on Earth. The British Coun cil carries ou t very little activity in the United States, on th e basis that there is little imp act that it could h ave on a mature democracy with a thriving dom estic media and close informal transatlantic links – and becau se the Embassy has historically had a major information p rogram me. But it is clear

Competitive and Co-operative Public Diplomacy

29

that there is an imp ortant need for public diplomacy activity in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s, a n d a s t h e c a s e s t u d y d e m o n s t r a t e s ( s e e pp endix I) it is not d ifficult to imagine a series of activities designed around long-term relationship building, and political edu cation which could ha ve a considerable impact. What is needed is a clear strategy for these different types of countries with different goals for each of the institutions. We set this out in Chap ters Seven and Eight.

4. Keeping Your Head in a Crisis Ensur ing crisis responses do not divert governments fr om long-t erm goals P u b l i c d i p l o m a c y o p e r a t e s i n c e n t u r i e s, o r i n s e co n d s : combining the long-term background th rough w hich events are perceived with the instant shock that can be pivotal to an international relationship. This temporal du ality comes out strongest in a m ajor crisis. Relations with the Mu slim world were framed by differing degrees of engagement from the time of the crusades, through colonial times, the creation of Israel to the Gulf War, but in an instant the attack on the World Trade Centre reframed th e power dynam ic in the relationship. Britain’s image arou nd the world h a d b e e n d e f in e d f o r d e c a d e s t h r o u g h i m a g e s o f t h e p o m p , circum stance and cool reserve of the British Monarchy, bu t the pu blic’s reaction to Princess Diana’s death in an instan t buried man y associations of Britain with th e ‘stiff upp er lip’. Equally, a single night of violence at the Heysel stadium supp lanted the idea of the English gentlemen in the consciousness of many European p opu lations with its polar opp osite: the hooligan. Each shock or crisis represents an op portu nity to effect radical paradigm shifts in p ublic diplomacy, opportun ities that can be seized and turned to the advantage of a country. However, the very natu re of the shock mak es it difficult to deal with: it is unexpected, it is out of control, it may be h ighly positive or highly negative in its initial effect, it can su ck up enormou s resources in its wake, and it is rarely repeated in th e same form. Governments are not very good at planning their resources aroun d the id ea of shocks which makes it even more difficult to

30

Public Diplomacy

Keeping Your Head in a Crisis

31

respond – in spite of the fact that there has barely been a year th is decade w hich has not had a major public diplomacy shock. 2001 was p erhaps atyp ical, but for the UK it was a year d efined by its p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y c r is e s : t h e o u t b r e a k o f F o o t a n d M o u t h disease, the collapse of the railway system, riots in Bradford , Burnley an d Old ham as well as September 11th. The response to each crisis needs to be targeted, w ell resourced an d ru n like a political campaign rather tha n a d iplomatic effort. The key challenges are: • Rapid reaction: an integrated response that will span changes in policies, the deploymen t of resources and comm unications • Internal co-ordination

up in buildings and staff which m akes it difficult to free up p r o g r a m m e m o n e y i n a c r i s is . T h is m a k e s i t i m p o s s ib l e t o develop new programm es on the scale of the American response (which was able immed iately to draw on emergency funds), but also hampers the rapid deployment of staff. For example, several interviewees comp lained about th e fact that it took weeks to get telephones and emails set up in the Coalition Information Centre in London (in contrast with th e Washington office). The World Service and the British Cou ncil have m ore flexibility as they are more able to redeploy resources within the year or country bud gets – but both will have to w ait for the next financial cycle to be able to carry out strategic plans for the future. Given the frequen cy of ‘unforeseen’ shocks, it is certainly w orth investigating the strategic flexibility that w ould be p rovided by a centrally-managed pot of ‘crisis’ money.

• International co-ordination • The ability to keep track of long-term goals

Rapid Reaction and surge capability T h e b o x es o n t h e n e x t f ew p a g e s s u m m a r i s e s o m e o f t h e r e s p o n s e s i n B r i t a in a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t es t o t h e c r i si s o n September 11th. It was inevitable that the Un ited States’ response would be of far greater magn itude than the UK’s – both because the attack took p lace in Amer ica, and because of the relative size and power of the American nation. But although the initial pu blic response of the British Governm ent was masterful – both on a symbolic and p ractical level – there remain a nu mber of bureaucratic and ad ministrative barriers that can hamp er a rapid response. The first constraint is th e lack of bud getary flexibility. Because the Foreign Office’s bud get has been pared dow n over the years in the interests of cost-effectiveness, m ost of its resour ces are tied

32

Public Diplomacy

Another issue is geograp hical/ physical flexibility. Ideally, institutions need a presence that can be scaled up and d own without gen erating the adverse med ia attention that the closing a ph ysical presence generates. This is something that th e MOD or DFID are naturally good at. There is a case for thinking about creating a rap id-reaction pu blic diplom acy squad th at could set up in any crisis situation within 24 hours. As the Perm anent Und er Secretary to the Foreign Office Sir Michael Jay says: “How do you cope with su rges? Much of the FCO’s life is coping with surges. But MOD and DFID know how to set up in a crisis. We need a rap id reaction diplomacy that will allow u s to set up a mission in Kabul in hou rs.” One solution might be to d evelop a residual capacity that can be deployed in the event of a crisis. The United States are currently reconstituting the remains of the Washington CIC as a regional team for Middle East media wh ose primary function wou ld be to engage in regional dialogue. This would inv olve a readiness


33

The UK Public Diplomacy Reaction to September 11th

The US Public Diplomacy Reaction to September 11th

In the immediat e aftermat h of t he September events, No 10 took over direct control of news management, working closely with the FCO to create an incident room to manage the day to day control of the crisis. In due course, the Coalition Inform ation Centres (CIC) and t he Islamic Media Unit were created to coordinate messages and provide a direct information response in Arabic. The Public Diplomacy Department of the FCO prod uced a publicatio n, Never Again , which echoed an American web site wi th a similar pu rpose, and it s Broadcasting and Allied Media Unit started producing regular news updates through its radio and B r i t i s h Sa t e l l i t e N e w s n e t w o r k s . I n a d d i t i o n , i t e m b a r k e d o n a programme of targeted news articles and press briefings.

• From September 12th, every key government speech and policy statement was produced in six languages on t he day of p ublication and in up to 30 languages by a few days later.

The timet able of responses was as follow s: • W ith in hou rs, BBC Worl d Service start ed a 45 hour news progr amme their longest ever. • Within weeks No 10 and the FCO had established Coalition Information Centres (CICs) in W ashingt on, London and Islamabad in cooperation wit h major coalit ion alli es. They had also set u p th e Islamic Media Unit . • In j ust over one mo nth, UKwit hNY, a previously planned major event opened in New York having been re-branded to suit the r evised message. • W ithi n th ree month s, the British Council had ident ified £2m savings and developed initial ideas for Connecting Futures (then Open M inds), a progr amme of action specifically aimed at connectin g the M uslim and Christian w orlds. • With in t hree mont hs the BBC World Service increased it s hours of out put in Urdu , Arabic, Pashto , Persian and Uzbek by b etw een 18 per cent and 104 per cent. • Over the next three months, the British Council continued to operate in Pakistan and processed 20,000 exam candidates and 5,000 Chevening scholarship applications as usual. In contrast, the USIS in Islamabad closed and handed over its theatre to CIC. • W ithin four mont hs the British Tourist Auth ority launched UKOK as a way of re-assuring people about tourism to t he UK.

34

Public Diplomacy

• Large numbers of in terviews with US Officials took place on the Arab media. • The Stat e Department co-ordinat ed wit h the Whit e House and Department of Defense to create special media centres to cover a rolling news cycle and gain a rapid-response capabilit y. • ‘ Leaflet b ombs’ dropped on Af ghanistan, each with 100,000 flyers depicting, e.g. Taliban beating a group of women and bearing t he message, "Is this the fut ure you want f or your children and women" in Pashtu n and Dari. • Si n g l e c h a n n e l w i n d - u p r a d i o s d r o p p e d o n A f g h a n i st a n . V O A broadcasts in Pashtu n and Dari. C-130E radio jamming planes flying over Afghanistan. • Media t ours to th e U.S. for foreign journalists, particularly Muslim journalists, were mounted swiftly. • Voi ce of Ameri ca’s Arab ic service rebrand ed to ‘ Radio Sawa’ (‘Radio Together’ ) broadcasting 24 hours a day and aimed at a youth market wit h popular music int erspersed w ith news bullet ins. Radio Sawa has a budg et of c. $30m. • Produced a four-colour bo oklet, Net w or k of Ter ro r ism , released on November 6th by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), to visually and emotively illustrate the impact of September 11th. This product became the most widely distributed public diplomacy document ever produced. It is now in 36 different languages. Disseminated as an insert i n publ ications like Italy’s Panoram a and Kuwait’s al-Watan and as a full insert in the Arabic edition of Newsweek. • Photographic exhibition of Ground Zero by Joel Meyerowitz t o open in 20 countries. By the first-year anniversary date of 9/11, thi s exhibit will have opened in 60 cities. To increase relevance and broaden interest it was tailored t o local circumstance, e.g. th e exhibit in London, w hich showed pictures of the Blitz in World War II alongside.


35

Future US September 11th related Public Diplomacy Expenditure and Plans

communications and provide support for a global public diplom acy campaign.

• Planned US public dip lomacy expendit ure f or FY 2003 is $595,711,000, whi ch represents a 5.4 per cent increase over t he FY 2002 fundi ng level. Of this amount $247,063,000 is for Educational and Cultural Exchanges and $287,693,000 is for public diplomacy activities within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs.

• Enhanced Int ernational Informat ion Program (IIP) activities, including improved content and presentat ion on t he website via the latest technology for delivery of mat erial to t arget users, who w ill include perceived critical international leaders and opinion makers.

Some pl anned uses of thi s money include: • $15 million w ill be used to f und an agg ressive campaign o f m essage placement. Short video programs will air profiling the lives of certain Muslim Americans - teachers, basketball players, fi remen - on t argeted media outlet s in nine predominately M uslim countries. The intended message is that the U.S. is an open society, to lerant and accept ing o f all religions, and specifically a countr y where Muslims are free to practice Islam. • $17.5 million w ill be empl oyed fo r init iatives such as American Corners, where multi-media rooms would be installed in partnering instit utions in target countries to bring an American environment and experience to key audiences, especially you nger generatio ns. • Another plan is to reinvigorate English Teaching t o for eigners in their own schools, whi ch is seen as an eff ective way of exposing t hem t o American values and preparin g them f or pro ductive lives in a modern world.

• Increased t ranslation s of Inf oUSA, a combined Internet and CD-ROM informat ion pr oduct wit h t ext materials detailing U.S. laws, governance, education, society, and cultu re. It is updated daily on the Int ernet, and 30,000 CD-ROMs are distribut ed every six mont hs to users worldw ide. Recipients range from executive branches and government ministries to academic institu tio ns, NGOs and medi a out lets. • Increased polli ng by t he Bureau of Intellig ence and Research in Muslim countries. • Expanded Office of Broadcast Services’ coverage of special international events, remote pr oductio ns, facilit ative assistance eff ort s, dialogu es and Foreign Press Centr e jour nalist t ours. These activiti es include wor king with foreign broadcasters to produce documentary reports that highlight aspects of American life, cultur e or community. The documentaries are then shown o n nation al foreign television. Foreign jour nalist tours focus on report ing to urs for journalists in strategically important regions - the Mid dle East, t he Balkans, and South Asia - th at have f ew o r no US-based correspondents

• The US plans to acquire television, fi lm, and radio right s for use in Muslim-majority states to broadcast t he output of existing programmes i n t h e p r i v a t e s e ct o r , i n c l u d i n g c u r r e n t e v e n t s p r o d u c t i o n s , documentaries, docu-dramas and dr amatic feat ures.

• Some of t he supplement al public diplomacy fund ing fo r 2002 will be used to magnif y the benefit s of Fulbright and Internati onal Visitor (IV) exchanges by, for instance, setting up an alumni data bank. 50 per cent of International Coalition leaders had once been exchange visitors to the US. The prog ramme f unds 25,000 exchanges and visits wit h £237 mill ion.

• An ECA exchange prog ram fo r Mu slim yout h, teachers and young polit ical leaders, adapting pre-existing models and programmes to t he Islamic wor ld.

• Plans for a VOA satellit e news broadcast t o th e Midd le East t o compete with Al-Jazeera et al, to broadcast 24 hours a day, with funding of approximately $250 million.

• New projects designed to educate the foreign public on the war against terr orism and t he U.S. commitm ent t o peace and prosperity across all nations including $5.3 million for expansion of outreach programs to improve

36

Public Diplomacy


37

to relocate and reorgan ise on a regular basis, liasing with som e o f t h e 3 5 U S a g e n c ie s t h a t c u r r e n t l y m a i n t a i n a n o v e r s e a s presence. Alastair Campbell argues that we should ad opt a similar ap proach in the UK: “obviously you w ill never ever h ave totally fool-proof crisis managem ent systems, because what makes it a crisis is the fact that it’s d ifferent. But, wha t w e’re going to do is have a CIC operation ready to be activated at an y point tha t we or the Foreign Office think that it shou ld be. With ready to roll links into other governments d epartments, and hopefully ready to roll links into other countries that m ight need to be involved….What it means in practical terms is that within every main governm ent dep artment likely to be involved in a crisis management situation there is a named individu al, whose job is to be that person, wh o may at the drop of a hat be called off doing wh atever they’re doing at th e Cabinet Office or at the Home Office and be brou ght into a structure with p eople they know and systems they know.”

Internal coordination Acrisis creates an immediate sp lit between internal and external aud iences who interpret a single government pron ouncement in r a d i c a l ly d i ff e r in g w a y s . O n e o f t h e g r e a t s t r e n g t h s o f t h e Foreign Office is its extraordinary network of offices around the world th at are able to d isseminate messages – but th ese are often d i s c o n n e c t ed f r o m t h e k e y m e s s a g e s w h i c h n e e d t o b e disseminated from London . In Britain Foot and Mouth disease, the collapse of the railways and the riots were treated as domestic issues for weeks after they broke out. The establishment of COBRA u ndoubtedly showed an ability to deal w ith surges on the d omestic side but this was not related to an international strategy. Several of the foreign corresponden ts we interviewed complained abou t the lack of access and information as the crisis un ravelled. And although

38

Public Diplomacy

the DCMS were consulted as the impact on tou rism became clear, the fact that the Governm ent tends to involve d epartments r a t h e r t h a n n o n - d e p a r t m e n t a l p u b l ic b o d i e s m e a n t t h a t t h e British Tourist authority w as not involved in COBRA. Foot and M o u t h t o o k o n s u c h m o n u m e n t a l p r o p o r t i o n s t h a t it w a s e v e n t u a l l y t r e a t e d a s a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l is s u e – u n l i k e t h e problems with the railways and the race riots which have been treated exclusively as dom estic stories. The stru ctural problems around news man agement are discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. Alastair Campbell explains the importance of centralising commu nications in a crisis: “The thing abo ut crises is that you never know where they’re going to come from. Foot & Mouth: we didn ’t know that was going to happ en. When it does happ en t h e r i s k i s y o u d e f a u l t t o a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t y o u r e x is t i n g structures will be able to cope. Now the point about crises is that they don ’t always cope. What may m ake it a crisis is that your existing structures aren’t able to manage. You d o have to throw things out, and get on with absolutely relentless focus. Whatever the enquiries are going to say on foot and mou th, the truth is that in many ways we did actually perform miracles by getting it und er control as quickly as we did. A lot of that was through, adm ittedly in my view too slow, centralisation: things being brough t to the centre. All the different bits of government likely to be involved being locked in together. When you talk about a huge international story, like September 11th, that gets ever more d ifficult. You’ve got to work ou t, where are the m ain points of activity an d in form ation ? Obv iou sly Am erica an d Afghanistan were the main two. You had Pakistan, you had the whole Midd le East situation as a factor. And then you had other zones of opinion.” The importan ce of getting clear leadership from th e top of governmen t is confirmed by Tucker Eskew, Bush’s appointee to Keeping Your Head in a Crisis

39

the Coalition Information Centre in London: “In the history of the US global commu nications efforts co-operation has been, at times, lacking. Generally it is intermittent and in fact our efforts have been least successful and most pron e to innervations and attack from various m edia, or governmental qu arters, when it was seen as u ncoordinated and of little interest to the chief executive of our government, n amely the President. Conversely, the history of our efforts shows success and lack of such attacks when th e President is viewed as interested … co-operation an d e x e cu t i v e i n t e r e s t a n d i n t e g r a t i o n r e a l l y a r e c r u c i a l g o i n g forwards, based on history and recent experience.”

International Co-ordination With a foreign p olicy crisis, the challenge for governm ents is often n ot simply to man age their own messages to foreign and domestic audiences but to try and co-ordinate the messages of different coalition partners. In many ways the Kosovo conflict was a wake-up call on this which inspired governments to try to create an effective strategy for dealing w ith commu nications. Alastair Campbell explains how importan t it is to ensure a consistent voice between capitals and institutions: “Dealing with this required a degree of co-ordination between capitals which w a s n o t t h e r e i n t h e e a r l y d a y s . T h e r e a l p r o b le m w i t h t h e ‘convoy incident ’, for examp le, was n ot just tha t it happ ened – for people accept that there w ill be accidents in w ar – but that different things were said in d ifferent par ts of the operation, as we speculated and thought aloud before the facts were known. The resulting confusion was dam aging.” The Coalition Information Centre was d eveloped to ensur e that commu nications in Afghan istan were h and led effectively. With offices in London , Washington and Islamab ad, it was designed to follow th e clock and ensur e that the d ifference in time-zones

40

Public Diplomacy

would not allow the Taleban to dom inate news agendas while coalition p ress offices were still ensconced in th eir beds. The Washington office was essentially a bilateral US-UK operation, but th e office in London h ad rep resentatives from across the coalition includin g countries like Russia and Norw ay. The routine was extremely effective, with daily conference calls c h a ir e d b y K a r en H u g h e s i n t h e W h i t e H o u s e a n d A l a st a i r Campb ell in Dow ning Street, an intranet w ith lines to take on the issues of the day, a research team with a brief to develop strategic messages and p lan events which could carry them, and an electronic grid of future activities so that the timing of annou ncements and stories could be plann ed strategically.

Long and short-term vision T h e m o s t d i ff i cu l t c h a l l e n g e i s m a n a g i n g t h e r e l a t io n s h i p b e t w e e n s h o r t - t e r m c r i si s m a n a g e m e n t a n d l o n g - t e r m relationship building. In the heat of the mo ment, there is a danger of und ermining both the institutions and th e messages that governm ents are trying to promote for the long term. With an event as d ramatic as September 11th there is enormou s pressure on institutions to drop long-term p lans and concentrate on th e crisis to the exclusion of all else. There is a dan ger that structures which have been bu ilt up over years are completely sup ersed ed . The new st ructu res such as the Coa lition Information Centre are built up out of nowh ere with a different chain of command , usually going d own from the White Hou se or Downing Street rather than throu gh the FCO or the State Department. We have seen above why it is important to have a tightly managed, targeted, well resourced team dealing with commun ications. But on ce the initial structure has been set up it is imp ortant to build links with the organisations and p eople who will be working in these areas long after the crisis has elapsed – if not there is a danger of that knowledge disappearing


41

as it did after Kosovo. This is often the opp osite of what takes place, for example in Islamabad the USIA was closed d own when the Islamabad Coalition Information Centre was formed. Different institutions need to operate according to different timeframes. Those which focus on fostering long-term r elationships need to d evelop strategies over a nu mber of years. The reason wh y the World Service was able to respond to th e crisis in Afghanistan more effectively than an y of its rivals was that it had been broadcasting in Pashtun for over twenty years and in Persian for sixty and had established a bed-rock of trust and goodw ill (built up on its editorial independ ence) which could be draw n on in the crisis. It has also been present in Arabic since 1938 and has bu ilt up a rep utation for quality journalism, wh ich has mu ch to do w ith its continued effectiveness in the current Middle Eastern crisis environm ent. It attracts 10 million w eekly listeners in the Midd le East includ ing 16 per cent reach in Saudi Arabia; 18 per cent in Jordan ; 12 per cent in Syria; and h as a strong web offer in BBCarabic.com, giving 8 million month ly page impressions. The British Council has been op erating in Muslim and Arab countries for decades and built up a series of relationships which are importan t. In some of these countries, simply ma intaining the existing levels of engagement at a time of uncertainty (as the Council did in Pakistan w here it d elivered 20,000 exams in October) sends out a positive message. There is a strong case for making extra resources available to p ublic d iplomacy institutions to deal with a crisis, and the institutions them selves need to become more ad ept at sp otting the potential of a crisis as an op portun ity to change the long-term relationship. But the key is to develop activities which draw on th eir strengths – and are in line with their long-term values.

institutions that are – to a d egree – insulated from shor t-term political needs. If not, long-term p rocesses will be made subservient to short-term p olitical goals. Changing p erceptions of Britain or w inning supp ort for our values in many parts of the world is not something that can be achieved in any one year or any one ad ministration, so we m ust have th e capacity for long term thinking and planning. That is unfortunately unlikely to be something that is possible in the Foreign Office with its shorter time-horizons. A m b a s s a d o r A n t h o n y Q u a i n t o n , f o r m e r d i r e ct o r o f t h e U S Foreign Service, explains how USIA has becom e less effective at delivering on its long-term goals as it has been brought closer to the concerns of the State Department: “USIA wanted to be seen as being responsive to the political agend a of the day. And that mad e it easier to snap up because its target was the short term foreign policy agenda of the US administration. Then it makes sense to integrate it into the State Departmen t because that is w h e r e t h e d a y t o d a y i n t e r a ct i o n b e t w e en A m e r i c a a n d t h e world comes together. But it m eant almost a comp lete erosion of the cultura l mission. Exchanges or various kind s of artist’s program s which used to be very mu ch at the centre of USIA’s progr ams in th e ‘50s, ‘60s and th e ‘70s became second ary to th em i n t h e d r i v e t o m a k e P u b l i c D i p l o m a cy i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e process of Foreign affairs and traditional diplomacy. “ One of the problems of not having a clear pu blic diplomacy strategy is that there are no strategic messages to return to in a moment of crisis. Though they w ere not set in part of a formal strategy, it is possible to identify some key themes about Britain which the Governm ent has sough t to prom ote since 1997. The key political messages before September 11th were: “Britain is a force for good in the w orld” and “Britain is a leading mem ber of the EU”. The economic messages were about inn ovation and

One of the lessons of this is the imp ortance of creating 42

Public Diplomacy


43

creativity. And the key social messages were about diversity and multiculturalism. Each has been un dermined – not through an y deliberate act, nor even as a result of any sp ecific lapses but as th e cumu lative impact of the governments various responses to the crisis of September 11th. In spite of the fact that the Prime Minister ha s been careful to bring these key m essages together in his major speeches – such as the speech to th e Labour Party Conference in October 2001 and h is speeches in Africa, India an d th e US – our research show s that the collective imp act of the actions has led to perception s of Britain as “an A merican stooge”, “a h alfhearted European country”, “not letting go of empire”. One young ed ucated par ticipant in a focus group in India said: “The UK is a lackey to the US and also un clear about its role in Europe”. (For further d iscussion of the impact of the UK’s post September 11th positioning on bilateral relationships, see App endix I, especially the France and Ind ia case studies.)

take into account n ot only domestic public opinion, but the way things will be seen in Europe, America, and the rest of the world. What is said in one country is picked up in the med ia of other c o u n t r i e s a n d v i c e -v e r s a . W h e n t h e r e i s a c r i si s , t h e P M i n e v i ta b l y g e t s i n v o l v e d a n d t h e m e s s a g e s b e c o m e t h e possession of a small group of people. It is not a deliberate thing, but one of the un intended consequences of this is that messages can go out wh ich play badly in some parts of the world”.

To an extent this is inevitable, but it is important to be conscious of the dan gers throug hout the pr ocess. Sir Michael Butler, the former British perm anent rep resentative to the European Un ion, argues th at we need to be forever vigilant: “The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary need to think of the consequences of the reactions of other countries when we are dealing with the United States. It is probably an illusion to think that w e can add that much to our influence in the US by being more compliant than others – there are diminishing returns – but we can dam age our relationship w ith other countries. The more we talk about ‘being a brid ge’ or the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, the more w e are likely to irritate other EU member states as they all think that th ey themselves have a sp ecial relationship w ith Europe – as well as underscoring our h istory as a reluctant European. In deciding the line to take on any issue, you need to

44

Public Diplomacy

Keeping your head in a crisis

45

5. Moving Beyond Propaganda Many of the initiatives which have been d eveloped in the w ake of September 11th seem to hav e fallen into w hat can best be described as a ‘conveyor-belt’ model for the transmission of information. If one reads recent debates and discussions about public diplomacy – particularly in the United States, but in other countries as well – there is a sense that ma ny p olicy mak ers feel that the main p roblem is a lack of information, as if to say: “if only other peop le had access to the same degree of information that we have, and the same degree of insight, then they wou ld agree with us”. The problem goes beyon d cru de ‘psyops’ activities such as drop ping ‘leaflet bombs’ (showing a m ember of the Taliban beating a group of wom en and b earing the message: “is this the future you want for your children and your wom en” in Pashtu and Dari) or dropping single channel wind-up radios tuned to the VOA. The tone and feel of many initiatives is declamatory and about telling rather than proving through actions, symbols and w ords – or engaging in dialogue with a real intent to listen. If we are to move beyond propagan da, the first challenge is to understand the target audience and start from wh ere they are.

Many organisations struggle to internalise and prepare for potential threats that do not tie in with th eir underlying strategic assumptions. But it is difficult to carry out successful diplomacy if you d o not have ears for things that you don’t want to hear. Too many Foreign Office publications and speeches are aimed at winning arguments and proving that we are right – rather than persu ading au diences to change th eir minds. Both the FCO and the State Departm ent prod uced leaflets on the attack on the

46

Public Diplomacy

World Trade Centre w hich fell into this trap. Although they contained d ramatic and shocking p ictures which worked on an emotional level, the text was very forensic and arg um entative – with sections structured around 6 bullet points explaining why the September 11th attacks were d efinitely carried out by Bin Laden. The problem is that these sorts of messages put out by diplomats w ill become enmeshed in w hat has been called a battleground of “you r information vs. my information”. As the former advertising executives Adam Lury and Simon Gibson put it: “the answer is not more information, but a d i f f er e n t f o r m o f e n g a g e m e n t ” . T h a t is w h a t l e d t h e U S Und ersecretary of State for Pub lic Diploma cy, Charlotte Beers, to advise Am erican pu blic affairs officers: “Our Goal is NOT w hat you say, but the response that you desire”. In other w ords pu blic diplomacy is not simply delivering a message to an au dience – it is about getting a result. And to get a resu lt, you need to take account of the fact that the listener’s views an d exp erience matter as mu ch as the message that the speaker is send ing. This means being ready to explore the legitimacy of some of our most basic beliefs, from hu man rights and gender right d own to health and safety, and environmental safeguards in different societies. It means cond ucting research about why people feel th e w ay th ey d o. A good examp le of this being d one s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i s t h e Br i t i s h C o u n c i l ’s Connecting Futures progra mm e, a new 5 year initiative which aims at building deeper mu tual und erstanding, learning and respect between young people from different cultural backgrounds, by working in new w ays and w ith wider, more diverse commu nities in the UK and overseas. The countries initially involved include Pakistan, Banglad esh, Malaysia, Ind onesia, Saud i Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, the Palestinian Territories and the United Kingdom . Connecting Futures research has been carried

Moving Beyond Propaganda

47

out w ith five thousand young people aged 15-24 to find ou t their views of the UK and other countries and their own aspirations for the future. The idea is to use this research to d evelop new ways of working and engaging with a wider au dience of young p eo p le u sin g t h e in te rn et an d n ew co m m u n ica ti on s t e c h n o l o g i e s ; t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n , a r t s , s p o r t s a n d s c i en c e projects; via school links and youth exchanges; by networking y o u n g p r o f e s s io n a l s ; b y p r o v i d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s fo r o p e n dialogue and debate; and by w idening access to our information and education services.

DGCID, they set ou t a new mission for the organisation: instead of seeking to promote French exceptionalism, it sough t common cause with other coun tries on the receiving end of US cultural d o m i n a n c e a n d p o s i t io n e d i t s e l f a s t h e c h a m p i o n o f t h o s e countries that felt swamp ed. In a similar man oeuvre, when it became apparen t that French could not compete w ith English as a global language, they sought to promote multilingualism: if French were not to be the first foreign language learned aroun d the world, it was importan t to try and ensure that more than one foreign language wou ld be learned.

The second problem is that a one-way flow of messages is likely to be counter-productive. A major source of difficultly for the positive presentation of Western countries abroad is the widespread an ger at what is perceived to be a one-way flow of culture from the West to the rest of the w orld. The perception that local custom s, local histories and local iden tities are being hollowed out by the unstoppable advance of Gap, Starbucks, Tom Cruise and Who Wants to be a Millionaire? , although it may not be true, is certainly damaging. It risks creating an adversarial attitude between ‘the West and the Rest’.

This means pu shing p luralism as a central part of the UK’s culture and id entity, and emph asising the imp act that foreign cultures have in Britain. One example of an institution that is very effective at bu ilding such mu tuality into Britain’s relations with oth er countr ies is Visiting Arts. By bringing artists and performers from other cultures over to Britain, they present a very p ositive image of a receptive British culture th at plays w ell i n t h e p r o u d o r i g in a t i n g c o u n t r y a n d w o r k s w e l l t o d i s p e l concerns about cultural hegemony or a d ominating attitude from the UK toward the third w orld. Yet the bud get of Visiting Arts is tin y co m p are d to the am ou nt of m on ey sp ent disseminating British cultural p rodu cts through the British Coun cil – the Arts dep artm ent’s bud get is close to £21 million poun ds, and around £1 million is spent on Visiting Arts projects. The scope for improvem ent in this area is large, particularly in comparison to the French model of budgeting, which has a pot of money allocated to each country for cultural exchange in general, which is then spen t on facilitating a two-way cultural flow.

I n m a n y c o u n t r i e s t h e r e i s a l s o a p o s t - i m p e r i a l s e n s it i v i ty t o w a r d t h e a c t i o n s a n d m e s s a g e s o f th e U K . Re b u t t a l o f argum ents about n eo-colonialism – although v ital in the short term – can in the long term on ly lead to a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ u n l e s s r e a l r e la t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r e s e e n t o b e m u t u a l c a n b e developed. In order to avoid imp otent argum ent falling on deaf ears it is important to hav e the right message and the right positioning on a topic. We can learn from the recent rep ositioning of French pu blic diplomacy, which used to be based on p ushing French cultural exceptionalism and promoting the French language. With the creation of their new d epartment for p ublic diplomacy, 48

Public Diplomacy

One other idea for promoting mutuality in relations with other countr ies is to emp hasise the utility of working closely with institutions in that country to carry out simultaneous m utually


49

beneficial pub lic dip lomacy. Close co-ordination b etween, say, the UK and German governments on the negative aspects of their respective national images wou ld, in the first place obviously address those particular image problems, but more broad ly serve as excellent pu blic diplom acy about that public diplom acy. The British Council and the Goethe Institute in Germany are currently planning activities along these lines, to be preced ed by a reciprocal research project. If the activity seems to be coming from a stand point of mutu al interest, rather than of promotional work by one country in an other, then it will have greater impact and be treated with less suspicion on both sides. In a similar vein, the World Service is looking to expand its role as a forum for debate, moving toward greater interactivity and involvement of it aud iences. The World Service has already had s u c c e s s in t h e ‘ Ta l k i n g P o i n t ’ co m b i n e d r a d i o a n d o n l i n e program me wh ich engages aud iences in discussions with world leaders and with each oth er. For example, after September 11th a special edition of the programme received some 30,000 e-mails from eyewitnesses and people wh o wanted to express their feelings about the events. The third challenge is to move beyond intellectual forms of communication. Recent advertisemen ts for the Morgan Stanley Dea n W itte r cr ed it ca rd h old th at 93 p er cen t o f all commu nication is non-verbal. While it is difficult to tru st their exact figur e, it is clear that man y other factors – experience, emotions, images – will influence p eople’s respon se to our messages. The challenge is to move from sup plying information to capturing the imagination. The British Am bassador to Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer, explained the imp ortance of symbolism in Washington after September 11: “The British stock has never been higher in th e

50

Public Diplomacy

US. It is a combination of word s and symbols – at three events. First, Blair saying “it is an attack on us all.” Then on September 13th the playing of the star-spangled b anner at th e changing of the guard at Buckingham Palace. And third, when the President mad e his add ress to congress, there was Blair up in the Gallery showing his sup port. The combination of these events produ ced a surg e of affection for the UK. What w e are really saying to Americans is that we are the on ly people in the entire cosmos who you can really count on when the going gets tough.” Lury and Gibson point out that “more peop le understand foxhunting as a result of listening to the Archers than from listening to endless pro and anti debates. An episode of Eastenders or Brookside or Coron ation Street will do more to change people’s attitud e towards race or homosexuality or crime than all the work of think ta nks pu t together”. There are ways of projecting an image w hich either changes or reinforces the way people think through th e provision of information – but we m ust constantly examine the forms and content of our d ifferent types o f c o m m u n i c a t io n i f w e a r e g o i n g t o c a p t u r e p e o p l e ’ s imaginations. F o r e x a m p l e , o n e o f t h e m o s t s u c c e s sf u l h u m a n i t a r i a n operations in Afghanistan, UNICEF’s inoculation of 7 million c h i ld r e n i n j u s t 3 w e e k s , w a s o n l y m a d e p o s s i b l e b y t h e extremely effective d issemination of information about the importance and pu rpose of inoculation through a p opular soap opera o n the BBC’s Pashtu n service. This dramat isation of important issues is an excellent way of communicating with broad p opu lations, and h as also been employed to pu t across m e s s a g e s a b o u t H I V a n d A i d s i n V ie t n a m , a n d c o n f l i ct prevention in Indonesia.


51

T h e f o u r t h c h a l l e n g e i s proving your relevance . F o r m a n y people around the world, it is no longer a given that a country like the United Kingdom matters. All the survey d ata shows that people in many countries see the UK as country in decline. In the first British Cou ncil Through Other Eyes survey ‘Tradition/ conservatism/ stasis’ was the most common unprompted sugg estion of the UK’s major weakn ess (with 11 per cent), whilst North ern Ireland came second with 5 per cent. In the follow-up survey, conservatism w as still top, with 19 per cent. This also comes out from focus grou ps. One you ng p rofessional in India said of the British: “They don’t realise that the British Empire is no longer th ere. They still cannot d igest this fact that [they] are not the b est. So it will still take some time for them to come o ut of their shell and start competing w ith the rest of the world.” This is echoed in a focus group respon se for Spain (from Through Other Eyes 2): “They are living in th e past. They still think th at they are the best, but they hav en’t been the best for fifty years and they d on’t know.” This means that in many coun tries where perceptions of the UK are positive, people do n ot see it as a significant p artner. For example in Poland our focus groups showed that though young people were m ore favourable to Britain, they w ould all turn to Germany as a natu ral partner in the EU accession p rocess as a result of their perception s of the relative influen ce of German y in the EU system (see Poland case stud y in Ap pend ix I). Proving our relevance should n ot take the form of protestations in speeches and promotional literature. There is sometimes a tenden cy to believe that by asserting that w e are the 4th largest economy in the w orld, memb ers of the UN Security Council, leading players in Europe, etc, we are dem onstrating our relevance. The challenge is to und erstand the concerns of the target audience and bu ild on areas of mutuality, while making the most of actual British su ccesses to show th at we are relevant through ou r actions. 52

Public Diplomacy

One w ay of proving one’s relevance is to concentrate on ‘niche diplomacy’. Norway is a good examp le of a country that has a voice and presence on the international stage out of proportion to its modest p osition an d unp romising assets. It has achieved this presence through a ruthless prioritisation of its target aud iences and its concentration on a single message – Norway as a force for peace in the w orld. Positioning as a contributor to world peace enables Norway to achieve greater visibility than its s i z e w o u l d o t h e r w i s e w a r r a n t a n d r e b u t s a c cu s a t i o n s o f isolationism. Main activities in this field are conflict resolution activity in the Mid dle East (the Oslo Accords) Sri Lanka and C o l o m b i a , a n d N o r w a y ’ s la r g e a i d b u d g e t . N o r w a y a l s o operates a ‘rapid -reaction force’ to assist in election mon itoring and conflict preven tion – The No rwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and H um an Rights (NORDEM) – that manages to o p e r a t e i n a r o u n d 2 0 co u n t r i e s a n n u a l l y . T h e c lo s e n e s s o f NORDEM’s co-operation with OSCE further emphasises Norway’s contribution to peace with key allies. The Nobel Peace Prize originating in Oslo is a hap py h istorical fact which gives Norway a widely recognised peg to h ang this side of its story on. (See App end ix II.) But this appr oach of demand-led niche diplomacy needs to go beyond strategic messages – it must be reflected in all activities. A s e n i o r o f f i ci a l in t h e B r i t i s h C o u n c i l m a k e s t h i s p o i n t effectively: “In our experience you can only bu ild relationships b y t a p p i n g i n t o p e o p l e ’s n e e d s . Yo u c a n ’ t e n g a g e t h e m meaning fully – i.e. beyond the cocktail chat – in any other w ay. That’s wh y w e market English classes to targets (as a foot in the door), design seminars and other colloquia aroun d practical issues rather than philosophical debate, and d evelop alumni g r o u p s a r o u n d p r o f e s si o n a l n e e d s r a t h e r t h a n ju s t s o c i a l circuitry.”


53

6. Diplomacy by stealth: Working w it h ot hers to achieve our goals Trust is essential for effective pub lic dip lomacy, and yet, for a series of reasons, foreign govern ments find it increasingly ha rd to gain. Some difficulties are structural, to d o w ith the n atural a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a g a p e x i st s b e t w e e n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o n e coun try an d an other (if a message is d elivered from a conspicuously ‘British’ standpoint, or appear to be ‘the Voice of Amer ica’, it will arouse su spicions of partisan ship). Some difficulties are a result of the w ay in w hich all institutions, and particularly govern ment institu tions, are facing increasing public scepticism (In Britain opinion polls by MORI suggest that politicians and g overnmen t ministers are trusted by only 20 per cent of the popu lation, compared to doctors at 91 per cent, TV newsreaders at 71 per cent and even ‘the Ordinary Man in the Street’ at 54 per cent). The situation is even m ore comp lex in countries with totalitarian governments. Other problems are specific to the public diplomacy of Western countries and governm ents, and linked to pr evailing issues of international p o w e r s t r u c t u r e s a n d g e o p o l i t i ca l h i s t o r y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , obstacles for effectively pu tting across a message to a foreign popu lation layer on top of one another, making the job of public diplom acy increasingly complicated. This raft of problems cannot be easily circumvented. They can, however, be alleviated; and central strategies for doing that inv olve working locally, a commitment to independ ence, a focus on m utuality, and an awareness of p ositioning. The traditional appr oach to pu blic diplom acy activity overseas, be it cultural festivals, seminars, economic pr omotion or policy adv ocacy, is that it shou ld all be topp ed and tailed with “a few words from the Ambassador.” In fact it wou ld be far more u seful 54

Public Diplomacy

in man y cases to keep British governm ental involvement with an event as inconspicuous as p ossible. Where possible messages should be d isseminated by p eople with something in common with the target aud ience – Raymond Blanc made a far more convincing advocate for th e safety and quality of British beef in France than the agricultural attaché at the embassy, or the Ambassador himself. And the decision to arrange visits of prom inent Mu slims living in Britain to Islamic countries in the wake of the 11 September w as a m ore convincing d emonstration of British respect for Islam than ministerial pronou ncements. The general lesson is that if a message will attract distrust simply because it is perceived to be coming from a foreign government, make sure it ap pears to be coming from a foreign government as little as p ossible. Increasingly, in order for a state to h ave its voice heard, and to have influence on events ou tside its direct control, it must work through organisations and networks that a r e s e p a r a t e f r o m , i n d e p e n d e n t o f , a n d e v e n c u l t u r a l ly suspicious toward governmen t itself. The contribution of NGOs to the p ush for restrictions on the use of landmines, for example, d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s th a t c a n c o m e f r o m partnerships with such group s. Similar benefits could equally come from wo rking m ore closely with foreign p olitical parties, harnessing the power of brands, or from realising the potential inherent in the growing diaspora that have accompanied the increasing incidence of migration. Yet in order for such potential leverage to be well emp loyed, governmen ts must exhibit sensitivity to the peculiar circumstances that surrou nd any such alliance, and mu st be aware of the kinds of p itfalls that m ay accompan y it.

NGO Diplomacy W o r k i n g w i t h n o n - s t a t e a c to r s s u c h a s N G O s i s c e n t r a l t o effective commu nication with civil societies in other coun tries (and h ence central to influencing their governm ents) because Diplomacy by Stealth

55

they hav e three key resources that are not necessarily easily available to a foreign governm ent: credibility, expertise, and app ropriate networks. Whilst people are often quick to question the motivations behind the d iplomatic pronou ncements of a state or suspicious of information relayed directly by a government, NGOs like Amnesty or Oxfam have a longstanding repu tation for indepen dence – and hence a credibility – that it is not feasible for a governm ent to bu ild up itself. The Environics International Global Issues survey of 1000 peop le in each of the G 20 coun tries found th at 65 per cent of people said that they tr usted N GOs to work in the best interests of society, compared to only 45 per cent trusting national governments to do the same. Secondly, these organisations possess great expertise within a range of issues which, coupled with their reputation for independ ence, gives them authority. Lastly, as campaigning organisations as w ell as centres of expertise, they have access to networ ks of activists, experts an d foreign p oliticians and ar e experienced at marshalling those networks to exert pressure in a given policy area. No d iplomatic mission p ossesses (or wou ld wish to p ossess) the capability to organise demonstrations on the streets, nor are they well positioned to co-ordinate sustained lobbying camp aigns. There are over 20,000 transn ational NGO networks already active on the world stage (of which 90 per cent were formed d uring the last 30 years) many of whom could make effective partn ers for the cond uct of public diplomacy. There are already examp les of the Foreign Office seconding an d then perm anently taking on employees of certain environmental NGOs, people from Amnesty International in its human rights sections, and even recruiting its Head of Policy Planning from Oxfam, but co-operation on an organisational level could be even m ore fruitful.

56

Public Diplomacy

It is im po rtan t, ho w ever, to b e clear-eyed abou t su ch relationships, as they bring their own peculiar difficulties. In forming alliances with the non -state sector, government w ould essentially be seeking to exp loit synergies between its own agenda and that of independ ent people or organisations that could be more or less great, and extend to broader or narrower policy areas. The obvious corollary of this is that governmen t must be more relaxed about deviations from the ‘party line’ between itself and its partn ers in areas that are peripheral, and it should be p repared to accept the necessary relinqu ishment of c o n t r o l t h a t w o u l d g o w i t h s u c h a n a l l i a n c e. Eq u a l l y , t h e government side must be aware of the impact of differences in organisational culture w ith the NGO sector; NGOs have a much more informal culture, and tend to work on a ‘want-to-know’ r a t h e r t h a n a ‘ n e e d - t o -k n o w ’ b a s i s . Go v e r n m e n t h a s t o b e prepared to accept th e impact these differences have on w orking practices and on information d ispersal within a given p roject. There have been several notable successes that have come ou t of government co-operation with the non-state sector. For example, the prob lem of ‘conflict diamond s’ being smu ggled on to th e w o r l d m a r k e t , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y f u n d i n g s o m e o f A f r ic a ’s bloodiest civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola an d Liberia, could not hav e been effectively tackled w ithout sustained government action alongside N GOs and business. Sovereign governments, includ ing th e UK and Canad a, acted to br ing togeth er representatives from the d iamond ind ustry, particularly De Beers and the World Diamond Council, and NGOs like Global Witness and Hu man Rights Watch in the ongoing ‘Kimberly Process’, und er the aegis of the UN . The resulting steps taken to regulate international diamond trade and to seek to ensure that no d iamond money found its way back into conflict zones could only have been carried ou t by such a coalition.

Diplomacy by Stealth

57

Another example of synergies between governm ent desires and capabilities and those of the N GO sector bringing some success is the Jubilee 2000 process. The organ isation of a su ccessful campaign of d ebt relief faced two stru ctural problems: in the first place the key institutional mov er, the G7/ 8, lacked an y institutional continuity; and in th e second p lace, debt relief as a political issue w as of low salience for governmen ts. In essence, fine word s at G7 sum mits could not be translated directly into action as th e G7 lacks any kind of bu reaucracy or adm inistrative capacity. Equally, it was also difficult to persu ade gov ernmen ts to act, as debt relief was not a bread and b utter issue for any significant prop ortion of their electorates, and presented in the short term only visible costs, without concrete benefits. However, an informal coalition of a Gordon Brown/ Claire Short axis in the British Cabinet and a coterie of campaignin g NGOs was able to lau nch an effective process at the Birmingh am s u m m i t i n 1 99 8. G o v e r n m e n t p r o v i d e d t h e i n s t i tu t i o n a l continuity tha t was lacking, whilst the NGO sector was able to exploit its resources and expertise to keep the issue high on political agendas. One final, famous, example is the highly successful campaign to eradicate the use of landmines wor ldwide. In a strikingly successful piece of non-state based diplomacy, the Canadian and Norw egian governm ents were able to ally themselves with several anti-landmine N GOs and together p lace a landm ine ban f o r m a l l y o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n d a s , w h i l s t ca m p a i g n i n g successfully to raise the pro file of the issue inform ally. The resu lt was the establishment of a new international norm throu gh skilled d ip lom atic e xp loitation of a syn ergy betw een government and non-government sections of global civil society. The opportu nities for adv antageous relations with the non -state sector are also more nu merou s and easier to grasp for the UK

58

Public Diplomacy

b e c a u s e o f t h e la r g e n u m b e r o f w o r l d c l a s s N G O s w i t h headqu arters in the UK. Examples includ e Oxfam, Amnesty International, Save the Children an d Action Aid. Wh ilst the government has m ade efforts to include N GOs in its decisionmaking and build broader links with them, much more could be done. One idea wou ld be to formalise relations through send ing representatives to some of these NGOs – thus allowing a continuity of contact and the capability for swifter reaction if it were needed.

Diaspora Diplomacy O n e o f t h e c e n t r a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e i n c r ea s e d v o l u m e o f international migration in th e latter half of the twentieth century is that ther e now exist ‘living links’ – relations, friends, former business partners – with virtually every country in the w orld. One striking measure of this is that London is one of the world’s most linguistically mixed cities, where over 300 languages are in everyday use. T h e r e h a v e b e en a t t e m p t s t o t a p i n t o a n d s t r e n g t h en t h e diplomatic potential which those links represent. One example is the British Council’s ‘Connecting Futu res’ project (mention ed above) which, in the a ftermath of September 11th, seeks to bring together young p eople from ethnic minority groups in th e UK with young people from Muslim countries from Nigeria to Egypt and Indonesia and attempt to improve their mutual und erstand ing. Another examp le is the Foreign Office’s high profile dispatch of a consulate team to the Muslim pilgrimage, the Hajj, which was intended both to p rovide assistance to the 20,000 British Muslims w ho p erform th e Hajj, and as an initiative in cultur al relations. The British Coun cil in Ind ia has also instituted an innovative program me of events and activities that shows the contribution of the diaspora to UK culture and business.


59

The untapp ed poten tial in the UK diaspora could, with sustained inv olvement, yield several advanta ges to UK foreign policy. Firstly, and most ob viously, it can help fill the dem and for l a n g u a g e s k i ll s t h a t h a s b e e n h i g h l i g h t e d b y t h e e v e n t s following September 11th, where Pashtun , Farsi and Arabic s p e a k e r s w e r e m u c h s o u g h t a f t e r . A s i m il a r sh o c k fr o m elsewhere in the world would make similar demands. Furthermore, such links und oubtedly help p rovide the cultural know ledge, political insight and hum an intelligence that is necessary for successful foreign policy. It has often been o b s e r v e d , f o r i n s ta n c e , t h a t t h e m i s t a k e s a n d u n p l e a sa n t surprises that mark the history of events like the Vietnam War or the Iranian Revolution might have been avoided h ad there been more compr ehensive and intimate kn owledge of those societies available to policy-makers. Daniel Ellsberg, the Departm ent of Defense official who leaked the Penta gon Pap ers on US decisionmaking in Vietnam, has for instance laid great emph asis on what he asserts is a fact that no official in the US administration at the time of the war’s escalation “could have p assed a m id-term paper in Vietnamese History”. The thickness of relations that the UK’s thriving diaspora repr esent should be a great ad vantage in redu cing misappreh ensions of other societies. There are also importan t economic benefits to be had by focusing on th e diaspora as a chann el of pu blic diplom acy: tourism, trade, investment, skills. James Rauch of the University of California, San Diego, has argu ed th at over time a 10 per cent increase in immigrants to the US will increase US exports to th e country of origin by 4.7 per cent and US imports from the country of origin by 8.3 per cent. Professor Rauch also reports that in Canada a 10 per cent increase in immigrants from a given country eventually increases Canadian exports to that country by 1.3 per cent and imports from th ere by 3.3 per cent”.

60

Public Diplomacy

Lastly, the nu rturing of talent from those diaspora not only provides governm ent with representatives who are sensitive to, and possess credibility with, foreign p opu lations, it also is excellent pu blic dip lomacy itself for attracting furth er talent from those coun tries to the UK. It is a measure of how far there is to come in this regard (and consequently of wh at potential lies untap ped) that there is, as yet, no one from an ethnic minority in the up per echelons of the Foreign and Commonw ealth Office, British Council, TPUK, or Invest UK – and only a ha nd ful of individuals on middle management. There are, however, dangers and caveats which mu st be borne in mind in pu blic diplomacy d ealings with diaspora. The first cautionary tale to be aw are of is the history of the capture of aspects of US foreign policy by ethnic groups, preventing the US governm ent taking action wh ich otherwise it would consider to be the most ad vantageous. There have been some signs that similar ethn ic interests have taken over some sections of local politics in the UK – it is, for instance, not a healthy effect of such diaspora politics that local government elections in Bradford can concentrate on problems in Kashmir, rather than in West Yorkshire. A second imp ortant, and easily overlooked, aspect of this is the complexity of relations between d ifferent diasp ora of the same country. A focus group we organised with young professionals in Delhi revealed very different attitudes toward the Indian diaspora in the US and the UK. Indians in the UK are common ly seen as low-skilled, low wage, and n on-aspirational – an image essentially dominated by the corner shop and the import-export trade. In stark contrast the US Indian d iaspora is seen in a very positive light, as ambitious and highly skilled – an image heavily influenced by the perceived p revalence of Indians in the IT industry in Silicon Valley (see India case study,Appendix I). One


61

respond ent said: “I think that the comm unity in the UK are traders, merchants, and businessmen. They are not professionals (if you d on’t includ e doctors). In the US Indian’s are the smart set and that sort of perception generates a certain amou nt of affinity and warmth, which in the current situation is not there between th e Indians and the English”. The conclusion that s h o u l d b e d r a w n f r o m t h i s d i f f er e n t i a t io n i s t h a t a t t e n t io n s h o u l d b e p a i d t o i m p r o v i n g t h e i m a g e , n o t ju s t o f t h e U K generally, but of sp ecific diaspora within it if their full potential is to be utilised. Lastly, there is a considerable danger th at governm ent relations with the UK diaspora become captured by stereotypes or overconcentrate on traditionally defined “community leaders”. There is a significant risk that conception s of dealing with diasp ora become racialised, and concentrate largely on links b e t w e e n n o n - w h i t e e t h n i c g r o u p s . I f t h i s w e r e a l lo w e d t o h a p p e n t h e n t h e e q u a l l y a d v a n t a g e o u s l i n k s t h a t co u l d b e developed with, for example, the significant UK Polish diaspora, or those of Australia or the US, might be overlooked . Linked to this is the dan ger that the government seek to commu nicate with such commu nities through their self-app ointed leaders. To do this is to damagingly homogenise an ethnic group into a small coterie of generally male, midd le-aged representatives. In order for public diplomacy through the diaspora to be effective it mu st instead take in and seek to employ the full diversity of that ethnic group.

Political Party Diplomacy A third area wh ere non-government to government d iplomacy could be very fru itful is in buildin g relations between p olitical p a r t i e s o f d i f fe r e n t c o u n t r i e s . M a n y p r o b l e m s b e t w e e n governmen ts that sup erficially appear to be d iplomatic are, unavoid ably, difficulties that revolve arou nd perceived p olitical

62

Public Diplomacy

differences. For example, one important contributing factor to the frosty relations that h ave sometimes prevailed between Britain and France in the last few years h as been the su spicion is some parts of the French left toward New Labour’s perceived neo-liberal standp oint. Michael Jay, the perm anent Un der Secretary at the Foreign Office and former Ambassad or to Pa ris explains: “The French perception of Blairite liberalism as being ‘Ultimate Liberalism’ without an y concern for social infrastructure got v ery mu ch in the way of persuad ing the French to adopt a liberalising agenda in the EU. People who d idn’t wan t to listen to these things fell b a c k o n t h e s t e r e o ty p e s o f r a i lw a y s n o t w o r k i n g a n d N H S waiting lists. What gets across in France is that this is wh at hap pens if you follow British policies – rather th an th e fact that these are real problems that that an imaginative and energetic governm ent is comm itted to solving in an innovative way….In this sense economic and social misconceptions are more unhelpful than cultural ones….There is a lot to be said for closer contact between p olitical parties, but there are questions of clarity of objectives and monitoring that would need to be sorted out.” The relations between political parties of the same broad stripe in different countr ies can be a vitally importan t dimension of their overall foreign relations, and one that th e United Kingdom has been very p oor at man aging because of its overemph asis on a structure of diplomacy based on states. Br i t a i n h a s l o n g b e e n s u s p i c io u s o f m i x in g p o l i t ic s a n d diplomacy. It’s vision of diploma cy is heavily influenced by the Palmerstonian outlook of the mid-nineteenth century: what international relations scholars refer to as ‘realism’. This app roach, which imagines that p olitical ideas an d p oliticians


63

may com e and go, but the interests of Britain remain etern al, is e v e r m o r e d i s c r ed i t e d i n a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w o r l d . O n a g r o w i n g l i s t o f i s su e s – e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , s o c ia l r i g h t s , agriculture, drugs, terrorism, the environmen t, human itarian intervention – Britain’s interests are neither immutable, nor particular to Britain alone. Instead, such issues can only be dealt with th rough a deliberative political process. Increased links between political parties, especially w ithin the EU coun tries, represen t one way to d eal with that h istoric shift, and the UK’s outd ated idea of the political independ ence of diplomacy can only serve to cripple us in that new en vironment. Other countries have been prep ared to foster such relations. One e x a m p l e i s G e r m a n y ’ s K o n r a d A d e n h a u e r St i f t u n g a n d Freidrich Ebert Stiftung – large, politically oriented institutes that receive substantial amou nts of state fund ing to facilitate policy d ebate and exchange between d ifferent coun tries (see box overleaf). The adv antages w hich such efforts prod uce can be placed und er three headings. Firstly, by nurturing relations b e t w e e n t h e p o l i t i c ia n s o f d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , i t m a k e s diplomacy easier by giving both sides a clear idea of the political positioning and possibilities of the oth er. Secondly it allows a channel for policy exchange that repr esents the infrastructure required to renew the intellectual capital of political parties, and for bringing in new id eas to debate. Thirdly, it helps d evelop an international outlook within parties that are not at that time in government that can be very advantageous in smoothing transition between ad ministrations. It is interesting to note that the only UK bu dget a vailable for activities remotely similar to t h a t o f t h e G e r m a n S t if t u n g e n i s t h r o u g h t h e W e s t m i n s t e r Found ation for Democracy, and is therefore only available in transition countries. As soon the tran sition to a dem ocratic civil society begins to pr esent the d esired opp ortunities for closer cooperation, the infrastru cture for capitalising on th ose links

64

Public Diplomacy

disappears. But it is important to recognise that there will need to be clear safe-guard s to ensure th at the activities prom oted ar e a p p r o p r i a t e . It w o u l d b e t r e m e n d o u s l y d a m a g i n g f o r a gover nm ent to u se its r esou rces an d p osition on the international stage to secure party political capital for itself. I m p r o v i n g l i n k s b e t w e e n p o l i t ic a l p a r t i e s w o u l d a l s o n o t necessarily involve the sizeable bu reaucracy and considerable expense of the Germ an Stiftung system. (The Friedrich Ebert S t if t u n g a l o n e h a s a n a n n u a l b u d g e t o f D M 2 0 4 m i ll i o n , distributed to over 90 countries.) Instead, it wou ld be m uch more p ractical to expan d th e British Coun cil’s remit into a p olicy exchange role - particularly within the other EU countries where such p olitical links are m ost vital. Alternatively, a d esk officer, seconded from each of the three main p olitical parties, could be seconded to the British Cou ncil or embassy in each EU country with a remit to foster cross-border party relations. In either case the central point is that political parties should be treated in the same way as other NGOs, and provided w ith fund s to develop international networks that are ad vantageous to the UK in a similar way to those of Oxfam or Amn esty.

Brand Diplomacy Over the last twenty years brand s have become one of the most important channels for transmitting national identities to consum ers. Whereas earlier generations m ay have iden tified countries primarily through their history, political institutions or high culture, today brand s can form an important p art of the national image of some countr ies. Some brand s such as Coca Cola or Levi’s have always d erived mu ch of their emotive pull from associations with the A merican w ay of life, its values and freedom . But in man y situations this formu la is reversed . Very


65

The German Stiftungen The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung The Freidrich-Ebert-Stift ung has a threefold aim: fur therin g a democratic, pluralistic political culture through political education; facilitating access to higher education by pr oviding scholarships to young people; and contributing t o internati onal understanding and co-operation wherever possible “ to avert a fresh outbreak of war and conflict.” The Stif tun g has a tot al of 581 staff in th e head offi ce in Bonn, the six educational centres, the t welve regional o ff ices and abroad. It has off ices in 90 countr ies and is active in more t han 100. Its activities include political education within Germany and the award of scholarships (1700 scholarships were awarded i n 2000, 340 of those to f oreign n ationals.) Internationally, it is involved in projects in the fields of economic and social development, socio-political education and information, the media and communication and providing advisory services. Approximately half of t he Foundation’ s annual budget is devoted t o this co-operation w ith partners in the trade u nions, polit ics, th e business and academic communities, the media and the arts. Its aims are differentiated between developing and industrialised countries. In developing countries it wor ks toward: the improvement of political and social framework conditions; the democratisation of social structur es; the strengt hening of free tr ade unions; the improvement of communication and media structures; regional and internati onal media co-operation;regional co-operation between states and different interest groups; and overcoming the North-South conflict. In ind ustrialised countri es the Friedrich-Ebert-Stift ung seeks to “ foster dialogue amongst all democratic forces with the aim of bringing about a balance of interests, solving confli cts and developing policy opt ions.” In transitional countries particularly in Eastern Europe the Friedrich-EbertStiftung is involved in supporting the transition to a market economy and establishing a civil society, particularly in the fields of labour market, social, environment al and media policy. It has a budget of approximat ely 204 million DM (in 2000); coming mainly from central and regional government f unding.

66

Public Diplomacy

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung The Konrad-Adenauer-Stif tung is aff iliated t o t he Christian Democratic movement, and emerged f rom t he ‘Society for Christian Democratic Education Work’ founded in 1956. It was named after the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic in 1964. At present, it operates over 200 projects and progr ammes in mor e than 100 countries. It has a budget of DM 200m of which more than DM 100m is earmarked fo r int ernational activiti es. It is funded by t he Federal Mini stry f or Economic Cooperation and Development as well as by the Foreign Off ice. It w orks with foreign political parties, parliaments and governments; education and r esearch instit utes; universities; industry confederati ons and t rade union s; cooperative societies; women’s, environmental, and self-help organisations; and the media. Its activities include: • • • • •

political education (Only in Germany) conduct of scientif ic and fact-finding research for political projects scholarship grants research int o the histor y of Christian Democracy support and encouragement for European unification, internat ional understanding, and development-policy cooperation.

few people have been to Japan or Sweden, but they hav e very p o w e r f u l a s s o ci a t i o n s w i t h t h e s e co u n t r i e s t h r o u g h t h e i r purchases of branded produ cts – whether it is perceptions of technological sophistication in Sony, Nintend o or Tamagoshis, or d esign simplicity throu gh IKEA, Saab and Ericsson. This is because, as Wally Olins has argu ed, “Brands hav e become highly visible objects of consum ption w hich have b ecome a significant focus for th e ind ividual’s loyalties. Global brand s, some m ass mark et like Nike, Coca-Cola, Burger King, others e x p e n s i v e l ik e P r a d a , G u c c i a n d H e r m e s d e m o n s t r a t e t h e individual’s need for self-definition. These global brands also provide the comfort of representing an idea – youth, energy, Diplomacy by Stealth

67

good taste, money and so on. Individuals from every nation seem to be su sceptible to this extraordinary phen omenon. While b r a n d l o y a l t y i s n o s u b s t i t u t e f o r n a t i o n a l i t y , i t c er t a i n l y complements it”.

Image 2: Brand Value Distributed by Country Bermuda Total 0% Denmark Total 0% Finland Total 4% FranceTotal 5%

T h e b r a n d i n g c o n s u l t a n c y In t e r b r a n d h a s d e v e l o p e d a method ology to measure the value of global brands an d regularly prod uces a league table. The latest figures show the e n o r m o u s d i s c r ep a n c y b e t w e e n t h e s t r e n g t h o f d i ff e r en t countries’ brands. Over tw o thirds of brand s (68 per cent) worth over $1 billion are American while no other country accounts for more th an 6 p er cent of brand s. In fact Coca-Cola alone is worth as mu ch as the combined bran ds of any oth er country. Britain comes second to th e United States with 6 per cent, bu t its high valued br and s (Unilever and Diageo) are involved in alcohol and m und ane household pr odu cts. These figures show the total dom inance of the US and provide yet an other clue to the US’s dominant place in people’s perceptions, but they only tell part of the story as they are based on the market capitalisation of the b r a n d s . I n f a c t s o m e o f t h e Br i t is h b r a n d s w i t h t h e m o s t resonance are not compa nies. For example the BBC brand has one of the highest recognitions in the w orld, and it is the only internet brand that trad es globally in the same league as Yahoo, Google, MSN or AOL. This relationship between brand s and national perceptions is pow erful and complex. Simon Anh olt is one of many auth ors who have pointed ou t that the dominant perceptions which some of these national images create make it very difficult for ‘non-typical’ comp anies to p romote themselves. This is the experience of the Italian Olivetti, who stru ggled against th e dominant perceptions of Italy as a fashion or style producer or the German comp any Hu go Boss who feel constrained by the antisceptic images of German engineering and technical efficiency. Perhap s the d ecision of British-based consum er 68

Public Diplomacy

Germany Total 5% US Total 68%

Ireland Total 0% Italy Total 1% Japan Total 5% Korea Total 1% Netherlands Total 1% Sweden Total 1% Swit zerland Total 5%

UK Total 6%

Chart and data courtesy of Interbrand. For t able of data see Appendix III

electronics chain Dixons to call their own-brand products Matsui (and thu s take on the persona of a Japanese compan y) is the best examp le of this clash taking p lace. It is for this reason that th e main brand s that have wan ted to associate themselves with Britishness have been premium bran ds that trade on heritage s u c h a s A s p r e y ’ s o r Ja g u a r , w h o h a v e f o r m e d a n i n f o r m a l grouping called the Walpole Group which organises activities to promote traditional perceptions of Britain and explores how these different brands can exploit synergies in their respective markets.


69

This means that although businesses and their brands are an importan t part of the UK’s face in many p arts of the world, it is difficult to enlist their resources to chang e perceptions of the United Kingdom . Most businesses do not see p romoting Britain as their responsibility either because they prefer not to be seen as British companies, or they do not see it as their job. But although m a n y c o m p a n i e s a r e s t r i v in g t o t r a n s c e n d t h e i r n a t i o n a l identities and become ‘global brand s’, very few have achieved this in pra ctice – they are often seen in th e phr ase of Brian Boylan from Wolff Olins as being “global from som ewher e”. Research by BMP shows that whatever th eir aspirations, they are likely to be constrained by the advan tages or disadvantages of national stereotypes for different sectors of the economy. T h e f a i lu r e t o i n v o l v e b u s i n e s s s u c c e s sf u l l y i n n a t i o n a l prom otion has been th reefold. First, it has been difficult to persuad e more than a sm all number of very obviously British compan ies (such as British Airw ays) that p erceptions of Britain a r e a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n o f m a r g i n a l im p o r t a n c e t o t h e m . Secondly, businesses have been w ary of getting caught up in a controversial political project like ‘Cool Britannia’. And thirdly, it has been seen as a governmen t scheme to get money ou t of compan ies, rather than a strategic use of their assets to imp rove their market position and the national brand. If this situation is to be turn ed rou nd , new initiatives will need to be seen to start w ith busin ess priorities rather t han governmen ts, and business mu st be in the driving seat. In the l o n g - t e r m , i t w o u l d b e p o s i t i v e fo r a g r o u p o f m o d e r n , aspirational companies such as Virgin, Psion, Dyson or Chan nel 4 to organise promotional camp aigns that showcase a mod ern d y n a m i c Br i t a in , i n t h e s a m e w a y t h a t t h e W a l p o l e G r o u p reflects the British heritage bran d. The r esult could be similar to the situation in Japan w here its reputation as a prod ucer of high-

70

Public Diplomacy

quality consum er goods has n ot displaced the traditional images of nature, geisha girls and cherry blossom still used by the Japan Tourist Office alongside m ore mod ern images. H owever, a sh ift has taken place in people’s ‘top of mind’ picture of Japan, which is predominantly contemporary, compared with the UK’s, where it is predominantly traditional. The challenge is to reinforce contemporary images of the UK to move th e balance of young people’s ‘top of mind’ image. But in th e short-term, it is probably more sensible to begin with a manageable project which is evidently in the interests of all big companies in Britain. One solution which has been p roposed by the management consultants McKinseys is the idea of organising a c a m p a i g n d e s i g n e d t o a t t r a c t t a l e n t t o B r i t a in . T a l e n t i s increasingly mobile desp ite immigration restrictions – looking for the best opportu nities and lifestyles it can find in th e world. In Silicon Valley it is estimated that 15 per cent of successful entrepreneurs are first generation Indian immigrants. London already has a good story to tell on the bread and bu tter issues of political freedom, gend er equality, education, tax and legal systems w hich mean s the battle for skills is in the softer, more cultura l territory. It lays claim to hu ge strength s in its location (Europe), language (English), time zone (half-way between New York and Tokyo), social infrastructure and academic/ creative excellence. This accounts for th e fact that it is already the m ost pop ular location for European comp anies headquar ters (with 107 compared to 37 in Paris, 14 in Brussels and 10 in Frankfurt). T h e s e co m p a n i e s s h o u l d b e t a r g e t e d f o r s u p p o r t o n a n aggressive campaign including prizes at top business, creative and scientific institutions around the world . This ties in with th e recent announ cement by the Hom e Secretary David Blunkett to double the num ber of work p ermits for highly skilled workers, which presents an obvious and legitimate opportun ity for a business-led camp aign in this area.


71

7: Good Practice and Gaps in the Spectrum of British Institutions Br i t a i n h a s s o m e o f t h e m o s t e f f e ct i v e a n d e n v i e d p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y i n s t i t u t i o n s a r o u n d t h e w o r l d . T h e BBC W o r l d Service consistently outp erforms all its rivals in terms of reach, impact and reputation. The British Council has built on its strong identity with wid e-ranging reforms carried out in recent years that have been seen as a model by the French, German a nd Norw egian Governments in their recent reviews of cultural relations. Invest UK has overseen consistently higher levels of inward investment than any other EU country. And there are an array of other institutions from TPUK and the British Tourist Authority to the Westminster Found ation for Democracy and DFID whose w ork around the world brings benefit to the UK. And yet the wh ole of this spectrum of institutions and activities remain s less than the su m of its parts. Despite all the talk of ‘joined-up government’, ‘strategic co-ordination’, and the establishment of various reviews of UK pu blic diplomacy, there is still no overarching strategy to ensure th at we are pr omoting the right messages and span ning the three dimensions of public dip lomacy. The table below shows that there are some m ajor gaps w hich are not adequately covered by the institutions at our disposal. In this chapter, we w ill examine the institutions as a spectrum and see whether there are gaps between them wh ich a r e n o t y e t f i ll e d . W e h a v e d i v i d e d o u r a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e spectrum of institutions under four h eadings: the three dimen sions of public diplomacy; strategic co-ordination and planning; d ifferentiation; and evaluation. 72

Public Diplomacy

Table 3: How do British Institutions Span the Three Dimensions of Public Diplomacy? Purpose

Reactive

Proactive

Relationship building

Political/ Military

G O O D at post level.

GA P on promotion of

MIXED . Some good

MIXED work with London-based correspondents.

strategic messages, though some single issues campaigns.

initiatives British Council and Embassies, but no strategy to work with political parties. Danger of Gap emerging as opinion-makers increasingly turn from radio to TV.


GA P on general promotion. G O O D with specialist audiences.

G O O D work by Invest

Economic

MIXED work with London-based correspondents. Society/ Culture


MIXED work with London-based correspondents.

GA P on popular culture. G O O D . British Council

on arts events.

UK and TPUK.

G O O D . British Council

with professional groups. BBC reaches wider audience.

The Three Dimensions We argue tha t we n eed a clearer distribution of responsibility according to the dimensions rather than subject matter. It is clear that th e FCO need s to be the lead institu tion on new s man agement, w ith the FCO, British Council and World Service leading on p olitical and cu ltural relationship-building and TPUK playing that role in th e economic sphere. For strategic commu nications, the FCO, British Coun cil, TPUK and Invest UK all need to d evote more resources in all three spheres. News M anagement The official governm ent structu res that are in p lace for dealing with the m edia were d evised before the era of globalisation and the 24-hour global new s-cycle. Most embassies do an excellent job of respon ding to issu es as they arise at country level, but they are not able to deal with many stories because they are in the w r o n g p l a c e . R e p o r t in g f r o m p o s t s in E u r o p e a n d N o r t h America suggests that the most imp ortant source of stories

Good Practice and Gaps in the Spectrum of British Institutions

73

abou t Britain are wr itten by the 1,700 Lond on-based foreign correspondents. Wh ile th e For eign an d Com m on w ealt h Office’s N ew s Department will talk to the p ress about ‘foreign’ news stories, they will refer enquiries about domestic stories to the relevant d e p a r t m e n t s . Bu t t h e p r e s s o f f ic e s o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Transport or the Home Office are not equipp ed to un derstand the international repercussions of their actions. When they are going throu gh a crisis, they w ill natur ally be primarily con cern ed abo u t d om estic p ress cove rag e. Fo reig n correspondents (sometimes jokingly referred to by press officers in do mestic dep artmen ts as ‘no votes TV’) will inevitably get a second class service – struggling to get access to ministers, information and assistance. Our research also found th at press an d p ublic affairs officers in several British embassies hav e had difficulty getting clear information out of domestic departments. One official complained : “The lines MAFF prod uced m ay have been fine in t h e U K b u t t h e y f a i le d t o a d d r e s s c o n c e r n s o v e r s e a s . T h e ‘formal’ end of foot and mou th was ann ounced at mid night with no notice to embassies and n o app arent discussion between DEFRA and FCO about how to deal with it in pu blic diplomacy terms.” Because there is so little access to Govern ment sources man y foreign corresponden ts will rely on dom estic med ia as a source for their stories. This means that foreign cover age of the UK often repeats the sensationalist accounts of th e UK media – without giving the context which peop le in the country know throu gh experience. It is therefore not un common for Britain to b e d e s c r i b e d a s ‘a t h i r d w o r l d c o u n t r y ’ w i t h a c r u m b l i n g infrastructure – accepted as rhetoric by the domestic British

74

Public Diplomacy

aud ience, but easy to tak e out of context in the foreign press. T h i n g s h a v e g o t b e t t e r s i n c e S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h , b u t A l a s t a ir Campbell admits that there is still a long way to go: “We haven’t got brilliant links out to the foreign med ia. They are n ot as good as they shou ld be. And the issue is time, or the lack of it. For all that peop le talk about m y great army of spin-doctors and all the rest of it, we don ’t have that m uch in term s of actual resources. I ’m d o i n g a b r i e f i n g n e x t w e e k w i t h a l l t h e A m e r i c a n correspondents, we do regu lar briefings with the Arab media at the mom ent. But to be frank that is likely to slip if the Middle East calms dow n a bit. And at another p oint, you will sud denly find th at you are having to d eal much more with the European London-based media.” T h e r e i s cl e a r l y a n e e d t o h a v e a t t h e v e r y l e a s t b e t t er c o o r d i n a t i o n , b u t i d e a l l y a l s o s om e o n e i n e a c h G o v e r n m e n t dep artment w ho is responsible for dealing with the foreign med ia. There are also important qu estions about whether the Government Information and Commun ications Service should not be the source of press and public affairs officers in embassies a r o u n d t h e w o r l d , a n d w h e t h e r i t m i g h t n o t b e p o s s ib l e t o develop a cadre of internationally-minded exp erts within the service.

Strategic communications The biggest gap in the public diplomacy armou ry is at the level of proactive communications – both in terms of activities and the platforms that are covered. In the econom ic sphere, proactive c o m m u n i ca t i o n s a r e l a r g e l y r e s t r i ct e d t o t r a d e f a ir s a n d promotional camp aigns amon gst specialist audiences. There is a better record at getting to broad er aud iences in the cultural sphere, w ith some British Cou ncil offices appointing pu blic relations p rofessionals and using exhibitions such as the Design

Good Practice and Gaps in the Spectrum of British Instit utions

75

Coun cil’s ‘Millennium Prod ucts’ to generate positive stories about UK innov ation and creativity. The fashion week in Delhi was a good example of prestige elite events being u sed to create a mu ltiplier effect which ensured positive features about th e UK over a nu mber of month s (see India case study, Ap pend ix I). Other exam ples include the ‘Typiqu ement British’ festival of over 200 films at the Pom pid ou centre in Paris wh ich attracted rave reviews and aud iences of over 70,000. There is, however, a major gap in the u se of popular culture to change p erceptions of the United Kingdom , as the British Coun cil’s arts dep artment concentrates on experimental or h igh brow art. This is worrying as British popular culture produces some of the most visible icons of the country who could be used as d oor-openers for other activities and messages. Wha t is more th e British Coun cil’s Through Other Eyes survey showed that although figures from British popular culture are among the most recognisable in the world, man y people think they are American.

76

positive news stories by orchestrating ev ents such as a football match inv olving British soldiers in Afghanistan an d visits to London by H amid Kharzai and Dick Cheney on the sixth-month anniversary of September 11th. This sort of forward p lanning and thinking should become more of a defining feature of the commun ication team s of the British missions abroad.

In the p olitical sphere, things are even more p atchy. Press and public affairs officers spend most of their time reacting to issues that come up or putting out th e latest messages about individual p o l i c y a r e a s . So f a r , p r o a c t i v e c o m m u n i c a t io n s h a v e b e e n restricted to dealing with difficult issues such as the French beef ban, the MacBride legislation in the Un ited States or the war against terrorism. The British Embassy in Pa ris organized an extremely effective campaign over BSE including outreach work with local and regional med ia, tours by British vets and chefs as well as events on CJD and food safety with th e British Council (see Appendix I).

Part of the problem is that few of the resou rces available are used as pa rt of a strategic effort. In Londo n, the FCO’s Public D i p l o m a c y D e p a r t m e n t p r o d u c e s m a t e r i a l fo r r a d i o a n d t e l e v is i o n w h i c h i s o f q u e s t i o n a b l e u s e . I n p a r t i c u l a r i t i s questionable whether p roducing official government news feeds is a viable tool for influence – and there are very few attemp ts to track what u se is made of them. While some of the feature program mes, such as a documentary on Mu slims living in the UK, have a m uch clearer pur pose, the majority of the outpu t is not linked to clear political priorities. Emba ssies have claimed that the range of printed an d au diovisual resources are often inappropriate: too generic to be relevant for a particular country, a n d o n l y a v a i l a b l e i n E n g l is h . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e l i a n c e o n printed publications distributed from a central source means that time-limited material – such as the mon thly ‘Snapshot UK’ – may simply arrive too late to be useful. Above all the materials p r o d u c e d h a v e t h e f e e l o f ‘ o f f ic i a l ’ i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h und ermines their credibility. The FCO is curren tly reviewing its publications strategy with the goal of moving towards shorter, more flexible web-friendly publications which posts can use as a template for local production for use on their websites, and its radio and TV outputs.

The Coalition Information Centre was an imp ressive innovation as it took the craft of strategic commu nications beyond dom estic politics into foreign policy. The results w ere excellent, with consistent themes being brought ou t and attemp ts to create

There are also some gaps in the British media presence. Asurvey of young professionals in 30 countr ies (Through Other Eyes , 1999 and 2000) showed that local media (particularly press and TV) are among th e most pow erful sources of information for man y

Public Diplomacy

Good Practice and Gaps in the Spectrum of British Institu tions

77

Table 4: M ain sources of information about the UK

people. These two are topp ed only by word of mouth as the main sources of information about the UK, and ah ead of British press and TV.

Word of mouth Local press National TV news Books BBC World (TV) British press Visiting the UK Internet International press Films

Missing off the ‘top ten ’ list altogether is radio, both local radio and international radio services such as the BBC World Serv ice. Th ese cam e fifteen th an d eleventh in the survey resp ectively. Although still a major medium in lessdeveloped countries, radio as a source of information and influence is increasingly losing out to television in more d eveloped countries and am ong more elite members of society. For example the BBC World service reported a fall of 12 million listeners in India last year (see India case study , App end ix I). This fall is likely to be r e p l i c a t e d e l s ew h e r e a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r a d i o s t a t i o n s a r e increasingly caught in a p incer movement between the rise of cable and satellite television on the one han d and growing competition from quality local and regional radio services – often taking ad vantag e of political liberalisation – on the oth er. Over the last few years th e extent of this shift has been partially obscured by the BBC’s prescient d ecision to bu ild up an FM presence, which has led to record listenership figures of 150 m i l l i o n . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e B BC w a s t h e f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l broadcaster to spot this opportu nity has given it an important ‘first-mover advantage’, but changing patterns of media consumption and increased competition mean that the rise will soon p lateau , and t he BBC will face a serious risk of a decline in radio listeners. The Through Other Eyes data on information sources shows the i m p o r t a n c e o f s u s t a i n e d i n v e s t m e n t i n t e l e v is i o n a n d t h e Internet if British pu blic dip lomacy is going to keep a breast of 78

Public Diplomacy

the patterns of consum ption of its target groups. The picture on the Inter net is positive. The BBC’s online p resence is imp ressive and it manages to attract one of the largest audiences of any site i n t h e w o r l d . T h e Br i t i sh C o u n c i l h a s l a u n c h e d a s e r i e s o f pop ular sites includ ing its LearnEnglish site wh ich attracts over 100,000 visitors a m onth and its FootballCulture site which attracts 70,000. The i-UK Portal project linking th e activities of the main p ublic sector partn ers (going live from the second h alf of 2002) should make an important contribution to making UK organisations’ websites more user-friendly. However television is a growing gap . It is an anom aly in that the BBC World Service receives pu blic fun ding to sup port its radio and internet platforms, but its global television channel is run on a commercial basis. There are a num ber of explanations for this. First, television is more expensive to pro du ce than rad io and online, so the tax-payer can get a better reach for every poun d spent on each of th ose platforms. Second ly – as BBC World is beginning to p rove – it is easier to prod uce a commercially viable service on television than on internet or ra dio. BBC World ha s managed to secure a strong position in some markets – it is now available 24 hou rs a day in 91 million household s. Data for our case stud y countries shows that it reaches three times as m any viewers as CNN in Ind ia (but on ly half as many as Star New s); is on a p ar with CNN in Poland; and reaches 630,000 households each day an d 2.9 million people each week in th e United States. Thirdly, the Governm ent has been reluctant to authorise public fund s for BBC World on th e groun ds that it w ill distort the m a r k e t a n d g i v e B BC W o r l d a n u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e o v e r commercial operations such as Sky News. But because it has taken longer to develop a nd n ot received the same resources for distribution and marketing, it does not match CNN International’s reach or ability to set the news agenda.


79

CNN International also boasts the world’s most syndicated news service, providing video and aud io reportage to more than 9 0 0 t e l e v i s io n s t a t i o n s a n d m o r e t h a n 1 7 00 r a d i o s t a t i o n s w o r l d w i d e . I t i s cu r r e n t l y l a u n c h i n g l a n g u a g e w e b s i t e s (includ ing a German an d Arabic site) in competition with some of the BBC’s 42 languag e sites wh ich it is aggressively pu shing across platforms – outspen ding the BBC Arabic web-site on marketing by a factor of 10. At the m oment comm ercial pressures mean that BBC World is n o t a l w a y s a b l e t o m a t ch t h e b r e a d t h o f p r o g r a m m i n g a n d d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f t h e BBC W o r l d S e r v i c e (a l t h o u g h i t s incorporation into a new global news division along with the BBC World Service could signal a richer ed itorial agenda). This will need to change before the Government considers giving it p u b l i c f u n d i n g , a s it w i l l h a v e t o p r o v e t h a t t h a t f u n d i n g s e r i o u s ly a d d s v a l u e . B u t i n t h e m e d i u m t e r m , i t w i l l b e necessary to mak e this investmen t if the BBC is going to have th e same imp act on the global news agend a in a cable and satellite age as it did in the era of short-wave. The case for publicly fund ed television is not that it will replace radio or online provisions - it’s that successful broadcasters need to be a ctive across all platforms to match increasingly complex patterns of media consum ption. The UK cannot afford to be shut out of one of the key elemen ts of broad cast med ia. While BBC World can operate on a commercial basis in d eveloped markets, it cannot do so in non revenu e-generating markets, some of which are crucial to the UK’s political interests. France has already realised the critical impor tance of television as a p ublic diplom acy med ium and provid ed p ublic fun ding to TV5. This has allowed it to become the 3rd largest international network in the wor ld, available in 130m h omes d espite the fact that it is broadcast in French and does not build on a p owerful media brand like the BBC.

80

Public Diplomacy

Relationship building Relationship-building has been the bread-and-butter w ork of the British Coun cil and BBC World Service for d ecades. The BBC has built up a loyal global following am ong op inion formers in developed countries and much broader groups in developing countries (60 million week ly listeners in Africa includ ing half the pop ulation in Tanzania, one third in Rwan da an d 45 per cent in Lagos). They have earn ed h igh levels of trust across continents. T h e i r r e s ea r c h a m o n g c o s m o p o l i ta n s s h o w s 8 9 p e r c e n t o f respondents in the US regard th e World Service as a trustworthy source of information, with 85 per cent d oing so in Lagos and 86 per cent in Karachi. The fact that so man y opinion -formers get their international news from th e BBC is a pow erful way of dealing w ith ‘cognitive dissonance’ – the dang er that our b asic starting points are very different from those of people in other countries, and that consequen tly any dialogue just results in us talking p ast each other. T h e Br i t is h C o u n c il h a s d e v e l o p e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h a r t s adm inistrators, scientists, civil servants, acad emics, teachers, journalists, policy advisers, and even m ilitary p ersonnel through language tuition, training and capacity-building, arts projects, school exchanges, and m anaging the Ch evening scholarships on behalf of the FCO. More could be d one to bu ild relationships with the 350,000 people who are taught English in British Council offices every year, an d it shou ld also be a p riority to carry ou t clear profiling of the 800,000 peop le who take exam s adm inistered by the Coun cil every year. Anecdotal evidence shows that these are all highly edu cated, skilled ind ividuals who would make good targets for pu blic diplomacy activity, and would be a natural target group for any campaign to attract skilled work ers to the United Kingdom .


81

In 2001 some 40,000 UK peop le were invo lved in excha nges organised by the British Council (including 20,000 young people who w ent on Connect Youth exchanges around the w orld and 1800 modern langu age studen ts who went overseas as teaching assistants). 2500 foreign students from 20 countries were posted as teaching assistan ts in UK schools. There is a strong case for examining the brand ing, follow-up and organisation of these teaching assistantships, school exchan ges, and Scholarships. Research by the British Council on the Chevening scheme shows t h a t p e o p l e ’s i n i t i a l im p r e s s io n s o f t h e U K a r e n o t a l w a y s positive. It is clear that British schemes d o not h ave the sam e p r e s t i g e a s s o m e r i v a l s c h e m e s s u c h a s t h e Ja p a n e s e J ET programm e, or the Fulbright scholarships. Part of the problem might simp ly be the fact that very few p eople even in Britain know w hat Chevening is, but it wou ld also be worth examining w h e t h e r w e h a v e t h e r i g h t m i x b e t w e e n a p p l i ca t i o n s a n d nominations, how we use our alumni networks, and wh ether we should consider organizing a greater nu mber of shorter exchanges – rather than year-long stints – in order to attract people at the top end of their careers. (Particularly as evaluation b y t h e B r i t i s h C o u n c i l o f it s i n t e n s i v e v i s i t s p r o g r a m m e s suggests that they are very effective, in the short-term at least, at improving perceptions of the UK.) In the economic sphere both TPUK and Invest UK nu rture contacts through their overseas networks, and by p utting people in touch with relevant businesses in the UK or overseas. Also the network of Chambers of Commerce organises a series of privatesector driven activities in different coun tries with variable results.

Atlantic, Greenwich and City Fellow ships Established in 1994 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of D-Day and the US contribution t o the liberation o f Europe, the Atlantic Fellowships in Public Policy are intended t o att ract outstandin g US mid-career professionals to spend time in the UK. The Atlant ic Fellowships have three main stated goals: enabling US public policy experts to benefit from British ideas and best practice, thus enhancing t heir ability t o make contribut ions to policymaking in the US; share ideas on best practice in public policy for mut ual benefit ; and creating a transatlantic network of public policy experts and practitioners to encourage ongoing collaboration and exchange. Around ten Fellowships are awarded annually, sponsored and funded by th e FCO and ad mini ster ed by t he Brit ish Council USA. Since 1994, 54 Fellow ships have been award ed t o pr ofessionals from public, business and philanthropic sectors for periods of between six and ten months. Also set-up in 1994, the City Fellowships Programme brings young American financial services professionals from ethnic minorities to work in the City of London. The scheme is funded through banks and financial services fir ms like NatWest, Bank of Scotland, J.P. Mo rgan an d Goldman Sachs. The tot al value of fellow ships awarded t o dat e is approximately $6 million. The Greenwich Fellowships in Internat ional Journalism, established in 1999, are also aimed at ethnic minorities - this time in the field of journalism. Experienced Am erican et hnic minor ity j ournalists are given the opport unity t o wor k f or a British news organisation w hile acting as a mentor t o young British minority journalists for up t o one year. The stated aims of the Greenwich Fellowships include strengthening the links between the United Kingdom and t he ethnic minorities of t he United Stat es, and buildi ng pro fessional relat ionships betw een journ alists in Britain and the US.

Bu t a l t h o u g h l o n g - te r m r e l a t io n s h i p s i n t h e e c o n o m i c a n d cultural spheres are strong, there is only a patchy record in developing long-term p olitical relationships. Some brilliant

82

Public Diplomacy


83

initiatives are scattered aroun d bu t there has been no systematic attempt to nu rture these relationships. One of the main reasons is a culture wh ich sees it as imp roper for British diplomacy to explicitly sup port political activities. While it wou ld clearly be i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t a x- p a y e r s ’ m o n e y t o b e e x p e n d e d o n ‘politicking’ there are clearly a ran ge of activities – aroun d p olicy exchange, networking and debates abou t core values - which could play an imp ortant role in helping the UK promote its interests (see above, Chapter 6, on Political Party Diplomacy).

a narrow definition of political neutrality which insists they all bring together politicians from across the political spectrum an d mix them w ith broader cultural figures and journ alists in any single event rather than across a programm e of activity. It might be worth chan ging the definition so that the equally useful activity of bringing togeth er special advisers or m inisters from the centre-left or centre-right from arou nd Europe to talk abou t high salience issues like migration or health policy in separate groups might be u ndertaken.

Embassies are constrained in this role as it is difficult for them to create a neutral space for people to meet informally, and in some countries it is awkw ard for them to bring together figures from across the political spectrum (See South Africa case study for an e x a m p l e o f t h i s ; a n d o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n c r e a s e in t h e importan ce of the British Cou ncil, App endix I). Added to this is t h e f a c t t h a t m o s t e m b a s s i es a b r o a d l a ck t h e p r o g r a m m e bud gets, manpow er and expertise to organise major events of this type. Nevertheless, some have created inn ovative programmes such as policy-maker exchanges (the Atlantic fellowship s in Washin gton ) an d w ork w ith bilateral organisations (Konigswinter in Germany).

There is a strong case for giving the British Council extra resources to fill this gap. It is currently not resourced to develop exciting political programmes in the way that it is to put together a r t s p r o g r a m m e s . Th e C i v i l So c i et y , H u m a n R i g h t s a n d Governance department only has 15 staff to cover the wh ole spectrum from capacity building in d eveloping countries to p o l i c y e x ch a n g e i n E U co u n t r i e s , co m p a r e d t o t h e A r t s Departm ent’s 100 staff. This will also require a cultural chan ge in Embassies, w ho ha ve jealously pr otected th eir role as gatekeepers to the political world – even if they have n ot invested the resources themselves in these a ctivities.

This is an area wh ich the British Coun cil is beginning to m ake its own . Bilateral events like UKUZAin South Africa, Pontignano in Italy, the Pragu e Castle Conference and the An glo-Belgian forum are high-profile, high-calibre networking events which have b e c o m e a f e a t u r e i n t h e p o l it i ca l c a l en d a r o f t h e c o u n t r i e s concerned. The European Think Tank forum w hich brought together young p olicy-makers from around the European Union a n d m a n y a c c e s si o n c o u n t r i e s w a s a u n i q u e e x p e r i m e n t i n creating a m ultilateral debate on the future of the EU. These events are incredibly useful but are slightly constrained by

84

Public Diplomacy

Strategic Co-ordination Though th e indepen dence of the British Coun cil and World Service have been essential to their success, there is a dan ger of du plication and lack or co-ordination in th e UK spectrum of pu blic diplomacy institutions. The BBC World Service, althou gh alm ost entirely Governm ent funded , has total editorial independ ence – unlike the Voice of America. This fact is recognised in almost every country in wh ich it broadcasts, with the result that it is trusted as a media source more highly than the VOA. The British Council, as a nongovernmental bod y, is able to work m uch more flexibly in some


85

countries than embassies, which mu st maintain government to government links. In apartheid-era South Africa, the British Council worked entirely with non-governmen t organisations, creating links with an d earning th e respect of those now in government (see the South Africa case study , Append ix I). But on the downside, poor co-ordination between the different i n s t it u t i o n s c a n l e a d b o t h t o t h e g a p s i n t h e o v e r a l l p u b l ic diplomacy effort that we ha ve discussed, and to du plication and wasted effort. For example: • In some countries both the embassy and the British Council p r o m o t e t h e m s e l v e s a s t h e le a d i n g s o u r c e o f g e n e r a l information about the UK. • The FCO’s Planet Britain and th e British Council’s CultureLab websites, both aimed at you ng peop le, were developed at the sam e tim e w ith ou t an y collab ora tion bet w een th e organisations. Work has started on putting systems in place which will improve this situation. In the UK, a co-ordinating forum for sharing and agreeing the pub lic diplomacy app roaches of the different organisations has been set u p bu t has yet to p rove itself effective. Aseparate b ody , Britain Abroa d, w as set up in 2001 for t h e p u r p o s e o f b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r t h e v a r i o u s p u b l i c s ec t o r organisations and comp anies with a stake in how the UK is perceived overseas. It has had some success in getting pa rtners – both pu blic and p rivate sectors – to share experience and w ork more closely together in areas such as research, but its proposals for additional, focused public diplomacy activities have not so far been funded. Overseas, embassies have set up public diplomacy committees with m embers from th e embassy, the British Coun cil, and, in 86

Public Diplomacy

s o m e c o u n t r i e s D F ID , t h e B r i t is h T o u r i s t A u t h o r i t y a n d representatives of British comp anies. But the effectiveness of these bodies is variable. In some countries such as France and Ger m an y, w h ere th e com m itte es ar e ch air ed by th e Ambassad ors, these bod ies have been effective (See France case study, Append ix I). But in others there is a m uch less successful record. Part of the problem is that they are not always attend ed by the relevant peop le in the different institutions, but the main reason is that their agendas are not strategic so they work as a forum to exchange information about forward plans and resolve possible areas of co-operation rather than trying to set a strategic agenda.

Co-ordination: the example of Team Norway The name ‘Team Norway’ w as adopt ed in t he mid-90s to describe the close co-operat ion overseas betw een Embassies, the Norw egian Tour ist Board, the Norw egian Export Council, the Nor wegian Seafoo d Export Council, Chambers of Commerce and, in t he US, the Nor wegi an Infor matio n Service. Origin ally a closely-integrat ed strategic approach, it now describes a looser cooperation and sharing of informat ion, wit h each organisation wor king to it s own t argets but linking w ith th e other organisations’ activit y where appro priat e. In the US, Team Norway organisations on t he East Coast meet every 7-8 w eeks, wi th annual meetings for Team Norway organisations in the w hole countr y. ‘Team Norway’ remains as a powerful slogan for member organisations.

Differentiation British institutions are engaged in pu blic diplomacy in almost every country in th e world. Activities vary enorm ously between countries but this often has more to do w ith the personalities and history of the institutions based th ere than any strategic goals. Why for examp le does the British Coun cil organize excellent long-term p olitical relationship building con ferences in Italy (Pontignano) and Belgium (Anglo-Belgian Forum) bu t not in Good Practice and Gaps in the Spectrum of British Instit utions

87

France? Why d oes the FCO fun d excellent scholarsh ip programmes like the Atlantic and Greenwich fellowship in the United States, but not in European Union countries where strong links between policy-makers and media are equally important? Why is the BBC World Sevice fund ed to contin ue a Polish Service for a country that is d eveloping rapid ly and will shortly enter the European Un ion, at the same time as it is closing d own its German an d French Radio services? Will they close d own the Polish Service when Poland enters the Europ ean Union? Why does the British Coun cil host an imp ressive range of cultural activities in one developed country (France) and ha ve merely a vestigial presence in an other (the Un ited States)? What is needed is a clear strategy for these different types of countries with different goals for each of the institutions. Within the most developed countries such as the other countries in the European Un ion, the United States and Japan, the UK should be aiming to strengthen the relationship as a partnership of equals. These countries, particularly European Union countries and the United States, are those which are of m ost importance for the UK, with strong shared political, economic and strategic interests, and there is huge un tapp ed poten tial for the UK to learn from these countries. The aim should be for mu ch greater mutu al familiarity, with as mu ch attention paid to turn ing aroun d British perceptions of foreigners as to changing others’ perceptions of Britain. Research shows that even in those countries with the closest contact with the UK, old-fashioned and unhelpful stereotypes persist in m any p eople’s minds, and the same is true in reverse. As well as greater familiarity, the UK should aim for genuinely m utually beneficial partnerships – creating channels for policy exchange and learning by bu ilding networks at all levels, from policy makers and journalists to school studen ts and the voting p ublic.

88

Public Diplomacy

In EU and Accession countries particularly, the UK should be seeking in the first place to concentrate on the m essage that Britain is a committed an d engag ed m ember of the EU, and a very valu able present or fu ture ally in the p olitics of the EU. Long-term political network and alliance building is the key to these bilateral relationships. In particular, the UK should aim to build and strengthen links between political parties within EU countries in order to create broad transnational political alliances that can both co-operate on issues at the European level and bring benefit to the countries individually through policy exchange. Ad ditionally, as public opinion in different Europ ean countries is of such impor tance on man y EU issues in which the UK has an interest, it should instigate p roactive public diploma cy campaigns, targeted at imp ortant sections of foreign populations, in order to create some influence and leverage on these issues. Furthermore, in the current or future accession c o u n t r i e s i n C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e , i t i s i n t h e U K ’s interests to cultivate a stable and prosp erous region, and to develop close ties with those countr ies which in the next few years will become fellow members of the European Union. The developm ent of strong networks should be the main aim of pu blic diplomacy in these areas. I n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s w h e r e t h e U K ’s i n t e r e s t s a r e competitive , f o r e x a m p l e i n e m e r g i n g r e g i o n a l p o w e r s l i k e South Africa and Ind ia (see case studies, Appen dix I) the UK shou ld act primarily with th e aim of alleviating the negative association between globalisation and increased trading and investment linkages with these countries, and the spectre of a neo-colonialism. Several of the major transitional countries have ties to the UK larg ely as a resu lt of a colonial legacy. This legacy may h ave left strong ties of language, history and institutions between the two countries, as well as long-term personal links through diaspora comm unities, but it will often also have


89

resulted in ambivalent attitudes which need handling with sensitivity and aw areness. One of the UK’s main tasks in these c o u n t r i e s t h e r e f o r e i s t o d i s p e l t h e n e o - c o l o n i a l im a g e b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g g o o d f a i th a n d m u t u a l i t y o f i n t e r e s t w h i l e engaging decision makers and influencers in global debates. O n e w a y o f d e m o n s t r a t in g t h e t w o - w a y n a t u r e o f s u c h relationships is by emph asising th e UK’s cultural plura lism an d e x p a n d i n g s c h e m e s l ik e t h e V i s it i n g A r t s p r o g r a m m e t o dem onstrate that th e West is receptive to influences from the developing world, and not merely an implacable exporter of a Coca-Cola culture and an exploitative economy. Other aims will be to harn ess positive links to strengthen economic ties and to encourage the developm ent of partnerships in sectors such as technology. Finally, in developing countries wh ere the UK’s interests are cooperative , it should adop t a strategy similar to that ou tlined above, namely one that downgrades the ‘Britishness’ of the UK’s activities, and seeks to work in co-operation with the oth er Western countries wh ose interests in these areas are essentially indistinguishable from Britain’s.

Evaluation Where market research is about finding ou t about on e’s starting point, evaluation looks at the impact of activities. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to evaluate public diplomacy activity. While it is possible to measure changes in public opinion over time, there is no wa y of being certain wh at factor or combination of factors may h ave influenced this. In ad dition, while some facts may be easy to measure or quantify, these may not an swer the most i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s . F o r e xa m p l e , a n e v a l u a t i o n o f p r e s s relations work based on the nu mber of UK-related articles app earing in the med ia, or the number of column inches, fails to take into account the qu ality or content of the articles, or the

90

Public Diplomacy

n e g a t i v e a r t i c le s w h i c h m i g h t h a v e a p p e a r e d i f t h e p r e s s relations work had not happened. N or do they m easure what is ultimately of most importance, the articles’ impact on readers, listeners or viewers. • The solution ad opted by th e BBC World Service and th e British Coun cil is to use a combina tion of specific, measu rable data an d m ore general questions to gain as full a picture as possible. In many cases, the measu rable data is used a s a ‘proxy’ for the more imp ortant, but un measu rable, imp act of the activity. • The BBC World Service carries out rolling annu al surveys of nu mbers of listeners and continu ous mon itoring of on-line usage, and more d etailed evaluation of attitudes towards its s e r v i ce s i n t e r m s o f b o t h q u a l i t y a n d t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s i n priority countries. In the p ast its main head line goal was num ber of listeners but this is being redefined to focus on a framework grouped around: reach (overall audience and ta rg et seg m en ts) ; re p u ta tio n (tr u st); an d im p act (distinctiveness of the offer). • Th e Brit ish Cou n cil h as d ev elop ed an ev alu ati on method ology based on the ‘Performance Scorecard’ approach (curren tly in operation in 25 per cent of posts), where th ey track improved p erceptions of the UK through follow-up surveys and story-boards. They will also monitor growth in the active membership of networks, virtual professional communities and alumni groups. It is importan t that these different methods of evaluation are compatible with each other so that the FCO can get an overall sense of how th e spectrum of institutions is working across the different dimen sions of public diplomacy. This means tha t it is


91

importan t to track outpu ts as well as outcomes – particularly as some of the outcom es will only materialise over the long-term. The US State Departm ent has d eveloped an impressive set of output indicators which are regularly monitored. They use sophisticated contact-managem ent systems to track the amount of contact with each of the target group s (includ ing face-to-face m e e t i n g s , p a r t i c ip a t i o n i n s e m i n a r s , a t t e n d a n c e a t f i lm o r cultural presen tations, and u se of the library, as well as followup contact). They gather data on the thematic breakdown of activities, form ats, ven u es, an d the rang e of p artn er organisations. Most impressively they track med ia coverage for each activity.

Multilateral Public Diplomacy: A Case Study The paradox of di plomacy is that as it becomes more mult ilateral, it depends ever more on fluctuatin g natio nal polit ical debates. Achieving change on many f oreign p olicy and the domestic issues will depend on forging international alliances and working through multilateral str uctures. But whi le th e issues become mor e tr ansnatio nal, th e pressure on governments will remain predominantly nation al - and sometimes even local. Take CAP refo rm for example. The issues of concern i n France are th e support stru ctures for French f armers, in Germany it is food safety and quality, w hile in Scandinavian countries the main arguments are about the environment and the impact on the developing wor ld. The challenge for public diplomacy is to li nk t hese competing nat ional debates and map out a path f or change. The goal will not just be t o win the batt le for pu blic opinion at home - but to ensure that publics in a majori ty of countr ies see the issue fr om ou r perspective and exercise pressure f or change on their national governments. Achieving t hese objectives demands a good deal of co-ordination between advocates of change - governmental and n on-governmental. The means reinventin g bi-lat eral relatio ns so t hat t hey are focused on multilateral issues - and to use networking and events to link up different national debates and get third party validation for our ideas. The starting point should be a mobilisation of domestic departments. The Europe Minister, for example, could write a letter to all other departments saying inviting t hem to use public diplomacy to support t heir internat ional policy needs - asking the domestic departments to list their priorities on part icular issues and explain th e barrier s they have come up against. This can t hen lead t o a concerted campaign across the thr ee dimensions of public diplomacy: a. New s management

Launch a "step change" programme for the European media It is important t o deepen links with the fo reign media in the capital and on t he ground. In the same way that t he British Government launched a ‘step change’ initiative which consisted of ministers and officials meeting their counterparts in all EU countries - a media initiative could encourage all ministers to d o at least one interview w ith a jo urnalist from each EU country on an issue of political importance.

92

Public Diplomacy


93

Multilateralise responses The key danger with multi lateral issues - in each country - is for t he media to p aint a black and whit e picture of w inners and losers which makes it diff icult for each individual government to pl ay their hands eff ectively. The key for each government w ill be to b e able to show t hat t hey are in t he m ainst ream, and have t he mat erial and inf ormat ion t o multilat eralise responses - in order to avoid being f orced into defensive corners where t hey threaten t o use the veto. c. Pro-active Communications

Plan and co-ordinate activities and strategic messages with advocates of change. Bring together all the key parties - both governmental and nongovernmental t o plan a strat egic campaign and ensure that th e public and media pressure reflects the right issues at the right times. NGO Diplomacy Work o ut which NGOs and int erest groups have an interest in pu rsuing change and work with the NGOs in your country to build a multi-national alliance. This might be wor king w ith groups like t he RSPB, Oxfam and t he Consumers Association in Britain on CAP reform - and gett ing t hem to use their European umbrella gr oups to shape the debate in other countries. d. Relationship building

Think-tank and political party diplomacy The key solution is to get into a position w here people from other countr ies come t o issues from t he same perspective as you - so that you do not need to persuade them. This is very difficult if their n ational, political, media and academic debates start from very different premises. For example, the debate on the f utur e of the CAP in Brussels has traditionally been framed by the farming and agricultural policy community. Yet aroun d t he EU there are there are a series of disparate lobbies (development ngos, environmentalists, consumer groups, tax payers groups) who would benefit f rom refor m, but because their perspectives have not been linked, it has been easy for t he agenda to be set by farming ministries in hoc to their producer interests.

94

Public Diplomacy

8. Conclusions and Recommendations All governments pay lip-service to the way that the rise of global communications and the spread of democracy, the growth of global NGOs and the developm ent of powerful multilateral organisations have changed the natur e of pow er within societies, and altered th e craft of government an d d iplomacy. But very few h ave adequ ately reflected it in the way that they deploy their resources, organise their activities, or go about their core business. I t i s a p a r a d o x t h a t , a s i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e h a s i n c r ea s e d , t h e amount invested in nurturing relationships w ith the rest of the world has steadily declined. For some European countries this was a necessary adjustment to the end of empire, and the fact that many of the international engagements are condu cted by dom estic dep artments rather than thr ough foreign ministries. But in Britain at least – in spite of the fact that cuts in the bu dgets of the FCO, British Cou ncil and BBC World Service hav e been reversed since 1997 – there is a continuing imbalance between the amou nt spent on (relatively cheap) preventive and proactive diplomacy and the (relatively expen sive) military capab ilities that we need to respond when things go wrong. The biggest challenge is to the culture an d p riorities of foreign services themselves. Public diplomacy can n o longer be seen as an ad d-on to the rest of diplomacy – it has to be seen as a central activity which is played ou t across many d imensions and w ith man y partn ers. This will have serious implications for the way that resources are dep loyed. Asubstantial amount of the Foreign Office’s bud get is tied up in peop le and b uildings – leaving very Conclusions and Recommendations

95

little to develop progr amm es which are capable of meeting our p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y g o a l s . E xp e n d i t u r e o n b u i l d i n g s a l o n e (runn ing costs and capital expend iture) is £230 million, almost twice the British Cou ncil grant of £140 million. It is difficult to jud ge the exact amount of time spent on pu blic diplomacy by individu al diploma ts, but only 5 per cent of FCO staff overseas a r e l i s t e d a s c o m i n g u n d e r O b j e ct i v e 5 ( b r o a d l y , P u b l i c Diplomacy) and 11 per cent in the UK. This is less than a quarter those engaged in consular services overseas (22 per cent). There has also been a tendency to target public diplomacy resources on softer markets – rather than th e most importan t developed countries - on the grou nds tha t it is easier to have an impa ct there. This is puttin g the cart before the horse. If our analysis about the changing nature of power is correct, it follows that the key challenge is to develop a mod el of public diplomacy capable of having an impact in the countries that are of most strategic importance, and to d eploy resources in a way wh ich reflects those priorities. Above all what is needed is a mu ch broader and more creative idea of what p ublic diplomacy is – and w hat it can do. The main overall conclusions of this rep ort are:

96

News man agement needs to focus much more effectively on

foreign correspondents based in London . • I n s t i t u t i o n s n e e d m u c h greater flexibility (budgetary, physical, and in personnel terms) to be able to respond swiftly and effectively to short-term crises. • The UK should differentiate its public diplomacy strategies in different countries, identifying wh ere its interests are in competitive a n d w h e r e t h e y a r e co-operative, a n d prioritising bilateral expenditure according to comp etitive importance. • There are potential savings to be made in the short term by s t o p p i n g t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f n e w s-f ee d s b y t h e F C O i n London and instead concentrating on condu cting research and p rodu cing resources on strategic messages which can be c u s t o m i s e d a t p o s t l e v e l . I n t h e m e d i u m t e r m , European Union fund ing should be sou ght to cover our activities in cooperative countries and we shou ld explore the p ossibilities of mergin g the BBC’s francoph one Africa service with Rad io France Interna tional to produ ce a co-operatively funded European service in Africa.

• The government should commit more resources to pu blic diplom acy which will become an increasingly importan t tool of influen ce on foreign and dom estic policy. Public Diploma cy efforts should be focused on the countries which are most important to our interests rather than those which are perceived to be the easiest to influence.

More detailed recommendations are grouped together below under the headings

• Add itional expend iture of those resources should concentrate on proactive messaging a n d b u i l d i n g long-term political relationships, and not on reactive, argumentative rebuttal.

• Co ve rin g t h e th re e d im en sio n s (News Management, Strategic Comm un ication, Long-term Relationship Building)

Public Diplomacy

• Strategy and Co-ordination • Differentiating Pub lic Diplomacy on the Groun d

Conclusions and Recommendations

97

• Crisis Diplomacy • Working Through Others • Beyond Propagand a • Professionalism and the Condu ct of Public Diplomacy

A. Strategy and Co-ordination It is important to d evelop a way of planning for, and thinking about, the sp ectrum of p ublic diplomacy activities in a strategic fashion. I n g e n e r a l , th e G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d e n s u r e t h a t s u b s t a n t i al resources in all the organisations are focused on the countries which are most importan t to our interests. This means ending the reluctance to spend resour ces on mature d emocracies - such as the US or France – where opinion is hard er to change, but where British influence is critical to ou r foreign and dom estic policy goals. • The Foreign and Com monw ealth Office, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development, and dom estic departments, should develop a clear strategy for Britain in the w orld. This can then act as a framewor k for the other organisations in their planning. The Public Diplomacy Strategy should contain: - a list of priority countries (includ ing a sense of wh ether pu blic diplomacy shou ld be organised co-operatively or competitively); - one or two clear strategic messages; - target audiences; - a framework for explaining the roles of the different organisations; - a strategy for working with others beyond government. 98

Public Diplomacy

• Co-ordination: - T h e r e m u s t b e a ce n t r a l b od y i n L o n d o n t h a t h a s sufficient clout w ithin a ll the p ublic d iplom acy organisations which is charged with ensuring strategic co-ordination – and m aking sure that there are no gap s in public diplomacy activities; - The Public Diplomacy Committees on the ground shou ld be chaired by the Ambassador to ensure that they are reflected in all the activities of the mission; - The Public Diplomacy Committees’ strategy should be built into each institution’s strategic planning, so that, for example, British Council strategy should explicitly includ e overall public diplomacy strategy and pu blic diplomacy w ork by other organ isations as part of its working context. - All organisations should explore more effective ways of co-ordinating their activities with oth er EU Countries in both co-operative and comp etitive countries. One idea worth p ursuing w ould be having a m eeting of all the EU heads of mission in each country w ho could mand ate the EU delegation to pursu e shared goals in its public diplomacy activities.

B. Differentiating Public Diplomacy on the Ground The Government should ensure th at the pu blic diplomacy it carries out in a given country is suitable for that coun try, rather than simply being a repetition of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of public diplomacy. In particular, there should be a d ecision about whether the natu re of the national interest is competitive or whether it can be pu rsued co-operatively w ith other countries. The public diplomacy institutions should tailor the kind of public diplomacy they do, and the messages that they send, to those interests and cond itions.


99

• The Foreign Office should create a target group of the 50 or so countries wh ere it calculates that the UK has strong b ilateral interests. All competitive asp ects of pu blic dip lomacy in the r e m a i n i n g c o u n t r i e s , in c l u d i n g Br i t i s h ‘b r a n d i n g ’ o f governance programmes and attempts to promote our own interests at the expense of others should p layed dow n. - At the Copenhagen EU summit, the Government should prop ose a plan for Europ ean co-operation on activities of mutual interest, including promotion of democracy and hum an rights, democratic capacity-building, and th e supp ort of civil society and of media infrastructure, in non-competitive countries. - The British Council and BBC World Service should seek to d eep en co-op era tion w ith sim ilar Eu rop ean organisations. In particular the BBC should work w ith broad casting services like RFI or Deutsche W elle, both in service provision and in media capacity building and training progr amm es in countries of co-operative rather than competitive interest. Furthermore, the UK sh ould differentiate its pub lic diplomacy offering along the following lines:

• In all developed countries, there should be a large increase in pu blic diplomacy resources. Public diplomacy work shou ld concentrate on: - Campa igns of proactive commu nication aimed at med ia mu ltipliers. Our core messages should be constantly p rom oted by the id entification , p rom otion and placement of good new s stories. - Long-term political relationship building, in the form of scholarship program mes like the Atlantic Fellowships, political party links and policy-exchange p rogramm es. - In te r es t gr ou p s an d N GO s, an d p ar ti cu la r ly

100

Public Diplomacy

campaigning NGOs, in order to d isseminate messages to developed civil societies via their superior network s and credibility. - A concerted push to mar ket BBC World television as a platform for n ews to r eflect the fact that television is by far the more important medium in developed countries, particularly for forming opinions abou t the UK. The Governm ent should exp lore the prospect of channelling money into BBC World to make this possible. - C o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h o t h e r co u n t r i e s , p a r t i cu l a r l y E U countr ies, to prom ote the benefits of multilateral action to the world’s developed nations. • I n EU and Accession countries, a particular subset of developed cou ntries, the UK should: - M o v e t o m a x i m i s e o u r l e v e r a g e i n t h e E U ’s s h a r e d political space by providing money to d evelop powerful alliances between major political parties across the spectrum. - A c t iv e l y t a r g et p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y ca m p a i g n s o n k e y political issues, like CAP reform or asylum policy, to the key influential constituencies such as bu siness, e n v i r o n m e n t a li s ts a n d c o n s u m e r g r o u p s i n o t h e r countries. - D e v e lo p a p r o g r a m m e o f a c t iv i t ie s w h i c h s t r e s s t h e ‘European ess’ of Britain, to ensure w e are considered to be central to EU politics and hence a vital ally for others. - Work with national think-tanks and p olitical parties to develop an intergovernmental strand of thinking on the future of the Europ ean Union to counteract the more c e n t r a l i s i n g a g e n d a o f t h e Br u s s e l s - b a s e d p o l i cy community. - Instigate a ‘Step Change For Pu blic Diplomacy’ which mirrors the Step Change Programm e by getting each

Conclusions and Recommendatio ns

101

British Minister to give at least one interview a year to a major newspap er or TV programm e in each member state. • I n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s, w h e r e t h e U K i s p u r s u i n g competitive interests , f o r e x a m p l e I n d i a , w e s h o u l d concentrate on : - Targeting the ‘successor generation’ even more than is currently the case. In many of these key coun tries, Britain’s influence is fading as the generation with which i t h a s c l o s e s t li n k s p a s s e s a w a y ( s e e C a s e S t u d i e s , Appen dix II). - Developing our capacity for using indigenous languages un til all pub lic diplom acy literature is available in more than one language. - Utilising Britain’s diaspora commu nities to strengthen relations (see below.) - E m p h a s i s i n g cu l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m a n d m u t u a l i t y o f relations, for instance through an expansion of the Visiting Arts scheme (see below) in order to cou nteract the p erception that, w ith increased open ness to international marketplaces, Western culture is flooding out the ind igenous cultures of these nations. - DFID should pr ovide the Embassies in these countries with d etailed information on th e contribution of the UK to p overty red uction, citing specific newsw orthy projects so that the Embassy’s public affairs officers can utilise this very importan t source of positive impressions of the UK. • I n developing countries where th e UK has no significant bilateral interests , public diplomacy should be carried out in a c o -o p e r a t i v e f a s h i o n w i t h o t h e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , particularly other EU states: - There should be no ‘great game’ in p ublic diplomacy, 102

Public Diplomacy

w h er e d ev elo p m en t ass ist an ce, in ter n at ion al broadcasting, political assistance and exchanges are u sed to develop spheres of influence. - There should be a pu sh to create multilateral funds to c a r r y o u t t h e l a r g e a m o u n t o f v e r y i m p o r t a n t p u b l ic dip lomacy activity in these countries. These shou ld concentrate on conflict prevention, civil society capacity building, governance and p olitical developm ent and other areas. - G r e a t e r in v e s t m e n t s h o u l d b e p o u r e d i n t o t h e s e co operative funds.

C.

Covering The Three Dimensions

The government shou ld d evelop a strategy for filling the gaps in the British public diplomacy effort. • News Management It is important to bring structu res for dealing with the m edia up to date to reflect the 24 hour new s cycle and th e increased importan ce of foreign correspond ents in spreading the news: - All Whitehall departments should have liaison officers to communicate with the corps of foreign correspondents in London. - T h e r e sh o u l d b e m u c h g r e a t e r li n k s b e tw e e n t h e Embassies and their respective London correspondents. - In the long term, there should be a move to develop a Government Information and Communication Service that covers both foreign and dom estic policy. There shou ld be mu ch greater interplay with GICS, with secondments to a ll the bigger posts. - Embassy pu blic affairs staff should be su fficiently senior for public diplom acy to have credibility as an equal 4th m a j o r s t r a n d o f E m b a s s y w o r k a l o n g s i d e p o l i t i c a l,


103

consular and commercial. - The Foreign Office should ap point a spokesperson of international stature to major media orga nizations like CNN and Al-Jazeera. It wou ld help Britain’s case if viewers got used to a regular speaker wh o could work to dispel stereotyp es about Britain. For examp le, the US State Department brough t back diplomat Christopher Ross from retiremen t to act as its pub lic face in th e Middle East. • Strategic Communication British public diplomacy has not concentrated enough on the mediu m-term strategic delivery of key messages, but has instead focused too much on reactivity and rebuttal. We recommend that: - There should be proactive commun ications campaigns in all Embassies and British Coun cil offices overseas, to sp ot a n d p r o m o t e n e w s s t o r i es t h a t d e l i v e r t h e s e k e y messages. - To facilitate this, a centra l grid of all activities that can be mad e into news stories about Britain abroad shou ld be produ ced and made available to overseas staff from a central base in London . - T h e in s t i t u t i on s s h o u l d m a k e i t th e i r b u s i n e s s t o b e a w a r e o f e v e r y U K -r e l a t e d e v e n t o c c u r r i n g i n t h e i r country. No opportu nity to present a positive story about the UK should be missed simp ly because an event is not on the initiative of one of the institutions. For examp le, Elton Joh n co n cert s in War saw ar e excelle n t opp ortun ities to emp hasise the message that Britain is a creative country, even if he has n ot been invited by the British Cou ncil. - Activity in other countries should increasingly be ‘UK’ branded , not branded w ith the different institutional

104

Public Diplomacy

logos (FCO, British Council, TPUK, etc.) – except in the rare circumstance where there is a clear case for giving priority to the institution rather than th e UK as a wh ole. There should be a clear distinction of official government positions and even ts, but all other activity should be group ed un der a single brand w ith a single logo. • Long-term relationship buildin g There should be much m ore attention p layed to funding for long-term relationship development, as the most effective way of communicating p ositive messages about th e UK and fostering good relations between the countries concerned. These kind of program mes have been su ccessful in the fields of arts and ed ucation, but mu ch more should be done outside these areas in politics, policy exchange and science. - T h e C h e v e n in g S ch o l a r s h ip s a n d o t h e r e x ch a n g e schemes like the Atlantic Fellowships, should be greatly increased in number and th ere should be much more concentration on converting those exchanges into longterm netw orks of relationships via follow up work. - In addition to boosting funding for the Chevenings, there s h o u l d b e a c a r e fu l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r s t r u c t u r e . Shorter time periods (e.g. a single term) could increase t h r o u g h p u t a n d a l lo w t h o s e h i g h - fl y e r s w h o c a n n o t spare an en tire year to participate. There shou ld also be thought given to broadening the range of people who receive Chevenings – p erhap s by reconsidering a w a r d i n g t h e m s o l e l y o n a c o m p e t i t i v e b a s is a n d allocating some scholarships v ia nomination. - The British Council should be actively building lasting relationships with everyon e that learns English by systematically profiling its client-base, building real and virtual networks. - The British Coun cil should be actively building lasting


105

relationships with everyone that takes an examination throu gh them by d eveloping mu ch clearer profiling and u sing the inform ation to system atically tar get individuals. - British Council websites should be used to build virtual networks, through p olicy discussion group s and arts discussion email lists. - T h e r e s h o u d b e a r e v i e w o f t h e b ra n d i n g , a lu m n i schemes and follow u p of all scholarships, teaching a s s is t a n c es h i p s a n d e x ch a n g e s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e y becom e as p restigiou s as th e Fulbrig ht, Rhod es scholarship and JET programme. In particular, we should examine whether the schemes should be renamed so that they make a positive statement about modern Britain.

D. Crisis Diplomacy By u nderstanding and planning for p ublic diplomacy’s central role in crises, it should be possible to develop resp onses to momentous events that reinforce rather than und ermine our strategic message goals. The Governm ent shou ld: - E n s u r e t h a t t h e r e a r e p r e - e x i s t in g c l e a r st r a t e g i c messages. If these are w ell understood then it is easier to make su re that reactions to crises bolster them rather than detract from them. - Build pu blic diplom acy into crisis response teams at the beginning. If a broad coterie of the right partn ers are involved from the start, then the core crisis team will have a w ide enoug h vision of how actions will impact internationally. - Free up crisis response bud gets by provid ing a centrally mana ged p ot of money for crisis pu blic diploma cy. This w o u ld t h e n b e f l e x i b l e e n o u g h t o p r o v i d e

106

Public Diplomacy

commu nications cover for u nexpected eventu alities. - E n s u r e t h a t t h e r e r e m a i n s a r e s id u a l s ta f f r e a d y t o provide international co-ordination when the n eed arises. This could take the form of a skeleton Coalition I n fo r m a t i o n C e n t r e , k e e p in g o p e n l i n e s o f commu nication and capabilities that can be expand ed at short notice. - T h e F CO s h o u l d s e t u p a ‘d i p l o m a t i c S W A T t e a m ’ c a p a b l e o f s et t i n g u p a v i r t u a l e m b a s s y w i t h p u b l i c affairs potential within 24 hours anywhere in the world that a crisis could conceivably occur.

E. Beyond Propaganda • Public diplomacy institutions should concentrate more on using ou r consump tion of others’ culture as a way of making pluralism a central p art of the UK’s public diplomacy message. - At least 10 per cent of British Council post bud gets should be spent on bringing foreign artists, lecturers, journalists and politicians to the UK to perform or sp eak. The institutional imp lications of a grea tly increased influx of sponsored visitors would ha ve to be examined , and the question of whether to expand Visiting Arts or c o l la p s e i t s r o l e i n t o t h e B r it i s h C o u n c i l sh o u l d b e considered. - The scope of cultural imports should be much broader, w i t h n o t j u s t t h e a r t s b u t p o p u l a r c u l t u r e , p o l i t ic s , science, and acad emia catered for. The goal to be kept in mind shou ld always be creating maximum impact in their countries of origin. - The UK should bring together the different schemes to recruit teaching assistants u nder a p restigious large-scale JE T- s t y le b r a n d , w h e r e y o u n g f o r e i g n s t u d e n t s a r e


107

funded to come and teach their languages in Britain for a year, and a network of alumni should be created.

F. Working Through Others In order to comm un icate with citizens who ar e sceptical of ‘government information’, the Government should make working with n on-governmental organisations an imp ortant part of pu blic diplomacy. • On any issue where the Government has a message that is on the global agenda, it should seek out th e key NGOs and ally with them – using their netw orks, skills, and cred ibility to attain mutu al goals. - The FCO shou ld ha ve staff shad ow ing the m ost i m p o r t a n t N G O s , b u i ld i n g r e l a t i o n s h ip s w i t h t h e m , helping them w ith problems that arise. This would build a secure found ation if close co-operation is requ ired in the future. - It should be routine to share information with NGOs in areas of overlap, and to involve them in policy-planning where they h ave expertise. • The UK should take further steps to use its many diaspora commu nities to advan tage. These should include: - Instituting links to diaspora commun ities in the UK – diaspora diplomats – to strengthen relationships with their descendent coun try and to em ph asise the UK’s mu lticultural status. - U s e m e m b e r s o f t h e U K’s d i a s p o r a c o m m u n i t i e s a s ‘ambassad ors’ to their origin country, to p roject positive messages about the UK as a tolerant and multi-ethnic culture. - The FCO, British Council, Invest UK, and TPUK should recruit heavily from diasporas, u tilising pre-existing familiarity and language skills. 108

Public Diplomacy

• The UK shou ld concentrate on creating close relationships between d omestic political parties and their counterparts in other countries. This should be an absolute priority in EU countries, where th e shared p olitical space makes it a prerequisite for effectively seeing through European policies. - T h e Br i t i s h C o u n c i l s h o u l d b e g i v e n a n e x p l i ci t authorization an d additional resources to fund political p a r t y p o l i cy e x c h a n g e a n d r e l a t io n s h i p b u i l d i n g i n exactly the same way as it d oes for think-tanks and other NGOs. - The British Council should be given the resources to develop its governance and civil society departmen t so that it is capable of giving the sam e sort of program me supp ort on long-term political relationship-building a s it currently does on the arts. - T h e G ov e r n m e n t s h o u l d e x a m i n e t h e i d e a o f g iv i n g funding to each of the main p olitical parties in order to second p rogram me officers to British Coun cil Offices or E m b a s s i e s i n EU c o u n t r i e s w i t h a b r i e f t o i m p r o v e r e l a t io n s h i p s a n d m u t u a l l e a r n i n g o n p o l i c y is s u e s between the United Kingdom ’s main parties and their European sister par ties. • The government shou ld self-consciously try to associate itself w i t h d y n a m i c a n d m o d e r n B r it i s h b r a n d s a n d t r y t o g e t business to u se its clout to build p ositive perceptions of Britain - The government should back a business-led programme for attracting talent to the UK from overseas by targeting the companies that have their Europ ean headq uarters in London. This should includ e a series of aggressively marketed scholarships an d placements. It could draw u p o n t h e Br i t is h C o u n c il ’s e d u c a t io n n e t w o r k s t o identify and attract that talent.


109

G. Professionalism and the Conduct of Public Diplomacy The conduct of public diplomacy by the UK’s institutions should be reformed so as to incorporate professional communications s k i l ls . A r e a s t h a t h a v e a n i m p o r t a n t e f f e ct o n t h e o v e r a l l impression of the UK, but that are currently neglected, should be actively ta ckled. Specifically: - Translation bu d gets shou ld be boosted to allow dissemination of all public diplomacy literature in the vernacular. - All the public diplomacy institutions should be prepared to spend resources on bu ying in professional skills in marketing or design. - It should be norm al practice to conduct serious, largescale research to und erstand ou r target aud iences. We should identify gaps and target them, rather than attempting a blanket offering. One idea wou ld be to team up with other countries to condu ct benchmark su rveys which wou ld have greater credibility (the US spend rough ly $5 million a year on polling). - A less resource-intensive way of condu cting market research is by online polling. This has been tried, for example, by the British Council in the first phase of their year 2000 market research survey of online services. • Much greater attention should be paid to the experiential and gatewa y image aspects of the UK’s national identity abroad . In particular: - The premises of UK institutions abroad should suit the i m a g e o f Br i t a i n w h i c h o r g a n i s a t i o n s a r e t r y i n g t o convey. - Visa processing should be used as an opportu nity to c o n v e y p o s i t iv e m e s s a g e s a b o u t t h e U K t h r o u g h i t s

110

Public Diplomacy

processes and premises. 100,000 people get visas in India every year, and th ey are very likely to be part of the growing midd le class that the UK seeks to target. Visa app lication is consequently an importan t opportu nity to presen t a positive image of Britain. Processes should be efficient an d use m odern technology; electronic visa a p p l i ca t i o n s s h o u l d b e m a d e e l e c t r o n i c r a t h e r t h a n simply seen as an opportu nity to cut out a third of the queuing. Premises should exemplify th e best of British design through the layout, appearance and display material. Visa app lication shou ld also be used as an opportu nity to d istribute literature about visiting the UK, places to stay, etc. - Because the UK is an island, 80 per cent of its visitors c o m e t h r o u g h f iv e m a j o r g a t e w a y s . T h i s p r e s e n t s a unique op portun ity to create a positive imp ression of the U K a t t h e o u ts e t o f a n y v is it t h a t is b e in g comprehensively squandered by the anonymous, poorly lit, poorly designed pu blic and retails spaces at these gateways. Because the airports are ru n by BAA, a private company, there are limits on what govern ment can do to remedy this. But concerted political pressure should be pu t on th e leadership of BAAto use its influence with th e s u p p l y c h a in t o r a d i c a l ly i m p r o v e t h e d e s i g n a n d environment of these gateways. - A d d i t io n a l l y , t h e BT A s h o u l d c o n s id e r i n v e st i n g sig n ifica n t re so u rce s in p re sen tin g a m od ern , contemporary , creative image of Britain in these key spaces.

Conclusions and Recommendatio ns

111

Appendix I: Public Diplomacy on the ground A stu dy of UK publi c diplo macy in t he United States of America, France, Poland, India, Sout h Af rica, and t he United Ar ab Emirates. In considering th e UK’s relationships w ith other coun tries, it is clear that the very different relationships will give rise to different pu blic diplomacy needs. In chapters Seven and Eight we set out a typ ology of countries and in this section how th is is p l a y e d o u t i n p r a c t i c e in d i f fe r e n t t y p e s o f c o u n t r i e s . Th e following sections look at the UK’s public diplomacy w ork in a num ber of examp le coun tries, and tr y to answer a series of questions. The countries selected were: • Two developed coun tries: the US and an EU member state, France • One Central European transitional country: Poland • Three developing coun tries with historical ties to the UK, all economically and politically important in their regions, includ ing two w ith large Muslim popu lations: Ind ia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. All six countries were selected for the strength of the public diplomacy work carried ou t there, to see what examples of good practice might be applicable elsewhere, and to examine what th e effects of public diplomacy wor k can be. 112

Public Diplomacy


113

Fact-finding visits to each country were necessarily short, and so the summ aries below shou ld not be taken as comprehensive, but as highlighting key points. The questions we tried to cover are: 1. Do we comm it enough r esources to that countr y, given its importance in the world, and the kinds of relations we w ish to foster with it? 2. Are we clear about w hat ou r strategic messages should be, and how su ccessful have we been so far in pu tting those messages across? 3. Should w e be seeking to act competitively or co-operatively with other countries in delivering our messages? 4. How successfully do w e span the three d imensions of public diplomacy – from news managem ent and rebuttal, through medium term strategic message delivery, to long-term relationship bu ilding? Also, how w ell do our institutions mesh together in covering that spectrum? 5. Are we seeking to develop relationships and foster trust w ith the right non-governmental partners in that country? 6. Are we targeting au diences and issues correctly, and utilizing the correct platforms for our m essages? 7. Do we have the skill sets that we n eed in place to carry out pu blic diplomacy on a professional basis?

The USA

The US-UK relationship: strengths Strong historical and cultural links and a common language Close foreign policy and security relationship Military cooperation in Kosovo, the Gulf, Bosnia and Afghanistan Shared member ship of key mult ilateral o rganisations, especially the UN Security Council and NATO Close commercial links • Both count ries are the largest overseas investor in each oth er’s economy • UK exports to the US tot al £30 billion • The tw in importance of New York and London as the world’s leading financial centres Personal contact • Personal and family ties • 4 million US visito rs to t he UK each year • 40,000 US stud ents current ly in th e UK Shared cultural space • Shared cultural history • US film and music in the UK • Interest in Briti sh film and music among the under-25 age group in t he US Stro ng academic and scientif ic links • 10 per cent of p rof essors in the Harvard Facult y of Sciences are British Close ties between the media in both countries, including exchange of personnel Str ength ening of t he US-UK relationship aft er the Septemb er 11th attacks • US public appreciation of the UK’s support after September 11th • Stron g personal relationship betw een President Bush and Tony Blair since September 11th

8. Are our resp onses to crises in the relationship betw een the UK and the host country in line with our long-term goals?

114

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

115

UK public diplomacy in the US The US-UK relationship: weaknesses US attit udes tow ards the UK tend t o be stereotyped and out o f date • Survey data shows many Americans consider t he British to be conservative, old-fashioned, arrog ant, and not technologically advanced Demographic and social changes mean that groups who do not share traditional links with t he UK are increasingly influent ial The USis commercially self-sufficient and has no real n eed fo r Brit ish products • No competitive advantage in most sector s in being recognised as British • Many British firms brand themselves as American or Canadian for t he American market Irish-American support for the Republican movement in Northern Ireland • A vocal pro-Republican Irish-American lobby, particularly in Boston and New York, sees Brit ain as the enemy • Some media, such as the Boston Globe, prin t ant i-British stor ies about Northern Ireland • Sinn Fein and the IRA receive much of th eir funding f rom proRepublican Americans Trade disput es betw een th e US and t he EU Some disagreements on global policy issues such as Kyoto Foot & Mou th Disease and the r ace riots in t he north of England in t he summer of 2001 received a lot of negative media coverage and discouraged many people from visiting Britain

Strengths

Weaknesses

Substantial resources are put into what is the largest programme of UK public diplomacy activity worldwide, with a network of o ffi ces in thir teen major cities managing public diplomacy activities

The British Council i s disproportion-ately small

Tony Blair’s ‘Shoulder to Should er’ speech, th e playing o f The Star Spangled Banner at Buckingham Palace, and Blair’s visit to Washington shortly after September 11th very well received

The BBC has a good repu tat ion for t he quality of its international news Atlantic fellowships excellent model for public diplomacy

Opportunities

Threats

TV is the main medium for news, information and entertainment

The size and diversity of the US presents a challenge

Appetite f or global news post September 11th.

Demographic changes in t he US

Increased demand for international education

Public Diplomacy

Impact of the BBC is stil l low among general public, although th ey claim t o reach 24 per cent of cosmopolitans in key cities on t he East Coast

British Film Of fice in Los Angeles which promotes the UK film industry in the US

The highly developed electronic communications environment leads to high expectations

116

BBC programmes shown on Public Service Television tend to perpetuate a stereotyped view of the UK

The radio market is very segmented, with about 10,000 radio stations. Public service radio only attracts 5-6 per cent of t he adult radio audience Competition for t hose wishing to study overseas both from other Anglophone countries and f rom other EU countries

Appendix I

117

Interest among policy-makers in international good practice, and many shared policy issues

Reduction in number of students studying British politics over the last 25 years

Large number of alumni: over 1,300 Marshall scholarships to date

The US is, as is widely recognised, the most importa nt and influential country in the world: its first and only hyperpower. The UK’s relationship w ith the US is remarkably strong, one might even say sp ecial, and is a prod uct of powerful historical, linguistic and cultu ral links. As a result, ‘the m arket’ takes care of a great deal of the relationship very well. Commercial ties are pow erful, with d eep interpenetration of investment capital, and strong links between New York and London as two of the World’s financial capitals. Interpersonal contact is equ ally high, with 4 million visitors a year from th e US coming to Britain on top of the 40,000 stud ents studying here. When the strength of these ‘mark et’ links is coup led with th e difficulty of produ cing public diplomacy impact within such a sophisticated society with a p lethora of different med ia outlets, the conclusion might be draw n that p ublic diplomacy in th e US can largely be left to its own devices. Yet given the USA’s unusually disproportionate importance, and the existence of real market failures in its relationship w ith the UK on some issues, notably areas of difference in broad political stance, we should be all the more clear-eyed abou t wh at specific areas of the relationship need ad dressing, and all the more committed in dealing with them. The two chief messages that th e British Embassy seeks to pu t across about the UK are firstly that w e are the closest and most natural ally of the US, and secondly that w e are an innovative

118

Public Diplomacy

and mod ern country. Efforts on the first score have been, on any measure, fantastically successful. British actions after September 11th h ave been by far the single biggest influence in r einforcing a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t w a s a l r e a d y v e r y w i d e l y h e l d . Bl a i r ’s ‘Shoulder to sho ulder’ speech, and th e playing of the StarSpangled Bann er at Buckingham Palace, followed b y Blair’s visit t o W a s h i n g t o n s h o r t l y a f t er t h e a t t a ck s , h a v e u n d o u b t e d l y impacted very p ositively on popu lar perceptions of the UK amongst th e US public. Another examp le of responsive and effective public diplomacy in this area was the UKwithN Y festival held in October 2001. Although p lanned before the September 11th attacks, this event was carefully adap ted to pu t across a strong message of UK-US solidarity at a difficult time – a m essag e th at seem s to h ave been ver y e ffectively commu nicated. There is also evidence that th e UK is peculiarly differentiated from other European countries in this area, a result in part, n o dou bt, due to Tony Blair’s stance on US policy that contrasted w ith the critical statements of many European politicians, and of EU Foreign Affairs Comm issioner Ch ris Patten. On the second score – presen ting Britain as an innov ative, creative and exciting country – efforts have been less successful, partly because they have had to work against pu blic preconceptions rather than with them. Surveys of attitud es in the US towards Britain have revealed that the comm on stereotype is of a country that is technologically backward, old-fashioned and c o n s e r v a t i v e , a n d e v e n s o m e w h a t a r r o g a n t . T h e Br i t i sh C o u n c i l ’s w o r k i n p r e s e n t i n g a d i v e r s e a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y s e l e ct i o n o f B r it i s h a r t s – i n c l u d i n g e v e n t s l i k e t h e G r e a t Expectations exhibition of innov ative British design – and also the scheduling on BBC America of programmes that challenge the more trad itional stereotypes of the UK popu lar on Am erican television go some w ay to ad dressing this weakness in the UK’s

Appendix I

119

image. Similarly, British Coun cil targeting o f publishers in t he pro motion of British wr iters, the British Film Office’s promotion of the UK film indu stry throu gh its office in Los Angeles, and th e ongoing w ork the British Coun cil does in p roviding information to US arts events funders and building links between them an d UK artists, is intended to alleviate this problem. But progress towards this second overarching p ublic diplomacy aim suffers in compar ison with th e success of efforts to pr omote the first. One gap in stra tegic message presentation tha t is not fully add ressed by British public diplomacy work in the US is around the issue of multilateralism. The general Europ ean enth usiasm for transferring national sovereignty to mu ltilateral institutions like the EU, or for multilateral agreements like the Kyoto treaty o n c l im a t e c h a n g e , c a n b e r e g a r d e d w i t h s u r p r i s e a m o n g s t policy-making circles in the US. This is an issue of cognitive dissonance, where the case for multilateralism w hich Europeans have found convincing has n ot been effectively made to the Americans in such a way that they can at least recognise the basis for European enth usiasm. This presentation work – similar in kind to the political presentation w ork being don e in the UK to ‘sell’ Europe – is perha ps not som ething th at the Embassy would wish to be involved directly in, but it is an area where the British Council might usefully be more active. It is imp ortant to n ote at this point that althou gh the UK’s crisis response pu blic diplomacy in the US has been highly successful (as detailed above) it has somewhat neglected this multilateral strand of the UK’s strategic messages to th e US. There is a tension betw een emp hasising the UK as the US’s closest and natural ally (the concentration of m ost pu blic diplomacy w ork after September 11th) and trying to highlight the argu ments for m u l t i la t e r a l i s m . In c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n t h e f i r s t , t h e U K h a s perh aps lost sight of the second . The ram ifications of this have

120

Public Diplomacy

significance for m ore tha n just US-UK relations, as will be brought out more clearly in the French case study, below. Presentation of the case for mu ltilateralism is also a message where co-operation with other European partn ers would be mu tually beneficial. In gen eral terms, the UK h as a considerable adv antage in carrying out its pu blic diploma cy in the US bilaterally, but in this case the deficiencies of EU and other countries’ relationships w ith the US impa ct detrimentally on the UK, and so we should work closely with other European countries to improv e the image of mu ltilateral activity and institutions with th e US policy elite. One w ay of achieving this beneficial co-operation would be for the various Ambassadors of t h e E U c o u n t r i e s t o jo i n t l y m a n d a t e t h e E U d e l e g a t i o n i n W a s h i n g t o n t o a c t i v e ly p r o m o t e a E u r o p e a n p o s i t i o n o n mu ltilateral co-operation to the US. In terms of trust-building wor k with the righ t group s, British pu blic dip lomacy is well-placed, and building on a good found ation. Overall British foreign p olicy, and the h istoric links between the two countries particularly in the two w orld wars, affords us a distinct comparative advantage in this area. Consequently, mu ch work ha s been well-directed at key or problem areas. One examp le of both of these targets being hit at once is the Consulate in Boston. This not on ly works w ell in developing links with the influential Harva rd and MIT academic commu nities, but is very active in dealing with the difficulties arising from the strong Irish Republican links in the city. For example, the consulate un dertakes imp ortant med ia work in briefing th e Boston Globe on stories that reflect w ell on the UK to coun teract its long-standing inclination to take up a pro-Republican, anti-British stance on the issue of Northern Ireland

Appendix I

121

U K p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y w o r k i n t h e U SA s p a n s t h e t h r e e dimen sions of pu blic diplom acy well. Short-term news managem ent and rebuttal activity is carried ou t effectively by t h e e m b a s s y , a n d t h e w o r k d o n e i n fo s t e r i n g l o n g - t e r m relationship-building should be singled out for praise as an example of good practice. Here th e UK builds on a firm ba se of elite links. Educational ties are very close, with the success of long-runn ing scholarship exchang es like the Fulbright and Marshall Scholarships perhaps reflected in the fact that 10 per cent of professors in H arvard ’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences are of UK origin. On top of this baseline of familiarity, programm es like the Atlantic Fellowships are excellent w ays to prom ote policy and idea exchange. In this ongoing programm e, preeminent experts in a v ariety of policy fields are invited take u p 3 m o n t h f e ll o w s h i p s i n t h e U K , t h u s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e invigorating th e UK’s policy debate and fostering h igh-level links into the American political establishment. (The importance o f t h e s e a ca d e m i c a n d p o l i cy - m a k i n g t i e s s h o u l d n o t b e un derestimated , particularly in a country like America where a ‘revolving d oor’ op erates betw een the large acad emic institutions and found ations like the Rockefeller and influential positions in government.) Similarly excellent relationship building work also goes on in the fields of media and finance, with the Greenwich and City fellowships respectively. Two suggestions for improvem ent of the delivery of public diplomacy in th e US might, however, be ventu red. The first is the relative weakness of med ium term m essage delivery, particularly wh en considered in comparison to th e strength of the short and long-term public diplomacy work. The embassy could do more in organ ising an ongoing series of stories to be placed in the US media over the year to p ut across some of the UK’s strate gic m essage s to th e US, like th e case for mu ltilateralism. The second area for improvem ent is the co-

122

Public Diplomacy

ordination and location of the two major UK public diplomacy i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e E m b a s s y a n d t h e B r i t is h C o u n c i l . T h e relationship betw een the Embassy an d the British Council has been bad in the past, and good co-operation between those two institutions is of course key to an effective overall strategy. Furth ermo re, the choice of location for the offices of certain bod ies is questionab le. Placing th e British Cou ncil Office (wh ich is proportionately small compared to the size and imp ortance of the USA as a target market) in Washington rather than in New Yo r k h a m p e r s i t s w o r k b y p l a c i n g i t a t a r e m o v e f r o m t h e cultural capital of the East Coast. The British Film Office’s location in Los Angeles is a well thou ght ou t decision, but its lonely position as a British cultural d iplomacy institution on the West Coast highligh ts the East Coast-centred n atur e of British pu blic dip lomacy in the US. There is a case for sugg esting that by concentrating on the Eastern Seaboard cities, and particularly on Washington, w e are in effect preaching to the converted, the most Ang lo-centric and cosmo politan US citizens, and th at the UK would d o mu ch better to concentrate on the major cultural centres of the West Coast like LA and Seattle. It is to the credit of the Embassy and the British Cou ncil in Washingto n that th e full extent of this danger – that th e UK be left communicating with its ‘natural constituency’ on the Eastern Seaboard wh ilst the d emograp hic balance in the USA shifts decisively to the West and South – has been recognised. It is, in fact, a m ajor p reoccu p ation of th e Em bass y fr om the Ambassador dow nward s, and w ith good reason as the results from the 2000 US censu s dem onstrate. The US, alone am ong industrialised nations, continues to grow rapidly in population terms – overwh elmingly as a result of immigration from Latin America and Asia to the Western and Southern States of the US. The Hispanic and Asian popu lations grew by 58 per cent and 37

Appendix I

123

per cent resp ectively from 1990 to 2000, and Whites are now a mino rity in 48 of the largest 100 cities in the US, up from 30 in 1990. The conscious effort to broad en the makeu p of the various Fellowship schem es – Atlantic, City and Gr eenw ich – is one example of a positive step in this direction. But it is vital to realise that these dem ograp hic swings in terms of ethnic composition of the pop ulation and in geograp hical distribution (States in the South an d West grew twice as fast as those in the North an d Mid west in the 1990s, and now contain almost 60 per cent of Americans) require a parad igm shift in the conduct of pu blic diploma cy in the USA, and not simply tinkering or reorientation of existing schemes and methods. In a country wh ere George W. Bush finds significant advantage in his ability to deliver camp aign speeches in Spanish, it is vital that UK public dip lomacy be condu cted in that langu age as well. Equally, in a country w here 12 per cent of the popu lation is black, conscious exposure of the UK’s own large black popu lation ought to be central to our pu blic diplomacy strategy.

including Pu blic Radio in all of America’s top 20 cities, and can n ow cla im 24 p er cen t of its ch ief ta r ge t au d ien ce (‘cosmopolitans’ in Boston, New York and Washington) tu ning i n e v e r y w e e k . H o w e v e r , t h e U SA ( a lo n g w i t h m o s t o f t h e developed world) receives the overwhelming m ajority of its new s not by rad io but by television. The most effective way to c o m m u n i c a t e Br i t i s h o b je c t i v i t y a n d h i g h s t a n d a r d s o f independ ent analysis in its news service to a significant num ber of Americans is to concentrate resou rce on m arketing BBC World as the BBC news p latform in the US – a move th at requ ires significantly increased resources being allocated.

Finally, there are areas an d op portu nities that the UK is failing to effectively utilize. One examp le of this is the large contin gent US press corps based in London. These correspond ents represent a key constituency for UK pu blic diplomacy, with great influence and the capacity to disseminate stories to a great nu mber of people. They should be integrated fully in any UK pu blic diplomacy strategy for the USA, but at present are u nderu sed in commun icating with the Am erican p ublic. A second opp ortun ity that is being missed is in the area of television news. The BBC puts across a diverse image of Britain well to a large nu mber of p eople. The World Service has been effective in getting its programs carried on over 100 US stations,

124

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

125

Norw egian Public Diplomacy in the US

France

Norway’s image in the US

The French-British relat ionship: strengths

The prevailing image of Norway in t he US stems from Norw egian immigrants, who have settled particularly in the mid-West but also in New York , Chicago and Seatt le. The image is on balance posit ive, (in contrast to , say, German imm igrant s fr om t he 1930s, who se image of Germany is considerably mor e negative) but could not really be considered reflective of contemporary Norway.

High level of personal contact and f amiliarity • 12 million Brit ish people visit France each year, and over 3 million French visit the UK. • Over 100,000 visit the UK fro m France each year to l earn English. • Over 12,000 French stud ents are current ly stud ying at UK universities. • 1,800 UK firm s in France, and over 1,500 French fir ms in the UK. • 955 town twinnings

The Norwegian Information Service wants to balance this with a contemporary image of an internationally active country concerned wit h human right s, along the lines of the Canadian or other Scandinavian image, but d oesn’t w ish to replace the old image ent irely. Other positive associations come from its history in WWII, and membership of NATO. The only major negative association stems fro m commitment to whaling. The Norwegian Inf ormat ion Services in New Yor k covers th e whol e of US and is based in New York as ‘wor ld capital of cultur e and economics’ (compare the British Council’s location in Washington). It is also moving from print-based to w eb-based information material. Norw ay seeks to focus on school children and universities with Scandinavian departm ents. It provid es schools with a study uni t, ‘Learning about Norway’, designed for teachers and children. This is distributed to 15-20,000 teachers in print & electronically. Norway recognises that just being reactive in its media management will n ot w ork because there are few opportu nities in the normal course of events for Norwegian stories. Instead it seeks to create its own events which will generate media attention and concentrates resources on these - for instance the annual Norwegian Run in Central Park, with up t o 5,000 people att ending, or t he annual Norwegian Christmas tree illumination at Union Station in Washington. It also runs a major visitors programme in Washington which gets future members of Congress to visit Norway. Washington puts reciprocal emphasis on getting visitors to Norway.

Geographical closeness and good communication links: • The Paris-London air ro ute is the busiest in th e world , carrying 3.3 million passengers each year. • Eurostar and Eurotunnel Large number of French correspondents in London Rapidly in creasing i ntern et u se • 2.8 million people had internet access in 1999, a figure w hich has continued to rise since then. Interest in British arts • 400,000 people attended a British Council exhibition on Bacon in 1996. • London a popular destination f or young people, particularly for its nightlife and ‘ethnic’ music. Extensive commercial link s • France is the UK’s 3rd largest export market and 3rd largest supplier aft er t he US and Germany; th e UK is France’s 3rd lar gest expor t supplier.

The French-British relationship: w eaknesses Traditional suspicion between the two countries UK not in the Euro Agricultural crises: BSE and FMD • Boycott of French goods in UK supermarkets Probl ems wit h th e UK health service and tr ansport system Suspicion of UK liberal economics and closeness to t he US Perception of UK as anti -EU Relatively poor knowledge of each others’ languages

126

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

127

Strengths

Weaknesses

Web-based inf ormation in French on Embassy and British Council w ebsites

No BBC World Service pr esence on FM due t o high costs of FM frequencies

Good links wit h French journ alists based in the UK

BBC Online in French is tar geted not at France but at Francophone Af rica

Commercial and cultu ral activit ies out side t he capital Seminars on policy issues Redesigned public space at the British Council offering videoconferencing and electronic information resources

Foreign Office publications in English are of limited use in France Journali sts’ visits not target ed at those already in the UK

Regular high-profile events featu ring British design, visual and performing arts English teaching for young learners, with British teachers and authentic materials Scholar ships and exchanges, especially two-way programmes Campaign by Embassy and BTA in response to BSE and FMD

Opportunities High value placed on culture Influential national press and strong regional press No UK-style t abloid press Anniversary of Entente Cordiale in 2004 UK excellence in scienti fic f ields including IT and biotechnology Annual midsummer ‘Fete de la Musique’ Rapidly increasing inter net u se

128

Public Diplomacy

Threats Reduction in Brit ish Council funding Reduction i n t he Chevening scholarship p rogr amme

France is a critical target for UK public diplom acy not solely because it is in the EU, but becau se it is one of the EU’s pivotal members. On many of the key issues where Britain is intensively seeking leverage and supp ort from other EU countries, France is the most important country we need to win over. It is France that we mu st persuad e to secure reform of the CAP – a political problem w e have been attemp ting to deal with for decades. It is also France which is obstructing the opening of its energy markets, a ma jor obstacle in the continuing p rocess of Europ ean economic reform. As such, France must be on e of our highest resources priorities for public diplomacy. But on the contrar y, the UK appears to be mak ing a serious mistake in cutting back fund ing for pub lic diplom acy in France in general, including redu cing the nu mber of Chevening scholarships, and squeezing the British Council budget. This trend could well be damaging in the long term. Some justification for these cuts might be offered by p ointing to the thickness of informal and m arket relationships between the UK and Fran ce. France is the UK’s third largest trad ing par tner after the US and Germ any, and is host to over 1800 UK firms. Stimu lated by Eurostar’s convenience, the large num ber of tourist visits between the two countries (12 million from the UK to France, 3 million back the other w ay) make for a high level of sup erficial familiarity. Furth ermor e, the UK receives over 100,000 visits a year from French seeking to learn English. But this unqu estionably high level of comm ercial and p ersonal linkage is not p utting across the sophisticated p olitical messages that are requ ired to maximise the impact of pu blic diplomacy in a shared political space like the EU. The key strategic message which the UK is seeking to pu t across in France is that it is, in fact, a European country. There are tw o s t r a n d s t o t h e F r e n c h s u s p i c io n t h a t t h i s m e s s a g e s e e k s t o

Appendix I

129

respond too. In the first place is the su spicion tha t the British d o not share the sam e values as continental Europ eans: values of social justice and welfare capitalism, rather tha n d octrinaire mark et liberalism. Linked to this is the suspicion that th e UK is at best a half-hearted Europ ean country, which keeps m ore than h a l f a n e y e a c r o s s t h e A t l a n t i c , a n d w h e r e B l a ir c a n b e caricatured as George Bush’s poodle. These suspicions are based in part on old an tagonism, and on a h istory of post-war European relations where De Gaulle’s ‘Non ’ and Margaret Thatcher’s echoing n egative some years later seem ed to set the tone for British-Europ ean relations. Contempor ary eviden ce of this is identified in th e UK’s reluctance to join the Euro, an d in New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ which was regar ded in some circles across the channel as some kind of smokescreen for an essentially free-market liberal economics. UK efforts to dem onstrate its closeness to the US unfortunately meant that the pro-European message became lost in the rhetoric o f s t a n d i n g s h o u l d e r t o s h o u l d e r w i t h f r ie n d s a c r o s s t h e Atlantic. The British Beef scandal highlighted the final important strategic message that the UK seeks to put across in France, which is to emp hasise the quality and trustw orthiness of British science. This is a readily identifiable weakness in the French image of the UK. 15 per cent of French professionals interviewed in th e British Coun cil’s ‘Throug h Oth er Eyes’ surv ey were m ainly or very un favourable to the statement that th e UK has a strong reputation for science – only China and Turkey th ough less of British science than th e French. There are impor tant efforts being mad e on this score, building on the work d one in the short term d u r i n g t h e B e e f cr i s i s . T h e s e f o c u s o n f a c i l it a t i n g a n d highlighting areas of scientific co-operation th rough things like the Alliance Partnership, or the Prix Franco-Brittanique awarded

130

Public Diplomacy

to you ng French and British scientists. In terms of effective trust-bu ilding, UK public diplom acy in F r a n c e s u f fe r s f r o m a n i n i t ia l d i s a d v a n t a g e i n t h a t b o t h pop ulations have relatively poor knowledge of each other’s lan gu ag es, w h ich ob vio u sly lea d s to d ifficu lties in communicating with the wider French public. The institutions in France are well aware of this problem, and are taking important positive steps to remedy it. In particular, the grow ing use of the intern et in Fran ce (2.8 million w ith access in 1999 – a figure tha t c o n t i n u e s t o r i s e ) h a s a l lo w e d f o r e a s y p r e s e n t a t i o n o f docum ents and material in both French and English. Both the Embassy an d th e British Coun cil websites are ava ilable in both French and English, and hits on the British Council website have in fact increased by a factor of 80 following that lan gua ge provision. How ever, the BBC’s presence in France is minimal, and there is no French langua ge TV service in wh at is predom inantly a television-based mark et. BBC World Service is n ot av ailable on F M i n F r a n c e d u e t o t h e h i g h c o s t o f FM f r e q u e n c i e s i n developed markets, and in any case the World Service’s French language service is primarily targeted at Francophone Africa. Provid ing su fficient investm ent to bo ost BBC TV in Fran ce, as t h e m o r e p o p u l a r m e d i u m , a n d t o p r o v i d e h i g h - q u a li t y program ming that wou ld app eal to a French audience, in French, is probably an unrealistic suggestion. Nevertheless, there could u sefully be a strategy for targeting French broadcast media to increase exposure of British pr ogramm ing. Add itionally, there should be more concentration on long-term language training, especially through residential exchanges. The Ja p a n e s e h a v e p i o n e e r e d a n e x ce l le n t a n d v e r y l a r g e s c a l e scheme to invite you ng p eople over on JET schemes to teach

Appendix I

131

English for a year in Japan – a scheme that is then capitalised on with a great d eal of follow-up , network bu ilding, and long-term relationship development. The range of teaching assistanceships that are organized by the British Council do not have th e same prestige and profile as the Japan ese scheme. There is a strong case in bringing the various schemes together under a stronger brand , similar to the JET scheme, which wou ld imp rove British langu age skills in French, and create a caucus of youn g French with greater experience of both English and of the UK. One consideration that requires more attention in UK public diplomacy in France is the need to reach the right constituencies with the UK’s key messages. The grou ps that it is imp ortant for us to reach, particularly in connection with ou r high pr iority political issues like CAP reform and liberalisation of energy markets, lay primarily outside of the Metropolitan aud ience at which the m ajority of UK work is directed (and who a re most likely to have direct experience and personal links with the UK). The UK needs to w ork with farmers and consumer grou ps in order to directly tackle its priorities in France. Some excellent work h as already been done in this regard – particularly the visits made by British vets during the BSE crisis – but more could be don e in reaching these audiences. In this regard the strength of the French regional p ress, certainly in comparison with the centralised med ia of the UK, could well be an asset and is an important target for more intensive media liaison work. I n t e r m s o f c o -o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s U K p u b l i c dip lomacy institutions in France, and of coverage of the whole spectrum of public diplomacy from short to long term, the picture in France is generally positive. The institutions w ork well together and their pu blic diplomacy strategic planning is among st the best in any country and could serve as a model for other coun tries. The closeness of this relationship is in p art a result of the p eculiar p ervasiveness of the French state, which 132

Public Diplomacy

leads the British Council to work throu gh the Embassy on most issues as formal relations with the French state will commonly form pa rt of any large scale project. As mentioned abov e, short-term crisis response and med ia rebuttal in France is conducted well and professionally. The w e a k n e s s e s in c o v e r a g e c o m e a t t h e l o n g - t e r m e n d o f t h e spectrum . The majority of longer-term co-ordinated p ublic diplomacy campaigns focus on th e creative/ innovative image of the UK, and consist largely of arts events (often highly successful ones: over 400,000 people attended a British Council Bacon exhibition in the mid 1990s). There has, however, been a neglect of the political issues that are a vital point of UK-French relations. There should be a sustained campaign to work up good news stories around, say, CAP reform or British commitmen t to Europe. One u nd er-utilised resource in this regard is the significant cohort of French press in London . These shou ld be targeted by the Foreign Office in W h i t eh a l l , an d b y t h e o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t s , o n a systematic basis and in co-operation w ith the Embassy in Paris – b r i e fi n g i n F r e n c h a n d p r o v i d i n g F r e n c h t r a n s l a t io n s o f ministerial speeches. These British news could then be an excellent source of pro-British stories in the French press, and a good conduit for p olitical messages that the UK seeks to d eliver to the French p ublic. More serious is the weakn ess in long-term relationships, particularly in the policy arena. While there are around 12,000 French studen ts stud ying at UK un iversities, these kind of links are not being systematically followed up to create networks of F r e n c h p e o p l e w i t h e x t en s i v e e x p e r i e n ce o f t h e U K a n d o f E n g l is h . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s c a l in g d o w n o f t h e C h e v e n i n g scholarship prog ramm e – the Foreign Office’s program me of

Appendix I

133

scholarships targeted at futu re decision-makers – to only seven Chevening aw ards in 2001/ 2 is very un fortunate in this regard. The programm e is an excellent way of ensuring that some of the top people in politics, business and the media have th e kind of und erstanding of Britain that can only be gained by spend ing time in the country. Given the importance of France to the UK w i t h i n t h e E U , a d d i t io n a l i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e s c h o la r s h i p programme now would undoubtedly pay dividends in the future. This criticism leads on to a wider gap in Franco-British relations and in British pu blic diplomacy in France. In the context of French and British sovereignty-sharing in the EU, and of the importan ce of dem onstrating the UK’s fundam entally shared political values with the continent, it is strange to that there is no scheme that correspo nd s to the Atlantic Fellowships scheme in the USA. The potential for future p olicy co-operation and for cross-fertilisation of policy ideas within the EU context that su ch a scheme w ould offer is significant. Furth ermore, th e British Council is not resourced to help in fostering links between French and English political parties, and w hilst it is prepared to hold som e political seminars it is not able to und ertake this on a more systematic basis. It is vital for an effective UK political presence on the European stage that we forge alliances with continental political parties, and enga ge in debate an d p olicy exchange with continental think-tanks and other institutions. Work that follows the lines of the German Stiftungen in other sophisticated and integrated European polities like France w ould be an im port ant p ublic d iploma cy asset, and is conspicuously lacking in pub lic diploma cy efforts at present.

134

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

135

Poland The Poland-UK relat ionship: weaknesses The Poland-UK relationship: strengths The two governments have excellent bilateral relations The Polish and UK go vernments share a similar no n-federalist, pro enlargement at tit ude tow ards the EU Poland is the UK’s largest trading partner in Central and Eastern Europe Historical links, especially cooperation duri ng t he Second World War, have left a mutu ally positive relationship, particularly among the older generation Poles are relatively well-informed about the UK: in a 1999 public opinion survey, 60 per cent of educated young Poles claimed to know at least ‘a fair amount’ about t he UK In th e same survey, 74 per cent of young educated Poles said t hey felt ‘very’ or ‘mainly favourable’ towards the UK - higher than eith er the US or Germany British democracy and t he legal system are rated highly i n Poland, and Britain is thought of as multicultural and racially tolerant In the same survey, 84 per cent of respondents perceived British goods and services as very or f airly go od, and only 1 per cent as poor 83 per cent t hink British higher education is either fairl y or very good. Brit ish media are rat ed hi ghl y in t erms of bot h qu alit y and trustworthiness Polish businesses are keen t o w ork w ith British companies, and w ould like to see more Brit ish compani es in Poland Sizeable Polish diaspor a in th e UK which is generally w ell regarded in bot h countries Engli sh is widel y spoken : 91 per cent of young ed ucated Poles speak English, and the remaining 9 per cent wish to learn 39 per cent of educated young Poles have visited the UK at least once

136

Public Diplomacy

Images of t he UK tend to be stereotyped and tr aditional Many Poles feel that Britain does not value its relationship with the EU The UK is not able to compete w ith the strength of Germany’s influence as Poland’s strongest ally in the EU UK investment in Poland ranks only sixth, behind that of Germany, the USA, France, th e Netherl ands and Italy, and many Brit ish companies are not widely recognised as being British In the survey quoted above, 69 per cent of respondents agreed with the proposition that the UK is not very welcoming t owards foreigners Focus group d iscussions wit h youn g educated Poles in 1999 show ed t hat British businessmen are regard ed as being u nwi lling to t ake risks and t o compete successful ly in a competit ive environm ent Knowledge of Poland in the UK is very limited Legacy of resentment of t he UK’s role dur ing t he Second World War, and the feeling it let Poland down Bad publicity associated wi th incidents of Poles being r efused entry t o the UK at UK airports

As the largest of the EU accession countries with a population of 40 million, Poland will be an important n ew voice within the shared political space of the EU. Poland will wield the sam e num ber of votes in the Comm ission as Spain, and only two less than the ‘Big Four’ – the UK, German y, France and Italy. In sp ite of Germany’s huge influence in Poland, w ith its strong commercial and cultural ties, in EU policy terms the P olish governm ent is closer to the UK’s position than to the federalist vision of German y, making the UK and Poland n atural allies. It i s , t h e r e fo r e , v e r y m u c h i n t h e U K ’s i n t e r e s t t o b e s e e n a s i n t e r e st e d i n a n d e n g a g e d w i t h P o l a n d , t o b u i l d n e t w o r k s between th e respective political leaders an d to foster mutu al sympathy and understanding between the two populations. Given that other EU member states such as Germany and France have similar interests, the UK must also try to offer something distinctive. Appendix I

137

UK public diplomacy in Poland Strengths

Weaknesses

British Council hig hly regarded for its role during Communism

Embassy premises do not present modern front

BBC World Service Polish service is widely r ecognised and respected for its quality and trustworthiness, and judged the highest-quality news provider in Poland

Str ategic planning between dif ferent agencies is weak

DFID’s ‘Know How Fund’ is wid ely recognised

Opportunities

Threats

Largest EU accession count ry wit h a population of nearly 40 million

Futu re Eastern bord er of the EU, with eastern neighbours a possible threat to stability

Expected to j oin t he EU in 2004

Reducing importance of radio as a source of inf ormation and entertainment

One of t he fastest g rowing economies in Europe, with annual growt h of 3.8 per cent NATO member Poland keen to f orm a bridge between the EU and Ukraine

Weaknesses in border management, environment and corruption need resolving prior t o EU accession Need t o restructure t he agricultural sector

Stemming from this accepted impor tance, the UK commits significant resources to public diplomacy in Poland (and in the other EU accession countries). In fact, Poland stan ds as a g ood mod el of a country wh ere public diplomacy has been taken very seriously indeed. N evertheless, the UK public diplomacy effort in the UK is being out-spent by German pu blic dip lomacy, wh ich, for historical and geogra ph ical reasons, places a very high pr iority on good relations with the Poles.

138

Public Diplomacy

The UK’s strategic messages in Poland are d etermined to a large extent by the n ature of ou r chief bilateral interest there, EU relations, and also by th e baseline of Polish pu blic opinion toward the UK, as revealed in the British Cou ncil’s ‘Throu gh Other Eyes’ survey of you ng edu cated professionals in a series of countries. That survey r evealed relatively high levels of Polish familiarity with and favourability toward the UK. 60 per cent of those surveyed claimed to kn ow ‘a fair amount’ about the UK, and 74 per cent felt ‘very’ or ‘mainly’ favourable – a figure th at exceeded both Am erican and German scores. How ever, despite warm Polish opinions toward the UK, they did n ot perceive it as a committed European country. Lack of interest in the EU was perceived as th e UK’s major weakn ess by 13 per cent of Poles – second only to its conservatism and lack of innovation at 14 per cent. Almost a qu arter felt that the UK cared ‘not a lot/ n ot at all’ for its relations with the EU (a sense of rejection echoed by th e F r e n ch a n d t h e G e r m a n s s u r v e y e d ) . St e m m i n g f r o m t h i s baseline, it is therefore imp ortan t for the UK to p roject itself as a key pa rtner an d a seriou s player in th e EU. If alliance on EU issues is one of the chief advantages we wish to gain from our relations with Poland, then w e cannot afford to app ear as if the EU is not a top priority for the UK; because if that does seem to be the case then we will not appear attractive allies for the Poles. The second chief consideration for the strategic pu blic diplomacy relationship with Poland is that, as well as appearing less committed to Europe than other EU countries, we are also regarded as less imp ortant to Polish national interests than Germany. In the ‘Throu gh Other Eyes’ survey, German y was associated more strongly than the UK with innovation an d ‘w o r l d - b e a t i n g c o m p a n i e s ’, a n d w a s r e g a r d e d b y a h i g h e r proportion of p eople as a m ajor financial and trading centre. The clear overall impression of Poles was that Germany w as the economic powerhouse of the EU, and consequently the chief

Appendix I

139

140

source of the investment and jobs that wou ld stem from EU membership. This impression is also backed up by the figures, which have th e UK ranking only sixth for inward investment in Poland, behind Germ any, the USA, France, the Netherland s and Italy. This means there is a need for a strong comm ercial public diplomacy message, to convince Poland of the strength of British business. It also means that the British relationship with Poland is at a disadvanta ge, particularly relative to the German -Polish relationship, in being seen to be able to back its warm w ords and prom ises with concrete advantages to Poland.

EU. Furth ermore, in 1999 an FCO-fund ed Action Plan, w orth around £125,000 was launched to help Poland p repare for the technical aspects of EU mem bership in areas like Trade, Justice and Home Affairs, Agriculture and the Environment. The British have also contributed to read ying Poland’s armed forces for NATO accession th rough the ASSIST programm e, of military and English language training. Development work of this kind, par ticularly wh en it gains a high local p rofile like DFID’s ‘Know How Fund’ work has, makes a very p ositive long-term imp act on UK-Polish relations.

The two key messages, therefore, that the UK seeks to convey in Poland are firstly that w e are committed Europeans, and second that we are a country with serious economic and p olitical weight on the Europ ean scene. Both of these messages combine to presen t the UK as a key political ally in European p olitics once Poland has successfully acceded to th e EU. UK public diplomacy in Poland has been in th e main very successful at delivering th ese messages, particularly through the mediu m an d long-term aspects of the relationship. Notable in this regard ha ve been the UK’s high-profile developm ent work , the World Service’s broadcasting, and the British Council’s scholarship programmes.

The British Council’s wealth of scholarship prog ramm es in Poland ar e another effective w ay of influencing the long-term relations of the two countries, by exposing Poland ’s future decision-makers to the UK at an early stage. In addition to the 15 Joseph Conr ad scholarships – the locally brand ed version of the F C O ’s C h e v e n i n g s c h o l a r s h i p s – t h e B r i t i s h C o u n c i l a l s o p ro vid es fu n d in g for yo u n g law yer s, scie n tis ts an d businesspeople through individual schemes. In fact the British Council’s repu tation in Poland generally is very good, stemming at least in part from positive associations with its work in Com m u nist tim es, w he n, as on e o f th e fir st w este rn organisations operating in Poland , it was seen as a ‘wind ow on the w orld’.

T h e Br i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t , t h r o u g h t h e E m b a s s y , h a s m a d e considerable contributions to Poland’s development d uring the post-Communist decade of transition. The Department for I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e lo p m e n t ’s ‘ Kn o w H o w F u n d ’ (w h i c h i s adm inistered through the Embassy) has disbursed over £100m on developm ent projects in support of Poland’s development as a m a r k e t e c o n o m y s i n c e 1 98 9 . T h i s w o r k h a s b e e n w i d e l y recognised, and is an excellent way of dem onstrating th e UK’s commitment to the economic strength of Poland and the wider

T h e B BC P o l i s h s e r v i c e a l s o b e n e f i t s f r o m a r e p u t a t i o n established und er the Commu nists, when it was one of only three n on-state broad casters in Poland . The BBC’s perceived editorial independence was valued h ighly, even over the other international broadcasting netw orks available at the time: Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. The BBC continues to enjoy this high rep utation, wh ere the qu ality of its analysis is often rated m ore highly th an th e local Polish med ia. These da ys BBC Polish service current affairs programm es are broadcast on

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

141

regional pub lic radio, including a flagship 45-minu te current affairs program me w hich reaches some 600,000 peop le, mostly in the BBC’s ‘cosmopolitans’ target group. In addition, the BBC p r o v i d e s 5 -m i n u t e h o u r l y n e w s b u l l e ti n s o n n a t i o n a l a n d international news wh ich are u sed by a num ber of commercial radio stations across the cou ntry. The result of all this exposure is that opinion surveys estimate that there are aroun d 2.6 million ‘conscious listeners’ to t he BBC. This successful media footprint is one of the strongest aspects of the UK’s relations with Poland, but two factors should be kept in consideration with r egards to it. In the first place, the imp act of the television station BBC World shou ld not be overlooked, and as Poland ’s econom y d evelops it is likely that it will become an even mo re influential, opinion-forming sou rce of imp ression about the UK. Amongst the youn g professionals interviewed in ‘Throug h Oth er Eyes’, 29 per cent cited BBC World as their m ost important source for forming an opinion on th e UK – ahead of BBC Polish Service radio (desp ite being broa dcast in Eng lish), and second only to visiting the UK in person. In the important ‘successor generation’ group which that survey targeted, over 90 p e r c e n t o f w h o m a l r e a d y s p e a k E n g l i s h , BBC W o r l d ’ s competition w ith CNN is an increasingly important area for a t t e n t i o n . T h e s e co n d f a ct o r t h a t s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d i n connection w ith the BBC’s excellent p rofile in Poland is that there could be a danger of dow n-grading the importance of the service wh en Poland eventually does accede to the EU, taking the serv ice down to the level of the BBC’s involvem ent in G e r m a n y o r i n F r a n c e. T h is w o u l d b e t o a b a n d o n a l l t h e adva ntages which had been gained in the first place. Thus, British p ublic diplomacy in Poland is very good, an d covers particularly the long-term aspects of this importan t relationship well. However, there are some areas that would

142

Public Diplomacy

b e n e f i t fr o m m o r e a t t e n t i o n . O n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t constituencies which British pu blic diplomacy in Poland must add ress, Polish farmers, is perhaps not being well covered by current efforts. This is because it can be h ard to have an impact outside of metropolitan areas. It is vital for the UK to have some persu asive leverage with th is group if it is to gain benefit from an alliance with Poland within the politics of the EU, and if Poland is to integrate efficiently into the structure of the new enlarged EU. British public diplomacy should be concerned with convincing the Polish that the CAP w ill be inflationary for food prices. It shou ld also be concerned with convincing the Polish agricultural sector that a reformed CAP w ill benefit them by, for instance, providing fun ding for them to meet EU hygiene levels. A second area where UK pu blic diploma cy needs to be concentrating in the near futu re is in co-operation betw een political parties in the UK an d Polan d. The activities of the Westminster foundation, fostering parliamentary democracy and effective political parties in transition countries, mean th at para doxically we have better links with Polish political parties than w ith parties in most oth er EU countries. But as Poland rapidly ap proaches accession, we should begin to look at policy exchange and co-operation rath er than the d emocratic capacity building with which the Westminster Foundation concerns itself. There is some work in this area. The British Cou ncil runs seminars which provide a forum for Polish policy-makers to discuss broad policy issues with UK counterparts and politicians from the Comm ission an d other European countries. Recent seminars have covered themes like mod ernising government in E u r o p e , E U e n l a r g e m e n t a n d E u r o p e a n i n t e g r a t i o n . Bu t a concerted bilateral programme of relationship-building would pay m uch greater dividend s for the UK. This is an area w here the Germans h ave been very active, and w here their politicallyoriented foundations, like the Konrad Adenhau er Stiftung and

Appendix I

143

the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung , have been very effective at forging links with Poland ’s political class. Britain cannot afford to overlook this potentially very fruitful area. Lastly, there is an important task for m ultilateral, EU level, pu blic diploma cy to perform in Poland. It is by no means a certainty that the Polish referendu m on accession w ill be won by the pro-European s. Given that enlargemen t has been decisively deemed to be in the interests of the current EU countries, it is also in their interests that the Polish referendu m, and th e other referenda , result in an en largement, and consequently in their interests to combine their efforts to p ersuade the Poles to vote ‘yes’ to EU accession. The EU needs to act together to sell itself to the populations of the potential accession countries, just as the Irish government h as to sell the benefits of enlargement and the Nice treaty to its own popu lation, or the British governm ent w ill h a v e t o s e l l b e n e f i t s o f jo i n i n g t h e E u r o t o i t s s c e p t i c a l population.

India The India-UK relationship: strengths Democratic system o f g overnment Historic ties with Britain Highly educated cosmopolitan urban minority Internet use is increasing r apidly • Internet users are currently estimated at 7 million Economic ties are growin g • Trade of £5 billion per annum • UK is the biggest investor in India • 200 companies in sectors including biot echnology and IT • 250 Indian firms have invested in the UK Large Indian diaspora in the UK • 1.3 million people of Indian descent in the UK • Extensive family ties Cricket is hugely po pular Large numbers of Indians visit the UK • 200,000 visa applications each year Burgeoning IT industry Many UK NGOs active in In dia

The India-UK relationship: weaknesses Only 3-4 per cent of the population knows English Historic links with Britain are weakening • The current polit ical leadership is the last generatio n who experienced the British period Nationalist p olitical leadership w ith a dislike of for eign involvement in local and regional issues such as Kashmir Suspicion of the strengt hening of Pakistan’s ties wit h th e west The Indian media is quick to criticise the UK Negative reaction t o th e UK’s suppor t of th e US aft er Septemb er 11th

144

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

145

UK public diplomacy in India Strengths

predicted 25 million in 2005

Physical presence in the 4 major cities, and network of British libraries supported by the British Council in a fur ther 7 cities

Weaknesses

British Council is one of m ost modern and eff ective off ices wit h pioneering Knowledge and Learning Centre

BBC Online in French is tar geted not at France but at Francophone Af rica

BBC World Service Hindi service is very popu lar in r ural areas and has a good reputation BBC World television is popular in urban areas among the growing number of people with satellit e or cable t elevision

No BBC World Service pr esence on FM due t o hig h costs of FM frequencies

Foreign Office publications in English are of limit ed use in France Journali sts’ visits not target ed at those already in the UK

Sponsored visits programme: 30 visits to the UK p er year, including journalists, politicians and business people Indian media are receptive to articles placed by the Embassy High Commissioner’s media appearances are well reported.

Opportunities

Threats

Highly educated cosmopolitan urban minority Burgeoning IT industry

Large rural population wit h low levels of literacy, particularly among women

Large NGO sector and high level of public aw areness of social issues

Large number of languages spoken, with no one lingua franca

Regionally influential

Large numbers of people have no access to media

Huge population of over 1 billion people Rapidly growing number of internet users: 5.5 million at the beginning of 2001, and a

146

Public Diplomacy

Number of listeners to BBC World Service is falling

The UK’s colonial links with Ind ia mean that it trad itionally has a major institutional presence, and a considerable commitmen t of resources. The UK has a diplomatic presence in four m ajor cities, and a British Council presence in a furth er seven. It und oubtedly spends m ore than any competitor country. But given the vast importan ce of India, and the scale of the pu blic diplom acy challenge in commu nicating with it, those resources are meagre. India is the largest dem ocracy in the world, with over 1 billion p eop le. It has 28 states, 15 official langu ages, 24 languages spoken by a million people or m ore and u p to 700 mu tually u nintelligible dialects. It has a GDP of $2.2 trillion, and a GDP growth rate of 6 per cent per ann um in real terms. This amou nts to a ma ssively lucrative market, if it is ever fully opened up to international trade. In add ition, it is a nodal p layer in WTO negotiation as a leader of the non-aligned mov ement, and as one of th e w orld ’s most imp ortan t tran sitional economies. It is a nu clear power, and is of pivotal regional and geopolitical importance. Along with Pakistan, it is the most likely candidate for first state to become involved in a nuclear war . It is one of China’s chief regiona l rivals. Fur therm ore, its i m p o r t a n c e i s b o u n d t o g r o w a s i t b e c o m e s m o r e a s s e r t iv e internationally and more p rosperous internally. It is, in short, one of the most imp ortant, and the most d ifficult, aud iences for public diplomacy in the modern world. The UK has a great variety of close links with India as a result of its colonial past. An estimated 4 per cent of the population speak English, and it is virtually a first language for many edu cated Indians. This small section of the p opu lation is in charge of m any key sectors of so ciety – econo m ic, political and bur eaucratic. There is a great deal of familiarity on both sides, stemming from th e education of many of the Indian elite in the UK, and from the large Indian diaspora in Britain. However, that close relationship is und er threat. A new generation of Indian

Appendix I

147

leaders is emerging wh o have had no d irect relations with the UK, and no experience of colonial rule. As India becomes richer, a growing entrep reneurial midd le class is push ing out the old adm inistrative elite. An increasing num ber of Indian MPs no longer sp eak English. In the British Coun cil’s Through Other Eyes survey of ‘successor generation’ young professional Ind ians, the U K l a g g e d b e h i n d t h e U S in b o t h f a m i l i a r i t y r a t i n g s a n d favourability ratings. This demonstrates that the UK faces a dem ograph ic threat to its public diplom acy position in India. On top of this, India has a vast and sophisticated m edia market. It has more quality English-language national broad sheets then the U K d oes, an d t his d esp ite the n oted fact tha t th e o v e r w h e l m i n g p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t io n c a n n o t r e a d English. It is estimated to ha ve over 300 English langu age dailies, and over 2000 dailies in Hin di. Estimates of the total n u m b e r o f p u b l i ca t i o n s , i n cl u d i n g w e e k l i e s , m o n t h l i e s , quarterlies and oth er journals in all langu ages in India place the figure at almost 40,000. Covering this vast m edia m arket is something of a tall ord er for the ap proximately 20 staff engaged i n P r e s s a n d P u b l i c A ff a i r s w o r k i n t h e B r it i s h d i p l o m a t i c representations arou nd India. These figures are an ind ication that public diplomacy in India could und oubtedly use more resources. The UK is generally clear about th e messages it wan ts to convey in India. It seeks to emphasise its commitment to Ind ia, its own status as an innovative and modern multicultural country, and as a major player in w orld affairs (a mem ber of the UN Security Council, the EU and NATO etcetera). There is a mixed record on the effective transmission of these messages. One particular area that has not come across effectively is the presentation of the UK as a tolerant and mu lticultural society. There has been a positive reaction to British Cou ncil initiatives like the visit of Benjamin

148

Public Diplomacy

Zephan iah to talk about the Stephen Lawrence case, and so demon strate an openn ess in Britain about its race problems, but in the Through Other Eyes survey qu oted above, racism and racial discrimination was the second most comm only listed weakn ess of the UK, behind a n over-reliance on the Un ited States. But there are som e key messages that the UK does n ot seek to pu t across with its pub lic diplomacy in India wh ich ought to be importan t aspects of that strategy. The prom otion of regional security is a vital par t of the UK’s (and t he w orld’s) interest in South Asia. Public diplomacy can play an imp ortant part in th is by, for instance, presenting the argu ments for mu ltilateralising the Kashmir conflict, and seeking to ease tensions betw een Muslims and H indus in the region. More broadly, it is important to commun icate to the Ind ian pop ulation the existence of an alternative route to international influence. At the momen t, the message which the world sends to India by its actions and by its responses to Indian actions suggests that the only way to achieve recognition of India’s strength – symbolised by a permanent seat on the UN Security Coun cil, a luxury tha t China enjoys but wh ich India is denied – is through the flexing of nuclear and other military muscles. There is a job for public diplomacy to do, which it does not curr ently take on either mu ltilaterally or on a bilateral UK-Ind ian basis, in comm un icating tha t an alternative route via international co-operation, trade and engagement exists. The second large area w here pu blic diplom acy ought to be contributing in India, but is not doing enou gh, is on the issue of globalisation and liberalisation of trad e. The UK, along with the W T O c o u n t r i e s a s a w h o l e , m a k e s l i t t l e e ff o r t t o s e l l t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f fr e e t r a d e , a n d t h e D o h a a g r e e m e n t , t o t h e broader Indian p opulation. Given that the en ormous p otential of the Indian m arket can only be tapped if its trade regulations are

Appendix I

149

r e l a x ed , a n d t h a t t h i s w i ll o n l y h a p p e n i f a b r o a d e n o u g h coalition of support can be built up within India’s enormous dem os, then strategic commu nication on th e benefits of trade a l r e a d y b e i n g r e a l i s e d ( i n c lu d i n g t h e p o w e r f u l In d i a n I T indu stry) and on the potential gains from globalisation in the future, would be of great advan tage to the UK. Although there is much w ork done w ith businessmen, promoting the UK as a trade partner and gateway to Europe, there are few attempts to engage the broader pop ulation in a consensus of support for trade liberalisation as a vision for Ind ia’s future. British p ublic diplomacy in India covers the three d imensions of public diplomacy well, but there are important gap s and areas of und er-resource that need to be highlighted. In terms of short-term news m anagemen t, the Embassy is faced with an enormou s task with only a comparatively small staff, as noted a bove. Nevertheless, the coverage of the media is patchy a n d c a n b e i m p r o v e d . T h e Em b a s s y o n l y r e a l l y co v e r s t h e English newspapers and the major publications in Hindi. Prior to September 11th, papers in Urdu were not even monitored, and even after their inclusion, there remain 13 official languages whose pu blications are n ot mon itored. Because of the sensitivity of the Indian med ia to bad British news stories and governm ent slip-up s – particularly events like the race riots in Bradford and Oldham in the summer of 2001 – swift reaction to news stories is especially importan t. Yet much of the pu blic diplom acy outpu t of the Embassy and consulates remains in English (in contrast to the US, which is able to do a lot of work in the variou s vernaculars), and the Embassy is concerned that mor e needs to b e d o n e b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t s i n W h i t e h a ll t o instrumentalise the Indian press corps in London in rebutting negative impressions of the UK.

150

Public Diplomacy

Anot her im por tant consid eration at th e level of new s man agemen t and n ews coverage is the position of the World Service in India, particularly with reference to the rising class of young en trepreneurial Indians which mu st be the chief target group of British public diplomacy strategy. The World Service’s editorial indep endence enjoys a good reputation, as does its r e c o g n i se d e x p e r t i s e i n t h e r e g i o n i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e American outlets. It also received a big boost in a ud ience and p r e s t i g e in t h e a f t er m a t h o f Se p t e m b e r 1 1 t h w h e n i t w a s c o n s id e r e d t o b e i n f o r m a t i v e , u n b i a s e d a n d o b je c t iv e . Bu t outside of this u nfortunate and exceptional situation, most of the time the younger generation prefer to watch their news on television rath er than listen to it on the ra dio. The BBC World Service did not come in the top ten of sources for impressions of Britain in th e Through Other Eyes survey, wh ereas the televisionbased p latform BBC World came in fifth. In fact, India is on e country w here BBC World is p erforming very w ell, and actually outp erforms CN N by a factor of 3 to 1. Whilst it is clear that radio is the vital medium for comm un icating to India’s rural poor, in terms of efficient retu rn of influence on investment it m u s t b e r e c o g n i se d t h a t I n d i a – a c o u n t r y w i t h 7 0 m i ll i o n television sets – is increasingly a country where television is the vital med ium for produ cing impact. In the medium term, there are examp les of inspired thinking on message delivery in Indian p ublic diplomacy. When the England cricket team tou red Ind ia und er the captaincy of Nasser Hussain – an Englishman of Indian d escent – the op portun ity for a series of positive news stories on the inclusive multicultural nature of modern Britain w as spotted and exploited. This was particularly influential given the enorm ously high p rofile of the sport of cricket in India, and indeed because of its pre-existing status as a highly politically charged game due to the frequently stormy and competitive India-Pakistan matches. In fact, a mem ber of

Appendix I

151

the Embassy’s staff was assigned to th e tour full time for the pu rposes of managing its public diplomacy potential. Equally, the British Council and th e Foreign Office have used the Indian d iaspora in the UK well to pu t across the same strategic message. The Foreign Office’s visits to the Pu njabi commu nity in Southall have strengthened links with that community and are to be p ublicised in India. There has also been attention paid to the nu anced issue of common p erceptions of the British Indian diaspora as uned ucated, unskilled and unambitious – a verdict often accompan ied by unfavourable contrasts w ith the Silicon Valley millionaire stereotype of the Indian diasp ora in the United States. British Indian d ot.com millionaires are to figure heavily in future d iplomatic visits. Long-term relationship-building is also generally very good . The British Cou ncil m ana ges to r each an au d ience o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 0 0, 0 00 p e o p l e a y e a r , m o s t l y t h r o u g h i t s network of information centres and libraries and its provision of English-language books an d information. It hopes to increase that figure to 300,000 by concentrating on expanding internetbased bu t assisted d istance learning. India is a priority coun try for the expansion of Chevening scholarships, and the target is to increase the number of Indians studying in the UK from 4,300 currently to aroun d 10,000 in 2005. The Embassy’s spon sored visits programme, which is followed up with interviews and often also results in p ositive new s stories from med ia visitors, is another good mod el for developing the kind of links that can be v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l o v e r t h e l o n g e r t e r m . F o r i n s t a n c e , P r im e Minister Vajpayee had been on a sponsored visit to the UK whilst in opposition. However, the scale of the programme – c.30 visitors in 2001 – is inadequ ate given the size of the popu lation and of the governing class in India.

Co-ordination between th e UK public diplomacy institutions in I n d i a w o r k s r e l a t i v e l y w e l l . Th e B r i t is h C o u n c i l a n d t h e Embassy have a good w orking relationship an d complement o n e a n o t h e r ’s w o r k w e l l . Bu t t h e r e a r e w e a k n e s s e s o f co operation, particularly with the Departmen t for International Development, in terms of co-ordination with the EU and other EU governments on m essages of common interest. The issue of using DFID work to p ublic diplomacy advan tage is a thorn y one. Foreign Aid’s chequered history of neo-colonial medd ling and export prom otion was the motivation behind DFID’s avow ed p rinciple to concentrate exclusively on p overty redu ction as its goal, and n ot to engage in any accompanying branding or pu blic relations work w hatsoever. Furthermore, given that some of the imp ortant development work that DFID engages in is not necessarily immed iately p opu lar (initiatives like putting in w ater meters, although highly beneficial in the long-term, can provoke powerful imm ediate negative reactions), t h e r e a r e o c c a si o n s w h e n p u b l i c a f fa i r s w o r k a r o u n d s u c h projects could actually be counter-produ ctive, and could even work to u nd ermine the legitimacy of the kind of reforming gov ernm ents w ith w hom DFID w orks . H ow ever, it is i n e s ca p a b l e t h a t t h e o n l y U K g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c y t h a t h a s impact and reach outside of the metropolitan elite, and w hich does a great d eal of very positive work , is DFID; and DFID acts entirely below the rada r of public exposu re. There mu st be a happy medium between a USAID model of brashly branding every cent and every brick of aid, and DFID’s trappist silence. Perh ap s b y fo cu sing on the p ositiv e ou tcom es o f UK development work, a very important m essage could get across to a large number of Indians that the UK is engaged with an d investing in th e future of India, without comprom ising the w ork that DFID does. The other main issue in pu blic diplom acy co-operation in Ind ia

152

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

153

is multilateral co-operation w ith the EU. India, as one of the noda l countries in trade negotiation, is one of those countries wh ere the EU is very active dip lomatically. There is good cooperation between the mem ber states through the EU in areas like cultural presentation. But the wide interests of the European countries – in hu man rights, in good govern ance, and in forging consensus in favour of globalisation – are not areas where th ere has been a concerted attempt at combining mutually enforcing messages. EU public diplomacy shou ld not just be limited to f i lm f e s t i v a l s a n d c u l t u r a l e x c h a n g e , b u t s h o u l d e x p l o i t a comparative multilateral advantage in dealing with hard political issues without the baggage that might go with such messages in a delicate post-colonial bilateral relationship like that of the UK and India. Lastly, it is imp ortant to note th e swiftly growing importan ce of the Internet as a platform for message d elivery in Ind ia. Ind ia had 5.5 million internet users in 2001, and that figure is set to quintu ple in 4 years to a p redicted 25 million in 2005. This internet boom , linked to the streng th of the Indian information technology sector as a whole, is concentrated around precisely t h e k i n d o f s u c ce s s o r g e n e r a t i on I n d i a n s t h a t U K p u b l ic diplomacy seeks to target. The Embassy and the British Council have respo nd ed well to this chang ing situation. The Embassy’s website, recently redesigned, attracts 1.8 million hits a month, and rising. This compar es very well with, for instance, the Observer On line which is one of the UK’s most frequ ently visited w eb pages at aroun d 1 million a mon th. The Council has concentrated heavily on converting its English language t e a c h i n g a n d i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s o u r c e s – t h e ce n t r a l relationship bu ilding tools – to a p artially online basis, and aims to increase its reach by a half throu gh this med ium. The World Service has recently launched major multimedia websites in Hindi and Urdu , providing 24 hour new s through text, graphics and streaming audio. 154

Public Diplomacy

South Africa The South Africa-UK relationship: strengths South Afri ca is import ant t o the UK fo r its strat egic importance and inf luence in sub-Saharan Af rica The two countries have a longstanding relationship wit h many close personal cont acts, including betw een the current Sout h Afr ican political leadership and former anti-apartheid campaigners in the UK Economically, the UK is by f ar t he biggest investor in South Af rica, and one of its most important trading partners Opinions of the UK among young educated South Africans are generally favourable: in a survey conducted in 1999, the UK w as rated hi ghly fo r it s economic stabilit y, democracy, legal system, m ulti cultural society, and f or the quality of its higher education Approximately two-fifths of educated young South Africans have visited the UK at least o nce DFID and m any UK NGOs are active in Sout h Af rica

The South Africa-UK relationship: weaknesses The history of the UK’s relations with South Africa, particularly the UK’s ambivalent at tit ude to sanctions during t he apartheid era, has left a feeling of mistrust among some Differences between the t wo governments in their handling of the March 2002 Zimbabwe election also created wider public distrust The major investment by the UK in South Africa is not widely recognised outside the business community, and companies which have been in Sout h Af rica fo r many years such as Shell and BP have come to be thought of as South African rather t han British In the 1999 survey quoted above, educated young South Africans thou ght o f t he UK as tradit ional, conservative and lacking in g lobal perspective, and rat ed it signif icantly behind the US, Japan and Germany in terms of its scientific and technological innovation Only 6 per cent of the black population att end university, and the m a j o r i t y o f y o u n g So u t h A f r i c a n s h a v e l i t t l e c o n t a c t w i t h o r understanding of the UK

Appendix I

155

UK public diplomacy in South Africa Strengths Commitment to cooperative working among UK agencies, and joint mission statement Str ength ening and refocusing of British Council and High Commission publi c diplo macy activity BBC World popular on satellite TV, and BBC news bulletins and foreign correspondents’ reports used on publi c and commercial radio

increased demand for education and training opport unities, international networking and information

Weaknesses DFID does not h ave a public communications strategy for its work, and is not widely recognised outside its immediate circle of contacts

Market research and evaluation data collected by British Council

Opportunities Interest in British culture and sport, p articularly among t he young. Skills short ages and t he need f or capacity building create a demand for international expertise NEPAD provides an agreed framework f or capacity building and development activity Emergence of a growing black professional class creates

Threats Reduction in Brit ish Council funding Barriers to development including the HIV/Aids crisis threaten South Africa’s fut ure development Instabili ty and economi c crisis in Zimbabwe could threaten South Af rica’s econom ic success

South Africa is a pivotally imp ortant cou ntry on th e African continent – a growing economy and u ndou btedly the preeminent regional pow er. Partly as a result of this importance, and partly as an accident of former colonial ties, South Africa enjoys a sizeable British presence: a large nu mber of consu lates for the H igh Comm ission, a large British Cou ncil effort, a lot of DFID developm ent projects across the country a nd a significant num ber of British companies investing in it. It consequently has a greater concentration of British pu blic dip lomacy actors than t h o s e o f m a n y o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a n d a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l a rg e commitment of resources that balances well with the importance of South Africa to the UK. The UK has three m ain messa ges in South Africa. Firstly it seeks to pu t across an economic message, that the UK is the natural busin ess partn er and ally for South Africa. Second , it has an important message seeking to promote democracy and regional stability in Souther n Africa – a message complicated by even ts in Z i m b a b w e s u r r o u n d i n g R o b e r t M u g a b e ’ s r e - el e ct i o n . T h e British High Com mission Mission Statement in South Africa states tha t, “We believe that Britain’s single biggest interest in S o u t h A f r i ca a n d t h e r e g i o n i s t h a t t h e c o u n t r y s h o u l d b e successful, stable, prosperou s and a positive influence.” This l e a d s o n t o t h e U K ’ s fi n a l m e s s a g e w h i c h i s t h a t t h e U K ’ s contributions to Southern African politics, and its relationship with the country in general, is unselfish – p ost-colonial not neocolonial. The UK’s economic message seem s to hav e got across to South Africans well. The UK is by far th e largest investor in South Africa, and one of its most impor tant trading p artners, and this makes an effective base for a nar rative that h as the UK in the role of South Africa’s chief economic ally. UK investmen t in South Africa w as valued at £6.5 billion at th e end of 1999, and the UK

156

Public Diplomacy

Appendix I

157

is South Africa’s second largest export m arket and third largest source of imports. The extent of this economic partner ship is recognised to an extent by the young u rban South Africans interviewed by th e British Council. They were amon g the most inclined to see the UK both as a key financial centre, and as the hom e of ‘wor ld-beating com pan ies’ – a sign that th e UK’s economic public diplomacy is on firm ground in South Africa. The other m essages – the UK’s unselfish interests, particularly in promoting regional stability – have perhaps been less successful. One test of the success of this kind of pu blic diplomacy is the extent to wh ich it can soften reactions to British statements that touch on the sensitivities these strategic messages are designed to a d d ress. Sou th Africa’s fro sty resp on se t o British condem nation of the ‘election’ in Zimbabwe d emonstrated that an inclination to see the British as ‘medd ling’ had not been overcome. Lying behind th ese challenges to British pub lic dip lomacy impa ct is a growin g dem ograp hic challenge to British relations with South Africa, similar in kind to the threat p osed by the r i s i n g g e n e r a t i o n o f m i d d l e c l a s s le a d e r s i n I n d i a . W a r m opinions of the UK, and th e positive reputa tion of the British Council in particular, are based in part on links built up d uring the years of apa rtheid. The British Council made a considerable reputation for itself du ring the ap artheid years, partly through its work in bringing disadv antaged black South Africans to the UK for higher education, and partly through its close relations with an ti-apartheid campaigners – symbolised by its move from Pretoria, then a bastion of ap artheid, to Johannesburg in 1987. The UK was a comm on p lace of refuge for Black leaders at th at time and several ANC safe houses were maintained in London. This positive image was reinforced further w hen th e Labour government came to power in 1997, and former anti-apartheid campaigners from Britain and also from South Africa now had

158

Public Diplomacy

seats on the UK government front bench. But th e generation th at had direct experience of beneficial links with the UK are increasingly giving w ay to one that h as no memory of such ties. One estimate p uts 43 per cent of the South African pop ulation un der the age of 19. The vast majority of this youn ger generation h ave had little or no experience of the UK, a n d d i s p l a y d e c r e a se d i n t e r e s t i n i t a s a r e s u l t . U K p u b l i c dip lomacy institutions in South A frica, par ticularly the British Council, are well aware of the threat this generational change poses to UK-South A frican relations. The British Council’s strategy in South Africa concentrates on en gaging the successor generation in its activities, and particularly to impress upon them that the UK is a diverse and innovative country that is a source of opportun ities for them. The British public diplomacy institutions in South Africa in general work together well. This is at least in par t a resu lt of the High Comm issioner’s personal emp hasis on the imp ortance of pu blic diplomacy, which she has been keen to p lace at the top of the agenda. In order to co-ordinate the w ork of the organisations and avoid d up lication, ‘task forces’ of High Com mission, DFID a n d Br i t is h C o u n c i l s t a ff h a v e b e e n s e t u p f o r a n u m b e r o f sectors in wh ich the three institutions are involved su ch as HIV/ Aids, conflict prevention and governan ce. These issue-led organisational units also act as channels of information and commu nication, and rep resent a good model for pu blic diplomacy co-operation. D F ID a r e , h o w e v e r , u n w i l li n g t o e n g a g e i n b r o a d p u b l i c commu nications work as it is not considered to be p art of their remit. This means that m uch of the UK’s contribution to South A f r i ca – s o m e £ 3 0 m i l li o n a y e a r – c o m e s t o t h e a t t e n t i o n primarily of a small number of stake-holders in governm ent and NGOs w ho are d irectly involved with DFID work. This means Appendix I

159

that some op portu nities for for excellent excellent public diplomacy wor k go begging, particularly particularly as the message wh ich ich such development work sen ds is a very positive one of the UK’s UK’s engagemen t with S o u t h A f r i c a ’ s n e e d s , a n d i t s d i f f ic ic u l t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n program me. Where DFID projects projects do get wider pu blicity, blicity, this is is generally either due to a h igh-profile igh-profile visit visit by a UK visitor visitor or th e H igh Com m ission er, w hich is p u blicised by th e H igh Commission’s own Press a nd Public Affairs Affairs Section, Section, or because it is publicised publicised by the p roject roject man agemen t agency itself, wh ich may not n ecessarily ecessarily even be British. British. The final final aspect worth highlighting in regard to UK public diplomacy in South Africa is the advantages that have accrued from a p olicy of h irin g local, p rofe ssion al sta ff in communications roles. Both the High Commission and the British Council have put significant management changes in place over the last year, which build up their public relations and commu nications nications resou rces. On the British ritish Council’s Council’s pa rt, this was p artly in response to a cut in its core grant and partly to redirect resources into programmes, but also to free up resources t o p u t i n p l a c e a n u p g r a d e d c o m m u n i c a t io io n s s t r a t e g y . T h e changes have included: a move to new, smaller premises, with enquiries, information services and teaching all handled either electronically or off-si off-site; te; a reduction in th e num ber of UK expatriate staff by over half, replacing them with senior South African African staff with professional professional experience and good networks of contacts, contacts, including including a d edicated edicated communications communications m anager; and an impr oved w ebsite with far more information available available online. The High Commission has also upgraded its staffing, upgrad ing the head of section section and recruiting recruiting several new local staff with experience in in the South African African m edia. It has opened a new w ing in the High Commission dedicated to press and pu blic affairs affairs work. This coincided coincided with th e relocation relocation of the section section from Cape Town to Pretoria, where it is close to the

160

Public Diplomacy Diplomacy

gov ern m ent an d to Johan nes bu rg w her e m ost m ed ia organisations are based. This institutional change has resulted, for the Council at least, in improved comm unications unications networks an d an excell excellent ent media s t r a t e g y . T h e C o u n c i l ’s ’s e m p l o y m e n t o f a c o m m u n i ca ca t i o n s professional who h ad p reviously worked in the President’s Offic Officee and on the South African Olympic bid bid has prod uced an exemplary med ia strategy, aimed p rimarily at multiplication multiplication of impact, where even seminars aimed at elite elite participants participants are designed around hooks to secure secure med ia coverage coverage and h ence raise awareness of the UK in the broader su ccessor ccessor generation aud ience as well as impacting on the sm all membership of the ‘auth ority generation’. In In term s of networking , the Coun cil’ cil’s links links w ith black black leaders, maintained throu gh the Thatcher Thatcher era, a r e n o w p a y i n g d i v i d e n d s . A s it it u a t io io n w h e r e f or or m e r A N C people are now employed by the British British Council cannot but help in the creation of influential influential networks through which UK pu blic diplomacy can work.

Appen Appendix dix I

161 161

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The United Arab Emirates - UK relat ionship: ionship: Strengt Strengt hs The UK has strong historical links with the United Arab Emirates Many Emiratis have personal experience of studying, living or visiting t he UK English is foreign language of choice for Emiratis UK higher education education is rated highly fo r it s quality quality

Strengths

Weaknesses

Good market research by the British Council

Lack of sufficient Arabic language skills among expatriate staff

Co-location of the BTA within the Brit ish ish Council in Dubai British Business Groups in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi

The UAE is the UK’s largest trading partner in the Gulf

British Tourist Authority college projects

A large number of British companies are based in the UAE, providing oilrelated and other services

English language teaching

The British are the largest Western expatriate community in the UAE

Information on study in th e UK

British companies have a reputation for trustworthiness and high quality

Arabic and English langu age BBC services

The British Business Business Group, w hich has branches in Ab u Dhabi and Dubai, is the largest national business group within the UAE The decision of UK companies to keep their expatriate employees in the country af ter September 11th, in contrast to many US companies, companies, was taken as a sign of the UK’s continued trust and engagement with the UAE The UK receives receives a lot of coverage in t he Emirati pr ess ess, most of i t po siti ve

The United Arab Emirates - UK relationship: w eaknesses The UK is considered considered no t t o be doi ng enou gh t o resolve the IsraelIsraelPalestine alestine situat ion Many Emiratis feel th e BBC BBC is biased biased in f avour of Israel Israel in it s reporting of the Israel-P Israel-Pales alestine tine situ ation Due to fears of racial attack in the UK, there has been a drop in numbers of Emiratis travelling there since September 11th The USis more att ractive than the UK t o many young Emirati s becaus because e of its modern, state-of-the-art image and familiarity from US television television p r o g r a m m e s , a n d i t i s se e n a s t h e c o u n t r y o f c h o i c e f o r w o r k oppo rtu nit ies in sectors sectors such such as IT

162

UK public diplomacy in the United Arab Emirates


No UK alumni ass association No arts or cultural programme

Regular tr ade missions missions

Prince of Wales Business Business Initiative Forum Lectures

Opportunities Creation of ‘Media City’ in Dubai with regional influence influence Satelli te di shes, hes, ow ned in 67 per cent of households in 1997, are unrestricted by government Large and increasing increasing nu mber of internet subscribers Creation of Dubai International Financial Centre ‘Emirat ‘Emirat isatio isatio n’ pol icy leads to increased increased need f or skills training of Emiratisprofessional class creates increas increased ed demand for education education and training opportunit ies, ies, int ernational networking and information

Threats Young Emiratis tend t o look t o the US not t he UK as th e preferred country to visit visit o r live in Low rating of UK academic qualifications in BTA tourism project survey Increasing competition for education pr ovision ovision in UAE, UAE, particularly particularly for w omen

Appen Appendix dix I

163 163

UK pub lic diplomacy in th e United Arab Emirates (UAE) (UAE) is is concentrated on securing advantage to what are considered the UK’s UK’s overall interests in the UAE: firstly, firstly, to have a g ood friend to the UK in the Arab league, and secondly to m aintain and strengthen the considerable commercial links between the two countries (the UAE is the UK’s UK’s largest trading partn er in the Gulf, and British business has a high-profile presence in the UAE, particularly in the oil ind ind ustry ). In order to fur ther these in ter ests , UK p u blic d ip lom acy con cen tra tes on th e comparatively small Emirati population in the UAE. Although t h e E m i r a t i m i n o r i t y m a k e s u p o n l y 1 0 -2 -2 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e pop ulation, it makes up a very large proportion of the 20 per cent who are citizens, and is by far the wealthiest section. H ow ever , w hile the Em bassies aim to m aint ain goo d relationships relationships with the UAE’s UAE’s political and bu siness leaders, this group is restricted restricted to a small nu mber of pow erful families, families, limiting limiting the am ount of influence influence that p ublic diplomacy has on this group. As a result, the main pu blic diplomacy focus of all the organisations is the youn ger generation of Emiratis. This focus means that the British Council’s education services are one of the k ey tools of public dip lomacy in the UA E. There There is a big deman d for edu cation cation services services for the young gen eration of Emiratis. This is partly because wealthy Emirati parents are keen for their their children children to kn ow English English and to study abroad , partly as a consequ ence of a policy of ‘Emiratisation’ ‘Emiratisation’ in local businesses, w h i c h i s i n c r e a s i n g t h e n e e d f o r s k i ll ll s t r a i n i n g f o r y o u n g Emiratis. In add ition, there there is increasing increasing d emand for better higher education opportu nities nities in the UAE, for those who do not wish to travel abroad or whose parents d o not wish them to – particularly women. The large size of many Emirati families – making overseas education an expensive expensive option – and security security fears following September 11th reinforce this tendency.

164


On the wh ole, British education is in in high d emand , but a recent BTA survey su ggested that British British acad emic qualifications qualifications ma y no longer be valued as highly as in the past, making the work of promoting UK u niversities niversities and ed ucational products all the more important. The Britis British h Cou ncil provide English language teaching and other p rofessional rofessional courses in its four teaching centres in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah Sharjah an d Ras Al Khaimah. Khaimah. Information and advice on opp ortun ities for study in the UK is provid ed in British British Coun cil information centres in Dubai and A b u D h a b i , o n t h e B r i ti ti s h C o u n c i l w e b s i te te , a n d t h r o u g h travelling exhibitions exhibitions to higher ed ucational colleges, colleges, and the period 1998 1998 to 2002 2002 saw a consid erable increase in stud ent numbers. The British Council is responding to the demand for improved edu cational opportu nities in in the UAE through offering offering assisted distance learning courses from UK universities: Strathclyde University’s University’s MBA MBA an d N ewcastle Un iversity’s MEd MEd in TESOL are both available at the Dubai British Council, and the MEd will be available in in Abu Dhabi in the future. New Distance learning learning courses are also being d eveloped on -line. -line. A new initiative initiative is the opening the new Dubai British University offering full-time Br i t i s h h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n f o r t h o s e w h o d o n o t w i s h t o g o overseas. There is is considerable considerable scope and d emand for training training am ong Emirati professionals. The British British Coun cil run s English languag e and professional professional development training contracts contracts for a ran ge of private and pu blic sector organisations, including the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), hotels, police, armed forces, forces, and local government. It also offers offers general an d business English courses at its teaching centres Appendi Appendix xI

165 165

The creation of the Dubai Intern ational Financial Centre in F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 2 c r ea t e s i n t e r e s t in g n e w o p p o r t u n i t i es f o r engagement by the UK, for example through skills development and w ork exchanges to the UK.

The Embassy Press and Public Affairs Sections are able to use this attention to VIPs to their adv antage, by inviting leadin g Emiratis to important UK occasions, thus ensu ring positive media coverage.

A joint initiative of th e Prince of Wales Business Initiative Forum (POWBIF) and th e British Business Group is a series of lectures to higher ed ucation colleges on corpo rate social respon sibility, given by British compan ies such as BP. These created a lot of enthu siasm both for British corporate pra ctice, and for the companies them selves.

I n t e r m s o f s t o r i e s o r i g in a t i n g i n L o n d o n , s u c h a s k e y U K government speeches, it is u nfortunately often d ifficult for these to be placed in the local media. This is du e to delays in getting Arabic translations and by th e difference in the UK and Arabic working weeks – the UAE working w eek runs from Saturday to Wednesday, so a story held over the UK weekend from Friday to be sent out on Mond ay arrives in the UAE several working days after the speech was m ade.

The second key tool of British pu blic diploma cy in the UAE is the m edia. The BBC World Service has recently boosted its Arabic outpu t to a 24-hour stream for the region. Also, the BBC Arabic website is a market leader in the region, currently r e g i s t er i n g s o m e 8 m i ll i o n p a g e i m p r e s s io n s p e r m o n t h , a significant propor tion of which originate in UAE. Although the E m i r a t i m e d i a a r e h i g h l y c o n t r o l l e d , t h e y a r e n o n e t h e l e ss influential as a source of information on the UK. Most print media are based in Dubai. Television is also very influential as a source of news and information, with m ajor television stations based in Du bai, Abu Dhabi, and in other emirates of the UAE. Al-Jazeera, based in Qatar , is also much w atched an d high ly influential in the UAE. One feature of the very controlled local med ia is the importance it places on stories concerning its p olitical leaders an d members of its ruling families. This tends to m ultiply the p ositive or negat ive effects of state and VIP visits. This played nega tively du ring President Sheikh Zayid’s recent visit to the UK, when h e failed to m eet Tony Blair – and conversely, Tony Blair’s visit to him in Geneva in late 2001 (after September 11th) was seen as a major signal of continued friendship between the tw o countries.

166

Public Diplomacy

After September 11th th e Embassy Press and Public Affairs Section focused on the message that UK is multiracial and a friend of the Mu slim world . A nu mber of high-level visits in both d irections shortly after the crisis were of major importance in reinforcing this message. In October, the Abu Dh abi National Oil Company (ADNO C) trade mission to the UK helped to persuad e others that it w as still safe to visit the UK. And in Novem ber, trade m issions from the UK to the UAE, including a visit by th e Du ke of York in his n ew r ole as foreign representative for trade and investment, and a display by the Red Arrows, were widely seen as a positive message about the UK’s continued enga gement in the Gu lf and in the UAE. How ever, the generally effective public diplomacy wo rk of the UK institutions in th e UAE d oes not, perh aps, ho ld in sufficiently clear view the fact that the UK’s key r elationship with the U AE is not just bilateral, aimed at gaining influence within the UAE and w ith its citizens, but is instead throu gh the UAE’s med ia outlets to the rest of the Arab World. The opening o f D u b a i ’ s ‘M e d i a C i t y ’ i n F e b r u a r y 2 0 00 i s a c o n c r e t e

Appendix I

167

demon stration that the UAE represents a nodal point of communication with a m uch broader Arab Mu slim p opulation that the West has a vital interest in influencing. A num ber of major med ia organ isations – such as Reuters, Sony, Zen TV, Midd le East Business New s and oth er major broadcasters have opened offices in Dubai, and the largest Middle East pan-Arab broadcaster, MBC, has decided to relocate there from London. Given the imp ortance of broadcast TV, particularly pan-Arab satellite broadcasting like MBC, in forming Arab opinions about f o r e ig n p o l i cy i n g e n e r a l a n d r e l a t io n s w i t h t h e W e s t i n particular, this grouping of med ia organisations represents a clear oppor tunity for reaching a very broad and very importan t audience. Some work has been done in this regard. The Head of the Islamic Med ia Cen tre in Lon d on v isited Abu Dha bi an d w as interviewed b y Abu Dh abi TV. Unfortunately, few British appear on Al-Jazeera du e to a lack of those with su fficient Arabic languag e skills, although it has been a central target of much of the Coalition’s ad h oc pu blic dip lomacy effort after Septem ber 11th. But attem pts to p ut across the Western p oint of view to Arab pop ulations via Dubai’s media organ isations ough t to be a co-operative Western effort backed by the institutions an d resources necessary to operate a perman ent presence on those media. This opportu nity for influencing the p an-Arab television new s agen d a w ould be an excellent startin g p oint for international co-operation on public diplomacy (see Chapter 4 of this report). At the least there should be an EU p ublic diplomacy unit seeking to place qualified interviewees on the Arab television stations, backed by EU money, and putting across from a broad Western stand point the kinds of messages – of diversity and religious tolerance, that fighting terrorism is not the same as making w ar on Islam and is in the interests of Arab as well as Western nations – that are currently seen to b e of such import to commu nicate to the Arab World. 168

Public Diplomacy

Appendix II: Niche Diplomacy How Norw ay uses scarce resou rces t o punch above its weight 1. Overview Norw ay’s international footprint is relatively sm all. It is a small c o u n t r y o f u n d e r 5 m i l li o n p e o p l e . A l t h o u g h a m e m b e r o f NATO, it is not a m ember of th e EU. This leaves it on th e fringe of Europ ean decision-making on m any issues which have a direct effect upon it. In ad dition to this initial unprom ising position, it lacks many of the features that h ave helped other small countries have an imp act on the world stage. Norwegian is not an international language, and is spoken by large popu lations nowh ere outside Norway. Geographically, Norw ay is not a ‘hub’ country like Belgium or th e Netherlands, and does n o t h a v e m u c h o p p o r t u n i t y t o b u i ld u p f a m il ia r i ty t h r o u g h travel and tou rism. It lacks any strong brands or international companies to raise awareness of Norwegian business. It does not have a strong popu lar culture that exports well. Prima facie, t h e r e f o r e , N o r w a y s h o u l d h a v e d i f f i cu l t y g a i n i n g a n international profile. Yet, Norway h as a voice and presence on the international stage out of proportion to its modest position and u nprom ising assets. It has achieved this presence through aggressive pursu it of niche pu blic diplom acy, and a ru thless prioritisation of its target a u d i e n c e s. N o r w a y ’ s c o n c en t r a t i o n o n a s i n g l e m e s s a g e – Norw ay as a force for peace in the wor ld – and on am eliorating the effect of two n egative imag es – lack of influence in Europ e through non-EU status and attachment to whaling – has allowed it to commu nicate much m ore effectively than countries like the Appendix II

169

U K , w h i ch c a n h a v e a c o n f u s i n g m a e l s t r o m o f p e r h a p s conflicting messages. Equally, its geograp hical concentration of the vast majority of its public diplomacy activity on just 6 key relationships – the USA, Russia, France, German y, the UK and Japan – has allowed it to prod uce the international impact it has on a sm all budget of just u nder £5 million. Norw ay’s prime goal in securing this international visibility arou nd th e issue of peace and conflict preven tion is twofold. Firstly, it does allow Nor way to g ain a genera l profile it might not already h ave wh ich is beneficial to the country in broad terms. More specifically though, Norway’s reputation in conflict resolution ensures that it is regarded as relevant in mu ltilateral forums, and by other important international players, and this affords it influence on this issue.

2. Strategy Main features: a. Concentration of p ublic diplomacy resources vis a vis six countries with gr eat bilateral imp ortance to Norw ay, i.e. the US, UK, France, German y, Japan and Russia (where Russia and the US relationships are cru cial security ones; the UK, Germany & France are the 3 most pow erful EU states; all bar R u s s i a a r e k e y e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s ; a n d R u s s i a a f fe c t s Norw ay’s bord er region). Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris all have expatriate staff heading u p a pub lic affairs unit. There are also dedicated staff in Copen hagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, but w ith much sm aller budgets as these are not priority countries, and in a sense can be regarded as p art of the ‘home mark et’ (most projects and exchange are based on individ ual and institution contacts). In other Embassies, information an d cultural work is han dled by local staff or diplomats w ho also have other respon sibilities. 170

Public Diplomacy

b. Positioning as a contributor to w orld peace enables Norway to achieve greater visibility than its size would otherwise w a r r a n t a n d r e b u t s a c c u s a t i o n s o f i so l a t i o n i sm . M a i n activities in th is field are conflict resolution activity in the Midd le East (the Oslo Accord, etc.) Sri Lanka and elsewhere, a n d N o r w a y ’ s l a r g e a id b u d g e t . N o r w a y a l s o o p e r a t e s a ‘rapid-reaction force’ to assist in election monitoring and conflict preven tion – The Norweg ian Resource Bank for Democracy and H uman Rights (NORDEM) – that manages to operate in arou nd 20 countries annu ally. The closeness of NORDEM’s co-operation with O SCE further em ph asises Norw ay’s contribution to peace with key allies. Norw ay also try to play a role on a regional basis, i.e. in the Barents region, in fost erin g econ om ic an d social d evelo p m ent an d environm ental cooperation in North West Russia. The Nobel Peace Prize originating in Oslo is a happ y historical fact which gives Norway a widely recognised peg to h ang this side of its story on. Futur e plans include setting u p a Peace Institute in Norway. c. Norwa y seeks to rebut and / or avoid negative pub licity on whaling an d on N orway’s perceived isolationist stance (a perception coming ou t of its non-membership of the EU). It e m p l o y s b o t h p r o a c t i v e (n e w s m a n a g e m e n t , v i s it s ) a n d ‘avoidance’ (NOT mentioning whaling in the US) tactics.

3. Coordination overseas Norwegian public diplomacy overseas is undertaken under a single banner, ‘Team Norway,’ which w as adopted in the mid9 0 s t o b o t h e n c o u r a g e a n d d e s c r ib e t h e c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n overseas between Embassies, the Norw egian Tourist Board, the Norw egian Export Council, the Nor wegian Seafood Export Council, Chambers of Comm erce and, in the US, the Norw egian Information Service. Originally a closely-integrated strategic

Appendix II

171

approach, it now describes a looser cooperation and sharing of information, with each organisation working to its own targets b u t l i n k i n g w i t h t h e o t h e r o r g a n i s a t i o n s ’ a c t iv i t y w h e r e app ropriate. In the US, Team Norw ay organisations on the East Coast meet every 7-8 weeks, with semi-annual meetings for Team Norway organ isations in the wh ole country. The phrase ‘T e a m N o r w a y ’ r e m a i n s a s a p o w e r f u l s lo g a n f o r m e m b e r organisations.

4. Institut ional Coordination in Norw ay Up un til a year ago, the promotion of Norwegian culture overseas was sp lit between 3 ministries: the Ministry of Culture dealt with other Scandinavian countries; the Norw egian Agency for International Development Co-operation (NORAD) with developing countries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with the rem ainder. Short term cultural exchange projects have now been moved to the MFA, but there is still a 2-way sp lit between the MFA an d the Ministry of Cultur e. The Ministry of Culture seems prep ared to han d over respon sibility for cultural prom otion work in Scand inavian countries to the MFA, but the organisational change yet to be made. The Ministry of Culture also has an agency, Norsk Kulturrad (Norwegian Arts Cou ncil) which funds arts events , nationally, and wh ich m ore and more find s itself involved in international p rojects. The Ministry of Culture has resp onsibility for fund ing the “impor t” side of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cu l t u r a l p r o j e c t s, b u t h a s v e r y l i t t l e m o n e y allocated for this purpose, and mainly regard th is as a task for the larger cultural institutions. Within the MFA, there is a sp lit between m edia-relations staff for t h e M i n i s t e r s / St a t e S e cr e t a r i e s w h o d o d a y - t o - d a y n e w s man agement, and the Press & Cultura l Affairs section wh o produ ce longer term information material, co-ordinate inward visits by journalists, etc.

172

Public Diplomacy

Other organisations with an overseas remit or interest includ e the Ministry of Education & Research (for u niversities projects) and local government (some of which are v ery active in international exchanges). There have been two p roposals put on the table in recent years f o r i m p r o v i n g t h e c o - or d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d i ff e r en t organisations. One was for th e establishment of a ‘Norwegian Council’ along th e lines of the Swed ish or British Council. This has been turned down as too expensive (although the Swedish Council model is considerably cheaper tha n the British because it doesn’t include overseas offices). The second (suggested in the Rudeng rep ort) is for a co-ordinating body to be set up w ithin the MFAresponsible for press and cultural affairs. This has been a g r e e d i n p r i n c ip l e , b u t h a s r e c e i v e d n o e x t r a m o n e y , a n d therefore hasn’t yet gone ah ead. It is doubtful as to w hether it will be effective as the M inistry of Cultu re is un willing to be ‘coordinated’ by the MFA. Cultural exchange activity is planned by sectoral committees of mem bers of the arts comm un ity, co-ordinated by th e MFA. E m b a s s ie s c a n t a k e i n i t i a t i v e s, m a k e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o r comment on plans, but are n ot the final decision-makers on which cultural p erformances or activities take place wh ere. Some Embassies have a separate bu dget for pu blic diplomacy purposes.

5. Activities a. Idea of increased use of internation al network ing, especially among the youn g (rather than th e ‘seminar-tired’ older people already in influential positions.)

Appendix II

173

b. Visits by member of the Norw egian royal family often u sed for public diplomacy pu rposes.

7. Budget Expenditure on Press, Culture & Information work: 2000 = NOK52.2m (c £4.3 m)

c. Famou s nam es as ‘door op eners’ – i.e. Ibsen, Mun ch, Grieg used as p egs for introdu cing m ore contemporary artists. Also potential for using Nobel in peace/ hum an rights fields.

2001 = NOK57.2m (c £4.7 m) (No increase in 2002) Breakdown of 2000 expenditure (NOK): Cult ural act ivit ies

d . I n fo r m a t i o n c a m p a i g n o n i n f o r m in g y o u n g N o r w e g i a n s about g lobalisation issues. (Information to Norw egians about foreign p olicy is part o f MFA’s role).

6. Major events

17 m

Info/PR activities abroad

17 m

Press act ivit ies

10 m

Teaching Norwegian abroad

6m

Info to the Norwegian public

2.2 m (= 4.2 per cent, c £180k)

Total

52.2m

a. N orwa y 2005. 2005 will be the 100th anniversa ry of Norw ay’s independence from Sweden, and a big domestic festival is being planned, which will also be reflected in activities overseas. Sweden’s sensitivities will need careful handling. Message dom estically will be internationalist and message internationally will be pro-peace.

174

Public Diplomacy

Appendix II

175

Appendix III: Global Brands

176

Brand

2001 Brand Value ($MM)

Country of origin

Brand


Country of origin

Brand


Country of origin

Bacardi Bermuda total

3,204 3,204

Bermuda

Carlsberg Denmark total

1,075 1,075

Denmark

Nescafe Rolex Swatch Switzerland total

13,250 3,701 1,004 59,643

Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland

Nokia Finland Total

35,035 35,035

Finland

L’Oreal Danone Louis Vuitton Chanel Moet & Chandon France total

17,798 13,583 7,053 4,265 2,470 45,169

France France France France France

Unilever Diageo Reuters BP Shell Smirnoff Johnnie Walker Financial Times UK Total

37,847 15,004 5,236 3,247 2,844 2,594 1,649 1,310 69,732

UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK

Mercedes BMW Merck Volkswagen SAP adidas Nivea Siemens Germany total

21,728 13,858 9,672 7,338 6,307 3,650 1,782 1,029 65,363

Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany

Guinness Ireland total

1,357 1,357

Ireland

Gucci Armani Benetton Italy total

5,363 1,490 1,002 7,855

Italy Italy Italy

Toyota Sony Honda Nintendo Canon Panasonic Japan total

18,578 15,005 14,638 9,460 6,580 3,490 67,752

Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Korea

Philips Heineken Netherlands total

4,900 2,266 7,166

Netherlands Netherlands

Ericsson IKEA Absolut Sweden total

7,069 6,005 1,378 14,452

Sweden Sweden Sweden

Nestle

41,688

Switzerland

US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US

US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US

6,374 6,374

68,945 68,208 65,068 52,752 45,435 34,665 32,591 30,092 25,289 22,828 22,053 19,005 17,983 17,209 16,919 15,298 15,015 14,361 12,354 12,224 10,838 10,801 8,951 8,746 8,269 7,862 7,589 7,062 7,005 6,599 6,214 6,019 5,978 5,532

5,464 5,261 5,149 5,085 4,572 4,530 4,495 4,378 4,369 4,140 4,060 4,041 4,032 3,761 3,747 3,724 3,617 3,483 3,130 2,416 2,415 2,184 2,037 1,910 1,885 1,757 1,583 1,410 1,235 42,396 858,024

Samsung Korea total

Coca-Cola Johnson & Johnson Microsoft IBM P&G Intel Disney Ford McDonald’s AT&T Marlboro Citibank Hewlett-Packard Cisco Systems American Express Gillette Merrill Lynch Colgate-Palmolive Compaq Oracle Budweiser Kodak Pfizer Gap Dell Goldman Sachs Nike Heinz Kellogg’s MTV Pepsi Xerox Pizza Hut Harley Davidson

Apple KFC Sun Microsystems Kleenex Colgate Wrigley’s AOL Yahoo! Avon Duracell Boeing Texas Instruments Kraft Motorola Levi’s Time Hertz Tiffany & Co. amazon.com Burger King Mobil Wall St. Journal Barbie Polo Ralph Lauren Fedex Starbucks Jack Daniels Pampers Hilton GE US total

Public Diplomacy

Appendix III

177

Appendix IV: the main interviewees for the project In the UK:

Sir Michael Jay, Richard Stagg, John Buck, Carole Sweeney , Caroline Matthew, Tim Flear, Jane Clarke, Nicholas Arm our, Patrick Hold ich, Piers Cazalet, Bruce Bucknell, Philip Malone, Chris Hend erson and colleagues at the FCO; Ba r o n e ss H ele n a Ke n n ed y , D a v id Gr ee n , A n d r ew Fotheringham, Patrick Spaven, and colleagues at the British Council. Nigel Chap man , Fred Marten son, Barry Langridge, Jeff Hazell, Sam Miller, Sylvie Morot, Marek Cajzner, Grzegorz Paluch, and colleagues at th e BBC Worldser vie and BBC World. H . E . Ta r a l d B r a u t a s t e t , O y v i n d S t o k k e , a n d c o l l e a g u e s , Norw egian Embassy in London; Ann Pearcey, Trade Partn ers UK and Steve Davies, Department of Trade and Industry

Richard Lankford, US Embassy Press Office; Marit Hodanger, Norw egian Tourist Bureau ; Dr Dieter Strauss, Director Goethe Institut; Richard Morgan, British Embassy; Ulrich Marthaler, Invest UK; John Gaudern, British Tourist Authority.

In India: Edmu nd Marsden, Director British Coun cil India and oth er British Cou ncil staff; James Callahan , Counse llor for Public A f f a i r s , U S E m b a s s y ; Ya s u o M i n e m u r a , C o u n s e l l o r f o r Information and Culture, Japanese Embassy; Thierry Aud ric, C o u n s e l l o r f o r C u l t u r a l A f f a i r s , Fr e n c h E m b a s s y ; C a r l e s Lutyens, British Business Grou p; Tilmann Waldraff, Director Max Mueller Bhavan (Goethe Institute); Heike Dettmann, Counsellor for Cultural Affairs, German Embassy; Christof Werr, Goethe Institut; Tom Macan, Deputy High Commissioner and staff at the British High Commission; Sukuma r Mur alidharan, Chief of Bureau , Frontline;

Alistair Campbell, 10 Downing Street;

Chandralekha Roy, Editor, The Economic Times on Sunday; Robert Graham-Har rison, Director, and colleagues at DFID Ind ia; Fran cois M asso u lie, First Secretar y, Eu rop ean Commission; Arun Mu ttreja, Program me Director VSO India

Tucker Eskew, Co-alition Information Centre

Chevening programme alumni.

Tamsin Bailey, Design Cou ncil; Daniel Sreebny, US Embassy;

178

In France: Brun o Delaye, DGCID, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Catherine Suard, Jean Garbe, Marie-Anna Lebovits, Patric, Donabedian, Ronald Goeldner, Olivier Richard , DGCID, Ministry of Foreign A ffairs; John Tod, British Council France; Dany Cavelier and stud ents at the Centre de formation d es journalistes

Public Diplomacy

Appendix IV

179

In Norway: Eva Bugge, Rolf Willy Hansen, Arne Gjermundsen, Alf Modvar, Jan Gerhard Lassen, Johan Meyer, Espen Rikter Svendsen and colleag u es a t th e De p art m ent for P ress , Cu ltu re an d Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jon Mor land, Pr ess Spokesman International Development, MFA; Iver Neum ann, Depar tmen t of European Policy Questions, MFA; Ole Jacob Bull, Jean Yves Gallardo and Christian Lund, Norwegian Cultural Council; Erik Rud eng and Mette Lend ing, authors of 'Change and Renewal' report; Janne H aaland Ma tlary, ARENA

In South Africa: H.E. Ann Grant, British H igh Comm ission; And y Sparkes, Nick Shep p ar d , Bob Tha in, Ran d olp h Jones , Britis h H igh Commission; Jud y Moon, US Embassy

Svein-Erik Ovesen, N orweg ian Tourist Bureau ; Bjorn Otto Sverdrup , Confederation of N orwegian Business and Industry; Kjetil Wiedsw ang, Dagen s Na eringsliv; Jan Erik Raanes, Norge 2005; Nils Morten Udgaard, Aftenposten

John Loos, ABSA; Clive Gobby, Director and Paul Johnson, D i r e c t o r C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , Br i t i s h C o u n c i l ; O s a m u I m a i , Japanese Embassy

Mr Alf Modvar and Ms. Margaretha Ø stern, Ministry of Culture; State Secretary Elspeth Tronstad, MFA

In Poland: Tim Simm ons, Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy Alicia Clyde, Press and Public Affairs Officer, British Embassy; A n d r e w C K o s s , C o u n s e l o r f o r P u b l i c A ff a i r s , a n d R o y S Weatherston, US Embassy; Jerzy Roguski, Director American Information Resour ce Center; Od a von Breitenstein, Konrad A d e n a u e r S t if t u n g ; A m b a s s a d o r S t e n L u n d b o , N o r w e g i a n E m b a s s y ; M ic h a e l D a v e n p o r t , T r a d e P a r t n e r s U K ; H a n n a Jezioranska, Delegation of the European Commission in Poland; Robert Koza k, BBC World Service; Jean-Yves Pot el, French Embassy; Chevening programme alumni Agnieszka Ostrowska and Agnieszka Soltys;

180

Public Diplomacy

Jim McAlpine and Hu she Mzend a, DFID Southern Africa; Jud y Leon, Trade Partners UK; Philip Howell, Barclays Bank PLC; Roger Baxter, Chamb er of Mines of South Africa; Ronnie Ntu li, Jo h a n n e s b u r g M e t r o p o l i t a n C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e a n d Industry; Nick Ras and Gou s Wilson, LawGibb Group

Charles Mabaso, Royal Neth erlands Embassy; Johan Viljoen, French Embassy; ll Ishm ael and Neil Carney, British Tourist Authority; Chevening programme alumni

In the United Arab Emirates: (Abu Dhabi) Robert Sykes, Director British Council Gulf States; Robert Schw arz, British Business Group Abu D habi; Alistair McKenzie, John Gard ner, Steve Davis an d Jason Smith, British Embassy Abu Dhabi; (Dubai): Tim Gore, Director British Coun cil D u b a i ; Je n n i f e r B i b b i n g s , Br i t i s h B u s i n e s s G r o u p D u b a i ; Jonath an Walsh, Face to Face Pu blic Relations; Simon Collis, Consul General, British Embassy Dubai; Mark Miller, British Tourist Authority; Dr Bassem Younes, University of Sharjah Emirati students w orking at th e British Council

In the US: (in Washington DC); Sir Christopher Meyer, Ambassador;

Appendix IV

181

Robert Peirce, British Embassy; Susan Stewart, First Secretary Scottish Affairs, British Embassy; Peter Smyth , North ern Ireland Bureau, British Embassy; Andy Mackay, Director British Council; Professor Barry Fulton, The George Wash ington Un iversity; Steven Livingston, The George Washington University; Mary Gawronski, Georgetown University; Anthony Quainton, National Policy Association; Ambassad or Jurk Vollebek and Jon Age Oyslebo, Norw egian Embassy; Martin Turn er, BBC Washington Bureau Chief; James Wilkinson, Coalition Informa tion Centre, The White House; Ambassador Christopher Ross, State Department; Jefferson T Brown, Dav id LArn ett, Joe B Johnson , Donna L Woolf of the State Department; Professor Joseph s. Ny e, Dean Kennedy School of Government; Professor Benjamin Barber (in Boston) Teresa Evans, British Consulate-General; Professor Alan H enrikson, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Univer sity; Professor Joseph N ye, Ken ned y School of Governmen t, Harvard University; Jane Christo and colleagues at WBUR-FM pu blic radio; George Ferguson , HM Consu l-General; Professor Peter Hall, Center for European Studies, Harvard University (in New York)Sara Everett, British Information Services New York and colleagues; Sir Thomas H arris, HM Consu l-General, New York; Robert Fletcher, M & C Saatchi; Paula Kerg er an d Beth H o p e , C h a n n e l T h i r t e e n / W N E T ; Ra y R a y m o n d , B r i t i s h Consulate-General; Atlantic and City Fellowship alu mni Colonel Jay Parker , West Point; David Tereschuk, consu ltant to the UN. Donn Rogosin and Kent H Steele, WLIW21 public television; Richard Fursland , British Am erican Business Inc; Eva Vincent, Marian ne Moe a nd Espen Gu llikstad , Royal Norw egian Consu late General; Robert Titley, British Tourist Au thority

182

Public Diplomacy

N ot es

18 3

Also available from The Foreign Policy Centre

FROM WAR TO WORK

Individual publications should be ordered from Central Books, 99 Wallis Road, London, E9 5LN tel: 020 8986 5488, f ax: 020 8533 5821 email: [email protected]

Rowena Young

To order online go to www.fpc.org.uk/reports

‘An insightful analysis that gets us beyond the anachronistic hard on/soft on dru gs debate, and points up t he key dilemmas facing governments in the search for an effective drug policy’,

(Subscriptions are available from the Centre itself)

March 2002, £16.95, plus £1 p+p, ISBN 1 903558 07 7 Kindly support ed by Globalegacy

Mike Trace, National Treatment Agendy

THE FOREIGN POLICY CENTRE MISSION STATEMENT March 3rd 1999; Free, with £1 p+p, or free w ith any pamphlet.

‘Likely to be contr oversial wi th Mandarins and inf luential wit h M inisters’, Financial Times

THIRD GENERATION CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP Simon Zadek November 2001, £19.95, plus £1 p+p. ISBN 1-903558 08 5 Kindly support ed by Diageo and Friends Ivory & Sime

RE-ORDERING THE WORLD

‘Zadek stri kes at t he heart o f the d ebate.’ Craig Cohon, Global Legacy

March 2002, £9.95, plus £1p+p, ISBN 1-903558-10-7

Mark Leonard (editor), with essays by Ehud Barak, Ulrich Beck, Tony Blair, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Malcolm Chalmers, Robert Cooper, Fred Halliday, David H eld, Mary Kaldor, Kanan Makiya, Joseph Nye, Amartya Sen, Jack Straw and Fareed Zakaria.

The Pro-European Reader Dick Leonard & Mark Leonard (editors) with essays by Winston Churchill, Jean Monnet , Roy Jenkins, Mikhail Gorbachev, Mil an Kundera, David Puttnam and Tony Blair.

‘Caused a storm …’ The Observer

Published by Palgrave November 2001, £16.99, ISBN 0 -333977211

‘Here’s a book full of cures for prejudice and phobia. Some of the antidotes are bold, some wry, some profound, some sharp – all short.

The treatment is worth every Euro.’ Neil Kinnock

‘Compell ing and succinct’ ,

Peter Hain, former M inister of State, FCO

THE KIDNAPPING BUSINESS Rachel Briggs Kindly suppor ted by Hiscox, Contro l Risks Group , ASM Ltd., M arsh Ltd. and SCR March 2001, £14.95, plus £1 p+p

GOING PUBLIC: Diplomacy f or the Information Society (int erim report) Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson

‘A fascinating pamphlet’,

Simon Jenkins, The Times

May 16 2000 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-7-4 The project i s suppor ted by t he BBC Worl d Service, The Brit ish Council, and the Design Council.

THE FUTURE SHAPE OF EUROPE Mark Leonard (editor) Kindly supported by Adamson BSMG Worldwide

‘An impor tant new pamphlet...argues that the old i deas of British diplomacy must change profoundly’, Gavin Esler, The Scotsman

November 2000 £9.95; plus £1 p+p.

‘The Europe of Nice is a building site w aiting for new master buil ders. A bo oklet by The Foreign Poli cy Centr e makes the po int more eloquentl y than any polemicist’, Peter

AFTER M ULTICULTURALISM

Preston, The Guardian

May 2000 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-8-2

Yasmin Alibh ai-Brown, The Foreign Policy Centre

‘Yasmin i s brave, intelligent and always worth reading’, Diane Abbott, M P, New Statesman

NGO RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: A new deal for global governance Michael Edwards, Director of Governance, Ford Foundation (writing personally) In association wit h NCVO

RE-ENGAGING RUSSIA

July 2000 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9053558-00-X

John Lloyd, Journalist and Member of The Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Council In association with BP Amoco 20th March 2000 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-6-6

‘Re-engaging Russia is excellent on where Russia’s relationships with the West went wrong...thought-

provoking, hi ghly enjoyable, creative and t imely’, Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP, M inister for Europe

‘An indispensable counterweight to optimists and pessimists alike’, Will Hutton ‘This is the agenda on which a new politics must be constructed and new alliances forged’, Clare Short, Secretary of

REINVENTING THE COM M ONW EALTH Kate Ford and Sunder Katw ala, The Foreign Policy Centr e In association w ith the Royal Commo nwealt h Society November 1999 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-4-5

‘Intelligent and wi de-reaching’,

The Times

‘[The Centr e’s report has] very str ong m erit s. Its proposals deserve hon est enquir y’, Business Day, Sout h Af rica ‘M y f irst thou ght was “ Why has it taken 50 years to start thi s debate? Why aren’t more developing countries leading it?” ’, Sharon Chetty, The Sowetan

TRADING IDENTITIES: Why Countries and Companies Are Becoming More Alike Wally Olin s, October 1999 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-3-1

‘A fascinating pamphlet’,

Peter Preston, The Guardian

State for Internat ional Development, New Statesman

NETWORK EUROPE Mark Leonard, The Foreign Policy Centr e In association w ith Clif for d Chance 10th September 1999 £9.95; plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-2-3

‘A radical agenda for reform from the government’s favourite foreign policy think-tank’, Stephen Castle, Independent on Sunday

‘A welcome contribution to the important debate about Europe’s future’, Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister

THE POSTMODERN STATE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER Robert Cooper, Cabinet Office (writing in a personal capacity) In association with Dem os 2nd ed ition

GLOBALIZATION – KEY CONCEPTS David Held & Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton April 12th 1999 £4.95, plus £1 p+p. ISBN 0-9535598-0-7

What d id 1989 really mean ? Robert Cooper argu es that the end of the Cold War also marked the end of the balance-of-pow er system in Europ e. Yet today’s open, mu lti-lateral postmod ern states must deal with a complex world – where m any states follow trad itional realpolitik, while collapsed and failing states present the d angers of pre-modern chaos. The second edition of

this groundbr eaking pamp hlet also addresses how the role of religion in international politics is very different today.

‘Mr Cooper’s pamphlet explains, lucidly and elegantly, how the emergence of w hat h e calls the postmodern state has changed int ernational relations’, New Statesman ALSO FORTHCOMING IN 2002

Subscribe to The Foreign Policy Centre The Foreign Policy Centre offers a n um ber of ways for people to get involved. Our subscription scheme keeps you u p-to-date with ou r work, w ith at least six free pu blications each year and our quarterly newsletter, Global Thinking. Subscribers also receive major discounts on events an d furth er pu blications. Type of Subscription

Price

Mark Leonard and Catherine Stead on Public Diplomacy: Comparative Experiences

Individuals

£50

Organisat ions

£150

Mark Leonard, Sacha Chan Kam a nd Phoebe Griffith on Immigration , Integration and Citizenship (kindly supported by The Emp loyability Forum)

Corpor ate and Libraries (w i ll r ecei ve A LL p ub li cat i on s)

£ 200

Rachel Briggs on Travel Advice Yasmin Alibhai-Brow n, David Blun kett, Michael Wills, David Lammy, Philip Dodd Professor Francesca Klug and others on Global Britons: Reflections on identity after Oldham, Bradford and September 11th Adrienne Katz on Identity and Young People Francesca Klug on Human Rights

Need to Know , a novel by Narration Christopher Haskins on The Future of European Agriculture See www .fpc.org.uk for news and inf ormation. Write t o [email protected] to join our email list For subscript ions and part nership scheme, see overleaf

Please make cheques payable to The Foreign Policy Centre , indicating clearly your p ostal and email address and the app ropriate package, and send to Subscriptions, The Foreign Policy Centre, Mezzan ine Floor, Elizabeth H ouse, 39 York Road, London SE1 7NQ. For further details, contact Rachel Briggs: rach [email protected] g.u k

public diplomacy - mark leonard

Recommend Documents