Property Digests (Articles 484 – 484 – 501) 501) ARTICLE 484 (CO-OWNERSHIP) 1. G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent. FACTS : The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property.
Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, being respondent’s exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage. Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Friday’s Club), Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in proportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting all expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees, clearances, etc. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to deliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to May 1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides: Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
RULING: YES. It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Page 1 of 65
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Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. 2. G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000 SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents. Armada) respondents. FACTS : The 340 square meters of land, the property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos."4Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751.
Spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of
sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs." plaintiffs." Court of Appeals issued the decision reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents. ISSUE: Whether Or Not private respondents are coowners who are legally entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. RULING: NO. The trial court found that the disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute sale technically described the portion sold to each son. The portions belonging to the three sons were separately declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. Jose's testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose.
More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 134594 13459 4 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595 under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596 owned by Jose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record. However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings. The lot in question had already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact Page 2 of 65
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Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. 2. G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000 SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents. Armada) respondents. FACTS : The 340 square meters of land, the property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos."4Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751.
Spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of
sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs." plaintiffs." Court of Appeals issued the decision reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents. ISSUE: Whether Or Not private respondents are coowners who are legally entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. RULING: NO. The trial court found that the disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute sale technically described the portion sold to each son. The portions belonging to the three sons were separately declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. Jose's testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose.
More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 134594 13459 4 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595 under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596 owned by Jose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record. However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings. The lot in question had already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact Page 2 of 65
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that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists. After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available. Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, Code , there is coownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. described . This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows: "Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza." Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary. 3. G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004 APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O. FORTUNO,petitioners, vs. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents.
FACTS: This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintiffs against the defendants. The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana LlanderOcampo, they begot ten (10) children. The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa LlanderOcampo, they acquired several parcels of land and, upon their death, left the following properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, presently covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at ₱17,240.00; (b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of ₱6,240.00; and (c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, declared under TD No. 35122 and assessed at ₱6,780.00. That all the above named parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so and moved by a common purpose, both of them mortgaged to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint to secure the payment of a ₱110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were x x x exclusively to the benefit of said defendants only In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties described in paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983) which they had caused to be annotated thereon, particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB. Counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint. ‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen OcampoBarrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30 September 1987, TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the lot described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the original complaint was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant Vicente Barrito, on the strength of an alleged Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor. Page 3 of 65
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Both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said parcel of land was among the lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867 of which the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the mother of the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are defendants, that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the exclusive owner thereof; that the transfer of defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the ownership over said property now subject of this partition is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein. Ruling of the Court of Appeals According to the appellate court, other than the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership7 executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners’ cla im of co-ownership. The CA held that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to prove their defenses. ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership exists over the parcel of land (a) RULING: NO. Petitioners’ chief evidence of co ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof of ownership of their predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus coowned, the former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim. First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his "exclusive ownership" of the property, "having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons." Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all
powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners. As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT4389 (983), which named the former as owner in fee simple; and a Declaration of Real Property, evidencing payment of real property taxes, also by Fidela as owner. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Coownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others. 25 The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership. In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definiteportion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement of co-ownership. Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her right over the property had already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an interest to declare. Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13654 as proof of her ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face value of respondent’s TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.
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We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named therein. But given the circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again, we stress, Belen clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the property in question and thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated allegation of co-ownership thereof. In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration35 indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
4. G.R. No. 152766 June 20, 2003 LILIA SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, Respondents.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the coowner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
FACTS : Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
The MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery. Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the decision of the MeTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid given that one of the co-owners did not consent thereto. RULING : YES. The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the coowners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute. 5. G.R. No. 122904. April 15, 2005 ADORACION E. CRUZ, THELMA DEBBIE E. CRUZ, GERRY E. CRUZ and NERISSA CRUZTAMAYO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMIT FINANCING CORP., VICTOR S. STA. ANA, MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, RAMON G. MANALASTAS, and VICENTE TORRES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, as well as Arnel Cruz, who was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 49466. Petitioners filed said case on February 11, 1983 against Arnel Cruz and herein private respondents Summit Financing Corporation (Summit), Victor S. Sta. Ana and Maximo C. Contreras, the last two in their capacities as deputy sheriff and ex-officio sheriff of Rizal, respectively, and Ramon G. Manalastas in his capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal. The Complaint[4] alleged that petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal. Yet the property, which was then covered by Transfer Page 5 of 65
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Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 495225, was registered only in the name of Arnel Cruz. According to petitioners, the property was among the properties they and Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of Delfin Cruz, husband of Adoracion Cruz.
belong.[14]Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of Partial Partition,] distributing to each of them their shares consisting of several lots previously held by them in common. Among the properties adjudicated to defendant Cruz was the parcel of land covered at the time by TCT No. 495225. It is the subject of this case. Subsequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had been subdivided and individually titled in the names of the former coowners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition. This arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement[6] executed on August 23, 1977 or a day after the partition.
In the deed, the shares of petitioners and Arnel Cruzs in the mass of co-owned properties were concretely determined and distributed to each of them. In particular, to Arnel Cruz was assigned the disputed property. There is nothing from the words of said deed which expressly or impliedly stated that petitioners and Arnel Cruz intended to remain as co-owners with respect to the disputed property or to any of the properties for that matter. It is wellsettled in both law and jurisprudence, that contracts are the law between the contracting parties and should be fulfilled, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties.
Petitioner Thelma Cruz discovered that TCT No. 495225 had already been cancelled by TCT No. 514477 which was issued on October 18, 1982 in the name of Summit. Upon further investigation, petitioners learned that Arnel Cruz had executed a Special Power of Attorney[7] on May 16, 1980 in favor of one Nelson Tamayo, husband of petitioner Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, authorizing him to obtain a loan in the amount of One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P104,000.00) from respondent Summit, to be secured by a real estate mortgage on the subject parcel of land. Since the loan had remained outstanding on maturity, Summit instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and at the foreclosure sale it was declared the highest bidder. Consequently, Sheriff Sta. Ana issued a Certificate of Sale[9] to respondent Summit, which more than a year later consolidated its ownership of the foreclosed property. In their complaint before the RTC, petitioners asserted that they co-owned the properties with Arnel Cruz, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence, they argued that the mortgage was void since they did not consent to it. The trial court declared in favor of plaintiff and against defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court stressed that the Memorandum of Agreement does not contain any proscription against the mortgage of the subject property although it provides that the parties thereto are entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties covered by it. ISSUE: Whether or not the real estate mortgage on the property then covered by TCT No. 495225 is valid. RULING : YES. Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned in common. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
To be considered a co-owner, one must have a spiritual part of a thing which is not physically divided, or each of them is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.[18] In Dela Cruz v. Cruz, et al.,[19] this Court denied the prayer for legal redemption of plaintiff-appellant therein because the portions of appellant-plaintiff and of the defendant spouses are concretely determined and identifiable, for to the former belongs the northern half, and to the latter belongs the remaining southern half, of the land. As the absolute owner thereof then, Arnel Cruz had the right to enjoy and dispose of the property,[22] as well as the right to constitute a real estate mortgage over the same without securing the consent of petitioners. 6. G.R. No. 161136 November 16, 2006 WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD and LOLITA A. VAGILIDAD, Petitioners, vs. GABINO VAGILIDAD, Jr. and DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, Respondents. FACTS: A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253 was owned by Zoilo. Sometime in 1931, ZOILO died. Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of ZOILO, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253, measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by LORETO.
In view of the death of ZOILO, his children, LORETO, Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva executed an Extrajudicial x x x Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to LORETO. On January 29, 1987, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T-16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was issued in the name of LORETO alone. GABINO JR. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No. Page 6 of 65
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1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 1253-B. GABINO JR. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On even date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the optdescribed property was also executed by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO. The aforementioned deeds, which were both executed on December 7, 1989. Spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Antique, against spouses WILFREDO and Lolita Vagilidad. The plaintiffs claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B which was sold to him by LORETO in 1986. They alleged that [GABINO JR.] is a nephew of defendant WILFREDO. They likewise raised that when GABINO SR. died, defendant WILFREDO requested GABINO JR. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDO’s name for loaning purposes with the agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They added that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, plaintiff GABINO JR., without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, DOROTHY, executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO receiving nothing as payment therefor. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners WILFREDO and LOLITA and held that LORETO did not validly convey Lot No. 1253-B to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 since at that time, the heirs of ZOILO had not partitioned Lot No. 1253.5 It ruled that LORETO could only sell at that time his aliquot share in the inheritance. He could not have sold a divided part thereof designated by metes and bounds. GABINO, JR. and DOROTHY filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Loreto and Gabino jr. over lot no. 1253-B is void on the ground that Loreto had no right to dispose an aliquot part of the yet undived property of Zoilo. RULING : NO. Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Before the partition of the property held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the coowner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987, to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment.
Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," LORETO could not have validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to transfer the ownership of the subject property at the time of sale. The mere fact that LORETO sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the sale a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. In the case at bar, the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Be that as it may, the co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they have previously received their respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION. The rights of GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. 7. G.R. No. 154486 December 1, 2010 FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner, vs. ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE, substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA, Respondents.
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Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) FACTS : The spouses Andres Jarantilla and Felisa Jaleco were survived by eight children: Federico, Delfin, Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael and Antonieta. Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is the grandchild of the late Jarantilla spouses by their son Federico Jarantilla, Sr. and his wife Leda Jamili. Petitioner also has two other brothers: Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.
supposedly rolled back into the business as additional investments in her behalf. Antonieta further claimed co-ownership of certain properties(the subject real properties) in the name of the defendants since the only way the defendants could have purchased these properties were through the partnership as they had no other source of income.
Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves the real properties of their deceased parents.7With the exception of the real property adjudicated to Pacita Jarantilla, the heirs also agreed to allot the produce of the said real properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of Rafael and Antonieta Jarantilla.
RTC: During the course of the trial at the RTC, petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr., who was one of the original defendants, entered into a compromise agreementwith Antonieta Jarantilla wherein he supported Antonieta’s claims and asserted that he too was entitled to six percent (6%) of the supposed partnership in the same manner as Antonieta was. He prayed for a favorable judgment.The RTC, in an Order 1approved the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreementand on December 18, 1992, decided in favor of Antonieta.
In the same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio Deocampo entered into an agreement with the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla to provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support to any commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement. This business relationship proved to be successful as they were able to establish a manufacturing and trading business, acquire real properties, and construct buildings, among other things. The spouses Buenaventura and Conchita Remotigue executed a document wherein they acknowledged that while registered only in Buenaventura Remotigue’s name, they were not the only owners of the capital of the businesses Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street, Manila), Remotigue Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and Remotigue Trading (Cotabato City). In this same "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," they stated the participating capital of their co-owners as of the year 1952, with Antonieta Jarantilla’s stated as eight thousand pesos ( ₱8,000.00) and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.’s as five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00). The present case stems from the amended complaintdated April 22, 1987 filed by Antonieta Jarantilla against Buenaventura Remotigue, Cynthia Remotigue, Federico Jarantilla, Jr., Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, for the accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the delivery of her share corresponding to eight percent (8%), and for damages. Antonieta claimed that in 1946, she had entered into an agreement with Conchita and Buenaventura Remotigue, Rafael Jarantilla, and Rosita and Vivencio Deocampo to engage in business. Antonieta alleged that the initial contribution of property and money came from the heirs’ inheritance, and her subsequent annual investment of seven thousand five hundred pesos (₱7,500.00) as additional capital came from the proceeds of her farm. Antonieta also alleged that from 1946-1969, she had helped in the management of the business they co-owned without receiving any salary. Her salary was
CA: Both the petitioner and the respondents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. The petitioner claimed that the RTC "erred in not rendering a complete judgment and ordering the partition of the co-ownership and giving to [him] six per centum (6%) of the properties."Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision setting aside the RTC’s decision. ISSUE:Whether or not the partnership subject of the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital funded the subject real properties. RULING:NO.Persons who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise and agree to share the gross returns of that enterprise in proportion to their contribution, but who severally retain the title to their respective contribution, are not thereby rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital, and no community of interest as principal proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds derived. In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and such a community of interest, as far as third persons are concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the whole property. x x x.
The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the owners, though they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they may, without becoming partners, agree among themselves as to the management, and use of such property and the application of the proceeds therefrom. Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties. The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar, for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have Page 8 of 65
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agreed to, and did, contribute money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows down to their intent in acting as they did . It is not denied that all the parties in this case have agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be able to later on share its profits. They have admitted this fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted one common documentary evidence to prove such partnership - the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. It is clear that a partner is entitled only to his share as agreed upon, or in the absence of any such stipulations, then to his share in proportion to his contribution to the partnership. The petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. However, petitioner fails to realize that this document specifically enumerated the businesses covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City. Since there was a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed went to the three businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go beyond the stipulations in the document. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in limiting petitioner’s share to the assets of the businesses enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. The petitioner has failed to prove that there exists a trust over the subject real properties. Aside from his bare allegations, he has failed to show that the respondents used the partnership’s money to purchase the said properties. Even assuming arguendo that some partnership income was used to acquire these properties, the petitioner should have successfully shown that these funds came from his share in the partnership profits. After all, by his own admission, and as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, he owned a mere 6% equity in the partnership. In essence, the petitioner is claiming his 6% share in the subject real properties, by relying on his own self-serving testimony and the equally biased testimony of Antonieta Jarantilla. Petitioner has not presented evidence, other than these unsubstantiated testimonies, to prove that the respondents did not have the means to fund their other businesses and real properties without the partnership’s income. On the other hand, the respondents have not only, by testimonial evidence, proven their case against the petitioner, but have also presented sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate their claims, allegations and defenses. They presented preponderant proof on how they acquired and funded such properties in addition to tax receipts and tax declarations. It has been held that "while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription." Moreover, it is a rule in this jurisdiction that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence.
8. G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Respondents. FACTS:Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon. Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the coownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Trial court ordered the partition of the subject property. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the appellate court partially reconsidered the Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. ISSUE:Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code in order to prohibit the partitioned of their family home. RULING:NO. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Page 9 of 65
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Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos . Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal
support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.1âwphi1 Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. ARTICLE 485 1. G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014 FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent. FACTS:The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790 square meters, more or less. Prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent), with the affected portion being described in the deed of absolute sale Eliseo. Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves. Pursuant to the deed extrajudicial partition, OCT No. O-188 was cancelled, and the Register of Deeds issued TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to the petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. Due to the petitioner’s needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him on a complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City. LOWER COURT: The MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner, ruling that the deeds of sale executed by Eliseo in favor of the respondent did not have the effect of conveying the disputed property to him inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their father, which included the disputed property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had no right to dispose of a definite portion thereof. Page 10 of 65
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RTC: On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint holding that the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question of ownership of the disputed property was involved. CA: CA promulgated its decision, affirming the decision of the RTC, and dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the right of possession over the disputed property. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent was either a coowner with the right of possession over the disputed property. RULING :YES. The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.
In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro indivisoand exercising her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it. Even if an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 49325 of the Civil Codegives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would beallotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only the seller’s pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned. As Eliseo’s su ccessor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Codeto take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.27 Article 497 states: Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the coowners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property he was buying was notexclusively owned by Eliseo.1âwphi1 He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an oral agreement of partition vis-à-vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the complaint, to wit: That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter that the portion sold to him was his share already; that they have orally partitioned the whole lot before defendant acquired the portion from him. His knowledge of Eliseo’s co-ownership with his coheirs, and of their oral agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it appear to the respondent that the partition had already been completed and finalized, the coheirs had not taken possession yet oftheir respective shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner herself.
In that sense, it would have been easy for him to ascertain whether the representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition because it did not conform to what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him by law, particularly the right to take an active part in the partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to. It was only on September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time of the first sale transaction, and a year and two months from the time of the second sale transaction, that the coheirs executed the deed of extrajudicial partition. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or toobject to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos. ARTICLE 487 1. G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003. MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents. FACTS: ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that: 1. He is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond (FISHPOND) situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan; 2. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters; Page 11 of 65
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3. That DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. 4. That DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate the area as well as pay damages. DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, alleged that: 1. The complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed; 2. That the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir; 3. That ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith. RTC rendered a decision in favor of ABEJO and ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on coownership shall govern the rights of the parties. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIAs claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs right over his undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when necessary. DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the court
cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition. ISSUE: Whether an action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the undivided portion of a common property is proper before partition. HELD: No. Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no coownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition : It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion. As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half of the building in favor of private respondent. Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJOs claim of ownership over the undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJOs undivided share by offering to settle the Page 12 of 65
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case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND. Following the inherent and peculiar features of coownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions. Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each coowner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law. To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a coowner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND. Is the order to pay damages in the form of rent premature before partition?No. The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A coowner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co -ownership. The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others. Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning from that date.
The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property, considering the circumstances at that time.
ARTICLE 488 1. G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951 ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees. FACTS:In 1941 the sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion.
Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her siblings but both declined to buy it. The offer was later made to their mother but the she also declined to buy. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc. The three coowners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement". Before, during and after the execution of the contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of Angela Tuason and Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third coowner, Araneta, Inc. Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are reproducing them below: (9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there are no purchasers thereof; (11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons; (15) No co-owner of the property subjectmatter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to the other co-owners to Page 13 of 65
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purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs; Angela Tuason revoked the powers conferred on J. Antonio Araneta because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and she decided to rescind said contract and asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Later, Angela filed a complaint in the CFI asking the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said property. However, the court dismissed the complaint. The Angela Tuason appealed from that decision. Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to the owners therein and less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales. But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below: ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement. ISSUE:Whether or not paragraphs 9, 11, and 15 violate the Art. 400 of the Civil Code. RULING: We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or contract referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable. Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400. 2. G.R. No. L-25014. October 17, 1973. DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE CASTRO, JR., WILFREDO DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE CASTRO and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO ALEJANDRO, in substitution for the deceased, defendant-appellant, ARSENIO DE CASTRO, SR.)., petitioners, vs. GREGORIO ATIENZA, respondent.
Page 14 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) FACTS: On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of land. The lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease, the term of the lease was for five years from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year. In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exhibit A) was signed by them. "Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows: "2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin and nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956.” Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did not pay the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present action." On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of Tomas de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate court found that "the testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.). . . supports the contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio who was interested and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration that "I agreed to sign this document (referring to the cancellation) because of my desire to cancel our original agreement" and that his purpose in obtaining the cancellation of said lease agreement with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the intention of having said fishpond leased to other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I can see in the signature of Felisa Vda. de Castro." The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio "was the one interested in cancelling the lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most probably undertook to obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his brother Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his own failure to obtain such signature to elude his own undertaking and liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the rental paid in advance by
respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00. The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or concurrence of Felisa Vda. de Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an essential condition to the validity and effectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the lease (Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim, holding that "(S)ince then specific provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's claim, we are not prepared to supply such condition unless the same can be deduced from other evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party thereto." ISSUE: Whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent Atienza) independently of his co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the same third party, whether Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third party? RULING: The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the judgment of the appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent Atienza, independently of his coowner (although said co-owner had also leased his other undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could likewise by mutual agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs) therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such liability.
The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the contract of lease Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half interest in the fishpond they owned in common to the plaintiff. Could one of them have validly leased his interest without the other co-owner leasing his own? The answer to this is given by appellant in his own brief when he said that it would result in a partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half. If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff." Page 15 of 65
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The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the rights and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly provides that: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 3. G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996 ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City. Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, sometime after Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue. In an instrument, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital gains. Socorro discovered the sale while she was at the City Treasurer's Office. She sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa for the redemption of the property. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents initiated against petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
The RTC handed down its decision holding that private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed. On appeal, theCA reversed the decision of the court a quo. The thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Socorro may redeem the property; and 2.) Whether or not Socorro’s right to redeem the property had already lapsed. HELD: 1.) We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died, her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession. Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria. 2.) When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus: Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title. Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code: Page 16 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of safe shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiatedbefore the trial court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. vs. Intermediate Appellate Even in Alonzo Court,relied upon by petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale.
All given, we find no error in the appellate court's finding that private respondents are entitled to the redemption of the subject property. ARTICLE 491 1. G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008 LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA CATAPANG, respondent.
M.
Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the coownership. FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of aparcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay MahabangLudlod, Taal, Batangas. Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang, with the consent of NormaMaligaya as one of the aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot adjacent to thesubject parcel of land. The house built by Catapang intruded on a portion of the coowned property.
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and made several demandsfor Catapang to demolish and vacate the part of the structure encroaching upon theirproperty. However, Catapang refused and disregarded the demands of Cruz. Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTCof Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only oneof the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the house and
possession of the portion of the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC affirmed thedecision of the MCTC. Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot becharacterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause ofaction for forcible entry. Thus, the case went to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the consent given by one of the coowners is sufficient to warrant thedismissal of a complaint for forcible entry. HELD: No, Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to theprejudice of the co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is tantamount todevoting the property to her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. The Court ruled that it would necessarily follow that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly gives consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as Catapang in this case, in the thin gowned in common.
In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each co-owner may use the thingowned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it isintended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or preventthe other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The Court ruled that, to giveconsent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property would be toinjure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other co-owners from usingthe property in accordance with their rights. In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal ofthe complaint for forcible entry filed against the respondent Catapang. The consentgiven by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of her other coowners did notgrant Catapang any right to enter and even build upon the co-owned property.According to the Supreme Court, the respondent Catapang’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay inthe constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in orderto enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry. The petition was GRANTED. 2. See Manuel de Guia vs. CA and Abejo case digest 3. G.R. No. 161916
January 20, 2006 Page 17 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, vs. EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents.
ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed. ARTICLE 493
FACTS: A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador. The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot. The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit. HELD: NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became coowners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the
1. G.R. No. 191090 October 13, 2014 EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO and ELY B. FLESTADO, Respondents. FACTS: Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe were husband and wife. They have two children, Juan Irenea. Juan is married to Leonarda and they have six children. Irenea on the other hand is married to Santiago Samson and they have two children, respondents Herminia Samson-Bico and Merlita Samson-Flestado.
Apolonio owned a 29,748 sq.m. parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal that was later inherited by his 2 children. Upon their death, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners. In April of 2002, the heirs of Juan (Ballesteros), without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of petitioner Extra-ordinary Development Corp (EDC) a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00. Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the existence of co-ownership over the subject property. EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims. EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name. This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and conveyance of property with damages. In defense, EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received their share in the down payment made by EDC but they were both unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land. RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents. The decision stated that respondents and the heirs of Juan are coowners of the subject property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the onehalf share of the heirs of Irenea and thus the sale is null and void; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale when the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that onehalf of the property sold is owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents were coowners of the Page 18 of 65
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subject property because Herminia informed EDC of such fact through a letter. CA: Affirmed with modifications. It ruled that The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EDC is not void, but valid, but only to the extent of onehalf of the subject property or 14,874 square meters, but not as to the other half of 14,874 square meters which is coowned by the respondents. The heirs of Juan were ordered to return to EDC half of the purchase price. ISSUES:1. Whether or not respondents are able to prove co-ownership; 2. Whether or not EDC was an innocent buyer in good faith; and 3. Whether or not the Contract of Sale with EDC is valid. HELD: 1.)YES, respondents are entitled to their share because they were able to prove co-ownership. Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject property through her clear testimony (she was also able to show birth, baptism and marriage certificates). Moreover, there was an admission of the coownership made by the heirs of Juan in their Answer to the Complaint.
During the hearing, it was admitted that the heirs of Juan was aware that half of the property belongs to the respondents and that they forgot to ask for the latter ’s signature in the deed of sale. The Answer submitted by the heirs of Juan, as well as the testimony of Juan constitutes judicial admissions. Well settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. 2) NO, EDC was not an innocent purchaser in good faith. EDC was claiming that the judicial admissions were not binding because they bought the property in good faith. In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the property sold. The execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly coowned by them together with the respondents, was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided onehalf share thereof, as they had no title or interest to transfer the other onehalf portion which pertains to the respondents without the latter ’s consent. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have (nemo dat quod non habet.) Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDC ’s rights over the subject property originated from sellersappellants Ballesteros, said corporation merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than what its sellers have.
3) YES, the Deed of Absolute Sale is VALID but only with respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan over onehalf of the property. This is in recognition of the heir ’s rights to dispose of their own share. Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of each coownersto have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co ownership.The heirs are also ordered to return the ½ purchase price paid by EDC so as not to constitute unjust enrichment. 2. G.R. No. 108228 February 1, 2001 SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., respondents. FACTS: Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:
Salome Bornales
4/16
Consorcia Bornales
4/16
Alfredo Bornales
2/16
Maria Bornales
2/16
Jose Bornales
1/16
Quirico Bornales
1/16
Rosalia Bornales
1/16
Julita Bornales
1/16
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed Page 19 of 65
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portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon. Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C6. Petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes. The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by meters and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common is valid. HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. In Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al.: …The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or
in part even without the consent of the other coowners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoymen . Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent. We are not unaware of the principle that a coowner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as coowner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three coowners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad . Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said coowner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a coowner of the property. In this case, Regalado merely became a new coowner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name . Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had already been effectively segregated from the ‘mother lot’ even before title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted Page 20 of 65
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that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the intervening years between the date of petitioners’ purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, question petitioners’ right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,we had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis ). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the present. The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. In this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same in his name alone because he was aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject porti on as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.
Records show that the particular area subject of this case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted the lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledad’s ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162. Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. 3. G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016 MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY [MCIAA], Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF GAVINA IJORDAN, NAMELY, JULIAN CUISON, FRANCISCA CUISON, DAMASTNA CUISON, PASTOR CUISON, ANGELINA
CUISON, MANSUETO CUISON, BONIFACIA CUISON, BASILIO CUISON, MOISES CUISON, AND FLORENCIO CUISON, Respondents. A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller. FACTS: Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale(Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). MCIAA rejmained in material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject lot through the CAA, later renamed the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT), and is presently known as the Air Transportation Office (ATO). The subject lot was transferred and conveyed to MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958.
In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Consequently, OCT No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, the Cuisons. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest. The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC,alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title. The RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian. On appeal, the CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. MCIAA insists that the respondents were fully aware of the transaction with Julian from the time of the consummation of the sale in 1957, as well as of its continuous possession thereof; that what was conveyed by Julian to its predecessor-in-interest, the CAA, was the entirety of Lot No. 4539, consisting of 12,012 square meters, not just his share of 1/22 of the whole lot; that the respondents were guilty of inexplicable inaction as to the sale, which manifested their implied ratification of the supposedly unauthorized act of Julian of selling the subject lot in 1957; that although the respondents were still minors at the time of the execution of the sale, their ratification of Julian's act became evident from the fact that they had not impugned Page 21 of 65
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the sale upon reaching the age of majority; that they asserted their claim only after knowing of the phenomenal rise in the value of the lot in the area despite their silence for more than 30 years; and that they did not assert ownership for a long period, and did not exercise physical and constructive possession by paying the taxes or declaring the property for taxation purposes. Respondents aver that they were not aware of the sale of the subject lot in 1957 because the sale was not registered, and because the subject lot was not occupied by MCIAA or its lessee; that they became aware of the claim of MCIAA only when its representative tried to intervene during the reconstitution of the certificate of title in 1980; and that one of the co-owners of the property, Moises Cuison, had been vigilant in preventing the occupation of the subject lot by other persons.
the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
4. Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, 19310. February 3, 1997
HELD: Valid only as to Julian’s share.
A stipulation in a contract of sale regarding automatic appropriation amounts to pactum commissorium, and is therefore null and void. More than that, even if such automatic appropriation of the cargo truck in question can be inferred from or be contemplated under the aforesaid mortgage contract, such stipulation would be pactum commissorium which is expressly prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code and therefore, null and void.
Firstly, both the CA and the RTC found the Deed and the Tax Declaration with which MCIAA would buttress its right to the possession and ownership of the subject lot insufficient to substantiate the right of MCIAA to the relief sought. We are now instead bound and concluded thereby in accordance with the well-established rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive. Secondly, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the CivilCode provides that no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid: x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.
Facts: Esguerra bought a truck from GAMI on installments. To secure the payment, a chattel mortgage was executed by Esguerra. Later, Esguerra failed to pay 2 installements. Consequently GAMI filed an action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Agents of GAMI, impersonated sheriffs and took the said truck while it was in the possession of Esguerra’s driver, Carlito Padua; and the same had remained in the possession of GAMI, notwithstanding demands for its return by Esguerra.
Esguerra filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, TagaytayCity to recover said truck and for damages. Esguerra alleged, among others, that due to his failure to pay the installments due, the agents of GAMI, Jose Tino and Samuel Dore, representing themselves as deputy sheriffs and with use of force, threats and intimidation, seized the cargo truck in question from his driver, Carlito Padua, while unloading gravel and sand in Pasay City; and that despite repeated demands, GAMI refused and failed to return the same. GAMI, et al. filed their answer with a counterclaim, alleging as affirmative defense that the plaintiff gave his consent to the taking of the truck by the agents of the corporation on condition that he be allowed to recover its possession upon payment of his back accounts. Issue: Whether or not GAMI is liable for damages in taking the truck Held: The taking of Esguerra’s truck without proceeding to sell the same at public auction Page 22 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) appropriating the same in payment of Esguerra’s indebtedness is not lawful. However, the respondent appellate court did not err in holding that while the mortgagee can take possession of the chattel, such taking did not amount to the foreclosure of the mortgage. Otherwise stated, the taking of Esguerra’s truck without proceeding to the sale of the same at public auction, but instead, appropriating the same in payment of Esguerra’s indebtedness, is not lawful. As clearly stated in the chattel mortgage contract, the express purpose of the taking of the mortgaged property is to sell the same and/ or foreclose the mortgage constituted thereon either judicially or extrajudicially and thereby, liquidate the indebtedness in accordance with law.
A stipulation in a contract of sale regarding automatic appropriation amounts to pactum commissorium, and is therefore null and void. More than that, even if such automatic appropriation of the cargo truck in question can be inferred from or be contemplated under the aforesaid mortgage contract, such stipulation would be pactum commissorium which is expressly prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code and therefore, null and void. The three remedies of the vendor in case the vendee defaults under Art. 1484 are alternative and cannot be exercised simultaneously or cumulatively by the vendor creditor. Having opted to foreclose the chattel mortgage, respondent GAMI can no longer cancel the sale. The three remedies of the vendor in case the vendee defaults, in a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installment under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, are alternative and cannot be exercised simultaneously or cumulatively by the vendor-creditor. In Cruz vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation (23 SCRA 791, [1968]), the Supreme Court construing Article 1484 of the Civil Code, held: “Should the vendee or purchaser of a personal property default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any one of these three. 5. G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999 TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private Respondents De Castro filed an action for partition over a parcel of land which was sold, without their knowledge, by their brother Mariano in favor of Petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College. It is the contention of the private respondent De Castros that Mariano was only able to sell his undivided share on the lot in question but not the other co-owners’ equivalent to four -fifths (4/5) of the property. Mariano, on the other hand, raises the defense of prescription/laches.
1) No. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only that which corresponds to his grantor’s share in the property owned in common. 2)No. In the light of the foregoing, petitioner’s defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, ‘no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.’ In Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. 6. Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676) Facts: The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs. Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated on its OCT.
When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering the land as security, the bank’s lawyer, Atty. Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted. The extrajudicial settlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was signed by the heirs, with the exception of Gregorio, Jr., then only a minor. After the document was notarized, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit against Jovita’s husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent.
Issues: 1) Did the sale by Mariano effectively include the entire land? 2) Was the action for partition filed by the siblings of Mariano barred by prescription?
Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario had offered the land for sale. She informed her younger brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an action for partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition against their mother, she was impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument, they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain the loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad’s school fees and for household repairs.
Held:
Issues: Page 23 of 65
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1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against p etitioners? 2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the property? Held: 1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The record reveals that there was an intention on the part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their interest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082, CC, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
2.) No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land in his mother’s name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC, which provides that “when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resulting trust arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time when the trust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their mother’s effort to sell the property, his claim cannot be considered barred either by prescription or by laches. 7. G.R. No. 182314. November 13, 2013. VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN vs. CHARLES MANCAO Facts: Felix Gochan (Gochan), Amparo Alo (Alo), and Jose A. Cabellon were co-owners of Lot Nos. 1028 and 1030 of Subdivision Plan Psd-21702 located in Cebu City, Cebu. Petitioners are successors-in-interest of Gochan, while respondent bought Lot Nos. 1028-D-1, 1028-D-3, 1028-D-4, and 1028-E covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 139161-1391645 from the children of Angustias Velez and Eduardo Palacios, who, together with Jose, Jesus, Carmen, and Vicente, all surnamed Velez,7 acquired Lot Nos. 1028-D and 1028-E from Alo.
Sometime in 1998, petitioners, including Mae Gochan, filed a case for legal redemption of Lot Nos. 1028-DD, 1028-EE, 1028-FF, 1028-GG, 1028-HH, 1028-II, 1028-JJ, 1028-KK, 1028-LL, 1028-MM, 1028-NN, 1028-OO, 1028-PP, 1028-QQ, 1028-RR, 1028-SS, 1028TT, 1028-UU, 1028-VV, 1030-I of Subdivision Plan Psd21702 covered by TCT Nos. 2318 to 2337.8 The TCTs are registered under the names of Gochan (married to Tan Nuy), Alo (married to Patricio Beltran), and Genoveva S. De Villalon (married to Augusto P. Villalon), who is the successor-in-interest of Cabellon. The case, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-22825 and raffled before Cebu City RTC Branch 17, was brought against the spouses Bonifacio Paray, Jr. and Alvira Paray (sister of respondent), who purchased the lots from the heirs of Alo. On November 20, 1998, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement,10 whereby, for and in consideration of the amount of Php650,000.00, the Spouses Paray conveyed to petitioners and Mae Gochan all their shares, interests, and participation over the properties. On November 27, 1998, the court approved the agreement and rendered judgment in accordance with its terms and conditions.11 The decision was annotated on December 29, 1999 in the subject TCTs as Entry No. 188688. Claiming that the legal redemption adversely affected Lot Nos. 1028-D-1, 1028-D-3, 1028-D-4, and 1028-E, respondent filed a suit before the CA for “Declaration of Nullity of Final Decision and Compromise Agreement and the Registration of the Same Documents with the Register of Deeds.” CA ruled in favor of respondent. Hence this instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that extrinsic fraud was present when the respondent was not impleaded in the redemption case and when petitioners entered into a compromise agreement with Bonifacio Paray. Ruling: The governing law with respect to redemption by co-owners in case the share of a coowner is sold to a third person is Article 1620 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1620. A coowner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other coowners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership. Its purpose is to provide a method for terminating the co-ownership and consolidating the dominion in one sole owner.
The redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for legal Page 24 of 65
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redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner. Thus, the mere fact that respondent was not impleaded as a party in Civil Case No. CEB-22825 is not in itself indicative of extrinsic fraud. If a seller/coowner is not treated as an indispensable party, how much more is a third person who merely alleged that his lots are affected thereby? Truly, the exclusion of respondent (or other alleged subdivision lot owners who are equally affected) from the legal redemption case does not entitle him to the right to ask for the annulment of the judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules, because he does not even have any legal standing to participate or intervene therein. WHEREFORE premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. 8. AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004 FACTS: Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio.
It turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he sold a portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria Bacong, Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition thereof. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and petitioners’ cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano and the three purchases considering the fact that it was made without the consent of the co-owners. HELD: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale). The provision clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse in so far as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised such acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to the cestui que trust or the other coowners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate the existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano. Respondent’s reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to land. Further, respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano. 9. PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA ET. AL. Facts: Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed SPAs authorizing spouses Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB by way of mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB which were inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said amendment against spouses Garcia and PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya and they became owners pro indivisio upon the death of Ligaya on 1987. PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described in the as a “widower. During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid Page 25 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during marriage or thereafter. Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies. All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the name of one spouse does not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code. The effect of the mortgage with respect to the coowners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr. cannot mortgage the entire property. 10. MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. CA and JOSE B. ABEJO (see previous case digest)
complaint impleading the bank as additional party defendant. The court issued an order rejecting the amended complaint of the petitioners. Likewise, the court dismissed the complaint and held that pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner is not invalidated by the absence of the consent of the co-owners. Hence, the sale by Esperanza of the property was valid; the excess from her undivided share should be taken from the undivided shares of Criseta and Antonio, who expressly agreed to and benefited from the sale. The CA likewise held that the sale was valid and binding insofar as Esperanza's undivided share of the property was concerned. It affirmed the RTC ruling that the lack of consent of the co-owners did not nullify the sale. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. - Deed of Absolute Sale was merely relatively simulated, it remains valid and enforceable.
11. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES BALITE VS. LIM FACTS: Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite were the owners of a parcel of land. When Aurelio died intestate, his wife Esperanza and their children inherited the subject property and became coowners thereof. Esperanza became ill and was in dire need of money for her hospital expenses. She, through her daughter, Criseta, offered to sell to Rodrigo Lim, her undivided share for the price of P1 mil. Esperanza and Rodrigo agreed that under the Deed of Absolute Sale, it will be made to appear that the purchase price of the property was P150,000 although the actual price agreed upon by them for the property was P1mil.
On April 16, 1996, Esperanza executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Rodrigo. They also executed on the same day a Joint Affidavit under which they declared that the real price of the property was P1mil. payable to Esperanza by installments. Only Esperanza and two of her children Antonio and Criseta knew about the said transaction. When the rest of the children knew of the sale, they wrote to the Register of Deeds saying that their mother did not inform them of the sale of a portion of the said property nor did they give consent thereto. Nonetheless, Rodrigo made partial payments to Antonio who is authorized by his mother through a Special Power of Attorney. Esperanza signed a letter addressed to Rodrigo informing the latter that her children did not agree to the sale of the property to him and that she was withdrawing all her commitments until the validity of the sale is finally resolved. Then Esperanza died intestate and was survived by her children. Meanwhile, Rodrigo caused to be published the Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners filed a complaint against Rodrigo for the annulment of sale, quieting of title, injunction and damages. Rodrigo secured a loan from the Rizal commercial Banking Corporation in the amount of P2mil and executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the property as security thereof. On motion of the petitioners, they were granted leave to file an amended
HELD: Validity of the Sale We have before us an example of a simulated contract. Article 1345 of the Civil Code provides that the simulation of a contract may either be absolute or relative. In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but without any substance, because the parties have no intention to be bound by it. An absolutely simulated contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.
On the other hand, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, such a contract is relatively simulated. Here, the parties’ real agreement binds them. In the present case, the parties intended to be bound by the Contract, even if it did not reflect the actual purchase price of the property. That the parties intended the agreement to produce legal effect is revealed by the letter of Esperanza Balite to respondent dated October 23, 1996 and petitioners admission that there was a partial payment of P320,000 made on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale. There was an intention to transfer the ownership of over 10,000 square meters of the property . Clear from the letter is the fact that the objections of her children prompted Esperanza to unilaterally withdraw from the transaction. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale was merely relatively simulated, it remains valid and enforceable. All the essential requisites prescribed by law for the validity and perfection of contracts are present. However, the parties shall be bound by their real agreement for a consideration of P1,000,000 as reflected in their Joint Affidavit. Deed of Sale not an Equitable Mortgage For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: one, the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, two, their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. In the present case, however, the Contract does not merely purport to be an absolute sale. The records and the documentary Page 26 of 65
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evidence introduced by the parties indubitably show that the Contract is, indeed, one of absolute sale. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed upon a mortgage of the subject property. Furthermore, the voluntary, written and unconditional acceptance of contractual commitments negates the theory of equitable mortgage. There is nothing doubtful about the terms of, or the circumstances surrounding, the Deed of Sale that would call for the application of Article 1602. The Joint Affidavit indisputably confirmed that the transaction between the parties was a sale. We find no basis to conclude that the purchase price of the property was grossly inadequate. Petitioners did not present any witness to testify as to the market values of real estate in the subjects locale. They made their claim on the basis alone of the P2,000,000 loan that respondent had been able to obtain from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. This move did not sufficiently show the alleged inadequacy of the purchase price. A mortgage is a mere security for a loan. There was no showing that the property was the only security relied upon by the bank; or that the borrowers had no credit worthiness, other than the property offered as collateral. Co-Ownership The appellate court was correct in affirming the validity of the sale of the property insofar as the pro indiviso share of Esperanza Balite was concerned. Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of such interest. The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership. Hence, the transaction between Esperanza Balite and respondent could be legally recognized only in respect to the formers pro indiviso share in the coownership. As a matter of fact, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the parties expressly referred to the 10,000-square-meter portion of the land sold to respondent as the share of Esperanza in the conjugal property. Her clear intention was to sell merely her ideal or undivided share in it. No valid objection can be made against that intent. Clearly then, the sale can be given effect to the extent of 9,751 square meters, her ideal share in the property as found by both the trial and the appellate courts. 12. LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS Co-ownership; nature Sanchez Roman defines coownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa
defines it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.” Co-ownership; characteristics The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners. Co-ownership; relationship In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other coowners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each coowner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his coowners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in coownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. FACTS: Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC. MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery. RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings. On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice. On 28 April Page 27 of 65
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1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special permit of demolition from the court. Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area. On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit. PROCEDUARAL ISSUE: WON Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy. RULING: As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice. The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Xxxx Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON Lilia Sanchez has a right to the property. RULING: Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons havein a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the thingssubject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and thesame.”
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the coowners. In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held proindiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his coowners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be Page 28 of 65
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effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
The deed contains the statement "that by virtue hereof, the said Andrea Budlong is hereby vested with full ownership and property of the lot in question." It was acknowledged before Genaro Visarra the mayor of Tagbilaran, an ex oficio notary.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Remanded to the MeTC for partition.
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on October 27, 1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the said lot. The title shows that the lot is owned by the following co-owners: Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco Garrote 1/6, and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.
ARTICLE 494 1. BALO vs. CA G.R. No. 129704 September 30, 2005 Doctrine: An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. Facts: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages, was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas, Eugenio Balo, Ulpiano Balo, Jr., Nida Balo-Moraleta, Nora Balo-Catano, Zaida Balo, Judith BaloMandreza, Danilo Balo and Ronilo Balo, alleging that she (private respondent) and petitioners are the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION AND ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, WAS WAIVED, OR WAS OTHERWISE ABANDONED Held: No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners did not ipso facto establish prescription. Dismissal prior to answer is premature. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action. 2. Budlong vs. Pondoc Facts: This is an action for the partition of Lot No. 5447, with an area of 12,524 square meters, situated at Barrio Ubujan Tagbilaran City, Bohol, at six hundred pesos in 1965.
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their two-thirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's personal services to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any descendants in 1935 and 1937, respectively. Francisco Garrote an alleged brother of Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc left Bohol thirty years before 1966 and had never returned to that province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died and was survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote Presumably, Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot. She declared it for tax purposes in her name. She paid the realty taxes thereon from 1936 to 1966. She planted the lot to coconuts, bamboos, bananas and a mango tree. Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of donation. The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1, 1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718. He did not comply with that request. On May 11, 1965 Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the said lot. She retarded the action against Francisco Garrote and the five children of Isabel Garrote-Pondoc Francisco was summoned by publication. He was declared in default. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of the lot extinguished her rights under the deed of donation. It opined that she could not ask for the partition of the lot because she does not appear as a co-owner in the title thereof. From that adverse decision, Andrea appealed to this Court. The trial court correctly held that the donation is valid. Defendants-appellees' belated contention on appeal that the donation is mortis causa (they did not raise that issue in their answer or in the lower court) is wrong. There is not the slightest indication in the deed that the donation would take effect upon the donors' death. It is indisputably an inter vivos donation. In the deed it is expressly stipulated that the ownership over the two-thirds proindiviso share of the donors in Lot No. 5447 was transferred to the donee. That notarial deed amounted to a transfer of the ownership.
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Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) Issue:Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because her name does not appear in the certificate of title Held: Yes. We rind the appeal to be meritorious. The trial court erred in assuming that the donee ceased to be a co-owner
Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act No. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof". LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND 1. Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and incidents as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, it is subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The rights and liabilities which are created by law and are made applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to registered land, except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496. 2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are applicable to registered lands. 3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c) to the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants, will other cotenants except as otherwise expressly provoked in Act No. 496. The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a coowner of Lot No. 5447. She became the successorin-interest of the donors, Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be the co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights of Andrea as a co-owner. Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land. The trial court erred in applying to this case section 38 of Act No. 496 regarding review of the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. This is not a case of fraudulent registration. Nor is this a case where the rule on laches is applicable Moreover, the defendants waived that defense because they did not invoke it in their answer
In conclusion, we hold that the 1934 donation should be given effect. It was confirmed by plaintiffappellant's ion of the donated lot, her improvements thereon, her enjoyment of the fruits thereof, and her payment of the realty taxes dues thereon for the years 1936 to 1966. 3. Epitacio de Lima vs. CA Facts: During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965. On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action. On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) In not holding that the right of a coheir to demand partition of inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already been waived. 2) 2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners. Page 30 of 65
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Issue: whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Held: Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the coowner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his coowners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee. Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a coowner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55). However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the coowners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is que considered adverse to the cestui trust amounting to a repudiation of the coownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been
made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted. Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time. 4. Tomas Claudio Memorial College vs CA Facts: On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint.On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
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Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case. Court of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Held: There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 3 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 4 Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence the court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all cases. In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner who elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same case. 7 To do otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court. On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 8 Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. 9Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer. In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." 5. Arturo Trinidad vs. CA Facts: On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused. In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants Page 32 of 65
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that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was timebarred.
Respondent Court sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
6. Consolacion Austria vs. Lichauco
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony. Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943. The right to demand partition does not prescribe. Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, Acquisitive prescription may set in. Issue: Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription. Held: Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
It is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the coownership.
Facts: Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion Austria are siblings of full blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of the defendant-appellant.
The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of six hundred sixty one (661) square meters located in Palanan, Makati City. The aforesaid parcels of land have permanent improvements thereon which straddle both lots, namely, a residential bungalow and two (2) units, two-storey apartments, the titles of which are registered jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners thereof. The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early part of 1996, they informed defendantappellant of their desire to have the subject properties partitioned based on the percentage of each co-owner’s respective share. A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by which the subject properties could be physically partitioned among the co-owners. However, the defendant-appellant Austria refused to accede to any of the schemes presented by the realtor for the physical apportionment of the subject properties between the co-owners thereof. Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of them, on July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against the defendant-appellant Austria and two other defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos for partition of the subject property. Within the period for filing an answer, the defendant-appellant Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. The lower court denied the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendant-appellant Austria, and directed the defendants to file their answer within the remaining period provided by the Rules. Within the prescriptive period, the defendantfor appellant Austria filed a Motion Reconsideration of the November 10, 1997 order, which the lower court denied in an order dated February 2, 1998. Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Page 33 of 65
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On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Austria received a copy of the Decision dated October 30, 1998 dismissing her petition for certiorari and prohibition. The defendant-appellant Austria moved for the reconsideration thereof. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendantappellant Austria received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 9, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration of the decision denying her petition for certiorari and prohibition. Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme Court denied the said petition for review for non-compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56. Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendant-appellant Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated October 15, 2001 denying her petition for review. In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the Supreme Court denied with finality the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The lower court in its order dated July 6, 1999 declared the defendants in default, set the reception of ex-parte evidence, and commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the exparte evidence and to submit her corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is concluded. On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 6, 1999 with an urgent prayer to cancel plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence on August 9, 1999, which was however denied by the lower court, for lack of merit, in an order dated January 14, 2000. The plaintiffs-appellees then presented evidence ex-parte on January 28, 2000.
their
The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the lower court on February 14, 2000, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees. A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the defendant-appellant Austria, which was, in an order dated August 7, 2000, denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the order that petitioner pay reasonable rental for her use of a portion of the disputed properties. The appellate court denied reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s decision is valid in alternatively ordering the partition of the subject property or authorizing its sale to a third party. Held: There is no question that a co-ownership exists between petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is the determination of whether a coownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a coownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. The proceedings in this case have only reached the first phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves something more to be done by the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination of just compensation by the appointed commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is considered a final order and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby. However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized the sale of the subject properties to a third party and the division of the proceeds thereof. What makes this portion of the decision all the more objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein) only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs. It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal resulting in the appellate court’s failure to Page 34 of 65
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rule on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply brush this issue aside considering that its resolution is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case.17 The rectification of the trial court’s decision is accordingly in order. 7. Cabrera vs Ysaac Facts: Unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their property, none of them may sell a definite portion of the land. The co-owner may only sell his or her proportionate interest in the coownership. A contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio.
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 Juan P. Cabrera assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 19, 2003 2and resolution dated January 3, 2005.3 These decisions ruled that a specific performance to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land is not available as a relief for Juan Cabrera. It appears that the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506.4 One of the coowners is respondent, Henry Ysaac.
Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986. On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to Juan Cabrera.6 He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for his needs because there was no parking space for his vehicle. In order to address Juan Cabrera’s concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of land have a combined area of 439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the two families agree to it.
Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and Juan Cabrera settled on the price of ₱250.00 per square meter, but Juan Cabrera stated that he could only pay in full after his retirement on June 15, 1992.8 Henry Ysaac agreed but demanded for an initial payment of ₱1,500.00, which Juan Cabrera paid. According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him that the Borbe family and the Espiritu family were no longer interested in purchasing the properties they were leasing. On June 9, 1990, Juan Cabrera paid the amount of ₱6,100.00.10 Henry Ysaac issued a receipt for this amount. ₱3,100.00 of the amount paid was reimbursed to Mamerta
Espiritu and, in turn, she gaveJuan Cabrera the receipts issued to her by Henry Ysaac. On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However,at that time, Henry Ysaac was in the United States. The only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife. The wife refused to accept Juan Cabrer a’s payment. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent. Held: We find that there was no contract of sale. It was null ab initio. As defined by the Civil Code, “[a] contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. ”For there to be a valid contract, there must be consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is established.
Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates himself to deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money or its equivalent.77 A “contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.”78 The seller and buyer must ag ree as to the certain thing that will be subject of the sale as well as the price in which the thing will be sold. The thing to be sold is the object of the contract, while the price is the cause or consideration. The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a definite portion of a coowned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This is evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was under the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.85 The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the coownership. However, this was not the object of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has “no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.” ARTICLE 495 1. Heirs of Juanita Padilla vs. Magdua Page 35 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) Facts: Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanita’s death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property4 (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that the land was registered under the Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardo’s daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo. Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third parties. Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her parents. Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of ₱590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of prescription The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo’s daughters in favor of Dominador. Issue: whether the present action is already barred by prescription. Held: Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with the requirement of sufficient repudiation of coownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of public records only because it was kept by the Provincial Assessor’s office for real property tax declaration purposes. However, such cannot be contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardo’s favor.
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her signature on the Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardo’s possession of the land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador contends that the alleged written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died was only made known lately and conveys the possibility of being fabricated. Dominador adds that the alleged ‘highly questionable signature’ of Juanita on the Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years from the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners. The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed. After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners’ evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardo’s daughters, namely Page 36 of 65
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Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardo’s daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardo’s daughters had legal personality to sell the property. Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that Ricardo’s possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.10 Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardo’s family ever lived there. Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the land. Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanita’s death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother’s land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo’s interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land.
In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run. However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo’s repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription. Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardo’s alleged possession since 1966. Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardo’s alleged possession since 1966. 2. Aguilar vs. CA Facts: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the coownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu. Page 37 of 65
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After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that they could divide the proceeds between them. In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died. In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property. Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pretrial on 26 April 1979. On 20 April 1979. Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled. When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence. On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was filed. Issue: whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent. Held: We find merit in the petition. As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory.3 A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.5
Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the case of movant. In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was proper. With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at Page 38 of 65
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any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no coowner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code. However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate. 3. Lavaadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna Facts: The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 1 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the ProCathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15,
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
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1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
Issue: What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997. After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates. The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC. The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100 proindiviso share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; Both parties appealed to the CA. The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
Held: Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on coownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997. The Court concurs with the CA. In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz: Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.(n) In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, Page 40 of 65
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without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued in respondent’s name alone.
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two sons.
4. Borromeo vs. Descallar
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-ininterest) who acquired real properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens system? Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta’s residence at a squatters’ area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased f rom the document. But it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons for only two months after the break up. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for ₱250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the RTC of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor. In her Answer, respondent belied the a llegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G. In its decision, the court a quo found. Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation Page 41 of 65
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that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich’s financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are welldefined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich. Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent? Held: In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. SC AFFIRM THE RTC. The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. 5. G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000 GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents. FACTS:Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the Tumlos. Said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment Page 42 of 65
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building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay P1,600/month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000/month for the rental, which was not fulfilled by the Tumlos. When the Fernandez demanded the payment from the Tumlos of P84,000 from Toto and Gina Tumlos as unpaid rentals for 7 years and P143,600.00 from Guillerma as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but said demand were unheeded. Then they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000 in attorney's fees. Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and covendee of the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. MTC promulgated its decision in January 1997. Upon appeal to the RTC, Guillerma et al alleged that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. RTC affirmed with the judgment of the MTC. CA reversed the RTC Decision. ISSUE:Whether or not that petitioner is the co-owner of the apartment. RULING:No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were the co-owners of the disputed property.
Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must be presented to be deemed as co-owner of the property acquired during the cohabitation. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the apartment building. She merely anchors her claim of co-ownership on her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. No other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. Her claim of having administered the property during their cohabitation is unsubstantiated, for there is nothing in the Article 148 of the FC provides that the administration of the property amounts to the contribution in its acquisition. 6. G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011 MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO, MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA; EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs, namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO, ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIOHADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO T. TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA, CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs, namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN; and SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUEROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 140553 LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent. FACTS:The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by the Torbela siblings from their parents.
They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over the property in favor of Dr. Rosario. Four days after, a TCT was issued in Dr. Rosario’s name covering the property. Another deed of absolute quitclaim was subsequently executed twelve days after by Dr. Rosario acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same. This deed was notarized but not immediately annotated. Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he obtain through DBP for P70,000.00. He used the proceeds of the loan to build a 4 storey building which was initially used as a hospital but later converted into a commercial space. Part was leased to PT&T and the rest to Rosario ’s sister who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant. Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the mortgage was cancelled and ratified by a notary public. However, Dr. Rosario took another loan from PNB. He later acquired a third loan from Banco Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB cancelling the mortgage with PNB. Rosario failed to pay their loan in Banco Filipino and the property was extra judicially foreclosed. Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought to register their ownership over the lot and to perfect their title but couldn’t because the title was still with DBP. They showed as proof the deed of absolute quitclaim presented executed by Rosario himself. In 1986, they filed a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession and damages. They Page 43 of 65
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tried to redeem the lot from Banco Filipino but failed. TCT was issued to Banco Filipino. The Torbela’s claim they have right over the rents of the building through accession because they are the land owners. ISSUE(S): W/N The Express Trust created herein was effectively repudiated HELD: Yes. There was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first registered owner of Lot No. 356-A, Valeriano. Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However, the Torbela siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and use said property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which would be used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A a claim supported by testimonial and documentary evidence, and borne out by the sequence of events immediately following the execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. Rosarios name. On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly acknowledged that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and conveying the same back to the Torbela siblings for the consideration of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital building started on Lot No. 356-A. Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is the testimony of Atty. Lorenza Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who had no apparent personal interest in the present case. Atty. Alcantara, when she was still a boarder at the house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr. Rosarios mother), was consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also witnessed the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario. In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his name, to prove his purported title to Lot No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,[53] the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title: The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.[54] (Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name. Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings. Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law. Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, [n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.[62] It is possible to create a trust without using the word trust or trustee. Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust. In Tamayo v. Callejo,[64] the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in the beginning, but the registered owners Page 44 of 65
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subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of the property to another party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established between him and the Torbela siblings under Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property, together with the improvements thereon. ARTICLE 498 1. G.R. No. L-40064 December 4, 1934 RESURRECCION TAGARAO, BUENAVENTURA TAGARAO and SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffsappellees, vs.MARCOS GARCIA, ET AL., defendants. MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES RUFINO, and ELUETERIO RUFINO, appellants.
DOCTRINE: Co-ownership is distinguished from common-law concept of joint tenancy, in that in the latter, the rights of the co-owners are inseperable, as if they were one; hence, one may not without the consent of the other, dispose of his interest, and when one of them dies, the surviving co-owner is subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner immediately upon the death of the latter (by mere fact of such death) similar to what may be termed as an agreement of survivorship. are the FACTS: Petitioners defendant Garcia’s brother.
grandchildren
of
The land is a 31-ha land bought by Ventura and Marcos Garcia (defendant). Ventura has two children: Merced and Claro. Plaintiffs are the children of Merced. Plaintiffs’ parents died in 1914. This actio n for delivery of ¼ of the land was brought in 1928. Their ages were: Resurrecion 24, Serafin 23, Buenaventura 18.
plans, Marcos promised him a 4-ha w/c he obtained in 1927. The certificate was issue in 1918 and stated that Marcos and Tabifranca each owned ½. In 1921, Tabifranca sold the ½ to her step daughter and step granddaughter apparently to avoid her son from a previous marriage from inheriting it. Meanwhile, Tagarao learned of her uncle Claro’s obtaining of the 4-ha share w/c prompted her to also claim. Marcos promised to give her her share but instead he sold his ½ to the brother of his son-inlaw.
The RTC ordered delivery of the ¼ and annulled the sales. Issues: a. Whether or not the sale valid - VOID b. Whether or not plaintiffs entitled to relief - NO Held: Void. Resurrecion not entitled.
Ratio: 1. Sale by Tabiifranca is fictitious. She knew she was not entitled to the land as her spouse has acquired it before their marriage. The price is disproportionate to the value. The buyers are in no financial position as they are minors. Sale by Marcos fictitious. Buyer is in no financial position-only as retailer of tuba and fresh fish. This was alleged to be a mortgage. Interest was not paid. 2. The 3-year exception under Sec. 42 of Art. 190 not yet elapsed. But Resurrecion is already 24 and the 3-year period has prescribed. Tagarao cites Velasquez vs. Teodoro w/c held that where defendants’ interests are joint and inseparable, the others’ right is saved by the disability of another, although the former is not disabled. But SC said that case is N/A because she can dispose of her ownership in common w/o the consent of co-owners. Every co-owner is the absolute owner of his part although the effect of disposal is limited to his share upon partition. Any of the co-owners also has a right to partition.
The statute of limitations protects the diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his right. She did nothing to protect her rights in 1915 (death of mother). After this, Marcos’ possession was in concept of an owner w/c ripened after 10 years of continued possession Dispositive: Only 2/12 ordered transferred.
After the death of his brother Merced, Marcos claimed the land in a cadastral case and alleged that he purchased it in 1904 with his 2nd wife Tabifranca. To prevent Claro from frustrating his
2. G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990 MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. Page 45 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents. FACTS: On March 13, 1980, Reyes et. Al. filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, seeking to enjoin Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their proindiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of registered land located in the province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares.
Reyes claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from private respondents for a reasonable price. Further, Reyes at al asserts: 1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition; 2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive; 3. That they are willing to exercise their preemptive right for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said properties; 4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the complaint; On the other hand, respondents averred: 1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square meter; 2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; 3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein; 4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel. In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents filed a motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners' shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. and its proceeds thereof distributed among the parties.
Finding merit in the request, and for the purpose of determining the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of allotting the subject properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party who is able and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon required to submit their answers thereto. Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the subject properties under more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject properties. On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it was irrelevant. On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in the coownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public bidding for the subject properties on April 13, 1981. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: a. Whether or not Reyes et, al has claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares - NO b. If so, whether of not the public sale of the subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code is valid - YES HELD: The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
This claim is patently without basis. In this A. jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the proPage 46 of 65
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indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced.
party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the New Civil Code.
Article 1620 provides: A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares is null at this moment.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the coownership.
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale of the latter's proindiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar. There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". It cannot be said that private respondents had agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower than the selling price of private respondents. Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their proindiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a coowner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which may have been sold to the third
B. Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar. Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case. Art. 498 provides that: Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. Page 47 of 65
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The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners. Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which they could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares. Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under Article 498 of the New Civil Code. 3. G.R. No. 179205 July 30, 201 HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, Petitioners, vs.MARIO A. BA TONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL, Respondents. FACTS: The subject prope1iy consists of a 3,750 square meter-portion of the 15,001 square meters parcel of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated as Lot No. 1, and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1 07449[4] under the names of Reynaldo Del a Rosa (Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Del a Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal (and Mario Batongbacal for 50.00 per square meter or for a total of 187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment of 31,500.00 leaving a balance of 156,000.00. As shown in the document denominated as Resibo and signed by Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, t he parties agreed that the amount of 20,000.00 as part of the advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in 10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase price is fully settled.
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement, Mario and Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a survey to segregate the area of 3,750 square meters from the whole area covered by TCT No. T-107449, delineating the boundaries of the subdivided parts. As a result, they came up with a subdivision plan specifically designating the subject property signed by a Geodetic Engineer. Mario and Guillermo thereafter made several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SPA as agreed upon, but such demands all went unheeded. Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages, seeking to enforce their Contract to Sell dated 18 February 1987. In their Complaint, Mario and Guillermo asserted that they have a better right over the subject property and alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith. It was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its impossibility, to return the amount of P31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in either case. To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario and Guillermo, after initiating Civil Case No. 215-M90, filed a Notice of Lis Pendens registering their claim on the certificate of title covering the entire property. In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in their Complaint. Reynaldo in his Answer, countered that the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to understand that the contract between him and the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the latter will loan to him the amount of P31,500.00 payable once he receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land registered under TCT No. T-1 07449. Following the pre-trial conference without the parties reaching an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties proceeded to present, in open court, documentary and testimonial evidence to substantiate their claims. For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs therein to adduce sufficient evidence to support their complaint, the RTC, in a Decision dated 24 March 1999, dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and ordered Reynaldo to return to the former the sum of P28,000.00 with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the court a quo that the contract he entered into with Mario was an equitable mortgage. It was held by the trial court, however, that the supposed Contract to Sell denominated as Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot bind his co-owners into such contract without an SPA authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot be compelled to deliver the subject property but he was nonetheless ordered by the court to return the amount he received as part of the contract Page 48 of 65
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price since no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, brushed aside the claim of equitable mortgage and held that the sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and enforceable.
According to the appellate court, no SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided share as it is limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon the termination of the coownership. The Batongbacals could have validly demanded from Reynaldo to deliver the subject property pursuant to the Contract to Sell but such option is no longer feasible because the entire property has already been sold to third persons to whom a new title was issued. The appellate court thus proceeded to rescind the contract and ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he received as consideration thereby restoring the parties to their situation before entering into the agreement. In seeking modification of the appellate court's decision, Mario and Guillermo pointed out that the title of the subject property has not yet been transferred to third persons, and thus, Reynaldo can still be compelled to execute a deed of conveyance over his undivided share of the entire property. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Mario and Guillermo and directed Reynaldo to convey the subject property to them. On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified of the death of Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be substituted as party in this case. Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution be reversed on the ground that it was rendered not in accordance with the applicable law and jurisprudence. ISSUE: Whether the contract entered into by parties was a Contract to Sell or an equitable mortgage RULING: CONTRACT TO SELL An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of the
loan obligation.[18] While there is no single test to determine whether the deed of absolute sale on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage, the Civil Code, however, enumerates several instances when a contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit: Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws. A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals the utter frailty of petitioners' position because nothing therein suggests, even remotely, that the subject property was given to secure a monetary obligation.
The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain terms that the instrument was executed with the intention of transferring the ownership or the subject property to the buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is it indicated that the transfer was merely intended to secure a debt obligation. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the property. The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. That the parties intended some other acts or contracts apart from the express terms of the agreement, was not proven by Reynaldo during the trial or by his heirs herein. Beyond their bare and uncorroborated asseverations that the contract failed to express the true intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any evidence indicative that there was an equitable mortgage. Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the price carry the day for the petitioners. It must be underscored at this point that the subject of the Contract to Sell was limited only to 1/4 pro-indiviso share of Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and not the entire 15,001-square Page 49 of 65
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meter parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property, to wit: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and or the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights arc involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him m the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his proindiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of his coowners. This right is absolute and in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the property held m common. In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all fours to the present petition, the Court upheld the right of the co-owner to alienate his proindiviso share in the co-owned property as part of his right of dominion. It was even pointed out that since the previous sale is valid, the subsequent conveyance effected by the co-owner is null and void pursuant to the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," nemo dat quod non habet. In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of his share in a co-owned property. In Arambula v. Nolasco, the Court intimated: The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that or individual owners which are not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co-owned with others. That part, which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co-owners. So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the coowned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, "each party is the sole judge of what is good for him.” Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals were true, i.e., that the entire propc1iy has been sold to thirds persons, such sale could not have affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to recover the property from Reynaldo. In view of the nature of co-ownership, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to Sell, which limited the subject to Reynaldo's ideal share
in the property held in common is perfectly valid and binding. In fact, no authority from the other coowners is necessary for such disposition to be valid as he is afforded by the law fullownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. A condition set forth in a sale contract requiring a co-owner to secure an authority from his co-owners for the alienation of his share, as seemingly indicated in this case, should be considered mere surplusage and docs not, in any way, affect the validity or the enforceability of the contract. Nor should such a condition indicate an intention to sell the whole because the contrary intention has been clearly written: x x x Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang !.ole No. 1, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulatang ito. Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the issue regarding the purchase price. A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the price and the object of the sale. The mere inadequacy of the price docs not affect its validity when both parties arc in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of a defect in consent is present. A contract may consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price. In the case at bar, however, no evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative of vitiated consent is attendant. As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the Heirs of Reynaldo did not even come close to proving that the parties intended to charge the property as security for a debt, leaving us with no other choice but to uphold the stipulations in the contract. Basic is the rule that if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control, we find that the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in modification of its original judgment, that the sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and enforceable. ARTICLE 501 1. G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988 PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship. FACTS:Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an Page 50 of 65
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area of 69,687 square meters. In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died, leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property. on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of P1,000. On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, (P1,000). Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido. In his affidavit, Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property. Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro Olivares, had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. They also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. On November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of their demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, however, the Lopezes did not answer said letter and the Olivares filed a complaint for partition and damages. In their answer, the Lopezes alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had prescribed. The lower court rendered a decision declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale and ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold
portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for partition of the said property has already prescribed RULING: NO - The action for partition has not prescribed.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due execution.13 What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such maximum. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered meaningless. In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the coownership. The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of Page 51 of 65
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the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed. 2. G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988 CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner, vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE, respondents. FACTS: The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan and designated as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos.
The property was registered originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945. On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio executed a document entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman." Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the intestate heirs as follows: a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendaño. b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and Miguel Avendaño. c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño. d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided threefourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. The transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" and both duly notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario Avendaño. Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on 20 September 1975 and a Subdivision Plan was drawn up by the Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating a one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property as belonging to Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234
square meters) of the same property as belonging to petitioner Concepion Roque. Concepcion claimed that preparation of the Subdivision Plan, was a preliminary step leading eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, however, respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership and rejected the plan to divide the land. Thus, Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. Concepcion Roques alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same. In an Answer, respondents impugned the genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground "that the signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic signatures of the supposed signatories ...." It was also alleged that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, "occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of the [defendants]." The trial court ordered the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Emesto and Victor Roque in favor of Concepcion Roque, over the 3/4 portion of the subject property. The Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed both the petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. “While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendants, after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership, asserted that they are the exclusive and sole owners of the 314 portion of the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case has become one of ownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot. It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as such from the moment an alleged coowner asserts an adverse title. The action that may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession” ISSUE:Whether the action for partition has already prescribed - NO RULING:An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be coPage 52 of 65
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owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque-the coowner seeking partition — has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a threefourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. The Court notes in this respect the finding of the trial court that petitioner, following execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November 1961, had been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot ... up to the present, and whereon plaintifrs house and that of her son are erected. " Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other coowners: in other words, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action. The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 — more than sixteen (16) years later — that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-
ownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a three-fourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the coownership. 3. G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013 ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS, vs. LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS. FACTS:Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by OCT RO-630. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
RESPONDENTS are the heirs of PETITIONERS are the heirs of GREGORIA.
ROMANA.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo a case for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the pr operty but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property. In their Answer, herein petitioners claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches. The trial court dismissed the complaint of Leonardo on the ground that his right right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Page 53 of 65
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Code. Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO630 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Gregoria. It also found that the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s successors. However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively. The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141. ISSUE:W/N case should be dismissed on the ground of prescription/laches. NO RATIO:Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co -owners of the subject property.Thus, having succeeded to the
property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing." From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other coowners. Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – before the Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141. Page 54 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the coownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those: 1. Between husband and wife; 2. Between parents and children; 3. Among other ascendants and descendants; and 4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a coowner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the coownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost. In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time. 4. G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005 LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P. BRAVO,[1] ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVOQUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR namely: GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO as their attorney-infact, and HONORABLE FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO, represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C. BRAVO, respondent, and DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., intervenor-respondent. FACTS: Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and Simona Andaya Bravo ("Simona") owned two parcels of land ("Properties") located along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. They have three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero ("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), Roland Bravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo ("Ofelia").
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA") on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to "mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx." Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and Philippines (DBP) respectively.
Development for P10,000
Bank and
of the P5,000,
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage "Deed of Sale") conveying the Properties to "Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo" ("vendees"). However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos.58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortgage loans and the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricio’s name even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of the Properties. Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are coowners of the Properties by succession. Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession and rental income of the Properties. In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene in the case. David Jr. filed a complaint-inintervention impugning the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court allowed the intervention. Trial Court: The trial court upheld Mauricio’s sale of the Properties to the vendees. The trial court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without question about its validity. It DENIED the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties.
Court of Appeals: REVERSED; the Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simona’s consent. The appellate court held that the GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties. ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION HELD:This Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the Properties.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the “Roland A. Bravo” in the Deed of Sale is their father, although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the same clarification before the trial court. As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his Page 55 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) brothers and sisters, in his father’s portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are coowners of the Properties. As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.
OTHER ISSUES: Whether Simona validly appointed Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact to dispose the properties in question – YES
HELD: We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void. In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to "sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx" as well as to "act as my general representative and agent,with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf." Taken together, these provisions constitute a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is called a "general power of attorney," the specific provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the Properties Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price – No
HELD: We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for valuable consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the property taken from the estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the computation of legitimes. Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. In this case, respondents have not proved any of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale. 5. G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, 1982 HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN, namely, RUSTICA, CEFERINA, VICTORINA, REMEDIOS, ELSIE, CIRILA, PURIFICACION, and VIRGINIA, all surnamed JARDIN, and WALDERICO Z. JARDIN, as Heir of Galo Jardin, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HEIRS OF SIXTO HALLASGO, namely, PAZ, CORAZON, NERIO, and ELIODORA, all surnamed HALLASGO, defendants- appellees.
FACTS:This case is about the enforcement in 1973 of a 1920 partition of certain unregistered lands. The following is a summary of the allegations in the complaint filed in 1973 by the heirs of Catalino Jardin and Galo Jardin against the heirs of Sixto Hallasgo in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 4234: The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were survived by their two children named Catalino and Galo and by Sixto Hallasgo, apparently Maura's child by her first husband.
In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a private document the following properties inherited from the Jardin spouses: (1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now Lower Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, with an assessed value of P1,000. Catalino and Galo each received as their share 495 square meters and seven coconut trees. The remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees were allotted to Sixto. (2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Camposanto planted to 7-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P500. An area planted to five gantas was given to Sixto while the remainder was adjudicated to Galo and Catalino. (3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 2-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P200 was assigned to Galo and Catalino. (4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Canajawan planted to fourteen gantas was assigned to Sixto. (5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio Canajawan planted to thirteen gantas with an assessed value of P500 was assigned to Galo and Catalino. (6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon planted to ten gantas was assigned to Galo and Catalino. (7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Mandagisiao planted to five gantas was assigned to Sixto. (8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Calabugon planted to six gantas was divided equally among the three heirs. (9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon, Claveria, Bukidnon, plus one cow, was assigned to Sixto in exchange for a house of strong materials located at the poblacion. Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square meters in the lot at the Poblacion of Jasaan in exchange for Catalino's one-half share of the riceland in Barrio Sagpolon (No.6). Catalino became the owner of 990 square meters of the poblacion lot. Galo became the sole owner of the riceland at Sagpolon. In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to use as a garden an area of 350 square meters which is a part of the 990 square meters owned by them. However, in 1964 Sixto fraudulently and without the knowledge of Catalino's children (Sixto's nephews and nieces) included said portion in the cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot. Page 56 of 65
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Sixto and his children refused to reconvey the said 350-square-meter portion to Catalino's children. Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the children of Catalino and Galo, who both died after the war, Sixto occupied the parcels of land adjudicated to Galo and Catalino in the 1920 deed of partition including the house of strong materials. Sixto used those lands after the death of Galo and Catalino and did not give to their heirs any share of the harvests.
The document of partition itself shows that it was already implemented in 1920. Under that partition, the land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 2-1/2 gantas, the land located at Barrio Canajawan and the land located at Barrio- Sagpolon planted to ten gantas (Nos. 3, 5 and 6) were definitely adjudicated to Galo and Catalino. Sixto could not have usurped those lands for if he did so his brothers Galo and Catalino would have resisted the usurpation. There was no co-ownership as to these lands.
It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of Galo and Catalino came to know of the 1920 deed of partition which was shown to them by Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation in the provincial commander's office at Camp Alagar when they sought to recover the said portion of 350 square meters from the Hallasgos.
That the 1920 partition among the three heirs was implemented is shown in the allegations of the complaint with respect to the poblacion lot. As already stated, Galo and Catalino were each given 495 square meters and seven coconut trees out of the poblacion lot. The remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees were given to Sixto.
On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino came to know that the shares of Galo and Catalino in that partition allegedly had been in the possession of Sixto and his children "for a long time". In spite of earnest efforts, Sixto's heirs refused to settle the case amicably with the heirs of Galo and Catalino.The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973 complaint that Sixto's heirs be ordered to reconvey to them the lands allocated to their parents in the 1920 partition and the portion of 350 square meters in the poblacion lot appropriated by Sixto. The plaintiffs also prayed for damages.
That partition of the poblacion lot shows that the 1920 agreement was actually enforced. There was no co-ownership as to the Poblacion lot. If the 1920 partition was enforced as to the poblacion lot, there would be no reason why it would not have been implemented with respect to the other lands.
Defendants Hallasgo filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court in a minute order dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, citing Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857. The plaintiffs appealed. They contend that their action had not prescribed and that its dismissal had no factual basis. The appellants invoke the rule that the action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe and that a co-owner's possession of the community property is not deemed adverse to the other coowners. They argue that the 1920 handwritten partition signifies that Sixto recognized the existence of the co-ownership. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed (YES – However , the plaintiffs' action for the recovery of the 350-square-meter portion of the Poblacion lot may be maintained) RULING:There are no allegations as to the specific dates when Galo and Catalino died (it was merely alleged that they died "after the war") and when Sixto died; when the heirs of Galo and Catalino became of age; the date when Sixto allegedly usurped the lands allocated to Galo and Catalino; what lands are in the possession of Galo and Catalino's heirs and why they did not sue Sixto during his lifetime to recover what pertained to them.
The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920 partition were the Camposanto corn land planted to 7-1/2 gantas and the Calabugon rice land planted to six gantas (Nos. 2 and 8). But it was not alleged with particularity when Sixto repudiated the co-ownership as to those lands and claimed them as his own. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no coowner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned". It also provides that "no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe, the coownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription. "If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the hereditary or community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have prescribed." (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). Page 57 of 65
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In the instant case, as the partition was made in 1920 and the plaintiffs did not specify when Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-ownership of the lands in Camposanto and Calabugon, the trial court assumed that prescription started to run even before the Civil Code took effect. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Hence, the trial court concluded that the 1973 action was barred by prescription. With respect to the portion of 350 square meters of the poblacion lot, the same is governed by other legal rules. That portion was loaned to Sixto by his nephews and nieces by way of commodatum or precarium (Art. 1947, Civil Code). In grievous violation of the trust, he allegedly included it in the cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot. (Whether he obtained a Torrens title for it is not specified.) The action of Catalino's children for the recovery of that 350-square-meter portion from Sixto's heirs has not yet prescribed. The trial court erred in dismissing that part of plaintiffs' complaint. 6. G.R. No. 149313 January 22, 2008 JULITA ROMBAUA PANGANIBAN, PAQUITO ROMBAUA, RUPERTO ROMBAUA, TERESITA ROMBAUA TELAJE and LEONOR ROMBAUA OPIANA, petitioners, JULITA S. vs. OAMIL, respondent. FACTS: Julita Oamil and Partenio Rombaua entered into an Agreement to Sell over a parcel of land claimed by Oamil to be Partenio’s conjugal share in a parcel of commercial land (the subject property) acquired by Partenio and his deceased first wife Juliana during their marriage. There are two portions of the subject property in contention, the 21st St. portion and the Canda St. Portion. Petitioners and their father Partenio are acknowledged co-owners of the subject property to the following extent: onehalf to Partenio as his conjugal share, and one-sixth each of the remaining half to petitioners and Partenio as the surviving heirs of Juliana. Oamil demanded for the execution of the final deed of sale over the parcel of land which was the subject of a prior Agreement to Sell. Thus, Oamil filed a complaint for specific performance against Rombaua.
RTC: ordered the execution of the deed of absolute sale over the ½ portion (front) of the realty subject matter of this case in favor of the plaintiff and to surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff. Note that the trial court did not specify which portion of the property – the 21st St. portion or the Canda St. portion – should be deeded to respondent as buyer of Partenio’s conjugal share. Partenio failed to appeal, and the decision became final and executory.The City Assessor of Olongapo City caused the transfer of the Tax Declaration covering the 21 st St. portion in respondent’s name.
Petitioners filed a petition for relief from the decision of the lower court on the following grounds: 1) that Partenio’s conjugal share in the pr operty, and that of petitioners as well, are being litigated in a judicial partition proceeding (the partition case) which is pending with the Court of Appeals, hence the trial court may not yet render a decision disposing of a definite area of the subject property in respondent’s favor; and, (2) that petitioners were unjustly deprived of the opportunity to protect and defend their interest in court because they are indispensable parties to the case (being co-owners of the subject property). CA: sustained the trial court’s ruling that Partenio’s conjugal share in the subject property consists of the 21st St. portion, thereby disregarding the prior final and executory decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (partition case) which declares that Partenio is entitled to the Canda St. portion. The appellate court based the award of the 21st St. portion to respondent on the ground that petitioners have always acknowledged their father Partenio’s "acts of ownership" over the 21st St. portion. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1.) WON Partenio can alienate his share over the property prior to its partition. - YES 2.) What are the rights of respondents as buyer of a property owned in common? – THOSE PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 497 3.) WON the respondent has the right to impugn the partition proceedings? – NO 4.) WON the RTC was correct in awarding the 21 st St. in favor of respondent. - NO RULING: 1. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. Before partition in a coownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
2. Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more of the coowners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity Page 58 of 65
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The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (judicial partition case), determines what Partenio, and ultimately, respondent, as his successor-ininterest, is entitled to in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 (Specific Performance case). As Partenio’s successor-in-interest to the property, respondent could not acquire any superior right in the property than what Partenio is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition. In a contract of sale of coowned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. 3. When respondent and Partenio executed the "Agreement to Sell", the former knew that the property she was purchasing was conjugal property owned in common by Partenio and the heirs of his deceased wife. And while Civil Case No. 140-0-93 (the specific performance case) was pending, respondent was apprised of the pendency of Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (the partition case). Yet, respondent did not intervene, nor did she take part, nor enter any formal opposition – as assignee of Partenio’s conjugal share in the property – in said partition proceedings. She did not exercise the rights granted her under Article 497 of the Civil Code. Instead, when the court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 decided to suspend the proceedings and hold the same in abeyance while the appeal in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 remained unresolved, the respondent unconditionally agreed to its temporary abatement. In other words, she chose to sit back and await the resolution thereof. Consequently, when the decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 (judicial partition) became final and executory without the respondent having questioned the same in any manner whatsoever, by appeal or otherwise, the division of property decreed therein may no longer be impugned by her.
4. The trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 could not award the 21st St. portion to Partenio, since the court in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 specifically awarded the Canda St. portion to him. The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which became final and executory, should put an end to the co-ownership between Partenio and the respondents, and the award made to each coowner of specific portions of the property as their share in the co-ownership should be respected. Since the issue of each of the co-owners’ specific portion in the aggregate property has been laid to rest in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, the final and executory decision in said proceeding should be conclusive on the issue of which specific portion of the property became the subject matter of the sale between Partenio and the respondent; that is, that Partenio, as declared owner of the Canda St. portion, could have transferred to respondent only that part of the property and not the 21 st St. portion. Although Partenio was free to sell or transfer his undivided interest to the respondent, the effect of such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
7. G.R. No. 160956 February 13, 2008 JOAQUIN QUIMPO, SR., substituted by Heirs of Joaquin Quimpo, Sr., petitioners, vs. CONSUELO ABAD VDA. DE BELTRAN, IRENEO ABAD, DANILO ABAD, MARITES ABAD, ANITA AND HELEN ABAD, respondents. FACTS:Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia) was the owner of four parcels of land, namely, Parcel I, Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV. Eustaquia died intestate in 1948 leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all surnamed Abad.
Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral partition of parcel III and parcel IV. Half of the properties was given to Joaquin and the other half to the respondents. However, no document of partition was executed, because Joaquin refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their respective shares in the San Jose property, and installed several tenants over their share in parcel IV. Joaquin, on the other hand, became the administrator of the remaining undivided properties and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, who were still minors at that time. Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them, but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to heed respondent s’ demand for partition of parcels I and II, prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with the Regional Trial Court. Joaquin asserted absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from Eustaquia in 1946, evidenced by deeds of sale executed on August 23, 1946 and December 2, 1946. He, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged that Consuelo’s occupation of the portion of the San Jose property was by mere tolerance. During the pendency of the case, Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was substituted by his wife and his children. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, declaring them as co-owners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It rejected Joaquin’s claim of absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, and declared void the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and consent. The court found that at the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income, which shows that the deeds of sale state a false and fictitious consideration. Likewise, Eustaquia could not have possibly given her consent to the sale because she was already 91 years old at that time. The RTC also sustained the oral partition among the heirs in 1966. According to the trial court, the possession and occupation of land by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and Page 59 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 – 501) Joaquin’s acquiescence for 23 years, furni sh sufficient evidence that there was actual partition of the properties.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It also rejected petitioners’ argument that the action was barred by prescription and laches, explaining that prescription does not run against the heirs so long as the heirs, for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. The CA found no repudiation on Joaquin’s part. It, therefore, concluded that respondents’ action could not be barred by prescription or laches. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. WON Joaquin acquired the properties by virtue of a valid sale. – NO 2. WON Respondents are co-owners of the subject properties. – YES 3. WON the partition was valid considering that it was orally made by the parties. – YES 4. WON an action for partition prescribes. - NO RULING: 1. The stated consideration for the sale are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively, an amount which was so difficult to raise in the year 1946. Respondents established that at the time of the purported sale Joaquin Quimpo was not gainfully employed. He was studying in Manila and Eustaquia was the one supporting him; that when Eustaquia died two (2) years later, Joaquin was not able to continue his studies. The Quimpos failed to override this. Except for the incredible and unpersuasive testimony of Joaquin’s daughter, Adelia Magsino, no other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered to prove that Joaquin was duly employed and had the financial capacity to buy the subject properties in 1946.
Likewise, both the trial court and the CA found that Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed. In other words, she was already mentally incapacitated by then, and could no longer be expected to give her consent to the sale. The RTC and CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of Joaquin. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Joaquin Quimpo does not necessarily prove ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The CA, therefore, correctly found this proof inadequate to establish Joaquin’s claim of absolute dominion. 2. Respondents are co-owners of the subject four (4) parcels of land, having inherited the same from a common ancestor – Eustaquia PerfectoAbad. Petitioners’ assertion that respondents failed to prove their relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant consideration. Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo
were Eustaquia’s great grandchildren. As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.
3. For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their portions of the San Jose property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. These unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV. In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, it was held that: Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. v. Andal, it Furthermore, in Hernandez was explained that: On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
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A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in sustaining the oral partition over parcels III and IV and in invalidating the deeds of sale between Eustaquia and Joaquin. 4. Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo were Eustaquia’s great grandchildren. As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any coowner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches. 8. G.R. No. 105608 April 30, 2008 TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD TINGA, MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN MONTEROSO, JR., REYNATO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, ADELITA MONTEROSOBERENGUEL, and HENRIETO MONTEROSO, respondents. x-----------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 113199 April 30, 2008 SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO MONTEROSO, ADELITA MONTEROSOBERENGUEL, and REYNATO MONTEROSO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, respondents. FACTS: Don Fabian had 4 children( namely, Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso) with his first wife, Soledad Doldol. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away.
A year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. They had 4 children, namely, Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr. After the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife. The CFI ordered the partition which covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were acquired: Parcel F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, S1, S2, S3 and S4. The "F" designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during the first marriage, to distinguish them from those acquired during the second marriage which are designated as "S" properties. On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin (son of Don Fabian with his first wife) filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso (son of Don Fabian with his first wife), the complaint involved a portion of Parcel F-4, described in the Project of Partition. They alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with the abovedescribed one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age. Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership, involving 12 parcels of land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4,) against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their representatives. Tirso alleged the following: (1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and (3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso. The defendants contended that Don Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during the second marriage, Page 61 of 65
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while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabian’s exclusive properties having been acquired through a donation from the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of the judicial partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated to Don Fabian as his share in the conjugal partnership of the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half of Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four children of the first marriage; that during his lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso, and Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through a homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase. Sps. Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang raised the defense of acquisitive prescription against Tirso. They averred that the right to ask partition is proper only where co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering that Tirso averred in his complaint that from the time of Don Fabian’s death in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an action for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. They assert that there being no co-ownership over the properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad MonterosoCagampang, Tirso’s cause of action, had already prescribed, either in 1949, i.e ., 10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang’s name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of action accrued in 1948 (death of Don Fabian). Tirso’s complaint was commenced in 1970. ISSUE: 1.WON a partition can be barred by prescription. GR: IMPRESCRITIBLE; EXCEPTION: WHEN THERE IS A REPUDIATION 2. WON Sps. Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang repudiated the existence of co-ownership against Tirso. – YES; WHEN THEY REFUSED UPON DEMAND BY TIRSO FOR PARTITION, SUCH CONSTITUTES A CLEAR REPUDIATION OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP IN WHICH ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION MAY SET IN. 3. WON the action for partition filed by Tirso has prescribed. -NO RULING: Recognition Prescription
of
Co-ownership
in
Acquisitive
The CA correctly ruled that Tirso Monteroso’s principal cause of action is unmistakably one for partition which by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches x x x. The only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an
action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a coowner at which instance the remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership among the heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties forming the decedent’s estate. Partition not Barred by Laches nor by Acquisitive Prescription The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death. Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian’s intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share. Reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned.
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Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, "where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the coowners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." In the instant case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had not timely been made against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the coownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition (in 1961) and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses. However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirso’s cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession of the subject properties. Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties of Second Marriage Tirso’s acknowledgment of Pendejito and her children’s possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the coownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention.
To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian under Sec. 105 of CA 141, which pertinently provides: Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act. It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was subrogated to the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8, 1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for taxation purposes. The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1. Assayed against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the aforequoted Sec. 105 of CA 141, the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1. It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of law for homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be categorized as the paraphernal property of Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the corresponding share of each of Don Fabian’s compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight children. 9. G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011 BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BAYANI SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
S.
was already married. FACTS:Respondent Respondent and petitioner met each other through a common friend and their relationship developed. Petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son. During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, as husband and wife. Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways. Both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate Page 63 of 65
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their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the RTC. Petitioner averred that she and respondent worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to ₱15,500,000.00. Respondent said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a 3.33% share. The CA denied the appeal and a ffirmed RTC’s ruling. ISSUES: 1.WON the determination of the existence of coownership is necessary in the resolution of an action of partition. – YES 2. WON respondent’s assent to the partition agreement is deemed to be an admission the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner. -NO RULING: 1. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia the Court explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a coowner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. 2. As to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, the Court ruled in the negative. An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible. A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
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