C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 1 FAMILY CODE Marriage is a contract only in form, but in essence it is an institution of public order , fo unded on custom and mora lity. It is a contract sui genereis which cannot be compared to any other contract. It is a convention of a social character, based on consent of the parties, which unites a man and a woman in a juridical act for the purposes of procreation and other material and moral ends necessary for the development of personality. FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149 Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a) As enshrined in the Constitution, it is the foundation of the family and the origin of domestic relations of the utmost importance to civilization and social progress; hence, the State is deeply concerned and is a party in its maintenance in purity and integrity. Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution , is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. NCC 220 Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favour the solidarity of the family . Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Promise to marry has no obligatory force; therefore as a rule its breach cannot give rise to liability for damages. Marriage as a contract is different from ordinary contracts: Ordinary Marriage Sex Irrelevant Must be by 1 man and 1 woman Force of law Agreement of parties The law fixes the duties have the force of law and rights of spouses Breach of Contract Gives rise to damages None Termination Terminable upon mutual Non-terminable agreement
NCC 19 - 21; NCC 2176; NCC 1403 2(c) Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry; NC22 Art. 22. Breach of contract. — Any person who has entered into a contract to marry but subsequently refuses without reasonable ground to marry the other party who is willing to perform the same shall pay the latter the expenses incurred
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 2 for the preparation of the marriage and such damages as may be granted by the court.
marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate, oral evidence will suffice as long as it is not objected.
Lupo v. Atienza The FC can be given retroactive effect as long as no vested rights are impaired pursuant to FC 256. In this case where two subsequent marriages were conducted one in 1965 under the NCC the other in 1991 under the FC, the SC ruled that no vested rights would be impaired if FC40(the law requiring a judicial declaration of nullity in order for a subsequent marriage to be conducted) were to be applied. Thus this case states that a judicial declaration of nullity is a requirement for remarriage and this is applicable to all marriages even those celebrated prior to the enactment of the FC.
Go. V. CA A wife is solely liable for the damages caused by a contract she entered individually, since under FC 73 wives can work without the consent of husband .
Bernabe v. Alejo The right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right which the FC cannot impair. Goitia v. Campus-Rueda Under NCC 143 and 149 a husband has the option to either maintain his spouse in his dwelling or provide a fixed pension for her. On the account of his conduct toward his wife (a justifiable cause for one party to leave; in this case the blowjob and the beatings), he may lose the option of maintaining her in his dwelling and be compelled to pay a fixed pension. Sermonia v. CA Prescription period for the filing of a Bigamy case starts at the discovery of the subsequent marriage. Constructive notice does not apply to bigamous marriages since the essence of such marriages is to conceal the first marriage and deceive the first spouse. Perido v. Perido A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place . In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married. People v. Malabago Parricide case, need to establish marital relationship in order to prosecute the crime of parricide . The best proof of marriage is a marriage certificate. To prove a
Trinidad v. CA The absence of a marriage certificate does not mean that the marriage did not take place. Evidence of marriage: 1.) marriage certificate 2.) witness to ceremony 3.) public and open cohabitation 4.) baptismal certificates indicating the marital relationship Vda de Jacob v. CA The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss. The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents. Silverio v. Republic For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears spermatozoa, while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes . Panganiban v. Borromeo A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery , barring the opposition of a spouse is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes , the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for. Selanova v. Mendoza A document liquidating conjugal property with the condition that both spouses withdraw infidelity charges against each other is effectively a ratification of personal separation (licensed infidelity). The law cannot allow this as it goes against the constitutional sanctity of the family policy.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 2 for the preparation of the marriage and such damages as may be granted by the court.
marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate, oral evidence will suffice as long as it is not objected.
Lupo v. Atienza The FC can be given retroactive effect as long as no vested rights are impaired pursuant to FC 256. In this case where two subsequent marriages were conducted one in 1965 under the NCC the other in 1991 under the FC, the SC ruled that no vested rights would be impaired if FC40(the law requiring a judicial declaration of nullity in order for a subsequent marriage to be conducted) were to be applied. Thus this case states that a judicial declaration of nullity is a requirement for remarriage and this is applicable to all marriages even those celebrated prior to the enactment of the FC.
Go. V. CA A wife is solely liable for the damages caused by a contract she entered individually, since under FC 73 wives can work without the consent of husband .
Bernabe v. Alejo The right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right which the FC cannot impair. Goitia v. Campus-Rueda Under NCC 143 and 149 a husband has the option to either maintain his spouse in his dwelling or provide a fixed pension for her. On the account of his conduct toward his wife (a justifiable cause for one party to leave; in this case the blowjob and the beatings), he may lose the option of maintaining her in his dwelling and be compelled to pay a fixed pension. Sermonia v. CA Prescription period for the filing of a Bigamy case starts at the discovery of the subsequent marriage. Constructive notice does not apply to bigamous marriages since the essence of such marriages is to conceal the first marriage and deceive the first spouse. Perido v. Perido A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place . In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married. People v. Malabago Parricide case, need to establish marital relationship in order to prosecute the crime of parricide . The best proof of marriage is a marriage certificate. To prove a
Trinidad v. CA The absence of a marriage certificate does not mean that the marriage did not take place. Evidence of marriage: 1.) marriage certificate 2.) witness to ceremony 3.) public and open cohabitation 4.) baptismal certificates indicating the marital relationship Vda de Jacob v. CA The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss. The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents. Silverio v. Republic For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears spermatozoa, while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes . Panganiban v. Borromeo A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery , barring the opposition of a spouse is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes , the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for. Selanova v. Mendoza A document liquidating conjugal property with the condition that both spouses withdraw infidelity charges against each other is effectively a ratification of personal separation (licensed infidelity). The law cannot allow this as it goes against the constitutional sanctity of the family policy.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 3 In Re: Santiago Notarized document to marry again, removing right of action is not judicially recognized and contrary to law.
Married like thrice without a declaration of nullity . Claimed that he married again to save friend from her administrative case. Regardless of intention, a marriage is still a marriage if all requisites and present.
De Leon v. CA The issue in this case is whether or not a letter pardoning one spouse is valid. In this case it wasn’t since the consent of de Leon was vitiated as the girl thr eatened to file cases against the guy, scandalizing their entire family.
Mallion v. Alcantara Sought annulment on the grounds of psych incapacity, the case was dismissed. Filed again for annulment on the grounds of lack of marriage license. The court said that since both cases involved the same issue and the same remedy its Res Judicata. (note: ma’am says this decision is wrong, Mo rigo is correct with respect to this issue).
Domalagan v. Bolifer A verbal agreement to marry is still valid, putting it in written form however allows it to be proved in court. Although in the absence of writing, oral evidence is admissible and is enough to prove an agreement as long as there are no objections to it.
FC 2 (1): No marriage shall be valid, unless the essential requisites are present: (1) Legal Capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
Cabague v. Auxilio The verbal agreement to marry must be proven by the proper party : the person involved in the agreement (one of the people getting married). Hermosisima v. CA Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or property advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved though, in this case the dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been present says the SC. Wassmer v. Velez Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong . However, in pursuance to article 21 of the NCC, damages can be claimed if preparations for the marriage have been made. In this case the aggrieved party already printed out obligations, bought dresses and the marital bed. Tanjanco v. CA Promise to marry case. Seduction is more than a promise to marry for sex, it involves deceit, enticement, abuse of confidence in order to get laid. Since the parties have been having sex regularly for 2 years, seduction cannot apply since the regularity of the act shows voluntariness and mutual passion . Thus girl cannot recover for damages. Vda de Mijares v. Villaluz
*LEGAL CAPACITY- minimum age (18), should have no existing impediments between the parties- no existing relationship or subsisting prior marriage. FC 148: Cases of cohabitation (not mentioned in 147, meaning parties may have no capacity to marry each other or are suffering under some legal impediment to marry each other): properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, IN PROPORTION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS. When there is no proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed equal.
IF one of the parties is VALIDLY MARRIED TO ANOTHER, his or her share of in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Party who acted in BAD FAITH, not validly married to another, his or her share of shall be forfeited.* *if the unmarried partner knows that his/her spouse is validly married to another, that bad faith will cause forfeiture of his or her share to the common children or descendants. Silverio V. Republic On change of name : Change of name is a privilege and not a right under Art 376 of NCC. New rule is RA 9048, where change of name is allowed on the following grounds: 1. Name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult write or pronounce, 2. New first name has been habitually and continuously used and he is publicly known by that name, 3. The change will avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of name on the ground of sex reassignment. Instead of avoiding
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 4 confusion, changing petitioner’s name may create grave complications in the civil registry and public interest. On change of sex: RA 9048 allows for correction re sex on the ground of clerical or typographical error. Change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error but a substantial one. Provisions cited were for correction instead of change of entry. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. The sex of a person is determined at birth. Since there is no special law recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex at birth, if without error, is immutable. On marriage: Marriage as a sacred institution is a special contract of permanent union between a MALE and a FEMALE- one of the essential requisites of marriage. TO GRANT THE CHANGES SOUGHT BY THE PETITIONER WILL SUBSTANTIALLY RECONFIGURE AND GREATLY ALTER LAWS ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONS- marriage is between two men, one just went under sex reassignment.
FC 5: Any male or female of the age of EIGHTEEN years or upwards not under any impediment may contract marriage. Under 18- marriage is void 18 to 21 without parental consent- marriage is voidable.
RA 6809- Act lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18. FC 21: When both are citizens of foreign countries, it is necessary for them to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials in order to obtain a marriage license. Stateless persons or refugees shall submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing capacity to contract marriage. Garcia V. Recio Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. Counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. Petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
There are two kinds of divorce: one terminates marriage, second suspends marriage and leaves the bond in full force. No showing in the case which type of divorce was procured. The Australian divorce decree presented contained a restriction that disallows the party to remarry- ground of bigamy. Legal capacity of a person to contract marriage is determined by the national law of party concerned. Rederick did not present any evidence to show his legal capacity to marry. But SC cannot declare nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy since there is no proof that on Rederick’s capacity to marry.
Te V. Choa Outcome of annulment case had no bearing on the determination of Arthur’s innocence or guilt in bigamy case. Ground for annulment cited by petitioner was for voidable marriage. Therefore, at the time he committed the crime of bigamy, marriage was still valid and subsisting. FC 14: In case either or both of contracting parties have not been emancipated by a previous marriage, between the ages of 18 and 21, an additional requirement of consent manifested in writing by the parents or guardian having legal charge of them shall be exhibited before the local civil registrar. FC 45: A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of marriage: (1) Party was below 18, without the consent of parents, guardians, or person having substitute parental authority over the party, unless after attaining the age of 21, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife. (2) Either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. (3) Consent of either party was through fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife, (4) That the consent of party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. (5) Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such capacity continues and appears to be incurable. (6) Either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 5 Anaya V. Palaroan The requirements for fraud to be a vice of consent in marriage are enumerated in NCC Art 85 (4). Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment , it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article: “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity” shall give ground to annul a marriage. Villanueva V. CA Force and intimidation is no moment since he was a security guard. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her. FC 35: The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other. Jimenez V. Canizares Impotence of wife cannot be satisfactorily determined from the statement of husband. Filipinas are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled by authority. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. Republic V. CA The duty of the civil registrar is to keep record of all applications for marriages. Thus, its certification is valuable. Their marriage was “secret”, thus there is failure to offer other witnesses to corroborate her testimony. Also, Edwin failed to answer and was declared in default. Cosca V. Palaypayon Illegal Solemnization of marriage: He solemnized marriage without the requisite of marriage license. He did not sign their marriage contracts. Sy V. CA Filipina did not expressly state in her petition the incongruity between the date of issuance of marriage license and date of marriage ceremony. License was issued a year after marriage ceremony. Thus, marriage was contracted without marriage license. Thus under Art 80 of NCC, marriage is void. Alcantara V. Alcantara
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity. - marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties
FC9: A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. (Exception is Chapter 2 of FC) FC10: Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Philippines. FC 11: Each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for a marriage license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following: 1. Full name of the contracting party 2. Place of birth 3. Age and date of birth 4. Civil status 5. If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled 6. Present residence and citizenship 7. Degree of relationship of the contracting parties 8. Full name, residence and citizenship of the father 9. Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother 10. Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge The applicants, their parents and guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the license. Obtaining a Marriage license - Issued by local civil registrar (FC 9)
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Each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application (FC 11) If with parents, not required to present residence certificate (FC 12) Required to present original birth certificate, or in default thereof, baptismal certificate (FC 12) Loss or destruction of such – sworn affidavit o No need if parents of contracting party in need of such are o present and would attest to the capacity and a ge of the party If previously married, applicant required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce. Without the death certificate - affidavit (FC 13) Party between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, shall also exhibit the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having l egal charge of them. Such consent shall be manifested in writing and shall be attached to said applications. (FC 14) Party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. No advice, or if it be unfavorable - marriage license shall not be issued till after three months (FC 15) In cases where parental advice is needed, a certificate of marriage counseling is must be attached. Failure to do so will result to suspension of issuance of license for 3 months (FC 16) Notice posted by local civil register for 10 consecutive days in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. (FC 17) In case of any impediment, civil registrar shall note it down in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court (FC 18) License is valid in any part of the Philippines for 120 days from date of issuance (FC 20) License is free of charge for indigent parties or those who have no visible means of income or those of insufficient income (attested to in an affidavit) (FC 19) Filed at the registry books by the local civil registrar [with name and date] (FC 25) o To avoid fixing marriage dates/license dates When either or both are citizens of a foreign country, before a marriage license can be obtained - submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit. (FC 21)
NCC Art. 84 No marriage license shall be issued to a w idow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband , unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. Sevilla vs Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429 Marriage is valid even if marriage license cannot be presented but was probably issued, especially if the reason why it cannot be found by the civil registrar is loaded work. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-existence of license . Not even a “Certification of Diligent Search and Inability to Find” issued by the c ivil registrar will serve as proof of non-existence of license. Presumption is towards validity of marriage. cf. DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991) DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991) P.D. 965 – The need for marriage counseling FC 27-34, cf. NCC 76, P.D. 1083: Exceptions to the For mal Requisites Marriage may be solemnized without a marriage license when: - Either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of deat h. Marriage shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (FC 27)
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If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar. (FC 28) Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (FC 33) marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. (FC 34 cf. NCC 76)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 7 FC 29. In the cases provided for in Art 27 and 28, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. FC 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. Marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by:
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a ship captain or by an airplane pilot between passengers or crew members, not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (FC 31) A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (FC 32)
Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 Judge Sanchez was found guilty of ignorance of law for solemnizing a marriage wherein both parties are still legally married. Affidavits of the parties stating that they are separated are not enough and cannot be accepted as just reason to remarry. Subsisting marriage is a legal impediment and legal separation does not sever the marriage bonds. De Castro vs. De Castro, G.R. 160172, February 13, 2008 validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked even in an action for support . Such will determine the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the child. WHO MAY SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE FC 7:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction ;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31: A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, bu t also during stopovers at ports of call (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32: A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10 : Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consulgeneral, consul or vice-consul of the Philippines.
NCC 56, 74, 75: Basically the same with the provisions of the FC re: solemnizing officer Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; (2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals; (3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance; (4) Mayors of cities and municipalities; (5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace; (6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and (7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and viceconsuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 8 Art. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a voyage, or by the commanding officer of a military unit, in the absence of a chaplain, during war. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be complied with by the ship captain, airplane chief or commanding officer. (n) Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. (n) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007 Guidelines On The Solemnization Of Marriage By The Members Of The Judiciary The solemnizing officer shall be duty-bound to do the following before performing a marriage ceremony - ensure that that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to the marriage - personally interview the contracting parties - personally examine the documents submitted to ascertain if there is compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the Family Code, as well as the presented marriage license to determine its authenticity, completeness, and validity. There shall not be less than two individuals of legal age to witness the marriage when the parties take each other as husband and wife. In cases when either or both of the contracting parties is a foreigner, the solemnizing officer must also examine the certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by the concerned diplomatic or consular officials attached to the marriage license. The legal fees for solemnization of marriage and issuance of marriage certificate by justices or judges are in the amount of Php300, regardless of who will be the solemnizing officer. These must be paid in Philippine currency and must be properly receipted. A demand for excess amounts shall subject the solemnizing office to administrative disciplinary measures. Aranes vs Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 - Marriage solemnized without a marriage license and outside of jurisdiction (party’s house) is VOID. Judges can only solemnize marriages within their jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside a judge’s chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in
remote places (c) request of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC).
Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996 - Presumption of spouse’s death made without summary proceeding is void. Marriage ceremony that followed is likewise VOID. Also outside judge’s jurisdiction. FC 7 – solemnizing officers – member of judiciary, priests, captain of ship, military commander, consul general. Villar vs Paraiso Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the power to solemnize marriages RPC 352 – performance of illegal marriage ceremony Tenchavez vs Escano The solemnizing officer is a chaplain who was not an authorized person to conduct such ceremony but the marriage is still valid since it was done in good faith. A foreign divorce is not binding . FC 3 (30) -personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife. Martinez vs Tan Marriage is valid since Martinez’ signature appears in their marriage license. The most important part of the license is the declaration of the husband and the wife . FC 8 – marriage ceremony must be in a public place except if it is not possible. There must be a sworn statement. Place of ceremony no particular requirement, as long as it is done publicly . After that marriage certificate is issued. The date and precise time of the marriage should be present. WON a settlement was decided upon is also mentioned in the marriage certificate.
Madridejo vs De Leon Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage contract solemnized in articulo mortis does not invalidate the marriage
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 9 People vs Borromeo Husband kills wife and claims that their marriage was void. Failure to send the NSO with the marriage contract does not invalidate a marriage . NCC 15 – Laws of the RP shall apply to its citizens: Territoriality NCC 17 – contracts shall be governed by the laws of the country where they are executed. FC 26 – marriages solemnized outside the country shall be valid if they are valid there. IF foreigner divorces Pinoy, Pinoy shall be allowed to remarry. Yao Kee vs Sy-Gonzales Aside from failure to show the documents of marriage, Chinese customs on marriage were not proven by Yao Kee. Republic vs Orbecido Orbecido’s wife became naturalized in the US an obtained a divorce decree then remarried. Orbecido is then also allowed to remarry. Art. 36 – PI at the time of marriage even if it manifests only during the marriage. Void. Art. 37 – incestuous and void FC 147 – if two people are living together but they are capacitated to marry, wages and salaries shall be shared between them equally. Lesaca vs Lesaca Baldomero sold properties before the second marriage but bought it again after the said marriage. There was no proof that the money spent was from the CPG. Yaptinchay vs Torres Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the legal marriage . Eugenio Sr vs Velez Dead body of Vitaliana does not belong to the live-in partner .
FC 39 – action for declaration of nullity shall not prescribe FC40 – absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage to declare previous marriage void Mercado vs Tan Mercado contracted a second marriage even before his first valid marriage was annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity. He was guilty of bigamy. Ty vs CA Reyes’ first marriage was void ab initio due to lack of license so he married Ty. NCC does not specify that a person must go to court to declare the marriage void ab initio. Morigo vs People Morigo is not guilty of bigamy even if he did not get a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. First marriage was void ab initio due to lack of ceremony and solemnizing officer so it does not bear any legal effect. Tenebro vs CA Tenebro was guilty of bigamy as he contracted a second marriage while the first marriage was subsisting. Obtaining an annulment of the second marriage does not absolve him from the crime . FC 41 – prior spouse absent for 4 years or in case of danger of death, 2 years. Subsequent marriage okay but must institute summary proceeding. Well founded belief FC 42 – subsequent marriage above shall be automatically terminated with bulaga spouse affidavit to prove reappearance and dissolution of subsequent marriage. FC 43 – effect of bulaga spouse: children legit; ACP or CPG dissolved except if one is in bad faith, his share is forfeited; donations shall remain valid except if done in bad faith, innocent spouse may revoke the designation of bad faith spouse as beneficiary in insurance; bad faith spouse cannot inherit. FC 44 – if both are in bad faith – void ab initio FC 45 – causes of annulment Republic vs Nolasco Nolasco cannot declare that his English wife was presumptively dead as he did not diligently look for her in Liverpool . Bienvenido vs CA
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 10 First marriage was subsisting since first wife was not absent for 7 years or dead . Furthermore, it was Bienvenido who abandoned his wife so he cannot claim presumptive death .
Armas vs Calisterio Second marriage was not bigamous since the first husband of Marietta was already gone for 11 years. Governing law was the NCC which only required 4 years of absence for presumptive death . Nonetheless, FC only requires 7 years.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration , was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Republic vs Bermudez-Lorino Gloria abandoned husband who was a violent alcoholic. They were separated for 9 years. The trial court’s ruling that the husband was presumptively dead is final .
FC39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).
Republic vs CA Apolinaria filed for presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc after being absent for 9 years. Such declaration is under a summary proceeding.
FC68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support . (109a)
Manuel vs People Manuel was guilty of bigamy since he did not get a declaration of presumptive death of his first wife who BTW was only in prison.
FC69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Republic vs CA Alegro did not diligently search for his missing wife . He only reported to the NBI that his wife was missing after the OSG’s appeal to the declaration. Elements of bigamy – legally married, first marriage has not been dissolved, contracts a second marriage, and it would have been valid.
Vitug – except for a void marriage due to PI , declaration of nullity of previous marriage may be a defense against bigamy . Void marriages are inexistent from the beginning and no judicial decree is required to establish nullity. voidable marriage is not a defense . If due to PI , it must be judicially declared
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY FC44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) FC36.
FC70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family . The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) FC71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a) FC72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief . (116a)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 11 FC73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other . The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds . In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper; and (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a) Lim v. CA alleged schizophrenic wife’s psychiatrist’s testimony admissible in court, not a breach in patient-physician relationshi p; during trial, use hypothetical questions Salita v. Magtolis Bill of Particulars stating wife’ inability to understand the demands of husband’s profession (doctor) is enough ultimate cause thus there is a cause of action Krohn v. CA husband may use wife’s confidential report/ medical record to show psychological incapacity Santos V. CA psychological incapacity must refer to mental (not physical) incapacity to comprehend basic mental covenants characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability, existing at the time of the marriage
wif e’s lack of attention to children ; lack of intention to procreative sexuality; and immaturity not psychological incapacity
RP v. Quintero-Hamano Japanese husband’s abandonment not psychological incapacity Dedel v. CA wife’s infidelity which (didn’t exist prior the marriage); her abandonment; that she had sexual affairs with several men not psychological incapacity Antonio v. Reyes SC granted! - pathological liar
psychological incapacity
Ferraris v. Ferraris epilepsy and mixed personality not psychological incapacity Mallion v. Alcantara st nd 1 petition invoking FC36 was denied; 2 petition’s ground-lack of marriage contract denied because of res judicata Paras v. Paras unfitness of a lawyer to practice profession is not equal to unfitness as a husband Republic v. CA = Republic v. Olaviano Molina Hernandez v. CA alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment not psychological incapacity
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA SC granted!
Marcos v. Marcos failure to give support, physical abuse, abandonment not psychological incapacity so need to undergo psychological exam
Republic v. Olaviano Molina immaturity, irresponsibility and quarrelsomeness not psychological incapacity
Republic v. Dagdag alcoholism, abusiveness, abandonment not psychological incapacity
Republic v. Dagdag alcoholism, abusiveness, abandonment
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin Remanded because the State should (annulment/declaration of nullity) FC48
not psychological incapacity
Choa v. Choa Pesca v. Pesca
participate
in
the
proceedings
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 12 Guidelines set in Molina/Santos mandatory; irresponsibility not psychological incapacity
emotional immaturity and
Barcelona v. CA Root cause of psychological disorders is still unknown, so the new rules in SC only requires petition to allege physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Siayngco v. Siayngco Inability to conceive and domineering attitude not psychological incapacity. Republic v. Iyoy Hot-tempered and extravagant wife left husband then married an American not psychological incapacity Yu vs. Yu procedural: a series of motions, habeas corpus and custody petitions -SC has not yet ruled whether either/both spouses are psychologically incapacitated.
Laurena vs. CA Homosexuality, infidelity, insensitivity not psychological incapacity Te vs. Te – SC granted! Husband - psychologically incapacitated - has personality disorder and unready to commit. Wife - psychologically incapacitated - has antisocial personality disorder, aggressive and rebellious. Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio Mama’s boy not psychological incapacity FC – 37 Marriages between ascendants / descendants of any degree , brothers / sisters full or half blood are void Notes from class: Can marry someone along COLLATERAL line minimum fourth degree NCC - 963-967 - rules on constructing a family tree
Catalan v. CA -doesn’t talk about FC 36 Zamora v. CA No medical examination is needed to prove psychological incapacity; but the allegation must be substantiated. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose Being jobless, a drug-user, and having anti-social personality not psychological incapacity. Navarro v. Navarro Person who had depression/escapism; Person who is always jealous not psychologically incapacitated Paras v. Paras (abandonment, womanizing) unfitness of a lawyer to practice profession is not equal to unfitness as a husband Almelor vs. RTC Homosexuality (which was not proven that it was concealed before the marriage not psychological incapacity.
FC - 38 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82) RPC - 246 - Parricide - killing of family members and ascendants / descendants NCC - 80 (7) - Void mariage if between step brothers / sisters
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 13 NCC - 82 - Relations that are by "step-father/mother etc" and through adoption likewise can't marry each other FC - 52-53 - (see below) *Presumptive legitime is defined as what the children will get if parents die today AM No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003 (Sec 2) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file for a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages . Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the state Enrico vs Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli Dispute over land causing heirs/children go to court claiming that the marriage was null and void for lack of marriage license, SC applies the current rule of AM 02-1110-SC (2003) - which says that petition for nullity may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, and that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and solely belongs to them What the heirs should've done is file for a declaration of nullity VIA a "proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse" FC - 39; FC - 36 (2) in relation to FC - 255 Art. 39. Action for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. Art 36 - Psych incapacity - makes marriage void Art. 255. - Other provisions of FC remain valid even if a certain provision is held invalid FC - 42 (2) - A recording of the reappearance ("bulaga") of the spouse in the civil registry terminates the marriage. FC – 237 - Annulment or declaration of nullity of a marriage of minors revives parental authority over the minor
Petitioner files for dissolution of conjugal partnership, and then respondent files for nullity on grounds of psych incapacity. TC grants nullity coz of PI. Later on respondent marries again, petitioner files for against the decision on grounds of PI but is denied. SC: Grants the petition stating the declaration of nullity was w/o a state appointed attorney to prevent collusion hence, the case is remanded.
NCC - 2035 Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid : (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) See: AM 02-11-10, Mar 4, 2003 Jocson vs Robles Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and respondent supports the claim that he was only forced into the marriage through a joint affidavit executed by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied on grounds that judgment rendering a marriage annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment (confession here being that the respondent himself admitted to being forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101 prohibit this. Tolentino vs Villanueva Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even if the sermons were not served to the respondent . SC: denied because in accordance with NCC 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant , court shall order a prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists , and if not, the attorney shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not fabricated and no collusion is in place.
FC - 48 - Court shall order prosecuting attorney to appear on behalf of the State to prevent collusion in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
Salcedo - Ortanez vs CA Respondent files for annulment for lack of marriage license and/or psych incapacity and provides 3 taped telephone conversations of the petitioner as evidence. Petitioner challenges the use of tapes as evidence but is dismissed by the CA. SC: the tapes are obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping law , CA decision is set aside.
Ancheta vs Ancheta
Malcampo Sin vs Sin
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 14 Petitioner files for declaration of nullity due to psych incapacity, and is dismissed. SC: even if the petition is dismissed, process should be correct - the state did not participate through an appointed fiscal to prevent collusion hence the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial.
Pesca vs Pesca Petitioner files for nullity through psych incapacity. Denied. SC: Petitioner, based on the standards set in Santos and Molina, has failed to make a case out of psych incapacity. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated to psych incapacity. Marcos vs Marcos Petitioner files for psych incapacity which is given by the RTC, but CA reverses on grounds that a psychological evaluation is needed. SC: Psych evaluations are not needed to settle psych incapacity but regardless there is no showing that the respondent's defects were present at the inception of the marriage no is it incurable. The illness can only be traced for a certain period and not during the celebration of marriage. Petition denied. FC - 50-54 Effects of setting aside of defective marriages : 1. Liquidation, partition, distribution of the properties of spouses 2. Properties donated by the innocent spouse into the marriage shall be revoked and return to the same innocent spouse for his distribution 3. Children conceived or born before judgment are legitimate. Court shall provide judgment for custody and support. Presumptive legitime is acquired. Under NCC legitime is one half of the parent's properties. Value of property shall be deducted from the inheritance and when actual legitime is determined in the future. 4. Innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary to former's life insurance policy 5. Guilty spouse disqualified from inheriting 6. Conjugal dwelling and it's lot goes to the spouse with whom the common children choose to remain , unless parties agree otherwise 7. If both spouses acted in bad faith , all donations by reason of marriage are revoked 8. The judgment affecting property and its delivery shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry 9. After all the foregoing, ex spouses are free to marry again , otherwise subsequent marriage shall be null and void FC - 147-148
147 - Man and woman w/ capacity to marry and live together w/o marriage or under a void marriage - assume equal shares and each one cannot dispose of the properties commonly owned by him unless union is terminated. In a void marriage, the one in bad faith forfeits his share of property in favour of the common children. If absent children, goes to descendants, if absent descendants, innocent party. 148 - Cohabitation not in above (legal impediment to marriage) - properties acquired by both through joint money - shall be owned in common proportion to respective contribution. Absent proof, presume equal . If one of the parties is married to another, his share shall accrue to the ACP / CPG of valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married, follow rule in last part of 147.
FC - 40 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) Though ma'am sides with Vitug saying that if void, no need for final judgment (ie "do I need to go to court to declare my marriage to my sister void? No – she goes on to say that Vitug’s stand is that you only need judicial declaration for annulments falling under FC – 36 and 53… BUT after everything, she ends the discussion by mentioning that Vitug says for practical reasons just go get that judicial declaration of nullity before getting married regardless of the reason. LABO. Haha
Bobis vs Bobis (Legarda: wrong case – rushed to the supreme court before lower court decides on the nullity) Respondent contracts a second marriage w/o declaration of void of the first case. Respondent files for declaration of nullity of second marriage and while ongoing information for bigamy was filed against him. Respondent then files a motion to suspend the proceedings of bigamy because of the pending nullity case makes it a prejudicial question. TC Grants. SC: FC - 40 - effective during the 2nd marriage requires a judicial declaration before a party can remarry , it doesn't erase the fact that he did marry for a second time. Declaration of nullity won't affect the bigamy case. Mercado vs Tan Mercado marries Tan, declaring that he is single even if he was still married. Tan files for bigamy. Petitioner files for declaration of nullity for his first marriage. CA
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 15 says he is guilty of bigamy. SC: Petitioner contracts 2nd marriage w/o judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Given that bigamy is already consummated, its immaterial that he is now filing for a declaration of nullity. FC 36 is not a defense to bigamy. VITUG: FC40 applies to VOIDABLE marriages and FC36 and 53.
Te vs CA Petitioner has 2 marriages. He files an action for annulment of first marriage claiming that he was forced to marry and that the wife is psych incapacitated. One month later, information for bigamy was charged. Petitioner questions the declaration of nullity as prejudicial to the case of bigamy. SC: The outcome of the civil case has no bearing on bigamy. Bigamy simply requires a second marriage to be contracted while a prior one is subsisting. Carino v. Carino SC: absent a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void, it remains valid nd (pursuant to Art. 140 of the FC) and 2 marriage is bigamous. Resp. gets nothing except what she can prove as her property via individual income by Art.148 of FC. Morigo v. Morigo He was acquitted via the retroactive application of his declaration of nullity w/c rendered his first marriage void ab initio. Lacking one element of the crime of bigamy (the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead) he was rightfully acquitted. (addt’l principle: voidable marriages, not defense for bigamy) Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 . Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated , but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Compare w/: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other , until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favour of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Art. 148.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 16 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article , only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal . The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Valdes v. QC-RTC Art. 147 applies. Contrary to petitioners belief, Par. 1 of art 50 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under Art. 40 where a spouse contracts a subsequent marriage before having a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage (not the case here). Thus in a void marriage regardless of cause (if not by Art.40) the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147. (In the instant case applying as the liquidation of co-ownership b/w common law spouses, via a declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity)
in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 17 To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a)
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a) Sec. 21 Admin Matter 02-11-10-SC: Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. –Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). Cf. Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Weigel v. Sempio-Dy nd The 2 marriage b/w pet. And resp. is void because of lack of judicial decree st declaring resp. previous marriage void. The 1 marriage acquired through forced consent (defect of an essential requisite to marry) made it voidable pending a judicial decree. w/o such a decree it remained valid and subsisting at the time of nd the 2 marriage as such rendering the latter marriage void. ( The Weigel Doctrine is manifested in the FC as Article 40, requiring a judicial decree for voidable marriages to be considered void) * According to J, Vitug Art. 36 (psychological incapacity) is akin to the application of voidable marriages since it requires judicial notice. Terre v. Terre Judicial declaration of dissolution of previous marriage is essential for acquiring a subsequent marriage. Absent in this case Atty. Terre is guilty of bigamy as his previous marriage to Dorothy was subsisting @ the time of his subsequent marriage. (Doctrine: judicial declaration of void marriages is essential for purposes of remarriage, w/o w/c previous marriage subsists) Art. 4(1) The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one , or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; Republic Act No. 6809 AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 18 Cf. Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity ; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane , at any time before the death of either party , or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity; Lim v. CA Not a breach of confidentiality. In the case at bar, the doctor was brought in as a medical expert, and not as the attending physician of the petitioner. Based on the pleadings from the lower courts and petitioner’s failure to prove otherwise (that the physician blackened the reputation of the petitioner), it shows that Dr. Acampado was there simply as an expert of psychiatry. Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease , regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a) Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud; Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. (1269) Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts , when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n) Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n) Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud , unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 19 Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n) Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error. (n) Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties. Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270) Buccat v. Buccat Fraud marriage valid, since the girl was six months pregnant during the marriage ceremony and thus would be visibly pregnant. Plaintiffs negligence is inexcusable for he was a first year law student at the time. Aquino v. Delizo Fraud proven and was valid grounds for annulment (fraud by concealment of th pregnancy). * even at 7 month, one can still conceal pregnancy Anaya v. Palaroan Facts: Plaintiff claims fraud as grounds for annulment since Fernando (defendant) did not divulge his premarital relationship with a relative. Held: Fraud regarding matters of chastity not valid grounds for annulment by fraud. (Art 46 is an exclusive enumeration excluding other misrepresentations or deceits as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity as being insufficient grounds for annulment by fraud).
However in this case homosexuality before and at the time of the celebration of the marriage was not proven and thus the petition for annulment is denied.
Jimenez vs Republic of the Philippines (Canizares) Aug 31, 1960 Jimenez averred that wife was physically incapacitated to consummate marriage (currently under FC45(5)). Wife did not show up to court and did not subject herself to medical examination. Annulment was not granted because the fact that Canizares was impotent was not proven in court. Medical examination ordered. Barcelona vs Court of Appeals Sept 24, 203 Barcelona's appeal to dismiss her husband's petition for annulment of marriage due to psych incapacity was denied by CA, hence this petition. She states that the action fails to state a cause of action because it does not allege the root cause of psychological incapacity. Dismissed because according to the revised rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, expert opinion need not be alleged and only expert opinion can allege root cause. Physical manifestations of incapacity may be alleged and will be sufficient for a cause of action. Tuason vs Court of Appeals April 10, 1996 Husband contests the decision of lower court annulling his marriage with wife due to psychological incapacity because he said he was not given due process and that because he was in default, state prosecutor must have stepped in to ensure that no collusion occurred. Dismissed, petitioner had his day in court, he actively participated through counsel. Also, he was not in default as he was able to pose answers to private respondent's allegations. Lukban vs Republic February 29, 1956 Petitioner asks to have husband presumptively declared dead as she wishes to remarry. Dismissed, there is no law that allows it and is not a requirement for remarriage. Take note of date.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo Facts: Atty. Macarrubo married thrice and thrice had reasons for a void marriage: st nd rd 1 marriage: psychological incapacity, 2 marriage: consent by fraud, 3 marriage: for lack of a marriage license (pending) Held: Disbarred for lack of good moral character.
Gue vs Republic March 24, 1960 Same as Lukban vs Republic, in fact cites a significant portion of it in decision. Again, take note of date.
Almelor v. RTC Las Pinas Homosexuality in itself is not grounds for annulment, but consent vitiated by fraud as manifested in a concealment of homosexuality is sufficient grounds.
SSS vs. Jarque vda. De Bailon March 24, 2006 Jarque was awarded death benefits by the court for the death of her husband. She nd rd was 2 (maybe 3 not clarified) wife married under NCC. SSS found her marriage to be void as first wife was found to be physically alive. Court declared that since she was married under the NCC, what was needed was a judicial declaration of nullity
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 20 of marriage (NCC87), and not mere filing of affidavit as contemplated by FC. But since husband was already dead, marriage was already terminated and annulment proceedings could not be possible . Death benefits were rightly awarded to Jarque FC Article 26 All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. General rule: Tenchavez vs Escano Foreign divorce of Filipinos is not recognized here. Benedicto Vs Dela Rama As per the civil as well as the canonical law in force here on August 13, 1898, divorce was granted in this case. That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of sovereignty. Divorce in 1903 is only legal separation. The parties can still not remarry. Only adultery or concubinage is the ground for divorce .
Arca Vs Javier The divorce was invalid. The Court held that the court in Mobile County in Alabama did not have jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines . He was just a member of the navy and merely rented a room in the US just to avail of divorce . Van Dorn Vs Romillo The divorce decree is recognized in the Philippines . Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. Pilapil Vs Somera A divorce was granted in Germany. After five months, Geiling filed for two complaints of adultery against Pilapil. Under the same considerations and rationale,
Geiling, being no longer the husband of Pilapil, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Quita Vs Ca The Court held that it was not established whether or not Quita has already obtained American citizenship when the divorce decree was granted. Therefore, if it was indeed proven that she had already acquired citizenship, she is no longer eligible for being the heir of Arturo. Llorente Vs Ca The divorce was valid since Lorenzo was already an American citizen long before he filed for divorce and remarried. Thus, foreign law is binding upon him. The will is also binding as Article 17 states that a contract is bound by the law of the country where it was executed. Garcia Vs Recio Recio did not present sufficient evidence during his second marriage to prove that he was indeed qualified to marry again. There are two types of divorces: absolute and limited. Under Australian laws, one can only remarry if he is granted absolute divorce; otherwise, he can be convicted of bigamy. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to receive more evidence to establish Recio’s legal capacity to marry. Diego Vs Castillo Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr. The couple were both Filipinos. A divorce was granted in Texas. Subsequently, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with complainant’s brother, Manuel Diego. Judge Castillo acquitted Escoto of the crime of bigamy because he ruled that the crime was not committed with criminal intent. Judge Castillo is liable for gross ignorance of the law. He must have known that the law in a foreign country is not binding to the citizens of the Philippines . Furthermore, it was not a mistake of fact as he claims it to be so. Republic Vs Orbecido Iii FC 26 shall also apply to married couple who are both Filipinos but with one gaining a different citizenship later on. However, there was lack in evidence to prove the claims of Orbecido. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent must also show that the divorce
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 21 decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
San Luis Vs San Luis The divorce was recognized in the Philippines . The CA remanded the case to the RTC. It was stated in the Family Code Article 147 as well as in Van Dorn vs Romillo that if a foreign spouse divorces his/her Filipino spouse by virtue of a foreign law on divorce, it shall be deemed as valid in the Philippines. Catalan Vs Ca The case was remanded to the RTC because the Court was not sure if the divorce granted was absolute. It was proven that both are naturalized American citizens but petitioner will only have a personality if the divorce granted to them in Orlando was limited divorce. Bayot Vs Ca The divorce was binding because Rebecca was an American citizen during the time this case was pending. Furthermore, Rebecca was still an American citizen when the divorce was granted . You have to go to court to have the foreign divorce recognized before you can remarry. It does not explicitly say that the marriage is dissolved but it allows the Filipino spouse, not the alien, to bring up issues on support, property and rights to succession.
FC 238-248 Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards: 1. separation in fact between husband and wife, 2. abandonment by one of the other, and 3. incidents involving parental authority. (n) Chapter 2. Separation in Fact Art. 239. For judicial authorization for a transaction, verified petition may be filed in court alleging: 1. De facto separation or abandonment 2. There is an action where a spouse’s consent is required by law 3. Consent is withheld or cannot be obtained Proposed deed shall be attached to or described in the petition. The final deed to be executed shall be submitted and approved by the court.
Art. 240. Claims for damages, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n)
SEPARATION OF SPOUSES
Art. 241. Upon proof of notice to the other spouse, jurisdiction over the petition shall be exercised by : a. the family court, if one exists, or b. the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n)
Benedicto v. De la Rama (1907) Liquidation of conjugal property upon dissolution must follow the procedure set forth in the Civil Code.
Art. 242. The court shall serve the spouse (whose consent is required) at his/her last known address with a Show Cause Order, Notice of Initial Conference and a copy of the petition .
CFI granted a decree of divorce to Agueda and Benedicto on account of the latter’s adultery, ordering Benedicto to give Agueda half of the fruits of their partnership as her share in the conjugal property. Phil SC reversed CFI decision and US SC reversed Phil SC, affirming CFI. On another appeal to SC, the case was finally remanded to CFI to determine the proper amounts and follow the liquidation procedure set forth in CC.
Art. 243. Preliminary conference with the judge: no assistance from the counsel. After the initial conference: parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences/hearings.
CC 1418, 1424, 1426 – to settle conjugal property after it has been dissolved. Inventory required.
Art. 245. The court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. The judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse . (n)
Art. 244. The court shall inquire into the reasons for the non-consenting spouse’s failure to appear, and shall require appearance, if possible. (n)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 22 Art. 246. If unresolved after initial conference, petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies. If testimony is needed , the court shall specify: 1. the witnesses to be heard 2. the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n)
Art. 247. Judgment shall be immediately final and executory. (n) Art. 248. Same rules as outlined above shall govern petition for judicial authority to 1. administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and 2. to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family . NCC 221 (1) Art. 221. void and of no effect: (1) contract for personal separation; (2) extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the CPG or of ACP; (3) collusion to obtain legal separation, or annulment; (4) simulated alienation of property to deprive the heirs of legitime. Albano v. Gapusan A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. The case is a malpractice suit against Judge Gapusan for having notarized an agreement for the personal separation and extrajudicial partition of conjugal property of a married couple, providing, among others, that they shall not file a case against each other in the event that either shall commit concubinage or adultery. Although the Court cannot impose disciplinary sanction because he was already a municipal judge, a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized documents that subvert the institutions of marriage and the family .
NCC 52 – Marriage is an inviolable social institution NCC 216 – The family is a basic social institution that public policy protects.
In re: Atty. Rufillo Bucana (1976) Sorry, this seems completely off tangent. Formaldehyde and cutting agent were shipped from New York to Manila, only formaldehyde was delivered. A cryptic message was sent to signify the loss, no description or value was mentioned. The owner filed an action for damages, and the Court ruled on the reckoning point of the 15-day period wherein notice attaches liability to either the insurance company or the shipping owner.
FC 26 par.2 Art. 26. Marriages abroad, if in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (17a) Filipino m. Foreigner: If the alien spouse obtains a valid foreign divorce, capacitating him or her to remarry, Filipino spouse may remarry under Philippine law too. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Tenchavez v. Escano (1965) A foreign divorce obtained by Fi lipinos during the effectivity of the NCC is invalid. Remarriage or cohabitation with another by either spouse is a ground for legal separation and entitles the other to damages. Pastor Tenchavez filed for legal separation from Vicenta Escano who left him shortly after their marriage, to go to the US, thereafter obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying someone else. SC pronounced the foreign divorce invalid, and her affair with second husband adulterous . SC awarded damages and granted legal separation to Pastor.
Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) It is not just, after a valid divorce was obtained at the instance of the foreign spouse, to consider the Filipino spouse still married to the foreign spouse while the latter is not anymore married to the former. (Hehe please rephrase) Filipina married American in 1972. They were divorced in 1982 (where in his SPA, he cited incompatibility and absence of conjugal property). By 1983, he asked the court to require Filipina to submit an accounting of her Manila business which he claimed he has a right over as it was conjugal property. SC held that since the divorce is valid in the US, and he is not repudiating it, he is no longer Filipina’s husband
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 23 pursuant to his national law. Ergo, he’s not entitled to control over and he cannot still be a possible heir to that which he claimed to be conjugal property.
1. 2.
Obiter: She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Somera v, Pilapil (1989) An adultery charge can only be prosecuted upon sworn written complaint of the offended spouse— jurisdictional requirement. Filipina married German. They separated and German obtained a valid divorce decree in Germany. Subsequently, German filed an adultery case against Filipina and her alleged paramour. SC held that after a valid divorce is obtained by the foreigner spouse, both cease to be the spouse of the other, ergo, they lose their standing to sue.
First and second repudiation – husband can take wife back without a need of new contract of marriage, and Third – irrevocable.
Art. 47. Ila. — Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations (ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be granted a decree of divorce by the court. Art. 48. zihar. — Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, the wife may ask the court to require her husband to perform the expiation or to pronounce a regular talaq. Art. 49. li'an. — Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an).
Muslim Code 45-55 Divorce (Talaq) Section 1. Nature and Form. —
Art. 50. Divorce by khul'. — The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition the court for divorce.
Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
Art. 51. Tafwid (by authorization of the husband) . — If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage .
By husband: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); (d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);
Art. 52. faskh. — Grounds for a judicial decree at the instance of the wife :
By wife: (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila); (c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar); (e) Redemption by the wife (khul'); (f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or (g) Judicial decree (faskh). Art. 46. Talaq. — (1) may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her.
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive months; (b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one year; (c) Failure to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital obligation in accordance with this code; (d) Impotency of the husband; (e) Insanity or incurable disease which would make the continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family; (f) Unusual cruelty (g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law . Art. 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. — Grounds:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 24 (a) Habitual assault and cruel conduct; (b) Association with people of Ill-repute ; (c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property ; (d) Obstructs observance of her religious practices; or (e) Treats her unjustly and inequitably as enjoined by Islamic law.
FC 55 (8)
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. —
RPC 333
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may remarry; (b) Loss of mutual rights of inheritance ; (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78; (d)Recovery from the husband of dower : 1. whole dower - after the consummation of the marriage, or 2. one-half - before its consummation; (e) Husband shall still support in accordance with Article 67; and (f) Dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership .
j)
Abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year.
Grounds for filing a petition for legal separation (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion
Adultery committed by a married woman who shall have sex with a man not her husband and by the man who had sex with her knowing her to be married, even if marriage be subsequently declared void.
RPC 334 Concubinage- when husband keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, has sex, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman not his wife, or cohabit with her in any other place.
RPC 247 Art. 55. Effects of other kinds of divorce. — Same as those of talag or faksh subject to the effects of compliance with requirements set by Islamic law.
NCC 97petition for legal separation may be filed: a) For wif e’s adultery or husband’s concubinage b) Attempt of one spouse on the life of the other AM No 02-11-11-SC Mar4,2003 Took effect on Mar 15, 2003 Sec. 2 (This is essentially FC 55 and FC 57) Petition for legal separation may be filed only by husband/wife within 5 years from the time of the occurrence of the ff: a) Repeated violence, abusive conduct on the petitioner, a common child or child of petitioner b) Violence or moral pressure to change political or religious affiliation c) Attempt to induce petitioner, common child, or pet’s child to engage in prostitution or connivance in such d) Final judgment with sentence of more than 6 years, even if pardoned e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism f) Lesbianism or homosexuality g) Contracting a subsequent bigamous marriage, in or out of Phil h) Sexual infidelity or perversion i) Attempt on the life
Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda Jose Campos-Rueda demaned from his wife Eloisa that she perform “lascivious acts on his genital organs ” which resulted in Eloisa leaving the conjugal dwelling and demanding support from Jose. Support outside conjugal dwelling was granted since Eloisa has just cause for leaving. Gandionco vs Penaranda Wife filed civil action for legal separation grounded on concubinage, then afterwards filed criminal action for concubinage. A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately Ong vs Ong Because of physical violence inflicted upon her and even her children, Lucita left her husband William. This was proven and affirmed by lower courts. Physical violence is also a just cause for abandonment so that it may not be used as
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 25 a ground for denying legal separation since such ground contemplates abandonment without justifiable cause.
separation causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
FC 55 compare with FC 46 (4) FC 55 provides grounds for filing a petition for legal separation which include (5) dru g addiction or habitual alcoholism, (6) lesbianism or homosexuality. FC 46 provides what constitutes fraud (under FC 45 (3)), which includes (4) concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
Matubis vs Praxedes (under NCC) The complaint separation for legal was filed outside the periods provided for by NCC 102. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956 ( more than 1 year after plaintiff become cognizant of the cause ). Moreover, the law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse , provided there has been no condonation of or consent (expressed in this case) to the adultery or concubinage.
FC 55 (9) compare with NCC 97 (2) NCC 97 (2) as a ground for filing a petition for legal separation: attempt of one spouse against the life of the other. FC 55 (9): attempt by the respondent against the life of petitioner. FC 101 (3) compare with separation in fact When is a spouse deemed to have abandoned the other: FC 101 (3) when he or she left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning . When spouse left conjugal dwelling for 3 months or failed within the same period to give any information as to whereabouts is prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning. FC 55 compare with NCC 99 NCC 99 states “No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic.” No such provision is present in FC 55. FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99 FC 57 provides that an action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. In addition to this, NCC 102 provides that the petition should be filed one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff become cognizant of the cause. Such was not included in FC . NCC 99 has a proposition about the location of the occurence of the cause of legal separation. None is found in FC 57. Lapuz vs Eufemio Wife died while her petition for legal separation was still pending. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action for legal
FC 58-60 (58): An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition (59): No legal separation may be decreed unless the court has taken steps towards the reconcilation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such effort, that reconcilation is highly improbable (60): No decree of legal separation shall be based on a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgement . In any case, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Sec 19, RA 9262 FC 58 says that no action for legal will be tried before 6 months after the filing of petition (6 months cooling off period ) Sec 19, RA 9262 says that when violence is alleged as reason for legal separation, we need not wait for six months. trial will start immediately
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC (Sec2): A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes... (Sec6): Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. - ... the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court on whether the parties are in collusion ... if the court finds collusion, petition is dismissed (Sec13): Prohibited compromise. -no compromise on the ff.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 26 (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation ; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; and (6) Future legitime.
Araneta vs Concepcion Tells us that though NCC 103 (now FC 58) says that though trial for legal separation commences only after 6 months from filing petition, judge can award support pendente lite and temporary custody of the children. This is because NCC 105 says that depending on the circumstances (and evidence presented, here the evidence of adultery and abandonment was convincing) the judge does not have to wait until the 6 months is over for the determination of support and custody. De Ocampo v Florenciano Here the court tackles the issue of collusion. The wife had illicit relations with a lot of men. After they had been living separately, husband again catches wife living with another lover . The husband files for legal separation. During trial, wife admits that she also wants to be separated. CA said that they could not be separated because legal separation should not be based on stipulation of facts. Supreme Court however said that the mere agreement to filing of petition or the fact that one party admitted adultery should not be basis for dismissal . What the law forbids is legal separation based solely on a stipulation of facts. In the instant case, there was an admission of adultery and evidence was presented to prove adultery. Hence they should be legally separated because the decree is not solely based on admission and stipulation of facts but also on evidence presented.
Lapuz vs Eufemio Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree , in an action for legal separation, abate the action? An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona. It follows that the effects of legal separation (ex. dissolution of property regime) do not take effect/cannot be enforced if one of the parties dies during pendency of trial because a legal separation cannot be decreed.
Ramos v. Vamenta whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Held: Article 103 of the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. In this case the wife filed for legal separation and an injunction against her husband administering her paraphernal property since by law the husband was administrator. Taking the facts into consideration, the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership.
Pacete v. Cariaga SC says that in legal separation, parties (in this case the defendants) should be allowed to present evidence and no judgement should be based on a stipulation of facts -especially if the facts came from the petitioner alone. What makes this case special is that the respondent (husband) who was allegedly living with another woman asked again and again for an extension to present evidence which the trial court denied, hence he was declared in default. It was held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case based on the stipulation of facts. Evidence should be presented in order for the court to decree legal separation. FC 61 par. 1 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other FC 61 par. 2 The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses , shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 27 or the conjugal partnership property . The administrator appointed by the court should have the same powers and responsibilities as those of a guardian under the rules of court.
granted temporary administration to the wife because she was administering the property for the past 19 years without complaint from the husband. An injunction against the husband is necessary to protect the interests of mother and children.
De la Vina v. Villareal This case is treated by paragraph 1 of FC 61 (the case started in the year 1917) regarding domicile of the wife. Husband contends that trial court does not have jurisdiction since his domicile (which follows that his domicile is the same as the wife's) was not within the jurisdiction of the court, the court being in Iloilo, Negros Occidental while he resided in Negros Oriental. The wife filed the case in Iloilo and was living there because she was ejected from the conjugal home by husband.
Extra (malang v moson) says that marriages between muslims before the muslim code are under the civil code. The muslim code only applies prospectively not retoactively. Hence civil code governs property relations. Subsequent marriages are void.
It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. However the rule is not absolute. The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theorical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile. Since the case was decided way before the NCC and FC, jurisprudence used was American. This case may very well be the basis for NCC 104 and FC 61.
Sabalones v. CA In this case, the husband was an ambassador who left administration of property in the philippines to his wife. When he retired, he did not return to his wife but instead contracted a bigamous marriage with another woman. However,when he needed money he wanted to sell the house the wife and children were living in. He argues that he has a right to sell the Greenhills property because according to FC 124, husband and wife has joint administration. held that though husband and wife have joint administration, under FC 61, after filing of petition for legal separation, the court shall designate an administrator(no more joint administration) albeit temporary. It was shown that the trial court
People v. Sensano and Ramos wife was charged with adultery and was convicted, asked for husband’s apology but husband refused and told her she can do whatever she wants. she went back to her lover, husband went to the US, after 7 years filed another adultery charge and petitioned for legal separation. IMPLIED CONSENT (dismissed and left wife/did not file action immediately) bars criminal action. People v. Rodolfo Schneckenburger Husband and wife executed a document where they agreed that no one would prosecute for adultery/concubinage. Husband secured decree of divorce from Mexico, lived with another woman in Manila. Wife file bigamy & concubinage charges. SC acquitted husband because Rodolfo acquitted of concubinage because the Agreement, while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes a VALID CONSENT to the act of concubinage within the meaning of RPC 344. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other. The offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. In this case, court distinguished two distinct offenses of: bigamy - celebration of the second marriage, with the first still existing; an offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state concubinage - mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife; an offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party SC also distinguished "pardon" (offense after its commission) from "consent" (offense prior to its commission)
FC 56(1):
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 28 The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
Benjamin Bugayong vs Leonila Ginez Husband and wife lived apart. Husband started to receive letters from anonymous sources alleging that his wife was being unfaithful. He went to her hometown, slept and had sex with her. He confronted her but she didn’t answer, so he left her, went somewhere else and had sex with some other woman. He filed for legal separation on the ground of adultery. SC held that he cannot file because he CONDONED his wife’s infidelity by having sex with her after he learned of her infidelity. Eduardo Arroyo v. CA Case where SC said: "A woman who has the staying power to volley tennis bags for fifteen minutes at the tennis court would not be incapable of doing the sexual act." - Wife and her lover stayed in a room for 45 minutes [Husband would later show pictures of the two in intimate poses]. Husband filed a criminal complaint for adultery. Wife and lover were convicted. Upon appeal by wife who alleged that her husband was also having an affair, husband filed a manifestation praying that the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity. SC denied because For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. FC 56 (4): The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; FC 60: No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
FC 56(3): The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
compare with NCC 101: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. (n)
NCC 221(3): The following shall be void and of no effect: Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage; William Brown v. Juanita Yambao Wife was an adulterer, husband had a concubine. Husband filed for legal separation due to his wife’s crime. Court Denied petition, invoking NCC 100 [Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation] and NCC 102 [appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945] Jose de Ocampo v Serafina Florenciano Wife admitted, in court, in a case filed against her by husband for legal separation, that she committed adultery. Husband still presented evidence to support his claim. Her confession NOT NECESSARILY indicated that there was COLLUSION, hence legal separation was granted. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. Husband’s failure to actively search for his wife and take her home DID NOT constitute condonation or consent since it was the wife who left the conjugal abode. It was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. FC 62.
FC 56(5):
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 29 During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.
No-trial six-month period is not an absolute bar. Courts may still issue within this period a preliminary injunction to entitle either spouse to manage his/her exclusive property.
FC 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.
FC 56: The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
FC 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Yangco v. Rohde 902 “Divorce” case. Alimony pendente lite may not be granted to a woman whose status as a lawful wife of the defendant has not yet been established. De la Viña v. Villareal 920. Alimony pendente lite may not be granted to wife pending litigation of legal separation case. Lerma v. CA Adultery is a defense against the wife’s claim for support pendente lite. Araneta v. Concepcion Legal separation filed by husband on the ground of wife’s adultery; Evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, may be presented during 6-months cool-off period that the court may determine which is best for their custody
NCC 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Matubis v. Praxede Although an agreement between spouses for neither party to prosecute the other for concubinage/bigamy is void and contrary to law, such agreement amounts to consent which prevents either of them from being able to petition for legal separation. People v. Sensano and Ramos A second charge of adultery is not a ground for legal separation where the husband abandoned the wife after she served her sentence for her first conviction, and did not do anything for several years when she reunited with her lover. The husband is deemed to have consented to her second adulterous act. FC 63: THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL SEPARATION 1. They can live separately from each other but marriage bonds are not severed 2. ACP or CPG shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse has no right on the net profits earned by the ACP and CPG in accordance with 43(2) 3. Custody of children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse in accordance with 213. 4. Offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from innocent spouse in intestate succession. Those in favor of him in the will of innocent spouse shall also be revoked.
Ramos v Vamenta FC 213: PARENTAL AUTHORITY in case of legal separation
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 30 Parental authority shall be exercised by parent designated by the Court, which shall take into account all relevant considerations (equity), especially the choice of child over 7 years old, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
NCC 106(3): Effect of Legal Separation Custody of children shall be given to innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of the minor. If that is the case, the court may appoint a guardian. P.D. 603 Child and Youth Welfare Code Art 17 (3) Joint Parental Authority In case of separation, no child under five years old shall be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to do so. Matute V. Macadaeg and Medel Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of "moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty" (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court). Without deciding whether the adultery committed by herein petitioner with her own brother-in-law involves moral depravity, it is clear to our mind that the affirmative assumption implicit in the order complained of cannot be characterized as an "abuse of discretion", much less a "grave" one. (the lower court kasi awarded it to Medel saying that there was grave abuse when custody was awarded to Medel because of poverty on the side of Matute. The court cannot hold there was abuse) Macadangdang V. CA and Mejias Even if Anahaw and Mejias were already separated in fact, legitimacy is still presumed unless impossibility of access is proven. Lapuz V. Eufemio An action for legal separation involves bed-and-board separation of spouses and is purely personal. Being personal in character, the death of a party to the action causes the death of the action itself. With regards to his share in the conjugal partnership: A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the a ppellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
FC 64: REVOKING DONATIONS after decree of legal separation Innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him/her in favour of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy even id such is stipulated as irrevocable. It shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocations shall be respected. The revocation as beneficiary in insurance shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke donation must be brought within 5 years from the time the legal separation has become final.
NCC 370-372 SURNAMES after legal sep Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 31 Laperal V. Republic It is mandatory that after legal separation, wife will still use the name and surname she used before the decree of legal separation. With the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Code). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. FC 65-67 Cases of Reconciliation Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 10 SOLO PARENTS WELFARE ACT of 2000 RA 8972
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO SOLO PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES I. Husband and Wife must live together and love and support each other (but cannot be forced to do so) . FC 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a) NCC 109: The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (56a) NCC 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (149a) » Court cannot compel the spouses to live together and fulfill their marital obligations » Court cannot compel the husband to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife without sufficient cause » Court is careful to grant separate maintenance because it would be an acknowledgement of the abnormal situation of spouses living separately in fact » Support can either be Financial or Home Maintenance Separation is not the End of Support Ilusorio V. Ilusorio-Bildner [May 12, 2000] The spouses cannot be compelled by the court to live together but they are required to support each other since marriage is a continuing commitment. Hence, habeas corpus cannot be granted to the wife for custody of her husband who was with their children. With sufficient cause, With Support: Ramirez-Cuaderno V. Cuaderno The Court cannot compel spouses to live together but it is careful to grant the separate maintenance of the wife because it is an acknowledgement of a de facto separation. Living together should be mandated by the spouses’ mutual affection and not be any legal mandate or court order. Since it had been recognized that the husband inflicted physical in juries on his wife and left her with her parents’, it
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 32 would be unrealistic to urge them to remain in one house where they both consider living together an impossibility.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Without sufficient cause, Without Support: Arroyo V. Vasquez De Arroyo Held: The wife cannot be compelled by the court to return to their conjugal home and fulfill her marital duties because it is outside of the province of the court to order such. However, the husband cannot be compelled to support her separately because she left the home without sufficient cause. Where her separate maintenance is unjustified, it cannot be held against her husband by requiring him to provide alimony.
NCC 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. (58a)
Atilano V. Chua Ching Beng Held: Husband cannot be compelled to support his wife by giving monthly allowances because he chose to support her by providing a home and she refused without just cause. Dissolution of Property is Not Legalization of Separation Lacson V. San Jose-Lacson Held: The grant of Court on the spouses’ petition to dissolve their property during marriage does not legalize their de facto separation. The Court does not acknowledge the separation in fact of the spouses, which is abnormal. It merely seeks to extinguish/saturate the seething emotions of the spouses by minding their separation. The court cannot compel them to live together but it can make their abandonment as difficult as possible. II. NCC: Husband chooses the family home and the Wife follows. FC: Both Husband and Wife chooses the family home. When can the spouses live separately from each other [without decree of LS]: 1. When one is abroad 2. For compelling reasons 3. Where there is violence, acts of immorality and infidelity UNLESS, separation is incompatible with the solidarity of the family
FC 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
Purpose of the rule: To strengthen and to secure the interests of the spouses where their union and harmony should prevail
Abella V. Comelec Held: The wife was disqualified from holding office as Governor of Leyte because she was not a resident of Kananga but of Ormoc (not part of Leyte). Although she had been a resident of Kananga, she was deemed to have reestablished and moved her domicile in Ormoc with her husband when they married. There was no evidence that they lived separately. De La Viña V. Villareal Held: The wife could have a residence apart from the conjugal abode because the general law that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband’s is not absolute. The husband’s concubinage forced the wife to leave because her stay would have been a condonation to his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duties. III. Husband and Wife must maintain and spend for the family together
FC 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) NCC 111: The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses. (n) FC 71.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 33 The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
NCC 115: The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property. (62a) IV. Husband and Wife can both exercise a profession FC 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper; and (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
NCC 117: The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object , provided: (1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and (2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family. (n) V. Husband and Wife can go to Court for relief when there is negligence of duties FC 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)
NCC 116: When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief. The court may counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper. (n) VI. Husband’s supremacy in the NCC NCC 112: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, unless there is a stipulation in the marriage settlements conferring the administration upon the wife. She may also administer the conjugal partnership in other cases specified in this Code. (n)
NCC 113: The husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (1) When they are judicially separated; (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year; (3) When there is a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements; (4) If the administration of all the property in the marriage has been transferred to her, in accordance with Articles 196 and 197; (5) When the litigation is between the husband and wife; (6) If the suit concerns her paraphernal property; (7) When the action is upon the civil liability arising from a criminal offense; (8) If the litigation is incidental to the profession, occupation or business in which she is engaged; (9) In any civil action referred to in Articles 25 to 35; and (10) In an action upon a quasi-delict. In the cases mentioned in Nos. 7 to 10, the husband must be joined as a party defendant if the third paragraph of Article 163 is applicable. (n) NCC 114: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. (n) VII. Wife is protected by RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children) Go Tan V. Tan [September 30, 2008] The wife sought a temporary protective order against his husband and parents-inlaw due to their verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her, which are
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 34 violations of Sec. 5, RA 9262. By virtue of Sec. 47 which provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, the parents-in-law can also be held liable. Sec. 3 requires the offender to be related to the victim by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating/sexual relationship but Art. 10 of the RPC provides for the principle of conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all. VIII. Wife is not required to use her husband’s surname Yasin V. Shariah Court Held: The wife need not have a judicial confirmation of her resumption of her maiden name after divorce because no law requires the woman to assume her husband’s name upon marriage. Marriage only changes the civil status in the civil registry and the name remains the same.
PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DONATIONS To each other FC 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property . Any excess shall be considered void. Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a) FC 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) NCC 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation… In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n) » Spouses cannot donate to each other [if property regime is not community] » Common-law spouses cannot donate to each other as well Arcaba V. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
[November 22, 2001] Because the woman used the man’s surname in various documents and slept in the same room with him, her conduct indicated that they are common-law spouses and hence, the donation by man to woman is void.
Sumbad V. Ca Children of spouses could have challenged the validity of the deed of donation executed by their father in favour of a woman on the ground of their common-law relationship. But due to their failure to present evidence of such fact, the donation is valid. *Good Faith can validate a donation / sale between common-law spouses Bienvenido V. Ca The sale between husband and woman was valid because it was not proven that the woman knew about the husband’s subsisting marriage and that she made the sale in bad faith. » PURPOSE: To prevent the undue influence of the donor over the done Matabuena V. Cervantes The prohibition on donations between spouses also applies to common-law marriages, as held in Buenaventura v. Bautista, because undue and improper pressure and influence may also exist among common-law spouses. Also, those in common-law relationships would be in a better position than married spouses.
To the spouses by reason of their marriage FC 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a) » Requirements of Donations Proper Nuptia: In a public instrument Solis V. Barroso Donations propter nu ptia is enforceable only if in writing. It is governed not by the laws on contracts but on donation. Art. 633 of the Civil Code applies and it requires that such donations be made in a public instrument in order to be valid and to vest a right.
FC 86.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 35 A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general. (132a) *NOT EXCLUSIVE! » May also be Revoked if Inofficious Lagua V. Lagua Donation propter nuptias may be reduced for being inofficious, by virtue of NCC 908, upon the donor’s death if it exceeds the value of the donor’s estate
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community » Support of the Family FC 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; » Debts that have benefited the family (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains , or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; FC 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. V. Aguirre De Garcia Obligations of the husband as a guarantor or surety for a company in an indemnity agreement are not chargeable against his conjugal partnership because only obligations that have redounded to the benefit of the spouses are deductible. Gelano V. CA Personal debts of the husband were held against the conjugal partnership because his debts benefitted the family. G-Tractors, Inc. V. CA Debt incurred by the husband in the pursuit of his business can be held against the conjugal partnership because as the administrator, the husband is doing right for the family and the practice of his profession is for their advantage. Hence, he should not be made to suffer his debts alone. » Expenses for the maintenance of the conjugal and separate properties (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; » Expenses for the professional activity of either spouse (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 36 If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)
FC 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. (164a) ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTIES FC 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. FC 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse. FC 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property FC 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. FC 96. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.
Yu Bun Guan Vs. Ong WON property is conjugal or paraphernal: (1) the title had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the "absolute and registered owner"; (4) she had paid the real property taxes thereon. FC 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. FC 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. FC 61. After filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitle to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. OWNERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 37 FC 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one of the spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. FC 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property.
When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.
FC 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between or among the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. Delizo Vs. Delizo Facts
FC 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. FC 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therin, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. Cf. FC 239.
DOCTRINE:
Under CPG Partition of the conjugal partnership of two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo+ with (1M) Rosa Villasfer+ and (2M) Dorotea de Ocampo 1M – 18 years; 2M- 36 years No liquidation of 1M’s properties How to partition? Application of FC 104. X – # of years of 1M; Y – capital of 1M A - # of years of 2M; B – capital of 2M Share of 1M: [(XY)/(XY:AB)]*[Value of property] Share of 2M: [(AB)/(XY:AB)]*[Value of property]
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS Belcodero Vs. CA As long as property was acquired during the marriage Conjugal Jocson Vs. CA Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. TCT with “X married to Y” is not proof that acquisition was during coverture.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 38 Ansaldo Vs. Sheriff Conjugal properties will be liable for H or W’s personal debt only if sufficie ntly proven that debt redounded to the benefit of the family Sps. Estonina Vs. CA Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. If acquisition was during coverture, presumption of conjugality can be overturned if property acquired through inheritance FC 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. Cf. FC 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. FC 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settle that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Cf. FC 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Castro Vs. Miat Property bought during coverture but paid through installments. Last installment was paid when wife was already dead. Husband secured titled over the property in his name as widower. Is property conjugal? YES. Since the marriage was before the effectivity of the FC, the provisions of NCC apply. (NCC 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses.)
FC 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settle that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. FC 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local customs. Malang Vs. Moson CPG applies to Muslim marriages contracted prior to the Shari’a Law FC 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Charpter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Cf. NCC 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. NCC 1768. The partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Art. 1772, st 1 paragraph. Pnb Vs. Quintos Loans and debts incurred/contracted during marriage are presumed to be a conjugal debts
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 39 FC 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and (4)That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. Laperal Vs. Katigbak The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to him, which is not the case. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the husband. Berciles Vs. GSIS Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment through exclusive funds. FC 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; FC 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her won exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper. FC 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. Veloso Vs. Martinez Proven that jewels were inherited paraphernal property, with rights to disposition, if sale is through spouse, written authority to sell is required. Plato Vs. Yatco The reconveyance of the property did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid came from common or conjugal funds
Lim Vs. Garcia WON properties are paraphernal or conjugal Evidence showing that wife used her inheritance money to purchase properties If inheriting exclusive property show proof! FC 111 A spouse may encumber, mortgage, alienate or dispose of his or her exclusive property WITHOUT the consent of the other. FC 112 Alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property. Wong et al vs IAC Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed an action for the collection of money to Katrina (who bought jewelries) and to Romarico. But the CPG was NOT made liable because the husband was not included in the SUIT, he did not have his DAY in court. DOCTRINE: Under the Regime of the NCC, husband is the SOLE administrator, and since he was NOT included in the suit, the CPG cannot be made liable since it was without the husband’s consent. FC 116 ALL PROPERTY acquired DURING the marriage is PRESUMED to be CONJUGAL until the contrary is proved. Torela vs Torela Petitioner proved that the property was acquired PRIOR to his marriage through inheritance. So the sale of the land is VALID. DOCTRINE: The presumption of CONJUGALITY only arises when it is PROVEN that the property was acquired DURING coverture. Magallon vs Montejo Homestead accrued and acquired DURING his marriage with Eustaquia. Magallon said it was THEIR property BUT lost the case because he FAILED to prove that they were MARRIED. DOCTRINE: Same as Torela, even though the homestead was acquired during their “coverture”, Magallon failed to prove that they were married, hence N O presumption of conjugality arises. Cuenca vs Cuenca
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 40 The parcels of land in contention was SURVEYED and APPROVED during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre, BUT this doesn’t mean that it was PERFECTED during the marriage DOCTRINE: An approval or a survey of homestead lands does not mean it was ACQUIRED or PERFECTED during the marriage. Hence it cannot be considered CONJUGAL property.
FC 117 THE FOLLOWING ARE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES (FC 117) (1)Those acquired by onerous title DURING the marriage at the expense of the COMMON FUND. Whether it was for the partnership or for only one of the spouses . (2) Those OBTAINED from the labor, industry, work or profession of EITHER or both of the SPOUSES. (3) The FRUITS of the common or exclusive property of each spouse. (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure (5) Those acquired through profession (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution in excess of the number brought to the marriage. (7) Those gained from games of chance. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusive,y by the loser. Cheeseman vs IAC Criselda Cheesman sold property WITHOUT the consent of Thomas Cheesman. But it was proven that SHE bought the land with her OWN funds and that Padilla (the buyer) bought it in GOOD FAITH. Obiter: Even if the lands were CONJUGAL in nature, Thomas Cheeseman still cant recover it because he is a FOREIGNER. DOCTRINE: Foreigners cannot own private lands in the Philippines. And property bought with PERSONAL funds of one spouse is EXCLUSIVE property hence she can dispose of it without the consent of another Villanueva vs CA Nicolas and Eusebia was Married. Nicolas lived with another woman named Pacita, they bore a child name Procopio. Properties in question were acquired DURING the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Hence it is Conjugal in nature and belongs to Nicolas and Eusebia, Procopio doesn’t have a right to ACQUIRE the gains from these properties Doctrine: Tax declarations in the name of Pacita (the other woman) were NOT enough to overcome the presumption of Conjugality. Moreover, Nicolas saying that he is “single” is also NOT enough to overcome the presumption of Conjugality.
Zulueta vs Pan-Am The Zulueta’s were kicked out and embarrassed by the captain because Mr. Zulueta heeded the call of nature in the island. They claimed moral damages afterwards. DOCTRINE: Moral damages accrue to the EXCLUSIVE property (General Rule) PanAM says that damages are not conjugal in nature. BUT SC says it belongs to the conjugal partnership because the CONTRACT of CARRIAGE was incurred DURING the marriage. Hence it must be presumed to be CONJUGAL in nature. Mendoza vs Reyes Poncao Reyes and Julia Reyes acquired property DURING their marriage on Feb 1947 on installment basis. Their LOANS were obtained JOINTLY by them. Hence, the property is conjugal and Julia Reyes cannot sell the said property. DOCTRINE: Even if the said property is registered under the name of the husband only or the wife only, it is still CONJUGAL in nature so long as it is acquired DURING coverture. Hence, even the mortgage is only recorded under the name of JULIA, it is still conjugal. Castillo vs Pasco In this case, the two installments used to buy the property totaled 6,000 pesos was paid 5,000 by the conjugal funds and 1,000 form the exclusive funds of MACARIA. Hence the property in question is 1/6 paraphernal and 5/6 conjugal. It is 5/6 conjugal because it was shown that the LOANS were obtained by BOTH spouses. DOCTRINE: Take note that this case was under the NCC. Loans that are obtained JOINTLY by the spouses becomes obligations of the conjugal partnership, and when these LOANS are used to buy property, the property becomes conjugal in nature. FC 119 When there is a credit payable to one of the spouses, partial payments to be collected from the principal shall be the EXCLUSIVE property. INTERESTS falling due the marriage shall belong to the CPG. FC 120 Ownership of improvements shall pertain to the CPG. (a)When the cost of the IMPROVEMENT made by the CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP are more than the VALUE of the property at the time of IMPROVEMENT, the property becomes CONJUGAL PROPERTY. (b) The value of the property that became conjugal property shall be reimbursed to the owner spouse upon dissolution.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 41 (c) If the improvement made by the spouses is NOT MORE than the VALUE of the property at the time of improvement. Then the property shall remain in the ownership of the owner-spouse. The improvements made shall be REIMBURSED at dissolution.
Padilla vs Padilla Narciso Padilla died, to distribute the last will and testament requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Concepcion wanted her PARAPHERNAL property to be segregated from the INVENTORIED estate with its reimbursements. The issue here is whether or not the reimbursement should be at the time of IMPROVEMENT or the time of LIQUIDATION. SC says reimbursement at the TIME OF LIQUIDATION. Obiter: Fruits of paraphernal property are EXEMPT from the payment of the obligations of the husband UNLESS it is proven that the obligations benefited the family. DOCTRINE: The value of paraphernal land was reimbursed to the wife at its VALUE at the time of LIQUIDATION. TAKE NOTE! Law now says that reimbursement should be at the TIME OF IMPROVEMENT . Caltex vs Felias Caltex was trying to levy upon the exclusive property of Felias (it was exclusive since it was donated to her by her parents). Hence, the levy was not allowed. DOCTRINE: Paraphernal property cannot be made liable upon the obligations and debts of the husband. Vda de Padilla vd Paterno Same facts as the Padilla vs Padilla above. But the question here is whether or not the mother (the sole heir of the will) should be held liable for the INCOME of the paraphernal properties? Yes, she should reimburse and return all the paraphernal properties of the wife. DOCTRINE: lots do NOT become automatically CONJUGAL when buildings are erected thereon. The ownership is retained by the WIFE until she is PAID the value of the LOT as a result of the LIQUIDATION of the CPG. Calimlim-Canullas vs Fortun Mercedes said that the house and coconut trees in the land were purchased with CONJUGAL funds. Hence the sale of her husband to Corazon is VOID since it didn’t have her CONSENT . Maramba vs Lozano
DOCTRINE: Ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is PAID. Embrado vs CA The paraphernal land of the wife became conjugal upon the construction of the building because it met 2 conditions: a.) construction of the building at the expense of the partnership b.) ownership of the land by one of the spouses. DOCTRINE: Since the land is already conjugal, the wife, who was previously the owner of the land, cannot encumber the property WITHOUT her husband’s consent. FC 121 THE CPG SHALL BE LIABLE FOR: (1) Support of the spouses, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse, support of illegitimate children shall be governed by Support. (2) All debts and obligations contracted DURING the marriage by the designated administrator spouse for the BENEFIT of the CPG, or debts acquired with the CONSENT of the other. (3) Debts and obligations WITHOUT the consent but BENEFITED the partnership (4)All taxes, liens charges and expenses upon CPG property. (5) Expenses for the preservation of the separate property. (6) Expenses needed to complete a vocational, professional course (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse as long as it BENEFITED the conjugal property (8)Donation of both spouses to the children for a vocational course or selfimprovement. (9)Expenses of litigation between the spouses. IF CPG is insufficient then the spouses will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their SEPARATE properties.
Mariano vs CA DOCTRINE: Esther engaged in a business with his husband’s consent hence the CONJUGAL property is LIABLE for the obligations and debts of the Business (doctrine na rin to) Ayala vs CA Alfredo Ching’s surety bonds are for the benefit of the CORPORATION, not for the benefit of the FAMILY. Hence, conjugal properties cannot be made liable.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 42 Ching vs CA Certain stocks of Alredo Ching were levied to pay his obligations. BUT, these stocks were GAINED during COVERTURE. Hence they are conjugal in nature and cannot be made liable to Ching’s debts caused by his securities.
Obligation that was charged against the CPG arose from the business of the wife (dresses) and since such was conducted with the consent of the husband (and the proceeds of such clearly went to defray family costs), it was held against the CPG.
Homeowners vs Dailo Dailo instituted a mortgage of property, part of the conjugal property, without the consent of his wife, hence the encumbrance made by the husband is VOID. Moreover, since the LOAN was not proved to benefit the conjugal property, the CPG cannot be made liable
Wong et al. v. CA Indebtedness (jewelry) arose in the transactions of the wife Katrina who used her maiden name in such dealing (being de facto separated from estranged husband). Such indebtedness cannot therefore be held against the CPG since it was not proven that such debt redounded to the family. Husband was not even notified of the case and therefore execution cannot be held against the CPG.
Javier vs Osmena The fruits of the paraphernal property (paraphernal since it was inherited by the wife from his father) was MADE liable because the debt was made by her FATHER whose land she inherited. Vda de Sta. Romana v. PCIB Husband (Ramon Sta. Romana) failed to pay purchase price of a lot (from Hodges, whose administrator is herein PCIB) bought clearly for the CPG and there for the benefit of their union, therefore CPG of Sta. Romana (through widow, Vda. De Sta. Romana herein) was made to shoulder such. Non-inclusion of Vda. De Sta. Romana in such case is immaterial; CPG was still made liable and therefore she is not entitled anymore to ½ such property. G-Tractors v. CA The debt incurred by husband Luis Luis Narciso from G-tractors (who leased him tractors to build switchroads and hauled felled trees in his logging concession) was credited against the CPG being that husband as admin incurred such debts for his job that shall benefit his family (benefits from such debt redounded to the family),therefore CPG liability DBP v. Adil Agricultural loan (20k) obtained by the spouses Patricio confessor and Jovita Villafuerte was to be paid in 10 yearly amortization (promissory note), but nd they defaulted, hence husband Patricio (then a Representative) made a 2 promissory note w/c acknowledge said loan and promised to pay within 2 months nd but again they defaulted. Such 2 promissory note was held against the CPG as such was made for the benefit of their union, hence chargeable against the CPG. Mariano v. CA
Ong v. CA Loan obtained by wife Teodora in the course of her logging business (such business being consented to by the husband and whose profits were nonetheless enjoyed by conjugal partnership) was credited against herein questioned property. Questioned property herein was proven to be paraphernal as the tax declaration bearing the name ‘Mrs. Ong’ does not prove that it was conjugal since it was not proven that such property was acquired during the coverture. Ayala Investment Investment v. CA Surety agreement entered into by husband in favor of his employer was not held against CPG absent the proof that such benefited the family of the husband. Burden of proving that the debt redounded to the family was not confirmed by debtor herein, therefore not charged against the CPG. Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp. Husband herein entered into an indemnity agreement to accommodate a rd 3 party but CPG was not held liable (as per Luzon Surety v. de Garcia). If spouse merely served as a guarantor, such shall not be taken against the CPG absent the proof (burden upon debtor) that loan redounded to the family. Ramones v. Agbayani Husband Santos Ramones sold part of their conjugal lot (without knowledge of wife Aldegonda) to agbayani. Years after Santos died, Aldegonda built septic tank in such contested lot prompting agbayani to sue her. Under NCC, sale made without consent of the other spouse is merely voidable (prescriptive within 10 years after such sale) but not in FC regime where such is ipso facto void. Since this case was still under NCC and 10 years has already passed since the sale, Aldegonda cannot do anything but remove such septic tank.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 43 Luzon Surety v. De Garcia rd Husband Vicente Garcia executed surety bond in favor of a 3 person; in rd default of such 3 person, Garcia’s CPG was not made liable because the debt did not redound to the benefit of the Garcia family.
The liabilities of Lagrimas following his murder conviction was charged against their CPG, with SC qualifying that said debt need not wait for the dissolution and liquidation of such CPG before it can finally be deducted from the latter. Dissolution is not a prerequisite for indemnity.
BA Finance v. CA Where a husband who abandoned wife and children made a loan allegedly in the name of wife’s sole proprietorship (through falsification), the wife’s sole proprietorship (which was also a CPG) was not made to shoulder such loan because loan did not redound to the benefits of the family
Go v. Yamane Liens incurred by wife and her sisters (Pucay) was not charged to CPG. It would have been charged against the property had it been paraphernal, but husband was able to show that questioned property was acquired during the coverture and therefore presumption of conjugality operates. Since the lien was charged against the wife and her sisters, such cannot be charged against the CPG. FC 124 (joint admin of CPG and exceptions therein)
Costuna v. Domondon (exception to general rule) Herein sale executed by husband was held valid even if such was secured without wife’s consent, or in this case ev en if the consent was withheld because sale was necessary for the treatment of husband’s burns and medical treatment rd (Amadeo having had 3 degree burns). Amadeo only sold ½ of the CPG (his share in such) but when he died, wife Estela wanted such sale to be nullified. SC said that her refusal to dispense consent when husband repeatedly sought such (and the gravity of the need to do so in order to finance his medical treatment) was grounded on sole greed. Moreover, the hospitalization and medication expenses of either husband or wife is subsumed under the term ‘benefits’ that would undeniably redound to benefit of the family (health and well being of both partners), which is therefore chargeable against CPG. Carlos v. Abelardo Honorio Carlos issued 25k dollars allegedly as a loan to her daughter and son-in-law for the latter to purchase their conjugal dwelling. Their failure to pay led to the formal demand for payments (albeit de facto separation of the spouses). Husband said that it was not a loan but compensation for his efforts to rehabilitate the construction company of his father-in-law. Nonetheless SC ruled that it was a loan, and that it was nonetheless chargeable against the CPG since said loan was executed to buy their conjugal dwelling which undoubtedly redounded to the family. FC 122 (debts that are chargeable against CPG, with the exception of indemnities, but only in so far asseparate property of offending spouse suffices for such else charged against CPG) PP v. Lagrimas
Guiang v. CA Husband executed sale without wife’s co nsent (wife was in manila, hoping to find work in middle east; husband later on living with another woman, their kids living in some neighbor’s house). Amicable settlement soon followed but wife even questioned her signature in such, saying that there was a forgery. SC said that sale was void and even if settlement was valid (arguing without admitting), such cannot ratify the sale since only voidable ones can be ratified. Husband as admin cannot proceed with sale without consent of wife. Heirs v. Mijares (1983.) Husband Vicente was declared admin by court in a proceeding where he alleged that wife is already dead, and sold ½ shares therein without of course the consent of the wife (de facto sep since 1974). Mortgage was rendered voidable by SC (sale under NCC regime) because of the lack of consent. Moreover, the admin was awarded then to husband on the premise that wife is already dead (which is not the case, ruling only arrived at due to falsification of husband); reliance on such was misplaced since sale has already been agreed as early as 1978. Roxas v. CA Husband as admin of prop cannot enter into contract involving CPG without consent of wife. Estranged husband herein entered into a contract of lease involving a lot where wife planned to put up a flea market. SC said that encumbrance or alienation without the other’s consent is voidable under NCC 173. SC remanded case for further proceedings. Ysasi v. Fernandez Under NCC regime, husband is sole admin, wife cannot divest husband of such admin by mere allegations of abuse of powers. Husband may even enforce
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 44 right of possession against wife who took over admin without his consent (such as the case at hand).
Docena v. Lapesura Certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by husband, Antonio Docena, compliant with ROC since they are spouse with joint interest over the alleged conjugal property, the signing of only one of them suffices. Under NCC, husband as sole admin of CPG he may defend CPG in a suit without being joined by wife. Under FC, even if husband and wife exercises joint admin, they need not act together, husband alone may sign the certificate. Homeowners Savings and Loan v. Dailo Loan obtained by husband Marcelino was without knowledge and consent of wife. But CPG was not held liable absent the proof that same did not redound to the family’s benefits (petitioner alleged that loan was used to construct house, but such was not proven in herein case). Property was therefore reconveyed to wife. Alinas v. Alinas In this case the Supreme Court did not depart from the strict letter of FC124, which provides as a matter of right that the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to the spouses jointly. In consonance with this right, the same provision of law also expressly states that these powers of administration do not include the disposition and encumbrance, which can only be done by authority of the court or with the written consent of the other spouse. In this case, Onesiforo Alinas’s sale of the property without his spouse’s consent is void in its entirety. Uy v. Court of Appeals The Professor was not exactly happy about how this case was disposed. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was in a coma, and his wife was just desperate to embark on all means to bring him back to normal by selling off some of their conjugal properties to pay off their medical bills. While the trial court sustained Mrs. Jardeleza, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise, ratiocinating that FC124 does not apply when the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent . It only applies when the spouse is absent, separated in fact, abandoned the other or withheld consent. What she should have done, according to SC, is to file a petition for judicial guardianship. Sabalones v. Court of Appeals FC124 provides that the conjugal property shall be jointly administered by the husband and the wife. In this case, Sabalones, who was an ambassador of the
Philippines, was regularly out of the country and thus for 19 years, without any objection from him, his wife has held the administration of their properties. Later on they were granted a legal separation decree on account of bigamy by Sabalones, and he was forfeited his share in the CPG. FC61 provides that after the decree of legal separation is given, court must appoint an administrator; although the trial court did not expressly appoint Mrs. Sabalones, its forfeiture of the CPG share of Ambassador Sabalones only means that it implicitly appointed Mrs. Sabalones as administratrix of their CPG. Sabalones cannot therefore file for judicial authorization to sell part of the CPG.
Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon In this case, Gimena Lapesura Aldón sold the lots that belonged to her CPG with husband Máximo Aldón to the spouses Felipe without the consent of Máximo. By operation of FC124, this sale is invalid, according to trial court, but Supreme Court asked: what kind of an invalid contract is it? The sale where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent constituted a voidable contract. Máximo is the proper party to impugn the sale. Because Máximo has since died, SC allowed his heirs to substitute him. Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court In this case, Criselda Cheesman, while married to Thomas Cheesman, acquired property from Armando Altares solely under her name; Thomas did not object to this. Later on, Criselda sold said property to Estelita Padilla, a sale to which Thomas objected, saying that the property belonged to their CPG and thus his consent was required. Supreme Court said that no such consent was needed because (1) Criselda was able to show that the property was hers alone and (2) Thomas is a foreigner, he has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale by the wife of the property in question. Frenzel v. Catito Foreigners cannot own lands. Alfred Frenzel questions Ederlina Catito’s sale of some of the properties he acquired for their supposed subsequent marriage which did not materialize. It may seem unfair in the part of Frenzel, but dura lex sed lex ; Ederlina needed no consent from him to dispose of said properties because of the Constitutional proscription against foreign ownership of real property. He cannot even recover the money used to purchase them. Heirs of Ayuste v. Court of Appeals Proceedings for the annulment of sale must be brought within ten years of the date of the questioned sale and within the existence of the marriage as provided for in NCC173. The questioned sale occurred in 1987 by Rafael Ayuste. Rafael died in
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 45 1989. Christina Ayuste filed for annulment of sale only in 1990. Although the petition for annulment was filed well within the ten-year period, it was filed when the marriage was no longer existing. The sale, therefore, is valid.
Villaranda v. Spouses Villaranda The issue here, is whether or not the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of Respondent Honorio Villaranda is valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court ruled that the Deed remains valid even if the spouses had not put into writing their consent to the exchange. The contract validly exists, and assuming that she did not give here consent thereto, it will only render the contract merely voidable, not void. Ainza v. Spouses Padua and Court of Appeals There was an oral contract of sale between Eugenia (married to Antonio) and Concepcion. Antonio claims that said property was part of their CPG and Eugenia did not ask for his consent. However, an action for annulment of oral contract of sale must be brought within six years from the date the right of action occurred. The sale occurred in 1987; he only filed in 1999. He was thus already barred by prescription to question the sale. Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals Prima Partosa-Jo is entitled to judicial separation of property on account of abandonment. Their agreement was not to be separated but for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and that he would visit and support her. But when she returned to their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he refused to accept her. This constituted abandonment. The physical separation of the parties, coupled by the refusalm by Jose Jo to give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for legal separation of their conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly cohabitated with other women and have not established just cause for his refusal to comply with his duties as husband.
The private respondents in this case, although already of age, gainfully employed and married are still entitled to receive allowance. The NCC gives the surviving spouse and her children the right to receive allowance without distinction. Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, which is only a procedural rule, which states that the widow and minor or incapacitated minors shall receive allowance during liquidation of estate cannot be allowed to impair the respondents’ right to allowance.
Maquilan v. Maquilan Virgilio and Dita Maquilan’s marriage was annulled on account of Dita’s infidelity. On the pre-trial of the case, he entered into a Compromise Agreement with Dita which the Court took as a voluntary judicial separation of properties which was approved by the lower court. Dita was convicted, and thus, if Virgilio had not entered into the Compromise Agreement, he can rightfully forfeit her of her share in their CPG, but no. He was wrong in having entered into an agreement with her, which was binding under FC 134. Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson The Supreme Court held in this case that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the C ourt of First I nstance grounded on the said a greement are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal property. The compromise agreement was allowed by the lower court because it does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. FC 147 (PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE) Requisites for application of FC 147 are: (a) parties are capacitated to marry each other; (b) they are cohabiting (c) exclusively and (d) there is no marriage or it is void (applicable to marriages void under FC36 and 53). When one comes under a co-ownership, it covers (1) wages/salaries; (2) any property acquired between him and partner and (3) property acquired during cohabitation. Fruits of separate property are NOT included.
Metropolitan Bank v. Pascual Nicholson and Florencia Pascual were married, but the marriage and CPG were dissolved on account of psychological incapacity. The two, however, did not liquidate their properties yet. Florencia secured a loan from Metrobank, mortgaged some of the CPG property, and defaulted. Florencia has the right to mortgage ½ of the CPG without consent. This mortgage is valid insofar as Florencia’s share is concerned.
FC 147, together with 148, was codified into the Family Code because the provisions of NCC144 were vague. The main difference between 147 and 148 is that in 147, the parties are capacitated to marry each othe r while in 148 they are not.
Santero v. Court of First Instance, Cavite
Maxey case: They were not legally married until 1919. She dropped dead subsequently. He marries the second time. Second wife sold property in question. SC applied NCC144
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 46 because nobody had vested rights that will be impaired by retroactive application. The property the second wife sold belonged to the first marriage, even though it was acquired during the cohabitation period prior to the 1919 marriage.
Valdes case: This is a very important case. Court agreed with Judge Tirona. Tirona: Once your marriage is void under FC36, you now come under FC147. If it is bigamous, it’s under FC148. For CPG: Fruits are not included for separation. Maxey v. Court of Appeals NCC144 provides that property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship (not necessarily marriage) belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them. This provision is based on the normal, customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. Domingo v. Court of Appeals FC40 reads as: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void and not solely for the purpose of remarriage. The declaration is not solely for the purpose of remarriage. FC40 can also be invoked for actions for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property. Liquidation of their property is just one of the necessary resultants of their declaration of nullity of marriage. Belcodero v. Court of Appeals Alayo Bosing and Juliana Onday were married in 1927; he left the conjugal home in 1946 to live with Josefa Rivera. In 1949, he purchased a parcel of land. Alayo died in 1967, the property was sold by Josefa to Josephine Belcodero in 1970. It’s clear, Belcodero cannot possibly own the land because it belongs to Alayo’s CPG with Juliana. FC147 and 148 cannot apply because it will impair the vested rights of the heirs of Alayo and Juliana. Valdes v. Quezon City Regional Trial C ourt Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Garcia’s marriage was declared null and void ab initio on account of psychological incapacity. The issue now is whether or not FC147 shall apply to parties of a marriage that was declared null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court held yes, because in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code.
Carino vs. Carino 2 women, both named Susan, are claiming death benefits and certain property of Santiago Carino, each women insisting to being his legal wife. The SC st ruled that both marriages were VOID. The 1 marriage is void under Art. 147 (No nd marriage license), while 2 marriage under Art. 148 (bigamous marriage). Neither were entitled to death benefits however, part of the property goes to petitioner because it was purchased during cohabitation and the other part to his legal heirs. Fehr vs. Fehr A couple’s marriage is void ab initio due to FC 36. Upon separating their property, Suite 204, LGC Condominuim was declared to be exclusive property of respondent husband. Wife was able to prove that it was conjugal property because they were already cohabiting when the unit was acquired. Art. 147 requisites were present: They are capacitated to marry, they live exclusively as H&W and their union is w/o the benefit of marriage.
Joaquino vs. Reyes Rodolfo Reyes is legally married to Lourdes Reyes but before his death, he had illicit relations with a woman name Milagros Joaquino. The two women are in court petitioning for ownership of a house and lot. Though the lot was registered in paramour’s (Joaquino) name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband ONLY belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse (Reyes). Gonzales vs. Gonzales Francisco (petitioner) and Erminda (respondent) lived together for 2 years before getting married. Years after, their marriage was declared null and void ab initio and the court divided their property between them. Their property relations should be governed by FC 147, which presumes that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be divided owned by them in equal shares. FC 148 (LIMITED CO-OWNERSHIP) With regard to cohabitation that does not fall under the requirements of FC 147, the separation of their property will fall under FC 148. There is ownership of money, property or industry IF both parties had jointly contributed for the acquirement of these. Ownership shall be
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 47
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FC 50 -
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proportional to their contribution. In the absence of proof, this is presumed to be equal. If one of the parties is validly married to one another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG of valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited (see FC 147 for procedure)
Final judgment by the courts apply to liquidation, partition and distribution of properties. (not applicable in this part yet but it also applies to the custody and support of common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes.) All creditors of the spouses must be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
Juaniza vs. Jose Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo have cohabited for 16 years. Jose is legally married to someone else. Jose owned and operated a jeep that was involved in an accident that caused death and injuries. Petitioners sue Eugenio and Rosalia for damages caused. The SC denied the motion with regard to the liability of Rosalia: Since Eugenio and Rosalia are incapacitated to marry, the rules on ownership of property is NOT provided for by FC 144, as the petitioners claim. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife; Rosalia is not liable. Gomez vs. Lipana nd st nd Joaquin Lipana contracts a 2 marriage while his 1 was still subsisting. 2 wife dies and her heirs (Gomez) are petitioning the forfeiture of the husband’s nd share in a piece of land the spouses had purchased together since the 2 marriage was void ab initio, and that it was the husband who was in bad faith, applying Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code. The SC ruled that the article no longer applies; the nd solution would be to divide the property in half – one half to the 2 wife (heirs) and the other to the conjugal partnership of the husband and his first wife. Yap vs. CA st Maning Yap married Nancy Yap while his 1 marriage to Talina Bianong st was still subsisting, Shirley (petitioner) is his daughter with his 1 wife. Maning dies in a plane crash. The SC ruled that the separation of properties will follow the rules under the New Civil Code and not under the Spanish Civil Code. Therefore, only Talina, her children and Nancy’s children (natural children by legal fiction) are entitled to a share. Nancy will not get anything because their marriage was void ab initio.
Bienvenido vs. CA The third wife of deceased Aurelio Camacho, Nenita, files a petition against nd private respondent (his 2 wife) for the piece of property allegedly sold to her by Aurelio. Luisita claims the land to be hers because she is the legal wife of Aurelio Camacho. However, the marriage of Luisita and Aurelio is not valid, because it was proven that even while he was still married to Consejo, he had already been living with Luisita. Only Consejo may file a claim for the property that Nenita bought. Also, the sale to petitioner must be presumed to be valid because there is no proof that she had bought it in bad faith. Agapay vs. Palang 60-yr old Miguel Palang contracted marriage with 19-yr old Erlinda Agapay while his marriage to Carlina Agapay was still existing. Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land that, upon the death of Miguel, Carlina is st claiming ownership over. The SC ruled in favor of the 1 wife because Erlinda could not provide proof that she had contributed money (she was only 19) to the purchase of the land. Under FC 148, the land belongs to the conjugal partnership of the man and his legal wife. Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez Similar to the case of Agapay v. Palang, the mistress could not provide enough evidence that she had contributed her own money for the purchase of the apartment building. Petition is denied, everything went back to the first wife. Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo Both parties cohabited during their own subsisting marriages and then eventually separated. During their cohabitation, they had set up a successful business together and several properties were acquired in the respondent’s (woman’s) name. Petitioner is claiming for his share of those properties, which respondent is insisting as her own. The SC remanded the case to the RTC, stating that under FC 148, the separation of property will be proportionate to the actual contribution for the acquiring of such. Both parties must show proof that they contributed to the purchases before obtaining a share. Saguid vs. CA Property regime falls under FC 148 because the woman was validly married to someone else before she and petitioner cohabited. Neither had proof of exact amount contributed to the purchase of the property, therefore the property was divided 50-50 between them
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 48 Villanueva vs. CA Joaquino vs. Reyes
(previous cases already discussed ) It doesn’t matter how much property one acquires; there is a presumption of conjugality.
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works 2 parcels of land belonging to Eduardo and petitioner Josefina were levied off because Eduardo owed money to respondent corporation. Petitioner tries to claim land as her own paraphernal property but she could not provide clear evidence that she purchased the land with her own funds prior to the marriage for the court to agree. She also admits that when she and Eduardo started living together, he was already incapacitated to marry her. Therefore, the land presumably belongs to Francisco and his legal wife.
FAMILY RELATIONS FC Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation , is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect . (216a, 218a) Matilde Alavado v City of Tacloban and WCC -Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor. -public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal certificate were held as competent evidence. -The marriage certificate is enough proof of marriage.
Atienza vs. De Castro De Castro was able to prove that she purchased, on her own, the parcel of land by providing evidence. Since they cohabited while Atienza was married to someone else, their property regime falls under FC 148.
Arroyo Jr. v CA and People Mrs. Neri did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri that both will pardon each other’s infidelity. Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after discovering the affair. There is no illegal contract.
Acre vs. Yuttikki Heirs of the deceased Sofronio Acre are claiming ownership over a piece of land which was proven to be exclusively owned by Yuttikki and her sister. Clearly, this does not fall under FC 148 because Sofronio did not contribute any amount for the purchase of the land.
Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)
Signey vs. SSS A man has 3 wives and 6 kids (from his common-law wives). He designated nd 2 wife, petitioner, as the primary beneficiary and his 4 children with her as secondary beneficiaries. However, the SC ruled that the death benefits from SSS should go to his legal wife and his legitimate children below the age of 21. Since he and his legal wife have no kids together, the death benefits for the children go to nd his children with his 2 wife. Petitioner gets nothing.
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
Borromeo vs. Descallar Austrian Jambrich purchased property and put it under the name of his Filipina girlfriend, Descallar. They parted ways and began seeing other people. At one point, Jambrich owed petitioner about P150,000. To pay off his debts, he sold his rights and interest over the properties previously mentioned. He discovered that Descallar had already sold it to someone else. Foreigners may not own property in the Philippines but Jambrich cured the flaw by putting it in Descallar’s name. And since it was proven that Descallar did not contribute a single centavo for the purchase of the property, these properly belong to Borromeo.
NCC 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 49 RPC 20. Accessories who are exempt f rom criminal liability . — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees , with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. RPC 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. RPC 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability . — No criminal, but only civil liability , shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. Gayon v Gayon According to Art. 222 of the NCC, no suits shall be filed between family member unless earnest efforts have been exerted to make a compromise. Art. 217 lists the family relations. Mrs. Gayon is Pedro’s sis-in-law. Her children are his nieces and nephews. This relationship is not included in Art. 217. Silvestre should be excluded
because he is already dead. The case, therefore is not in the purview of Art. 222. His failure to seek a compromise agreement does not bar the filing of the case.
Versoza v Versoza -The CC provision is a general rule. Future support is outside this general rule. Support is everything indispensable for sustenance. -Art. 2035 must be upheld because it maintains the ancient injuction against compromise on future support. Magbaleta v Gonong The SC affirmed the CFI judge. The case, being that Susana was a stranger, does not literally fall under Art 222. The Magbaletas must have their day in Court. De Guzman v Genato Earnest efforts for reconciliation evidently were made even though not expressly stated in the Jutba’s complaint. The fact that he searched for his wife and even enlisted the services of Phil Constabulary shows that the judicial prerequisite of “earnest efforts for compromise” had been made b efore the adultery suit was filed. O’Laco v Co Cho Chit SC held that while respondent-spouses did not formally put the fact of earnest efforts on their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed by law to introduce evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made. What was that evidence? Respondent O Lay Kia importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the Oroquieta property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna. But, instead of transferring the title as requested, Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. This testimony was not objected to by petitioner-spouses. Tribiana v Tribiana It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action which established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts . The failure of a party to comply with the judicial requirement that earnest efforts toward compromise must have been made before the suit against family was filed is a defect but it is curable by amendment of complaint or by presenting evidence.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 50 Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. v Acuna Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. In this case , Hiyas and the Owe spouses are strangers and not related to Alberto Moreno FC 152 : FAMILY HOME Constituted jointly by husband & wife or by an unmarried head of the family Dwelling house where family resides Includes the land where house is situated FC 161
There can only be one family home A person may be a beneficiary of only one family home
Taneo Vs. CA (March 9, 1999) The family home was only registered on Jan. 24, 1966 The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on Jan. 24, 1964 The money judgment was decided under the NCC where registration of the family home is a pre-requisite If, before living in the FH, a loan was obtained which was not paid, it is considered a debt which was constituted prior to the FH therefore not exempt from execution rd You have to constitute the FH on your property, not on a 3 peron’s property FC 153: Period of constitution Deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence From time of constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries reside= exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment To the extent of value allowed by law o FC 159: Death of spouse or both or of head of family FH shall continue for a period of 10 years Or as long as there is a minor beneficiary Heirs cannot partition unless court finds compelling reason
o
Family Home can be dissolved in 4 instances When none of the beneficiaries no longer reside Court issue If it is sold by the person who owns it with the consent of everyone 10 years after one or both spouses die
FC 154: BENEFICIARIES OF FH (those belonging to FC 150) Husband and wife or unmarried head of a family Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers, sisters (LC or IC) who are living in the FH and who depend on the head of the family for legal support Patricio Vs. Dario (Nov. 20, 2006) If you cannot prove that the father cannot support the son, the grandfather’s house as a FH cannot be maintained and thus can be partitioned 3 requisites to be considered as a beneficiary: 1. must be under FC 154 2. must be living in the FH 3. must be dependent for legal support on the head of the family who owns the home FC 155: FH exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: 1. for non-payment of taxes 2. debts incurred prior to FH 3. debts secured by mortgages on the FH before or after constitution 4. debts due to those who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building FC 160:
court may order sale of property if FC is more than amount fixed in FC 157 at time of constitution upon application of a creditor whose claim is not in FC 155
FH must be part of ACP or CPG Or exclusive property of either spouse with the other’s consent Or Property of unmarried head of family
FC 156:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 51
Or property that is subject of a conditional sale on installments
FC 157: Value of FH at time of constitution urban areas shall not exceed P300,000 rural areas shall not exceed P200,000 or may be fixed by law and dependent on currency changes after the adoption of FC FC 158: Requisites for a FH to be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered written consent of: person constituting the same o the latter’s spouse o a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age o court shall decide in case of conflict o does not say if it’s void or unenforceable without consent of child
FC 160, FC 161, FC 162 Provision regarding FH shall also govern existing family residences insofar o as said provision are applicable Ex. When parents consider CPG as FH (even though not registered) o Ching Vs. Ca (Feb. 23, 2004) The family did not benefit from the loan, only the company o CPG is thus not liable for the debts incurred bec. it is not Ching’s exclusive o property Modequillo vs. Breva
see case under FC 155
PATERNITY AND FILIATION FC 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate Natural Illegitimate (who could be legitimated) Legitimate (born and conceived during wedlock Adoption Equivalent to a legitimate child o Exactly the same rights o o
Modequillo Vs. Breva (May 21, 1990) o Not exempt from debt if incurred before FC came into effect Cannot retroact provisions of the FC o FC has prospective application became a FH starting Aug. 3, o 1988 Judgment was rendered on Jan. 1988 therefore FC is not o applicable and therefore not a FH (under NCC, have to register it first as such) Siari Valley Vs. Lucasan (Aug. 31, 1960) o family home constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt from execution Honrado Vs. Ca (Jan. 25, 2005) Such claim shoud be set up and proved before sale of property o Petitioner never brought up the issue during trial o Cabang Vs. Basay First of all, a FH must be constituted on the lad of the head of the family, o not on the land of a third party The FH does not fall under FC 156 therefore cannot be considered as FH o
o
FC 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child Illegitimate child Why? a) parents decided not to marry although capacitated - only this kind can be legitimated b) born out of adulterous relationship - can only be adopted to become a legitimate child Paternity – civil status of father with respect to child Maternity – civil status of mother with respect to child Civil Status can’t be compromised
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 52 Filiation – civil status of child in relation to parents Filiation and paternity – only a court can declare the existence and nonexistence ; it should be judicially established Affinity – relationship that occurs when marriage happens (in-laws) Affinity ceases by the dissolution of marriage that produces it Presumptions Children who are born or conceived in wedlock are legitimate o Doesn’t matter whether wife lives with another man, child is still o legitimate to the father, the legal husband If husband rejects the child as not his, he has one year to do so o
Tan v. Trocio Felicidad Tan, legally married to her husband, seeks the disbarment of Galileo Trocio because he supposedly raped her and got her pregnant which resulted to a daughter which Felicidad named Jewel. She also wanted support and recognition of Jewel by Galileo Trocio. SC ruled that since Felicidad was legally married to her husband, Jewel is the legitimate child of Felicidad and her legal husband, unless proven otherwise: physical impossibility of access Jewel couldn’t also be an unwanted child having been named, Jewel. Finally, oral testimony of helpers, photographs of Jewel playing with Trocio doesn’t prove paternity especially if mom is legally married to another man
Angeles vs Maglaya Aleli Maglaya want to be declared as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco, alleging that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva (wife of first marriage) with Belen, wife of second marriage (this marriage has been confirmed by Aleli) SC ruled that Aleli isn’t the legitimate child of Francisco because the marriage of her mom and Francisco wasn’t pro ven, no marriage certificate presented (NSO certified!), no priest was presented as witness and none of the witnesses could affirm the marriage No testimony that Genoveva and Francisco presented themselves in public as husband and wife. Aleli’s wedding picture showing Francisco giving her away is insufficient Francisco also didn’t sign Aleli’s birth certificate, thus she wasn’t even a recognized child if dad didn’t sign birth certificate, no presumption of legitimacy
SSS vs. Aguas 2006 Rosanna, wife of deceased Pablo Aguas, filed for death benefits from SSS. She alleged that he is also survived by his minor child, Jelynn. It was also found out that Rosanna and Pablo were separated already. SC ruled that only Jelynn could avail of the death benefits since she was proven to be a legitimate child (marriage proven! ) and she had a birth certificate signed by deceased Pablo. Art 164: children born during marriage: LEGITIMATE Rivera vs Heirs of Villanueva 2006 Angelina claims to be the natural daughter of deceased Pacita Gonzales as against the heirs of Pacita’s common-law-husband. SC held that she can’t inherit from Gonzales coz it wasn’t sufficiently established that she was Gonzales’ biological daughter since when she was born, Gonzales was already in her menopausal stage. Although she was listed as adopted, there is no showing that they went through the adoption process. She didn’t show her bcertificate to prove her adoption. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parent is not a valid adoption FC 42 The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. FC 43 (1) The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. The children conceived and born during the marriage of a woman (whose previous husband was presumed to be dead) and another man shall valid even though this second marriage has been terminated already by the reappearance of the presumed death husband (of the woman). This “bulaga” husband though as to execute an affidavit in court of his reappearance
FC 54 Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 53 legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void Children conceived or born during a voidable marriage before the judgment of annulment are legitimate Children conceived or born during a void marriage falling under Art 36 (psychological incapacity) and 53 (not complying with the requirements found in Art 52), before the declaration of nullity are legitimate
Art. 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. FC 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action FC 174 Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code
NCC 364 Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father NCC 374 In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion NCC 376 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority NCC 888 The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided NCC 979 Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child Moore v. Republic (1963) Elaine Moore wanted to have her minor, legitimate son by a previous marriage, use the name of her new husband, Moore. Court ruled that the laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father Art 364 provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of his father. There might be confusion as to paternity. Family name grants legitimacy. Art 369 also states that in case of annulment of voidable marriage, the children conceived or born before the annulment shall principally use the surname of father.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 54 Naldoza v. Republic Legitimate children (especially minors) aren’t allowed to adopt the birth name of their mother as their own surname because to discard the father’s surname removes prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry. Mother’s desire should not be the sole consid eration, nor the fact that their father was a swindler To allow this change of name would cause confusion to the minor’s parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate
Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code except children of voidable marriages before marriage is judicially declared annulled (Art. 54) children of void marriages before this marriage is declared void (Art. 36) children born and conceived out of the subsequent marriage before termination (Art 53 –void marriage coz of non-compliance with req) children born and conceived of subsequent marriage (with the new husband) before the termination of this marriage upon the reappearance of the presumed dead spouse (Art 42, 43)
Marquino vs IAC (NCC is used coz FC can’t retroact, vested rights will be impaired) st 1 issue: Art 285 clearly states that in action for recognition of a natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents except if the mom or dad died during the minority or if a document should appear of which nothing has been heard where mom or dad recognizes the child The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. Thus in this case, the father didn’t recognize the child during his lifetime although the case was already instituted before he died nd 2 issue: Right of child can be transmitted to heirs if before the child died, action for recognition has already been filed (Conde vs. Abaya) HOWEVER, under FC, even if minor, when dad dies, no action for recognition coz minor here is illegitimate
FC 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 ( within the life time or heirs for 5 years), except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172 ( open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws) in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent Comparison: for legitimate children, he has his lifetime to file for recognition however for illegitimate children, he only has the lifetime of the dad to file for recognition Voluntary acknowledgment – if father is dead, child can’t file for recognition anymore
Ong vs CA Alfredo and Roberto were able to prove that they were the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong through “over means as the ROC provides” Testimony of witness saying Saturnina (mom) cohabited with o Manuel for a period in time without Saturnina having any sexual relationships with other men Defense that Manuel was not sterile wasn’t proven by o medical evidences Dolores Dy, common-law-wife of Manuel treated them like o relatives as shown in the pictures and tokens of affection given by Dolores Dy to the boys
FC 165
FC 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child Osmeña de Valencia v. Rodriguez (1949) Illegitimate children of Pio Valencia were allowed to use the surname Valencia because he has allowed them to do so. Since birth, these children have been given and have borne the surname with the father’s consent. This also still applied under the FC. Jao vs CA
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 55 Blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity. In this case, the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mom and that of the alleged father are cross-matched. Blood grouping is merely conclusive as to exclusion
Uyguangco vs CA Graciano Bacjao alleges that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased Uyguangco thus he is entitled to inherit the properties left by the latter. However his legit children are saying he doesn’t have evidence Court ruled that Graciano, in absence of the documentary evidence provided by the civil court (record of birth, a will, statement before a court record, or any authentic private writing by Uyguangco recognizing Graciano) can not be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of a man who is already dead. (Art 278 of NCC) Mangulabnan v. IAC Edna Mangulaban filed for support for her illegitimate son by Ambrosio Asero. It was already proven that he was the biological son through testimonies; he was also an illegitimate son because Ambrosio was married thus he didn’t have the capacity to contract a marriage with Edna. Filiation, though, must still be proven, according to NCC 887. Two ways: voluntary recognition (will, birth certificate, statement before a court of record, private document) and compulsory recognition (court action recognizes filiation). In this case, the son had a birth certificate signed by the father and had 2 witnesses to prove paternity and filiation. Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals Teopista was able to prove that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro, although he denied such in court. Casimiro provided her and her husband with livelihood. He allowed to their son to build a house in his lot. Casimiro opened a bank account for them. Relatives of Casimiro testified Teopista’s mother and Casimiro were sweethearts and that he gave Teopista money ( PEDIGREE) Declaration of Teopista’s mother Teopista called him as “Papa Miroy” Under Art. 172 (other methods), she has established her status as the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
De Santos vs. Angeles 1995 All the eleven children of De Santos from his second marriage are illegitimate because an American divorce is worthless in the Philippines and when these 11 children were born, De Santos still had a subsisting marriage to Sofia Bona. They can’t be legitimated after the death of De Santos first and legal wife because at the time these 11 children were born, De Santos didn’t have the capacity to contract a marriage with their mother. (although they got married in Tokyo, that marriage was invalid because in the Philippines, De Santos still couldn’t contract a marriage) Lim vs. Court of Appeals 1997 Maribel Cruz was able to prove that Raymond Lim was the father of his daughter despite his denial through handwritten letters he wrote to Maribel saying that they were lovers, through pictures of him cuddling Joanna, the daughter, through the payments he made for hospital bills and the apartment he rented for her, his name (with his consent) appearing on the certificate of live birth of Joanna and the fact that he even got a copy of Joanna’s birth certificate when she started going to school (as evidenced by the receipt in his name) SC ruled that Maribel was able to establish filiation under Art 175 of FC, paragraph 1: record of birth appearing in civil registrar Tijing vs CA 2001 (case of the kidnapped son ) It was proven here that Angelita wasn’t the real mother of Eduardo Tijing because Angelita, during the time Eduardo was conceived and born couldn’t bear children anymore because she underwent ligation There was no evidence that she got pregnant nor she bore a child during the period in which Eduardo may h ave been possibly born It was the common-law-husband of Angelita who filed the birth certificate of Eduardo (who was there named Thomas) four months after the alleged birth, instead of the midwife or the attending Dr. There was a testimony from Vasquez that she helped Bienvenida (real mom) during the delivery of Eduardo and that Eduardo (now named Thomas) had very strong similiarities with Bienvenida. And there were also clinical records to prove such birth. Writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of the said child. Eceta vs. Eceta 2004
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 56 Rosalina was able to prove her filiation to Vicente through the photocopy of the birth certificate which was duly authenticated by the civil registrar and signed by Vicente himself. This act of signing alone, Vicente has acknowledged his paternity over Teresa
Briones vs. Miguel 2004 Joey Briones seeks to have joint custody of the child since at present, the child is already with his mother in Japan. However, since the son is an illegitimate child (natural since the parents were legally capacitated to remarry but decided not to), and his parents are separated, naturally, he must live with his mother. Under 213 of the FC, children below 7 years old must not be separated from their mothers Under 176 of the FC, the illegitimate child shall use the surname and shall be entitled to support from the father. Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals 2004 Mom here was claiming that her son was also the son of her boss, Cabatania. She said that her husband left her in the early part of 1981 and her son was born in 1982. Filiation wasn’t proven here because the birth certificate of the minor child wasn’t signed by the alleged father, the boss of the mom. Mom’s testimony was false when she claimed that she was a widow but in fact her husband was still alive. Thus this son was declared by the court as the legitimate son of the mom and her legal husband (who left her) since they still had a subsisting valid marriage. (Art 167 of FC) Agustin vs. Court of Appeals 2005 An unrecognized illegitimate child is still entitled for support as long as it is proven through means provided by court (Art 172) In this day and age, DNA testing is possible to prove the filiation of a son to the alleged father, however it is still not conclusive to conclude paternity, it is only conclusive to conclude non-paternity. An illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative father, must prove his filiation to the latter. BASIS for RULE ON DNA evidence (Agustin) Below 99.9% - merely corroborative evidence Above 99.9% - disputable presumption
No match – conclusive
Notes from Legarda’s lecture 1. Legitimate Children can prove filiation under Art. 172 2. Illegitimate Children may establish filiation under Art 175 3. Proof of Filiation of Legitimate and Illegitimate Children a. Record of birth – signed by father b. Public documents (like a will or statement in court record) c. Private handwritten documents 4. Under Art 173, only child can prove filiation, this right is intransmissible nd 5. Legitimate Children can prove filiation under Art 172, 2 paragraph, number 2 (any other means which the ROC provide) a. School records b. Last will of the father c. Last will of the sister d. Pedigree e. Witnesses, testimonies f. Marriage of parents g. Cohabitation h. Use of surname i. Baptismal certificate j. Family photographs 6. Only father can say that the child is not his 7. No one else can impugn his legitimacy 8. Ways to prove filiation for ill egitimate children (father has to be alive) a. Relatives of the father recognized the child b. Execution of wills or statements in court record c. Sexual relations d. Support e. Employment f. Use of residence, use of surname g. DNA h. called him papa i. pedigree – most important j. father registered birth k. report cards l. birth certificates signed by father Alba v. Herrerra Father's petition to cancel reference to him as father in a child's birth certificate is granted. Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother unless
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 57 recognized by the father. Love letters and notes submitted are not admissible because they are merely photocopied and are not proven to be an authentic writing of the putative father. In this case, the child is unrecognized and therefore will not take the surname of the father.
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
Angeles v. Maglaya Corazon, claiming to be deceased's sole legit child. Is she? Presumption of legitimacy may be availed only if there is proof of the marriage and the child's conception or birth during marriage. In this case, there was no proof of marriage presented. Also, a past case had pronounced her as not a legitimate child. Res judicata.
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
Guy v. CA If action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of a illegit child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for up to 4 years from attaining majority. Verceles v. Posada Authentic writing is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. The handwritten letters of Teofisto in response to Clarissa’s confession of her pregnancy, two of which were in his letterhead as Mayor, are conclusive that he had sired Verna. Moreover, in his Memorandum he admitted his affair with Clarissa, his exchange of love letters, and his giving money during her pregnancy. People v. Umanito Rape. Court ordered DNA testing. With the advance of DNA technology, it is possible to determine whether appellant is the father of the child. Montefalcon v. Vasquez Mother filed for acknowledgment and support alleging that Laurence is the illegit son of Vasquez. He signed birth certificate. If the father signed the certificate of live birth, there is no need to file any action for acknowledgment. DOJ Opinion No. 11 DOJ Opinion No. 4 FC 166.
Andal v. Macaraig As long as he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage, he is presumed legitimate. It can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible to have intercourse during the first 120 days. Just because he had tuberculosis and can barely move doesn't make it physically impossible. "The funniest case in the whole wide world" (Legarda, 2009). Macadangdang v. CA She had an affair, and because of that affair she was separated from her husband. She gave birth. The son is the legit child of the spouses. CC 255: Children born after 180 days after marriage and before 300 days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legit. No other evidence shall be admitted against this presumption other than physical impossibility. Concepcion v. CA The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from marriage. To overthrow this presumption it must be shown that there was no access that could enable the husband to be the father of the child. Even if they were separated for 10 years and she already is living with another man, the child still belongs to the valid marriage. The real husband is shown to be living in the same town so physical access was not impossible. AM No. 06-11-5-SC Rule on DNA Evidence the court may order DNA testing. It is final and executory and shall not be appealable.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 58 Jao v. CA Blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity. People v. Tumimpad same as Jao. A man was dropped as suspect from a rape case because of the result of a blood grouping test with the child. Tijing v. CA SC opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage. Herrera v. Alba So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests Agustin v. CA compulsory DNA testing does not go against the right to self-incrimination. It is constitutional. Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz The putative father died during the pendency of the action for recognition. Court remanded for DNA analysis. DNA tests can be had even after death of the putative father, as long as there are biological samples. People v. Quitoriano the fact that the girl gave birth 10 months after the alleged rape doesn't mean the rapist isn't the father. Gestation period can extend beyond 40 weeks if it's the woman's first pregnancy. FC 166 (3) Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
FC 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a) Chua Keng Giap v. IAC This case involved maternity, not paternity. Who better than the putative mother would know if someone is really her son? It is the putative mother who could say that Chua Keng Giap is not her son. Rodriguez v. CA Transition from CC to FC. CC 280 repealed by the FC 175 = illegit filiation can be proved in the same way as legit filiation. FC 172 also cited. FC 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a) FC 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a) FC 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 59 If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) Cabatbat-Lim v. IAC Violeta claims that she is an acknowledged natural child, to inherit. But there were no hospital records that the putative mother ever gave birth, nor record of her birth certificate. Being neither a legally adopted child nor an acknowledged natural child, she's not a legal heir of the deceased. Gaspay V CA Recognition of illegitimate child was proven through letters and the fact that petitioner used the deceased’s last name. Benitez- Badua V. CA showed that FC articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 can only be used when a husband impugns that a child is his, not when both spouses allege that the child isn’t theirs. In this case, it was proven that she was not the couple’s biological child since wife never became pregnant which witnesses corroborated and birth certificate is dubious because it stated that she was born in their household not in a hospital. Liyao Jr. V. Tanhoti-Liyao petitioner William Liyao is considered to be the legitimate son from the first marriage and not the illegitimate son from the extramarital relationship his mother had. This is considering that first marriage is still legal and no legal separation was made. Legitimacy is favored more than illegitimacy even if mother contests legitimate status.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Notes: Father who signs birth certificate of child assumes legitimacy unless it’s a fake (mom never got pregnant/contrary evidence) If father signs prima facie evidence of filiation Date of marriage is there – legitimate. Continuous and open filiation – direct, spontaneous, and public admission that he is father (doesn’t need to be forever) Continuous possession is NOT recognition, merely a ground to compel filiation.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Notes: - Legitimates – whole of child’s lifetime to prove legitimacy (doesn’t’ matter if father’s dead). Can’t pass on right (in transmissible) except when she dies during (1) minority (2) insanity (3) dies while instituting the action Diaz V CA legitimacy of child was proven through the ff evidence: (1) school records bearing the last name of the father, (2) last will and testament which recognized him as brother and sister of full blood children, (3) sister’s confirmation that he was her brother during her appointment as administrator of their father’s estate, (4) court order mentioning that he was their brother which they did not contest. All these evidence if taken individually do not prove legitimacy but when taken together do. Reyes V CA Petitioner was not able to prove her illegitimate status since no sufficient legal recognition was shown in documents she presented ie. School
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 60 Definitions discussed: - authentic writing, - does not need to be a public instrument but should prove that it was in alleged parent’s handwriting and the contents of which correspond to actual facts or signed by parent. - Public instrument – either (1) private individuals who execute documents authenticated by a notary or (2) documents issued by competent public official with formalities req by law - Marriage certificate is NOT a public instrument since it wasn’t notarized and is only declaration of contraction parties of their marriage. Tison V CA testimony of aunt regarding petitioner’s pedigree is proof of her legitimacy. In order for declaration of pedigree to be considered the ff should be present: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4) that the declaration was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the suit). Such declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimant’s right over the declarant’s own estate. If however the declaration is to claim a right from another family member other than the declarant’s estate the declaration may not be deemed credible. Trinidad v. CA Shows application of NCC Art. 267. Petitioner was able to prove legitimacy even without a marriage of birth certificate through the ff: certification that records were lost, witnesses to prove marriage, baptismal certificate, photos, consistent use of surname without objection from relatives.
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A baptismal certificate, though it may signify that alleged parent was her father, is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Tecson V Comelec shows application of FC 172’s “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws”. Legitimacy of FPJ was proven through notarized declaration of FPJ’s maternal aunt,, as proof of the acts of his alleged father recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, such as living together with FPJ’s mother and siblings in one household. De Jesus V Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon concerns two persons who want to be recognized as the illegitimate children of the deceased Dizon who also recognized them in accordance with rules as his illegitimate daughters. However Court held that before they can prove their illegitimacy they must first impugn their legitimacy since they were born during the subsistence of their mother’s marriage to another man Jesus. No proof of physical impossibility was presented and certificates of live birth also recognize Jesus as their father. Thus only when their legitimacy has been disputed can the paternity of Jesus be rejected. Agustin vs. Court of Appeals explains that DNA Testing to prove illegitimacy is not self-incriminatory since the right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. DNA testing also does not violate the privacy of the person since it only seeks to enhance public service and the common good.
Jison v. CA shows application of FC 172 and 175. Showed evidence of her illegitimacy through school records showing that alleged father spent for her education, notes and letters written by relatives, contested affidavit where she denounced her illegitimate status , high probability of being conceived while mother was in employment of alleged father.
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz shows that even if the alleged parent is dead, DNA testing can still be applicable. Death does not negate the application of DNA testing as long as appropriate biological samples are still available such as blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Labagala v. CA Petitioner relied on her baptismal certificate to prove her legitimacy however a baptismal certificate cannot substitute for a birth certificate.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 61 The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether someone was his child or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against a child.
Notes: Compare with art 172 – IS established not may established. 173 – can be brought in lifetime of child (voluntary acknowledgment) unless it’s under 172 for continuous and open filiation of illegitimacy.
Ilano V Ca discusses that while child may have been conceived through an adulterous relationship, this does not mean she cannot file for recognition. Evidence of his recognition of her such as financial support, testimonies, and signing her school records as her father prove that she is his illegitimate child.
Juan Castro And Feliciana Castro Vs.Ca shows how one proves illegitimacy through voluntary recognition which is defined by NCC 131 : “The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document.” In this case, it was shown when he himself took care of and registered her record of birth in the municipality. Thus even if his signature was missing, his actions clearly show his voluntary recognition of her. This is different form compulsory recognition that requires judicial pronouncement of illegitimacy since recognition was made in a private document.
Baluyut V Baluyut discusses how in order for an illegitimate child to inherit, he must voluntarily or compulsory be recognized by his parent (NCC 283). Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer upon illegitimate children any hereditary rights in the estate of the deceased. In this case, there was no evidence to show voluntary recognition since the father did not sign the records of birth. Compulsory recognition was also not present since the testimonies proved that father was trying to hide the fact he had an illegitimate child.
Lim V CA Petitioner alleging she is a recognized natural child produced her marriage certificate as evidence where her alleged mother gave her consent. She declares that this is a public instrument, which shows mothers recognition (Art 1216 of Civil Code of 1889). However, public instruments are defined as public documents authenticated by a notary or a competent public official. A marriage certificate is not a notarized public document but a mere declaration by the contracting parties of their marriage.
Proof of Filiation
When action should be filed
1. Record of birth
lifetime
lifetime
Voluntary recognition
2. Public document
lifetime
lifetime
Voluntary recognition
3. Private hand written lifetime document
lifetime
Voluntary recognition
4. Open and continuous lifetime possession of status of a legitimate child
lifetime putative only
of Ground to parent recognition
prove
5. Any other method
lifetime putative
of Ground to parent recognition
prove
Heirs Of Raymundo C. Bañas, Vs. Heirs Of Bibiano Bañas respondent tried to prove that he was an acknowledged natural child through handwritten notes where alleged father wrote “Su padre.” However this does not immediately translate to recognition of filiation. In private writings, filiations should be EXPRESSLY SHOWN in order to become evidence (NCC 278). Private authentic writing which is under compulsory recognition should expressly state recognition. In re Christensen When evidence and testimony showing that throughout his life the alleged father recognized child as his own, and only in his will did he say he wasn’t his child negates the evidence found in the will
Nature Legitimate Child Illegitimate Child
lifetime
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 62 only
Article 172 of the Family Code Mendoza vs Court of Appeals (September 24, 1994) An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws” according to the Civil Code, or “by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is his father” according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, a common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the other means whixh proved that Teopista Tunacao has been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child are: the financial doels made by Casimiro (alleged father) to Brigida Toring (Teopista's mother) the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro when Casimiro sold the vehicle, he gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista Casimiro gave permission to Lolito Tunacao (Teopista's son) to buid a house on his land Casimiro opened a joint account with Teopista Marquino vs Intermediate Appellate Court The heirs of natural child cannot continue the action for recognition upon the natural child's death. Recognition is not transmissible. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the putative parent, except in the following cases: 1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file action before the expiration of four years from attainment of his majority. (does not apply to the case since it was filed when Bibiana was already 45 years old) 2. If after the death of the father or mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action should be filed within four years from the discovery of the document. (no such document in this
case) The action for recognition of a natural child is extinguished at the death of the putative father. The party in best position to oppose the case is the putative parent himself. The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent.
Fernandez vs Court of Appeals (February 16, 1994) Photographs showing closeness between the alleged father and the petitioners are inconclusive. A birth certificate which is not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity. Testimony of the priest who baptized the child was not given weight as he could not possibly recall every parnet of the children he baptizes. Eceta vs Eceta (May 20, 2004) Respondent Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with the deceased Vicente Eceta by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate, which was signed by Vicente. The act of signing alone shows that Vicente has acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. If the birthe certificate is signed by the father, the child need not prove anything else. David vs Court of Appeals (November 26, 1995) → Father brought illegitimate child to Borocay with his legal family. Father then refused to give back son to the mother. Mother filed a petition for habeas corpus. Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an illegitimate child is under the parental authority of his mother. As a consequence of such authority, the mother is entitled to have custody of the child. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “no child under seven y ears of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”. Recognition of the child is only a ground for support and not custody. Also, affluent life does not guarantee grant of custody. Petition for habeas corpus is a proper remedy for those deprived of custody when they are entitled thereto. Tonog vs Court of Appeals (February 7, 2002) Law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. But father's right to custody is also recognized if the mother is proven by compelling reasons to
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 63
be unfit (neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immortality, etc.). If the child is older than 7 years old, he is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. It can give custody to other parent if the child's preferred parent is proved to be unfit. It can also give custody to a third person. Fitness of mother for custody is a question of fact (case remanded to trial court).
Liyao vs Liyao (March 7, 2002) → Wife cohabited with another man and had a child by him while her marriage is still subsisting. Upon death of her lover she sought for her child to be recognized as the legitimate child of her lover (who is filthy rich). The law presumes that all children born within a valid marriage are legitimate (even if the spouses in this case had been living separately for 10 years or if it was physically impossible for them to have sexual intercourse when the child was conceived and born) NCC 262 provides that the impugnation of the legitimacy of the child may only be validly invoked by the father and not the mother of the child, because “he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. FC 167 provides that “the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adultress”. Leonardo vs Court of Appeals (September 10, 2003) → Child of common-law spouses not allowed by court to use her father's surname. Article 176 of the Family Code: Illegitimate children SHALL use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.... During this case RA 9255, which allowed recognized illegitimate children to use theis father's surrname, does not exist yet. Republic of the Philippines vs Capote ( February 2, 2007) → Unrecognized Illegitimate child who used his father's surname was allo wed to have it changed to his mother's surname. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such (FC 176 which repealed NCC 336) The child is entitled to change his name as he was never recocnized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father.
RPC Art. 345 Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity . — Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced: 1. To indemnify the offended woman. 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing. 3. In every case to support the offspring. PD 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) Article 46. General Duties. - Parents shall have the following general duties toward their children: 1. To give him affection, companionship and understanding; 2. To extend to him the benefits of moral guidance, self-discipline and religious instruction; 3. To supervise his activities, including his recreation; 4. To inculcate in him the value of industry, thrift and self-reliance; 5. To stimulate his interest in civic affairs, teach him the duties of citizenship, and develop his commitment to his country; 6. To advise him properly on any matter affecting his development and well-being; 7. To always set a good example; 8. To provide him with adequate support, as defined in Article 290 of the Civil Code; and 9. To administer his property, if any, according to his best interests, subject to the provisions of Article 320 of the Civil Code. Article 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who: 1. Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his civil status. 2. Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive him of the love, care and protection he needs. 3. Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration. 4. Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in life and financial conditions permit.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 64 5. Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required by Article 72. 6. Causes, abates, or permits the truancy of the child from the school where he is enrolled. "Truancy" as here used means absence without cause for more than twenty schooldays, not necessarily consecutive. 7. It shall be the duty of the teacher in charge to report to the parents the absences of the child the moment these exceed five schooldays. 8. Improperly exploits the child by using him, directly or indirectly, such as for purposes of begging and other acts which are inimical to his interest and welfare. 9. Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately subjects him to indignation and other excessive chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him. 10. Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life. 11. Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon, regardless of its ownership. 12. Allows or requires the child to drive without a license or with a license which the parent knows to have been illegally procured. If the motor vehicle driven by the child belongs to the parent, it shall be presumed that he permitted or ordered the child to drive. "Parents" as here used shall include the guardian and the head of the institution or foster home which has custody of the child.
Solinap vs Locsin (December 10, 2001) → birth certificate presented as evidence was falsified Birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. Photograph of child with mother near the coffin of the putative father cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased. People of the Philippines vs Delantar (February 2, 2007) → rape victim of Romeo Jalosjos needed to prove filiation to the accused so that the maximum penalty for prostitution can be impposed upon the putative father. The birth certificate of the victim is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to the accused-appellant. Where the birth certificate presented was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the
alleged filiation.
Gapusan vs Court of Appeals (March 15, 1990) → The mother in her statement of assets and liabilities, GSIS life insurance, and application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teacher's Federation named the petitioner as her daughter. These documents were authenticated. The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by the mother is a public document having been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the law. A public document with recognition of filiation proves voluntary recognition (refer to table). → Petitioner must be held a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of her mother; therefore, entitled, in accordance with NCC 282, to bear her mother's surname and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code. People vs Barranco (August 31, 1989) Rape convist does not have to recognize child he had by his victim, but he has to support the child in accordance with law. People vs Rizo (August 30, 1990) → A 2-year old mentally retarded woman raped and impregnated by her yaya's husband. Trial court erred in ordering accused to recognize the child as his legitimate son despite the fact that said accused is a married man. If the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, whether legitimate or illegitimate. People vs Magtibay (August 6, 2002) → Raymundo Magtibay was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for rape. Considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child's status. Accused should only be ordered to indemnify the victim and support the child. Dempsey vs Regional Trial Court → Cases filed against father of an illegitimate child for violation of provisions in PD 603 (abandonment and refusal to give support) Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as provided in Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 65
months or a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or both. What is being sought in one of the two cases is the continuity of the support by the father. This cannot be the basis of a criminal conviction. The law itself (PD 603) protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that " all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible to do so. The new Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority. In this criminal prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case.
People vs Bayani (Octber 3, 1996) Admission of accused of paternity of rape victim's child gives rise to obligation to provide support. Rape convict who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring. FC Article 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a) Abadilla vs Tabiliran → Judge Tabiliran charged for gross immorality for publicly cohabiting and marrying another woman while his first marriage was still subsisting. Despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between the judge and his first wife. Article 269 of the Civil Code states that: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment
to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3) there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and (5) it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
ADOPTION Lazatin v Campos: The issue was whether Renato could take part in the estate of deceased Mariano Lazatin which hinges on the issue of whether Renato was an adopted illegitimate child of the deceased. His only evidence of adoption was an affidavit executed by the brother of the deceased. SC denied his petition: Only an adoption made through the court is considered valid. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. Only the records of the court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. Cervantes V Fajardo: After a court order making Angelie the adopted child of spouses Cervantes, her natural parents took her away from the said adoptive parents, demanding P150,000 otherwise they wouldn’t pe rmit the adoption. Court ruled that Angelie properly belongs to the adoptive parents, since a decree of adoption has the effect, among others of dissolving the authority vested on natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. Daoang vs. Agonoy: (the case that answered the grounds for disqualification from adoption) Grandchildren petitioned for the disqualification of their grandparents from adopting, invoking Art 335 of the NCC, which states that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. SC ruled that under E.O. 91, which is the law in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 66 E.O. 91, Art. 28 Enumerates the following persons who may not adopt: (1) married person without written consent of spouse; (2) guardian with respect to the ward prior to the final approval of his accounts; (3) person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (4) alien disqualified to adopt under laws of his own country or one with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations; (5) alien whose government or place of residence abroad has no agency that can provide competent professional evaluation (Homestudy) of adoptive family and post-placement services to the child and the family. Duncan vs. CFI: Petitioners are aliens who wished to adopt Colin Christensen, natural child of an unwed mother who didn’t wish to reveal her identity that is why she was represented by a certain Atty Velasquez. CFI dismissed since under NCC 340, written consent of the parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted is mandatory. Question is whether Atty Velasquez is a proper person required by law to give consent to the adoption. SC ruled that since the mother abandoned the baby and the attorney was the one who had actual physical custody of the infant, she is the guardian of the baby. In short, consent to the adoption of the natural mother who abandoned her child is not necessary. Person who had actual custody of the abandoned child (legal guardian) is sufficient. Ma’am Legarda skipped the cases when she was discussing adoption in class, saying that what’s important here is to memorize RA 8552. RA 8552: An Act establishing the rules and policies on the domestic adoption of Filipino children and for other purposes (baka itanong sa bonus) IMPORTANT! Provisions to memorize (sabi ni maam): 1. Who may adopt (section 7), 2. Who may be adopted (section 8) 3. Whose Consent necessary for adoption (section 9) . SEC. 7. Who May Adopt 1. Any Filipino citizen a. of legal age, b. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, c. of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
d. e.
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, (note: requirement may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent ; f. has means for support and care of the child. 2. Aliens have the same criteria as above for qualification provided that a. alien’s country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, b. alien living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the application for adoption c. alien was certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency with the: i. certification of the legal capacity to adopt in alien’s country, ii. certification allowing the adoptee to enter alien’s country as his/her adopted son/daughter: 3. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualifications to adopt may be waived if the alien is: a. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; b. one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse; c. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or 4. The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. 5. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt , except when (i) spouse seeks to adopt his/her spouse’s legitimate kid (ii) spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate kid: pero dapat may consent pa rin yung other spouse (iii) spouses are legally separated from each other. SEC. 8. Who May Be Adopted. a) below eighteen (18) years of age declared available for adoption; b) The legitimate kid of one spouse by the other spouse; c) illegitimate kid by a qualified adopter to make her legitimate d) A person of legal age if he had been treated like the child of the adopter since he was a minor e) A child previously adopted f) An “ulila”, pero bawal ampunin within 6 months after the death of parents
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 67 SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption . a) The kid being adopted, if 10 years old and above b) biological parents, or the legal guardian, or the agency having legal custody over the kid; c) legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any: d) illegitimate kids, if 10 years of age or over, of the adopter if living with adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. Landingin vs RP written CONSENT of natural parents, adopter’s children and adoptees are needed (Sec. 19 RA 8552 “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” . The natural right of a parent to her child requires that her consent must be obtained before her parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. Leaving custody and care of children to another when she works abroad does not constitute ABANDONMENT. Mother still sends financial support. Adopter is already of old age and failed to prove FINANCIAL ability to support adoptees. Pardo de Tavera vs. Cacdac (1988) It is not bureaucratic technicalities but the best interests of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. Department of Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Social Services and Development) refused to issue travel clearance to the adopted child of the British couple for the MSSID must first have a case study and for failure to comply with the 6 month trial period under Art. 35 of PD 603 “THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE”. The court dispensed with the trial period for it is satisfied with the report of the court’s Social Worker and that the couple works abroad. The money handed to natural mother by the Brits is just a gesture of assistance and not contrary to Art 32 of PD 603 (hurried decision to give up custody). Court decision is final and executory and refusal to issue the child a passport is depriving the Brits of their vested legal right to be with their adopted child. Republic vs Toledano American citizen married Filipina which in turn became naturalized US Citizen. The husband cannot adopt the younger brother of his wife because FC 184 provides that an alien (not married to a Filipino) cannot adopt unless he is a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a blood relative. It may appear that the wife can adopt her own
brother because she used to be a Filipino but it is against FC 185 which provides that the spouses must adopt jointly unless the adoptee is one’s illegitimate child or the legitimate child of his spouse.
FC 189Effects of Adoption: a. adopted becomes adopter’s legitimate child; b. natural parent’s parental authority is terminated; and c. adopted remains an heir of blood relatives. (amended by PD 603 (1)-same as a.; (2)-same as b.; (3)-use of surname) FC186 When spouses adopt or the one adopts the legitimate child of the other, there is joint parental authority.(amended by A29 of EO 91 (amends PD 603)-husband and wife who jointly adopts will exercise parental authority as if the adopted is their own natural child, if one spouse is an alien-spouses must jointly adopt) EFFECTS OF ADOPTION Tamargo vs CA Adoptee shot and killed someone a month before his grant of adoption. To hold that parental liability is retroactively lodged to adopting parent is unfair and unconsociable since they could not have foreseen or prevented the shooting since the adoptee is not yet in their custody. Natural parents are lodged with the parental liability for it exist between parents and a minor LIVING with them whom law presumes to exercise supervision and control over the child. Cervantes vs. Fajardo Natural mother took her child and demanded money from adopting parents. The provision that child under 5 years old shall not be separated with mother shall not apply when court rules otherwise considering the moral, physical, social welfare of child taking into account the resources, moral and social standing of contending parents. Aside from the fact that parental authority of natural parent is already dissolved by the adoption (FC 189 par.2), natural mother is not morally upright (jobless, maintaining illicit relation, has a child different from adoptee’s biological father, biological father has a legitimate family.) FC 189-see above FC 190 -provides for the legal succession to the estate of the adopted (6 paragraphs not mentioned in Stephanie Garcia case) In the matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia-The child can use her natural mother’s surname as middle name. Even if the adopted is deemed to be a
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 68 legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes, it is necessary to preserve and maintain filiation with her natural mother because she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter under FC A189(3).
FC 191Minor/incapacitated adopted represented by an authorized person appointed by court can file for rescission on grounds same as for loss of parental authority. Adopted 18 yrs old can rescind adoption on same grounds as for disinheriting ascendants (amended by PD A40- only the first sentence of FC 191 remains) FC 192adopter may rescind adoption if a. adopted committed act which is ground for disinheritance or b. if adopted abandoned the adopters at least 1 yr or by some other acts that definitely repudiates adoption (amended by PD 603 A41-1. when adopted attempted against life of adopter/s; 2. adopted abandoned home for 3 yrs and unable to locate after earnest efforts; 3. some others acts of adopted that definitely repudiates adoption.) FC 193If adopted is minor after rescission, parental authority goes back to natural parents if qualified, if not, court appoints a guardian. If adopted is incapacitated, court determines guardian. Rescission terminates relations between the adopted and adopting parents, including use of adopters’ surname. Rescission is recorded in registries. (amended by PD603 A42-no significant changes). Lahom vs. Sibulo Adoption is a privilege given to Adopter. It is in the best interest of the child. Adopter cannot rescind adoption (RA 8552 Sec. 19). Even if the FC is applied prescription is only 5 years from adoption. However as provided in RA 8552 Sec. 19, the adopter can disinherit the adopted under CC A919. SUPPORT FC 194 Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Professor: Must be indispensible. A cellphone or a car is not indispensible. Once your 18, your support is gone, exc ept when you’re still in school. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a) Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a) Kinds of support Conventional support – living under 1 house. Judicial – if you don’t support, you will be compelled to. Legal support – you are not required but the law says you can and you will be reimbursed. Support is 1. Intransmissible 2. Exempt from attachment 3. Reciprocal (Art 195) 4. Variable (dependent on circs and time) Pelayo v Lauron Physician assisted in childbirth. He sent the bill to the woman’s in -laws. SC: The inlaws cannot be compelled to give support when the husband is present. Medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support; therefore, when one spouse is sick, the other is under the unavoidable duty to give support. The physician therefore must send his bill to the husband, not the in-laws. Sanchez v Zulueta
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 69 Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, he must be given that opportunity
Reyes v Ines-Luciano While the case of LS was ongoing, the wife asked for Support pendent lite. The husband said that support should not be given because the wife committed adultery. SC: He should give support PL. REASON 1: Adultery was not sufficiently proven. Mere allegation is not enough. There must be evidence. REASON 2: The support is sourced from the conjugal partnership. Note: Reason 2 is now ineffectual because of the Lerma case. Lerma said that adultery, if sufficiently proven, is a good defense, regardless of the source of the support. De Asis v CA The guardian and father of the minor Glen came into an agreement to the effect that the father will not anymore support the child. The court approved the agreement. The guardian changed her mind and filed again for support. Husband argues res judicata. SC: Res judicata does not apply to cases of support because support is dependent on the needs of the supportee. The latter can file anytime if he needs support. Furthermore, Article 301 says that support cannot be renounced. Also, NCC 2035 says that future support cannot be a subject of compromise. De Guzman v Perez Failure to give support even though you have the means to do so is already a crime - neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603. The crime has the the offender is a parent; (2) he or she neglects his or following elements: (1) her own child; (3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and (4) the offender’s station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the child. Professor Legarda: It is also punishable under RA 9262. That is economic abuse. Lerma vs. CA (1974) 1. Husband (petitioner) filed an adultery case against his wife (respondent), and was convicted. Wife filed a complaint for legal separation, asking for support pendente lite. 2. Adultery is a good defense against a claim for support pendente lite.
3.
Within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 61 - The probable failure of the wife’s (respondent) suit for legal separation can be foreseen because she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery.
Reyes vs. Ines-Luciano (1979) 1. Wife (respondent) filed a complaint for legal separation against her husband (petitioner), asking for support pendente lite. Husband alleges that wife was an adulterer. 2. While adultery is a defense in an action for support, alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence. 3. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. Mangonon vs. CA (2006) 1. Husband and wife’s marriage got annulled. 7 months after, wife gave birt h to twins. Twins were about to enter college in the USA but lacked finances. Demanded support from the grandfather (father-side) due to her exhusband and her inability to finance the education. 2. Obligation to give support rests on those more closely related to the recipient, in the following order (FC 199): a. Spouse b. Descendants in the nearest degree c. Ascendants in the nearest degree d. Brothers and sisters 3. In this case, Francisco (grandfather) was tasked to give support to his grandchildren in default of their parents. 4. Support pendente lite was awarded in arrears, computed from the time they entered college until they finished. Canonizado vs. Benitez (1984) 1. CA ordered the husband to give support to his wife and daughter. Husband & wife instead entered into an agreement regarding the support, which the husband did not fulfill. Wife filed a motion for a write of execution which was denied by the respondent judge for reason of prescription. 2. Judgement for support does not become dormant and the five-year period for executing it by motion does not apply. 3. Judicial compromise may be enforced by a write of execution. The other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 70 4.
Obligation to give or the right to ask for support does not cease permanently – right to support subsist throughout the period that the marriage subsists.
Lacson vs. Lacson (2006) 1. Husband left his wife and legitimate daughters, promising to support them but never did so their uncle advanced money first. Wife filed a case for support, which was granted. Husband appealed. 2. FC 207 – “When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or rd fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any 3 person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.” 3. Amount of support which those related by marriage & family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver & to the needs of the recipient. Sy vs. CA (2007) 1. Wife filed habeas corpus against her husband to produce their 2 children, and custody was awarded to her. Husband alleges unfitness of wife, but failed to prove so. 2. In legal separation – custody of the minor child shall be awarded to the innocent spouse. Living separately without court decree – custody of the child will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent to live with if over 7yrs. old, unless parent chose is unfit (moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty.) 3. Law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children. 4. FC 203 – obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. PARENTAL AUTHORITY FC209: Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children , parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and wellbeing. (n) Sacred duties: 1. caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness
2. develop their moral, mental and physical character
FC210: Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a) Medina V Makabali (in connection with sacred duties as in enumerated in Art. 209) Mom Zenaida Medina left child to Dr. Makabali who gave birth to the child. Dr. Makabali reared the child as her own. SC said mom, who is living with a married man, is completely remiss of sacred duties, never even paid him a visit. The minor's welfare is supreme over any right by parents to exercise authority over them. Unson V Navarro Mom is living with her sister's husband. Mom was declared unfit by SC. Part of the sacred duties is the development of the child's well-being. Custody went to dad. Mom is given visitation rights. FC211: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. - Children's duty: to respect and obey parents (take note: not love) - Parents decide jointly but Dad's decision prevails, even in marriage, because of Art. 211 + Art. 45
FC223 - 224 They can put you in boy's town! FC223: The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority , may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 71 However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
FC224: The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper.
RA 6809: you are emancipated at 18. Once you're 18, you are emancipated from your parents. Eslao V CA Angelica was left to her paternal grandmother while mom was in the US. Grandmom refused to give Angelica back because she said mom abandoned child. SC gave custody to mom because she did not abandon Angelica, just left the child to grandma because grandma said she needs to grieve son's death. When left with grandparents, that is just temporary custody.
mother shall be deprived of custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reason to the contrary.
Espiritu & Layug V Ca Mom left conjugal home because she had affairs with husband's colleagues. She filed petition for custody. SC said Art. 213 does not hold age of child as paramount consideration, but the child's best interests. SC denied her of custody because it cited her infidelity as a compelling reason, and both children, who are now over 7 years old, chose dad. Santos Sr. V Ca Mom is working in the US while dad is a soldier. Child was in temporary custody of the maternal grandparents who claims that dad abandoned the child and is unfit because he goes from place to place. SC granted custody to dad because according to Art. 213, when one spouse is absent, the other parent takes over. A legitimate father is always preferred over grandparents. Bondagjy V Bondagjy Christian mom converted to Islam when she married muslim man and had 2 children. They separated, children lived with her with grandparents, converted Christians. Muslim dad filed for custody of 2 children and alleged wife is unfit. Sharia court gave custody to muslim dad. SC said since wife is now Christian, her fitness is governed by Family code. Evidence presented was not sufficient to establish her unfitness.
FC212: In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.
People V Glabo Glabo was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua for raping his retarded niece. SC held there is no need for him to acknowledge child since a person sentenced to RP loses parental authority. RPC Art. 345, requires indemnification, acknowledgment of child and support. Since RP carries with it civil interdiction, he is only required to indemnify and support the child.
FC213: (7 years-old rule) In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Vancil V Belmes Bonifacia's son, US serviceman, died. Bonifacia filed guardianship over kids. SC said they have a mom who is alive. Mom is not shown to be unfit. Custody goes to mom. Even if mom is shown to be unfit, Bonifacia still cannot be substitute guardian since she is American citizen.
Hontiveros V IAC Dad visited the child one day and never returned her. He filed petition for custody and tried to claim that mom is unfit. SC cited Art. 363, CC and Art. 17, PD 603: No
Sombong V CA Sombong could not afford hospital bills so her child was detained in the clinic of spouses Ty. Sombong visited child after 2 years in the clinic. Upon investigation, Dr.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 72 Ty said they gave a child to the Neri spouses (child named Christina Neri). Mom however cannot be sure if Christina Neri is her daughter. SC said custody cannot go to Sombong because she Christina is not her long lost child, and that Neri sps is in better position to care for the child.
FC 211: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
FC 212: In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the Court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the Court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children;
FC 63: The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
Tonog V CA The welfare of the child is always the first consideration. The child should not be wrenched from his familiar surroundings, away from the people and places to which she has attachments. The suitability of a parent is a question of fact.
FC 213: In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
FC 49: During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of parent with whom they wish to remain as provided for in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parents. FC 102: Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
Laxamana V Laxamana The children’s paramount interest demand that appropriate proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of the parents to obtain custody. Roehr V Rodriguez A hearing, finding/determining the fitness of the parent(s) to assume custody, is necessary for the welfare of the child. A foreign divorce can be recognized but it’s effects regarding custody of the children must be determined by the courts. Briones V Miguel For the welfare of the child, it shall be observed that the mother has custody of the said child. Only compelling reasons, like the unfitness of the mother, will it be otherwise. Gualberto V Gualberto Only moral lapses that adversely affect the child & distract the parent from caring are compelling reasons to deprive the parent from custody. Lesbianism, prostitution or infidelity are not, even during the tender age of the said child. Silva V CA
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 73 No man bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care and exercising special parental authority, inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
Salientes V Saliente In a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
Vancil V Belmes Substitute parental authority may be exercised in case of the death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents.
Sy V CA The law favors the mother, if she is a fit and moral person, to have custody as a mother’s love and devotion has no substitute.
FC 218:
FC 214: In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.
The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibililty shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
FC 219: FC 215: No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime, against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
FC 216:
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
FC 233: The person exercising substituting parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
FC 221: Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
NC 2180: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 74 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and l ive in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Palisoc V Brillantes As long as the students are in attendance to the school, the heads and the teachers exercising supervisory custody are to be held liable if they cannot show that they had been responsibly performing their duty. Amadora V CA Where the parents place the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher shall be the one answerable for the torts committed by the student while under his custody unless it can be shown that necessary precautions were undertaken to prevent the injury. As a general rule, teachers in charge of the student is liable for the acts committed by the latter in academic schools whereas in establishments of arts and trades (vocational and technical schools), it is the head thereof that shall be liable. Under the doctrine of Reddendo singula singulis,
“teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices”.
Salvosa V CA The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school does not constitute “attending school” or being in the “protective or supervisory custody” of the school. It must be shown, that for the teacher or head or school to be held liable, the student was attending a class or school function. Psba V CA School may be liable even if injuries by the stabbing incident were caused by elements outside the school because there is a contract between school and student: to provide an atmosphere to study. Case was remanded to the lower court for further hearing, even if a contract existed, the school can still be NONLIABLE if they can prove they exercised due diligence in providing security to the students. Saludaga V FEU SC reiterated that a relationship between a school and the student is a CONTRACT. Because FEU showed NEGLIGENCE when they failed to screen the security guards provided by the agency. FEU is liable to the students while the agency is liable to FEU. St. Francis High School V CA SC said that when a parent does not allow a child to go on a fieldtrip (swimming) but gives him MONEY to buy food, it means the PERMISSION was given. TEACHERS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT because they administered CPR. SCHOOL was not held liable, not on school premises, teachers not exercising basic duty, was able to prove due DILIGENCE. St. Mary’s Academy V Carpitanos During the enrollment (an AUTHORIZED school activity) a 15 year old boy took hold of a rented jeepney ( NOT OWNED by the school but by the owner of the school) and the steering wheel detached killing a number of people. The SCHOOL was NOT LIABLE; the PARENTS of the 15 year old were LIABLE, they were also the owners of the rented jeep. Child Learning Center Gr150920, November 25, 2005 Student was locked in the CR Got out the window and fell, almost dead The parents sued
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 75 -
SC said res ipsa loquitor : SCHOOL is responsible
School Of The Holy Spirit V Taguiam Gr 165565 July 14, 2008 Grade 5 teacher asked permission to use the schools swimming pool Teacher asked kids to bring consent/permits/waivers Kiara’s permit wasn’t signed but mother brought child to school with her swimsuit Only Esmeralda was the teacher present 2 kids were sneaking away, while she was away Kiara Mae drowned Teacher was fired (labor case) SC said, TEACHER WAS LIABLE because PERMIT WAS UNSIGNED, and should not assume that mother gave consent even if she brought the child and the swimsuit. FC 215: No descendant can be compelled to testify against parents and grandparents Except when indispensable
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Love and affection Moral and spiritual guidance Physical and mental health Education Representation Demand respect and obedience Discipline Other duties imposed by law upon parents and guardians
FC221: Parents and other persons exercising parental authority Civilly liable for injuries and damages Unemancipated children under their authority FC222: guardian ad litem, court appointed FC 223: disciplinary measures parents may take FC224: disciplinary measures may include commitment of a child to an institution
ROC130, S25: Rules of Admissibility Sec. 25: Parental and filial privilege No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a) ROC130, S22-23: Sec. 22: Disqualification by reason of marriage During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a) Sec. 23: Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
FC220: Rights and Duties Of Parents 1. Support, educate instruct
Medina V Makabali Dr. Makabali exercised the duties in 220 Child was abandoned Court gave guardianship to Dr. Makabali Luna V IAC Illegitimate child sued her father and his wife because parents have taken over her illegitimate child SC found Maria Lourdes and husband as unfit Compare to : CANONIZADO Even if there was a court ruling declaring that child will go to o parents Court looked into the situation when child said she would kill o herself Both parents were unfit o Grandparents were preferred o Cuadra V Monfort Parents were not liable Kids were in school o
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS FINALS REVIEWER | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 76 o
Normal things children do (tried to scared playmate, headband hit her eye)
RA 7610: THE CHILD ABUSE LAW FC225-226: Have been modified by RA 9231(Child Labor Law) FC225: Father and mother: joint legal guardianship over child’s property Bond is required Where market value of child’s property exceeds P50,000 o Annual income of the child exceed P50,000 o Pineda V CA Joint authority does not require court ruling or bond except when it exceeds P50,000 There was no proof that these were the ONLY properties owned by minor children FC226: Properties belonging to the child in ownership Right of parents over fruits of children’s property Primarily for child support o Secondarily for the collective daily needs of the family o ADVENT ITIOUS PROPERTY Ownership – child o Usufruct – child o Administration - parents o RA 9231 Sec12-B and 12-C Sec. 12-B: Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working Child's Income The wages, salaries, earnings and other income of the working child shall belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set aside primarily for his/her support, education or skills acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs of the family: Provided, That not more than twenty percent (20%) of the child's income may be used for the collective needs of the family. "The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through the work of the child shall be administered by both parents. In the absence
or incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall administer the same. In case both parents are absent or incapacitated, the order of preference on parental authority as provided for under the Family Code shall apply.
--NO longer about the fruits, modifies FC226 - whole things is the child’s only 20% of what he makes is for the use of the family - required to set-up a trust fund composed of 30% of the income - should report to the DOLE Sec. 12-C: Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child's Income The parent or legal guardian of a working child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the earnings of the child whose wages and salaries from work and other income amount to at least two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for which he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the fund to the Department of Labor and Employment, in compliance with the provisions of this Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age of majority.
FC227: Rules when parents entrust their property to a child PROFECTITIOUS Owner – parents o Usufruct – parents o Child is entitled to a monthly allowance As what they would pay for someone to else to administer the property Administration – child o Shall not be deducted from share/inheritance Lindain V CA Parents cannot sell property owned by the child without going to court Minors cannot give CONSENT If you discover that parents did this without your consent: 30 years to recover
Badillo V Ferrer
