Case Digests - Persons and Family Relations (3)

1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES

2. PEOPLE VS. VERIDIANO

FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town‗s police statio n commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.

FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense. Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review the respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982. RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against th e Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2 months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The wor d ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars & regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that, every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasn‗t in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.

HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod, then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.

3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

4. MRCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations implementations and administrative orders.

FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its nonobservance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazett e. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

HELD: Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights."

3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

4. MRCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations implementations and administrative orders.


The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazett e. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

HELD: Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights."

5. YAOKASIN VS. COMMISSIONER

6. KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags / sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin.

FACTS: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.

On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This Section 12 states that a decision of a Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either commissioner commissioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory. The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette. RULING: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.

The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In Clause V, the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 years, the debt w/ interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in Clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in Clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in Clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under Clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force. One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.

xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated. The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of good faith. The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

7. PUZON VS. ABELLERA FACTS: The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v. Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was covered by a town site reservation. This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Town Site Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain. The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of taxes. Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative effect. ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively RULING: Yes. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.

8. ACOSTA VS. PLAN

9. MRCA VS. CA

FACTS: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino Magday. After the answer, the complaint was amended to implead the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants. Magday filed an amended answer. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filed separate answers to the amended complaint.


After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied by the respondent Judge. They filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court granted their motion to appeal as paupers. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order was filed by the appellants. They mailed their record on appeal to the Court. The lower court denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the appellants raising the lone legal question of whether for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant, the timely submission of a record on appeal is required. ISSUE: Whether or not the law can be given retroactive effect. RULING: The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'

HELD: It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

10. BPI VS. IAC

11. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

FACTS: The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines [hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the Philippine Islands(hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a corporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case.

FACTS: This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

HELD: Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the oneman legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII. HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

12. MARTINEZ VS. VAN BUSKIRK FACTS: Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila. When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, was coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff‘s head and injuring the

carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant‘s employee tied the driving

lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver. RULING: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.

13. ARMIGOS VS. CA

14. NAMARCO VS. TECSON

FACTS: The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the f iling of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.

FACTS: On October 14, 1955, the CFI-Manila rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on October 21, 1955 served upon defendants in said case. On December 21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, f iled with the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Defendant Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely, pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought within 10 years from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on December 21, 1955 or 30 days from notice of the judgment -- which was received by defendants on October 21, 1955 -- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which the 10 years from December 21, 1955 expired. Plaintiff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, because when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on D ecember 19, 1955. Plaintiff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year.

Petitioner‘s contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy

of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977. HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days. [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.]

15. BARRETTO-GONZALES VS. GONZALES FACTS: The plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated and have not lived together as man and wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barretto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barretto and her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barretto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada, invoking Sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also pra yed that the marriage existing between Barretto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barretto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case. ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. RULING: Art 9 and Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in

manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals. Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that ―Laws relating to

family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country‖. And the last par t of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 17 also states ―...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts &

their property, and those intended to promote public order & good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a foreign country.‖

16. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO

17. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis. While in Misamis, Escano asked for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation and damages against wife and parents in law.

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal. RULING: No, the divorce and the second marriage are not recognized as valid. As stated in Art. 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. The Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of the code, instead of divorce; legal separation is used, wherein marriage is still recognized. To recognize a decree of divorce of foreign courts would be violation on public policy and Article 17 of Civil Code. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced elsewhere. It would not make any difference if Tenchavez was also in the court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗t

confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of adultery. As result, the petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation, and may recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.

1983, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon

Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

18. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA

19. PEOPLE VS. RITTER

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

FACTS: Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by appellant who inserted a foreign object into her vagina causing her death. A criminal case and a civil case was filed against the defendant

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter ―had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983‖.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. RULING: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

HELD: Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victim ‗s heirs despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is im pliedly instituted with the criminal action. The doctrine in Urbano v IAC, wherein a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable, is applicable.

20. ROE VS. WADE

interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy,

FACTS: Roe (petitioner), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county District Attorney Wade (defendant). A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does‘

complaint was not justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted.

including a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy, against

state action. 3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman‘s health and the potentiality

of human life at various stages of pregnancy. 4. No. The natural termination of Roe‘s pregnancy did not render her suit moot. 5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief. The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left to the judgment of the p regnant woman‘s doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the mother‘s health by regulating abortion procedures related

to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is

The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross- appealed the district court‘s judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.

―capable of repetition, yet evading review,‖ is an exception to the general

ISSUES: 1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States? 2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion? 3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion? 4. Did the fact that Roe‘s pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot? 5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?

The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. § 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.

RULING: 1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures on the mother‘s behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other

rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action is initiated.

The

Does‘

complaint

seeking

injunctive

relief

was

based

on

contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallford‘s case for injun ctive relief because once the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them. 3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child‗s PERSONALITY In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines

21. GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

22. QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint. Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney‘s fees. The defendant -

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari .

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its

appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing‘s failure to

allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint.

progenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa mere.‖ Article 742 of the

RULING: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child ( conceptus pro nato habetur ) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order. Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to

his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused‖ per Article 21 of

the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

23. DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA

24. LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE

FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a

FACTS: Fragante filed an application for a CPC to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan. Pending application with the Public Service Commission (PSC), Fragante died and he was substituted by the legal representative of his estate. The PSC granted the application. Petitioner contends that the PSC erred when it allowed the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante as the party applicant in the case pending before the commission.

cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant‘s brother in law Vicente

Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonia‘s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February

1931, he even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante can be considered as a

to eat on time for her and ―junior‘s‖ sake. The defendant ask his friend

RULING: There would be a failure of justice unless the estate is

Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

considered a ―person‖. Within the framework and principles of the

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

persons, the term ―person‖ used in section 1 (1) and (2) m ust be deemed

ISSUES: Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. RULING: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The m ere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. ―The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's r esolution to admit the status‖. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

―person‖.

constitution itself, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural to include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfilment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.

25. DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTICS

26. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ

FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria‘s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria‘s testate estate.

FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas‘ brothers and sisters unaware of the former‘s

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana‘s body to

the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio‘s residence. The court ordered

that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased. RULING: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that ―Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.‖ Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where ―a man

RULING: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos‘ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria‘s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria

as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court‘s judgment

against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney‘s fees against the corporation.

and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions‖. In addition, it requires that the ma n and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

27. JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

28. SMITH, BELL & CO. VS. NATIVIDAD

FACTS: On Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. The building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three

FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato, brought to Cebu for

daughters who fell. Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn‘t want to leave so he left with his son, his son‘s wife and neighbor

Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. The German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. On Feb. 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin, survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN, Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit. ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the case at bar. RULING: No, neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions, as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available when there are facts. Upon the issue of who between the mother and son died first, in light of the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be arrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.‘s merchandise between

ports in the islands. An application for registration was made at Cebu at the Collector of Customs, but was denied. This is because they were not citizens of the US or the Philippines. Based on Act 2671, Sec. 1172 of the Certificate of Philippine Register; upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. Domestic ownership, as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizen of Philippines, or US, or both. Plaintiff‘s contends that

Act No. 2671 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law, the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use. ISSUE: Whether or not Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process of law by the Philippine Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761. RULING: No. (judgment is affirmed, and plaintiff can‘t be granted registry.) Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippine Coastwide trade, falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview of the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the arteries of the commerce in the Philippines. If one be severed, the lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of the country and general welfare is sustained.

29. BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ

30. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS

FACTS: The defendant Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on July 5, 1901. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until November 14, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Manila.

FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one other persons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with two others as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severally Standard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of the debt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) that

In January 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other properties, belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the properties which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the plaintiff. HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.

her husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 b y Manila‘s Court of

First Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, with authority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given by her husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanently insane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane and unable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason asked the court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence for Villanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond. The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacity to act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908. ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva, appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908. RULING: No, he wasn‘t. ―Capacity to act‖ mus t be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long contrary is not proved, that is, at the time of his acting he was incapable, crazy or out of his mind; which, in the opini on of the court, has not been proved in this case.‖ There was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane.

31. MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU

32. YOUNG VS. TECSON

FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the notary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the thing benefited by the defendant.

HELD: Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not estop him from denying that he was of age or from asserting that he was under age, at the time he entered into the contract, for the breach of w/c an action is brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the liab. resulting from misrepresentation has its juridical source in the capacity of the person making the misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making the misrepresentation cannot bind himself by contract, he cannot also be bound by any misrepresentation he may have made in connection therewith. A person entering into a contract must see to it that the other party has sufficient capacity to bind himself.

According to the Defendant, the plaintiff‘s mother had sold a portion of the original land to the defendant for a sum. The plaintiff‘s father

subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for a sum to cover his children‘s welfare after his wife‘s death. The plaintiffs

had alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400. Cross-complaint filed for damages due to the malicious and unfounded complaint by the plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age. RULING: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their majority. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppels.

The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not aff ect the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract.

33. BAMBALAN VS. MARAMBA

34. SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land. He was forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell the land to Genovena Muerong, since she was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to the loan Genoveva gave Paula. To have the document of the sale acknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the petitioner. Isidro didn‗t try to conceal his age; in fact the respondent was well aware that Isidro was a minor.

FACTS: Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent Ramon) executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five parcels of land to petitioner Sia Suan. A few days later (within the month after the sale of the parcels of land), Ramon‘s counsel wrote to Suan‘s husband, Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the ground that Ramon was a minor when the signing took place. After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter, Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiao‘s counsel to ratify the sale. After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw Chiao, as payment for the sold parcels of land/ Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold the parcels of land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio inherited it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the piece of land in question void or valid. RULING: The sale of the land is void because Isidro is incapacitated to and hence, cannot be sold. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot

Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance of Laguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground of his minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; action

be used since the petitioner didn‗t try to hide his age

was denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramon‘s father and brother,

enter into such contracts, and because the land wasn‗t even registered

Art. 38 NCC provides that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. The land in question wasn‗t even registered in the Register of Deeds; the

sale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided in section 50 of Act. 496.

Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved. Ramon brought case to the Court of Appeals which reversed the CFI Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Alcantara‘s execution of the deed of sale is valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution. RULING: Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due to his act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect. The deed of sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it. Ramon is not allowed to annul such deed, because he already ratified it. Mercado doctrine is applicable in this case. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith; he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its ratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because he executed it while still a minor. ―…pr evious misinterpretation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract‖. The Court of Appeals said

that Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the Supreme Court holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in the deed of sale, due to his minority. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring any costs on their part. Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu, herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstance that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee‗s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from

disavowing the contract.

35. BRAGANZA VS. VILLA ABRILLE

36. US VS. VAQUILAR

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.

FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The

ISSUE: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. RULING: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because they minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.

witnesses‘ evidence for insanity include: • ―appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the ti me he was killing his wife.‖ • ―he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn‘t have killed his family‖ • at the moment of cutting those people, ―he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random‖ • sister said, ―…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me‖

ISSUE: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.

However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – ―in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of

RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of ―crazy‖ is not s ynonymous with the legal

deceit.‖

is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.

The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

terms ―insane‖. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.

37. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS

38. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN

FACTS: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity.

FACTS: Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old and was hired as a housekeeper by the mother of the accused. Accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lives with his mother. On March 16 1976 in the evening, after dinner, Estelita was sent to help the accused in the store. At 11pm, the accused called Estelita to help him close the door of the store and he

ISSUE: Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. RULING: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money.

suddenly pulled her inside and said ― come, let us have sexual intercourse‖ in which Estelita said she don‘t like. D espite the struggle of

Estelita, Policarpio was able to rape her and told her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her. But somehow, the family of the accused was able to find out which made Estelita leave the house. Estelita was crying on her home and told her mother about what happened. During trial, the accused pleaded not guilty but in the end he was convicted. He then appeal to the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime. RULING: Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. If there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairments was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. The testimonies negate complete destruction of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. The fact that the appellant threatened Estelita with death reveals to the court that the accused was aware of his act. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his a ffirmative allegation of insanity and the accused was not able to prove it. Although it is not a exempting circumstance under art 12 of Revised Penal Code, it is a mitigating circumstance under the art 13 of RPC.

39. ABELLA VS. COMELEC

40. CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO

FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte.It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.

FACTS: In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the ―residence‖ is more on the principle of ―intention‖, the animus revertendi rather than anything else.‖ In this

regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendi evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." HELD: In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.

The complaint alleged, in short: ( a) that defendants promised such marriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and ( c ) that without cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word. HELD: The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."

41. DOMALAGAN VS. BOLIFER

42. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant a certain amount upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the defendant; that he has completed his obligation under said contract by paying the stipulated amount; that notwithstanding said agreement, the daughter was joined to a lawful wedlock with another man not his son; that immediately upon learning of the marriage, he demanded the return of the payment he has made. The trail court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective. RULING: Plaintiff invokes paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action and, appellant argues that the verbal contract, not having been reduced to writing, plaintiff cannot recover. The section relied upon by the does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. RULING: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorney‘s fees. Because of

defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his se xual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

43. WASSMER VS. VELEZ

44. ESTREMOS VS. EPHAN

FACTS: Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that they have to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And on

ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of promise to marry can be recoverable for damages.

the next day he sent her the following telegram ―Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love Paking‖.

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. The record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to- be‘s trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the m aid of honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before the wedding he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of promise to marry. RULING: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, m ere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower court‘s judgment is hereby affirmed.

RULING: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong and by clear and manifest intent of the law making body is not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, any award of damages is untenable.

45. TANJANCO VS. COUIRT OF APPEALS

46. BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santos, he expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953 to Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to marry her or to give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21.

FACTS: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilou‘s parents to secure th eir approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. RULING: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, which in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained an intimate sexual relationship with a man, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint.

Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong. RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, ―deflowered‖ her since she believed that his promise to marry was true,

In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed.

and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.

47. PANGANIBAN VS. BORROMEO

48. IN RE SANTIAGO

FACTS: Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribed a contract before notary public Elias Borromeo. Respondent cooperated the inexecution of the document although he may not fully understand the content of the document. The substance of the document permits the husband and the wife to live in an adulterous relationship without any opposition.

FACTS: Ernest Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for nine years, sought the legal advice of respondent Atty. Santiago, a notary public in Negros Occidental. Santiago assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and told the latter to bring his wife that afternoon to process the document which authorized each other to marry again and waive whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. Relying on the validity of the document, Baniquit on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage, with Trinidad Aurelio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral practice RULING: Yes, the contract contained a provision which is contrary to law, morals and public order and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. In his instance, if the spouse should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, it is far from the purpose of the Legislature to bar to legalize adultery and concubinage. The agreement between Alejandro and Juana prior to marriage were contrary to law, morals and public order, as consequence not judicially recognizable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract prepared by a notary public annuls a marriage of Baniquit to his (first) wife. RULING: The contract executed between husband and wife upon the advice, prepared and acknowledged by a lawyer and notary public is contrary to law and morals, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent as well as the preparation and acknowledgement by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

49. SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA

50. LICHAUCO-DE LEON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. The contract, signed by the spouses and two witnesses before the culpable judge, divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses between them, and licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity; and withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other.

FACTS: On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. In October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences. On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage and filed for distribution of marriage but Jose Vicente was a Filipino Resident. On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon. Said agreement contained the payment sum of P100, 000 and transfer of lots conveyed to her who Macaria did. On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Macaria intervened that the properties in distribution which she paid was her properties and assailed that the purpose of validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement is the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente which states:

ISSUE: Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to dissolve their marriage is valid. RULING: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the provision under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, which state that the following shall be void and of no effect: (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife. Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which permits the husband to take a concubine and for the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public orders, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. The judge having become a lawyer in 1948, who was in good faith and with honest intent to terminate the marital conflict, since he was not aware of Art. 221 of the Civil Code, was merely reprimanded.

In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband,

Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:

HELD: The Letter-Agreement is invalid, because the use of the word "relations" in the letter agreement is ambiguous and subject to interpretation since Macaria believed it to be dissolution of marriage but for Sylvia it is only dissolution of property relations and that Sylvia and Jose both filed in the court for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Also, under Article 221 of the New Civil Code: The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; The letter agreement is an extra-judicial agreement prepared during marriage by Sylvia so it is void and agreement must be entered by the spouse and not to a third party.

51. PUGEDA VS. TRIAS

52. SISON VS. TE LAY LI

FACTS: The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934. The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two marriages celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 null and void on the ground of plaintiff‘s consent was obtained through force and intimidation employed upon her by her father. Morning of April 28, 1949, a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of MC of Davao; and on the afternoon, they remarried in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office in Davao City. The plaintiff‘s testimony provides that the defendant never wooed her and that the wedding was arranged by her father. Her father whipped her often as she opposed marriage and resorted in to beating her. She then ran away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her again. But when the subject of marriage was renewed, he handed her a knife telling her to choose between her life of his, because of fear that her father might kill her, so she agreed to the marriage

The defendants questioned the marriage of the plaintiff, when they produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. HELD: Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented it to proof marriage. Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.

The testimony corroborated by her mother and Epifania del Rio, a relative of her mother. She lived with her husband in his parent‘s home but considered him a stranger since she doesn‘t love him. Sh e was kept

a prisoner in the house; she never occupied the same bed with husband. The couple never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 having been forced by her husband using a knife. She mustered courage to escape from her husband‘s home . Meanwhile, the defendant claims that the marriages were regular and legal, and entered freely and voluntarily. That she was not kept as a prisoner and that she would ask her father in law to give her and her husband their own house and business. And only once he slapped her — when she ran away with P1200 and when asked where she came from she retorted it was none of his business. HELD: The CFI found the plaintiff‘s marriage consummated only by intimidation and force and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the defendant and declared two marriages between them null and void; defendant ordered to return the P1200 and whatever personal belongings the plaintiff had left in their house. Supreme Court affirmed that while it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled. And also affirmed that there was no voluntary cohabitation on the wife‘s part.

53. VILAR VS. PARAISO

54. ARANES VS. OCCIANO

FACTS: In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.

FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the

Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his r esignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place HELD: Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the power to solemnize marriages. The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself.

couple‘s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his

territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of m arriage license. It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage. Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid. ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction. RULING: The court held t hat ―the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage‖.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

55. MARTINEZ VS. TAN

56. MADRIDEJO VS. DE LEON

FACTS: Plaintiff Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for damages. Plaintiff claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a legal marriage under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage,that they take each other as husband and wife." CFI found for the defendant.

FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de Leon) contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the peace stating that they had agreed to marry, and asking the justice of the peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under oath that they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what they asked for. This statement was signed by them, in the presence of witnesses that they produced. A certificate was then made out by the justice of the peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties had been married by him. Both the parties knew the contents of the document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a marriage.

ISSUES: Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid, and whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo. RULING: With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites. In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

57. BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ

58. NINAL VS. BADAYOG

FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both

FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974 and they had five children who are the petitioners in this case. Twelve years later (1985), Pepito shot Teodulfa which resulted in her death. A year and 8 months after the said death (Dec. 1986), Pepito married the respondent Norma Badayog without a marriage license claiming that they were exempt from the requirement because they had already cohabited with each other for five years as husband and wife. Pepito died in a car accident on February 1997 galvanizing petitioners, the children from his first marriage, to file a declaration of nullity of the subsequent marriage claiming that it was void for lack of a marriage license.

contracting parties were ―separated‖ thus, respondent Judge ought to

know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. RULING: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both ―separated‖ is an impediment that would make their subsequent

marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the five year cohabitation as husband and wife in this case can be considered to have sufficiently met the requirement to be exempt from acquiring a marriage license. RULING: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the t ime of Pepito‘s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

59. REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO

60. PERIDO VS. PERIDO

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition, "where they partitioned among themselves lots inherited by them from Lucio Perido. The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance against the children of the second marriage, to annul the "Declaration of Heirship and ExtraJudicial Partition". Petitioners alleged that the children belonging to the second marriage were illegitimate. The trial court held that the 5 children of Perido were all legitimate and it annulled the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra- Judicial Partition". The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred (1) in declaring that the 5 children were and (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots because the said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong.7.The court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Now, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. RULING: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26, Par. 2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court‘s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, Par. 2 be

interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

HELD: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Because if they are not married, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." The petitioner‘s witness‘s failed to prove the illegitimacy of second marriage.

61. FIEL VS. BANAWA

62. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA

HELD: A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally "married" in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

FACTS: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza is liable for bigamy. RULING: No. Acquitted. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613 provides: ―Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case.‖ Thus, his marriage with Lema is null and void without need for judicial declaration. Third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.

63. PEOPLE VS. ARAGON

64. TOLENTINO VS. PARAS

FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.

FACTS: Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia G. Tolentino on July 31, 1943. While marriage was still subsisting, he contracted another marriage with Ma. Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on Nov. 1, 1948. He was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued living with Clemente until he died on July 25, 1974. Ma. Clemente was the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Tolentino claims that she is the rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for lack of publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void. RULING: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paras is the rightful surviving spouse of Tolentino. RULING: Yes. Petition granted. She needs to obtain judicial declaration from court first before she can request for the correction of the entry. Publication not necessary because all the parties involved are part of the case. Court should order the publication. Conviction of Tolentino for bigamy is best proof that his second marriage is null and void thus, Paras is still his rightful spouse. No need for judicial declaration of nullity for void marriages. Certificate entries though presumed to be correct must yield to positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

65. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY

66. DONATO VS. LUNA

FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the groun d of latter‘s former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.

FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner‘s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato‘s second since she had no previous

ISSUE: Whether Karl‘s marriage with Lilia is void. RULING: No, it is voidable. Petition dismissed. Presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. (CC ART. 85) It is valid until annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. Even if marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially for purposes of remarriage. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia‘s marriage are regarded void under the law.

knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. RULING: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can‘t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

67. TERRE VS. TERRE

68. JONES VS. HORTIGUELA

FACTS: Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dor othy‘s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

FACTS: Jones married Escano in December 1914 and had a child with her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. The court issued an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec. 1919). Later, Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escano died intestate leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly. However, upon Angelita‘s marriage and her reaching the age of majority,

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre‘s marriage w ith Dorothy is null and void. RULING: Dorothy‘s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin; thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother since the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was void because only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization of the second marriage. ISSUE: WON the subsequent marriage can be considered void. RULING: No. It is not necessary that the former spouse be judicially declared an absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage or the former spouse is reputed to be dead and this is the belief of the spouse present. The absence of Jones begins on the date when the latest news about him was received – Jan. 10, 1918. Hence, the more than nine years have elapsed prior to the present spouse contracting the subsequent marriage.

69. IN RE SZATROW

70. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA

HELD: The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not heard from in seven years is dead may arise and be invoked either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got m arried in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. RULING: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo‘s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case: burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state  

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71. CHOA VS. CHOA

72. BARCELONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENGZON

FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.

FACTS: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children. On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo

Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latter‘s psychological incapacity because

according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. RULING: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni‘s personalit y namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona ( petitioner Diana). The

petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged several non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister‗s house or would play tennis the whole day. When

the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the fami ly and to safeguard the respondent‗s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana. RULING: Diana contends that the 2 nd petition of his husband is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine the root cause and at times they couldn‘t determine it). What the new Rules require the

petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement

73. REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO

74. MORIGO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. RULING: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshio‘s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was

never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio‘s illness. This could have been done through

an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. RULING: Morigo‘s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

75. TENEBRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

76. YAPTINCHAY VS. TORRES

FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

FACTS: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that Isidro had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (‗46 -64—Taft Ave., Pasay City, and ‘64 -‘65—Russel Ave., Pasay City). Isidro died without a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with estimated value of about P500K; and left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion. On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together with others exclusively owned by Teresita. CFI granted such appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as special administratrix and of Josefina, as regular administratrix.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. RULING: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner‘s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner‘s

marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner‘s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a

marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes ―any person who

shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings‖. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would

indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

HELD: The petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Art. 144, CC cannot be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.

77. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY

78. TERRE VS. TERRE

FACTS: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilia‘s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the ―agreed facts‖ and to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

FACTS: The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her first cousin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prior marriage was void or voidable.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before entering a subsequent marriage.

RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that her marriage was vitiated by force. Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be irrelevant since the previous marriage wasn‘t void but

merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was made, her current marriage is therefore void.

RULING: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of Attorneys.

79. JOCSON VS. ROBLES

80. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA

FACTS: here the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.

FACTS: Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of concealment of pregnancy, and the wife failed to file a responsive pleading, the court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation. However, the husband refused to show his evidence nor be interrogated by the fiscal.

HELD: The court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly prohibiting the rendition of a decree of annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's father and brothers practically amounts to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

HELD: The court correctly dismissed the complaint for annulment. The investigation of the fiscal is a prerequisite to the annulment of marriage where defendant has defaulted.

81. BUCCAT VS. BUCCAT

82. AQUINO VS. DELIZO

FACTS: Petitioner met defendant in 1938 and married her the same year. Eighty nine days into the marriage, defendant gave birth to a child. It is for this reason that petitioner is seeking the annulment of their marriage. He said she claimed to be a virgin entering into the marriage. The court decided in favor of the defendant despite the fact that she did not appear. The court found it untenable that petitioner did not notice that defendant was pregnant at the time of marriage because she was about 6 months pregnant then. Upon appeal, said decision was affirmed.

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Conchita Delizo married Fernando Aquino in 1954 while she was pregnant. Aquino now claims that her pregnancy was concealed from him because it was of another man while Delizo claims that it was their child out of wedlock. Aquino filed a petition for nullification of marriage by reason of fraud. He presented the marriage contract while Delizo did not present any. The court ruled in favor of Delizo and did not invalidate the marriage because the concealment of the pregnancy does not constitute the fraud that would invalidate a marriage. Aquino tried to reopen the case but it was denied and the CA eventually affirmed the lower court‘s decision saying that it was impos sible for him not to have noticed that the girl was pregnant. A motion for reconsideration was filed or chance to present further evidence to the lower court which he did.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be declared annulled based on the evidence adduced. RULING: The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. This is due to the fact that it was impossible for a person whose intelligence cannot be questioned, being a first year law student, to not have noticed the severe stage and advanced stage that the person he was marrying was in at that time. His claim of developed abdomens being normal is not something the court can accept because it was not just a normal developed abdomen but one in an advanced and severe stage of pregnancy. The court cannot accept that there is fraud.

These evidences were his brother‘s statement that he himself fathered

the child and hid this fact from petitioner and showed pictures of Delizo saying she was naturally plump. The petition was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy constitutes fraud that could annul the marriage. RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative. In the Family Code, the law includes fraud as grounds for nullification of a marriage. In the present case, the pregnancy was concealed from petitioner at the time of the marriage and said child was of another man. This constitutes fraud and can justify an annulment. Petitioner was able to show that the girl was naturally plump or fat which does not make it obvious that she is pregnant. It has been shown that pregnancy is usually obvious on the 6 th month when the roundness actually appears. The case was then remanded for a new trial.

83. ANAYA VS. PALAROAN

84. SISON VS. TE LAY LI

FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and

FACTS: Morning of April 28, 1949, a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of MC of Davao was held, in the afternoon, spouses remarried in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T.

granting Aurora‘s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was

wooed her. And that the wedding arranged by father. The father whipped her often as she opposed marriage and resorted to beating her. She ran away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her again. But when the subject of marriage was renewed, they handed her a knife telling her to choose between her life or his. Because of fear that her father might kill her she agreed to the marriage. Testimony corroborated by mother and Epifania del Rio, relative of her mother. She

being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

Mih in office in Davao City. Plaintiff‘s testifies that the defendant never

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

lived with her husband in his parent‘s home but considered him a stranger since she doesn‘t love him. She was kept a prisoner in the

RULING: The concealment of a husband‘s pre -marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last

knife, she mustered courage to escape from her husband‘s home.

paragraph providing that ―no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity‖ shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the

case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

house; she never occupied the same bed with husband. They never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 forced by husband using a Defendant claims that the marriages were regular and legal, entered into marriage freely and voluntarily. The plaintiff was not kept a prisoner and plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her and her husband their own house and business. She slapped her only when she ran away with P1200 and when asked where she came from she retorted it was none of his business. The CFI found the plaintiff‘s marriage consummated only by intimidation

and force and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the defendant and declared two marriages between them null and void; defendant ordered to return the P1200 and whatever personal belongings the plaintiff had left in their house HELD: While it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled. There was no voluntary cohabitation on the wife‘s pa rt

85. RUIZ VS. ATIENZA

86. SARAO VS. GUEVARA

FACTS: Plaintiff requests the annulment of her marriage on the ground that his consent was given under duress. His wife, whom he had premarital relations, bore a child. When the child was born, the father of his wife allegedly approached him with a knife and in the company of a lawyer. The lawyer threatened his entrance to the bar.

FACTS: On the day of the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant, the marriage was not consummated because the defendant complained of pains. The defendant was operated on and her uterus and ovaries were surgically removed. The removal rendered the defendant incapable of procreation as such, plaintiff wants his marriage with the respondent annulled.

HELD: Petition cannot be granted because the petitioner had several chances of escape before the marriage and because his wife bore his own child. Where a man marries under threat of or constrain from lawful prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid marriage on the ground of duress. Proof of bodily harm must be sufficiently shown. Threat to obstruct admission to the bar does not constitute duress. Only if the threat is so grave that the person is not acting in his own freewill that a marriage becomes void.

HELD: Impotency is not inability to procreate but inability to copulate. Inability to copulate cannot be a ground for annulment and a temporary or occasional incapacity cannot be used as a ground to nullify a marriage.

87. JIMENEZ VS. CANIZARES

88. JOCSON VS. ROBLES

FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights a nd one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

HELD: Where the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings, the court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly prohibiting the rendition of a decree of annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's father and brothers practically amounts to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband. RULING: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.

89. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA

90. JONES VS. HORTIGUELA

FACTS: Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even if the sermons were not served to the respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner requests that she be declared the sole heir of the intestate estate of Marciana Escano, her mother. Prior to the motion, at the time when petitioner was still a minor, respondent was awarded a fixed rate of P10,000for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Petitioner alleged that when her mother remarried in May 1927, the judicial declaration of the absence of her father was not yet effective. As such, the marriage of the deceased and the respondent was null and void.

HELD: The Supreme Court denied because in accordance with NCC 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not fabricated and no collusion is in place.

HELD: Petition denied. Absence of one spouse shall be counted from the last day of communication or from the reception of the last news regarding the absent spouse. In this case, the first spouse was absent for 9 years.

91. LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC

92. GUE VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue. On Oct 11, 1944 Angelina was married to William Gue and had a child Anthony Gue, and another child named Eulogio. On January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to Shanghai China but since then had not been heard of, neither had he written to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to locate him despite of her efforts and diligence. They had not acquired any property during the marriage. She asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William Gue. The Court of First Instance, after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal saying that no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated and this action is not for settlement of the estate of the absentee as it is clear he did not leave an y

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. RULING: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that ―for the purposes

of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

HELD: A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be a prima facie presumption only and it still disputable, it is for this reason that it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, proof of actual death would still have to be determined. The provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil C ode , absence of 7 years, for succession shall not be presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years.

93. PEOPLE VS. MASINSIN

94. BENEDICTO VS. DELA RAMA

HELD: If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that her husband was permanently impotent or sterile, there is no liability.

FACTS: This is an action for divorce on the ground of abandonment and adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to defendant, and asked for divorce. They were married in July 1891 until August 1892, and lived happily together. T he defendant suddenly without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards. The plaintiff: complains that husband committed adultery with one Gregoria Bermejo in 1892. The CFI granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81,042.76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property. The court assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in Title 4 of Book 1 are still in force. The petitioner argues the power of the Governor General, without such order to suspend the operation of the code. And that the order of suspension is inoperative, for it did not mention the Book of this Code in which the suspended Titles 4 and 12, were to be found. The Title 4 relates to marriage and divorce, while Title 12 refers to Civil Registry (Book 1). The Supreme Court declared such as an error. On July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the Philippines and took effect on Dec 8, 1889. On Dec 31, an order was published which states that Titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the archipelago, though no decree can be found published in the Gaceta. The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the Constitution of 1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in 1889, no part of the law was in force here, except Articles 44 to 78 which were promulgated in 1883. It is claimed that if these are suspended, the only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical. There can be no doubt that the order of suspension refers to Titles 4 and 12 of Book 1 and it has always been understood, it follows that Arts 42-107 of the CC were not in force here. The canon law had not as such any binding force outside the church, however, any part of the canon law which by proper action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same footing as any other law in Spain. As ordered by the Council of Trent, these decrees have, in Spain, the force of a civil law. It may be doubted if these decrees, even if considered as extended to the Philippines and in force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question. Canonists suggest declaring adultery to be a ground for divorce, however, the causes for divorce is nowhere distinctly stated therein. The laws of the church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil laws. The decretal law provides abolishing in the peninsula the special

jurisdictions was extended to the Philippines. It states that ecclesiastical courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and eleemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trent, but incidents with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts. The Partidas contain provisions relating to the subject of divorce, it states that when spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between them. Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the other the sin of fornication. Religion if on desires to take holy orders and the other should grant permission, with authority of the church; while Divorce due to Adultery or Fornication, brought before the judge of the holy church, includes spiritual fornication. In here the spouses are separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may remarry after the death of the other. No other person but the spouses themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties themselves of their attorneys. This divorce did not annul the marriage. That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her suit so is the fact that she has pardoned her —if after a divorce has been granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the judgment ISSUE: Whether these provisions of the Partidas were in force in the islands prior to 1889? RULING: The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way. Recopilacion de laas Leyes de Indias provides ― and as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations and the Partidas of these kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the decisions of causes in accordance with the following law. By the operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the Partidas herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery and settlement of the Philippines became at once effective therein, they have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished from laws of the church. Being in force on August 13, 1898, they continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature. The Partidas recognized adultery as a ground for divorce, therefore according to the civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898, the commission

of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce. That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of sovereignty. The complete separation of the church and the state under the American government while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not affect the right itself. The fact that ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important. The jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of ACT no. 136. As the result, the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for divorce. For that the only gr ound therefore is adultery and that the action on that ground can be maintained by husband, and that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond. The CFI of Iloilo therefore, committed no error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case. The adultery of the defendant was fully proved. The adultery of the plaintiff is however, plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, which is the letter showing confession of guilt. On the main issue of Adultery, the lack of evidence destroys the theory of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the company of other women. It is not adequate to explain the sudden termination of their marital relations. The testimony of the defendant correctly explained the theory —he stated that on his return from an inspection of one his estates his wife‗s maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish Corporal of the civil guard, named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon her, that same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her there. That the plaintiff is guilty and the defendant has condoned the offense, though no factual evidence on this claim. Law 6 , Title 9 Partida 4 provides that the wife can defeat the husband‗s suit for divorce by proving that he has pardoned her, but no laws in the Partidas says that the effect of the pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him in a case like this present one. Therefore, neither of the party is entitled to a divorce, both committed adultery. Judgment is therefore reversed.

95. ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN

96. IN RE: ATTY RUFILO BUCANA

FACTS: Albano a municipal judge prepared and notarized a document providing for personal separation of Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It provides that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. They did this since they were separated for a long time and to forestall violent incidents between husband and wife.

FACTS: On November 10, 1975, Bucana notarized an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein they agreed that in case anyone of them will remarry, both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them. It would allow them to have a concubine, and extra-marital affairs. As his defense, it is said to have been prepared by his clerk and he only signed it out of negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Albano can notarize a personal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not he committed grave act of misconduct in notarizing agreement

RULING: No. The law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Family Code 26, Par 2 provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

RULING: Yes, he is guilty of malpractice. It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment.

97. TENCHAVES VS. ESCAÑO

98. VAN DORN VS. ROMILO

FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while Escano stayed in Cebu, then Misamis. In Misamis, Escano asked for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the United States without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation and damages against wife and parents in law.

FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes-Van Dorn a Filipino and Richard Upton a US citizen married in Hongkong. They established their residence in thhe Philippines. On 1982, they obtained a divorce in Nevada, US. Petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton is contesting for his share in Galleon Shop which he contends is conjugal property. Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal RULING: No, the divorce and 2nd marriage are not recognized as valid. As stated in Art 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of the code, instead of divorce, legal separation is used, wherein marriage is still recognized. To recognize decree of divorce of foreign courts would be violation on public policy and article 17 of Civil Code. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced elsewhere. It would not make difference if Tenchavez was also in court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗t confer jurisdiction on court which

had none. Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of adultery. Therefore, petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not Filipino Laws would still prevail. RULING: No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

99. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA

100. GARCIA-RECIO VS. GARCIA

FACTS: On Sept. 7, 1979, Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino, married Erich Geiling, a German in Federal Republic Germany. They later resided in Malate, Manila. On Jan. 1983, they asked for divorce which was obtained on Jan. 15 1986. By June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two complaints of adultery with William Chia and Jesus Chua.

FACTS: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina (Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio was single and a Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the c ouple‗s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent wasable to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not he can still file for adultery after German divorce RULING: No. Article 344 of RPC provides that only offended spouse may bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when complaint was filed. Since he filed it after he divorce was decree he is now not considered a spouse. It would be absurd to bring action determined by his status before or subsequent to commencement of adultery. Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot sue as spouse anymore.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven. RULING: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent‗s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was

submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner‗s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the jud ge. Indeed, petitioner‗s failure to

object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

101. GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA FACTS: On Jan. 7, 1915, the parties were legally married but after a month the woman left because of gross acts by her husband. As to the marriage, a contract in so far as civil effects are concerned requiring consent of parties provides that after the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the two. Reciprocal rights arise and legal existence becomes one, and that the termination of it should result in some relief. ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 149 is absolute and therefore can‗t grant wife any support since she was the one who left home RULING: No, separation is different from support given to wife as agreed upon in the contract they entered into when they got married when husband promised to support wife. The wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if sh e doesn‗t live in house anymore. Therefore, the husband should pay support.

102. PEOPLE VS. ZAPANTA

103. GANDIONCO VS. PEÑARANDA

104. MUNOZ VS. BARRIOS

FACTS: On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gandionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed in Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. By 14 November 1986 private respondent filed for support of pendent lite which was granted on 10 December 1986. Petitioner contends that civil action for legal separation and its consequences should be suspended in light of criminal charge of concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is said that after a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.

FACTS: Married in 1942. Husband (Barrio) and wife (Munoz) had frequent quarrels. During these quarrels, husband maltreated the wife. Unable to stand the maltreatment she suffered, she lived separately from her husband. After they lived separately, two more incidents of maltreatment occurred. She filed for a petition seeking legal separation, custody and child support. Upon the testimonies of witnesses it was established that the maltreatment of the wife consisted of: boxing in the face or abdomen, hair-pulling and twisting her neck.

ISSUE: Whether or not other actions should be suspended due to criminal action of concubinage RULING: The Supreme Court held in negative. On the issue of separation: civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense‖. The gove rning rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." The action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. An that a decree of legal separation on ground of concubinage may be issued without criminal conviction of concubinage thus no need to wait. On the issue of support, it can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. Hence, petition is dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the maltreatment in this case is a ground for legal separation. RULING: No. Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, maltreatment suffered by the wife does not constitute attempts on her life. Intent to kill must be established with clear and convincing evidence.

105. CONTRERAS VS. MACARAIG

106. LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO

FACTS: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She failed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. However she final ly found out about her husband‘s

FACTS: On August 18, 1953, Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio. On September 21, 1934, a Civil Marriage was celebrated, while on September 30, 1934 a Canon Marriage took place. They lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz. They had no children. Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949. Petitioner then prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of

mistress and the birth of the latter‘s child. In December 1963, wife finally

his share of the conjugal partnership of profits. Eufemio‗s answer states

met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his m istress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her husband‘s illicit relationship from the family driver . The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription.

declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok. During the pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969). On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: first, that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code, and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969 the counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario. On July 29, 1969, the Court dismissed the case, ruling that

ISSUE: Whether or not the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963.

Carmen Lapuz‗s cause of action has not survived, and it did not act on

RULING: December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her husband‘s in fidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation.

the motion for substitution. Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, whether or not abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? RULING: Yes, the action for legal separation is purely personal, it may be made by the innocent spouse and can still stop proceedings if they reconcile. The death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. Yes, it is solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death. The rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. The enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do

not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage Even in actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. The action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings.

107. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10, 1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. T hey had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and recorded as Zoilo‗s. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.

Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal separation and change of surname against husband due to abandonment and concubinage. The trial court d eclared that Zoilo‗s acts constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to: 



CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of their agreement)

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is not an innocent spouse RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for (NCC 100).

108. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ FACTS: On August 27, 1949, Bugayong married Ginez. Bugayong was a serviceman in the US Navy. Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On October 1951, Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation. On August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and lived together for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired Bugayong‗s

house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery. Instead of answering, Geniz packed up and left, which Bugayong took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. On November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz. Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint and file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: 





Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations; That under the same assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment.

Court ordered the dismissal of the case on the 2nd ground (condonation). Assignment of errors was brought to CA based on premature dismissal of case; in finding that there were condonation on Bugayong‗s part; and in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. Case was lifted to SC based on question of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of sleeping with wife for two days was already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she allegedly committed RULING: Yes, condonation is defined as conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed; forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation, it may be express or implied. US jurisprudence shows that one single act of sexual intercourse implies condonation. Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to

sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong. In this case, he slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus, falling under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

109. YANGCO VS. RHODE

110. DELA VIÑA VS. VILLAREAL

FACTS: A complaint filed by Victorina Obin against petitioner praying she be declared lawful wife of said Yangco, she be granted divorce, and allowance of alimony and attorney‗s fees. Luis contested declaration of marriage since there was not witness to it. Giving of alimony was granted even if there was still doubt as expressed by judge.

FACTS: Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance an action for divorce; partition of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month. Action is based upon the following grounds:

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge had jurisdiction to grant alimony or support to Victorina Obin. RULING: No. there is a need to show documents or circumstances of relationship to allow one spouse to ask for support. In this case, evidence should be the canonical certificate. This case, only claimed to be the wife and judge who issued the support said he issued it with doubt. One cannot ask for support without necessary evidence. One SC Justice dissents that one should give support to wife, for it would be unfair to her. Court of First Instance had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues upon which the right to alimony depended, and whether the remedy by an appeal from an erroneous exercise of this jurisdiction is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that had been provided, and if cases occur in which it does not afford adequate relief it is the default of the legislative power and it rests with it to provide additional remedies. Article 68 of the Civil Code provides that after a petition for a nullity of marriage or for a divorce has been interposed and admitted certain provisions shall be adopted during the pendency of the suit, among which is a provision for the support of the wife and such children as do not remain under the power of the husband.

1) Adultery, and wherein the husband ejected her from conjugal home and thus she established her residence in Iloilo, that she had no means of support and was only living at the expense of one of her daughters. 2) A preliminary injunction, restraining her and prohibiting her husband from conjugal property since defendant was trying to alienate or encumber said property. CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has exceeded his power in granting the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action. RULING: Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the husband‘s powers of administrat ion should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.

111. ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION

112. SAMOSA-RAMOS VS. VAMENTA

FACTS: Petitioner filed action against his wife f or legal separation on the ground of adultery. The defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as pay for attorney‗s fees. Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has abandoned the children and that the conjugal properties were worth only P80,000. Also contends that defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. The CFI granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the

FACTS: On June 18, 1971, petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legal separation for concubinage and attempt against her life. She also sought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin and management of private respondent). Clemente Ramos (private respondent) opposed such saying that hearing the petition for injunction would only make the prospect of reconciliation dim. CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion to suspend hearing on the injunction, and thus this certiorari. ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy on exclusive property of wife that is currently being administered by her husband can be tried in court even before the 6-month period allotted in cases of legal separation

children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorney‗s fees; reconsideration

denied. HELD: Writ prayed for is issued and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The co urt‗s order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. The main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiff‗s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced is by Art 103 of CC, provides for 6 months allowance as cooling off period. The provision of the code is mandatory, court understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibited, status quo is to be preserved for this time. It may be noted that since 6 months have elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowed, reasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given at the scope of the article cited may be explained. The cooling off period is to make possible a reconciliation but this practical expedient, is necessary to carry out legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the circumstances. The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice m ay be caused.

RULING: Yes. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the sixmonth period. Art 103 provides that in cases where court deems proper, it can appoint another to manage property between husband and wife. In this case, her paraphernal property, would show that it is not an aggravating circumstance to the prescribed 6-month period deemed as the cooling off period. In any case, more than 6 months have already passed thus court can hear both legal separation and mandatory injunction.

113. LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

114. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES

FACTS: Around May 1951, Lerma (petitioner) and Diaz (private respondent) got married. On August 1969, Lerma filed a complaint for adultery vs. Diaz and her lover Teodoro Ramirez. By November 1969, respondent files for legal separation and / or separation of properties, custody of children and support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life. The CFI said that respondent is entitled to support pendente lite from the date of respondent ‗s filing of the complaint, and that the amount would be a monthly support of Php1,820. Petitioner raised the case to the CA. The CA, initially issuing a preliminary injunction on the decision of the lower court to give the respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he were not asking for a chance to present evidence to the lower court. On 1972, the CFI ruled that respondent and Ramirez are convicted of adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA. Petitioner then files a new case of adultery against respondent and her new lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco. Petitioner raises the petition against the giving support pendente lite to the SC, claiming, among others, that respondent did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders until he filed a second adultery charge against her.

FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10, 1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. T hey had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can still claim for support even though she has already been convicted of adultery. RULING: No. Adultery is recognized as a defense for support. CC Article 303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance. CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation‖. If allowed one

would only need to file a case of legal separation no matter how groundless in order to get support. Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases.

recorded as Zoilo‗s. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.

Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal separation and change of surname against husband due to abandonment and concubinage. The trial court declared that Zoilo‗s acts

constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to: 



CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of their agreement)

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is not an innocent spouse RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she condoned and consented to (1) living s eparately (2) can commit grounds for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for (NCC 100).

115. PEOPLE VS. SANSANO & RAMOS

116. PEOPLE VS. SCHNECKENBERGER

FACTS: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and abandoned his family.-Wife did not have any means of survival so she resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. Around 1924, Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to which both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced. After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for Mariano to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went back to file for divorce (under Act2710)

FACTS: On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part recites as follows:

ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore barred from action RULING: Yes. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she would like to do. Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He is therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The sole purpose of filing the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation. The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an ―offended spouse‖.

He consented to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is thus, therefore barred from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he was still in a foreign country, he would have still been able to take action against the accused but since he didn‘t take this option, it showed a

considerable lack of genuine interest as the offended party.

Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. HELD: As the term "pardon" unquestionably unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

117. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ

118. BROWN VS. YAMBAO

FACTS: Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married on 1949 to Ginez while on furlough leave. Before he reported back to duty, they made arrangements as to where the wife would stay. In July 1951, the husband received letters informing him of his wi fe‘s infidelities. In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her, they lived together as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night after, they continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of her infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation.

FACTS: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of consent and connivance.

The court ordered the dismissal of the action based on wife‘s motion to

dismiss. He appealed but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted questions of law, to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the copulation which transpired after the husband knew about his wife‘s alleged infidelities can be considered an act of

condonation. HELD: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed. According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation. Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred.

ISSUE: Whether or not proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both spouses are offenders. HELD: No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he learned of his wife‘s relations in 1945 and only

filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal separation.

119. BROWN VS. YAMBAO

120. OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO

ISSUE: Whether or not findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop him from legal separation proceedings.

FACTS: Jose Ocampo was married to Florenciano and had several children together who are living with the husband. In March 1951, the husband discovered on several occasions that his wife was having illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff again surprised the wife and found her engaging in other illicit relations with Nestor Orzame. On July 5, 1955, husband filed a petition for legal separation with t he wife conforming to the charge provided that she isn‘t criminally charged. Because the wife did not answer the charge, the RTC

HELD: Yes. Collusion as defined defined is the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings. It is legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more than mere contract). The NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal separation since he is also guilty of concubinage. NCC Article 102 also bars him since he filed out of time. Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. It cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

declared her in default. The CA, however, held that the husband‘s right to legal separation on the ground of the wife‘s relatio ns with Arcalas had

already prescribed and it also interpreted the facts to mean that a confession of judgment on the part of the wife agreeing with the husband signified collusion between the parties and thus bars the right to procuring a separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA interpreted Art. 101, which prohibits a decree of legal separation upon a confession of judgment, properly. HELD: No. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This did not occur. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement "…

between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce." Griffiths v. Griffiths, Sandoz v. Sandoz. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefore.

121. MATUTE VS. MACADAEG

122. LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery and a decree of legal separation was granted to Armando Medel, awarding custody of the children to the latter. Medel went to the US leaving children with his sister in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned late 1954. With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father on the condition that the children would be returned after two weeks. She never returned and instead filed a motion to regain custody on the ground that the children did not want to go back to their father and that the father was living with another woman. Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court (in view of her failure to return the children). Judge Macadaeg absolved the Rosario from contempt but denied her motion for custody and ordered her to return the children. Rosario then filed an action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Armando and the Judge. Preliminary injunction was granted after filing.

FACTS: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. T he lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion

ISSUE: Whether or not mother can regain custody of her children after the issuance of a degree of legal separation. HELD: No. A decision rendering custody of minor children is never final… but until it is reviewed and modified, such a decision must stand.

In the present case, Rosario merely obtained permission from the legal parental authority who is the father. He may therefore demand their return at any time. Judge was well within his jurisdiction whether or not he chose to judge the other way. It is within his power to grant custody or not. No grave abuse of discretion occurred.

in the woman‘s finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal

assets. ISSUE Whether or not a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted. HELD: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife‘s change of

name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

123. ATILANO VS. CHUA CHING BENG

124. GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA

FACTS: Spouses were married on May 1951. Then they went to Zamboanga, and after the husband left the wife with her parents for a

FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent‘s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

while with the promise that she would go back to Manila, which didn‘t

come true. On Sept 30 1953, Atilano filed for support of 200/month against her husband in the premise that t hey were living separately since October 1952 due to their bickering. The husband replied that he preferred to support her in their own conjugal home in Manila. She was awarded 75/month but with the observation that separation was due more to in-laws than anything else and her demand to move to a different house from them. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can be compelled to return and live in their conjugal dwelling. RULING: Misunderstandings with a third-party is not seen by the law as a just cause to leave the conjugal home. The wife cannot be compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left. In this case, the husband has option whether to support her or not. The husband has expressed that he is willing to establish a conjugal home separate from his parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. RULING: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

125. ARROYO VS. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

126. RAMIREZ-CUADERNO VS. CUADERNO

FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

FACTS: Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno (petitioner) and Angel Cuaderno (respondent) separated from each other on November 17, 1956. Respondent inflicted bodily injuries on petitioner. He then took her to her parents‘ home where she asked mo ney from her husband at first, and eventually stopped from accepting any later. The petitioner then filed a complaint with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court asking for support on the basis of maltreatment and abandonment. Respondent claims that she left the domicile and was not entitled to said support. The JDRC granted petitioner support in the amount of P150 per month. But the CA reversed the decision and the two were admonished to live together as husband and wife, on the basis of husband‘s testi mony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife.

RULING: No. It would be unrealistic for the court to compel or urge the couple to live together when, at least for the present, they, specially the husband, are speaking of the impossibility of cohabitation. Marriage entitles both parties to consortium or cohabitation, but mutual affection must be the cause of this right, and not any legal mandate. This is an inherent characteristic of marriage in this jurisdiction. The separation stays until a different situation exists between the parties.

RULING: Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. It was held that the judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from crosscomplaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have the ability to force a husband and wife to cohabit by legal mandate.

127. ABELLA VS. COMELEC

128. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES

FACTS: Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the

FACTS: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes‗ marriage to the donor. Hence, t he appeal.

course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. RULING: For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. Art. 68 provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. While Art. 69 provides that the husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode.

ISSUE: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners. RULING: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

129. DELIZO VS. DELIZO FACTS: From the time of April 1891 until Dec 1909, Nicolas Delizo was married to Rosa Villasfer, who then later died. During Oct 1911 up to May 1957, he had a second marriage, to Dorotea de Ocampo until he himself died. The petitioners and respondents are fighting over the land owned by Nicolas Delizo whether it belongs to the conjugal property of the first or second marriage. The trial Court first partitioned the land to the first marriage‗s heirs since there was no liquidation of conjugal

property of first marriage thus the co-conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage. The judgment was appealed by petitioners from the second marriage. Court of Appeals ruled that Caanawan lands were acquired during the first marriage and the fact that lands were registered under ―Nicolas married to Dorotea‖ is merely descriptive of his civil

status. Though it did not agree with the partition of Trial Court when it held that ½ of conjugal property from first ma rriage is husband‗s own separate property when he remarried again. It also held that since it was at the time of the second marriage that the land was cultivated, it is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of the 47 hectares. Thus ½ that is given to the first m arriage‗s heirs must be deducted by the improvements made by second marriage. It declared partition as follows: One-half of the Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villasfer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. ½ to Nicolas Delizo descending to his heirs both in the first and second marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not the partition of lands made by CA is correct. RULING: No. Lands acquired in first marriage were from the Homestead Act and at the time of the 1st marriage, the lands weren‗t owned by

Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such lands. Act 926 provides the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law, thus Caanawan lands weren‗t conjugal property of first marriage due to non -compliance. Thus held that land properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership since to leave the heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance discord and not promote family solidarity.

130. BALLADOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

131. JOCSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

132. ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF

FACTS: Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina JocsonVasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate of his wife. Moises says that it should be partitioned between him and Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void. Defendant Moises says that the first document was signed through fraud and deceit. Same with the second and third document. Moreover, he said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold.

FACTS: Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and damages from the obligations of Agcaoili to Philippine Trust Company. Agcaoili defaulted hence Fidelity and Surety Company brought an action against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldo‗s personal obligations. Ansaldo filed action in the CFI to declare it null and void. It was granted by the CFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is conjugal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint savings account is liable for the payment of the personal obligations of the husband.

RULING: No. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that Moises said that Agustina didn‗t have enough f unds, but then Agustina is

in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more than the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to prove that a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the properties were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of title are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, because it was registered in his name alone.

RULING: No. It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of Ansaldo.

133. CASTRO VS. MIAT

134. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. QUINTOS

FACTS: Moises and Miat bought two parcels of land, one in Paranaque and one in Paco. Moises then wanted the Paranaque property to himself but would leave the two properties to his sons. Moises and Concordia bought the property on installment basis on 1977, and it was only on 1984 it was finished. Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to Romeo. However, Romeo found out that the property was sold to Castro by Moises. Moises bought the property through mortgage from Castro. Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo received none. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision nullifying deed of sale between Moises and Castro and ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo for P36,000.

FACTS: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31, 284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compañia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company. In the document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife, except in their civil statues. It also does not show that they bound themselves solidarily to the debt incurred. A complaint was then filed requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt. Defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal partnership. Petitioner raises Art 1408 of NCC that provides all debts incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to the conjugal partnership thus Margarita Ansaido, the wife, is part of the obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court held that conjugal partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private property of each of them since they are both obligated. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, the court reasserts that conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as husband and wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. RULING: No, it is a conjugal share. Since it was acquired through joint funds, Moises and Concordia bought the property during the marriage. There was even a letter from Moises to Romeo conveying the land. Moreover, Castro is not a buyer in good faith. Since they knew that t here was an adverse claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal partnership RULING: Yes, the Civil Code expressly states that partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. Also Article 1137 provides solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. A partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership, because, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon one. Properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof.

135. LAPERAL VS. KATIGBAK

136. BERCILES VS. GSIS

FACTS: The Laperals sought for recovery of money evidenced by promissory notes made by Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that Katigbak was supposed to sell. On Nov 1, 1950 the Trial Court ordered Katigbak to pay back the Laperals and return the jewelry. On Dec 1950 Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted. By Feb 1, 1955 the Laperals filed complaint that the separation of property should be annulled and should be deemed as conjugal property. On Dec. 27, 1958 the Supreme Court rendered judgment that while the conjugal property should be used

FACTS: GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement benefits. This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children. ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child and illegitimate children

to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal property of Kalaw shouldn‗t.

As the case was remanded the Trial Court rendered judgment that Kalaw‗s property was indeed paraphernal.

ISSUE: Whether or not property being contested is part of conjugal property. RULING: No. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provide properties acquired during marriage are deemed conjugal property unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively to husband and wife. It was shown through that (1) title is in name of wife alone (2) husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is financially able to buy property. In this case, proved that mother of Evelina bought the contested property for her , it was under Evelina‗s name, Ramon Katigbak issued a manifestation where he stated he had no interest in the property, husband could not have afforded to buy it. The land is therefore paraphernal and thus can‗t be subject to the debts of Katigbak.

RULING: No. Art. 287 of the New Civil Code say that illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and such successional rights are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child. There was no evidence of admission. There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in t he birth certificate of Pascual Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void. The baptismal certificate has no weight as well and living together does not prove filiation, also, pictures are not proof of filiation. Their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceased. Retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to Iluminada Ponce who is also an heir. This is in corollary with Art. 966 of the New Civil Code that provides if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. And, by Art. 980 of New Civil Code, children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

137. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ

138. PLATA VS. YATCO

FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and gave as security the jewelry.

FACTS: Amailia Plata purchased land which he then sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it to her seven months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa. On Sept 1958, Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the deal. Amalia and Gaudencio failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted. However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property

ISSUE: Whether or not jewelry is conjugal property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa.

RULING: It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the jewelry was kept remained with the deceased. Defendant now denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due. Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her m other. It is part of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the same. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose.

RULING: No, Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own exclusive paraphernal property since she owned it before marriage and even if Saldana did give it back to her when she was already married it did not transform it to conjugal property since there was no proof that they money paid to Saldana came from common or conjugal funds. And since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment against the hus band alone doesn‗t affect the paraphernal property of Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband. The Supreme Court can‗t decide at the moment whether property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio it was then remanded to Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

139. LIM VS. GARCIA

140. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an estate valued at P50,000. It was alleged in the inventory by the administrator, Luis Lim, that everything but a house and lot, P10k (paraphernalia) and P700 (acquired as payment for the land that he sold) were the conjugal property of Hilario and his wife, Isabel Garcia. The administrator contends that the said properties were the separate properties of Hilario because he allegedly brought them into the marriage alone. The three parcels of land were only conveyed to Isabel as a gift or for valuable consideration by Hilario during the coverture; hence, it is a void donation. The P700 was the price he had received for the sale of a certain lot.

FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and gave as security the jewelry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land were conjugal property. RULING: No, the evidence show that the properties were not acquired by Isabel by conveyance from Hilario but by third parties by way of exchange for a certain property she had in herited from her father‗s estate. Hence, they are her separate properties according to Civil Code Art. 1396 (3) since they were acquired by exchange of her separate properties. While the RTC held that they were part of her dowry, the record did not prove that it was so and evidence strongly supported the presumption that it was and continued to be part of her separate estate. Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received for the lot) and the buildings constructed thereon, Supreme Court held that they were part of the conjugal properties since the buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was the separate property of Hilario, Civil Code 1404 holds that the buildings, erected during coverture on a land belonging to one of the spouse, will be considered as conjugal partnership property, that is ―after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof.‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the jewelry needs to be returned to the defendant. RULING: The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

141. MANOTOK REALTY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Authorized as the special co-administrator of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, Vicente Legarda sold 280 sq.m. of the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision to Dr. Abelardo Lucero for P30/sq.m., payable on an installment basis. Lucero paid the initial amount of P200 and Legarda issued a receipt and delivered the property to him. Although he was ordered by the CFI to sell the Subdivision, Legarda failed to execute the necessary document/s and to submit the same to the Court for approval as he was ordered. He did not execute and register a deed of sale in a public instrument. Meanwhile, Lucera subsequently leased the property on 1953 to six tenants, who paid monthly rentals and constructed their houses thereon. On July 31, 1956, CFI authorized Philippine Trust Company as administrator of the estate to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time. Hence, it sold the same portion of the property to Manotok Realty, Inc. Although the property was advertised for sale, Lucera failed to appear in the estate proceedings. Instead, he waited for Legarda, who was no longer a special coadministrator, to send him the formal contract in order for him to make further payments. In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain Lucero when he finally went to them for payment of the property because the estate was then involved in litigation. Consequent to the litigation, a deed of sale was then issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13, 1959; the same was approved by the Court. On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc. demanded the surrender of the actual and material possession of the property and on March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for ejectment. Although summonses were served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero instead executed a deed of assignment of the lot in favor of his lessees. When RTC favored Manotok Realty, Inc., Lucero alleged on appeal to CA that the sale made by Legarda was valid because Legarda was authorized to do so and hence, there was no need for the approval of the probate court. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Legarda and Lucero was valid. RULING: No, the Court directed Legarda to sell the subdivision by executing the necessary document/s and submitting it to the Court for approval which Legarda failed to do especially where the sale was on installment basis. Moreover, the receipt does not conform to the legal requirements of contracts of sale since it was neither executed in a public instrument nor registered with the Registry of Deeds. By virtue of Sec. 1, Rule 73 (Estate of Olave v. Reyes) and Sec. 4, Rule 89 (Vda. de Gil v. Cancio) of the Rules of Court, the Court as a probate court is authorized to approve sales of immovable properties belonging to an estate of a decedent. Hence, the sale was invalid and unenforceable

(against third parties). Lucero and Sojio were also found to have acted in bad faith since the latter waited a long time before going to PTC, ignored the Court summons, and instead executed a deed of assignment, while the latter constructed a house when he was a mere lessee.

142. PALANCA VS. SMITH-BELL FACTS: Emiliano Boncan Yap borrowed P14k from the International Banking Corporation in order to construct a house. He then conveyed the house to his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, on Sept. 20, 1904, which the latter accepted, as a guaranty for the payment of his debt to IBC. When Smith, Bell & Co. later obtained a judgment and writ of execution against Emiliano for the collection of money and he failed to pay, the property was levied. Alejandra filed for declaration that the property was her exclusive property and demanded its possession and the dissolution of the levy. ISSUE: Whether or not the property is Alejandra‗s exclusively . RULING: No, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano was made upon credit of the property of his wife, the money became conjugal property by virtue of Civil Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to the construction of the house also made the house conjugal property and liable to the payment of his debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.

143. LIM QUENCO VS. CARTAGENE

144. TORELA VS. TORELA

145. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770). By March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago". He then executed a definite deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum. The children claim that the land was conjugal property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana Gallego clean the lot in question. Felimon Torela declared that he and his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land in question was decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego.

FACTS: The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs' mother). RULING: The property in question is not one of those enumerated in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage. Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstance that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties belong to the one spouse alone. RULING: When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

146. MAGALLON VS. MONTEJO FACTS: Respondents instituted a case against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of a parcel of land to which Martin had perfected a claim by homestead. Respondents claiming to the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaqia, who died in 1953, asserted a right to ½ of the land as their mother‘s share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. Defendant

denied marriage to Eustaqia although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage. Trial Court found that Martin was indeed married to Eustaqia and the respondents were their children. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. It appears that at the time the case was brought no certificate of title has been issued to Martin although he had complied with the requirements necessary to the grant. The OCT was only issued while Lacerna‘s appeal was pending in the IAC. It states on

its face that it is issued in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania Magallon ...," the latter being the present petitioner. IAC ruled in favor of respondents thus a writ of execution was issued. ISSUE: Whether or not the property is owned by Martin and Petitioner. RULING: No. The land in question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon In such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto. The petitioner herein, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of the land in question to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin Lacerna. The phrase "married to Epifania Magallon written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that

the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents.

147. CUENCA VS. CUENCA

148. ZULUETA VS. PAN AM

FACTS: Respondents were legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They allege that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all others are conjugal. They also allege that Engracia Basadre and Agripino were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar. Petitioners denied legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the respondents. They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children thereof. They also contend that subject parcels of land are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. The Appellate Court held Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon, proofs that properties in question belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property. Tax declarations were presented by petitioners are not real evidence to prove ownership or possession. Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to prove: that Engraciaand Agripino were legally married; that other petitioners were the legitimate children, and; that subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

FACTS: This case is about the off-loading of Rafael Zulueta from his flight back to the Philippines. Rafael Zulueta, along was his wife and daughter, was traveling from Wake island, going back home to Manila. While waiting for the flight, Mr. Zulueta went to relieve himself, but for some weird reason, did not go into one of the 8 restrooms in the terminal, but went to a secluded spot in the beach outside some 400 yards from the terminal. Upon his return, he was late, and the captain of the plane, Capt. Zentner was already being arrogant. As such there was an altercation between Zentner and Zulueta. Consequently,

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. RULING: No. Art. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. The presumption refers only to

Capt.Zentner had Zulueta‘s luggage off loaded, but only 3 of the 4

suitcases were found, and the last piece of luggage remained on the flight to Manila. Originally, Even Mrs. and Ms. Zulueta were supposed to be offloaded, but Mr. Zulueta was able to negotiate a compromise to allow them to stay on the plane back to Manila. Upon reaching Manila, wife tried asking local Pan-Am office to bring her husband home but they refused. When Zulueta sued, trial court awarded them damages which the SC reduced the amount upon appeal by Pan-Am. Upon, motion for reconsideration initiated by both parties (case at hand), Zulueta wants the trial court‘s decision to be affirmed in to to while Pan-Am wants the amount of damages reduced.32 While waiting for the results of the appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta, for reasons of their own, separated from each other. Mrs. Zulueta then entered into a compromise agreement with Pan-Am, settling for P50,000.00. Motion to dismiss, as far as she was concerned anyway, was filed but was subsequently denied by the SC on the ground that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband‘s consent, except in case cases provided by law.

the property acquired during marriage and doesn‗t operate when there is

no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Documents sought to be presented do not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and Engracia. Presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Documents show that 5 out of 8 parcels covered are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Retituto Presumption cannot prevail, therefore petition was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages involved are part of the conjugal property RULING: Yes. Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a contract of carriage with defendant, one which was ultimately breached by the offloading of Mr. Zulueta. The award of damages therefore was done collectively. Since Mr. Zulueta, having acted in his capacity as administrator, entered into contract with PanAm and paid for this with funds from the Conjugal funds, damages incurred by breach of contract of carriage naturally would be conjugal.

149. MENDOZA VS. REYES

150. CALIMLIM VS. FORTUN

FACTS: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. T hey were able to acquire two parcels of land in QC, plus buildings erected thereon from Araneta Inc. sometime in Feb. 1947 on installment basis. They had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) to pay the installments (2 joint loans of P12,000 and P8,000 acquired on 1948 and 1952 respectively). In the deed of sale, the vendee named is JULIA de REYES, with marital consent from Ponciano. The transfer certificates in the Register of Deeds were also in her name. The spouses built a house and camarin on the lots which were eventually leased to Efren and Inocencia Mendoza (appellees) who transformed the camarin into a movie house. November 1958, the Reyes spouses had to

FACTS: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas (petitioner) and Fernando Canullas were married Dec 19, 1962. They begot 5 kids. They lived in a house on the residential land in question, located at Bacabac, Bugallon,

ask for an extension of 5 years from the Dev‘t Bank of the Phil

the house and lot because of Mercedes, so she initiated a complaint against Mercedes for the quieting of title and for damages. Mercedes claims that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; she also claims that the sale of land together with the house and improvements to Corazon was null and void because they are CONJUGAL PROPERTIES and she had NOT GIVEN CONSENT to the sale. The original judgment declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the ½ of the house erected on said lands. Upon reconsideration prayed for by Mercedes, respondent court amended the prior decision and resolved that the plaintiff (Corazon) is (still) the true owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut trees, (but) declared the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff including 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas and his legitimate wife (Mercedes). Hence this case.

(successor of the RFC) for the payment of the money they borrowed, as payment for the outstanding balance of the lots. On March 3, 1961, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza couple while Ponciano was in Pampanga, attending to his farm. The couple ain‘t cool with one another anymore.

The sale was made without the consent of Ponciano. the contract was entered into using funds from the conjugal partnership, if the right of redemption pertains to the wife, it may make the property redeemed, in this case the damages, not conjugal. in this case however, since this right of redemption was not proven, there remains a presumption that the damages are part of the conjugal property. In the end, petitions were dismissed. Transfer certificates were issued to Mendozas. Ponciano filed a case in the CFI for the annulment of the sale. The Mendozas and Julia allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Julia, and the purchase was done in good faith. The CFI ruled in favor of Julia and the Mendozas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the sale null and void with respect to the ½ share of Julia to the lots in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question conjugal or paraphernal? RULING: Court says conjugal. The Court applied Art. 153 of the Civil Code (Art.117 of the FC par.1), declaring that the properties are acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the Reyes spouses from the RFC. Although Julia was contending that the money came from her personal funds and from the donations of her mother, various records show otherwise (Income Tax Returns – declaring conjugal partnership), and she did not deny the truth of these statements.

Pangasinan. After Fernando‘s dad died in 1965, he inherited the land. In

1978, Fernando abandoned this family and lived with Corazon Daguines (private Respondent) During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage by the CFI, which judgment had become final. On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject property with the house thereon to Corazon Daguines for the sum of P2000. In the deed of sale, Fernando described the house as ―also inherited by me from my deceased parents‖ . Corazon however was unable to take possession of

ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property. RULING: Yes. A correct interpretation of Art 15835 yields that: Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale.

151. MARAMBA VS. LOZANO

152. JAVIER VS. OSMENA

FACTS: In 1948, plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a sum of money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court. On 1960, not satisfied with the judgment, Lozano appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time. Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of execution was issued. On Aug. 18, 1960, a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept. 16, 1960. However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an adjournment of the sale to October 26. During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that her liability be then fixed at ½ of the amount awarded in the judgment. The sale proceeded anyway. On June 28, 1961, trial court granted the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to proceed to satisfy her liability which is only half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04)

FACTS: Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona Javier, became indebted to the estate of Tomas Osmena. Sheriff executed judgment of debt by selling at public auction all the right, title, interest or share which the Collates had or might have in two parcels of improved real estate and especially the usufructuary interest therein of Pascuala Santos, the surviving widow of Felix Javier, which interest was acquired by Petrona Javier (wife). Specifically the land inherited by Petrona from her parents

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction. RULING: It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for it.

and the usufructuary right acquired from Petrona‗s father‗s second wife

for the sum of P3,000 (amount was borrowed giving as security for the loan an mortgage on the property she had inherited). Petrona Javier claimed that Collantes had no rights in said properties or in the usufructuary interest and filed for annulment of sale. The Osmena estate admitted exclusive right of ownership; claimed that the money which said usufructuary interest was purchased belonged to the conjugal partnership and therefore the right of usufruct belonged to said conjugal partnership. The CFI: annulled only the sale of 2 properties. ISSUE: Whether or not fruits of paraphernal property should be used to pay off the debt incurred by the husband RULING: Yes. Art 1401 of Civil Code provides that fruits, revenue, or interest collected during marriage coming from partnership property of from that which belongs to either of the spouses is community property. Thus, fruits of paraphernal property form part of assets of conjugal partnership and are liable for payment of marriage expenses. Wife manages paraphernal property but the fruits of such are managed by the husband as the administrator of conjugal property. Debt he incurred in this case was to meet the obligations of the conjugal partnership and were for the benefit of the family in his exercise of profession or industry. Thus conjugal partnership can be used to pay it off

153. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA VS. PCIB

154. DBP VS. ADIL

FACTS: PCIB is the administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges. PCIB filed for the recovery of a parcel of land (Lot 1258-G) purchased by Ramon Sta. Romana from C.N. Hodges. Sheriff levied on the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F and improvements, also purchased from C.N. Hodges. A third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that Lot 1258-F and its improvements had been sold to him. The RTC rescinded the contract and ordered return of possession of Lot 1258-G. The CA affirmed decision. The trial judge issued a writ of execution and the sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F. Ramon Romana died intestate, petitioner Socorro L. Vda. De Sta. Romana, surviving spouse, filed a motion to quest the writ of execution. Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution and levy on execution made on Lot 1258-F and the improvements existing thereon be annulled insofar as her ½ share in the said properties. Respondent moved to dismiss on ground of res judicata and the CFI granted the motion to dismiss.

FACTS: Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum of P2,000.00 in a promissory note whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. The obligation remained outstanding and unpaid. Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. They defaulted in payment, prompting DBP to file a complaint. Inferior court ordered payment but the CFI of Iloilo reversed the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not wife should get ½ of property of husband who died when the land in question is used to pay off debt. RULING: No. As long as conjugal partnership subsists, there can be no ½ share of husband or wife. Only when conjugal partnership is dissolved between husband and wife can they claim it. Any levy on conjugal partnership property to satisfy monetary judgment against husband is null and void. In this case, the auction was made before the conjugal property was dissolved thus wife can‗t claim it. Also showed that the debt

was for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Non-inclusion of wife in suit to enforce obligation is immaterial. Need not be joined by wife in suit against conjugal partnership (section 4, rule 3of rules of court and Art 113 of CC)

ISSUE: Whether or not conjugal partnership may be used to pay debt in promissory note when husband was the only one who signed it. RULING: Yes. Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. In this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.

155. LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA

156. BA FINANCE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank. Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety. This subsequently prompted Luzon Surety, on August of the same year, to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case and ordered the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960, CFI issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his sugar quedans, conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed

FACTS: One May, Augusto abandoned his wife and children. On July 1, 1975, Augusto Yulo secured loan from BA Finance Corp. as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in own behalf and as representative of A&L industries which is managed by his wife, Lily Rulo whom he said gave him authority to procure loan and sign the promissory note. Augusto failed to pay loan. Thus BA Finance filed a complaint against the spouses. Lily Yulo contended thought that they were already separated when promissory note was executed, that her signature was forged, and she was the sole proprietor of A&L and never gave Augusto any authority to sign the promissory note and said business already closed. Both the TC and CA dismissed petitioner‗s complaint and

ordered them to pay Lily damages.

the lower court‘s decision. Review through SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signing of the indemnity agreement redounded to the benefit of the family and thus, should fall under the liabilities of the conjugal partnership. RULING: No. The administrator‘s obligations are only chargeable to the conjugal property if he believes it is done for the benefit of the family. No proof was presented that Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or guarantor, did so for the benefit of the family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety did benefit the family because it added to Garcia‘s reputation as being

trustworthy and enhanced his standing in the community. This is too remote/fanciful a benefit to be considered in terms of what is provided for in Art. 161.

ISSUE: Whether or not Augusto and Lily can be made answerable for obligations since it is part of the conjugal partnership of spouses. RULING: No. While Augusto and Lily is part of conjugal property, it can‗t be made liable since the obligation contracted by Augusto is not for the benefit of the conjugal partnerships (Art 161 of CC). Evidenced by his abandonment two months prior to when he contracted the promissory note. Made it appear that wife gave him authority to procure such loan.

157. CARLOS VS. ABELARDO

158. PEOPLE VS. LAGRIMAS

FACTS: On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio C arlos issued a check worth $25k, in the name of Pura Vallejo, against his pe rsonal account in Banker‗s Trust. It was allegedly a loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in order to help them in their married life. Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis.

FACTS: On October 11, 1962 a judgment finding Froilan Lagrimas guilty of murder becomes final. A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity in the case was issued and 11 parcels of land in the name of the accused were scheduled for auction on Jan. 5, 1965. On December 29, 1964 the wife of Lagrimas files a motion to quash the writs of attachment

Despite this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorio‗s Bank‗s

Trust Check (the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel denied the nature of the money as a loan. He claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share in income from Honorio‗s business, H. L.

Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the account of HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not included in HLCC‗s Articles of Incorporation or

Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against the personal account of Honorio and that the same was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for payment of a house and lot that became their conjugal dwelling. ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property should pay for the loan of 25, 000 even when acknowledgement was not signed by husband RULING: Yes. Art 121 of FCC, conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts and obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by both the spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2) debts and obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but their family has benefited. Evidence here shows that family did benefit since they used the loan to buy the house which became their conjugal home.

and execution on the properties citing that they belong to the spouses‗ conjugal property and thus could not be held lia ble for the husband‗s

individual indemnity. The LC grants the petition which is later reversed by a second judge of the same court only to be reaffirmed by a third judge ruling for the wife of the accused on March 5, 1960. The LC rules that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal properties of the accused only after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of the assets thereof pursuant to ART 161 of the NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil indemnities may be taken from the offender‘s conjugal properties even before the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of its assets. RULING: Yes, the Civil Code provides that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal property of an offender when the offender‗s exclusive

properties are insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the law does not contemplate that the conjugal partnership must be dissolved and its assets liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It merely requires that the offending spouse repay the liabilities taken from the conjugal partnership when such partnership is to be dissolved. However it is a condition in the article that the indemnities collectible from the CPG must not eat in to the funds for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children as it would lead to injustice.

159. YSASI VS. FERNANDEZ

160. FELIPE VS. HEIRS OF ALDON

FACTS: Juan Ysasi married Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi. Juan conceded that Hacienda Manucao-A is CPG. Since 1948 spouses have been shuttling back and forth from Philippines to Spain (where they also own real estate) but Juan travels more frequently. Hacienda Manucao-A is managed by Valentin Bilbao (1952-1965) but Juan is the overall administrator. In 1965 Jon (son) took over as manager. 1966, Juan told younger son Jose Mari to assist Jon but Jon refused to let Jose Mari act as cashier, dissension thus developed. Such prompted wife to leave Spain (May 1967) to fix problem. She brought letter from Juan to sons and a list of matter that she was to ascertain and report to husband. Husband then contends that she never made any report. On June 1967, Jon resigned which was accepted by Juan who designated Valentin to

FACTS: Almosara and Maximo acquired several parcels of land during their marriage. Wife sold the lots without the consent of husband.

take over. But upon Valentin‗s arrival in PI on August 19, 1967, Jon

refused to hand over hacienda saying that his mother took possession as administrator. Wife filed a petition on September 5, 1967 1967 at the CFI Negros Occidental where she sought administration of CPG or separation of property, praying that she be appointed receiver litis pendentia on the grounds that Juan is not in the position to manage since he is already of old age (77 years old) and has a blind left eye. The abandonment was without just cause. The husband moved to set aside order appointing wife as receiver but she opposed. On September 22, 1967 she further prayed that a disinterested person (BPI) be assigned as receiver if dispute continues. Respondent judge on October 7, 1967 turned aside 9/5 orders appointing her as admin. Juan moved for a writ of prelim mandatory and preventive injunction to compel wife and son to turn over hacienda to Valentin, but wife and son opposed. Respondent Judge denied petition for mandatory injunction on December 22, 1967. Thus petition where husband prays for prelim mandatory injunction to compel wife and son to hand over hacienda. ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may be deprived of conjugal partnership of properties upon allegations of fraud and abuse of such powers. RULING: No. The code recognizes authority of husband to be administrator of conjugal property and mere allegations of fraud may not take this right away from him. The CA‗s resolution of putting hacienda into receivership of BPI would destroy the husband‗s rights when it

should be used to preserve and secure them. The respondents are directed to turn over authority to petitioner.

HELD: The sale is void. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership by selling conjugal property without the consent of her husband.

161. AGUILAR-REYES VS. MIJARES

162. DELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Lot 4349-B-2 is a 396sq.m covered by TCT 205445 in Balintawak QC registered under Spouses Vicente and Ignacia AguilarReyes, purchased using conjugal funds during converture (including apartments in the CPG). Vicente married Ignacia in 1960 but were de facto separated since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983 Vicente sold 4349-B-2 to Mijares spouses for 40k and therefore new TCT 306087 was issued. She also found out that Vicente filed for administration and appointment as guardian of their 5 minor children at the MTC QC XXI where he misrepresented that Ignacia died on 3/22/82 and that he and the 5 kids are the sole heirs. Vicente was appointed guardian on Sept. 29, 1983 and authorized on Oct. 14, 1983 to sell estate of Ignacia. On Aug. 9, 1984 she wrote Mijares spouses to return ½ shares in lot. Thereafter she filed for annulment of sale. Mijares spouses claimed to be good faith buyers and that the sale was valid due

FACTS: Dela Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years.

to the court‗s approval. Vicente also contended that what he sold was

only ½ (his share) and left intact her share, that he never misrepresented her. On Feb. 15, 1990 TC declared sale as null and void. That purchase price was 110k and ordered Vicente to return 55k to Mijares couple. Ignacia filed for Motion for modification that sale be declared void in its entirety and that Mijares reimburse to her the rentals from March 1 ,1983. TC granted on 5/31/90 and said that the sale was void in entirety, ordered Vicente to reimburse the full 110k. TC on 6/29/90 amended the previous order and directed the Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in the name of Ignacia and Vicente and Vicente paying 50k to Ignacia for damages. Pending appeal, Ignacia died thus was substituted by compulsory heirs, they were contending that rentals should be reimbursed. On 1/26/2000 CA reversed TC, upholding that the Mijares were in good faith thus the sale was valid. ISSUE: Whether or not voidable deed of sale of property due to lack of consent pertains to only wife‗s share.

RULING: No, whole property. Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC. 166, husband can‗t alienate real property of conjugal partnership unless

wife has been declared a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction or in a leprosarium. 167, wife may annul said contract within ten years from transaction questioned. And both laws were complied with. Alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only in so far as the share of wife in the conjugal property is concerned. The limitation of, contract shall prejudice wife was not spelled out in statute. Conjugal partnership is

liable for many things when it is existing thus husband has to be stopped from disposing it without consent of wife.

HELD: Since there was no abandonment by the husband, there is nothing to justify a separation of conjugal partnership properties.

163. SANTERO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

164. GARCIA VS. MANZANO

FACTS: Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for Allowance from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual (legitimate father of private respondents) which was granted by the CFI. Petitioners (also legitimate children of Pascual with another woman) oppose the motion on the grounds that most of the private respondents are already of age. Neither of the women are legally married to Pablo Pascual.

FACTS: Spouses live separately from each other. Wife assumed complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not court acted with grave abuse of discretion by granting the motion for allowance. RULING: No, petition lacks merit. Art. 290 (support for children can apply even beyond the age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It doesn‗t matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and ma rried. The New Civil Code entitles the children to allowance as advances of their shares in the inheritance from their father, Pablo. A substantive right cannot be impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court).

HELD: The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of the husband. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband doesn‘t lie in a judicial separation of

properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal property.

165. LACSON VS. SAN JOSE-LACSON

166. MAXEY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On Feb. 14, 1953 the Lacson spouses got married. On Jan. 9, 1963, Carmen (respondent) left their home in Bacolod to go to Manila. On March 12, 1963, she filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen and this was affirmed by the CFI. By May 7, 1963, respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old. The CA ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

FACTS: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of this common law marriage. They had six children (petitioners). It was about 1903 when they started living together. Through 1911-1912, Melbourne bought the lands in question. On 1919 when they married in church and when the first wife died. The husband on 1953 remarried, and the second wife sold the land. It was only on 1961 when the children discovered sale. Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale over particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their father‗s second wife. They allege that common properties belonged to their parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their knowledge and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953. Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not support should be awarded to the wife. RULING: Yes it should have, but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise. However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten). Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC provides for every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)

ISSUE: Whether or not common law spouses, prior to marriage, share conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912. RULING: Yes. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application. Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property acquired during their cohabitation together. The woman runs the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . .‖ ―In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." The petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.

167. JUANIZA VS. JOSE

168. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA

FACTS: Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendantappellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.

FACTS: Lipana contracted two marriages: first with Maria Loreto Ancino on 1930 and second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino on 1935. This while the

ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney RULING: The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

first marriage was still subsisting but Isidra didn‗t know. On Dec. 13,

1943, Lipana and Isidra purchased a piece of land in Cubao worth P3,000. With the Torrens Title issued in Feb. 1, 1944 and named under ―Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.‖ On July 20, 1958, Isidra died

intestate and childless, survived only by her sisters. By August 7, 1961, Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of Isidra‗s estate prayed for the forfeiture of the husband‗s share in the Cubao property in favor of the

estate relying on Art. 1417 of the Old Civil Code. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the estate. Because the second marriage was void ab initio and the husband was the one who gave cause for nullity ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code is applicable. RULING: No. Since Lipana‗s first marriage hasn‗t been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 1417, it is upon the termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place. When did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of 2nd marriage terminate? Only upon Isidra‗s death in 1958. Art. 1417 was no longer in force, it is changed by NCC (took effect 1950. No action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband‗s share. It should recognize the right of second wife to her husband while other half is conjugal partnership of first marriage. Thus decision is reversed.

169. VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS

170. YAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Consuegra contracted two marriages. Upon his death, the two wives wanted to get his retirement insurance benefits.

FACTS: Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong in 1939 and they had 4 children. 2 of which died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the two surviving children, Shirley and Jaime. While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning married Nancy on December 11, 1948. T hey had four children. On February 21, 1964, Maning died because of a plane crash. On March 3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her minor children. Talina was initially appointed special administratrix and then later Shirley Yap was appointed regular administratrix.

HELD: The equitable solution was for the two wives to each be given half of the benefits. The first wife was the wife recognized by law. The second wife, on the other hand, married Consuegra in good faith. It was also the second wife and her children who were acknowledged beneficiaries of the insurance.

Since there was a residue of properties and collectible debts after payments to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of Maning and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate. Lower court declared Talina and her children as the legal heirs of Maning. The CA reversed this decision and ruled that the estate should be equally divided into two equal part: ½ to Talina and her children and ½ to Nancy Yap and her kids by virtue of the Leyes de Partidas. Petitioners contend that since Maning died in 1964 when the NCC was already effective, the Spanish Civil Code should be followed. ISSUE: Whether or not the second wife is entitled to inherit. RULING: No. The records show that the properties in question were acquired by Talina and Maning during their marriage. Hence, these properties in the absence of any evidence to t he contrary are considered conjugal properties of Talina and Maning (Art. 142, NCC). Pursuant to Art. 142 and Art. 185 of the NCC, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning approved by the lower court have been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning and Talina as their shares. The ½ share of Maning would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed to his heirs. Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio (Art. 83, NCC)

171. CARINO VS. CARINO

172. ALAVADO VS. CITY OF TACLOBAN

FACTS: Cariño contracted 2 marriages. Upon his death, both women filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance.

FACTS: Ricardo was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer‗s Office of Tacloban City. His l ast day of service was August 19, 1974. On August 6, he went to work only to supervise laborers but he suffered a severe headache. He died on August 7, the day after, of Cerebral Hemorrage. The wife filed claim for death benefits, in her own behalf and of minor children. The hearing officer in Tacloban City issued an award granting the wife P5,200 as death benefits and P200 as burial reimbursement. Tacloban City appealed. On Nov 29, 1975, WCC dismissed the wife ‗s claim for death benefits on the ground of lack of filiation between claimant and deceased. According to WCC, Matilde only presented a marriage certificate. Marriage Certificate is not an authentic proof of marital status. She should show original Marriage Contract or Marriage Certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar. For filiation, her presentation of birth certificate is not enough. Baptismal Certificate is not authentic proof of kinship of the person baptized. WCC said that the wife failed to prove that she was legally married to deceased because of a lack of marriage contract. She only submitted was a copy of marriage cert issued by church, which shows that they were married on August 9, 1939. And that they lived together for 35 years until death of her husband.

HELD: Both marriages were void. The first marriage is void for lack of marriage license. The second marriage is void for being bigamous. Article 147 governs the first marriage while Article 148 governs the second. One- half of the subject ‗death benefits‘ under scrutiny shall go to the first wife as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs, his children with the first wife.

ISSUE: Whether the claimant and her children had the right to claim death benefits of the deceased. RULING: Yes. Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor. If such relationship was not denied or contradicted, the presumption of marriage must be admitted as fact. Public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal certificate were held as competent evidence. There is no evidence on record that will overthrow the presumption of marriage. The marriage certificate is enough proof of marriage. It is certified to be a true copy of the original issued by the Local Civil registrar of City of Tacloban. The provisions of the WCC must be interpreted in favor of laborers, WCC being a social legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the workingmen. WCC decision is set aside. Award is reinstated.

173. ARROYO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

174. GAYON VS. GAYON

FACTS: Nov 2, 1982, Dr. Jorge Neri filed criminal complaint for adultery against wife Ruby Neri with Eduardo Arroyo. This is witnessed by Jabunan in Baguio. Motions of reconsideration filed by the accused party were denied. On Aug 26 1991, Dr. Neri prayed case to be dismissed since he cons ented to his wife‗s infidelity. Petitioners thus filed motions for dismissal or grant new trial.

FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex ―A‖ — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Anne x ―B‖ — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff‘s favor for the consolida tion of ownership in and to the aforementioned property. In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex ―A‖ to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had

ISSUE: Whether or not pardon made by spouse after court ruled that one is guilty of adultery can enable for a new trial to commence. RULING: Pardon has to be given before criminal complaint has been filed. Once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. In this case given after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In protection of family and marriage as inviolable institution.

ever executed ―any document of whatever nature in plaintiff‘s favor‖; that

the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to ―employ the services of co unsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00″; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff ―did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case‖ before filing his

complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit is tenable. RULING: As regards plaintiff‘s failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this

provision applies to suits ―filed or maintained between members of the same family.‖ This phrase, ―members of the same family,‖ s hould,

175. WAINWRIGHT VS. VERSOZA

however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters.

FACTS: Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and three minor children, Jose Ma. Versoza, Jr., Charles John Versoza and Virginia Felice Versoza lodged a complaint for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite against Jose Ma. Versoza. Grounds for complaint is that abandoned the plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains illicit relations with another woman. The defendant answers the claim is premature for it states no cause of action. Article 222 of the Civil Code: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff‘s sister -in-law, whereas her children are his

nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff‘s

failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.

in article 2035." The ground for dismissal of the instant case is ―the suit is

between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made." Lower Court‘s decision is the dismissal of the complaint upon the ground

that there was no showing that efforts have been exerted to settle the case amicably before suit was started. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code will apply in the instant case. RULING: Decision of the lower court, reversed. Article 222 is subject to the limitations in Article 2035 of the Civil Code. Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future support is prescribed, then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be alleged in the complaint. The right to support cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. Article 2035 of the Civil Code cannot be subject to compromise and therefore outside the sphere of application of Article 222.

176. MODEQUILIO VS. BREVA

177. SIARI VALLEY VS. LUCASAN

FACTS: As liability for a vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 which killed Audie Salinas and which injured Renato Culan, Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay indemnity for damages to spouses Salinas and to Juanito. Consequently on July 7, 1988, a writ of execution and levy were issued against a parcel of residential lot and an agricultural land, the titles of which were under the name of Modequillo. Modequillo then motioned to quash, alleging that the residential lot was their family home that had been constituted since 1969, prior to the case and hence exempt from liability by virtue of FC 155.

FACTS: CFI ordered Filemon Lucasan to pay 80k to Siari Valley for damages and value of cattle. A writ of execution was issued. Sheriff levied on lands of the defendant. The lands were sold to the highest bidder. Lucasan files an opposition challenging the validity of the execution since one of the lands auctioned was the land where he extrajudicially constituted as the f amily home.

HELD: The family home is not exempt from liability. Modequillo‗s house and lot were constituted as a family home NOT under the NCC (by judicial or extrajudicial means) but under the FC by operation of law when the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. FC 162 provides that all

RULING: No. The family home is exempt from execution EXCEPT when a debt is incurred before the family home was registered (CC art 243). The reason for this is to protect creditors from a debtor who may act in bad faith by making such property a supposed family home for the sole purpose of defeating the claim against him.

existing family residences at the time of the FC‗s effectivity are

considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to the family home under the FC. FC 162 has a prospective application. Hence, his family home was constituted only on August 3, 1988 and not on 1969 when it was first occupied as a family home. The accident took place on March 16, 1976 and the judgment became final on Jan. 29, 1988, prior to the constitution of the family home in August. Liability can thus be held against the family home.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lucasan‘s family home which was extrajudicially established exempt from execution.

178. PERIDO VS. PERIDO

179. DE LA PUERTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. He died on 1942. The children and grandchildren from his first and second marriages executed a document entitled ―Declaration of Heirship and Extra -Judicial Partition‖ where they would partitio n amongst themselves the estate of Lucio. Eventually, the heirs from the first marriage backed out from said partition. They now say that they are exclusive heirs of the estate since ALL FIVE CHILDREN of LUCIO are illegitimate and have no succesional rights. Heirs from the first marriage say that the first three children from the second marriage are born before the first wife died in 1905, therefore proving that they were born out of wedlock. The last two were also born out of wedlock as testified by the heirs from the first marriage. The case reached the SC, hence the instant case.

FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the children are legitimate. RULING: Yes. It was found out that the first wife died during the Spanish regime, therefore disproving the theory that the three children were born out of wedlock. The certificate of titles indicating that he was single and the testimonies saying that the children were born out of wedlock were not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the capacity of marriage. Lucio and the second wife, who were without impediments to marry, were already living together as husband and wife before the children were born, thereby giving rise to the presumption that the children are legitimate.

ISSUE: Whether or not they are legitimate children. RULING: Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.

180. TAN VS. TROCIO

181. MOORE VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her Trocio was threatening to have her alien husband and to tell authorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational school. On Nov 1979, Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio. Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her

FACTS: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also American) had a son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 years old) born also at US. Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California on May 31, 1949. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on September 29, 1956 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived with them. Elaine

and her family‗s cases and said she was only doing this because he

filed at CFI Rizal a motion to have her child‗s surname be changed into

declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra. On Feb 13 1986,since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc,, the provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively liable.

Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal.

which begot a son, Jewel. She didn‗t immediately tell the police since

ISSUE: Whether or not Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct. RULING: No, there is lack of evidence. After the incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school. The fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened in school premises. How could the help have been there then? Insuffiecient evidence show that it was his son: (1) unusual closeness as testified by her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together is not enough ground to establish paternity. Presumption is Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and Felicidad were living together.

ISSUE: Whether or not law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother and is there is justifiable reason exists to allow change of name. RULING: Regarding the first issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise with respect to paternity and that said change may even redound to the prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name.

182. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC

183. MANGULABNAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They had two children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc. Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (the reby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed at the CFI Bohol on April 10, 1978 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed petition saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations.

FACTS: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He then moved for a reconsideration but was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of the TC on the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support as in the case of an acknowledged child.

ISSUE: Whether or not two children‗s prayer to drop their father‗s surname is justified. RULING: No. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use their father‗s surname. Said minors and their fath er should be consulted about such, mother‗s desire should

not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion as to the minor‗s parentage and might also create the

impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.

ISSUE: Whether or not recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is required before support may be granted. RULING: No. The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the NCC. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had been provisionally established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth certificate were presented to prove the paternity of the child.

184. OSMENA DE VALENCIA VS. RODRIGUEZ

185. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG

FACTS: Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the

FACTS: On Jan 1941, Emiliano Andal, who was married to Maria Duenas, became sick with tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live with them to help them with the farm. Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix and lived together from 1942-1943. Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died.

defendant Pio Valencia in the latter‗s lawful wedlock with plaintiff

Catalina Osmena. Defendants on the other hand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his commonlaw wife. Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname

Maria didn‗t attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to

―Valencia‖.

Mariano Andal. Maria then filed for recovery of land that was originally given to Emiliano by his mother upon his marriage to Maria. Maria said

ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia.

that the land is her son‗s since he is the legitimate heir of Emiliano.

RULING: Yes. This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit the land. RULING: Yes. Art 108 of NCC Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of m arriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Emiliano is presumed to be legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of marriage. Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick of tuberculosis, could not sexually perform so even if Maria was having an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano is Emili anos‗ son. As result the son is the legit heir and thus inherits the land of his father.

186. MACADANGDANG VS. COUT OF APPEALS

187. TAN VS. TROCIO

FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

FACTS: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan contends that Jewel is Trocio‘s son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation. RULING: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, f or the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

HELD: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan contends that Jewel is Trocio‘s son.

188. JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

189. AMURAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Jao filed petition for recognition and support against Perico. Based on the Blood Grouping Test, Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico.

HELD: Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears.

HELD: There is almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity. The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. But if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods of the parents are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

190. CHUA KENG GIAP VS. PAC

191. CABATBAT-LIM VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of action because he is not the son of the abovementioned couple as testified by the mother herself.

FACTS: Violeta is claiming to be the only child of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat.

Respondent contends res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. And also the mother‗s testimonials, SY Kua he rself testified that she is not her son. Petitioner contends paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of the mother should not be credited. ISSUE: Whether or not Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua. RULING: Yes. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say - as indeed she has said these many years - that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. Petition Denied.

HELD: Factual findings indicate that child is not born of the deceased; she is only a ward (ampon) without formal adoption proceedings. The action is not impugning legitimacy since the claim is not that child is illegitimate but that she is not the decedent's child at all.

192. LIYAO, JR VS. TANHOTI-LIYAO

193. REYES VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo. William Liyao, Sr. was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son. Son claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao, Sr.

FACTS: Private respondent filed with the CFI for order compelling the petitioner Irene Reyes a.k.a. Irene Ramero to execute a deed of reconveyance on several props to the respondent. Respondent allege that petitioner acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit. Respondent who are the sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since they allege the petitioner was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva Ramero and the latter‗s husband Justino Reyes. Petitioner claims that she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother with Justino Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child since she mentions that decedent supported her financially through her education. CFI rules against respondent dismissing the order for reconveyance. Respondent appeal to CA which rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of the petitioner on the said props are null and void. CA rules that though petitioner was a spurious child of the decedent she was never recognized and thus cannot inherit. In her motion for reconsideration w/ the CA petitioner cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the decedent as proven by the latter‗s consent no ted on the petition marriage certificate.

HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. Liyao, Jr. cannot ch oose his own filiation. If Corazon‘s husband, Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child if his mother‘s

alleged paramour.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a recognized child of the decedent and is thus able to inherit. RULING: No, it is a well-established doctrine that for an illegitimate child to inherit he/she must first be recognized by the putative parent through voluntary or compulsory means. In this case the petitioner was never validly recognized by Francisco Delgado contrary to her assertions. The evidence she presented was not compelling to establish her filiation to the decedent. For instance her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. Furthermore it cannot be said that her baptismal certificate is credible evidence regarding filiation since the statements contained therein only attest to the administration of the said sacrament on the said date. In addition to this her permanent student records and her written consent to her father‗s opera tion both being unsigned and not written in her father‗s handwriting cannot suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover the

pictures she present did not give weight to her arguments as they are not constitutive of proof of filiation. Finally the alleged consent stipulated by Francisco in the ℗ marriage certificate cannot be given weight since it is not signed and does not appear in the decedent‗s handwriting.

194. CASTRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

195. MENDOZA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

RULING: Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.

ISSUE: Whether or not such recognition or acknowledgement of a natural child must be made in a record of birth, a will, or in some other public document. RULING: Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in some other public document. In the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya. However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate if baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.

196. RAMOS VS. RAMOS

197. LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE: Whether or not actions of the father and his family imply

FACTS: Lim and Uy are both alleging that they are heirs of deceased Susana.

recognition of plaintiff‘s status as an acknowledged natural child.

RULING: The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin Ramos, received shares in the estate implies that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin and Granada Ramos, and the late Jose Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs because Martin Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well known in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos are estopped from attacking plaintiffs‘ status as

acknowledged natural children.

HELD: Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with formalities required by law. Marriage contract presented by petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889. Marriage contract is a mere declaration of the contracting parties, in the presence of the solemnizing officer and 2 other witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband or wife. It does not possess the requisite of a public document of recognition. It is not a written act with the intervention of the notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him.

198. BANAS VS. BANAS

199. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Raymundo Bañas was the child of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. Bibiano Bañas shouldered his education. Upon Raymundo‘s death, his heirs filed for partition or recovery of heredita ry share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo was a recognized natural child of Bibiano.

FACTS:

HELD: There was no voluntary recognition. The note signed ―Su padre, B. Banas‖ is not sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition. It is merely

indicative of paternal solicitude and not acknowledgement of paternity.

ISSUE: RULING:

200. VDA. DE ALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

201. BALUYOT VS. BALUYOT

FACTS:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

RULING:

RULING:

202. PATERNO VS. PATERNO

203. GAPUSAN-CHUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

HELD: In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the t ime of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter. The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's surname.

ISSUE: RULING:

204. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN

205. PEOPLE VS. RIZO

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is obliged to recognize the child.

FACTS: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old mongoloid sister was bigger than usual. She discovered that she was pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the husband of her yaya had intercourse with her in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Felicidad. On October 22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a baby. Rizo did not confirm nor deny that he had sexual intercourse with her but filed a motion to dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC found Felicidad to be a competent witness and rendered judgment against the accused. RTC also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring as his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a married man.

HELD: Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines provide iIn any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; In the case at bar, the record shows that conception had occurred at or about the time that rape been inflicted upon Filomena by the accused, or more particularly, within 120 days from the commission of the offense. 19 The acknowledgment required of the accused by the trial court should be understood to be acknowledgment merely of the filiation of the child; the accused being a married man could not sire an illegitimate natural child, 20 a status which in any event is no longer recognized under the Family Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rizo can be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime. RULING: No. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the judgment ordering him to recognize the child as his legitimate son should therefore be eliminated.

206. DEMPSEY VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

207. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel Dempsey without the benefit of marriage and Christine Marie was born. The child receives monthly support from him in the sum of $150. Janalita seeks for the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his American citizenship. Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was abandonment and failure to provide adequate support for the child though he had the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found him to be guilty. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier decision.

FACTS:

ISSUE: RULING:

ISSUE: RULING:

208. PEOPLE VS. BARRANCO

209. LAZATIN VS. CAMPOS

FACTS: Rosalia Barranco (19) was raped by Bartolome Barranco, the second cousin of her father who lives 100 meters away from her house. On Feb 10,1980. Rosalia was raped by while being threatened with

FACTS: On Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondents Nora and Irma. One month after, Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding. On April 11, 1974, Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will. By Nov 22, 1974, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child. Aug. 20, 1975, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was an ―illegitimate son‖ of Dr. Lazatin and was lated adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. Respondent court heart

death, he was holding a butcher‗s knife to her neck. On March 19, 1980,

Bartolome attempted rape but foiled because Rosalia was able to fend him off by hitting him with a piece of wood. On the eve of the same day, Rosalia confessed to her mother the rape. They went to the police and had a physical exam. Turned out she was pregnant. On April 3, 1981, trial court convicted Bart of Rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua ISSUE: Whether or not the court can order Bartolome to acknowledge the child.

petitioner‗s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of

RULING: The trial court erred when it ordered that the child be acknowledged as Bart‗s because the child of a sin cannot be

acknowledged by a married man. However he is entitled to support the child.

Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption hi his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents‗ objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses

as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as ―Renato Lazatin‖ but was compelled to change his surname to ―Sta. Clara‖ when the deceased spouses refused to give

consent to his marriage to his present wife. On March 4, 1976, respondent Court barred the introduct ion of petitioner‗s evidence and on March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption. The Court denied motion ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in not allowing petitioner to introduce new evidence. RULING: No. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Petitioner‗s flow of evidence in the case below doesn‗t lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. No proof of specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses No judicial records of adoption or copies. Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate as an adopted son because of lack of proof

210. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO

211. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARANTO

FACTS: This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered

FACTS: Court of Appeals granted Caranto spouses‘ petition for adoption

the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the

HELD: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption. The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.

petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the child. RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne Fajardo was changed to Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she

was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted. RULING: Yes. Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted

of Midael with prayer for the correction of the minor‘s first name from

Midael to Michael.

212. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES

213. SANTOS VS. ARANSANZO

FACTS: Feb 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles (private respondent) filed petition to adopt Jason Condat, court grants it given that all requirements for adoption are satisfied. Petitioner appeals to CA who affirms the trial court decision, hence this petition

FACTS: Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949. With their parents whereabouts unknown, their current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave his written consent, Paulina being 14 years old likewise gave consent. Hence, Court granted petition. On Oct 21, 1957, Juliana dies, Simplicio files for settlement of intestate estate including Paulina and Aurora as surviving heirs. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the first cousin of Juliana files an opposition to the petition, stat ing that Simplicio‗s marriage to Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora were void for there is no written consent from natural parents. Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the first cousin of Juliana and adding that she is the mother of Paulina Santos, likewise files as opposition. The CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES and declares that the adoption is void for lack of written consent. Petitioners file for preliminary injunction against the CA orders and the Court grants it hence this petition by the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision w/c granted the petition in favor of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles. RULING: No. Though Dioscoro was not named as a petitioner, he did provide written consent that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child, which is sufficient to make him a petitioner. The future of the child must not be compromised by insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules. Adoption statutes are liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institutions and to protect the child. Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interest of the child. The CA found the following in the petition and correctly approved the adoption: Natural parents gave consent / DSWD recommended approval / Trial court approved / Written consent of adopting parents

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents can assail in settlement proceedings the adoption decree of Paulina and Aurora Santos. RULING: No. If natural parents have abandoned the children, the guardian‘s consent suffices. Furthermore, the adoption court made sufficient findings that the natural parents of them minors couldn‗t be

located, hence its order cannot be attacked collaterally. Hence the CA erred in reviewing, under collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. Even if Simplicio were married to another person (not decided in this case), the estate of Juliana being the subject matter, the adopted children status of Paulina and Aurora is not affected, hence they succeed Juliana. Respondents cannot intervene in the settlement proceedings and attack the adoption. As the adoption is held valid, and in intestate succession, adopted children exclude first cousins, the CA decision is reversed.

214. DAOANG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE

215. NIETO VS. MAGAT

FACTS: Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed petition for adoption of the minor Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. Petitioners minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang assisted by their father, file an opposition claiming that the Agonoys have a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy (mother of Roderick and Rommel), who died March 1, 1971, thus Agonoys are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art 335. The Trial Court still granted the petition for adoption

FACTS: pouses Ernesto and Matilde Magat reared as their own child Roy Sumintac, who is their nephew, from his birth until the spouses went to Guam to work when the boy was already four years old. They petitioned the court to allow them to adopt Roy, but the trial court denied this, on the ground that t hey are non-residents of the Philippines and that the trial custody as required under P.D. No. 603 cannot be effected. They went to the Supreme Court to have the decision reviewed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent spouses are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art. 335 par. 1.

ISSUE: Whether or not residency in another country disqualifies the couple from adopting, and whether or not the trial custody is a mandatory requirement.

RULING: No. Art 335, those with legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. The law is clear, children mentioned therein do not include grandchildren. The legislators of the NCC obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt. Adoption is used to benefit the adopter. This has since changed as now; the present notion on adoption promotes the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a happy life. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, etc children is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt

RULING: Negative on both questions. The fact that the prospective adopters reside temporarily in a foreign country does not disqualify them from adopting a minor child. On the second issue, the law specifically authorizes the court, either upon its own or on petitionerâ€™s motion, to dispense with the trial

custody if it finds that it is to the best interest of the child. In this case, the Minister of Social Services and Development suggests that trial custody is unnecessary because the child was already comfortable with the couple and the couple was capable of disciplining the child.

216. DUNCAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

217. CANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty. Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses to adopt the child.

FACTS: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to adopt the 3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition for adoption along with Clavano.

HELD: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to t he adoption. The father‘s consent is not required because the child is illegitimate. The mother‘s consent is not necessary either, because she

is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a proper party. Provision says legal guardian)

HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang‘s cons ent as the father is necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.

218. BOBANOVIC VS. MONTES

219. PARDO DE TAVERA VS. CACDAC

ISSUE:

FACTS: On June 19, 1986, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor, Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition, OSG failed to send any representative for the State. Evidence established that the Gordons (British spouse) are allowed by their home country to adopt foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines. The husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building Superintendent therefore financially secured. Anthony's mother, Adoracion Custodio, had given her consent to the adoption realizing that her child would face a brighter future. The Case Study Report submitted by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation as the natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr 2mos child. Trial Court declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the Gordons. The Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if subpoenaed, saying that the Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency. And that there is a required six-month trial custody, which had not been met nor were the reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603). Contended also that the Gordons had given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were shopping for commodities. Under the Muslim Law (Dubai), Anthony cannot inherit from the adopting parents. The Gordons had filed another petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month later they tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same name and represented that she was the very same girl they were adopting. There being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.

RULING:

ISSUE: Whether or not travel clearance can be withheld by MSSD following the objections MSSD is raising RULING: NO. As the Trial Court has held, it ordered the MSSD to issue the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue the corresponding passport saying that the Court Social Worker Report could take the place of a report from a duly licensed placement agency or of the MSSD. Court had also impliedly dispensed with the six-month trial custody considering that the Gordons were

foreigners whose livelihood was earned abroad. And that the Decision had become final and executory. The Trial Court relied on the Resolution of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court and the ruling in Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes "In refusing to grant the travel clearance

certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects of a valid and final judgment of the Court regarding which no appeal had even been taken from (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370, July 7, 1986)." The 10,000.00 given by Gordon spouses was only a financial assistance to the natural mother of the child. The spouses also would want to adopt a baby girl but upon learning that she‗s mongoloid, they

turned her over to International Alliance for Children, where she unfortunately died. And finally, Muslim Laws shall not apply to them, they being Britons.

220. IN RE: ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA FACTS: The spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. It is established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00. It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners. HELD: Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of

paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).

221. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO FACTS: A Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petit ioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she

was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused. ISSUE: Whether the adoption would be given effect. RULING: The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

222. IN RE: HABEAS CORPUS OF ANGELIE CERVANTES

223. PELAYO VS. LAURON

FACTS: A Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext th at she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused.

FACTS: On the evening of October 13, 1906, Dr. Arturo Pelayo was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He was asked to give birth to their daughter-in-law. He assisted in the delivery of the child and was kept occupied until the next day. He valued his fee at P500 but Marcelo and Juana refused to pay without reason. On November 23, 1906, a Complaint by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella for collection of money was filed. Lauron and Abella contends that that their son and his wife lived independently from them and in a separate house and that if she did stay in their house that night, it was due to fortuitous circumstances. They also allege that their daughter-in-law had died due to the childbirth. On April 5, 1907, the Regional Trial Court held Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted. RULING: Yes, respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband is bound to pay the bill RULING: Yes. Article 142 and 143, Civil Code provides: Mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support which includes medical services in case of illness. Also that when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored. Also that the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support. Hence, her husband, and not her father and mother- in-law, is liable. It is of no matter who called the doctor and requested his services for there was imminent danger to her life and medical assistance was urgently needed.

224. SANCHEZ VS. ZULUETA

225. REYES VS. INES-LUCIANO

FACTS: Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego and had a child Mario Sanchez. On 1932 Feliciano refused to support Josefa and Mario and then abandoned them. Josefa and Mario have no means of subsistence. Feliciano receives a monthly pension of P174.20 from US Army. Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez sought monthly allowance for support and support pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez. Feliciano contends that Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez which resulted to Mario Sanchez. Also that on October 27, 1930, Josefa abandoned the conjugal home. And as the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario, Mario is not entitled to his support. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense which Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals denied

FACTS: On January 18, 1958, Manuel J. C. Reyes married Celia IlustreReyes and had children. On March 10, 1976, Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down the 13-flight stairs and hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half unconscious. By May 11, 1976, she left their office. On May 26, 1976, she returned to get her overnight bag and Manuel demanded that she get out but she ignored him, hence, he doused her with grape juice, kicked her and attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver. On June 3, 1976, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed against Manuel J. C. Reyes an action for support pendente lite, and for Legal Separation when he had attempted to kill her. Manuel contends that Celia committed adultery with her physician and that she is thus not entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was excessive

ISSUE: Whether or not Macario and Josefa are entitled to support RULING: No, Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support of the wife or an action for support of the child who is the fruit of such adulterous relations. The defense should be established and not merely alleged, and that proof must therefore be permitted. Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he asked for an opportunity to present evidence to prove his allegations, it was error to deny him the opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite RULING: Yes. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support but only if proven. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action but it must be established by competent evidence and not merely alleged. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. During hearing of the application for action for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. Yet Celia asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not n ecessarily from Manuel‗s private funds. Determination of Amount - Celia was unemployed and without funds, all their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President, Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel: Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61; Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84; The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. Also that these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite: it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application. In view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered, mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite.

226. LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

227. CANONIZADO VS. BENITEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were married on 1951. On 1969, petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent. 1969, respondent then filed for legal separation on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life. Moreover, she wanted support pending trial for their youngest son. On 1969, respondent Judge granted respondents application for support pendente lite. Petitioner filed for a preliminary injunction which was dismissed. Meanwhile, in 1972, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Respondent and Teodor Ramirez (his paramour) guilty of adultery.

FACTS: On Sept. 27, 1968, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ordering defendant to give plaintiff a monthly support of P100.00 beginning with October 1964, payable in advance within the first 5 days of each month. Said decision became final and executory on Jan. 21, 1969. On Oct. 24, 1969, an order of execution was issued for P27,900 follow by the writ itself on Oct. 28, 1969. The writ was recalled and set aside to enable Canonizado to correct the amount therein stated. On Oct. 6, 1967, Christina (daughter) became of age but since she was still studying then, her support was formally terminated only in April 1969. The total amount due her as of this latter date was determined at P16,150 for the period from Oct. 1964 to April 1969. Writs of execution were again issued on Feb. 10 and March 30, 1970; both were returned and unsatisfied. On July 11, 1973, the petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement. Petitioner filed a motion for execution and contempt of court. By Aug. 3, 1976, petitioner and respondent entered again into an agreement. On Jan. 12, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to require the respondent to pay current support beginning Feb 1978 based on the decisions of Sept. 27, 1968 and Jan. 21, 1969. Respondent filed an opposition on the ground that his obligation to support has terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the respondents claim for support pendente lite. RULING: Yes. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. There must be a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately for him/her to gain support. In other words, the right to support was lost by the respondent when she was found guilty of adultery.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court can be compelled by mandamus to a ct on the petitioner‗s motion for payment of current support. RULING: No. NCC 303: The obligation to give support shall also cease: (3) when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance from his subsistence. This doesn‗t affect the

right to support between spouses but only the action to make it demandable subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists. Respondent can rightfully file motion to oppose the payment of current support to terminate the demandability of the same for the time being. Respondent judge cannot be compelled by mandamus to order respondent to pay current support when the latter alleges that a ground exists for the suspension of such obligation. A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or reenforced when appropriate circumstances exists

228. HONTIVEROS VS. IAC

229. UNSON VS. NAVARRO

FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and private respondent Brenda Hernando are the father and mother of an acknowledged natural child born on November 27, 1981 named Margaux Hontiveros. From November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and custody of Brenda and Alejandro used to take the child out during Saturdays and return her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982, Alejandro picked the kid up and never returned her to the mother. The mother then filed a petition for habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux without depriving the father of his visitorial rights. At the hearing conducted on September 9, 1982, the minor child was produced before the Court and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties that Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for 7 days every other week. On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the mother from bringing the kid to the USA where she is bound for.

FACTS: Unson and Araneta were married on April 19, 1971. Maria Teresa, their child would stay with petitioner during school days and spend weekends with her mother but her mother wouldn't even bother to pick her up during non-school days. During early part of 1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been living with her brother in law Reyes. Reyes and Araneta later beget two kids and later embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner contends that Maria Teresa was born and reared under the Roman Catholic faith and should not be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life which is the upbringing and training her father is committed to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable arrangement and no specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by her and Unson regarding custody of the child and that Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's parents. She admits her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not morally unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to custody of his minor child Margaux. RULING: No. Article 363 of the NCC provides that ―no mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure‖. Clearly, Brenda has a clear legal

right under Art. 17 of PD 603 to the custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reasons to the contrary. While the petitioner would have the court believe that private respondent is unfit to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to the mother. RULING. No. It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not say immoral influence, that the situation in which Araneta has placed herself might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. She might start getting ideas about the peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law. The Court has no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitorial rights over the child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the custody of minor children are open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion.

230. EXCONDE VS. CAPUNO

231. PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES

FACTS: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a

FACTS: Spouses filed a case with the RTC for damages on the death of their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila Technical Institute grounds (laboratory room) against defendants Antonio C. Brillantes (member of the Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (the President), Santiago M. Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio L. Daffon (co-student and assailant of Palisoc). The death of the victim was believed to have been caused by the heavy fist blows to the body which he had incurred from a fight with Daffon which damaged his internal organs. The lone witness to the event, Desiderio Cruz, attested that he and Daffon were fixing a machine while the victim was looking on. After a snide comment by Daffon regarding his inaction, the victim slapped him which started the fight. Daffon then retaliated with fist blows to the body. After which Palisoc fell down and fainted after which he was brought to the hospital where he later died from his injuries. The TC found Daffon guilty for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the other defendants from liability under Article 2180 of the NCC. The court cited that the damages to incurred in the case would not be on the defendant from MTI since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school‘s

supervisor. He boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle and two passengers (Isidiro Caperina and Amado Ticzon) died. At the time this happened, Dante‘s father, Delfin was not with him, nor did he know that his son was

going to attend a parade. Dante was then charged with double homicide through reckless imprudence. After conviction by the RTC and CA, petitioner Sabina Exconde (mother of one of the deceased) filed a separate civil action against Dante and Delfin for damages in the amount of P2,959.00. Defendants averred as a defense that Dante should be the only one civilly liable because at the time of the accident he was not under the control, supervision, and custody of Delfin. The lower court sustained the defense, and so Exconde appealed, the case certified to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin can be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante for damages resulting from the death of Isidro caused by the negligent act of his minor son Dante. RULING: Article 1903, 1st and 5th paragraphs: ―The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for an y damages caused by minor children who live with them.‖ ―Teachers and directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or

ISSUE: Whether or not under the factual findings, the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials from civil liability under Art. 2180 of the NCC.

apprentices while they are under their custody.‖

RULING: Yes, the SC held the lower court erred in its application of Art. 2180 in as much as they misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the

The 5th paragraph only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Hence, neither the head of

student) remain in their (the school‗s) custody‗, to mean that the school incurs liability for a student‗s actions only if the student actually boards or

the school, nor the city school‘s supervisor, could be held liable for the

resides w/ them (a case where their influence over the student supersedes that of the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the mentioned phrase actually implied that liability arises not from the boarding of the student w/ the school but from the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. As such being that the offense occurred in school premises during class time within the supervision of the school. They should be held liable under 2180 unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." which they did not do.

negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided by law. The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages that may be caused by the m inor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon parents the ―duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,‖ while, on the other hand, gives them the ―right to correct and punish them in moderation.‖ The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they

exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. The defendants failed to do.

232. AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

233. SALVOSA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate, Pablito Daffon, while in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. He was in school to finish a physics experiment as a pre-requisite to graduating that year. He died at 17. The respondent school and its faculty members submit that they cannot be held liable for what happened because, technically, the semester had already ended.

FACTS: The Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and is also an institution of arts and trade. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy. B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer, he was appointed by the AFP and he also receives his salary from the AFP. He also receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a commerce student of the BCF. On Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio in the parking lot of BCF with an unlicensed firearm which he took from the armory of the ROTC Unit. Heirs of Napoleon (Respondents) sued for damages from Abon, his officer, officers of the BCF and BCF, Inc. The RTC rendered their decision, sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and severally for damages. The IAC affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not they should be held liable now that the semester had ended when the incident happened. RULING: No and the petition is hereby denied. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code states that: ―Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.‖ There

have been cases in the past where who was liable would depend on w/n the school was academic or non-academic. If it were academic, the teacher-in-charge of the student would be liable, while if it were nonacademic, the head would be. (The ratio of this being that heads of schools of arts and trade would be closer and more involved with their students, who can be considered their apprentices.) The Court believes that this provision should apply to ALL schools, academic and nonacademic. Even if the student was within the school grounds and basically doing nothing, he is still within the school custody and subject to the discipline of school authorities. However, in the case at bar, none of the respondents can be clearly said to have been responsible for what happened to Amadora. The school itself cannot be held directly liable because according to the provision, it is only either the teacher-in-charge or the head of the school. The rector, dean of boys or the high school principal also may not be held liable because it is clear that they are not teachers-in-charge. Alfredo‗s physics teacher cannot be held liable because he was not necessarily the teacher-in-charge of Daffon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. RULING: No. Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident was around 8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed to be in the ROTC office at that time, as ordered by his Commandant, Ungos. Abon could not have been in the custody of the school at the time, as he was under direct orders to have been somewhere else. IAC decision is reversed.

234. ST. MARY‘S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS

235. MEDINA VS. MAKABALI

FACTS: From Feb 13- 20 1995, St. Mary‗s conducted an enrollment drive, part of which were school visits from where prospective enrollees

FACTS: On Feb. 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to Joseph Casero in Makabali Clinic, Pampanga, owned by respondent Dra.Venancia Makabali. Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. Zenaida never visited the child nor paid for his expenses until Aug of 1966 where she claimed for custody of the minor. Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with Feliciano Casero with two ot her children, with the tolerance of Casero‗s lawful wife who lives elsewhere. During trial, the minor addressed the respondent as Mammy, and even chose to stay with the respondent. With Dra. Makabili making a promise to allow the minor the free choice of whom to live with upon reaching the age of 14 – the Court held that it

were studying. As a student of St. Mary‗s, Sherwin Carpitanos (son of

respondent spouses) was part of the campaign group. Sherwin, along with other students were riding the jeep, owned by co-respondent Vivencio Villanueva, driven by James Daniel, 15 years old, also a student, allegedly, he was driving in reckless manner resulting the jeep to turtle, and Sherwin died as a result of injuries sustained. After trial, RTC ordered St. Mary‗s to pay the spouses Carpitanos for damages. St. Mary‗s appealed the ruling to the CA, but was denied, hence this appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin. RULING: Yes, Under FC Art. 218, Schools have special parental authority (APA) over a minor child while under their custody - such authority applies to field trips and other affairs outside school whenever authorized by the schools. Under the Family Code, Art. 219, if a person under custody is a minor, those exercising SPA are liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their custody. For St. Mary to be liable, there must be an act or omission considered negligent and which has proximate cause to the injury, and the negligence must have causal connection to the accident. Respondents fail to show that the negligence was the proximate cause, hence reliance on Art 219 is unfounded. Respondents Spouses Daniel (parents of driver) and Villanueva (owner of the jeep) admit that the cause of the accident was not negligence of St. Mary‗s nor the reckless

driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep - which the Carpitons do not dispute. T here is likewise no evidence that St. Mary‗s allowed the m inor James to drive, it was Ched Villanueva, grandson of the jeep owner who allowed James to drive. Hence liability for the accident whether caused by negligence of the driver or detachment of steering wheel guide must be pinned on the minor‗s parents. The negligence of St. Mary‗s was only a remote cause. With the evidence presented by St. Mary‗s and with the fact that the Daniel

spouses mention the circumstance of detachment of steering wheel, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be responsible

was for the child‗s best interest to be left with the foster mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in ordering the minor to stay with the respondent. RULING: No, petition dismissed. While the law recognizes the right of parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (NCC Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to pr ovide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.

236. LUNA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

237. LINDAIN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Private Respondent Maria Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna, who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Luna. Maria is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they are the parents of Shirley, who is the subject of this child custody case. Around 2-4 months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means who loved Shirley and raised

FACTS: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land whose title was under their names.

her as their very own. Petitioners asked for the respondents‗ consent to Shirley‗s application for a US Visa because they wanted to bring her to

Disneyland but to no avail. Hence, petitioner left Shirley with the respondents, upon the latter‗s request, but with instructions that their

driver take and fetch Shirley to Maryknoll College every school day. When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, and the trial court ruled in favor of them. Respondents appealed to CA, who reversed the order. Petitioners opposed the execution of the judgment and filed a motion for reconsideration on grounds of the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which would make the judgment prejudicial to the child‗s best interests. Shirley made a manifest

during the hearing that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the petitioners herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. Regardless, respondent court still ruled in favor of the respondents ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners is entitled to the rightful custody of Shirley. RULING: Petition granted, Shirley goes to the petitioners. Shirley‗s manifestations that she would kill herself or run away if she were taken away from the petitioners would make the judgment unfair, unjust, if not illegal. NCC Art. 363 provides that questions relating to the care, custody, and education, etc. of children, the latter‗s welfare is paramount,

hence best interests of the minor can override procedural rules - even the rights of the biological parents. Furthermore, in her letters to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel who beat her often. To return her to the private respondents would be traumatic, as requested by the child herself, let us not destroy her future.

HELD: Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and duties as legal administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power to mortgage, encumber or dispose.

238. CHUA VS. CABANGBANG

239. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Pacita Chua worked as a hostess and lived with Chua Ben in 1950. They had a child but died in infancy. She then cohabited with Sy Sia Lay, with Robert and Betty Chua Sy as fruits. After Betty‗s birth, they

FACTS: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They had two children: Junior and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned the conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50,000 from Rep. Maglana and 10,000 from a certain Galagar. Classmates of Junior and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed at the Court of First Instance of Bohol on April 10, 1978 a petition to change surname of her two children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). Trial Court dismissed petition saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio, but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations.

separated. She then became Victor Tan Villareal‗s mistress in 1960, a

girl was born to her but then they separated and she gave the child away to a comadre in Cebu. On May1958, Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, who were then childless, acquired custody of Betty, who was then four months old. They had her baptized as Grace Cabangbang. On how Cabangbangs acquired Betty: according to Pacita, it was Villareal during their cohabitation, who gave Betty to Cabangbangs (for favors Villareal received). She only knew of such when Betty was three years old and was brought to her by Villareal, who then returned Betty to the Cabangbangs due to threats. The Cabangbangs say they found her wrapped in bundles at their gates and then treated her as their own, and that only when Betty/Grace was 5 ½ years old that the controversy arose. Trial Court said that Betty was given to Cabangbangs by Villareal but with knowledge and consent from Pacita. Pacita demanded the custody of the child. Respondents were the Cabangbangs and Villareal. A writ was issued by court but the body of child was not produced. The Trial court eventually ruled that for the welfare of the child, she should remain in the custody of the Cabangbangs ISSUE: Whether or not the child should be with Pac ita. RULING: No. Article 363 of the New Civil Code say that minor under seven years of age shall not be separated from mother, but issue is now moot as Grace is already 11. The courts may, in cases specified by law, deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not been taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two chi ldren‗s prayer to drop their father‗s surname is justified. RULING: No. Following the New Civil Code Art. 364, since Junior and Bombi are legitimate children, therefore they should use their father‗s

surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mother‗s desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of

name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion a s to the minor‗s parentage and might also create the impression that said minors are illegitimate children, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.

240. JOHNSTON VS. REPUBLIC

241. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA

FACTS: On June 24, 1960: a Petition for Adoption of Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana was filed by Isabel Valdes Johnston. The 2-yr.-10-mo. old baby was then under the custody of the orphanage Hospicio de San Jose whose Mother Superior consented to the adoption. As alleged in the petition, Isabel was then married to Raymond Arthur Johnston who also consented to the adoption. The adoption was granted but the surname of the child was changed to

FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin‘s

―Valdes‖ because it was held as the surname of the petitioner. On October 24, 1960, a Motion was fi led to change the surname to ―Valdes Johnston‖. ISSUE: Whether the adopted child can use the surname of adopter‗s

husband. RULING: No, because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her surname can be used by the child. NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use the adopter‗s surname. The husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption, his consent to the adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopting father. Hence, his surname cannot be used because it would give the wrong impression that he adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to the status of his legitimate child under NCC 341 (1). But why ―Valdes‖ despite her marriage to Johnston? Because ―Valdes‖

remains to be as her own surname. Use of the surname of the husband is only an addition to the surname of the wife and it does not change the latter. NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to her surname her husband's surname but she has a surname of her own to which her husband's surname may only be added if she so chooses.

mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer‘s

using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records. She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion among persons and entities she dealt with and would entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances. ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer. RULING: The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition, the mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of Serafin Ferrer.

242. TOLENTINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

243. LEGAMIA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1931 – Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentino married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

FACTS: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter‘s death,

Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio‘s death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed ―Corazon L. Reyes.‖ The voucher evidencing payment of Michael‘s claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed ―Corazon L. Reyes.‖

For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon‘s prosecution.

RULING: Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law. There was a commentary by Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband‘s surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. Of the husband even if he has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no usurpation of the petitioner‘s name and surname. Usurpation implies

injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity

HELD: It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the nam e of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man‘s wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is

not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

244. REYES VS. ALEJANDRO

245. EASTERN SHIPPING VS. LUCERO

FACTS: In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts.

FACTS: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed as captain of the ship EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, meaning the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.

The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband , invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto must be judicially declared absent. RULING: No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. The provision is concerned with the interest or property of the absentee. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. The reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: 1. The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; 2. The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee; and 3. The general interest of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner. In this case, since there were no properties to speak of, the dismissal of the Courts is valid. .

Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the following dates: February l6, 1980 7am; February l6, 1980 3:30pm; February 16, 1980 9:50pm (on the third message he stated that seawater was entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon ship). The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative. The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept. On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for the payment of the accrued salary allotment of her husband which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila. The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary. RULING: The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed. Art. 391 NCC: The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane. The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro : "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." Hence the NLRC decision is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid.

246. TOL-NOQUERA VS. VILLAMOR

247. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ

FACTS: December 1986, Daya Maria T ol (seeking administration of the estate) alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984 and a certain Diosdado Tol had

FACTS: HC served over the body of Vitaliana Vargas who allegedly died on the 28th of august 1988 but was only made known to the courts on

fraudulently obtained a title of Remigio‗s property. Diosdado countered

sisters, with the allegation that Tomas Eugenio unduly took away their sister sometime in 1987 and made her reside in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. Tomas Eugenio was arguing that HC should not govern the dead body, and besides he was already (allegedly) able to secure a burial permit to bury her at the grounds of PBCM of which he is the head. The brothers and sisters of Vitaliana were arguing that Tomas

that Daya Maria was not an acknowledged natural child of the absentee and the title was originally in his name. ISSUE: Whether or not Daya Maria Tol can be appointed administratrix when Remigio was not yet declared presumptively dead.

September of 1988 after the HC petition of Vitaliana‗s brothers and

doesn‗t belong to the list of persons who are mandated by the law

RULING: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator. The relevant laws on the matter are found in the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interest of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representatives, regulating them according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court.

(According to NCC 305 and 308) to bury her (he being just a commonlaw husband, therefore lawfully has no relations with her). ISSUE: Whether or not the brothers and sisters are the lawful custodians of her body (right to bury the deceased) RULING: Yes. Supreme Court decided for the sisters and brothers of Vitaliana, given that Tomas was just the common-law husband of the deceased. The right to bury her therefore remains on the nearest kin of Vitaliana, who are the respondents herein.

248. REPUBLIC VS. SAYO

249. REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA

FACTS: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on January 9, 1952 in Nueva Vizcaya as the fifth legitimate child of his parents. The nurse erroneously reported to the Local Civil Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims that he and his parents are Filipino citizens. Copies were furnished to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Local Civil Registrar. Copy of the notice of hearing was posted and it was also published in a newspaper of general circulation published once a week for three consecutive weeks. The TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the Government.

FACTS: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the City of Cebu. The TC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a week for three consecutive weeks and notice was duly served on the Solicitor General the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and changing also the status of the mother from married to single. The Local Civil Registrar avers that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the minors and the status of the mother. The Trial Court granted the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure followed satisfied the requirements of ―appropriate adversary pro -proceedings‖. RULING: Yes. It is true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality of citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a summary proceedings. However it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the proper remedy is used. Biana, Jr. submitted the following: a voters ID of his father, a decision of the Bureau of Immigration showing that his father is a natural son of a Filipino citizen and that his mother, being a legal wife was also a Philippine citizen, a certification issued by a the Bureau of Immigration stating that the father is a Filipino citizen, the birth certificate of his brother stating that he is the son of Philippine citizens and his Voter's ID.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings that took place could be regarded as proper suit or appropriate action for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register. RULING: Yes. The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. The decision of the Trial Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Case Digests - Persons and Family Relations (3)

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