NATRES CASE DIGEST SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOOD VS. CA (181 SCRA 443) FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable. CA ruled, upholding the SolicitorGeneral's contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable and disposable land of the State. HELD: No. Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO (191 SCRA 71) FACTS: The case at bar started at 1961 whe the spouses Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel of land, Lot 7454 originally party of Santiago but had since then been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya.
The registration was opposed by Bayaua, Reyes, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products. The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after, the Heirs of Sandoval, Heirs of Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development entered a compromise agreement, which effectively distributed parts of lot 7454 among the aforesaid parties and the counsel of the Heirs of Sandoval as attorney's fees. The compromise agreement was approved by the court and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the court to annul the decision rendered by the court a quo for being void and made in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contended that the the Heirs of Sandoval et. al. did not present any evidence to support their claims of ownership or registration, nor did the government agencies involve have a y authority to enter into the compromise agreement, and finally, that he was not notified of the proceedings and so had not opportunity to take part therein. As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they asseverate that the land is not a public land as the possessory information title in their name and of their predecessors-in-interest, the pre-war certification appearing in the Bureau of Archives, and the fact that the proceeding of the registration was brought under the Torrens act which presupposes an existing title to be confirmed, are all evidences that the land is a private land.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's evidences can be considered as proof that the lot 7454 is a private land. HELD: No. Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 1
NATRES CASE DIGEST private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title. 5 In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question. It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of possession. 7 Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
SEVILLE VS. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY GR NO. 129401 FEBRUARY 2, 2001 FACTS: LSBDA (Leyte Sub-A Basin Development Authority) was created by virtue of PD no. 625. In connection with this, a letter of instruction was executed authorizing LSBDA to purchase or acquire privately owned land. In June 14, 1980, certain Calixto Yap sold to LSBDA a 464,920 square meter parcel of land. The LSBDA was able to register it under its name through the approved miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands. However in May 11, 1990, petitioner Seville filed a complaint for recovery or real property, rentals and damages against LSBDA, contending that he acquired the property and its predecessor-in-interest for more than 30 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 2
NATRES CASE DIGEST years and therefore they are the rightful owner of it. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, when the case reached in the CA, the latter reversed the RTC decision on the ground that petitioner’s possession of the
said property was never ripen into ownership since it still remains under the inalienable land of public domain.
ISSUE: 1. WON LSBDA ‘s title to property valid? 2. WON petitioner’s claim of ownership over the property was correct? HELD: The SC ruled in favor of LSBDA. According to the SC, Seville or the Ortega estate did not become the owner of the subject property even though they possessed the land for more than 30 years, because at the time they occupied the said land, it is still part of inalienable land of public domain. Until the State declares it to be alienable and disposable, no matter how long they possessed it, it may not ripen into ownership. Here the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving in court that the subject property is already outside the component of inalienable land of public domain when they occupied the same. LDBDA is a rightful owner of the said land because, it acquired ownership and title over it through Sales patent application which was approved by the Bureau of Land, this shows that the said property is no longer under the ambit of inalienable public land.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS IAC 219 SCRA 108 FACTS: The land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan. Pacific Farms, Inc. initially applied for registration the subject property under the Land Registration MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Act (Act No. 496). The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the (1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn. Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta.
ISSUE: WON the land known as the "Tambac Island" can be subject of registration. HELD: No. The Court held that lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 3
NATRES CASE DIGEST This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.
ISSUE: The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. The conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. 5 United Paracale vs Dela Rosa (221 SCRA 108) PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao
6 Republic vs Register of Deeds of Quezon (224 SCRA 537) PAMISARAN, Excel Joy G.
FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT. Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime. Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land
HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privatelyowned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 4
NATRES CASE DIGEST
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. 7 Ituralde vs Falcasantos (GR No. 128017, January 20, 1999) NALLA, Glene Alacayde Facts: On October 17, 1986, Ramon Ituralde, herein petitioner, acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land, with an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less. However, on November 3, 1986, respondent Alfredo Falcasantos Falcasan tos applied with the Bureau of Lands for the award to him of the same parcel of land under free patent, which application was protested by Ramon Ituralde. On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for free patent. Alfredo failed to exercise the right of repurchase, which amounted to a waiver. The Director of Land then rejected Alfredo’s application and allowed
Ramon Ituralde to file a public land application for the subject land. Meanwhile, in a case for the recovery of ownership and possession filed by Ituralde against Alfredo, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioner the owner and the possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the improvements existing thereon, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question. Ramon appealed to the decision. However the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed Roman’s appeal. Hence this case.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals committed an error in reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Ruling: NO. Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain. We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951'." and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation. In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon , we held that "Forest land, like mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition." In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: "Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain." Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. " And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership." JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 5
NATRES CASE DIGEST What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question.
The Lower Court denied the application, while the CA reversed the decision, affirming the surface rights of the Dela Rosas, while also the sub-surface rights of the BCI and Atok. In other words, the CA ruled that the surface was to be agricultural and mineral underneath.
8 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa (GR No. L-43938, 04/15/1988) MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang
ISSUE: 1. Who has better claim on the land in dispute 2. WON land can be classified as both agricultural and mineral at the same time.
FACTS: The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership is being disputed by four parties: the Dela Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc. (BCI), Atok Corp. (Atok) and the Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD). Sometime in 1965, Jose dela Rosa, on his own behalf and on behalf of this three children, filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According to the children, they had acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As evidenced, they produced tax declarations and realty tax receipts. BCI and Atok opposed their application claiming that the lots were covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. BCI, on lots 1-5, contented that it had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in the concept of an owner. As evidence, BCI presented geological maps, payments of taxes and construction on the land. Atok claims of ownership on a portion of lots 15 and all of lots 6-9 is similar to that of BCI, that a mineral claim covering that the lots had been sold to them in 1931 and produced evidence such as the construction and tax payments. BFD objected that the land in dispute was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proc. No. 217. And since it was a forest land, it cannot be subject to alienation, pursuant to the 1935 and 1973 Constitution.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
HELD: 1ST ISSUE: The Court held that BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The Court found that the mineral claims of both BCI and Atok have been perfected prior to the approval of the 1935 Constitution. As a legal effect of a valid mineral claim, it segregates the area from the public domain and confers to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim. As of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of BCI and Atok. Even if the land was included in the Central Cordillera forest reserve, it did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies. The claim of the Dela Rosas was disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired the land through prescription since the lad had already been converted to mineral land. 2ND ISSUE: No. Land cannot be classified as half agricultural and half mineral. The Court held that the classification of land must be categorical: the land must either completely be mineral or agricultural. In this case, while the land was initially classified as forest land, it ceases to be so and completely became mineral when the mining claims were perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled by the Dela Rosas, it is still to be considered as mineral land.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 6
NATRES CASE DIGEST As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon or underneath, it is still mineral, and not agricultural.
petitioners, caused the extrajudicial partition of the property. Thus, the Register of Deeds issued a TCT under the names of the heirs/petitioners in 1954.
Hence, the Court ruled that BCI and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of the lands of the public domain except agricultural lands. It could not have been transferred to private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription not could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. Wherefore, the decision of the CA was set aside, and reinstated the decision of the lower court. 9 Heirs of Gozo v. Philippine Union Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, G.R. No. 195990, [August 5, 2015]) LOZADA, Leah Amaya
FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Spouses Rafael and Concepcion Gozo who possessed a property in Brgy. Lala, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte of 236,638 sq.m. Respondent (PUMC-SDA) claimed that a portion of that property was donated to it by spouses Gozo based on the deed of donation dated 28 Feb. 1937. When spouses Gozo donated the property in 1937, they were not yet the registered owners of the property although they are the lawful possessors thereof. In 1953, the land was registered under the name of spouses Gozo and an OCT was issued in their favor pursuant to Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Phil. After
Rafael
Gozo’s
dealth,
his
recognize the donation.
After Concepcion’s
death, the heirs/petitioners continued to pursue their claims to recover the subject property from respondent. In 2000 or after 6 decades after the alleged deed of donation was executed, petitioners filed an action for declaration of nullity of deed of donation and recovery of possession and ownership against respondent. Petitioners argued that the signatures of their parents in the deed is not genuine and the donation lack the formality of acceptance, hence invalid. Respondent argued that since 1937 they are in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner, that they have built therein a church and an elementary school and that the petitioners’ claim of lack of acceptance 63
years after the deed was executed is already barred by laches. In 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners declaring that since the deed is void for lack of acceptance, they are the rightful owners thereof. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision on the ground of laches stating that petitioners failed to assert their rights over the land for more than 60 years, thus laches had set in. ISSUE: Whether or not the donor is necessarily the owner of the real estate donated?
wife
Concepcion and their 6 children, herein MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
When Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision, it was at this point that respondent brought to the attention of Concepcion that 5,000 sq.m. portion of the property is already owned by it based on the deed of donation. Upon learning from the ROD that the donation was not annotated in the title, petitioners refused to
RULING: JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 7
NATRES CASE DIGEST
No. The donors may be the possessor at the time of the donation in 1937, but they are not the owners thereof as the subject property was part of the public domain. It was only in 1953 that ownership of the property was vested by the State to the spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Phil. Hence the donor is not necessarily the owner of the real property they donated when the said property was still part of the public domain (inalienable). The donors cannot give what they do not have, nemo dat quod non habet .
SANGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. 174964 OCTOBER 5, 2016 FACTS: Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, containing 1,222 square meters and 10,598 sq m, respectively, were registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were embraced in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-182, and occupied by the Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both State-run schools. On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8562, authored by Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Cong. Garcia), converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC), and integrating thereto the BCC. All parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades and the Bataan Community Colleges are hereby declared to be the property of the Bataan Polytechnic State College and shall be titled under that name: Provided, That should the MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
State College cease to exist or be abolished or should such parcels of land aforementioned be no longer needed by the State College, the same shall revert to the Province of Bataan. On the basis of the above provision, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected. Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC (collectively, the respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC of Balanga, Bataan against the Governor and the petitioner. Initially, the Board of Trustees of the BPSC was impleaded as an unwilling plaintiff but was eventually included as co-petitioner in the civil suit pursuant to Resolution No
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just compensation? HELD: NO. Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of the State. The State's ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are beyond dispute. S ection 2, A rticle XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 8
NATRES CASE DIGEST
REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA G.R. NO. 186603 APRIL 5, 2017 FACTS: A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued. The State through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC claiming the property is inalienable public land because it fell within the timberland area. RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property. CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original Certificate of Title. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which
accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title. HELD: No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts. Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191- N, the predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Havin g been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings. This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.
IMPERIUM AND DOMINIUM LEE HONG KOK VS. DAVID GR NO.G.R. NO. L-3038 DECEMBER 27, 1972 Nature: Lee Hong Kok, et al filed an appeal on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court in dismissing the complaint to have the Torrens Title of Aniano David be declared null and void. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 9
NATRES CASE DIGEST FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title to a parcel of land pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. An order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to Aniano David. Since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, Lee Hong Kok did not put up any opposition or adverse claim to Lot 2892. The opposition was fatal because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein. Under Section 38 of R A 496 , any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within 1 year from the date of the issuance of the patent otherwise the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after the lapse of 1 year. The contention of Lee Hong Kok was that David’s lot is a private property for it was
formed thru the process of accretion.
ISSUE 1: Can the patent certificate of Aniano David to the property be nullified? HELD: No. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
There is no legal justification for nullifying the right to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor. 1.
The lot in question is NOT a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained its public character for having been formed by reclamation and not accretion.
a.
RECLAMATION is the act of filling submerged land by deliberate acts and reclaiming title thereto.
b.
ACCRETION - is the process whereby the soil is deposited; accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of the land bordering on streams, torrents, lakes, or rivers i.
Therefore the only remedy available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud.
QUESTION: But did he commit any fraud? NO. Aniano David has not committed any fraud in applying for the purchase of the Lot because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application who had occupied the land since 1938. QUESTION: If the grant was presumed to be invalid, who has the right to question it?
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 10
NATRES CASE DIGEST c. Only the G overnment, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Ag ric ulture and Natural Resources can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title purs uant to a void patent.
d. The private parties cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of the Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. e. Citing Maninang vs Consolacion: ‘The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.’
g. The manifestation of the concept of jura reg alia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, was embodied in the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, the ownership however is vested in the state rather than the head thereof. h. As to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain, the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress. i. There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain (Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands ). j. “No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.”
By what authority does the government have in disposing of the land in question? f. IMPERIUM refers to the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty.
DOMINIUM, on the other hand, is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Therefore it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law otherwise the property is and remains part of the public domain. 2. Was David’s title to the property already indefeasible? a. As far back as 1919, in A quino v. Director of Lands , Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceeding s under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 11
NATRES CASE DIGEST are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedi ng s , and for both the decree of regi s tration is s ued is conclus ive and final."
b. Meanwhile in Cabacug v. Lao. There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
RULING: The decision of the CA of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IMPERIUM The State’s authority to govern is
DOMINIUM 1.
embraced in the concept of sovereignty that includes passing laws concerning a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. 2.
When the State acts in this capacity, jure imperii, it generally enjoys state immunity.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
The capacity of the State to own and acquire property. It covers such rights as title to land, exploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. It refers to lands held by the government in a proprietary character: can provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources.
The Regalian Doctrine whereby all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept. In this capacity, jure gestium, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes liable as such.
IPRA LAW (R.A. 8731) CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF DENR GR NO. 135385 DEC. 6, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1 997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 12
NATRES CASE DIGEST form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
CARIÑO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT 41 PHIL. 935 (1906)
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
FACTS: Mateo Carino (appellant) filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration to be granted a parcel of land consisting of 146 hectares in Baguio, Province of Benguet together with a house erected thereon. It was granted, but the Government of the Philippines and also on behalf of the United States averred having taken possession of the property for public and military purposes, Respondents also asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired and no prescription runs against the Spanish crown. The US succeeded the title of Spain through Treaty of Paris and Mateo’s land was
not registered and that he had lost all his rights and now is deemed to be a mere trespasser. Then the Court of First Instance dismissed the application for Mateo since he did not possessed the land since time immemorial and the land was property of the Government. The decision was Philippine Supreme Court.
affirmed by the
Thus the case was brought to the Supreme Court by virtue of Writ Error(general method of bringing cases to court, an appeal the exception, confined equity in the main.
US of this to
Mateo Carino in his appeal stated that he is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, they have owned the land for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris ,they all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots and had inherited or received his land from his father in MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
accordance with Igorot custom. However, no document of title had been issued from the Spanish Crown
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the
land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner. “In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto. The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, for the reason that the act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.”
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 13
NATRES CASE DIGEST ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY VS. RTC BRANCH 57 MAKATI GR NO. 81564 APRIL 26, 1990 FACTS: On November 5, 1985, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291. Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar petition, and in addition, to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 291, embracing allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9, 1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. During the pendency of the case also, Proclamation No. 192 (“RESERVING FOR
THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON”) and Proclamation No. 423 (“RESERVING FOR
MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY
CITY”)
were
issued
by
the
government. On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order, directing the petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts complained of. In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal had conveyed the property to the Government of the United States in 1906 and the Manila Railroad Company on which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Land MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Registration, later Justice of this Court, had stamped his imprimatur. On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order which grants the plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION in order to safeguard the integrity of the land embraced in OCT 291 and authorizes Plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares: 1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or surveys within Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic engineer or engineers at plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and simplify the efficient administration of the property described in OCT 291; and 2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area or areas or portion or portions thereof, subject to the approval of the Intestate Estate Court, to cover expenses for the payment of taxes to which the property is subject, as well as expenses of administration and for the protection of the integrity of the said lands. Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987, it issued another order acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the Order of the Court dated October 12, 1987, to execute and perform the acts authorized in the said Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of Execution, he may take whatever steps he considers appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without need of further Orders or additional authority from the Court. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court, however, denied it" 3 "it being directed against . . . an interlocutory order. Hence, this recourse.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 14
NATRES CASE DIGEST ISSUE: Whether or not, Proclamation 192 and 423 were valid in the absence of proof of ownership of the property by the government?
Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds no support from the records.
HELD: Yes.
The presumptions is "that official duty has been regularly performed," and the burden is on the private respondent to prove irregular performance. The barren insistence that Judge Ostrands order was a forgery is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption. To begin with, the act of forgery has been seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Pasig, who supposedly certified to the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order, has himself joined the other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.
While there is no presumption that property is Government property until otherwise shown, because the law recognizes private ownership, thus: Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.
we find hard evidence on record that:
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS A. CONSTITUTION
(1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the United States of America;
PALOMO V. CA 266 SCRA 392 G.R. NO. 130906
(2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the Philippines, and
FACTS: In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in Albay were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue of EO No. 40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were registered in the name of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
(3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final order of Judge Ostrand. Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No. 81564 is pressed hard to establish the fact that portions of the property, especially the open spaces referred to in the lower court's writ of injunction and the private respondent's manifestation of December 14, 1989, and which open spaces it claims to be outside Maricaban, are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With respect, however, to parts thereof on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission National Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos contended that they have been in possession of the subject lands and have introduced improvements thereon. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 15
NATRES CASE DIGEST
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the petitioners valid? HELD: NO. Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands, whether agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown. Private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889. The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court. More importantly, the lands in question were not classified as alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of alienation.
REPUBLIC VS CANDY MAKER INC GR. NO. 163766 JUNE 22, 2006 FACTS: On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia Cruz and Felisa Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot. The MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State. HELD: Yes. The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.
CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. NO. 133250 JULY 9, 2002 FACTS: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 16
NATRES CASE DIGEST Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (“CDCP” for brevity) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA “to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.”
areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit.”
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay”2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA “the
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA
parcels of land so reclaimed under the ManilaCavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
to amend its contract with CDCP, so that “[A]ll
meters.” Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA.” A ccordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the
“(i)
CDCP
shall
undertake
all
reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA. xxx (iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (“JVA” for brevity)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 17
NATRES CASE DIGEST Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA
with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
as the “grandmother of all scams.” As a result,
seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed
the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are:
the petition “for unwarranted disregard of
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, 9 and the 10 Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition
judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court.” 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (“Petitioner” for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order . Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of restraining order; and
a
temporary
(c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.] In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 18
NATRES CASE DIGEST required the parties to file their respective memoranda. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (“Amended JVA,” for brevity). On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on “constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void.”
ISSUE: WON the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 19
NATRES CASE DIGEST 17 Alba vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 120066, 9/9/1999) ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud GR 120066, September 9, 1999 FACTS: In 1958, Lachica filed an application for title to a 4,485 sq.m. parcel of land which he had acquired through purchase dating back to 1945. However, some parties filed their opposition thereto invoking that they are owners of some parts of land within the total area applied for. The lower court ruled in favor of Lachica and held, among others, that Lachica had been in actual, open and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945 and thus had acquired it through prescription. ISSUE: Did Lachica acquire the subject property by prescription? RULING: The Court ruled on the negative. Based from the facts and evidences presented, it was proven that Lachicha only had a title to a 620sq.m. portion of the total area. Prescription cannot be had on the remaining area as the Court held that the law applicable in this case is Sec. 48 of CA 141 (wc deals with registration of lands of public domain) and not Sec. 19 of Act 496 (wc deals with registration of private lands) and with which the lower courts had relied on. The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. In this case, the lower courts relied on the provisions on prescription with the assumption that the subject property is a private land. However, the application for registration should be that of a judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Public lands are classified into (1) alienable or disposable lands which includes agricultural lands and (2) inalienable or non-disposable lands or those not susceptible of private appropriation which includes Timber lands and Mineral lands. For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. Possession of public agricultural land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor and it is because the statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. Under (b), Sec. 48, CA 141, confirmation of an imperfect title to a public domain requires that: 1. There be an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain; 2. It should be under a bona fide claim of ownership; and 3. possession should be for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure In this case, Lachica had not yet satisfied the requirement of the 30 years possession, hence, prescription cannot be granted in favor of him. JOM 18 Republic vs Imperial (GR No. 130906, 2/11/1990) DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D
Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial FACTS: JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 20
NATRES CASE DIGEST On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
failure to file the appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted. HELD: Yes. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide." The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 21
NATRES CASE DIGEST premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved. The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.
19 Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals and Bisnar (GR No. 83609, 10/26/1989)
CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 708) Facts: On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings. After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80 years. The CA affirmed the CFI’s
decision, holding that the classification of the lotsas timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil.10). Issue/s: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private ownership. Ruling: No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripe ninto private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. 20 Montano vs Insular Government (GR No. 3714, 1//26/1909) CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez Facts: Montano applied for land registration of a parcel of land used for fishery in Libis, Caloocan. This was opposed to by the Solicitor-General (Sol. Gen.) contending that the land is owned by the US Government as well as Obras Pias de la Sagrda Mitra as it was the absolute owner of the lot. The Court of Land Registration granted the application of Montano. Only the Sol. Gen. appealed the decision. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 22
NATRES CASE DIGEST
Issue: Whether the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be overflowed at high tide could be registered as private property. Held: Yes, it can. The Supreme Court held that since fish ponds are not classified as forest or mineral lands, it must necessarily be agricultural land. The Court noted that before Montano owned the lot, bacawan had been sown and propagated in the mud by the owner. The Court also noted that government land is NOT similar to public domain or public land. Government land includes not only public domain, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or developed to public use or subject to private right. Government owns real estate which is part of public lands and other real estate which is not part thereof. There is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses. 21 Lee Hong Kokvs David (GR No.G.R. No. L-30389, 12/27/1972) CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay FACTS: § Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
§ On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959. § Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion) § The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case ISSUES: 1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO 2. W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials) § Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. § Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 23
NATRES CASE DIGEST grant, express or implied, from the government § Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of 5 years. § Imperium v. Dominium 1. Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty 2. Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. 22 Director of Lands vs CA and Valeriano (GR No. 58867, 6/22/1984) CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan 23 Menguito vs Republic (GR No. 134308, 12/14/2000) BENITEZ, Winnie L Menguito v. Republic [G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000] FACTS: A petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals Sept 30, 1997 decision against the Menguito’s – the petitioners, with promulgated resolution 10-Mos. later reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The RTC decision confirmed the application for the titling of the parcel of land with aggregate area of 2112 sqm located at Brgy Ususan, Taguig,
The application of TCT was brought by the operation of the Land Registration of Authority as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 proceeding to declare: 1. That its applicants –the Menguito’s, are owners, in fee simple, these 11 parcels of land. 2. Listing the applicants lot title numbers, attendant documents given with their respective Technical Descriptions. For the said application, the RTC of Pasig issued a notice of its initial hearing against the whole world publishing the same at Abante Tabloid on April 5, 1989. Seven days earlier, however, March 30, 1989, the Office of Solicitor General, filed its contention as: 1. Applicants nor its predecessor’s
in interest were neither in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious possession or occupation of the land they applied for since 1945. 2.
Applicants
don’t
have
competent and sufficient evidence of bonafide acquisition –without open, uninterrupted-continuous, exclusive, adverse or notorious occupation of the lot in the concept of the owner and so appearing not genuine or indicative of pretended possession. 3. Titling from fee simple with Spanish grant title were not anymore available after Feb 16, 1976 as required by PD 892. 4. That the said parcel of land applied for is part of the public domain and belonging to the Republic of the Philippines –and not subject to private appropriation. The OSG thus stated its valid opposition on the presented documents by the applicants leaving its prayers that said application be denied and land in question be reverted to the ownership of the Republic of the Philippines.
Metro Manila, in favor of the Menguito’s.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 24
NATRES CASE DIGEST At the appellate court, the RTC’s decis ion
favoring the registrations of the land applied were reversed and thus this petition. ISSUE:
WON the CA’s did not err in its
-thus denied the petition and declared cost against petitioner. Note:
decision to reverse the trial court findings. Menguito v. Republic: HELD:
No. The petition is without merit. “Unless public land is shown to have been
The Court cited Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, provide the registration the registration of the title of lands in this wise; “(b) Who by themselves, or their predecessors
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land in the concept of the owner.”
24 MesinavsSonza (GR No. L-14722, 5/25/1960) BANTUGAN
The Court thus observed that the petitioners have insufficient evidence on this.”
The Court likewise pointed that;
25 Susi vsRazon (G.R. No. L24066December 9, 1925) BALUCANAG, April Gem Balansag
• Applicants to avail the OCT they must
overcome the presumption that the land they applied for forms part of the public domain and if so, it has to be shown as reclassified or alienated to a private person by the state. • Otherwise, the land remain inalienable public domain. • To overcome this, an incontrovertible or clear and convincing evidence must be presented. • The court observed that applicants possession were tacked only as far back as 1948 to its predecessors of interest –the same must have shown that their predecessors in interest were in possession of the property by some 30years back or 1938 before WW-2. The court find the petitioners failed to show it even as they claimed that Cirilo Menguito once declared the land for tax purposes in 1943 –yet failed to show documentary evidence to support the claim. The court therefore find no
FACTS: On September 5, 1899, Valentin Susi bought a parcel of land from Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza. Prior to such purchase, the said sellers have been in an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land for 19 years. After the purchase, Valentin Susi took possession of the land in an open, continuous, adverse and public manner and without interruption. However on September 13, 1913, the possession was interrupted when Angela Razon filed an action to recover possession of the land. The Court of First Instance dismissed Angela Razon’s complaint.
Despite the dismissal of the case, Angela Razon filed for the purchase of the disputed land with the Director of Lands. Valentin Susi filed his opposition and asserted his right over the land. However, the Director of Land overruled the opposition and sold the land the Angela Razon on the ground that the land was still and public land and Valentin Susi does not have a title over it.
reason to modify the appellate court’s decision MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 25
NATRES CASE DIGEST ISSUE: WON Valentin Susi already acquired title to the land.
HELD: YES. Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly personally and through his predecessors for 45 years. This being the case, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of United States in Cariño vs Government of the Philippine Islands is applicable. Here, it held that To acquire a right to a certificate of title over a land of the public domain, under the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No. 926, as amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open, adverse, public and continuous possession from July 26,1894, is sufficient, provided the possessor makes application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. The possessor under such circumstances acquires by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the government, and the actual issuance of a title is not necessary in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. In the present case all the requirements for a grant were complied with since Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. By a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 26 Alba vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 120066, 9/9/1999) APURADA, Kathryne Vencio Facts: MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyor's certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277. The land applied for is residential. The initial hearing was held on and an order of general default was issued but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco. Petitioners contended that they were the real owners of the subject land, which they have been possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest, and the applicant is only entitled to have the portion of 620 square meters which is contrary to his application of 4,845 square meters. The trial court finds that Dr. Jose Lachica as the absolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original registration in his name.
Issue: WON the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for. Held: NO In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, (which is the law enforced during the filing of application) as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, which states that: Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 26
NATRES CASE DIGEST (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. 49 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure . These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 50 (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51 A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain. The private respondent failed to satisfy the Supreme Court that he complied the condition set forth for the judicial confirmation of his title for the following reasons, to wit; MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
a. as to the (a) of Section 48 of CA 141respondent did present any imperfect title with Spanish decree. b. as to the (b) of Section 48 of CA 141prescription cannot be applied as there were no express grant from the government that the subject land was amongst the agricultural land certified as alienable and disposable. Ultimately, No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state. c. nor he is members as specified on the (c) condition of CA 141. 27 Republic vs Court of Appeals and Naguit (GR No. 1/17/2005) ANTOPINA, Babielen Poliquit Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government. The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorneyin-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 27
NATRES CASE DIGEST corresponding taxes due on the subject land. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable. The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. Held: Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, provides: SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 28
NATRES CASE DIGEST been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRODENR), which stated that the subject
28 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL JESURA 244-326)
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. ISSUES: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons – Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban – the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become
the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
property was “verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
HELD: JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 29
NATRES CASE DIGEST The Petition is denied. (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, oneordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular —is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 30
NATRES CASE DIGEST
29 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [September 3, 2013 COSTAN 30 1/21/1997)
Palomo vs CA (GR No. 95608, TAN, Cesnee Joyce V.
Palomo v. CA (266 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 130906) FACTS: In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in Albay were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue of EO No. 40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were registered in the name of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889. The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court. More importantly, the lands in question were not classified as alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of alienation.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
31 Republic vs Bracewell[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000] TACDER, Lovella Fe Madelo
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos contended that they have been in possession of the subject lands and have introduced improvements thereon.
In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., who acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the petitioners valid? –NO HELD Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands, whether agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.Private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Facts: The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, canceling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles. On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 31
NATRES CASE DIGEST 141. The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain. On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order. It also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.
Issues: a) Whether the failure of the petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time? b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for?
Held: The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows — Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. These petitioners failed to do. The homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio. Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned. Having found petitioner to have no cause of
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 32
NATRES CASE DIGEST action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition. 32 Republic vs Court of Appeals and Bernabe (GR No. L-40402, 3/16/1987) RAÑON, Rexie Monicimpo FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry (BOF) as an agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land Act. On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged that they acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above petition but later withdrew the same upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland had already been released from the mass of the public forests. Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging that the land is still a Public Land and as such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496. The lower court adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have complied with all the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. This decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees. Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for Review, adding: that respondents executed simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the subject parcels to third parties MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
for fictitious considerations in order to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value. The Court of First Instance denied this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision.
Petitioner’s
Motion
for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the lots claimed by respondents could be legally be the subject of a juridical confirmation of Title under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141 as amended by Republic Act 1942. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public lands. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20 days of possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As such, respondents and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots for the required period of 30 years as disposable agricultural land. 33 Republic v. Bautista, Jr., G.R. No. PLAZA, 166890, [June 28, 2016]) Mariafe Manatad
FACTS: Apolonio Bautista Jr. acquired lot 17078 through succession, when his father Apolonio Sr. died in 1987. He applied judicial JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 33
NATRES CASE DIGEST confirmation of imperfect title before MTC with testimonial evidence that his father was in possession of the said lot since 1969 and acquired it from Jardin and Villanueva, through notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 15, 1971 and May 25, 1973 respectively. The MTC granted the application and declared him as the owner in fee simple of the said land. The Government of the Philippines appealed before CA, contending that the testimony of Apolonio Jr. is an hearsay which should not be given probative value. The application of judicial confirmation of imperfect title must comply with Sec. 48(b) of CA 141. The CA affirmed the ruling of MTC, it pointed out that the Government of the Phil. did not timely object to the evidence presented.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of judicial confirmation of imperfect title to Apolonio Jr proper? RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of MTC and CA. It held that the requisite period of possession must conform with Sec 48(b) of Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942 which provides that any person who applies for judicial confirmation, he or his predecessor in interest must have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of public domain under the bonafide claim of ownership at least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In the present case, the lower court relied only on the testimony of Bautista Jr. that his father acquired the land and in possession since 1969. He failed to prove that the transferor had in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of said land for at least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Bautista Jr. has no personal knowledge of these facts. Lack of this evidence does not give the court the right to grant a judicial confirmation of imperfect title in favor of Bautista Jr. 34 MIAA vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 155650, 7/20/2006) PELAEZ, Chester Bryan Pepito MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 which states that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA. Thus, MIAA negotiated with City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due. MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 amounting to 624M. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, also issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No. 061. The OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061 and pointed out that Local Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA then filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. However, this was dismissed due to because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The Court of Appeals also denied MIAA's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, MIAA filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issue: WON the Land and Buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 34
NATRES CASE DIGEST Held: Yes. The Court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. 35 Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibovs Municipality of Buruanga (GR No. 149145, 3/31/2006) PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao 36 Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (GR No. L-27873, 11/29/1983) PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota 37 Ankronvs Government of the Philippines (GR No. 14213, 8/23/1919) NALLA, Glene Alacayde
Facts: This case involves an application for registration under the Torrens system of a certain parcel of land. The only opposition of the said application which was presented by the Director of Landswas that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
mentioned in said decision. On appeal, appellant, contented, among others that, that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. Issue: WON the land in question cannot registered? Ruling: The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 35
NATRES CASE DIGEST superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. 38 Sta. Rosa Development Corporation vs CA (GR No. 112526, 10/12/2001) MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang FACTS: The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian
Reform
Adjudication
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to acquire private rights in land without the willing consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society. The said land was inspected by the Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities concerned, they decided that the said land must be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioners filed an objection on the ground that: · The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes. · The area was rugged in terrain with slopes 18% and above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) · The occupants of the land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as beneficiaries.
Board’s
(DARAB) order of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development Corporation (SRRDC), was the registered owner of two parcel of land situated at Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. According to them, these lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang community and that 90 light industries are located in that area. They were alleging respondents usurped its rights over their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land provides water to the residents, respondents sought an easement of a right of a way to and from MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against respondents.
ISSUE: · Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R.A No. 6657 · Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted? HELD: Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. · Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 36
NATRES CASE DIGEST water may be declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. · Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now. Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court opines that the area must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88 families who are beneficiaries of the CARP. It is important that a larger view of the situation be taken because of the thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for its natural purpose.
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to the application. Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted evidence to prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-ininterest. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners for having presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over the property. ISSUE: (1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO. (2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO. HELD: (1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the literal description of Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR). Their main claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like
Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of
protection of watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they, however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since the said land falls under exception.
39 Collado vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 107764, 10/4/2002) LOZADA, Leah Amaya FACTS: Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated
in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the application was a technical descriptio n, stating “this survey MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
the proclamation setting aside the MWR are subject to private rights. ” EO 33 (which established the MWR) has a saving clause that the reservations are “subject to existing private rights, if any there be.”
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 37
NATRES CASE DIGEST The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First Set_ Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes." (2) An applicant must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived from old Spanish grants or titles). In the case at bar, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession (at least 30 years). Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became nondisposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 38
NATRES CASE DIGEST 40 Director of Forestry vs. Villareal (GR No. L-32266, 2/27/1989) LARANAS, Rascille Mae Dagoon FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed. It is undisputed by the parties that the land in dispute is a mangrove land HOWEVER the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares are still in contention. Director of Forestry claims that it is forestall and is not disposable. On the other hand, Private respondents insists that it is alienable as agricultural land. ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps classified as public forest lands? RULING: YES. Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution or are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL G.R. No. L-32266 | February 27, 1989 | Cruz, J. assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Respondent even showed, a survey of the land and its tax declaration to support its claim, however the court held that the same is insufficient especially now that the land is a forest land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory. 41 Atok-Big Wedge Mining Corporation vs Court of Appeals, GR No. INOK, Erick Jay 88883, 1/18/1991) Noro G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991 JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 39
NATRES CASE DIGEST FACTS: Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present . Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim. On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied . MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards went to the place of the construction to verify and then to the police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi , which was dismissed after due hearing by the MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan Consi. Petitioner ATOK appealed to the RTC of Baguio, which reversed the decision of the MTC, ordering defendant Liwan Consi to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim, restoring possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. Defendant Liwan Cosi was further ordered to remove and demolish the house he constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia Mineral claim. In a petition for review filed by Liwan Consi with the CA, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the subject forcible entry action, and further rule in part that: Liwan Consi had a possessory right over the property which may mature into ownership on the basis of longterm possession under the Public Land Law. Thus, it held that both Consi and ATOK are of equal footing with regards to the subject lot, holding possessory titles to the land. The petitioner through its long term occupancy while respondent mining firm being the claim locator and applicant for lease on the mineral claim. ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 40
NATRES CASE DIGEST HELD: It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]). In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or obtaining of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok . As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim. It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes (Ibid). MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-ininterest has been in possession of said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same. Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same. Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of copossession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings. Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim while private respondent's possession started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer in possession." It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in actual physical possession of the property. Having been deprived of this possession by the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for ejectment. With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property in question.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 41
NATRES CASE DIGEST 42 Palomovs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997] IMPIG, Sychar M 43 Republic vs Southside Homeowners (GR No. 156951, 9/22/2006) HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda Nee Corong
45 SIAN Enterprise vs. FF Cruz (GR no. 146616, 8/31/2006) FERNANDEZ, Pauline August Momongan SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. 500 SCRA 406 (2006)
44 Republic vsAlagad (G.R. No. L66807 January 26, 1989) GURO, Farhana FACTS: On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu226971, amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application.
Issue: WON that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 HELD: The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition We therefore remand the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We, consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner. Facts: Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its name. It eventually withdrew the application and filed a petition for registration over the same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICO‘s
representative could no longer be contacted, and later on, WESVICO has ceased operations. F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore lease application over a foreshore land, a portion of which is adjacent to the lot previously occupied by WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN) purchased the properties previously owned by WESVICO from the Development Bank of the Philippines. It subsequently filed a foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP. Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore
31
lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping area, it should be given preference in its lease. F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential right since the area in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that the JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 42
NATRES CASE DIGEST ownership was not by means of accretion. This argument has been sustained by the Land Management Bureau. Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was upheld, declaring that there was no basis to declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. F. F. Cruz however appealed to the Office of the President which overturned the decision of the DENR Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, the present petition. SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore land and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it preferential rights over the ISSUES: Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or ―reclaimed‖ area
HELD: That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner. It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area into existence. Such foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.‖ Following
Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same. Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate court, littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed an application for registration thereover. For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right remained, however. Its move to have the contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than proves its interest to utilize it. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‘s petition for registration which, as
stated earlier, was archived by the trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application. Parenthetically, the petition for registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it ceased operations due to financial reasons. 46 Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (GR No. 14869) ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud FACTS: In 1913, cadastral proceedings were conducted to settle the title to a considerable tract of land in the Province of Rizal. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (church) and other private parties were claimants of 13 cadastral lots that comprised the contested property. The lower court ruled in favor of the private claimants. Upon appeal, the church invoked that the composition title of the church with the Spanish Government included the subject property. The church then presented one witness and rested. The private oppositors then called their respective witnesses to prove title by possession, and rested. The church thereafter made an offer to present additional testimony intended to show that the possession of the private claimants had been interrupted and that it was merely possession through the tolerance of the church. However, the counsel for the oppositors objected to the entry of additional testimonies which was sustained. ISSUE: Did the lower court err in refusing the entry the church’s additional testimonies?
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The object of a cadastral petition is that the title to the various lots embraced in the survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 43
NATRES CASE DIGEST a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the plaintiff and all theclaimants are defendants. As a general rule, courts should adhere to the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence that governs registration proceedings. However, in registration proceedings where so many parties are involved and action is taken quickly and abruptly, opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. This case was remanded back to the lower court with the church being allowed to admit additional testimonies in the interest of justice and ascertainment of truth. JOM 47 7/30/1943) D
AbelleravsFarol (GR No. 48480, DALISAY, Armando, Jr.
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner, vs. MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents Facts: Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either the same parties in this case or the latter's predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the land. But his complaint was dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1) prescription in favor of defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of these lands to him had not been formally accepted according to Article 633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground aforementioned. It appears in that decision of this Court that after the perfection of the appeal, Abellera executed a public document formally accepting the donation of the land, and presented and deed of acceptance MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
together with proofs of notification of acceptance to the donor, as ground for new trial. In July of 1918, or four months after the abovementioned decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another action for recovery of the land against the same defendants in the previous case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of First Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which included the hacienda in question that had in the meantime been subdivided into lots. The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's claim over the lots concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription. Issue: Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res judicata, have any power to entertain the motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove his ownership of these lots? Ruling: Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and convenience. The principal aim is to settle as much as possible all disputes over land and to remove all clouds over land titles, as far a practicable, in a community. To attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all claimants ample freedom to ventilate whatever right they may assert over real estate, permitting them, in keeping with the law of evidence, to offer proofs in support of their allegations. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral case res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 44
NATRES CASE DIGEST another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment can not set up in a motion to dismiss. 48 Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No. 68109, 7/17/1991) CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No. 68109, 7/17/1991)
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Severino Gayapanao and his siblings questioning the decision of the IAC in upholding the validity of the sale of the land between their father Constantino and their sister. The 2 hectare land, subject of this case is part of 10 hectare homestead land registered in the name of Constantino Gayapanao under OCT. The final order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of patent was issued on December 10, 1937. On November 15, 1938, Constantino Gayapanao executed a private deed entitled kasulatan ng bilihan in favor of Simeona Gayapanao and his husband.
encumbrance in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions. In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled that a sale of homestead within the five (5) year prohibitive period is void ab initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity through the passage of time. 49 Republic vs Garcia (GR No. L11597, 5/27/1959) CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez Facts: Garcia was granted a homestead patent for his 23.21 hectares of land. After 3 years and 3 months later (April 14, 1950), he sold 19 hectares to the lot to several persons. For this reason, the CFI of Cotabato decreed the reversion of the property in favor of the Government for violating the selling the property within the prohibitive period of 5 years from date of issuance under Sec. 118 of CA 141.
RTC’s decision: The contract of sale between
Simeona Gayapanao and her father is null and void for having been executed with the 5 year prohibitory period provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Law
Garcia contends that he did not violate the said provision since the sale was not registered and that it was not the entire land was sold.
CA’s decision: It reversed the decision of the
RTC and uphold the validity of the sale.
Issue:
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding the validity of the sale?
Whether or not Garcia violated the Sec. 118 of CA 141.
RULING: No, the provision of law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within 5 years after the grant is mandatory.
Held.
From the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period. The only exception mentioned by the law is the sale or
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Yes, he did. The Supreme Court held that it is enough that the property, in whole or in part, was alienated or encumbered within the prohibitive period except in favor of the Government, Sec. 118 of CA 141 partly provides: Except in favor of the Government or any its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provision shall not be subject to encumbrance of alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 45
NATRES CASE DIGEST and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, association, or corporations.
Such alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the whole grant. In granting a homestead to an applicant, the law imposes as a condition that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent. Sec. 124 of CA 141 provides: Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of section118, 120, 121, 122, and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
50 Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs Court of Appeals (GR No. 104114, 12/4/1995) CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay Facts: A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan, Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by Lee Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc Realty and Development Corp. Such land was originally co-owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-sixth), Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway all surnamed Bascara and Ernesto jacinto(collectively owned the remaining five-sixths). On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his onesixth pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY which was registered 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their share to MARC REALTY which was registered on 16 October 1989. Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never informed of the existence of the sale between Marc Realty and the Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally notified of the sale and was given a copy of the deed of sale. On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for legal redemption against MARC REALTY and consigned in court a manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY insisted that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action there being no allegation of prior valid tender of payment or a prior valid notice of consignation. On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in favour of Lee Chuy Realty which stated that there was a valid tender of payment and consignation. It also stated that neither a separate offer to redeem nor a formal notice of consignation is necessary for the reason that the filing of the action itself, within the period of redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that "a prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of an action for legal redemption” and that "there
must be tender of the redemption price within the required period because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of payment is a condition precedent to the filing of an action in court in order to validly exercise the right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY however argues that the filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, which is a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. Lee Chuy filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied Issue: JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 46
NATRES CASE DIGEST
WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender of payment a condition precedent to the filing of an action for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption; is the filing of the action with consignation equivalent to a formal offer to redeem Held: No. In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court, citing previous decisions, declared that the formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, within the prescribed period is only essential to preserve the right of redemption for future enforcement beyond such period of redemption and within the period prescribed for the action by the statute of limitations. Where, as in the instant case, the right to redeem is exercised through judicial action within the reglementary period the formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, while proper, may be unessential. The filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a distinct step or condition sine qua non to the filing of the action in Court for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. What constitutes a condition precedent is either a formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action in court together with the consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period. The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and Belisario cases was jettisoned by the Court of Appeals on the ground that they do not involve legal redemption by a co-owner but by a mortgagor. It concluded that the application of the rules on legal redemption by a co-owner differs from the legal redemption by a mortgagor. But the law does not distinguish; neither should we. For sure, the principle in the aforecited cases is applicable regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-owner or a mortgagor. Public policy favors redemption regardless of whether the redemptioner is a coMARIA ANNY G. YANONG
owner or mortgagor, although perhaps with unequal force and effect since each is given a fixed but different period. A co-owner desirous of exercising his right of legal redemption is given a period of thirty (30) days from notice of the sale within which to avail of the right to redeem.15 Under the free patent or homestead provisions of the Public Land Act a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance is provided,16 the five-year period to be reckoned from the date of the sale and not from the date of registration in the office of the Register of Deeds.17 The redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the other hand, is exercisable within one (1) year from the date of the auction sale as provided for in Act No. 3135.
51 Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 341) CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan 52 Frenzel vs Catito (GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003) BENITEZ, Winnie L
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, v. EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent. [G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003] CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: Petitioner – Alfred Fritz Frenzel, is an Australian Electrical Engineer who once worked with New Guinea Airlines, started doing business in the Philippines since 1974, and two years later got married to a Filipina Teresita Santos. They were separated bread and board in 1981 and two years later met Ederlina Catito as a masseuse in one of night clubs in Sydney Australia Frenzel got enamored with Ederlina and convinced her to setup wholesome business in Manila for her own as he was willing to help her. Ederlina returned and later Alfred followed and helped her setup a Edorial Beauty saloon JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 47
NATRES CASE DIGEST with his personal funds –let alone Ederlina as sole registered owner. Alfred went back to work in Papue New Guinea as airline pilot while Ederlina too went to Germany to file her divorce with her husband –Muller. When Alfred returned to the Philippines to live with Ederlina –he bought house and lot or real properties in QC for her with his own funds and agreeing to name it under Ederlina alone accepting that as a foreigner he is not allowed to own a real estate property under the Philippine Laws. Alfred decided to stay for good in the Philippines and sold his personal properties in Australia with proceeds later used to buy other 2-more properties in Davao City – again, in Ederlina’s name only. There was also
an occasion when Ederlina deposited some USD 250,000 in their joint-accounts. Meanwhile, Ederlina’s divorce case with her
German husband was denied and with the prospect that she could be charged with bigamy along with Alfed who himself is still married. This started their common law marriage deterioration and soon enough Alfred got penniless and filed his claim on the
No. The petition is Denied.
The Court ruled on evidence on record: to wit; “The three parcels of land subje ct of the
complaint were not mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but were sold to the respondent as the vendee, albeit with the use of the petitioners personal funds.” The sales of
three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy. This finds support under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
properties listed in Ederlina’s name alone as
well as charges the return of all other asset bought with his own funds.
ISSUE: Will the good faith doctrine and applicable Articles in Civil code 1416, In combination with RA Nos. 133, 4381 and Rep. Act No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted to him, by way of refund for the money he used to purchase the said properties. To bar the petitioner from recovering the subject properties, or at the very least, the money used for the purchase and to bar the petitioner to the proceeds thereof is to enrich the respondent at his expense, and can this withstand the Constitutional proscription on the property ownership for the aliens in the Philippines? Hence, this petition, after successive defeat from lower and appellate court.
HELD. MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
The court stated: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson. ”The ob jection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 48
NATRES CASE DIGEST advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, therefore, the petition is bereft of merits. 53 Muller vs. Muller (GR no. 149615, BALUCANAG, August 29, 2006) April Gem Balansag
FACTS: Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller are husband and wife in this case. They wed and resided in Germany until they decided to permanently reside in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, they bought a house in Antipolo, Rizal using the proceeds that they got from selling the house the Helmut Muller inherited from his parents in Germany. The marriage, however, did not last. They were eventually separated and Helmut Muller filed for separation of their properties. The trial court then dissolved the absolute community of property and ordered the equal partition of their personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during marriage. As to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using the paraphernal funds of Helmut, however, he cannot recover said property, nor have a right to recover the funds used to buy it since it was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals granted Helmut Muller’s prayer for reimbursement
for the Antipolo property. ISSUE: WON Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used to acquire the Antipolo property. HELD: NO. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
right on the said property cannot be sustained. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. 54 Lee vs. Director of Lands (GR No. 128195, October 3, 2001) APURADA, Kathryne Vencio Facts: Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal, and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, A Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designed as lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389. However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agriculture land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and ruled thus: pari delicto (in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of provision of the Constitution, both the vendor and vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and thus the courts will not afford protection to either party).
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners (Dinglasans) filed with the Court of First Instance and action for recovery of the same parcel of land. On Sept. 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong file with the trial. Both cases were elevated to the Supreme Court but were dismissed holding the suit barred by res judicata. On Sept. 7, 1993, Elizabeth ManuelLee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC,
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 49
NATRES CASE DIGEST Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of Capiz. They were the widows of the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Both widows received a parcel of land through succession from their deceased husbands. RTC ordered the reconstitution of the lost and destroyed certificate of said title of lot. On Jan. 25, 1995, OSG filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment of reconstitution alleging that petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA decided, declaring the judgment of reconstitution to be void. Hence this petition.
Issue/s: 1. WON OSG has the capacity to object the reconstitution. 2. WON constitutional prohibition still exists considering the land is now under the ownership of Lee’s heirs thru succession.
Held: 1. Yes. The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land t an alien did not validate the transaction. For it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction as was not the parties to the transaction. The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgement of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert it, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State. 2. No. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non- Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
land. “If the land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”
55 Ramirez vs. Vda de Ramirez (111 SCRA 704) ANTOPINA, Babielen Poliquit
Republic vs. Hachero ( G.R. No. 200973, May 30, 2016) Facts: In 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free Patent Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514, CAD-1150-D (s ubject land ) before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (C E N R O) of Palawan. The said application for free patent was later approved by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (P E N R O) of Palawan based on the following findings, among others that the land applied for had been classified as alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to disposition under the Public Land Law; On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered under Original Certificate of Title ( OC T ) No. E18011 on May 7, 1999. After an inspection and verification were conducted by the CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land, covered by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as timberland and so not susceptible of private ownership under the Free Patent provision of the Public Land Act. Hence, the Republic filed the Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent No. 045307-989384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for Reversion, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3726. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hachero on the ground that the free patent and title had already been issued after JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 50
NATRES CASE DIGEST Hachero was found to have complied with all the requirements; that it was the Republic itself thru the DENR-CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under the operation of the Torrens System. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: 1. Won the petition for cancellation of the title and reversion of the subject lot is meritorious. 2. WON the Government is estopped by its previous acts. Ruling: 1. C ancellation of title and revers ion proper where there exis ts a mistake or overs ig ht in g ranting free patent over i nalienable land Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation therefore is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. xxx. In Estate of the Late J es us S . Y ujuico v. R epublic (Y ujuico cas e), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.d In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion was not based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Hachero, his title could still be cancelled and the subject land reverted back to the State because the grant was made through mistake or oversight. This could probably be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted another investigation and verification on the subject land. It would appear that they suspected that a mistake was made in their issuance of the patent as the subject land had not been reclassified or released as alienable or disposable land. It remained plotted within the timberland classification zone. 2. Pres cri ption and es toppel cannot lie ag ains t the S tate
At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the statute of limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the State. Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's immunity from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its officials and agents. It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the aforequoted case that a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject to the proviso that "the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law." But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been secured by fraud or misrepresentation. Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 51
NATRES CASE DIGEST cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
purchasers for value and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot lie against them.
58 Republic vs Umali (GR No. 80687, April 10, 1989) RAÑON, Rexie Monicimpo
ISSUE: WON the sale itself be considered null and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles derived therefrom also ineffectual, void ab initio.
FACTS: The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square meters. It was originally purchased on installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971, these three assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full payment. On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants. Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval.
HELD: No. Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act), states that, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government. The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid,
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394. They were named as defendants and asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based. The present holders of the property claiming to be innocent MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government. 59 Piñero vs Director of Lands (GR No. L-36507, 12/14/1974) PLAZA, Mariafe Manatad
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 52
NATRES CASE DIGEST 60 Kionisala vs. Dacut (GR No. 147379, 2/27/2002) PELAEZ, Chester Bryan Pepito
that the parties stipulated only as to the existence of the map, but not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence,
Espinosa’s
rights
over
the
61 Evangelista vs. Santiago (GR No. PASAOL, Ric 157447, 4/29/2005) Jason Patlingrao
property, which accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.
62 Roco vs. Gimeda (GR No. L11651, 12/27/1958) PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota
Issue 1st Issue: Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.
63 Republic v. Hachero, G.R. No. Glene 200973, [May 30, 2016]) NALLA, Alacayde
64 Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, [April 5, 2017]) MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang Facts A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.
The State through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC claiming the property is inalienable public land because it fell within the timberland area. RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.
2nd Issue: WON the State may initiate an action for Reversion over the subject land. Held No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa. Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered.31 As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts. Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No.
91117. CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original Certificate of Title. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 53
NATRES CASE DIGEST property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings. This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case. 2nd Issue: WON the State may initiate an action for Reversion over the subject land. No. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations. There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a title under the Public
Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain.” 36
67 Mustang Lumber vs Court of Appeals (June 18, 1996) JESURA 68 10, 1997)
Paatvs Court of Appeals (January INOK, Erick Jay Noro
69 Crescencio v. People, G.R. No. 205015, [November 19, 2014]) IMPIG, Sychar M 70 Ruzon vs Sandiganbayan GR 186739, April 17, 2013 HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda Nee Corong 71 Aquino vs Municipality of Malay Aklan (GR NO. 211356, Sept 29, 2014) GURO, Farhana
FACTS: Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the construction of a threestorey hotel in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the DENR. The Municipal Zoning Administrator
denied
petitioner’s
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings
application on the ground that the proposed
and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa’s
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West
favor. No mistake or oversight was also found in the issuance of title. Hence, the remedy of reversion could not be applied in this case.
65 Ysmaelvs Deputy Secretary (October 18, LOZADA, Leah Amaya 66 1993) Dagoon
Executive 1990)
Oposa vs. Factoran (July 30, LARANAS, Rascille Mae
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance.
Cove’s hotel.
C ontentions of Wes t Cove: 1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. 2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 54
NATRES CASE DIGEST Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings The CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the property in question. RULING: The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s cla ssification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.
72 No.
Republic vs CA and Carantes GR L-56984, September 30, 1987) FERNANDEZ, Pauline August Momongan Republic vs CA and Carantes MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
GR. No. 56948, Set. 30, 1987 Facts: In 1968, respondent Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed an application for land registration over a parcel of land situated in Tuba, Mountain Province, containing a land area of 219.7879 hectares. In 1970, the director of lands, through the solicitor general, filed an opposition to the application for registration stating, among others: That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcel of land; neither it have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the present application. Few months after, the director of forestry also filed an opposition to the application on the ground, that the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under proclamation no. 217 dated February 16, 1929. After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, adjudicating the parcel of land to the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by the government in the Court of appeals however affirmed in toto the decision of the LRA. Hence, this petition.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. 2. Whether or not Carantes have established registrable title over the land in question.
Held: 1. Yes. Proclamation no. 217 merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands. The land was already JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 55
NATRES CASE DIGEST forest or timber land even before the proclamation. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land. The government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 2. No. It is a well settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, will not convert them into private property. The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a diction ary and “forest or timber land” as a classification of lands of the public
domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status a classification for legal purposes. 73 Yngson vs Secretary of Agriculture GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983) ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud 74 GR
Tribal 78 La Bugal-B’laan Association vs Ramos (12/1/2004) CAIGAS, Lloyd
79 2006)
Loneyvs People (February 10, CABANOG, Princess
80 DidipioEarthsavers Multipurpose Association vs. Gozun (GR No. 157882, 3/30/2006) CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan 81 (Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. v. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, G.R. No. 135190, [April 3, 2002], 429 PHIL 668-685) BENITEZ, Winnie L 82 YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs. Trans-asia Oil and energy Development Corporation, GR NO. 207942, January 12, 2015) BALUCANAG, April Gem Balansag
Director of Forestry vs VIllareal No. L-46048 November 29, 1988 DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D
83 Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. vs IAC (GR No. 63528, September 9, 1996) APURADA, Kathryne Vencio
75 International Hardwood vs UP Gr No. 521518 Aug 13, 1991 CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales
84 Apex Mining Corporation vs Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (GR NO 152613, June 13, 2006) ANTOPINA, Babielen Poliquit
76 People vs Que GR No. 120365, December 17, 1996 CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez 77 Miners Association of the Philippines vsFactoran (240 SCRA 100) CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
85 PNOC Energy Development vs Veneracion (GR NO. 129820, November 30, 2006) TAN, Cesnee Joyce V. 86 (GR
Benguet Corporation vs Leviste NO. 65021, November 21, 1991) TACDER, Lovella Fe Madelo
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 56
NATRES CASE DIGEST 87 Industrial Enterprises Inc vs Court of Appeals, GR NO. 88550, April 18, RAÑON, Rexie M. 1990) 88 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112526, [October 12, 2001], 419 PHIL 457-480) PLAZA, Mariafe Manatad 89 (National Water Resources Board v. A. L. Ang Network, Inc., G.R. No. 186450, [April 8, 2010], 632 PHIL 22-32) PELAEZ, Chester Bryan Pepito 90 (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 17194748, [December 18, 2008], 595 PHIL 305-352) PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao 91 MMDA vsJancom ([G.R. No. 147465. January 30, 2002] PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota 92 Mead vsArgel (G.R. No. L-41958, NALLA, [July 20, 1982], 115 SCRA 256) Glene Alacayde
96 Henares, Jr. v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 158290, [October 23, 2006], 535 PHIL 835-849) JESURA 97 People vs Que GR No. 120365, December 17, 1996 INOK, Erick Jay Noro 98 Cudia vs. Court of Appeals 284 SCRA 173 (1998) IMPIG, Sychar M 99 Pp. vs. RosalindoCutamora, Et. Al G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000 HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda Nee Corong 100 People vs. Robert P. Balao, Et Al G.R. No. 176819, Jan 26, 2011 GURO, Farhana 101 Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26, 2002 FERNANDEZ, Pauline August Momongan 102 Pp. vs. Sucro March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388 DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D 103
93 PAB vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93891March 11, 1991195 SCRA 112) MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang
People vs. Evaristo 216 S CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales
431
104 Pp. vs. Joselito del Rosario April 14, CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez 1999 94 Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94759, [January 21, 1991], 271 PHIL 148-154) LOZADA, Leah Amaya 95 Rodriguez, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74816, [March 17, 1987], 232 PHIL 562-575) LARANAS, Rascille Mae Dagoon
105
People vs Del Rosario GR 182601 CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay
106
People vs Gerente G.R. No. 95847-48. CABANOG, Princess
107 People vs Tonog G.R. No. 94533 CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 57
NATRES CASE DIGEST
108
People vs. Manlulu April 22, 1994 BENITEZ, Winnie L
109 Paderanga v. Court of Appeals 247 SCRA 741 (1995) BALUCANAG, April Gem Balansag
119 Myla Paredes Et. Al. vs. Judge Jacinto Manalo May 10, 1995 NALLA, Glene Alacayde 120 Abraham Ramirez vs. Antonia CorpuzMISTERIO, Macandong Sept. 26, 1986 John Kessler Sumauang 121
110 Enrile vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. APURADA, 213847 August 18, 2015 Kathryne Vencio 111 Borinaga v. Tamin 26 SCRA 206 (1993); ANTOPINA, Babielen Poliquit 112 Cardines v. Rozete, 242 SCRA 557 (1995). TAN, Cesnee Joyce V. 113
Pp. vs. Martin Villarama June 23, 1992 TACDER, Lovella Fe Madelo
114
Abubakar vs. Abubakar Oct 22, 1999 RAÑON, Rexie M.
115 Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia 162 SCRA 665; Marcelino Rivera, Jr. vs. Pp August 30, 1990 PLAZA, Mariafe Manatad 116 Pp vs. Marcelino A. Bugarin (June 13, PELAEZ, Chester Bryan Pepito 1997) 117
118
Pp. vs. ElegioNadera (Feb. 2, 2000) PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao Eligio Madrid vs. CA (May 31, 2000) PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Pp. vs. Omar Mapalao May 14, 1991 LOZADA, Leah Amaya
122 People vs. Joven De Grano G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009 LARANAS, Rascille Mae Dagoon 123 PilarCañeda Braga v. Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya (GR No. 223076, september 13, 2016 JESURA 124 Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, v. Hon. Teodoro a. Casiño (G.r. No. 207257, February INOK, Erick Jay Noro 03, 2015)
125 Lnl Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs. Agham party list (G.r. No. 209165) IMPIG, Sychar M 126 Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, [March 7, HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda 2017]) Nee Corong 127 Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, [September 16, 2014]) GURO, Farhana 128 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, [April 21, 2015]) FERNANDEZ, Pauline August Momongan JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM
Page 58
