LVN PICTURES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) & COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SAMPAGUITA PICTURES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) & COURT OF INDUSTRIALRELATIONS FACTS: Respondent Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) is a duly registered legitimate labor organization. LVN Pictures, Inc., Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., and Premiere Productions, Inc. are corporations, duly organized under the Philippine laws, engaged in the making of motion pictures and in the processing and distribution thereof. Petitioner companies employ musicians for the purpose of making music recordings for title music, background music, musical numbers, finale music and other incidental music, without which a motion picture is incomplete. Ninety-five (95%) percent of all the musicians playing for the musical recordings of said companies are members of the Guild. The Guild has no knowledge of the existence of any other legitimate labor organization representing musicians in said companies. Premised upon these allegations, the Guild prayed that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all musicians working in the aforementioned companies. In their respective answers, the latter denied that they have any musicians as employees, and alleged that the musical numbers in the filing of the companies are furnished by independent contractors. The lower court sustained the Guild’s theory. A reconsideration of the order complained of having been denied by the Court en banc,LVN Pictures, inc., and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., filed these petitions for review for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the musicians in question(Guild members) are “employees “of the petitioner film companies. RULING: YES The Court agreed with the lower court’s decision, to wit: Lower court resorted to apply R.A. 875 and US Laws and jurisprudence from which said Act was patterned after. (Since statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes achieved and the evils sought to be remedied). It ruled that the work of the musical director and musicians is a functional and integral part of the enterprise performed at the same studio substantially under the direction and control of the company. In other words, to determine whether a person who performs work for another is the latter's employee or an independent contractor, the National Labor Relations
relies on 'the right to control' test . Under this test an employer-employee relationship exist where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching the end. (United InsuranceCompany, 108, NLRB No. 115.). Notwithstanding that the employees are called independent contractors', the Board will hold them to be employees under the Act where the extent of the employer's control over them indicates that the relationship is in reality one of employment. (John Hancock Insurance Co., 2375-D, 1940, Teller, Labor Dispute Collective Bargaining, Vol.). The right of control of the film company over the musicians is shown (1) by calling the musicians through 'call slips' in 'the name of the company; (2) by arranging schedules in its studio for recording sessions; (3) by furnishing transportation and meals to musicians; and(4) by supervising and directing in detail, through the motion picture director, the performance of the musicians before the camera, in order to suit the music they are playing to the picture which is being flashed on the screen. The “musical directors” have no such control over the musicians involved in the present case. Said musical directors control neither the music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. The Premier Production did not appeal the decision of the Court en banc (that’s why it’s not one of the petitioners in the case) film companies summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies, through the musical directors, fix the date, the time and the place of work. The film companies, not the musical directors, provide the transportation to and from the studio. The film companies furnish meal at dinner time. It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists . . .where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end . . . ." The decisive nature of said control over the "means to be used", is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co., et al., in which, by reason of said control, the employeremployee relationship was held to exist between the management and the workers, notwithstanding the intervention of an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercise, the power to hire and fire said workers . The aforementioned control over the means to be used" in reading the desired end is possessed andexercised by the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered
Prez Vs. Pomar Facts: The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the court to determine the amount due to him for the services he rendered in the Tabacalera Company and that the defendant Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment of damages amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the costs of suit. Prior to this event, the petitioner was asked to be an English interpreter between the defendant and the military authorities and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render his services to the respondent and that he obtained passes and accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of the towns in Province of Laguna( e.g conferences between the respondent and the colonel commanding the local garrison, conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, major in command in Pagsanjan about the shipment of goods from Manila) and that the plaintiff was assured by the respondent that in every rendered service to the said company, there would be such payment. Thus, caused him to abandon his soap business and suffered damages in the sum of $3,200. The defendant filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the allegations stated by the petitioner. He also stated that Perez borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175 for his soap business, that Perez purposes in accompanying him is to extend his business and mercantile relations, free transportation, and that Perez had acted as interpreter of his own free will without any offer of payment and therefore no legal relation between them existed. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner. Held: Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.
Ratio: The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract. When one party knowingly receives something for nothing, the courts may impose a quasi contract. Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an agreement. Instead, an arrangement is imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust enrichment. On the services rendered by the petitioner in the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his rendition of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code, Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The fact that the defendant consented to accept an interpreter's services on various occasions, rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is just that he should pay the reasonable payment because it is well-known principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
Sterling products vs. Sol Facts: Loreta C. Sol charged the herein petitioners Sterling Products International and its Radio Director V. San Pedro with having committed an unfair labor practice act. In her complaint she alleged among others that she has been a regular Radio Monitor of respondents-petitioners; that on January 8, 1960, she filed a complaint against the said firm for underpayment, money equivalent of her vacation leave from 1952 to 1959. The complaint resulted in her dismissal, without just cause, on December 16, 1960.
Petitioners herein denied the charges and by way of affirmative defenses, alleged that complainant is an independent contractor whose services were retained by petitioners to submit reports of radio monitoring work performed outside of their (petitioners') office.
Issue: WON Sol is an employee or an independent contractor. Held: In the case at bar, the company not only hired and fired Mrs. Sol, without third party intervention, but also reserved to itself, possessed and exercised its right to control 'the end' to be achieved and 'the means' to be used in reaching such end, namely, the schedule and other instructions by which the monitor shall be guided, and the reports with specifications by which the company observes and verifies the performance of her work. It is not correct to say, therefore, that she was an independent contractor, for an independent contractor is one who does not receive instructions as to what to do, how to do, without specific instructions.
Finally, the very act of respondent Sol in demanding vacation leave, Christmas bonus and additional wages shows that she considered herself an employee. A contractor is not entitled to a vacation leave or to a bonus nor to a minimum wage. This act of hers in demanding these privileges are inconsistent with the claim that she was an independent contractor.
Dy Keh Beng -vs- International Labor and Maritime Union of the Philippines, et al. FACTS A charge for ULP was filed against Dy Keh beng for discriminatory acts within the meaning of RA 875, Section 4(a.1) and 4(a.2) by dismissing Carlos N. Solano and Ricardo Tudla for their union activities. A case was filed in court and Dy Keh Beng contended that he did not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the latter came to the establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis, each piece of work being done under a separate contract. The CIR held that an Er-Ee relationship existed between Dy Keh Beng and complainants Tudla and Solano, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece basis. Petitioner anchors his contention of the non-existence of employee-employer relationship on the control test., arguing that there was no evidence to show that petitioner had the right to direct the manner and method of respondent’s work. ISSUE Whether or not there existed an employee-employee relation between petitioner Dy Keh Beng and respondents Solano and Tudla. HELD: Yes. Evidence showed that the work of Solano and Tudla was continuous except in the event of illness, although their services were compensated on piece basis. The control test calls for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right considering that Dy Keh Beng is engaged in the manufacture of baskets known as “kaing”, those working under Dy would be
subject to Dy’s specifications such as the size and quality of the “kaing”. And since the laborers are done at Dy’s establishments, it could be inferred that Dy could easily exercise control upon them. As to the contention that Solano was not an employee because he worked on piece basis, the court ruled that it should be determined that if indeed payment by piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. Payment cannot be construed by piece where work is done in such establishment so put the worker completely at liberty to turn him out and take it another at pleasure. Justice Perfecto also contended that pakyaw system is a labor contract between employers and employees between capitalists and laborers. Wherefore, the award of backwages is modified to an award of backwages for 3 years at the rated of compensation the employees were receiving at the time of dismissal.
RAMON CARO vs. LUCAS RILLORAZA and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION Facts: While constructing the window railing of a building managed by petitioner Ramon Caro, . Lucas Rilloraza, a carpenter by occupation, fell to the ground and broke his leg, as the wooden platform on which he and another carpenter were working collapsed. Petitioner maintains that Rilloraza was not his employee, upon the ground that Rilloraza was hired by one Daniel de la Cruz, who, allegedly, is an independent contractor. This pretense was rejected, however by the Workmen's Compensation Commission which was affirmed that De la Cruz was, at least, "merely an intermediary" and that petitioner is the "real employer" of Rilloraza.
Issue: WON Rilloraza was petitioner's employee, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act
Held: Yes "independent contractor" means 'one who exercises independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to result of the work.' Furthermore, if
the employer claims that the workmen is an independent contractor, for whose acts he is not responsible, the burden is on him to show his independence. (Ruel Ligerwood, Rural Tel. Co. supra; emphasis ours.)
Petitioner herein did not prove, or even try to prove, that De la Cruz had agreed to do a piece of work "according to his own methods . . . without being subject to the control of his employer."
Daniel de la Cruz was not an independent contractor, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In fact, the notice of injury filed by Rilloraza on September 28, 1953, referred to De la Cruz as a "capataz". In other words, even if Rilloraza had been engaged by De la Cruz, and there is no affirmative evidence thereon, the former was induced to believe that the latter acted merely as foreman of Caro, who, in turn, was Rilloraza's employer.
The "employer" and the "employee" referred to in this provision are defined in section 39 of said Act, as follows:
(a) 'Employer' includes every person or association of persons, incorporated or not, public or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer. It includes the owner or lessee of a factory or establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for the reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason is not the direct employer of laborers employed there.
(b) 'Laborer' is used as a synonym of 'Employee' and means every person who, has entered the employment of, or works under a service . . . for an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer.
In other words, the owner or lessee of a factory or place of work or the owner or the manager of the business therein carried on, may be bound to pay the compensation provided in section 2, above quoted, despite the intervention of an "independent contractor."
"Employment is 'casual' when it is irregular, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature. Under most statutes; even if casual, it is not exempt unless it is also outside the business of the employer. Under this test, most maintenance and repair activities, as well as even remodelling and incidental construction, have been held to be within the usual course of a business."
Consequently, even if Rilloraza, who did the repair work thereof, were a casual laborer, engaged directly by De la Cruz, acting as an independent contractor, which he is not, the former would still be an employee of petitioner herein, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and, hence, would be entitled to demand compensation from him.
RONALD CABE and PURITA CABE, petitioners, vs. SOTERO L. TUMANG, Assistant Regional Director for Arbitration, and AMBROCIO SISON, Acting Sheriff, Region 1, Ministry of Labor and Employment, and SAMUEL TAMAYO, respondents.
Facts: Samuel Tamayo agreed in March, 1979 to construct for the spouses Ronald Cabe and Purita Cabe their residential house for P106,000 in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by an architect. The Cabes dispensed with his services when he allegedly made certain deviations from the plans. The house was finished by other persons.
Tamayo on June 28,1979 sued the Cabes in the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Laoag City for the recovery of P7,000 as payment of labor and materials. He filed the case as head carpenter of his 18 co-workers, whose wages he had advanced, and for reimbursement of materials which he had purchased
Issue: Tamayo was an independent contractor and not an employee of the Cabes.
Held: Tamayo was an independent contractor and not an employee of the Cabes. The Labor Regional Office and the National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction over his claim. Their jurisdiction is confined to claims arising from employer-employee relationship
SNOW WHITE ICE CREAM & ICE DROP FACTORY and/or JOSE FUTCHIAN CHING (SHOULD BE SO DEE), petitioners, vs. EMILIO GARCIA (Deceased), Substituted by: JOVITA LOZANO VDA. DE GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children RODOLFO, ANGELITA, MARIA, EMILIO, JR., and CORAZON, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
Facts: Emilio Garcia "began working with the respondent as an ice drop vendor in 1953. He was paid on commission basis of P0.02 per ice drop that he sold, thereby earning approximately P7.00 a day, seven days a week. As such vendor, his duties consisted mainly of breaking into small pieces the block of ice given to him, and placing them
in the ice drop push-cart to prevent the ice drops from melting. Claimant, when not selling ice drops, repaired broken down pushcarts belonging to the respondent, being also a carpenter by occupation. It appears that on July 27, 1960, while preparing the pushcart assigned to him for peddling, a block of the ice he was carrying fell on his right foot, smashing three of his [toes]. After a week of medication, he resumed his work despite the fact that he was still limping; that while pushing the ice drop pushcart along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila, his swollen right foot was hit by a barbed wire. Claimant, however, continued working until August 27, 1960 when he stopped as he could no longer withstand the pain and chilling sensation that he suffered. He was brought to the North General Hospital where his right foot was amputated below the knee, the abscess having already become gangrenous. He remained in said hospital until September 16, 1960. Dr. V. Roldan, a private physician, continued treatment on the claimant while at home until the amputation wound was completely healed nine months thereafter. Claimant alleged that he spent the total amount of P700.00 for said treatment."
Issue: Whether the employer-employee relationship existed between the claimant Emilio Garcia, now deceased, who in his lifetime was an ice drop vendor, now substituted by his heirs, the private respondents, 1 and petitioner Snow White Ice Cream and Ice Drop Factory.
Held: Under the controlling test as clarified by Justice Makalintal in the aforesaid Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 5 the criterion is whether the person or firm alleged to be the employer can direct or require the party assertedly enjoying the employee status to do a certain kind of work and to specify the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. As was emphasized by Justice Makalintal in the above decision: "The logic of the situation indeed dictates that where the element of control is absent; where a person who works, for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exists." Thus from Larson's authoritative treatise on Workmen's Compensation Law: "Just as the employer may buy his raw materials outright from an independent businessman, so he can distribute his product by turning it over completely to a jobber who is an independent businessman.
But, since disposition of the product is normally an inherent part of any business, there is an increasing tendency to indulge a presumption that salesman, distributors, and deliverymen who fall short of the status of businessmen holding themselves out to the public as such are employees. An award in Garcia’s favor should be sustained.
Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople
FACTS: Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal, appointed petitioner Mafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft drinks in Manila. Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. Months later,
Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with Repomanta and Moralde. Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde, through their union, filed a complaint with the NLRC, charging the general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them.4.Mafinco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent contractors. It stressed that there was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and Moralde.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts, Repomanta and Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by the NLC and its fact finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks is not a contract of employment.
JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, THE HONORABLE JOSE S. BAUTISTA, ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, and EMILIANO C. TABIGNE, JUDGES OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and YSMAEL STEEL SALESMEN'S UNION, respondents. Facts: On November 27, 1957, the petitioning Union, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor, filed a petition praying for the aforesaid certification, upon the ground that it is a labor organization composed of all the salesmen working for the Ysmael Steel Manufacturing Co. The Company maintains the negative upon the ground that the members of petitioning Union are mere commission agents or sales representatives, whose form of selection and engagement is different from that of the employees of the Company, for unlike such employees, commission agents are not required to undergo physical examination, to submit a police clearance, and to punch the bundy clock, and are not provided with identification cards. It is further urged that commission agents are paid neither wages nor salaries, but are granted commissions, the amount of which depends on their sales, and that their conduct as agents is not subject to the control or supervision of the Company, which, moreover, has no power of dismissal over them.
Issue: whether the members of petitioning Union are employees of the Company or mere independent salesmen.
Held: The aforementioned difference in the manner of "selection and engagement" does not prove, however, the alleged absence of employer-employee relationship. Most business enterprises have employees of different classes, necessarily requiring different methods of selection and contracts of services of various types, without detracting from the existence of said relationship. Besides, the very evidence for the Company shows that commission agents are dispensed from physical examination and from punching the bundy clock because their duties are extraneous to the factory work and they have no fixed hours to contact their customers.
An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.(Sec. 2[c], Rep. Act No. 875.)
The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. (Sec. 2[d], id.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that the members of petitioning Union are employees of the Company — within the purview of the terms "employer" and "employee" as defined in the Industrial Peace Act — for purposes of certification of said union as the bargaining representative of its salesmen or commission agents.
PNB v. Cabansag
Florence Cabansag was hired by the PNB Branch in Singapore and was terminated (even if her good work was commended) allegedly due to cost cutting then because of the need for a Chinese speaking employee. She was not properly notified by her boss and she was not given a chance to be heard. There was no due process. PNB should have 1) apprised her of her particular act or omission 2) inform her of their decision to dismiss her. 282, 283, 284 valid grounds of dismissal. She did not commit any offenses or omissions under 282, the business was not closing (283) and she did not have any diseases (284). She was simple forced to resign and was illegally dismissed. “contract of employment is imbued with public interest and cannot insinuate themselves from impact of labor laws”
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.
FACTS In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position.
On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was subject to certain terms and conditions.
Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an ‘Overseas Employment Certificate,’ certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.
Barely three (3) months in office Tobias told Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a ‘cost-cutting measure’ of the Bank. Tobias, likewise, told Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to resign from her employment. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a ‘Formal Advice’ from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.
On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation ‘DISMISSED’ spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be ‘out’ of her employment by May 15, 1999.
However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.
On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of Florence Cabansag.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy.
HELD
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code and more specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:
“SECTION 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a “direct hire” governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers.
Under the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” (RA 8042), a migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.”[21] Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of “migrant worker” or “overseas Filipino worker.”
INVESTMENT PLANNING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondent-appellee.
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in business management and the sale of securities. It has two classes of agents who sell its investment plans: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives who work on commission basis.
On August 27, 1960 petitioner, through counsel, applied to respondent Social Security Commission for exemption of its so-called registered representatives from the compulsory coverage of the Social Security Act. The application was denied.
These representatives are in reality commission agents. The uncontradicted testimony of petitioner's lone witness, who was its assistant sales director, is that these agents are recruited and trained by him particularly for the job of selling "'Filipinos Mutual Fund" shares, made to undergo a test after such training and, if successful, are given license to practice by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Among the features of said agreement which respondent Commission considered pertinent to the issue are: (a) an agent is paid compensation for services in the form of commission; (b) in the event of death or resignation he or his legal representative shall be paid the balance of the commission corresponding to him; (c) he is subject to a set of rules and regulations governing the performance of his duties under the agreement; (d) he is required to put up a performance bond; and (e) his services
may be terminated for certain causes. The majority of the agents are regularly employed elsewhere — either in the government or in private enterprises.
Petitioner submits that its commission agents, engaged under the terms and conditions already enumerated, are not employees but independent contractors, as defined in Article 1713 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1713. By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of work for the employer, in consideration of a certain price or compensation. The contractor may either employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material. Isuue: WON petitioner's registered representatives are employees within the meaning of the Social Security Act (R.A. No. 1161 as amended). Section 8 (d) thereof defines the term "employee" — for purposes of the Act — as "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services, where there is, employer-employee relationship."
Held: We are convinced from the facts that the work of petitioner's agents or registered representatives more nearly approximates that of an independent contractor than that of an employee. The latter is paid for the labor he performs, that is, for the acts of which such labor consists; the former is paid for the result thereof.
Even if an agent of petitioner should devote all of his time and effort trying to sell its investment plans would not necessarily be entitled to compensation therefor. His right to compensation depends upon and is measured by the tangible results he produces. The test of existence of the relationship of independent contractor, which relationship is not taxable under the Social Security Act and related provisions, is whether the one who is claimed to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer except as to the result of the work. A long line of decisions holds that commission sales representatives are not employees within the coverage of the Social Security Act. The underlying circumstances of the relationship between the sales representatives and company
often vary widely from case to case, but commission sales representatives have uniformly been held to be outside the Social Security Act. The logic of the situation indeed dictates that where the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exists.
GUARDEX ENTERPRISES V. NLRCFacts:A claim for alleged unpaid commissions of an agent is what is basically involved inthe action at bar. The two parties in this case are: Marcelina A. Escandor (engaged in the manufactureand sale of fire-fighting equipment and the building or fabrication of fire trucksunder Guardex Enterprises) and Jumbee Orbeta (a “freelance” salesman).It appears that Orbeta somehow learned that Escandor had offered to fabricate afire truck for Rubberworld (Phil) Inc. He wrote to Escandor inquiring about theamount of commission for the sale of a fire truck. Escandor wrote back on the sameday to advise that it was P15,000 per unit. Four days later, Orbeta offered to “followup” Escandor’s pending proposal to sell a fire truck to Rubberworld, and asked forP250 as representation expenses. Escandor agreed and gave him the money. Whenno word was received by Escandor from Orbeta after 3 days, she herself inquired inwriting from Rubberworld about her offer of sale of a fire truck. After 7 months,Escandor finally concluded a contract with Rubberworld for the latter’s purchase of a fire truck. At this point, Orbeta suddenly reappeared and asked for his commissionfor the sale of the fire truck to Rubberworld. Escandor refused, saying that he hadnothing to do with the offer, negotiation and consummation of the sale.Issue:Whether or not Orbeta (acting as an agent) is entitled to commission as regards thesale of a fire truck to Rubberworld?Held:No. He is not entitled to any commission.Ratio:Even finding that under these circumstances, an agency had indeed beenconstituted will not save the day for Orbeta, because nothing in the record tends toprove that he succeeded in carrying out its terms or ever as much as attempted todo so. The evidence in fact clearly indicates otherwise. The terms of Escandor’sletter – assuming that it was indeed an “authority to sell,” as Orbeta insists – are tothe effect that entitlement to
the P15,000 commission is contingent on thepurchase by a customer of a fire truck, the implicit condition being that the agentwould earn the commission if he was instrumental in bringing the sale about.Orbeta certainly had nothing to do with the sale of the fire truck, and is nottherefore entitled to any commission at all.
Furthermore, even if Orbeta is considered to have been Escandor’s agent for thetime he was supposed to “follow up” the offer to sell, such agency would have beendeemed revoked upon the resumption of direct negotiations between Escandor andRubberworld, Orbeta having in the meantime abandoned all efforts (if indeed anywere exerted) to secure the deal in Escandor’s behalf
PNB vs CABANSAG Case Digest [G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.
FACTS In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position.
On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was subject to certain terms and conditions.
Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an ‘Overseas Employment Certificate,’ certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.
Barely three (3) months in office Tobias told Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a ‘cost-cutting measure’ of the Bank. Tobias, likewise, told Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to resign from her employment. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a ‘Formal Advice’ from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.
On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation ‘DISMISSED’ spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be ‘out’ of her employment by May 15, 1999.
However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.
On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of Florence Cabansag.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy.
HELD
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code and more specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:
“SECTION 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a “direct hire” governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers.
Under the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” (RA 8042), a migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.”[21] Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of “migrant worker” or “overseas Filipino worker.”
RAVAGO vs ESSO EASTERN MARINE Case Digest [G.R. No. 158324. March 14, 2005] ROBERTO RAVAGO, petitioner, vs. ESSO EASTERN MARINE, LTD. and TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC., respondents. FACTS: The respondent Esso is a foreign company based in Singapore and engaged in maritime commerce. It is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent and co-respondent TransGlobal, a corporation organized under the Philippine laws. Roberto Ravago was hired by TransGlobal to work as a seaman on board various Esso vessels. On February 13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as S/N wiper on board the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted until February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was assigned to work in different Esso vessels where he was designated diverse tasks, such as oiler, then assistant engineer. He was employed under a total of
34 separate and unconnected contracts, each for a fixed period, by three different companies, namely, Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM and Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS), Singapore Branch. Ravago worked with Esso vessels until August 22, 1992, a period spanning more than 22 years. Shortly after completing his latest contract with Esso, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay. Preparatory to his embarkation under a new contract, he was ordered to report for a Medical Pre-Employment Examination, which, according to the records, he passed. He, likewise, attended a Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar conducted by the Capt. I.P. Estaniel Training Center, a division of Trans-Global. One night, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride in Cubao, Quezon City. He fractured his left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. Ravago’s wife, Lolita, informed the petitioners of the incident for purposes of availing medical benefits. As a result of his injury, Ravago’s doctor opined that he would not be able to cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job. For this reason, the company physician found him to have lost his dexterity, making him unfit to work once again as a seaman. Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, Esso paid him his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) as of and his final tax refund. However, Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees against Trans-Global and Esso with the POEA Adjudication Office. Respondents denied that Ravago was dismissed without notice and just cause. Rather, his services were no longer engaged in view of the disability he suffered which rendered him unfit to work as a seafarer. This fact was further validated by the company doctor and Ravago’s attending physician. They averred that Ravago was a contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate contracts by different companies. Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury activities and that he was not a mere contractual employee because the respondents regularly and continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his continuous service, was awarded a CEIP payment upon his termination from employment. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Ravago is a regular employee of respondent Esso. HELD: The SC held that seafarers are contractual, not regular, employees. Seamen and overseas contract workers are not covered by the term “regular employment” as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petition is denied.
