Nancy Sherman - Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life

International Phenomenological Society

Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life Author(s): Nancy Sherman Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Jun., 1987), pp. 589-613 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230 . Accessed: 30/09/2013 03:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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and Phenomenological Philosophy Research

Vol.

XLVII,

No. 4, Junei987

Aristotle on Friendship andtheSharedLife NANCY SHERMAN

Yale University

In thispaper I wantto considerthevalue of friendship froman Aristotelian pointof view.The issue is of currentinterestgivenrecentchallenges to impartialist ethicsto takemoreseriouslythecommitments and attachmentsof a person.' In what followsI wantto enterthatdebatein onlya restricted the challengearticulatedin Aristotle's way by strengthening and the sharedlife. systematicdefenseof friendship Aftersome introductory remarks,I begin by consideringAristotle's notionthatgood livingor happiness(eudaimonia)2foran individualnecessarilyincludesthe happinessof others.Shared happinessentailsthe rationalcapacityforjointlypromotingcommonendsas wellas thecapacwithand coordinateseparateends.This extendednotionof ityto identify happinesspresupposesthe extensionof selfthroughfriends,and nextI and Morality(BosRecentchallengescome fromLawrenceBlum,Friendship,Altruism, ton: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); BernardWilliams, "Persons,Characterand Press, i98i), pp. i-id; Morality"in Moral Luck (New York: CambridgeUniversity JohnCottingham,"Ethics and Impartiality," PhilosophicalStudies43 (i983): 84-99; and AndrewOldenquist,"Loyalties," The Journalof Philosophy79 (i98z): 173-93. claimswe treatselfand thoseextensionsof selfas one amongothers, The impartialist of othersthesame weightas we giveour own. The opponentargues givingtheinterests and attachments of a persondeservespecialtreatment, and withthatthecommitments out themlifelacks value and meaning.The debate has stirredKantiansand utilitarians to thegoods of friendship. aliketo findpositionswithintheirtheoriesthatare friendlier StephenDarwall exploresthe utilitarianand Kantianreplyin "ImpartialistEthicsand PersonalRelationship"(unpublished).A morerecentversionof his paper is "WhyParBarbara Hermanarticulatesthe Kantian ticularistsShould be Liberals" (forthcoming). positionin "Rules, Motives, and Helping Actions,"PhilosophicalStudies45 (i984): 369-77. Cf. her"Mutual Aid and RespectforPersons,"Ethics94 (i984): 577-60? and and Impartiality,"The Monist 66 (i983): ?33-50. "Integrity ofsoul inaccordancewithvirtue Eudaimonia,as thefinalgood forhumans,is theactivity and reason (iog8a3-i8). Aristotlealso refersto eudaimoniaas good livingand doing well (iog8bzi).

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considercertainminimalconditionsnecessaryforattachment.Finally,I discusshow Aristotle'snotionof a friendas "anotherself"is compatible bothwitha conceptionof theseparatenessof the individualsand of the distinctive ways in whicheach individualrealizesvirtuewithina shared life. Aristotleand Kant Beforesettingout Aristotle'sview,it is worthanticipatinga replyon his part to the Kantian position on friendshipas it has been articulated recentlyby StephenDarwall and BarbaraHerman.3The replywill bring into focus aspectsof Aristotle'sethicaltheorythat I presupposein my account. Accordingto Darwall, reasons for an agent to act based on friendly motivesare constrainedbyreasonsbased on principlesof right. This deontologicalconstraint on friendship is developedbyHerman.Her claimis thattheimpartialpointof view of the CategoricalImperativeis requiredboth to set the conditionsof permissibility for actingout of friendly motivesas well as to imposeobligatoryends whichthenmight best be fulfilledby friendship.4 Thus, Herman speaks of a double acknowledgment, suchthatin actingfromfriendship we recognizethatin additionto thatmotive,our actioneithersatisfiesa dutyor is withinpermissibleconstraints. In thisway motivesof friendship are constrainedby an overallrespectforpersonsas endsinthemselves, suchthatinactingout of friendship we neitheroverlooktheautonomyof a friend, nordisregard our dutiesto othersto whom we are not attached. Herman'sand Darwall's defenseoffriendship is ofa piecewiththegeneral Kantiantenetthatthepursuitof happiness(of whichfriendship is a part)5is framedbya lexicallyhighermoralvalue whichhas itssourcenot in thesentiments, butin principlesofpracticalreason.6Whilefriendships

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Darwall, "ImpartialistEthics"; Herman, "Rules, Motives and HelpingActions." "What is requiredis thatagentswho act fromemotionalso act permissibly. And where thereis an obligationto help,we are requiredto acknowledgethismoral claim,even though we may give help out of compassion, etc." "Rules, Motives and Helping Actions,"p. 376. On Kant'sviewfriendship is a partofhappinessinso faras itis based on emotionor inclination.Friendshipbased on mutualrespect,in contrast,willhave intrinsic moralworth. Cf. Doctrineof Virtue,trans.Mary I. Gregor(Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,i964), pp. 140-45. NeitherHerman nor Darwall discussthiscase. I raise some difficulties forthiscase at the end of mypaper. So Kant says: "And since none the less reason has been impartedto us as a practical power- thatis,as one whichis to haveinfluence on thewill;itstruefunction mustbe to producea willwhichis good . . . Such a will need noton thispurposebe thesole and completegood, butitmustbe thehighestgood and theconditionofall therest,evenofall our demands forhappiness.In thatcase we can easily reconcilewith the wisdom of

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maybe instrumental to actingfroma moralmotive(in thattheyprovide conditions foritsinculcationand flourishing), in so faras thesupporting moralworthoftheirown.7 theyarebased on emotions,theylack intrinsic on manycounts.But one Now Aristotle'spositionis quite different is this:ForAristotle, theethicalsphere(literally, that centraldisagreement betweenmoraland whichrefersto character(ethos)) does notdistinguish non-moralvalue, as the Kantian understandsthat distinction.Thus, and good birthnot excellenceof characterwill includephysicalstrength and easilyassignableto theKantiansphereofthemoral;and attachments while excluded froma Kantian view of the moral, will be sentiments, the factthatwe can be among motivesforethicalaction. Accordingly, blindedbyfriendship, or because of it act withtoo parochialan interest, does not,forAristotle, therebyremoveitfromtheethicalsphereofvaluation.8Rather,thatfactmerelyopens it to adjudicationwithotherclaims in lightofthoseotherconsidand to judgmentsabout itsappropriateness erationsthatmustbe giventheirdue. Thus Aristotleincludesmotivesof attachmentwithinthe ethical sphere,while still acknowledgingconSo in general,Aristotlesays,friendsare to straintson theirpermissibility. in theassignment of our helpand aid (Ii 55a7-9; i i6oai-8) be preferred butnotalwaysand notat all costs.Forexample,itwould be wrongto help a friendbeforereturning benefitsdue others,or to givea loan to friends beforerepayinga creditor,"exceptwhenhelpinga friendis especiallyfine is inappropriatein or necessary"(i i64bz5-i165 a4). Similarly, partiality specificcontexts,suchas inthecase ofa publicofficialwherethefairadjudication of claims is a part of the description of that office (1134a33-35bi).9 But on Aristotle'sview, this is just to say that the natureour observationthatthecultivationof reasonwhichis requiredforthefirstand of theattainment unconditionedpurposemayin manyways,at leastin thislife,restrict thesecondpurpose- namely,happiness- whichis alwaysconditioned,"Groundwork of theMetaphysicsof Morals, trans.H. J.Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 64. may have intrinsicvalue thoughnot Accordingto Herman and Darwall, friendships way inwhichcertain intrinsic moralvalue. Note on Kant'sown view,thereis a restricted mayhave moralworth- see note 5 above. On a Kantianview,friendswill friendships value inso faras social relationsare neededto sustainand nourish also haveinstrumental as merelyinstruthecapacitiesof a selfas a rationalchooser.A criticismof friendship of Kohlberg.Cf. Carol Gilmentalseemsto be at theheartof Carol Gilligan'scriticisms lingan,In A DifferentVoice (Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard UniversityPress, I98z). 8

For the claim that Aristotlenonethelessdoes have a moral theory,see T. Irwin's "Aristotle'sConceptionof Morality"and mycommentsin Proceedingsof theBoston Area Colloquiumin AncientPhilosophy,Vol. I, ed. JohnCleary(New York: University Pressof America,i986), pp. I15-50. betweenan objectionableand unobjecIn a similarvein,in IX.9 Aristotledistinguishes

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expressionof virtuethroughfriendship mustbe harmonizedwithother ends in thegood life.And thisis a consequenceof his moregeneralview thatparticularchoicesmustbe attentiveto all theethicallyrelevantparofone's situation.Accordingly, a choiceis appropriate(or hits ticularities the mean) onlyif it givesdue considerationin thisholisticway. of an action,in so faras Moreover,constraintson the permissibility theyarisefromtheexpressionofothervirtues,do notappeal to principles In makingan all consideredjudgmentof whatis exclusiveof sentiments. bestin a particularsituation,an agentappeals bothto thepassionaldispositions(hexeis)and rationaljudgment(logos) ofthephronimos,or person ofpracticalwisdom.To theextentthatthephronimosrepresents a point of view of experienceand reflective judgmentremovedfromirrelevant biases (NE 11.9i io9bi-9) we mightsay thereis somethinglikean appeal to an impartialpointof view in the assessmentof action. However,for Aristotle,the point of view is always thatof humanexcellence,constituted,as it is, by emotionalas well as rationalcapacities.The considerationsof friendship are within,ratherthan outside,thatpointof view. Furthermore, itis thepointofviewofa specificpersonconcretely reactAs suchthepointofviewofthephronimosis ingto specificcircumstances. neverreallya legislativeone, eitherin thesenseof applyinggeneralrules fromthetop down,or in thesenseof constructing laws fromthebottom up (as I believe the Kantian does in testingmaxims). In deliberating betweenthe competingclaimsof near and far,'0the virtuousagentwill correctforbiasesthatprejudice.Butthisneverrequirestheabstractdeliberativepointof viewofanyonewho mightfacetheoptions.My antecedand knowledgeofmypast are notdetachablefrom enthistoryofinterests fortheAristotelian, moralreasons mydeliberative position.Accordingly, foractionand thedeliberations ofa moralagentwillappeal to these.They limitthe optionspresentedas well as the reasons foraction. As a resultof thesesortsof assessments,it mayturnout thatclaimsof those more distantlimitthe claims of friendship.But these claims,of widergenerosity, justiceor thelike,do not have a privilegedpositionin

IO

tionablepartialitytowardself.In the firstcase an individualis partialto himselfin the sense thathe takes morethan his fairshareof certain"foughtfor"or scarce (perimacensurethisindividualforhisactionsinvolvea violationofjuschata) goods. We rightly tice; theyare a case ofpleonexia,takingforoneselfwhat othershave a legitimateclaim to. In thesecondcase an individualis partialin thesensethathe desiresto makehisown charactervirtuousand to makehimselftheseatofvirtue.Thisindividualis notguiltyofa forin wantingthathe be virtuous,he does not violateothers' criticizableself-interest, claims.The implicationis thattheend of virtueis not a scarce resourcedividedup by MM izizb8-z3. justice.Cf. ii68b15-i6,69a3z; principlesof distributive The expressionis Thomas Hill's. I owe thanksto himforencouragingmeto clarifysome section. issues in thisintroductory

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thegood life.Theydo notalwaystrumpothervirtues,noraretheyconstitutedanyless bypassional dispositions."Moreover,thesepassionaldispositionsare neitherblindnor irrationalforces,but rationallyinformed and guidedintentionalstates. UnliketheKantian,then,Aristotledoes not merelypermitattachment withina theoryofmoralityconstituted primarily byimpartiality. Rather, he makesattachment essentialto theexpressionof virtueand livingwith friendsa structuralfeatureof good living,as I shall be arguingshortly. These are some broad differences betweenKant and Aristotleon the questionoffriendship. Theyhaveto do generallywiththesourcesofvalue foreach,and themethodof arbitrating betweencompetingclaims.Atthe conclusionofthepaper I shalltakeup a finaldifference. Butto appreciate this,we mustfirstexploreAristotle'spositionin some depth. Friendsas ExternalGoods To beginwith,we mustsetdown some definitional points.By friendship (philia) Aristotletypicallymeansthemutuallyacknowledgedand reciprocal relationof good will and affectionthat existsamong individuals in each otheron thebasis ofvirtue,pleasureor utilwho sharean interest ity(NE VIII.z). Also includedamongfriendships are thenon-chosenrelationsof affectionand care thatexistamong familymembersand fellow in citizens(NE VIII. i z; VIII.9,IX.6).In thispaperI willbe mostinterested theway in whichbestsortof friendship, of virtunamely,thefriendship ous individuals(whatI willsometimescall "characterfriendship") figures in the accountof happiness.To a limitedextent,I shall also discussthe philiaoffamilyas itshedslighton mygeneralaccount.I shouldalso stress fromthestartthatwhilewomen,on Aristotle'sview,are excludedfrom thebestsortsoffriendships (on thegroundthattheylackthecapacitiesfor fullvirtue),I shall nonethelesstryto overlookthishistoricalprejudice, and forthepurposesof thispaper,allow myselfexampleswhichwould open the ranksof the virtuousto women. Withthissaid,let'stryto understandtheway in whichfriendsfigurein Aristotle'sgeneralschemeofgoods. In NE 1.8Aristotlearguesthatvirtue, forhappiness,and requiresin additionceras a good, is alone insufficient tainexternalgoods. The argumentis roughlythis:Happiness,conceived of as doing well and livingwell (iog8bzi), requiresnot merelyethical (and intellectual)virtues,but activitieswhich manifestthose excelof attachment would So Aristotlemaintainsthatappeal to some sortof wide sentiment ideallyreplacethemoredetachedpointofviewofjustice:"For lawgiversurgefriendship more than justice . . . for where thereis friendshipthereis no need for justice" (11I55az4-8).

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lences.'2Withregardto ethicalvirtue,endsof charactermustbe realized and implementedin action.'3 But for this, the proper resourcesand mustbe at hand. Amongtheseresourcesor externalgoods opportunities are friends: Yet evidently, as we said,happinessrequiresin additionexternalgoods; foritis impossible or not easy to do excellentdeeds withoutresources.For an individualperformsmany actionsthroughtheuse ofinstruments, wealthand politicaloffice.And the throughfriends, lack ofothergoods spoilsone's happiness,suchas finebirth,good childrenand beauty.For one would hardlybe happyifone werethoroughly ugly,or bornoflow birthor solitaryand childless.(io99a3 i-b4)

In this passage, Aristotlehas in mindtwo classes of externalgoods (whichhe recapitulates at ioggb27): thosewhichare instruments ofhappiness,i.e. - thosethingswhichare bynaturecooperativeand usefulas tools (io99bz7), and thosewhichare notmerelyinstrumental, butwhich are necessaryforand intrinsicto happiness(i.e., "belong necessarily" huparchein anagkaionioggbz7 and the lack of whichmars happiness ioggbz).'4 Friendsfigurein thelistof bothtypesof externalgoods. The firstclass of goods is somewhatstraightforward. Friendsmaybe instrumentsand toolsin thesenseinwhichmoneyand politicalconnectionare. They provideus withthe means forthe promotionof particularends. Thus we dependupon the aid and supportof friendsforaccomplishing ends we cannot realizeon our own. The way in whichfriendsfigurein thesecondclass of goods,however, is moredifficult to grasp.For while friendship has intrinsicworth(certainlyAristotletakesthelove parentsshow towardchildrento be an end in its own right - MM iziibi-z, and friendshipin general, foritsown sake" 1159az 5), itdoes so not in thesenseof "choiceworthy havingsome isolatedvalue, like thatof an "adventitious"pleasure (cf. ii6gbz5-7) which mightbe added to happinessas one more separate worthis of a muchmorepervasivesort, constituent.'Ratheritsintrinsic I do notsubscribeto theinterpretation of NE X.6-8 in whichintellectualcontemplation is a dominantgood of happiness.Cf.J.L. Ackrill,"Aristotleon Eudaimonia,"Proceedingsof theBritish Academy 6o (1975): 339-59. I argue the case also in myreviewof

Anthony Kenny'sThe Aristotelian Ethics,Journalof theHistoryof Philosophy i9 (i98i): 3

14

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100-104.

Accordingly, Aristotlecommentsthathappinesscould neverbe ascribedto a person, howevervirtuous,who sleptaway hislifeor out of inertiafailedto realizehiscapacities (io99ai-6). My remarkshereare indebtedto T. Irwin'sclassification of the two typesof external goods in "PermanentHappiness:Aristotleand Solon" presentedto theBostonAreaColloquiumin AncientPhilosophy,January,i985. Irwindoes notexplore,as I do, thespecial way in whichfriendship is an intrinsicgood. Gauthier-Jolif implysomething liketheviewI criticizeintheiraccountofthesecondclass

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providingtheveryformand mode of lifewithinwhichan agentcan best realize her virtueand achievehappiness.To have intimatefriendsand in one's life,in an ubiquitiousway,persons familyis to have interwoven toward whom and with whom one can most fullyand continuously expressone's goodness. In whatfollowsI wantto pursuethisnotionoffriendship as structuring thegood lifeand suggestthatit is because of thisrole thatAristotlecalls friendsthe"greatest"and "mostnecessary"ofexternalgoods (i i69bio, II54a4), withoutwhom we wouldn'tchoose to live "even ifwe had all 5 othergoods" (I 55a5-6, cf. i i69bi6-I7). As suggested,friendship crea or for of and ates context arena the expression virtue, ultimatelyfor happiness.This can be seen in variousways. It providesbeneficiaries for virtuousaction,as wellas opportunities foractionand sentiment unavailable to the solitaryor childless.'6However,I want to suggestthatit is essentialto the good lifein a more fundamentalway. In particular,it extendsand redefines itsboundaries,in sucha way thatmyhappinessor completegood comesto includethehappinessof others.Thus happiness or good livingis ascribableto me,not as an isolatedindividual,butas an extendedselfwithattachments, or friends. Happiness as Includingthe Happiness of Others The kernelof this is in Aristotle'sremarksin 1.7 regardingthe selfof good living.Self-sufficiency is a criterionof the good life sufficiency entailingthat a lifeis "lackingin nothing,"therebeingno othergood whichwhenadded to itwould makethatlifedesirable(io97bI5-zz). But sincefriendsare amongthegoods whichmake a lifeself-sufficient, selfis relationaland thegood lifea lifedependentupon and intersufficiency woven withothers: wedon'tmeanfora solitary foroneliving a lifealone, but Byself-sufficient individual, andwife, andingeneral forallfriends andfellow citizens sincea forparents, children, human being is bynature political andsocial.(io97bg-ii;cf.ii69bi8-ig) For humanbeingsthe self-sufficient lifeis a lifelargerthanthatof one individual.So theMagna-Moraliaremindsus, "we are not investigating

'6

1970), ofexternalgoods: L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain: PublicationUniversitaires, Vol. Z.I, p. 71. On thenotionthatfriendsallow forsustainedvirtuousactivity, cf.IX.9 I I7oa5-8. John Trooperdiscussesthe second class of goods as providingopportunitiesin thisway in Aristotleon theGoods of Fortune"PhilosophicalReview94 (i985): 173-96. Martha as an externalgood whichprovides Nussbaum takes up a relatedview of friendship objectsfortheexerciseof virtuein chapteri z of The Fragilityof Goodness. Luck and

in GreekEthicalThought:The TragicPoets,Plato,and RationalSelf-Sufficiency

Aristotle(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,i985).

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the self-sufficiency of a god, but of human beings" (izi8a8), and the Eudemian explains, "for our well-beingis relational (kath'heteron), whereas in the case of a god, he is himselfhis own well-being" (iz45bi8-i9).

Aristotlehas in It is importantto emphasizethat the self-sufficiency mindis self-sufficiency withregardnotmerelyto living,butto livingwell. does notmerelyenable themostimportantsortoffriendship Accordingly, us to live,butenablesus to flourish.These considerationsfindexpression in NE IX.9 and EE VII.iz whereAristotleagain takes up the relationof So in IX.9 he reportstheviewof some,that friendship to self-sufficiency. theself-sufficient persondoes notrequirefriends,"forthethingsthatare he requiresnothingfurther" good belongto him,and beingself-sufficient, (ii69b5-7). Aristotle'sdisagreement(ii69bzz-8, and EE iz44b6ff.) A person who lacked of self-sufficiency. centerson the interpretation mighthave friends,who perhapsspenthis lifein solitarycontemplation, minimalrequirements formaterialgoods. He mightbe moreor less selfin thematerialconditionsof living.But he could neverbe selfsufficient sufficient withregardto good activity.The problemwiththosewho claim as based on something otherwiseis thattheyfailto conceiveof friendship as something morethanutilityor transient pleasures,and self-sufficiency correspondinglybroader (i i69bz3-7).'7 Thus, these later passages in 1.7 of self-sufficiency as relationalby specifying sharpenthedefinition theself-sufficient morepreciselywhatsortof relationship(or friendship) lifenecessarilyinvolves. soliThe upshotof thesepassages,then,is thatwhiletheself-sufficient forliving(or onlyminitarymaynotneedothersas meansor instruments mallyso), he will stillneed othersto shareends and designa lifetogether withthose ends in mind: Forwhenwe arenotinneedofsomething, thenwe all seekothersto shareourenjoywhenweareself-sufficient thanwheninneed,andwe ment.Andwecanjudgethembetter whoareworthy oflivingtogether withus. (EE Iz44bi8-22) mostneedfriends

Thus thebestsortof friendship providesus withcompanionswithwhom we can share goods and interestsin a jointlypursuedlife.This sortof sharedhappinessconstitutesthe trulyself-sufficient life. There is considerablefurtherevidencefor the claim that friendship entailsa weavingof livestogetherintosome sharedconceptionof happiness. Aristotlepursuestheseissues with some insightin the Eudemian 17

In the EE Aristotlesays thatthe mostself-sufficing personwill need usefulfriendsand friendsthat amuse him only minimally,and will not value too highlysuch relations with regardto these means is only one aspect of self(I244b5-I5). But sufficiency as I have argued above. sufficiency,

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Ethics,and I want to considerthosetextsnow. In theEE Aristotleadds a newdimensionto hisdiscussionoffriendship as itappearsin theNE and MM. At I z3 6b3-6 he arguesthatthebestsort of friendship among virtuousadults (characterfriendship) displaysnot onlythe acknowledgedreciprocationof affectionand goodwill,but the acknowledgedreciprocationof a choice of one another: Itis apparentfromthesethingsthattheprimarysortoffriendship, thatamonggood persons,requiresmutualaffection(antiphilia)and mutualchoice (antiprohairesis) withregard to one another . . . This friendship thusonlyoccursamong humans,fortheyalone are consciousof reasonedchoices (prohaireseis).

Again,at EE Iz37a3off. he makes a similarpoint: If the activityof friendshipis a reciprocalchoice, accompanied by pleasure,of the acquaintanceof one another,it is clear thatfriendship of the primarykindis in generala reciprocalchoice (antiprohairesis) of the thingsthat are withoutqualificationgood and pleasant,because theyare good and pleasant.

The significance of the claim restson Aristotle'stechnicalterm,prohairesis.As I have arguedelsewhere,a prohairesisis a reasonedchoice thatis expressiveof a characterand theoverallends of thatcharacter.'8 The choiceof a friendexposes thiscapacityof practicalreasonin a perspicuousway. For in choosinga characterfriend, we select"anotherself" and ends,and a sense (I I7ob6-7) who sharesa senseofour commitments ofwhatwe taketo be ultimately "good and pleasant"inliving.We choose anotherto be a partnerin thejointpursuitof theseends. In so doing,we choose to arrangeour lives around a loyaltyto another,and around a willingnessto choose ends and pursuitswithinthe contextof thisloyalty.'9 comesin However,sinceforAristotletherealtest(peiran)offriendship spendingtimetogether(suzesai Iz37b3 5-37), thechoicesthatare constiare notso muchtheinitialoverturesas thosethat tutiveof thefriendship indicatea capacityto share and coordinateactivitiesover an extended periodof time." Theyare thechoicesthatindicatetwo livescan be interi8

'9

10

Cf. my "Character,Planningand Choice in Aristotle,"Review of Metaphysics34 (I985). Cf.EE I 2I4b7 on prohairesisas a capacityto arrangelifewithregardto certainends.Itis the phronesisand implicitly to notethatin theNE Aristotlecharacterizes also interesting prohairesisof thepersonof wisdomas a rightjudgment(orthoslogosI I44bz2-8), and as a judgmentofwhatis takento be best(NE III.3 i i i 2zbii ff.).Here too,inthenotionof is present.The friendship reflects a stablejudgment(to theterminology choosinga friend, bebaion I237bi i), and correctdecision(krisinorthenI237bI2), as deterkekrimenon minednot so muchin advance,but as borne out by timeand trust(i237bi3-i8). "Those who becomefriendswithoutthetestof timeare notreal friendsbutonlywishto be friends"(EE IU37bi7-i8).

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woven togetherinto some coherentpatternof good living. Significantly, Aristotledoes discuss these sortsof choices underthe notionof homonoia,literallysamenessof mind,or moreidiomatically, consensusbetweenfriends.Homonoia, he arguesin theEE, is arrivingat the same choice about practicalmatters(he-aute prohairesis),as in the case ofcivicfriendship, wherefellowcitizensagreeabout who shouldrule and who shouldbe ruled(Iz4ia3 '-3; cf.NE IX.6). In thecase ofintimate friendships, the consensusis not about who should rule,but about how and whatsortoflifeto livetogether:"Some havethoughtfriendship to be unanimityof feelingand thosewho have sucha consensusto be friends. is not a consensusconcerningeverything, But friendship buta consensus concerningpractical mattersfor the parties involvedand concerning thosethingsthatcontributeto livingtogether"(hosa eis to suzensunte-

nei 1z4iai6-i8).

The notion of consensuscan be seen as an extensionof Aristotle's In choosinga friend,one notionof reciprocalchoice (antiprohairesis). chooses to make thatpersona partof one's lifeand to arrangeone's life withthatperson'sflourishing (as well as one's own) in mind.One takes on, ityou like,theprojectofa sharedconceptionofeudaimonia.Through mutualdecisionsabout specificpracticalmatters,friendsbeginto express thatsharedcommitment. Consensus betweenfriendscan take various forms.So, forexample, two friendscometo a mutualdecisionabout how to act fairlyand honorablytowardanotherwho has wrongedthem,or abouthow bestto assista fellowcitizenwho has come upon hard times.Anyhappinessor disapthatfollowsfromtheseactionsbelongsto bothpersons,forthe pointment is thusshared.This decisionto so act was joint and the responsibility notionof jointdeliberationprovidesan importantinterpretation of Arislivetogether, notin totle'smorecompressedremarkthatcharacterfriends theway animalsdo, bysharingthesamepasture,but "bysharingin argumentand thought"(koinoneinlogon kai dianoias I I 7ob i i -i z). But equally, consensusmay expressonly a more generalagreement about ends and pursuits.Two friendsmaysharetheconvictionthattemperancein theirpersonallivesis of utmostimportance,yeteach realizes thatend in a different styleand manner.One does itthrougha scrupulous diet,the otherby refusingto take part in frivolousgossip about others. is to an end,ratherthanto particularwaysofexpressTheircommitment ing it.

sortof consensusin friendship. Buttheremaybe a morecharacteristic ofthe In thissortofcase friendsrealizesharedendswhichare constitutive

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friendship and whichdo not pre-existit."' Thus specificcommoninterestsdevelopwhicharea productratherthanpre-condition oftherelation, so, together,myfriendand I developa love forGeorgianhouses having had no real interestin themearlier.Aristotle'semphasison developing friendships throughtimeand througha sharedhistoryof mutualactivity suggeststhisnotionof thecommongood. But a qualificationis in order here.While specificand sharedways of being virtuouswill be among thosevalues peculiarto a specificfriendship, theacquisitionof virtuous statesof charactermustpre-existanyfriendship based on virtue.That is, theagentsmustchooseeach other,inpart,on thebasisofa firmand stable thecommitments character.Throughtheparticularfriendship, ofcharacter will deepen and express themselvesin ways peculiar to and Butevenso, a well-cultivated conditionedbythatfriendship. senseofvirin a way in whicha love of Georgian tue mustbe in place fromthe-start, houses need not be. Withinfriendship happinessis sharedin otherways too. Individuals withone another,suchthatevenwhereactivitiesare not cometo identify joint,or endsnotshared,one individual'shappinessaffectsthehappiness of theother.Whena frienddoes well,I feelhappytoo. Aristotleexplains thissortof "singlenessof mind" (miapsuche-EE I z4obz,bg-io) through thenotionsof sympathyand empathy,and arguesthatthesesentiments So at IX.io, Aristotlesays, are heightened themoreintimatea friendship. to a friend, thebetterable I am to minthemoreexclusivetheattachment ister to a friend'sneeds and to identifywith her joys and sorrows (II7ia6ff.) It may be because of my intimateknowledgeof her,I can imaginehow she feelsin thatsituation,or knowinghow I would feelor (havefelt)inthatsortofsituation,and knowingsheis similarto mein certainways,imagineshe mustfeelthatway. In theEE Aristotleindicates of some thatfriendsmightexpressnot merelysympathetic identification sort(ou moon sullupeisthai),butempathy,"feelingthesamepain . (alla kai tin autin lupe-n)(forexample,when he is thirsty, sharinghis thirst),if this were possible, and if not, what is closest to it" (EE Iz4oa36-9). But thequalificationsuggeststhatthisHumean-likeempathy,i.e.,comingto feelthesameeffect, mayintheendbe neithernecessary nor sufficient forpracticalconcern.It mightbe enoughthatI be able to imaginefrommyown pointof view,or fromwhatI taketo be thatofmy friend's,what she is experiencing.Thus, in tragedy,Aristotlesays, we respondwithpityand fearwhenwe imaginewhatitwould be likeforus, to suffera similarfate (peri to homoion).zz in our own circumstances, " I am gratefulto GregoryTrianoskyforurgingme to develop thispoint. Cf. Poetics 1453a4-6, RhetoricI385bI3-I4.

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To appreciatethecharacter'splightwe needn'tfeeljustwhatthecharacter feels. Thereis a further way in whichwe experiencea friend'shappinessor and failures,whichare notexplicsorrowas our own. Accomplishments itlyour own, are nonetheless,throughan extensionof self,sourcesof pride and shame. So Aristotlesays in Rh. 11.6: "And individualsfeel shame whenevertheyhave acts or deeds which bringsome disrespect, eithertheirown,or thoseoftheirancestors,or thoseofotherpersonswith whom theybear some close relation"(I385ai-3). Thus, whenour children do well, we feelpride in theirachievements,and when theydo poorly,shame,as ifwe ourselveshad fallenshort.It is not thatwe are responsiblefor theirerrors(thoughas parentswe may be), but that throughthe sense of belongingand attachment,we identifywith and sharetheirgood. But friendship of two livesin quitea difmayinvolvetheinterweaving ferentway. This can be seen as follows:Withina givenindividual'slife, choices(prohaireseis)articulatetheendsof characterin some unifiedand comprehensive way over time.So, deliberationreflectsa sense of planning,and an abilityto make choicesthatbestpromotenot a singleend, but a coherentsystemof ends. Choices of action are with regardnot merelyto thepartsof good living,butwithregardto thewhole,and the unityof ends thatentails(II4oaz6-z8, iI45ai-z). This model of planningis extendedto thesharedlifeof friends.Ends are coordinatednotmerelywithinlives,butbetweenlives.Thus,justas a particularchoiceI make is constrainedby mywidersystemof objectives and ends,so too is itconstrainedbytheendsofa friend.So, forexample,if a contemplated actionofmineprecludesa friendfromrealizingan importantgoal of hers,thenthatconsiderationwill figurein myjudgmentof whoseinterwhatis overallbest.Itmaynotbe an easymatterdetermining estsshouldprevail,and as withanydecisionofthemean,decidingwhatis rightwill requiregivingdue considerationto all relevantconcerns.But whateverthenatureof thesolution,thepointto be stressedis thatwhatis relevantto thedecisiongoes beyondtheeudaimoniaof a single,isolated individual.The endsofmyfriendmustbe takenintoaccount,justas mine must,in theoverallassessmentof whatis to be done. Indeed,thesurvival of the friendship dependsupon our willingnessto exhibitloyaltyin this way.

and WiderAltruism Attachment an individual'shappinessbecomes I have arguedthatthroughfriendship extendedto include the happiness of others.This presupposessome I want notionof an extendedself,or a selfenlargedthroughattachments.

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to explorethismomentarily, proposingcertainminimalconditionsnecesas attachment. But firstI wantto contrastattachment saryforfriendship witha widersense of altruism. Altruistic sentiments such as goodwill (eunoia), kindness(charis)and pity(eleos) are constitutive of variousvirtuesin Aristotle'sscheme,e.g. generosity (eleutheriotis)magnificence (megaloprepeia),and magnanimity(megalopsuchia).The definition of kindnessin Rhetoric11.7is useful forourpurposes.Itis a willingness to give"assistance(hupourgia)toward someonein need" (I3 85ai 8), and "is greatifitis showntowardsomeone in greatneed,or in needofwhatis importantor whatis difficult to get,or someonewho has needina crisis,or ifthehelperis theonlyone or first one or themostimportantone" (I385aig-zI).73 Accordingly, in actingout of kindness,our sympathygoes out to an individualbecause of the circumstanceshe happens to findhimselfin, and not because of who the specificindividualhappensto be. Thereis a kindof anononymity in our response.The situationis different in friendship. We act out of a more specificconcernfora particularperson,and because itis thatpersonwho is in need (and not another),what we can do and are willingto do, and whatotherscounton us to do, is oftengreater(cf.NE IX.8 ii 69ai 8-34). Theseremarksmightsuggestthefollowingobjection:thatwhenwe act out of kindnessratherthanfriendship, we somehowoverlooktheperson who is theobjectofour goodwilland considerhimmerelyas an occasion fortheexerciseofourvirtue.We mightevenseemto careina priggishway more forour virtue,than forthe particularpersontoward whom it is being expressed.24But on Aristotle'sview, I act for the sake of the whetheror notI havean enduringor priorattachment beneficiary, to him. Even thoughin widercases of altruismthebeneficiary in a is senseintersubstitutable byothers,thisdoesn'tdiminishmyconcernforthisperson now. Aristotlemakes the point as follows: To be a friendis to wish anotherwelland desiregood thingsforhim,"forhissake and notforyour own'> (Rh. I38ob37; cf. I38ib37). But equally, kindnessoutside of friendship dependsupon offering assistance"not in returnforsomething, nor forsome advantageto the helperhimself,but forthat of the one

23

24

Althoughkindnesscan be describedingeneralterms,actingfromkindnessdoes notcome down to followinga generalrule.To have a reliabledisposition,theremustbe, as a part of thatdisposition,some cognitivegraspof thegeneralsortsof circumstances in which that dispositionwould be appropriatelyexercised.But this involvesa flexibility to respondto new and oftenunfamiliaroccasions. The objectionmightbe answeredifwe say,notthatI act forthesake ofmyvirtue,butfor thesake of thispersonbecause of myvirtue.That is, myvirtueexplainswhyI am motivated to make this person the object of my concern.Cf. Barbara Herman, "Rules, Motivesand HelpingActions,"pp. 370-71.

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helped" (Rh. I385a18-i9)."5 Thus,friendship goes beyondgoodwill,insofaras itis directedtoward byothers(cf.NE IX.5). So I may a specificperson,noteasilysubstituted sortofperson havea wellcultivatedsenseofaltruismor evenbe a friendly well,buttheexerciseofthosevirtuand one who tendsto treatmyfriends For that,I ous statesdoes not itselfsecureforme thegood of friendship. haveto becomeattachedto a particularperson,and anotherpersonto me, in a way thatdisplaysmutualregardand affection(II5bz8-56a5) as well as a historyof sharedactivities.Moreover,whilevirtuousstatesof characterdependupon externalconditionsfortheirexercise,theabsence of favorableconditionsdoes notnecessarilydestroythem.But thisis not For friendship is morean activitythana state so in thecase of friendship. unlikeothervirtuousactivities, that of character,and a virtuousactivity, In dependsupon a specificpersonas itsexternalconditions6 theabsence of thatperson,thereis no friendship. ConditionsforAttachment is a themewhichrecursinAristotle'sdiscussion The notionofattachment butmostexplicitlywithintheaccountof naturalphilia,or of friendship, therelationof affection and caringbetweenparentand child.Thoughhis remarksabout the familyhave been forthe mostpartignored,theyare crucialforan account of the way in whicha selfbecomesextendedor attachedto particularothers.The primarytextshereare NE VIII.i z and Pol. 11.I. inratherbroad We can beginto considertheconditionsforattachment Aristotle'sviewswiththeteachingsof Diotima in outlineby contrasting theSymposium.The ascentof eros,accordingto Diotima,requiresthat intoa morenoble love thelove of a particularindividualbe transformed of the repeatableand universalqualitiesof that individualas theyare foundin otherpersonsas well as in impersonalembodiments,such as ofthosefeaand sciences.The claimis thatthereinstantiation institutions to makethosenewindividualsobjectsof turesin otherindividualssuffices 25

z6

forAristotlebetweenthetwo cases is notthatI treata friendmoreforhis The difference butthatwhenI failto,I commita deeperwrongand show own sake thanI do a stranger, in being a greaterfailingof character.As Aristotlesays, "a wrongbecomesintensified so thatitwillbe a moreterriblething exhibitedtowardsthosethatare morefullyfriends, to defrauda friendthan fellowcitizen,and moreterriblenot to help a brotherthana and moreterribleto wound a fatherthananyoneelse" (NE VIII.9 ii6oa4-6). stranger, saythisand leavesitopen at I I 55a4 as to whetherfriendship Aristotledoes notexplicitly that is a virtueor something(e.g.,activity)accompaniedbyvirtue.It is also noteworthy at I io5b22 Aristotlelistsphiliaas a passion,butherehe seemsto have in mindfriendly feelingas opposed to friendship.

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love. Aristotle'sargument,we shall see, impliesthata notionof friendship based on Diotima's model violates certainpsychologicalfeaturesof attachment.It violatesthe strongsense of friendship as self-referential, i.e.,thata friendis myfriendand is treatedas sheis becauseshestandsina particularrelationto me. For on Diotima's model,thereis no clearsense that the reduplicatedobjects retainthat strongand special relationof "beingmine" characteristic, presumably,of the initialattachment.The senseof belonginghas beendiluted,Aristotlewill suggest,bytherebeing justtoo manyindividualswithwhomI can reasonablyexpectto develop an intimaterelation.The psychologicalfeatureof exclusiveness,characteristicof friendship, is absent. Let's considerthesepointsmore closelyin the contextof Aristotle's remarksin PoliticsII.i." Here Aristotlemake thesepoints in arguing againstPlato's radical claim in Republic V thatpoliticalharmonyand unityrequiretheabolitionof the nuclearfamily.In its place will be the of a communisticfamilyin whichthe youthsof the city establishment becomethecommonchildrenoftheoldergeneration.Platodescribesitas follows: Forno matterwhomhe meets,he willfeelthathe is meetinga brother, a sister,a father, a or forebearers of each. (Rep. 463c) mother,a son, a daughteror the offspring That city,then,is bestorderedin whichthegreatestuse theexpression"mine"and "not mine" of the same thingsin the same way . . . (Rep. 462c)

Now Aristotle'sview is that a notion of philia which requiresthis extendeduse of "my mother,""myson," etc.,cannotbe sustained:For when "mine" is used as in the Republic "each of two thousandor ten thousandapplyingit to thesame thing"(iz6za8), "the expressions'my son' or 'my father'become less frequent"(hbkista legeintonemonehuionpaterae-paterahuioni z6zbI7). The notionof standingin a special relationto an individualbecomes weakened,on the one hand, by common ownership(for a son becomes only fractionallyone's own (iz6zaz-6)), and on the other,by havingtoo manysons withwhom to spreadone's love. thismorepreciselyin termsof two closelyrelated Aristotleformulates psychologicalprinciples:"Thereare two thingsabove all thatmakepersons love and care: Theyare a sensethatsomethingis one's veryown or

27

The importance ofthesetextswas broughtto myattentionbyM. Nussbaum,in "Shame, Separateness,and PoliticalUnity:Aristotle'sCriticismof Plato" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie 0. Rorty (Berkeley:Universityof California Press, i980), pp. 395-435.

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properto oneself(to idion) and a sensethatthatobjectis all one has, i.e., itmustdo" (to agapeton) (iz6za8). The latternotionis mostpoignantin thecase ofnaturalphilia,forthereis a sensehereinwhichthischildor this parentmust,bydefault,suffice as myown. The relationis fixedor permanent(EE i z6ob3 5), and theattachment thriveson itsexclusiveness.When the relationbecomes too inclusive,and the objects of attachmenttoo numerous,any given attachmentbecomes diluted,literally,"watery"

(hudareiz6zbi6).

Bothprinciplesexpressexclusiveness, thoughin distinctways.The first suggeststhatthewhole of an objectis one's own, i.e., itis notcollectively takencare of.The secondsuggeststhatthereare no owned or collectively othersuchobjectswithwhomone standsin thesame relation;thatis,the object of attachmentis not substitutable.In the extendedfamilyof the Republic,Aristotleargues,bothprinciplesare violated.He illustratesthe violationof thefirst(to idion) bythefollowinganalogy:as witha householdthatis neglectedwhenitis takencareofbytoo manyservants,so too of many childrenare neglectedwhentheyare thecommonresponsibility on to someoneelse,with individuals.Foreach parentpasses responsibility the result that the children are in the end inadequately cared for (i z6 i b33-8). The children,in turn,lackinga sensethattheybelongexclusivelyto a particularindividual(hos hekastou)(insteadof as theydo, to of feeling any one of many(tou tuchontos)),failto developtheintensity relation(iz6ib3g-6zaz). The inability of theparent-child characteristic is explainedbytheabsenceof a senseofto agapeton to formattachments - a sensethata givenparentcannotbe exchangedforanother.The implication,then,is thatalthoughparentsand childrenoftheRepublicreferto one anotheras "mine," the sense of belongingrequisiteforattachment cannot be sustainedin the absense of exclusiveness. It is worthnotingthatAristotle'sremarksseem to runcounterto the sortofdivisionoflabor he himselfwould advocateforthehousehold(NE i i6zazo-z9, Pol. I.). For on hisview,each parent,as well as thevarious has different rolesin themanagementof thefamily.The division slaves, care. However,I thinkAristotle, increases,ratherthanimpedes,efficient evenhere,does not abandon thesystemof divisionof labor. Rather,the cruxof his argumentis thatPlato,in requiringthatthemanyparentsof a rulesout thepossibilityof an effective childall fillthesame function, systemofsharedcare.Indeed,Aristotle'stwopsychologicalprincipleswould be consistentwitha notionof divisionof labor, so long as he stipulates thatit is a specificaspectof thecare of a childthatis primarily one's own (to idion),and thatthechildin turn,dependsupon thatrelationto be consistentlyfilledby one particularindividual(to agapeton).

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AlthoughAristotledwells on the case of naturalphilia, his remarks about exclusivenesshave more generalapplication,as suggestedby the discussionin NE IX.io. ThereAristotlearguesthatthe numberof intimate friendshipsany individual can have is highly limited (I I 7iaio-I

5;

requirea considerabledevotion cf.EE I3 8a9-io). For such friendships but of energyand time,and precludenot only othersuch friendships, Theyare cultivatedand sustainedat the otherloyaltiesand commitments. to note oftimeand interest. Here itis significant costofotherinvestments thathis remarksare relevantnot merelyto thecultivationof friendships, but to the cultivationof interestsin general. In the discussionof the familyin NE VIII.iz, Aristotlecontinueshis account of the conditionsfor attachment)8The requirementthat a friendbe "one's own" or to idionis herespecifiedin termsofparentsloving children"as in some way belongingto themselves"(hos heautonti onta) and childrenin turnlovingparents"as insomedegreederivingfrom them" (hos ap ekeinon ti onta) (ii6ibi8-i9, ii6ibz7-3o). The love at least,a love rootedin betweensiblings,on Aristotle'sview,is initially, thiscommonsense of belongingto parents(i i6ib3o). Althoughtheseremarksmake some appeal to biologicalconnections, thesebyno meansexhaustwhatAristotletakesto be relevantor mostcentralto attachment.The sense of belongingbetweenparentand child is to product(poiema): in bothcases moregenerallylikethatof craftsman the makers "are favorablydisposed (eunoi) to what theythemselves make" (MM iziib35-39). Here, belongingis an attachmentwhich resultsfromcreatinga product.The senseofone's own requiresthesense of makingsomethingas one's own. This seemsto be true,on Aristotle's Forhe suggestsadultfriends"mold" each view,evenamongadultfriends. and influencegreatlythe course of life other(apomattontaiII7zaiz), each follows. are not merely Moreover,in thecase of parents,theproductiveefforts and raisingthem: of bringingchildrenintothe world,but of nurturing "For parentsare thecause of children'sexistenceand nurture,and from theirbirthonward,oftheireducation"(i I 6za6-7). The parents'production,thus,is ongoingand constant,"guidedbymemoryand hope" (MM i z i i b38). Whileitis important to notethatAristotledescribesa mother's love as greaterthana father's,we needn'tunderstandhimto be claiming thatit is because a motheris morebiologicallyconnectedwithherchildren.For he goes on to say, "givingbirthto childrenis morelaborious" (NE ii68azO-8, ii6ibz7, EE Iz4ib5ff.). It is theactivityand labor (to z8

ofMoralEducaTheory Aristotle's issuesinmydissertation, I discusstheseandrelated I982. tion,HarvardUniversity,

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prattein)that makes for the greaterattachment.So he generalizes: "Everyonelovesmorethethingstheyhave broughtabout througheffort, forexample,thosewho have workedfortheirmoneylove it morethan those who have inheritedit . . . and forthesereasons,motherslove theirchildrenmorethanfathers"(i i6zazzff.). This readingseemsto be confirmed byAristotle'sbiologicaltheory,accordingto whichthemother's body is regardedas merelytheaccidentalmatterin whichtheform, carriedby the father'ssperm,is instantiated.9As such,it is the father, and not the mother,who bears the essentialbiological relationto the child.The idea ofa purelygestationalmother,who has no geneticrelation to thechildshe bears,would notbe a terribly strangenotionto Aristotle. It is also worthspeculatingthatgivenAristotle'sview of themother's primaryfunctionon thehousehold,herlabor will extendto thenurture and earlyupbringingof children.While she herselfwill lack education and by nature,the fullauthorityand controlof rationalpowers (Pol. i z6oaI4), she neverthelesswill be capable of executingorders for runninga householdin whichthe children'searlyeducationis a part.30 Her love and intimateknowledgeof her childrenwill be importantelementsin thateducation,and significant counterparts to thelesspersonalized aspects of public education (ii8ob8-iz). AlthoughAristotledoes not develop thesepoints about women, theydo not seem in principle inconsistent withhisviewofwomen'ssubordinatevirtueand rationality. ofchildrento parents,in turn,is notmerelyor primarThe attachment ilybiological,on Aristotle'sview,butan intentional responseto theaffectionand nurturedisplayedtowardthemas belovedobjects.This emerges fromseveralremarksAristotlemakes.For a start,he says "childrenlove theirparentsonlyaftertimehas elapsedwhentheyare capable of understandingand discrimination"(ii6ibz4-6). Most fundamentalin this theirown parentsfromotheradults.So in Physprocessis distinguishing ics I. I, Aristotleexplains: "Childrenat firstcall all men 'father'and all women 'mother,'and only later distinguisheach of themfromother

29

30

in Aristotle'sclaimthatmotherslove Thereis clearerevidenceforbiologicalattachment theirchildrenmorenotonlybecause of theirlabor but because "theyknow betterthan fathersthatthechildrenare theirown" ( i i 68a26). Althoughthemother'smatteris acciin a dentalto thechild,themothernonethelesscan be certainof herown contribution way the fathercannot. On therole of womenin ancientsociety,cf.Images of Womenin Antiquity, ed. Averil Cameronand AmelieKuhrt(London: Croom Helm, Ltd. i983), esp. Mary Lefkowitz, "InfluentialWomen"; Susan Walker, "Women and Housing in Classical Greece: the ArchaelogicalEvidence"RietVan Bremen,"Women and Wealth." Cf. also thehelpful source book by Mary Lefkowitzand Maureen Fant, Women's Life in Greece and Rome (London: Duckworth,ig82).

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adults" (i84biz-I4). The implicationfromthesepassagesis thatas children become capable of discriminating theirown parentsfromother adults,theycome to recognizetheirparents'special affectionforthem. Theyperceivethemselves"as" (hos I I68 bI8) belongingin a specialand exclusiveway. In additiontheyperceiveparents'love as unfailingand abundant.So Aristotlesays,"Of all thekindsof friendship we have disbetweenkinthatlove is presentinthegreatcussed,itis in thefriendships est degree(malista),and especiallyso in the relationof parentto child" (MM i 2iibi8-zo). Itis givenfromthestartas soon as a childis born(NE i i6ibz5), and is given non-instrumentally, for its own sake (MM Izi ibz7-3 5), without debts incurred for benefitsconferred(MM EE Iz39ai8). The child'sattachment Iziibzz-z7, is a responseto these perceptionsof love.

A Friendas Another butSeparateSelf The senseofbelongingand exclusivity thatmarksthefilialrelationis also of adult friendships.However, in the relationbetween characteristic parentand child,the childis in a significant way not yetseparate. For the child, lacking in mature rational capacities (NE IIIib8-95 is dependentupon the II44b8-iz, EE Iz4ob3I-33, Pol. Iz6oaII-I4) parent'sreason. A parentmakes choices (prohaiareseis)fora childand promoteshis good in a way thatwould be inappropriatewithinadult friendship. So Aristotlesays an adult friendis "anotherself,"but equally,in his own words, "a separateself" (autos diairetos)(EE I245a3o, a35; NE II7ob7, MM 12I3aI3, a24). This entailsthatsuchfriends promoteeach other'sgood in a privilegedway (as onlyanotherselfcan), but in a way that is nonethelessmindfulof the maturerationalagencyof each. So, oftherelation, ofcharacterfriendsand theexclusivity giventhesimilarity each is ina positionto knowhow bestto helptheother,and how to helpin a way thatmostreassuresand pleases. In thosecases wheredecisionsare notjoint,intimateknowledgeof each other'sabidinginterests putseach in a positionto offercounseland supportforthesortof choicesthatgive real shape to each other'slives.Yet withinthisextendedand interwoven life,the individualsnonethelessretaintheirseparateness.

3I

This is explicitin the followingremarkfromtheMagna Moralia: "For theredoes not seemto be any justicebetweena son and his father,or a servantand his master- any morethanone can speak of justicebetweenmyfootand me,or myhand or any of my otherlimbs.For a son is,as itwere,a partofhisfather(hospermerosti),and remainsso untilhe takestherankof manhoodand is separated(choristhei)fromhim,and becomes thenan equal and a peer withhis father"(MM II94biI-I7).

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the is importantin understanding Aristotle'snotion of self-sacrifice In way in whicha selfbecomesextendedyetseparatethroughfriendship. thereis a levelofpracticalconcernand willintimateand deep friendships ingnessto help one anotherthatfarexceedsthesortof concernshowna lesserfriend.One comesto counton an intimatefriendin a way one does notupon a strangeror mereacquaintance(NE VIII.9). Aid is givenwithout even having to ask (Rh. I386b35), and oftenwithout a return expected.But it is not clear thatthisgreaterwillingnessto help is in the For if friendship bestthoughtof as self-sacrifice. case of truefriendship extendstheself,thenone is notso muchsacrificing oneself,as actinginthe interestsof thisnew extendedself. butfor Aristotleis indeedloatheto viewsuch actionsas self-sacrifices, different, thoughrelevantreasons.In IX.8 oftheNE and I1.I3 oftheMM, he suggeststhatgivinga friendmaterialgoods,and eventheopportunities foractionand choice (i i 69a32-4), does not constitutea sacrificeof self, (indeeditis a case of self-love).For whatmattersmostto theself,namely reason (ii68b28-69a3) and the capacityto choose excellentdeeds in accordancewithreason,is by thatveryaction preserved.So thereis no real sacrificehere because the virtuousindividualdoes not forfeithis rationalcapacityor thedesireto use itin makinghimselftheseatofexcelFor it failsto distinguish lence. We mightfindthisdeeplyunsatisfying. betweena rightchoicewhichexercisesour rationalnatures,and theoutcomeofthechoicewhichliterally endsin thedeathofour reason.The latteris of coursea sacrifice.The distinction parallelsthatbetweenthepleasurewhichfollowstheexcellentexerciseofa stateand thepleasurewhich theend forwhichtheactivity was undertaken. comesfromaccomplishing in our result unhappiness,making Thoughfailingto accomplish endsmay the rightchoices and exercisingwell our abilitiesbrings,on Aristotle's view,itsown rewards.Perhapsin thisnarrowsense,thevirtuousagent's sacrificefora friendis not a loss. For no matterwhat theexternaloutofhavingexercisedwellhisabilcome,theagentwillhavethesatisfaction ities.3'

Implicitin thisregardforreasonis a certainlimitationon whata characterfriendcan giveanother.How one can help,is limited,amongother oftherationalagencyofeach. In so faras a things,byan acknowledgment friendis anotherself,in helpinga friend,an individualcannotpre-empt thatfriend'srationalagency,or desireto make choicesforhimselfwith regardto virtuousliving.For itis justbecausethatotherindividualvalues virtueand practicalreasonthathe has beenchosenas a friendand someinpart,because one withwhoma lifecan be spent.Theyarevirtuefriends, 3z

ofii698a2o ff.andiii7bi-zo. force Thisseems tobethecombined

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theyare capable oflivingin relationto one anotherin a waythatdoes not The resultis thatsuchindividualspromakeone theslave of theother.33 making moteeach other'sinterests onlyin certainways- notbydirectly choices for each other (unless these are jointlydeliberatedchoices or homonoia), but by givingeach greateropportunitiesfor choice, and greatermeansfortherealizationofends.Thesemeansmayincludescarce (perimachata)materialresources,as Aristotlesuggestshere,buttheymay also includesoughtforpsychologicalgoods, such as supportand esteem inour endeavours.So Aristotleremarksin theRhetoric:It and confidence offriends, that"theypraisethegood qualitieswe possess, is characteristic and especiallythose which we fear mightnot in fact belong to us" in supportand confidence (I 38 ia3 5-bi; cf.I 38ibIo-I4). We givefriends theseways,withoutminimizingtheirseparateness. evidencefortheseparatenessofselveswithincharacter Thereis further friendship. We can take up the issue by consideringthe possibilityof a of ideals of virtuouscharacters.On Aristotle'sview,havinga diversity virtuouscharacterimplies having all the virtues,or completevirtue For the virtuesimplyone anotherand are io98aI7-i8).34 II45ai-z, in inseparable.However,thepatternof unifiedvirtuesmightbe different different persons.So one individualmightbe especiallyhonest,thisvirtue seemingto gain pre-eminenceover others,while anotherindividualis beingmarked,above all, by a sense especiallygenerous,herinteractions of kindnessand bounty.Each individualhas all the othervirtues,and as externalconditionsallow. Butas a result exercisesthemappropriately, ofnature,developmentand resources,certainvirtueshave gainedgreater expressionand prominencein each individual'slife.35 Now individualsthatcometogetheras characterfriendsmightbe simiin theabove sensethatwhiletheysharevirtueas an overlaryetdifferent all end,theyexpressit,at times,in waysthatare distinctyetcomplemen-

34

3"

Here I drawon theimplicationofAristotle'sremarksat I I 24b3 I thatthemagnanimous person"cannotlivein relationto another,excepta friend.Forthatwould be slavish." See T. Irwin'snoteson thispassage inhistranslation oftheNicomacheanEthics(Indianapolis: HackettPublishingCompany,i985), p. 327. Aristotle'sremarkscan be understoodas makingeithertheweakerclaimthatthevirtues are in principleconsistent,or thestrongerclaim thatin actual cases of action,theycan nevercontingently conflict.I understandhim to be makingthe first,weakerclaim. Thereis implicitevidenceforsomethinglikethisin Aristotle'sviewat PoliticsI 3z9a9ff. virtuesor charactertraitsgain pre-eminence Therehe arguesthatdifferent at different timesin an individual'slife:"Inasmuchas thesedifferent functionsbelongto a different primeof life,and one requireswisdomand theotherstrength, theyare to be assignedto different persons."I owe thanksto T. Irwinforbringingthispassage to myattention.

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tary.Theyare notmerelook alikesof one another.Aristotlesuggeststhis thoughtat EE VII.'z. In assessingthetruthof theclaim thata friendis anotherself,he comments: forall to ofa particularindividualmaybe scattered,and itis difficult butthecharacteristics be realizedin one individual.For althoughby naturea friendis what is mostsimilar,one individualmayresemblehis friendin body,one in character(psyche),or one in one partof the body or character,and anotherin another(i245a30-34).

The notion that anotherself may not realize all of one's ends or thatwhilefriendsdesireto proleads Aristotleto remarkfurther interests motesharedends,failingthistheychoosemostofall to promoteeach other's separategood (Iz42b7-9). There are severalimplicationsin this notion of characterfriendsas in charactertraitand point one another.First,differences complementing of view,whilenot precludinga lifeof consensusand coordination,may nonethelessenable each individualto grow and learnfromtheother.In in NE IX he alludesto these Aristotle'sconcludingremarkson friendship and theirrole in adult ethicaldevelopment: differences of good personsis good, beingincreasedby theircompanionship;and The friendship theyare thoughtto becomebettertoo by theiractivitiesand by improvingeach other;for theyapprove. (II7zaIO-I 5) fromeach othertheytake the mold of characteristics

degree The suppositionis thatcharacterfriendsrealizeto a different manner)particularvirtues.Each is inspiredto develop (and in a different himselfmorecompletelyas he sees admirablequalities,not fullyrealized in himself,manifestin anotherwhom he esteems.RemarksAristotle here: makesabout thenotionof emulationin theRhetoricare pertinent nature is "before those whose Emulation,he says,is feltmostintensely like our own and who have good thingsthatare highlyvalued and are possibleforus to achieve" (I388a3I-z). Characterfriends,as extended suitedas models foremulation. selves,are eminently yetdifferent Thereare also implicationsforAristotle'sclaimthatthroughcharacter the partiesgain in self-knowledge.6In NE IX.9 and MM friendships IL.I5, Aristotlesuggeststhatwe learnabout ourselvesbyhavinganother selfbeforeus whose similaractionsand traitswe can studyfroma more detachedand objectivepoint of view: "We can studya neighborbetter thanourselvesand hisactionsbetterthanour own" (i i69b3 3-35). For in our own case, passion or favor at times blind our judgment(MM we different, I II23 ai6-zo). Throughanotherjustlikeus,yetnumerically

36

facilitatesselfCf. JohnCooper's excellentdiscussionof the way in whichfriendship knowledge,"Aristotleon Friendship,"Essays on Aristotle'sEthics, ed. Amelie 0.

pp. 301-40. Rorty,

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NANCY SHERMAN


can see ourselvesfroma pointof view outsideourselves,and so at a distance. But if anotherselfneed not be exactlysimilar,thenself-knowledge mightinvolvecontrastingoneselfwith another,and consideringhow anotherwould have actedin thesame circumstances giventhatindividual's different pointofview.Aristotle'sintroductory remarksinMetaphysics A have application here: "All human beings desire to know by nature . . . and especially delight in discriminatingdifferences" as a sub-speciesof knowledge,requires, (98oazz-z8). Self-knowledge, the discrimination of what is peculiarlyone's own. Another ultimately, and separateselffacilitatesthatdiscovery. I beganthispaperwiththepromiseto strengthen theAristotelian challengeagainstimpartialist ethics,and in particularagainstKantiantheory. Withtheseremarksabout self-knowledge, we are now in a positionto advanceinthatdirection.It is a featureofKantiantheorythatin assessing maxims,partof theassessmentwill dependon whetherthemaximssinour motives.Indeed,to be persuadedof theunacceptability cerelyreflect of certainmotivesis not merelyposteriorto recognizingwhat one's motivesare,butoftenaccomplishedbythatrecognition. The issueis one of transparency.37 Yet knowingtheheart,Kant tellsus, is a difficult and inscrutablematter.8We can neverbe fullysureifwe have told seemingly ourselvesthe truth. Howevertherearewaysofknowingtheheartexplicitin an Aristotelian accountoffriendship thatneedto be explorediftheissueoftransparency is indeedto be takenseriously.These involve,as we have justseen,informal methodsofself-reflection thatseempossibleonlywithinintimateand trustingrelations. Beforea friend, Aristotlesuggests,we can bareourselves,and acknowledgethefoiblesand weaknesseswe hidefromothers(Rh. 11.6).Storieswe havetoldourselvesabouthow we failedto helpanotherbecauseofinadequate means or resourcesmay simplynot hold up in thepresenceof an intimatecompanion.It maybecomeclear in such a contextthatthereal reasonI failedto actwas becauseI undervaluedanother'sneedsor did not me. Wheredeceitis not the regardtheoccasion as sufficiently benefitting issue,butdeeperambivalencesare,theconflictsmayonlysurfacebefore thosewho seemto knowus betterthanwe knowourselves.Thus,through intimatefriends, we cometo a visionofourselvesthatis moreresoluteand thanour purelyinternalized definite viewaffords.The issueis notsimply thatour own eyesare biased,butmoregenerally, thattheprojectof self-

37 38

See Onora O'Neill, "Kant afterVirtue,"Inquiryz6 (i983): 387-405. The Doctrineof Virtue,pp. 440, 445-46.

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knowledgerequiresexternaldialogue and audience. We need "to live togetherwithfriendsand sharein argumentand thought"in orderto be fullyconsciousof thesortsof liveswe are leading(I I7obi i-iz).2 Without friends, we act in blindnessabout who we reallyare,and indeedlack truepracticalreason. I wantto suggestthatthisconceptionofself-knowledge, so deeplytied to friendship, is not adequatelyaccountedforin Kantiantheory. On Kant'sview,friendship can be viewedinvariousways.As I said earlierin thispaper,in so faras acts of friendship are based on emotionand inclination,theycan be thoughtof as a componentof our happiness. While we do not have a dutyto happiness,happiness(and friendship a fortiori)are constrainedbymoralconsiderations.Equally,friendship and social relationsmayfigureas themeansforpromotingotherduties,such and in generalas a meansforsustainingand nurturing as beneficence, our in Rawls' capacitiesas a moralagent.(I believethepointis wellillustrated Well OrderedSocietyin whichfamilyand social relationsplay an essential rolein thenurtureand maintenanceof themoralpowersconstitutive of freeand equal persons.)In boththesecases, friendship maybe thought to have intrinsicand/orinstrumental value, but not moral worth. But in theDoctrineof Virtue,Kant suggestssomethingelse. Therehe arguesthat friendshipitselfis a positivedutyof end.40What he has in in whichmutualrespectconditions mind,moreprecisely,are friendships he says,we have a dutyto promote.Yet even intimacy;such friendships, here,Kant is deeplyskepticalabout thepracticalpossibilityof such intimacy(how willwe knowwhattheotherreallythinks,how willwe know thatshe will not revealour confidencesor hold us in contemptforour faults),and openlyurgesa principleof respect"thatrequires[friends]to keep each otherat a properdistance."4' It thusseemsthatthekindof intimacyAristotleenvisionsas a permanentfeatureof thegood lifewill be absentin theKantianmoralscheme. in Kant's genMuch moreneeds to be said about theplace of friendship eral moral theory.But for the time being, the Aristotelianchallenge is a permanentand practicalfeatureof remains- thatgenuinefriendship our lives,and thatit is the privilegedcontextin whichto scrutinizeour moralmotives.The apparentlyinsufficient weightaccordeditintheKantian theoryrevealsa limitationon theKantianaccountofpracticalreason,

I9 40

4'

at I ofthearduousargument I takethistobetheconclusion of I I7obI I-14. cisely,theconclusion

I

7oa I 5-b14,

The Doctrineof Virtue,pp. 140-45. p. 141. TheDoctrineof Virtue,

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andmorepre-

and morespecifically, a limitationon the CategoricalImperativeto test successfully our motives.42

of North 41Versionsof thispaper wereread to audiencesat BrownUniversity, University Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Wesleyan.In additionto helpfulcommentsfromthose audiences,I am gratefulto MarthaNussbaum,LarryBlum,and R. I. G. Hughesfortheir I also owe thanksto theNationalEndowmentfortheHumanities and interest. criticisms forfellowshipsupportduringthe period in whichI was writingthispaper.

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Nancy Sherman - Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life

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