The Case of a Child bitten by a Neighbour’s Dog Peter Banaag v. Arthur Sison
THE ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant, Arthur Sison is liable to Mary for damages as defined in Article 2129, Article 2176, Article 2179 and Article 2183 of the New Civil Code.
BRIEF ANSWER
Yes, as supported by Articles 2129, 2176, 2179, and 2183 of the New Civil Code and some Supreme Supreme Court Court decisio decisions, ns, the defendan defendant, t, Arthur Arthur Sison Sison is liable liable for damages damages notwiths notwithstand tanding ing his defenses that he was not at fault. He was negligent and as the owner of the dog, he would be responsible responsible to any damage it would cause except for inevitable circumstances. circumstances. I recommend recommend to file this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime on September 12, 2016 at around 3 p.m., Mr. Peter Banaag’s daughter, Mary Banaag, six years old, went to Mr. Arthur Sison’s house to buy ice-candy. Mary knocked at the gate many times, but got no response from Arthur. She pushed the gate and it yielded. Arthur’s dog, Prancer, jumped out and attacked her from behind. He bit Mary’s Mary’s leg and when she fell to the ground, Prancer bit her arms. She was saved by Fred Puzon, a neighbor, who kicked the dog away and protected her. Awakened by the commotion and having heard shouts that his dog had attacked a child, Arthur went out. Then, he commanded his dog to go back to his yard. Thereafter, he brought Mary to a nearby clinic for treatment, paying the medical bills thereafter. Because of the injury suffered by his daughter, Peter Banaag demanded twenty thousand pesos as damages from Arthur Sison. In reply, reply, Arthur rejected his demand demand alleging that he was not at fault. In fact, despite not being at fault, he still took the effort of bringing Mary to the clinic and paying for her treatment.
DISCUSSION
Based on the established facts, Arthur Sison is liable because according to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
As for the nature of Arthur’s liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of the Civil Code. It provides that:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74431, 179 SCRA 47), saying that:
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory negligence on Mary’s part as the former implied in his letter, or he may claim that letting Mary roam the vicinity unaccompanied is negligence on the part of the parents and constitutes the proximate cause of her injuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate unlocked before napping. Both scenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In the first scenario, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129792, 321 SCRA 375) that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law covers Mary, hence throwing the notion of contributory negligence on her part out the window. As for the second scenario, the ruling in Umali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69 SCRA 263) provides that parental negligence in allowing a young child to go out of the house alone may at most qualify as contributory negligence and as such would be covered by the second sentence of Article 2179.
Arthur, being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary, is liable for damages. Had Arthur not left the gate unlocked before taking a nap (an act showing a lack of due care), there would have been no way the dog could have attacked Mary. Of course, he may say that paying Mary’s medical bill should be enough, but that does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to under Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code, which specifically pertains to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. As mentioned earlier, the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of his liability.
By way of a concluding statement, it is respectfully submitted that Arthur Sison, despite all his justifications, remains liable for damages. At best, his defenses may only mitigate his liabilities.
