LegPhilo Midterms Digests

San Beda College Alabang

Le al Philoso h – Att . John R. Jacome

life enjoying his liberty and actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to freely express himself and associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing himself. For after all, a reflective grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life, knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.

Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the Filipinos' natural rights that justified the establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the 1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution,private respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.

We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the right to privacy" that the Constitution protects. If the exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to "grant the right (against unreasonable search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right.

To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments have been raised on the constitutional status of the exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v. Calandra, that it is only a "judiciallycreated remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Along the same line, others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires some effective remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it could replace it with other remedies of a comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit only if it is conceded that the exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence. Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the exclusionary right is the first kind of human law which may be derived as a conclusion from the natural law precept that one should do no harm to another man, in the same way that conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in which case the exclusionary right has force from natural law and does not depend on positive law for its creation; or if it is the second kind of human law which is derived by way of determination of natural law, in the same way that a carpenter determines the shape of a house, such that it is merely a judicially or legislatively chosen remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only has force insofar as positive law creates and protects it.

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Contributors:

Accad, Canones, Cordero, Ignacio, Narvasa, Padilla, & Santuyo



In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and natural right, we were aided by philosophy and history. In the case of the exclusionary right, philosophy can also come to the exclusionary right's aid, along the lines of Justice Clarke's proposition in the Mapp case that no man shall be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the government shall not be allowed to convict a man on evidence obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable search and seizure) for the protection of which, government and the law were established. To rule otherwise would be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to act with more temerity than a thief in the night for they can disturb one's privacy, trespass one's abode, and steal one's property with impunity. This, in turn, would erode the people's trust in government. Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent Dimaano as she invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on Ramas' unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG's petition for forfeiture against Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the petitioner's stance upheld by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then it could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,1987.

Ateneo De Manila University vs. Capulong G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993. FACTS: On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students‘ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.

RULING: YES. Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:

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a. freedom to determine who may teach; b. freedom to determine what may be taught; c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught; d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFERENCE: At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:

"Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected — which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies." Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This

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was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1575), Helmstadt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.

It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA, petitioner, vs. WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent. G.R. No. L-129. December 19, 1945

FACTS:

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Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed f rom such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.

ISSUES:

1.

Whether or not the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case.

2.

Whether or not the Military Commission was validly constituted by respondent, therefore having jurisdiction over the war crim es.

RULING: 1. NO. 2. YES. 1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), ―. . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered as a violation of this country‘s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.‖

2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.

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By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFERENCE: Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the State into whose hands they have fallen. (The Hague Convention of July 29, 1899.) Many of the basic ideas which prevail today in the customs and usages of nations and became part of the international law emerged from the human mind centuries before the Christian Era. Such is the idea that prisoners of war are entitled to humane treatment, that treasons of war should be discountenanced, and that belligerents must abstain from causing harm to non-combatants. Poets, philosophers, artists, and men of intellectual distinction in general, even though they became invested with enemy character on the outbreak of war, were honored and respected. In 335 B. C. Alexander the Great destroyed Thebes, but he left Pindar's house uninjured and honored the poet's descendants. In ancient Hellas was already known the practice of neutralizing cities and protecting them from the ravages of war. Temples, priest, and embassies were considered inviolable. The right of sanctuary was universally recognized. Mercy was shown to suppliant and helpless captives. Safeconducts were granted and respected. Burial of dead was permitted, and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong to cut off or poison the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisonous weapons. Treacherous stratagems of whatever description were condemned as being contrary to civilized warfare. Poets and philosophers, orators and historians proclaimed humane doctrines. Plato constructed his ideal republic on the basis of what he conceived to be perfect justice. Aristotle condemned the principle of retaliation as being antagonistic to true justice. Euripides speaks of excesses in war not only as acts of intrinsic wickedness and transgression against universal law, but, indeed, as a suicidal folly on the part of the offender. In one of his dramas he makes Poseidon declare: "But foolish is the mortal who lays waste cities, temples, and tombs, the sanctuaries of the dead; for having consigned them to solitude, he is one himself to perish afterwards."

Impelled by irrepressible endeavors aimed towards the ideal, by the unconquerable natural urge for improvement, by the unquenchable thirstiness of perfection in all orders of life, humanity has been struggling during the last two dozen centuries to develop an international law which could answer more and more faithfully the demands of right and justice as expressed in principles which, weakly enunciated at first in the rudimentary juristic sense of peoples of antiquity, by the inherent power of their universal appeal to human conscience, at last, were accepted, recognized, and consecrated by all the civilized nations of the world. Under these principles, petitioner General Tomoyuki Yamashita is entitled to be accorded all the guarantees, protections, and defenses that all prisoners should have, according to the customs and usages, conventions and treaties, judicial decisions and executive pronouncements, and generally accepted opinions of thinkers, legal philosophers and other expounders of just rules and principles of international law. The seriousness or unfathomable gravity of the charges against him, the unthinkable magnitude of the wholesale murders, rapes, and destructions for which he is called to answer, the beastly massacres and horrors by which he was thrown from the pedestal of military glory as the "Tiger of

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Malaya" into the bottom of perversity of a human monster, must not be taken into consideration, must all be forgotten, in order that true justice may be administered in this case.

CARAOS vs. DAZA G.R. No. L-442; May 23, 1946 DE JOYA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Caraos was found guilty of the crime of homicide, committed on the person of one Leoncio Ylagan, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. On May 3, 1944, he commenced serving his sentence in the provincial jail of Batangas. And on November 9, 1944, petitioner was released "by order of the Provincial Governor of Batangas, pursuant to a pardon issued by the authority concerned on those days of Japanese military occupation. According to the testimony given by petitioner, certain relatives and friends of his, upon whom he depended to work for his release or pardon, approached the provincial governor of Batangas to intercede, on his behalf, for his release or pardon; that one week before he was actually released there had been bombing and strafing in the in the vicinity of the provincial capitol of Batangas, where the provincial jail was located; and that he received his release papers, but lost them. Maximo M. Malvar, provincial governor of Batangas at the time, testified that he ordered the release of all prisoners in December, 1944, on account of continuous bombing and scarcity of food; and that others had been released pursuant to executive clemency prior thereto, but he could not remember whether herein petitioner was included among them. On March 6, 1946, Estrella Punzalan Vda. de Ylagan, wife of the deceased Leoncio Ylagan request the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioner to continue serving the unexpired portion of the penalty imposed upon him which was granted by Judge Inigo S. Daza. Alleging that he is deprived of his personal freedom by the Director of Prisons pursuant to the orders of respondent judge, petitioner comes now to ask relief by writ of habeas corpus ISSUE: Whether or not such pardon or executive clemency had really been extended to herein petitioner by the proper authorities.

RULING: NO. Under the law, the only authority that could have granted pardon or executive clemency to herein petitioner, during the Japanese occupation, was the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, or the Commander in Chief of the Japanese imperial forces. (Sameth vs. Director of Prisons, p. 613, ante). But no competent or satisfactory evidence has been presented to show that such pardon had been granted. The order issued for his arrest was, therefore, legal and proper. (People vs. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil., 386, 391.) If herein petitioner had really been pardoned either by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese imperial forces or by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, on November 9, 1944, he should have presented certificate copies of his petition for pardon and of the alleged pardon extended to him. There must be records of such official acts, if they had really taken place; and herein petitioner has failed

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to present any, coming either from the Insular Government or the provincial government of Batangas. And if petitioner had been pardoned at all, it must have been extended to him by the provincial governor of Batangas, who had absolutely no right or authority to extend to him executive clemency. In case of an invalid pardon, the original sentence imposed upon the prisoner must be carried out. (Cabantag vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.). The other possible and logical conclusion is that herein petitioner was among the prisoners whose mass release ordered by the provincial governor of Batangas, sometime in December, 1944, for their own safety and protection, due to the continuous bombing and strafing of the vicinity in which the provincial jail was located, by the American Air Force, and the scarcity of food; in which case it was his duty to surrender himself upon the restoration of normalcy.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting: It is evident that respondents were and are unable to point out any law upon which respondent judge's authority to order the rearrest and the recommitment of the petitioner can be supported. In fact, no such law exists. Much more, its existence is incompatible with the present legislation and the principle of separation of powers, one of the pillars of our system of government and democracy established by our Constitution, and recognized by all civilized nations as one of the fundamental safeguards of civil liberties since Montesquieu developed and perfected it upon the fecund germinal ideas firstly enunciated by the encyclopedia genius of Aristotle in the following words of his "Politics": "All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they differ from one another, constitution differs. There is one (1) element which deliberates about public affairs; secondly (2) that which concerned magistracies — the questions being what they should be, over what they should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of the electing to them; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power." (Book IV, Ch. 14.) "In great states it is possible, and indeed necessary, that every office should have a special function . . . certainly every work is better done which receives the sole, and not the divided, attention of the workers." (Book IV, Ch. 15.) Under the principle of separation of powers, government functions are divulsed and apportioned among the three departments - legislative, executive, and judicial — and within the province of each one of them no encroachments are allowed without violating the tripartite division established by the Constitution.

TECSON vs. DESIDERIO, JR G.R. No. 161434; March 3, 2004 VITUG, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the

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forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

RULING: It should be helpful to first give a brief historical background onthe concept of citizenship. Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self- sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society. The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship , which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship .

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

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No person m ay be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate

US vs. Guendia G.R. No. L-12462; December 20, 1917 STREET, J.: FACTS: An assault with intent to kill was committed by the defendant at the time and place mentioned in the record upon the person of his querida; but the proof shows, in our opinion, that the defendant was crazy at the time and has remained so since. He has now been committed by order of the Governor- General to the San Lazaro Hospital for confinement and treatment. The trial judge says, "I really believe that this man is crazy; or he appeared so, at least, during his trial in this court;" and the action of the trial judge in passing sentence upon the defendant must have been in part due to a desire to keep a dangerous insane person in confinement until proper disposition might be made of him. It is clear from the evidence submitted at the trial that the defendant was insane at the time of the perpetration of the act, and he is therefore exempt from criminal liability under subsection 1 of article 8 of the Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court should reverse judgment and acquit the accused of the offense with which he is charged.

RULING: YES. In Blackstone's Commentaries we find the following passage:

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"Also id a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought; and if after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed; for peradventure says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment of execution." There were good reasons for this tenderness or "humanity" of the English law, as the reader will appreciate when reminded of the fact that until modern times no prisoner arraigned before the bar of an English court was ever permitted to have counsel to assist him in his defense; that until within the memory of living man no accused person was ever permitted to give testimony in his own behalf; and finally that it was only in our own day that a person convicted of a crime in an English court has been allowed an appeal for a review of the facts. When Blackstone here speaks of madness he refers to a general perversion and obliteration of the mental powers much more pronounced than that which is considered sufficient to exempt from criminal responsibility. This is apparent from the fact that the courts have always treated a person as sane for the purposes of being tried if he has sufficient powers to comprehend. The conclusion to which we arrive is that when a judge of first insane is informed or discovers that an accused person is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of any such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. If, however such investigation is considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds, the court will acquit the accused if he be found exempt from criminal responsibility by reason of imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his commitment to an asylum should be made pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code.

US vs. Santos G.R. No. 12779; September 10, 1917 MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing two persons in front of an uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without warrant, although no crime had been committed, and took them to the municipal presidencia where they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours when they were released.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of coercion as found by the trial court.

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RULING: NO. The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience to legal process which it was his duty to obey. He must justify, if at all, under the rule that peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace. One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning o a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most conscientious officer must at times be mislead. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious nightwalkers is of particular interest. Blackstone says, "Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I, c. 4) to keep watch and ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to the constable, may virtue officii (by virtue of their office) arrest all offenders, and the particularly night-walkers, and commit them to custody till the morning." (II Cooley's Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the of cer. (Miles vs. Weston [1871], 60 Ill., 361, citing English decisions.) The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. surely the of cer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of life.

People vs. Pomar No. 22008. November 3, 1924 FACTS: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela. She was granted a vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, during those days, her employer who is Pomar failed to pay her salary pursuant to Section 13 of Act No. 3071 which provides: ―Every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, 30 days vacation with pay before and another 30 days after confinement. The law was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in ―factor y or place of labor of any description,‖ and insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. Hence, Fajardo filed a case against Pomar wherein the latter contested the constitutionality of Act No. 3071

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ISSUE: Whether the Act No. 3071 is constitutional

HELD: No. The law is unconstitutional. The provisions of said sections had not been adopted within the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest expounders of the common law, defines police power as ―the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.

The provision creates a term or condition in every contract made by every person firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant and a failure to include in said contract the terms fixed by law, makes the employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person xxx owning or managing a factory xxx of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a ―term‖ in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are therefore deprived of their liberty to contract which is protected by the ―due process of law‖ clause of the constitution.The police power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate express inhibitions of the people‘s law – the constitution.

In re: Columns of Amado Macasaet in Malaya A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC. August 8, 2008 FACTS: In a newspaper of general circulation of which Amado Macasaet was the publisher, 4 different articles contained statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court. Macasaet in his articles stated that a niece of the retired and deceased SC Justice Munoz-Palma who was working as secretary at that time to a certain Lady Justice discovered 5 boxes of milk one of which contained a 10 million peso bribe from a Chinese Businessman. When it was reported to the Lady Justice, the secretary was instead fired because the Lady Justice allegedly does not want others to know the bribery transaction. This lady Justice referred to by Macasaet was allegedly SC Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Hence, Macasaet sanctioned by the SC for indirect contempt

ISSUE:

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Whether Macasaet was wrongfully sanctioned for indirect contempt.

HELD: No. Sir William Blackstone aptly described the twin aspects of press freedom: ― xxx Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments dest4ructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.

People vs. Velasco G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000 FACTS: Honorato Galvez who was then the Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and his body guard was charged for 1 count of murder and 2 counts of frustrated murder. In the RTC, Galvez was acquitted. Herein petitioner would want the Supreme Court to reexamine the evidence because allegedly, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. According to the petitioner, this elevation to the Court would not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether there is violation of double jeopardy. HELD:

Yes. The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,

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expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-ofacquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

In Vaux‘s case, it was accepted as established that ―the life of man shall not be tw ice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or connected of the same offense is a good plea xxx‖ Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that ―no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime.

Laurel vs. Misa G.R. L-409. January 30, 1947 FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty RULING: Yes. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government stil had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn‘t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change

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since the sovereign- the Filipino people- is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

Allegiance as defined by Blackstone, ―is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the Kind, in return for that protection which the Kind affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King‘s dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King‘s protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due form the subject upon implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within the King‘s liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehavior; but the rights o f aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides. That thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences. Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance ot the government of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject ot its laws. They are born allegiance to the government of the state.

Manzanares vs. Moreta G.R. No. 12306. October 22, 1918 FACTS: A male child named Salvador Bona, 8 or 9 years of age, was killed through the negligence of defendant in driving his automobile. The mother of the dead boy is a widow, a poor washerwoman. She brings action against the defendant to recover damages for her loss.

Issue: Whether the loss of a human life could be compensated in money.

HELD: Malcolm, J. concurring. Yes. Grotius said ―Any man slaying another, unjustly, is bound to discharge the expenses, if any are contracted, for physicians, and to give to those whom the slain was in duty accustomed to main- such as parents, wives, children- as much as that hope of maintenance – regardbeing had to the age of the deceased- was wort: thus, Hercules is said to have made reparation (paid fine) to the children of Iphitus, slain by him, in order that expiationmight more easilybe made.

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th

Michael, the Ephesian, says upon the 5 of Nicomachii of Aristotle: ―but also the persons lain receives, in some sort, for what the wife or children or relations of the speaking of an unjust manslayer: that is, one who had not the right of doing that from whence death follows‖

Wherefore, if any one may have had the right, but has sinned against charity,as when one (being assaulted) has been unwilling to free, he shall not be bound. But of life, in case of a free man, no valuation is made, otherwise, in case of a slave who can be sold.‖

Both because of the civil origin of the applicable law in the Philippines, because we are not fetterd by the harsh common law rule on the subject, because it is the modern and more equitable principle, and because reason and natural justice are eloquent advocates, we hold that an action for damages can be maintained in this jurisdiction for the death of a person by wrongful act. It can be admitted, since objection has not been made, that the primary right of action is in the parent.

III.

Civil Law: Roman Jurists to Contemporary Thinkers

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez No. 46623. December 7, 1939 FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece of land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states ―Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith,‖ the petitioner‘s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis‖

RULING:

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Yes. The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void. Section 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides ―Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.‖ And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof.

Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through practically all the civil codes of Continental Europe, considers both as having acted in good faith. Article 364 of our Civil Code then comes into play. ―When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sewed, or planted on another‘s land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist whenever the act has been done in his presence, with is knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on his part. The codal section is evidently based upon the venerable maxim of equity that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A court which seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if relief is to be granted, it must be to a plaintiff whose conduct is not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to have applied to his adversary.

Jain vs. IAC No. L-63129. September 28, 1984 FACTS: Herein petition Jain was accused of Theft. It was alleged that Jain, who is a small planter of the San Carlos Milling district using the Honob loading station, in conspiracy with the accused tresfuentes, Bermejo‘s cane guard, withdrew the said trainman‘s receipts were deposited after the loading and substituted them with other trainman‘s receipts in the name of the accused Jain, thereby making it appear that the said cane cars belonged to the accused Wayne Jain and not the real owner Bermajo. Petitioner contended that he did not actually and/or physically, take , steal, and carry away cane cars loaded with sugar cane hence, no theft.

ISSUE: Whether Jain is criminally liable for theft.

HELD: No. In the Institutes of Justinian a more elaborate definition of theft is given as follows: ―Theft is the fraudulent handling of a thing with the object of acquiring gain either from the thing itself or from its use, or from possession of it.‖ The corresponding provision of the Partidas follows the definition given in the Institutes but contains the additional qualification that the taking must be without the consent of the owner.

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Evident from the foregoing is the condition sine qua non that for theft to be committed there must be physical handling for personal property. Such a condition is not present in the case at bar for at no time did the petitioner lay his hands on the sugar canes which belonged to others. The petitioner is right; he did not commit theft but he committed estafa.

People v. Hon. Velasco (Civil) GR No. 127444 FACTS: There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.

The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a reexamination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.

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ISSUES: Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy is permissible

HELD: NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.

United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at bar, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case.

The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.

Requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted , or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-ofacquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

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In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the ―criminal trial was a sham‖ because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

Side note: Acquittal must be valid – an error of jurisdiction is the only valid ground for review. If appeal is based on error of judgment, it will amount to double jeopardy. LegPhilo: Justinian on Codification of Law: Jeopardy, itself ―a fine poetic word,‖ derives from the Latin ―jocus‖ meaning joke, jest or game, and also from the French term ―jeu perdre‖ which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word ―iuparti‖ or―jupartie‖ means an uncertain game. The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that ―the laws forbid the same man to be t ried twice on the same issue.‖ The Justinian Digest providing that ―(a) governor should not permit the same person to be again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted,‖ suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting man‘s ―tragic vision‖ or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.

Cicero: D e L e g i b u s : It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized ―as a maxim of common law‖ based on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: ―Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another th in the future, but among all nations, it is the same.‖ But even as early as the 15 century, the English courts already began to use the term ―jeopardy‖ in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials. In Vaux’s Case,it was accepted as established that ―the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good plea x x x‖ Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that ―(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution

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before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime.‖

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is ―part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.‖ The interest in the finality of acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for ―repose,‖ a desire to know the exact extent of one‘s liability. With this right of repos e, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury‘s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

IV.

Criminal Law: Christian & Contemporary Philosophers Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601 (Crim)

Same: Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.

Facts: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the Philippines‘ obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier

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to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Issues: 1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations? 3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)? Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- ―punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.‖ Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law ―cruel, degrading or inhuman‖? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which ―court‖ will fix the time and da te of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the ―court‖ which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the ―judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out ―not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times.‖ Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that the infliction of ―wanton pain‖ in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal

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injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. ―In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished.‖ The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. 2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the ―most serious crimes‖. Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. 3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory. ―SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.‖ Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner‘s view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement. Legal Philosophy: PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion: So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, expressly

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prohibits any form of torture which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies. Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression. "Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme gravity." To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent." Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent. In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against welldefined "heinous" crimes? I respectfully submit it has not.

Santos v. CA and Bedia-Santos GR No. 112019 (Psychological Incapacity - Family Law)

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia‘s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julia‘s parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel‘s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in

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July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied. __________ Notes: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Legal Philosophy: O n P s y c h o l o g i c a l I n c a p ac i t y VITUG, J.: Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code‘s enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

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One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treatise, giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states: ―The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, o broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first: Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psychosexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then a broader one followed: ‗. . . ‗. . .because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .‘ (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049); then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3); finally, a new version was promulgated: ‗because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).‘ ―So the progress was from psychosexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.‖ Fr. Orsy concedes that the term ―psychological incapacity‖ defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. In a book, entitled ―Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,‖ written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

―This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.‖

Estrada v. Escritor, AM P-02-1651 (On the Separation of the Church and State ) Facts: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor‘s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but

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of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a ―Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‖ which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses since 1985 and has b een a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio‘s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of ―gross and immoral conduct‖ and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court ext ends only to public and secular moralit y. The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. The state‘s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. ―There is nothing in the OCA‘s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override r espondent‘s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General‖. In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent‘s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent‘s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the ―compelling state interest‖ test.

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision. Legal Philosophy: PUNO, J.:

We ascertained two salient features in the review of religious history: First , with minor exceptions, the history of church-state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed, and war, all in the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace. Second , likewise with minor exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to promote secular purposes and policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for the favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in exchange for religion‘s invaluable service. This was the context in which the unique experiment of the principle of religious freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional democracy and in human history.

Strictly speaking, the American experiment of freedom and separation was not translated in the First Amendment. That experiment had been launched four years earlier, when the founders of the republic carefully withheld from the new national government any power to deal with religion. As James Madison said, the national government had no ―jurisdiction‖ over religion or any ―shadow of right to intermeddle‖ with it.

The omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom and other natural rights, however, nearly prevented the ratification of the Constitution. The restriction had to be made explicit with the adoption of the religion clauses in the First Amendment as they are worded to this day. Thus, the First Amendment did not government; its intent was to make express the absence of power. It commands, in two parts (with the first part usually referred to as the Establishment Clause and the second part, the Free Exercise Clause), viz .:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious

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beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the movement of establishment of religion as an engine to promote state interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free exercise of religion.

People vs Dela Cruz L-52 feb 21, 1946 Facts: Appellant is charged with the cr ime of robbery in band com mitted on June 25, 1946. The Cour t of First Instance of Manila sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than six months nor more than six years, ten months and one day of imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P8,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He appealed from this sentence, praying that he be acquitted. The prosecution recommends affirmance, with the elimination of the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the principal penalty imposed being higher than prision correccional. At about 8:30 p. m., on July 25, 1945, while Dr. Gregorio B. Sison was closing the door of his drug store at 389 Dimasalang, Manila, four men armed with revolvers got near him, stuck revolvers over his ribs, pushed him inside the drug store, and ordered him and all other persons inside to lie down face downward. One remained to watch the door, another, who was manipulating his revolver several times, kept watch of the persons lying down, and the remaining two went upstairs. The one watching the door called several times the other watching the persons lying down, telling him to shoot their heads if they moved. The malefactors were able to get P200 from the cash register, P7,000 in bills, P500 in silver coins, and one pair of earrings with diamonds valued at P300, all located in one of the drawers in the kitchen. Issue and defense of Dela cruz: The main question in this case revolves on appellant's identity. He denies having participated in the commission of the crime. At the hour and on the day the robbery was committed, appellant does not remember whether he was at home or at Felix Huerta;,. He alleges that he lives by selling bread, shoes, pomade, and other things in the market, and admits that he gambles.

HELD: The analysis of the testimonies given in this case convinces us that appellant was conclusively identified as the robber who kept watch of the people inside the drug store while lying down; who, upon entering the drug store, was one of those who stuck a revolver at the ribs of Dr. Gregorio B. Sison; who, during the watch, was manipulating his revolver to the extent of dropping two bullets to the floor, and who was being named as Doro. The fact that the prosecution witnesses singled him out as the only one among the four robbers they could identify, it appearing that there were circumstances which made his identification possible, and that

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no unreasonable motive was shown why they should point him out, instead of any one of the three remaining gangsters, only serves to strengthen the credibility of said identification. There are no words strong enough to condemn banditry and gangsterism. During the enemy occupation, our peaceful citizenry had to endure the scourge of frequent wanton robberies. The abnormal conditions then reigning, the example of outlawry given by the masters of the situation, hunger and misery in some cases, the moral distress or mental disequilibrium in others, which produced the extraordinary situation, might explain the robberies and lootings perpetrated under the regime of greatest looters ever known in our country. But now, when everybody is given full opportunity to earn an honest and decent living, under a regime of law and freedom, of peace and justice, of noble principles and high ideals, and act such as the one committed by appellant and his cogangsters does not merit the least attenuation. The authors of such acts must be branded forever with the stigma of infamy. They are the shame of a race and the ignominy of a people, the disgrace of humankind. One of the geniuses who flourished in the thirteenth century, the philosopher and theologian whose exalted native endowment and original creative power in the intellectual field is the admiration of Christian world, Saint Thomas Aquinas, maintained that the appropriation of others' goods which they (the owners) do not need, if made in obedience to extreme necessity, does not constitute robbery. He declared that the superfluous things in the possession of some persons, by natural law, are goods for the maintenance of the poor. Evident and urgent necessity makes the one who appropriates the goods of another for the maintenance of his own life the legal owner of said goods (Summa Theologica, 2d part, Question LXVI. Art. VII). To strengthen his position, he quoted from Saint Ambrose (serm. 64, De temp. Decret. 47, cap. Sicut hi) the following: "The bread you are retaining belongs to the hungry; the cloth you are keeping aside belongs to the naked; the money you are hiding underground is for the redemption and absolution of the unfortunate." But, without subscribing necessarily to the above propositions of the two saintly authors, in the present case, there is absolutely no showing that extreme necessity impelled accused to perpetrate the robbery here in question. There is not the remotest hint that appellant would have died of hunger without the money and jewel which he and his fellow gangsters took from complainants' drug store, or that he would face an imminent danger of losing any vital limb or right. On the contrary, he testified that he was engaged in selling foodstuffs, such as bread; wearing apparel, such as shoes; and even articles of luxury, such as pomade. And it is evident that he earned more than enough to satisfy his prime needs, for he allowed himself the leisure and the spare money for gambling. He robbed, therefore, not because he was compelled by any pressing necessities, but by following impulses of moral perversity. For such individual, and for all individuals belonging to his depraved tribe, there is no reason to waste any pity or leniency. The race of robbers, bandits, gangsters, and other male factors of the same brand, should be ostracized perpetually from human society until the shame shall have disappeared completely from memory.

V.

Mercantile Law: From Customs to Law

US vs Tan Quingco Chua GR. L-13708 January 29, 1919

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How a lean little debt of P100 contracted in the year 1911 grew and grew until, after the lapse of five short years, interest had made of it the fat and respectable sum of approximately P700, is the story told by this record. The tale opens on April 29, 1911, with one, Pedro Andres, borrowing of Francisco Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, the instant defendant, the sum of P100, with interest of 24 cavanes of palay. In less than three months, or, to be exact, on the 9th of July of the same year, the debt was raised to P125, with interest of 30 cavanes of palay. Two years pass, and on June 28, 1913, it has become P226.70, secured by a pacto de retro, with the interest at 44 cavanes of palay annually. The day of reckoning came on October 17, 1915, when the debt was liquidated with the result that Andres had an obligation of P474.20, which he promised to pay on the 25th of the same month. One year later, action was brought to recover this sum and the corresponding judgment rendered therefor. Then, on October 25, 1916, Andres and Tan Quingco Chua executed a document by which Andres sold to Tan Quingco Chua under pacto de retro a certain parcel of land and a female carabao for the amount of P684.20; the period of redemption was to be five months; Andres was to hold the land during this time as lessee and as such lessee to pay a rent of 90 cavanes of palay, each cavan to weigh 44 kilos, in the month of February, 1917, and all charges during the existence of the lease. Execution on the judgment of October 25, 1916, resulted in Andres paying to the Chinaman P474, and turning over to him 98 cavanes of palay. The outcome of these various transactions was the filing of an information by the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija, charging Francisco Constantino Tan Quingco Chua with the crime of usury, predicated specially on the document of October 25, 1916, above described. The trial court, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, in a very able and fair decision, found that the accused had been proved guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P25, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The taking of excessive interest for the loan of money has been regarded with abhorrence from the earliest times. Usury, as such unlawful profits were known, was prohibited by the ancient laws of the Chinese and the Hindus, by the Mosaic Law of the Jews, by the Koran, by the Athenians and by the Romans, and has been frowned upon by distinguished publicists throughout all the ages. Issue: Did the accused violate the Usury Law by the accomplishment of what purports to be a pacto de retro, now in evidence as Exhibit B ?

HELD: Usury laws, ordinarily, are to be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. Nevertheless, the courts may look into prior occurrences in order to understand the particular fact which is claimed to be a violation of the law, and in order to ascertain the criminal intent. We entertain little or no doubt that Exhibit B was not a true pacto de retro, but was a sham document to cover usurious financial manipulation. This document, framed with legal precision, was a token of a debt originally of P100, grown to be P474.20, to which in this document was added P210 as interests, to make a total of P684.20. Then on top of this latter sum was dumped 90 cavanes of palay, denominated as rent, but which in reality was interest valued at P25 for the use of P684.20 for five months. In moving toward a conclusion, we have not forgotten the canon of construction which should govern penal statutes of this character. The rule is as stated by the Supreme Court of Alabama, namely:

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When operating on the contract or the security taken, it (the statute) is not, strictly speaking, punitive in its character, and we should so construe it as to repress the great evil the legislature has in view in its enactment. But when the punishment of the person who has committed usury is sought, according to the benignant principle which pervades our jurisprudence, it should be construed in all cases of doubt and uncertainty in favor of the accused." (Metcalf vs. Watkins [1834], 1 Port. [Ala], 57.) A document, legal in form, purporting to be a pacto de retro, accomplished on October 25, 1916, found to be a sham document to cover usurious financial manipulation. No doubt and uncertainty exists in this case. If the facts as found by the trial court are true, and we think they are, and if the law as enunciated in this decision is correct, and we think it is, then, this surely is usury, if there ever was usury. The money lenders did not alone pursue their calling in old Judea. The Shylocks have not merely strutted or skulked on the Shakesperian stage. The Philippines abound with such who exact their pound of flesh — and for these the law was intended and for these shall be enforced. Most of the ordinary contracts, when entered into in good faith, do not come within the pale of usury. Any person owning property may sell it at such price and at such terms as to the time and mode of payment as he may see fit, and such a sale, if bona fide, cannot be usurious however unconscionable it may be. Lord Mansfield characteristically says: "I lay the foundation of the whole upon a man's going to borrow under colour of buying: there the contract is usurious; but where it is a bona fide sale . . . it certainly is not." (Floyer vs. Edwards, 1 Cowp., 112, 116; 98 Eng. Reprint, 995.) Rent charges, as in the document before us, may be created or transferred without regard to the usury laws as long as such forms of transaction are not used as mere covers for usurious loans. A hard bargain need not necessarily be a void bargain.||| (U.S. v. Tan Quingco Chua, G.R. No. 13708, [January 29, 1919], 39 PHIL 552-559)

Philippine National Bank v . The National city bank of new y ork Mo tor Service Co., Inc., G.R. No. 43596, [Octo ber 31, 1936], 63 PHIL 711-746

Facts: : On April 7 and 9, 1933, an unknown person or persons negotiated with Motor Service Company, Inc. (MSCI), two checks in payment for automobile tires purchased from MSCI's stores, purporting to have been issued by the 'Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. (Pantranco) by J.L. Klar, Manager and Treasurer', against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and in favor of the International Auto Repair Shop, for P144.50 and P215.75. Said checks were indorsed by said unknown persons in the manner indicated at the back thereof, the MSCI, believing at the time that the signatures of J.L. Klar, Manager and Treasurer of Pantranco on both checks were genuine. The checks were then indorsed for deposit by MSCI at the National City Bank of New York and the former was accordingly credited with the amounts thereof, or P144.50 and P215.75. On April 8 and 10, 1933, the said checks were cleared at the clearing house and PNB credited the National City Bank for the amounts thereof, believing at the time that the signatures of the drawer were genuine, that the payee is an existing entity and the endorsements at the bank thereof regular and genuine. The PNB then found out that the purported signatures of J.L. Klar, as Manager and Treasurer of Pantranco were forged when so informed by the said Company, and it accordingly demanded from the National City Bank and MSCI and the reimbursement of the amounts for which it credited the National City Bank at the clearing house and for which the latter credited MSCI, but MSCI and National City Bank refused, and continue to refuse, to make such reimbursements. Pantranco objected to have the proceeds of said check deducted from their deposit. PNB filed the case in the municipal court of Manila against National City Bank and MSCI. Upon PNB's motion, the case was

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dismissed before trial as to the National City Bank. A decision was thereafter rendered giving PNB judgment for the total am ount of P360.25, with interest and costs. From this decision MSCI appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the drawee bank should be allowed recovery, as MSCI's position would not become worse than if the drawee had refused the payment of these checks upon their presentation HELD: A drawee of a check, who is deceived by a forgery of the drawer's signature may recover the payment back, unless his mistake has placed an innocent holder of the paper in a worse position than he would have been in if the discover of the forgery had been made on presentation. Forgeries often deceived the eye of the most cautions experts; and when a bank has been so deceived, it is a harsh rule which compels it to suffer although no one has suffered by its being deceived. Herein, MSCI has lost nothing by anything which the drawee has done. It had in its hands some forged worthless papers. It did not purchase or acquire these papers because of any representation made to it by the drawee. It purchased them from unknown persons and under suspicious circumstances. It had no valid title to them, because the persons from whom it received them did not have such title. MSCI could not have compelled the drawee to pay them, and the drawee could have refused payment had it been able to detect the forgery. By making a refund, MSCI would only be returning what it had received without any title or right. And when MCSI pays back the money it has received it will be entitled to have restored to it the forged papers it parted with. There is no good reason why the accidental payment made by PNB should inure to the benefit of MSCI. If there were injury to MCSI said injury was caused not by the failure of PNB to detect the forgery but by the very negligence of MCSI in purchasing commercial papers from unknown persons without making inquiry as to their genuineness. (The court held in the case (1) That where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the bank is estopped to deny the genuineness of the drawer's signature and his capacity to issue the instrument; (2) That if a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified by the said bank it cannot recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and did not have actual notice thereof; (3) That the payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the sense that this word is used in section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law; (4) That in the case of the payment of a forged check, even without former acceptance, the drawee can not recover from a holder in due course not chargeable with any act of negligence or disregard of duty; (5) That to entitle the holder of a forged check to retain the money obtained thereon, there must be a showing that the duty to ascertain the genuineness of the signature rested entirely upon the drawee, and that the constructive negligence of such drawee in failing to detect the forgery was not affected by any disregard of duty on the part of the holder, or by failure of any precaution which, from his implied assertion in presenting the check as a sufficient voucher, the drawee had the right to believe he had taken; (6) That in the absence of actual fault on the part of the drawee, his constructive fault in not knowing the signature of the drawer and detecting the forgery will not preclude his recovery from one who took the check under circumstances of suspicion and without proper precaution, or whose conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee or induce him to pay the check without the usual scrutiny or other precautions against mistake or fraud; (7) That one who purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy himself that the paper is genuine, and that by indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it into circulation before presentation he impliedly asserts that he performed his duty; (8) That while the foregoing rule, chosen from a welter of decisions on the issue as the correct one, will not hinder the circulation of two recognized mediums of exchange by which the great bulk of business is carried on, namely, drafts and checks, on the other hand, it will encourage and demand prudent business methods on the part of those receiving such mediums of exchange; (9) That it being a matter of record in the present case, that PNB is no more chargeable with

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the knowledge of the drawer's signature than MCSI is, as the drawer was as much the customer of MSCI as of PNB, the presumption that a drawee bank is bound to know more than any indorser the signature nature of its depositor does not hold; (1) that according to the undisputed facts of the case MSCI in purchasing the papers in question from unknown persons without making any inquiry as to the identity and authority of the said persons negotiating and indorsing them, acted negligently and contributed to PNB's constructive negligence in failing to detect the forgery; and (11) that under the circumstances of the case, if PNB is allowed to recover, there will be no change of position as to the injury or prejudice of MCSI.) The old rule which was originally announced by Lord Mansfield in the leading case of Price vs. Neal (3 Burr., 1354), elicited the following comment from Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Dedham National Bank vs. Everett National Bank (177 Mass., 392). "Probably the rule was adopted from an impression of convenience rather than for any more academic reason; or perhaps we may say that Lord Mansfield took the case out of the doctrine as to payments under a mistake of fact by the assumption that a holder who simply presents negotiable paper for payment makes no representation as to the signature, and that the drawee pays at his peril." Such was the reaction that followed Lord Mansfield's rule which Justice Story of the United States Supreme Court adopted in the case of Bank of United States vs. Georgia (10 Wheat., 333), that in B.B. Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Orangeburg (74 S.C., 180), it was held that "an unrestricted indorsement of a draft and presentation to the drawee is a representation that the signature of the drawer is genuine", and in Lisbon First National Bank v s . Wyndmere Bank (15 N.D., 299), it was also held that "the drawee of a forged check who has paid the same without detecting the forgery, may upon discovery of the forgery, recover the money paid from the party who received the money, even though the latter was was a good faith holder, provided the latter has not been misled or prejudiced by the drawee's failure to detect the forgery. Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsch-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, G.R. No. 13954, [Jan uary 17, 1919], 39 PHIL 474-494

FACTS: The question now before the court relates to the liability of the defendant company, as owner of the steamship Esslingen, for damages resulting from the illegal detention of cargo belonging to the plaintiff embarked upon that ship at Saigon and brought to the port of Manila at the outbreak of the European War. By the former decision of this court the cause was returned to the court of origin with instructions to grant a new trial wherein the inquiry should be limited to the determination of the amount which could have been gotten for the cargo taken on board in Saigon, if such cargo had been offered for sale in an undamaged condition in Manila Bay at the time when the damaged cargo was sold, judgment to be entered, thereafter, in conformity with the rule of liability enunciated in said decision. The case was accordingly reheard in the Court of First Instance upon proof submitted by the respective parties; and that court found that the 119,831 cavanes of rice meal contained in said cargo would, if undamaged, have sold for 30 centavos more per cavan than was received when the cargo was sold on November 6, 1914. Judgment was accordingly rendered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the loss thus determined, to wit, P35,949.30, with interest from November 6, 1914. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiff insisting that the trial court had awarded too little and the defendant that the court had awarded too much.

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The only question is thus upon the point of damages. Part of the cargo of the Esslingen consisted of cargo meal, and it is admitted that this portion of the cargo, being by nature less subject to deterioration than rice meal, was sold by the receiver in an undamaged condition for its full value, to wit, P4,729.62. The subject-matter of the dispute is therefore narrowed to the question of the price which the 119,831 cavanes of rice meal ought to have brought, if it had been offered for sale on November 6, 1914, in an undeteriorated condition. RULING: The law in force in these Islands is more favorable to penalties than the law of England and the United States; and it is unnecessary here to adopt the exact reasoning followed in the cases above cited. It is perhaps enough for present purposes merely to say that the clause under consideration is not applicable to the situation before us. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that this charter party is not to be construed exclusively by the law of the Philippine Islands, nor even by the local law of the country in which it was executed. It must be considered as governed by the general maritime law (Watts vs. Camors, supra). In this connection it is well to be reminded that, as was said by Lord Mansfield, in Luke vs. Lyde ([1759], 2 Burr, 887), the maritime law "is not the law of a particular country, but the general law of nation." Again, said he, quoting the eloquent words of Cicero: "Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omne tempore una eademque lex obtinebit."' (There shall not be one law at Rome, another at Athens; one now, another hereafter; but among all nations one and the same law shall prevail.)

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, there speaking through Ward, Circuit Judge, said: "It is of the utmost importance that commercial documents of familiar form going into all parts of the world should as far as possible be understood everywhere in the same way, which makes us the more content to follow the English decisions." (Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet vs. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 Fed. Rep., 935, 938.) As already stated, we are of the opinion that the damages assessable in this case should not be limited to the amount contracted to be paid for freight, and the damages must stand at the higher amount of the proven damages, or P87,777.56. When the case was before us at the prior hearing, we were not satisfied, in the absence of all proof as to the market value of rice meal in Manila, to allow the finding of the trial court on the question of the amount of the damages to stand, but now that further proof has been taken and the fact established that the cargo of rice meal in Manila, if undamaged, was reasonably worth as much, or more, than its original cost, we have no hesitation in sustaining the damages as proved on the basis of the cost price. Our conclusion is that the judgment appealed from must be modified in respect to the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of P87,777.56 instead of P35,949.30, with interest from November 6, 1914. So much of the judgment appealed from as awards to the plaintiff the sum of P57,823.35, less the commission of the clerk, the same being the proceeds of the receiver's sale, is hereby vacated, it appearing that this part of the judgment has already been satisfied. As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed, without express finding as to costs of either instance. 1. JUDGMENT; "RES JUDICATA;" LAW OF THE CASE. — When a cause is remanded by the Supreme Court to the Court of First Instance for the determination of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled, the rule of liability enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court becomes the law of the case and is

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