Consti2-Digests for Cases After Midterms

Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Art III sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an establ establish ishmen mentt of religi religion, on, or prohibi prohibitin ting g the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of reli religi giou ous s prof profes ess sion ion and wors worsh hip, ip, with withou outt disc discri rimi mina natio tion n or pref prefere erenc nce, e, shal shalll forev forever er be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or syst system em of relig religio ion, n, or of any any prie priest st,, prea preach cher er,, minist minister, er, other other religi religious ous teache teacher, r, or dignit dignitary ary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Establishment Clause AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ





Religious Freedom: Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate  is not not inhi inhibi biti tion on of profo profoun und d revere reverenc nce e for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. o Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence , in order to establish a gov’t that shall embody their ideals…” in the preamble of the Constitution.

FACTS: 



On May 1936, respondent announced in the newspapers that he would order of postage stamps commemorating the 33rd Internationa Internationall Eucharisti Eucharistic c Congress Congress under Act No. 4052 (cited below) Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head Head of the the Phil Phil.. Inde Indepe pend nden entt Chur Church ch (Aglip (Aglipaya ayan), n), seeks seeks a writ writ of prohib prohibitio ition n to prevent respondent respondent Director of Posts from iss issuing uing and and selli ellin ng pos postag tage sta stamps mps commemorative of the said Congress. Petitioner alleges that respondent in o issu issuin ing g and and sell sellin ing g the the post postag age e stamps stamps violated violated the Constitutiona Constitutionall provision on the principle of sepa separa ratio tion n of chur church ch and and stat state, e, specifically section 13, subsection 3, Art. Art. VI whic which h says says:: “No public public money or property shall ever be appro appropri priate ated, d, applie applied, d, or used, used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benef benefit, it, or suppor supportt of any sect, sect, church, denomination… or system of religion…”

Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom guaranteed in the Consti What is guaranteed guaranteed by our Constitution Constitution o is religious liberty, not merely religious toleration.





Justice Laurel 1937

occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims.” This This princi principle ple was recogn recognize ized d in the Malolos Malolos Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in the the inst instru ruct ctio ions ns of McKi McKinl nley ey to the the Phil Phil.. Commi Commiss ssio ion… n… and and fina finall lly y embod embodie ied d in the the Constitution as the supreme expression of the Filipino people.

General Concessions Concessions indiscrimi indiscriminately nately accorded accorded to religious sects: Tax Tax exem exempt ptio ions ns prop proper erti ties es devo devote ted d o exclusively to religious purposes Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a o priest, preacher, etc. is assigned to the arme armed d forc forces es,, pena penall inst instit itut utio ion n, orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in public o schoo schools ls is allow allowed ed by cons consti titu tuti tion onal al mandate, etc.

PRESENT CASE: 



ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling the postage stamps. HELD: No constitutional infraction. History of Separation of Church and State: “… our history, not to speak of the history of  mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for

Batch 2008A.

Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to issu issue e and and sell sell the the stam stamps ps cont contemp empla lates tes no religious purpose, but gives the Director of the Posts the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” The The pres presen entt case case was was not not insp inspir ired ed by any any sectarian feeling to favor a particular religious denomination. The The stam stamps ps were were not not issu issued ed for for the the o benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to the church. Purpose of the stamps was “to advertise o the Philippines and attract more tourists to the country”  offi offici cial als s took took advantage of an intern ernationa onally important event to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. The The stamp stamp as actual actually ly printed printed  instea instead d of showin showing g a Cathol Catholic ic Chur Church ch chal chalic ice e as orig origin inal ally ly planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the the City City of Mani Manilla with with the the inscription “Seat XXXIII

1

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Interna Internation tional al Euchar Eucharist istic ic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” What is emphasized is not the Congress bu t Manila, the capital of the Philip Philippin pines, es, as the seat of that congress. The propaganda resulting from the issuance and sale of the staff might redound redound to the benefit of the Roman Catholi Catholic c Church Church but this this was not the intention and is only incidental to the original purpose. “We are of the opinion that  the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of inciden incidental tal result results, s, more more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.” There may have peen poor judgment in issuing and selling the stamp but a gap still exists between that and the the unc uncons onstitu tituti tion ona ality lity of the the issuan issuance ce and sale which which was not filled by the petitioner. •

o

o

GARCES vs. ESTENZO

FACTS:

1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the the imag image e of San San Vicen Vicente te Ferre Ferrerr and and (2) (2) the the constr construct uction ion of a waitin waiting g shed shed as the barang barangay' ay's s proj projec ects ts.. Fund Funds s for for the the two two proj projec ects ts woul would d be obtaine obtained d throug through h the sellin selling g of tickets tickets and cash cash donations " 2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with with the practi practice ce in Easter Eastern n Leyte, Leyte, Counci Councilma lman n Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image

woode wooden n image image of San Vicente Vicente Ferrer Ferrer was acquire acquired d in Cebu Cebu City City by the the baran barangay gay council council for four hundre hundred d pesos 4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that that the devotee devotees s could could worshi worship p the saint saint during during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the the pret pretex extt that that it was was the the prope property rty of the the chur church ch because church funds were used for its acquisition. 5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the the occa occasi sion on of his his sermo sermon n duri during ng a mass mass,, Fath Father er Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in conn connec ecti tion on with with the the disp disput uted ed imag image. e. That That inci incide dent nt provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. 6. Father Father Osmeña Osmeña retali retaliate ated d by filing filing admini administr strati ative ve complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the the Depa epartme rtment nt of Loca Locall Gov Governm ernmen entt and and Community Community Development on the grounds of immorality, immorality, grave grave abuse abuse of author authority ity,, acts acts unbeco unbecomin ming g a public public official and ignorance of the law. 7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Cathol Catholic ic church church of Valenc Valencia. ia. Becaus Because e Father Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image 8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight eight hundre hundred d pesos, pesos, Father Father Osmeña Osmeña turned turned over over the image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for replevi replevin, n, he assail assailed ed the consti constitut tution ionali ality ty of the said said resolutions. 9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member member of the Aglipa Aglipayan yan Church Church,, and two Cathol Catholic ic laym laymen en,, Jesu Jesus s Edul Edulla lant ntes es and and Nicet Nicetas as Daga Dagar, r, file filed d against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolu resolution tions s (Their (Their main main argumen argumentt was it prejudic prejudiced ed members of the Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. ) 10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints.























RATIO

In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able able to atte attend nd thos those e sess sessio ions ns beca becaus use e he was was working working with a construction construction company company based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Mañago's absence from the sessions of the the bara barang ngay ay coun counci cill did did not not rend render er the the said said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed. 2)

WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made made resp respec ecti ting ng an esta establ blis ishm hment ent of reli religi gion on"" and and that that "no "no publ public ic mone money y or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, church, deno denomin minati ation on,, sect sectar aria ian n inst instit itut utio ion, n, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO

Ratio

The The wooden wooden image image was purcha purchased sed in connec connectio tion n with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there there is nothin nothing g uncons unconstit tituti utiona onall or illega illegall in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, barrio, then any activity activity intended to facilitate facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display display of his image) image) cannot cannot be brande branded d as illegal.

clai claim m that that it belo belong ngs s to his his churc church h is wron wrong. g. The The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image image to the Cathol Catholic ic church church,, that that action action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. Not every every governm government ental al activi activity ty which which involv involves es the expe expend ndit itur ure e of publ public ic fund funds s and and whic which h has has some some religious religious tint is violative violative of the constitution constitutional al provisions provisions regard regarding ing separa separatio tion n of church church and state, state, freedom freedom of wor worsh ship ip and and bann bannin ing g the the use use of publ public ic mone money y or property. (Lower Court’s decision affirmed)

LEMON vs. KURTZMAN

(1971)

This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial financial support for teacher teacher salaries, salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public scho school ols. s. The The Rhod Rhode e Isla Island nd stat statut ute e prov provid ided ed direc directt supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions." Question Presented

Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making stat state e fina financ ncia iall aid aid avai availa labl ble e to "chu "churc rchh-re rela late ted d educational institutions"? Conclusion

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a sain saint' t's s imag image. e. lt woul would d neve neverr have have aris arisen en if the the

Yes. Yes. Writing Writing for the majori majority, ty, Chief Chief Justic Justice e Burger Burger arti articu cula lated ted a thre threee-pa part rt test test for for laws laws deal dealin ing g with with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have princi principal pal effects effects which which neithe neitherr advanc advance e nor inhibi inhibitt religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religi religious ous inculc inculcati ation, on, and that that the "conti "continui nuing ng state state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions























This case is actually 2 cases involving two States, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, laws were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools and and teac teache hers rs.. In both both case cases, s, the the stat statute utes s were were challenged for being violitive of the first amendment for creating an entanglement between church and state. RHODE ISLAND STATUTE:

eeping ng Purpose: Keepi elementary schools.

the the

qua quality lity

of

2) fina financ ncia iall supp suppor ortt 3) acti active ve invo involv lvem emen entt It also stated 3 tests: 1) Stat Statut ute e must must have ave a secul ecular ar legis egisla lati tiv ve purpose 2) Princi Principal pal or prim primary ary effec effectt neither neither adva advance nces s nor inhibits religion 3) Statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion

nonp nonpub ubllic

payment of up to 15% extra salary to Means: Direct payment nonpublic school teachers. Teachi hing ng in a nonp nonpub ubli lic c scho school ol Qualifications: Teac where where avera average ge per-pupi per-pupill expendi expenditur ture e on secula secularr educati education on is less less than than the avera average ge in the public schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjects and must not teach religion else lose the benefits accorded by the statute. Background of schools: Nonp Nonpub ubli lic c scho school ols: s: 25% 25% of the the Stat State’ e’s s pupils. 95% went to RC schools. Teachers who applied: all come from these RC schools.

PENNSYLVANIA: Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising costs.

Reim Reimbu burs rsin ing g nonp nonpub ubli lic c scho school ols s on Means: expenditures expenditures for teachers’ teachers’ salaries, textbooks and instructional materials. Limited to course courses s also also taught taught in Qualifications: Limited public public schools schools.. Also Also limited limited to secula secularr subjec subjects. ts. Textbooks must be approved. Background of schools: Nonpubl Nonpublic ic school schools: s: 20% of State’ State’s s pupils pupils.. 96% attended RC schools.

ISSUE: WON WON the the stat statut utes es enac enacte ted d viol violat ated ed the the firs firstt amendment re: separation of Church and State, and are therefore unconstitutional. HELD: Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded).

Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as the legislative intent/purpose is most definitely secular. However, the court states that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each Stat State e invo involv lves es exc excessi essive ve enta entang ngle leme ment nt betw betwee een n government and religion”. As the schools taken into are church schools, they are seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives rise rise to enta entang ngli ling ng chur church ch-s -sta tate te relat relation ionsh ship ips. s. Also Also adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though the the case case does doesn’ n’tt real really ly say say why) why).. Also Also take taken n into into consideration is the teachers’ means of teaching. There is no way of ascertaining if the teachers will inject a religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that the schools and their teachers are subject to religious authority, and teachers are even told (in the “Handbook of School Regulations”) to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary work. Most Mostly ly,, thou though gh,, the the cour courtt is most most afra afraid id of actu actual al enta entang ngle leme ment nt that that will will be caus caused ed thro throug ugh h the the impl implem emen enta tati tion on of the the laws laws.. Du Due e to the the need need for for surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must run through applications to see who qualifies), there is crea created ted the the enta entang nglem lemen entt that that the the Clau Clause se prot protec ects ts agai agains nst. t. “... “...th the e very very rest restri rict ctio ions ns and and surv survei eill llan ance ce nece necess ssar ary y to ensu ensure re that that teac teache hers rs play play a stri strict ctly ly nonideological role gives rise to entanglements...” The The Penns Pennsyl ylva vani nia a stat statut ute e goes goes even even furt further her,, as it provides direct financial aid to these schools. Another consideration is the divisive political potential of the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. This refers to the division that will occur between those for and against state aid, thereby making it a political struggle. Here the state says that while political debate and division are normal, normal, those predicated predicated on religious religious lines are what the First Amendment sought to protect the country from. The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption challe challenge nge fell fell to over over 200 years years of univer universal sal practice practice,, state state aid has no such such support support.. Also, Also, these these statut statutes es create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be























educational opportunities available to the young. Appe Appell llan ants ts have have show shown n us noth nothin ing g abou aboutt the the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend lend scho school ol book books s free free of char charge ge.. Book Books s are are furn furnis ish hed at the the requ reques estt of the the pupi pupill and and owners ownership hip remains remains,, at least least techni technical cally, ly, in the State. State. Thus no funds funds or books books are furnishe furnished d to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.

(1968) Justice White FACTS:

1.

2.

3.

A la l aw (7 (701 o f th the Ed E ducation La Law) of of Ne N ew York requires local public school boards to pur purchase textboo books and lend end those textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students attending priva private te scho school ols s are are incl includ uded. ed. The The book books s loaned are "text-books which are designated for for use use in any any publ public ic,, elem elemen enta tary ry or seco second ndar ary y scho school ols s of the the stat state e or are are approved by any boards of education," and which "a pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends." Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 brought suit in the New York courts courts agains againstt James James Allen Allen because because Allen Allen would would remove remove the members members of the Board from from offi office ce if they they fail fail to lend lend book books s to parochial school students. The members of the Board contend that the law was invalid. The trial court held the law unconstitutional. The NY Court of Appeals held that 701 was not in violation of either the State or the Federal Constitution. The CA said said that that the the law' law's s purp purpos ose e was was to benefit all school children, regardless regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only text textbo book oks s appr approv oved ed by publ public ic schoo chooll authori authorities ties could could be loaned loaned.. It consid considere ered d 701 "comp "comple lete tely ly neut neutra rall with with respe respect ct to religio religion, n, merely merely making making availa available ble secula secularr textbook textbooks s at the reques requestt of the indivi individua duall student and asking no question question about what school school he atten attends. ds."" Board Board of Educati Education on brought the case to the US SC.

ISSUE:

WoN the stat statut ute e is a "law "law resp respec ecti ting ng an establi establishm shment ent of religi religion, on, or prohib prohibiti iting ng the free exercise exercise thereof," and so in conflict conflict with the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, because it auth author oriz izes es the the loan loan of text textbo book oks s to stud studen ents ts attending parochial schools. DECISION: The law Constitution.

is

not

in

violation

of

3.

The record contains no suggestion that religious books have been loaned. Absent evidence, the SC cannot assume that school authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that that they they will will not not hone honest stly ly disc discha harg rge e thei theirr duties under the law. In judging the validity of the statute on this record the Court must proceed on the assumption that books loaned to students are books that are not unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content.

4.

Ever Everso son n v. Boar Board d of Educ Educati atio on. The The test test for for

distinguish distinguishing ing between forbidden involvement involvements s of the state with religion: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advanc advancemen ementt or inhibi inhibitio tion n of religi religion on then then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circum rcumsc scri ribe bed d by the the Cons Consti titu tuti tion on.. To withs withstan tand d the strict stricture ures s of the Establ Establish ishmen mentt Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primar primary y effect effect that that neither neither advances advances nor inhibits religion. 5.

The Court Court has long long recogn recognize ized d that that religi religious ous school schools s pursue pursue two goals, goals, religi religious ous instru instructi ction on and secula secularr educati education. on. The State' State's s interes interestt in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the the secu secula larr teac teachi hing ng that that acco accomp mpan anie ied d religious training in the schools maintained by a reli religi gious ous order order (Pie (Pierc rce e v Soci Societ ety y of Site Siters rs). ). A substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that if the State must satisfy satisfy its interest in secular secular education education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interes interestt in the manner manner in which which those those school schools s perform their secular educational function.

the

RATIO:

1.

The language of 701 does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State claims no righ rightt to dist distri ribut bute e relig religio ious us lite litera ratu ture re

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU & LYNCH vs. DONELLY























•

The first, a crèche depicting the Christian Nativi Nativity ty scene, scene, was placed placed on the the Grand Grand Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c is the main, most beautiful, and most public part part of the the cour courth thou ouse se.. The The crèch crèche e was was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman and bore bore a sign sign to that that Catholic Catholic group group, and effect.

•

The second was was an 18-f 18-foo oott Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed just outside the City County building next to the city’s 45-foot Christmas Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor’s name & containing text declaring the city’s salute to liberty. The menorah is owned by Chabad Chabad,, a Jewish grou group, p, but is stor stored, ed, erected, and removed each year by the city.

•

Resp Respon onde dent nts s (the (the Grea Greate terr Pitt Pittsb sbur urgh gh Chap Chapter ter of the the Ameri America can n Civi Civill Liber Liberti ties es Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking perma permane nent ntly ly to enjoi enjoin n the the count county y from from displaying the menorah on the ground that the the disp displa lays ys viol violat ated ed the the Esta Establ blis ishm hmen entt Clause of the 1st Amendment.

•

•

•

WON display of crèche Establishment clause. YES WON display of menorah Establishment clause. NO

2.

appears. •

The concurrence concurrence concluded concluded that both because because the crèche is a “tra traditional symbol” ol” of Chri Christ stma mas, s, a holi holida day y with with stro strong ng secu secula larr ele element ents, and because the crèche was “displayed “displayed along with purely secular secular symbols” symbols” (i.e (i.e.. a Sant Santa a Clau Claus s Hous House e w/ a live live Sant Santa a distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/ “Season’s Greetings”, etc), the creche’s setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display and negates any message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs represented by the crèche.

•

The The concur concurren rence ce and dissen dissentt in Lynch agree that: 1) govt’s use of religious symbolism is unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al if it has has the the effe effect ct of endorsing endorsing religious religious beliefs; beliefs; 2) effect effect of the govt’s govt’s use of religiou religious s symbolis symbolism m depends depends upon its context.

1.

ON CR CRECHE The There re is no doub doubtt that that the the crèc crèche he itse itself lf is capable of communicating a religious message. The The ange angell in the the crèch crèche e endor endorse ses s a pate patent ntly ly Chri Christ stia ian n mess messag age: e: “Glo “Glory ry to God God in the Highest”

violates violates

RATIO: The Establishment Clause •

•

The Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig religion ion,, or proh prohib ibit itin ing g the the free free exerc exercis ise e thereof..” Lemon Lemon v Kurtzma Kurtzman n provides 3 test tests s for

determining whether a gov’t practice violates the the Clau Clause se.. A stat statut ute e or prac practi tice ce w/c w/c tou touches upon religion, on, if it is to be permissible under the Clause must 1) have a secula secularr purpos purpose; e; 2) neithe neitherr advanc advance e nor inhibi inhibitt religi religion on in its princi principal pal or primar primary y effect; 3) n ot foster an excessive entanglement with religion. •

The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt from from appe appear arin ing g to take take a posi positi tion on on ques questi tion ons s of reli religi giou ous s beli belief ef or from from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the

J. O’CONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides framework for evaluating govt’l use of religious symbols: O’Co O’Conn nnor or reco recogn gniz izes es any any 1) endors endorsemen ementt of religi religion on as invali invalid d becaus because e it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsi outside ders rs,, not not full full memb members ers of the the poli politi tica call community, community, and an accompanying accompanying message to adhe adhere rent nts s that that they they are are insi inside ders rs,, favo favore red d members members of the politi political cal commun community ity;; 2) She provides a method for determining whether the govt’s use of an object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing endorsing religion. religion. The effect of the display depends upon the message that the govt’s govt’s practice practice communicat communicates: es: the question question is what viewers viewers may fairly fairly unders understan tand d to be the purpose purpose of the display . That inquiry turns upon the context in whic which h the the cont contes ested ted objec objectt

The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each display display violates violates the Establishm Establishment ent Clause Clause because each has the impermissible effect of endorsing religion.

ISSUE: 1.

display, located in a private park w/n downtown shopping district. By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of the crèche in the display, holding that it didn’t have the effect of advancing or promoting religion.

•

•

Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crèche display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in Lynch, Lynch, nothing nothing in the context context of the display display detrac detracts ts from from the creche creche’s ’s religio religious us messag message. e. The Lynch display comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had its own focal point. Here, in contrast, the crèche stands alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase

























relig religio ious us mess messag age e of that that organ organiz izat atio ion, n, rather than communicating a message of its own. own. The Clause Clause prohibi prohibits ts what what occurr occurred ed here: the govt’s lending its support to the communication of a religious’ organization’s religious message. •

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Govt Govt may may ackn acknow owle ledge dge Chri Christ stma mas s as a cult cultur ural al phen phenome omenon non,, but unde underr the the 1st Amen Amendm dmen ent, t, it may may not not obse observ rve e it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.

the fundamental premise of the Establishment Cla Clause use its itself. elf. In con contra trast, st, confi onfini ning ng the the government's own Christmas celebration to the holida holiday's y's secula secularr aspect aspects s does does not favor favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs. 2. •

Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate Xmas

in some manner and form, but not in a way that that endor endorse ses s Chri Christ stia ian n doct doctri rine ne as the the Alleg Alleghe heny ny Coun County ty did did in disp displa layi ying ng the the crèche.

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On Justi Justice ce Kenne Kennedy dy’s ’s opin opinio ion n upho uphold ldin ing g the the display display of the crèche as permissibl permissible e under the Clause •

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Kennedy says the display of the crèche is consistent consistent with the Establishm Establishment ent Clause. Clause. He argues that this follows from the Marsh v Chambers decisi decision, on, which which sustai sustained ned the constitution constitutionality ality of a legislativ legislative e prayer. prayer. He also also asserts asserts that the crèche crèche,, even even in this this setting, poses no realistic risk of representing an effort to proselytize, having repu repudi dia ated ted the the Cour Court’ t’s s endorsement inquiry in favor of a proselytization Court’ t’s s anal analys ysis is of the the crèc crèche he approach . Cour reflec reflects ts an unju unjust stif ifie ied d host hostil ility ity towar toward d religion.

answer ered ed that that hist histor ory y cann cannot ot Court answ legitimate practices like the crèche display that demonstrate the govt’s allegiance to a particular sect or creed. Th The pros prosel elyt ytiz izat atio ion n test test pref prefer erre red d by Kennedy is much the same as the endorse endorsement ment inquir inquiry y except except to the extent extent forme merr requ requir ires es an obvi obviou ous s tha that the the for allegiance allegiance between the government government and the favored sect.

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*Endor *Endorseme sement nt inquir inquiry: y: WON the practi practice ce

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ON MENORAH The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol. But its message is not exclusively religious. It is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Chri Christ stma mas, s, has has both both relig religio ious us and and secu secula larr dimensions.

Its display doesn’t have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion given its particular physical setting. Its combined display with a Christmas tree & a sign saluting liberty does not impermissibl impermissibly y endorse endorse both the Christian Christian and Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally infirm infirm than than the endors endorsemen ementt of Christ Christian ianity ity alon alone) e),, but but simpl imply y reco recogn gniizes that that both both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winte winter-h r-holi oliday day season season,, which which has attain attained ed a secu secula larr stat status us in our our soci societ ety. y. The The wide widely ly acce accept pted ed view view of the the Chri Christ stma mas s tree tree as the the preemin preeminent ent secula secularr symbol symbol of the Christ Christmas mas season emphasizes this point. The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element in the city’s display by virtue of its size and and centr central al posi positi tion on.. The The plac placeme ement nt of the the menora menorah h beside beside it is readil readily y unders understoo tood d as a reco recogn gnit itio ion n that that Chri Christ stma mas s is not not the the only only traditional way of celebrating the season. Simi Simila larl rly, y, the the pres presen ence ce of the the mayo mayor’ r’s s sign sign confirms that in the particular context the govt’s associ associati ation on with with a religi religious ous symbol symbol does not represe represent nt sponso sponsorsh rship ip of religi religious ous beliefs beliefs but simply a recognition of cultural diversity.

LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY FACTS:























Notwith Notwithsta standi nding ng the religi religious ous signif significa icance nce of the creche, Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment Clause RATIO: •

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Th The conc concep eptt of a "wa "wall" ll" of sepa eparati ration on betw betwee een n chur church ch and and stat state e is a usef useful ul metaphor but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and affi affirm rmati ativ vely ely mand mandat ates es state; it accommodation , not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. This Court's interpretation of the Establ Establish ishment ment Clause Clause compor comports ts with the cont contemp empor oran aneou eous s unde unders rsta tand ndin ing g of the the Framers' Framers' intent. That neither the draftsmen draftsmen of the Constitution, nor the First Congress itself, itself, saw any establ establish ishment ment problem problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress is a striking example of the accommodati accommodation on of religious religious beliefs intended by the Framers. Our history is perva rvaded by official acknow acknowled ledgmen gmentt of the role of religi religion on in Ameri America can n life, life, and and equa equall lly y perva pervasi sive ve is evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of religious expression and hostility toward none. Rather than taking an absolutist approach in applying applying the Establishment Establishment Clause and mechanicall mechanically y invalidatin invalidating g all governmental governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized cha challen llenge ged d condu onduct ct or legis egisla lati tion on to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith or tends to do so . In the line-drawing process called for in each case case,, it has has ofte often n been been foun found d usefu usefull to whethe herr the the chal challe leng nged ed law law or inquire whet conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibi inhibitt religio religion, n, and whether whether it creates creates an

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purpo purpose ses. s. What Whateve everr bene benefi fitt to one one fait faith h or religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and incidental, and is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional and and execu executi tive ve reco recogn gnit ition ion of the the orig origin ins s of Chri Christ stma mas, s, or the the exhi exhibi biti tion on of reli religi giou ous s pain painti ting ngs s in gover overnm nmen enta tall lly y sup support ported ed museums. As to administrative entanglement, there is no eviden evidence ce of contac contactt with with church church author authoriti ities es conc concer ern ning ing the the con content ent or desig esign n of the the exhibition prior to or since the city's purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been necessary, and, since the city owns the crèche (worth $200), the tangible material material it contributes contributes is de minimis. minimis. Political Political divisi divisiven veness ess alone alone cannot cannot serve serve to invali invalidat date e other otherwi wise se permi permiss ssib ible le cond conduc uct, t, and, and, in any any event, apart from the instant litigation, there is no evidence of political political friction or divisiven divisiveness ess over over the the creche creche in the 40-year 40-year history history of the city's Christmas celebration. It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid forbid the use of this this one passive passive symbol symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in publ public ic plac places es incl includ udin ing g scho school ols, s, and and whil while e Congre Congress ss and state state legisl legislatu atures res open open public public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to this Nation's history and this Court's holdings.

EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS

J.Fortas FACTS:























law was upheld by the Tennessee Tennessee Supreme Court in the celebrated Scopes case in 1927. Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma because she she was was supp suppos osed ed to use use the the new textboo textbook k for for classroom instruction and presumably to teach the statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal. Petiti Petitioner oner challe challenges nges the consti constituti tutiona onalit lity y of the 'anti-evolution' statute which the State of Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public school schools s and universi universities ties of the theory theory that that man evolved from other species of life. ISSUE/HELD:

the the mand mandat ate e of the the Firs First, t, and and in viol violat atio ion n of the the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.

SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP

Justice CLARK FACTS:

Applicable Amendments: First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

1.

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No. 142 – The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible Bible shall shall be read read withou withoutt comment comment,, at the opening of each Public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the the requ reques estt of his his pare parent nt or guar guardi dian an.. The The exercises are broadcast into each room in the buildi building ng through through an interc intercom om system. system. This This is followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. Part Partic icip ipat atio ion n in the the open open exer exerc cises ises was considered considered voluntary. voluntary. The student student reading reading the bible bible must must select select the passag passages es and read any form or version he chases. (King James version, Douay or the Revised Standard versions as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures)

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The The consti constitut tution ionali ality ty of the said said statute statute was assailed by Edward Schempp, a member of the Unitar Unitarian ian faith who, along along with with his wife and children, questioned the validity of the statute, contending contending that his rights have been violated, under the 14th of table and to the Constitution of the United States. The The childr children en study study in Abingt Abington on Senior Senior High High School Schempp Schempp testifie testified d that that he at first first refused refused to exercise exercise his prerogative prerogative of excusing excusing his children from the morning exercises upon fear that his childr children en would would be labeled labeled as odd balls. balls. Their classmates would be liable for lumping religious diff diff d objec objecti ti heis heis with with

W/O Not the statut statute e violat violates es the consti constitut tution ional al provisions respecting an establishment of religion or prohibi prohibitin ting g its free free exercis exercise e (1st Amendment), Amendment), and th free speech ( 14 Amendment) . YES RATIO:

Government in our democracy, state and national, must must be neut neutra rall in matt matters ers of relig religio ious us theo theory ry,, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant oppos posite. The First Amend endment man mandates gove govern rnme ment ntal al neut neutra rali lity ty betwe between en reli religi gion on and and religion, and between religion and non-religion. Th There ere is and can can be no doub doubtt tha that the the Firs irst Amendment does not permit the State to require that teach teachin ing g and and lear learni ning ng must must be tail tailor ored ed to the the princi principles ples or prohibi prohibition tions s of any religi religious ous sect sect or dogma. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.

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The court rejected the defense’s argument that the children were allowed to excuse themselves via their parents’ request, saying that it did not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony. This was still in violation of the establishment clause clause in that that it threat threatens ens religio religious us liberty liberty by putting putting a premium premium upon belief belief as opposed opposed to non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect the the beli beliefs efs,, idea ideals ls,, and and even even mora morali lity ty of the the petitioners. ISSUE: WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al unde underr the the viol violat atio ion n of the the Esta Establ blis ishm hmen entt Clau Clause se unde underr the the Four Fourte teen enth th Amendment.

The former forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom to choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The latte latterr prot protect ects s the the freed freedom om to exerc exercis ise e the the chosen chosen form of religi religion. on. This it embrac embraces es two concepts: Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut)

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HELD: Yes. -

RATIO: I.

II.

It is true true that that reli religi gion on has has been been clos closely ely iden identi tifi fied ed with with Amer Americ ican an hist histor ory y and and governm government. ent. This This backgr backgroun ound d is eviden evidence ce tod today in our our public life through the the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presi Presiden dency cy to the the Alder Alderma man n of the the fina finall supplication, “So held me God.” Indeed, only last year, an official survey of the country indi indica cate ted d that that 64% 64% of our our peop people le have have church church membersh membership ip while while 3% profes profess s no faith at all. This is not to say, however that relig religion ion has has been been so iden identi tifi fied ed with with our hist histor ory y and and gove govern rnme ment nt that that reli religi giou ous s freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in out public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution could have implanted such belief. Minor v. Board of Education of (J. Alpho Alphons nso o Taft Taft)) Firs First, t, the the Cincinnati: (J. cour courtt has has deci decisi sive vely ly sett settle led d the the Firs Firstt Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig religion ion,, or proh prohib ibit itin ing g the the free free exerc exercis ise e

IV.

Public Schools are organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all reli religi gious ous teac teachi hing ng so that that the the schoo schooll can can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendment did not simply simply bar a congression congressional al enactment enactment esta establ blis ishi hing ng a chur church ch;; it forb forbad ade e all all laws laws respecting an establishment of religion. Engel Engel v. Vitale: Vitale: The establi establishm shment ent and free exercise clauses in certain instances overlap. The former does not depend upon any showing of dire direct ct gove govern rnmen menta tall comp compul ulsi sion on and and is viol violat ated ed by the the enac enactm tmen entt of laws laws whic which h establ establish ish an offici official al religio religion n whethe whetherr those those laws directly operate to coerce non-observing individuals or not. The former works also on the the beli belief ef that that a unio union n of gove govern rnmen mentt and and reli religi gion on tends tends to dest destroy roy gove govern rnme ment nt and and degrade religion. The The neut neutra rali lity ty of whic which h the the Court Court’s ’s case cases s speak speak thus thus stem stem from the recogn recogniti ition on from from history of the tendency of religious sects to fuse governmental and religious functions or cause a concert of dependence of one upon the other placing State support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies.

Test for Establishment Clause: 1. Existe Existence nce of of a secula secularr legisl legislati ative ve purpos purpose e 2. The prim primary ary effec effectt that that neithe neitherr advanc advances es nor inhibits religion.

Test for Free Exercise Clause: 1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against anyone in the practice























ENGEL vs. VITALE VI TALE

04/03/62 Black, J. FACTS: Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School Dist Distri rict ct 9, acti acting ng unde underr New New York York Stat State e law, law, composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start of each each cla class that that went went:: "Alm "Almig ight hty y God, God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." The program was supported by the NY State Board of Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting that use of this this offi offici cial al pray prayer er in the the publ public ic scho school ols s was was cont contra rary ry to the the beli belief efs, s, reli religi gion ons, s, or reli religi giou ous s practices of both themselves and their children. NY CA sust sustai aine ned d an orde orderr of the the lowe lowerr stat state e cour courts ts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents' objection. petitioners appealed. petitoners : prayer violates the non-establishment of religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the State's use of the Regents' prayer in its public school system brea breach ches es the the cons consti titu tuti tion onal al wall wall of sepa separa ratio tion n between Church and State.)

prayer is "non-de "non-denom nomina ination tional" al";; the respondents : prayer program, program, as modified modified and approved approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. ISSUE: WON WON the the establ establish ish

pra prayer yer is a relig eligio ious us exer exerc cise, ise, the the t of which which is prohibi prohibited ted by th 1st

ther there e was was a stat state e reli religi gion on,, many many peop people le who who held held contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the time time of the adoption adoption of the Constitut Constitution ion,, our history history shows that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal personal experience, that one of the greatest greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Governm Government ent's 's placin placing g its offici official al stamp stamp of approv approval al upon one partic particula ularr kind kind of prayer prayer or one particular form of religious services. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leaving the government of this country in the hands hands of the people people rather rather than in the hands of any mona monarc rch. h. But this this safe safegu guar ard d was was not not enou enough gh.. Ou Ourr Founders were no more willing to let the content of their prayers prayers and their their privil privilege ege of prayin praying g whenev whenever er they they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these these vital vital matters matters of persona personall consci conscienc ence e depend depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Gove Govern rnme ment nt would would be used used to cont contro rol, l, supp suppor ortt or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say -- that the people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office. Under that that Amendmen Amendment's t's prohibi prohibition tion agains againstt governm government ental al establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the the Four Fourtee teent nth h Amen Amendm dment ent,, gove govern rnme ment nt in this this coun countr try, y, be it stat state e or feder federal al,, is witho without ut powe powerr to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used used as an offi offici cial al pray prayer er in carr carryi ying ng on any any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. The history of governmental governmentally ly established established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of reli religi gion on,, the the inev inevit itab able le resu result lt had had been been that that it had had incurr incurred ed the the hatred, hatred, disresp disrespect ect and even even contem contempt pt of those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. re: respondents first argument Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the stud stud ts is lunt lunt to fr it fr th

























ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS

FACTS:

Ohio Ohio's 's Pilo Pilott Proj Projec ectt Scho Schola lars rshi hip p Prog Progra ram m give gives s educational educational choices to families in any Ohio school distri district ct that that is under under state state contro controll pursua pursuant nt to a federal-court order. The program provides tuition aid for certai certain n studen students ts in the Clevela Cleveland nd City City School School Dist Distri rict ct,, the the only only cove covere red d dist distri rict ct,, to atte attend nd part partic icip ipat atin ing g publ public ic or priv privat ate e scho school ols s of thei theirr parent's choosing and tutorial aid for students who choose choose to remain remain enroll enrolled ed in public public school. school. Both Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate, as may public schools in adjacent school dist distri rict cts. s. Tuit Tuitio ion n aid aid is dist distri ribu buted ted to pare parent nts s according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enro enroll ll thei theirr chil childr dren en.. The The numb number er of tuto tutori rial al assistance grants provided to students remaining in public school must equal the number of tuition aid scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of the partic participa ipating ting privat private e school schools s had a religi religious ous affi affili liat ation ion,, none none of the the adja adjace cent nt publ public ic scho school ols s participated, and 96% of the students participating in the the scho schola lars rshi hip p prog progra ram m were were enro enroll lled ed in religi religious ously ly affil affiliat iated ed school schools. s. Sixty Sixty percen percentt of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. Cleveland schoolchildren also have the option of enrolling in community schools, which are funded under state law but run by their own school boards and and rece receiv ive e twic twice e the the perper-st stud uden entt fund fundin ing g as partic participa ipatin ting g privat private e school schools, s, or magnet magnet school schools, s, which are public schools emphasizing a particular

undert undertaki aking ng to provid provide e educati educationa onall opport opportunit unities ies to children in a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion and permits participation of all all dist distri rict ct schoo schools ls---re reli ligi giou ous s or nonr nonreli eligi gious ous---an and d adjace adjacent nt public public school schools. s. The only only preferen preference ce in the program is for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and have priority for admission. Rather than crea creati ting ng fina financ ncia iall ince incent ntiv ives es that that skew skew it towar towards ds reli religi giou ous s scho school ols, s, the the prog progra ram m crea create tes s fina financ ncia iall disi disinc ncen enti tives ves:: Priva Private te schoo schools ls recei receive ve only only half half the the government assistance given to community schools and one-th one-third ird that that given given to magnet magnet school schools, s, and adjace adjacent nt public public schools schools would would receiv receive e two to three three times times that that given to private schools. Families too have a financial disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private school tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet, or traditi traditional onal public public school school.. No reason reasonabl able e observ observer er would think that such a neutral private choice program carries with it the imprimatur of gove govern rnme ment nt endors endorsemen ement. t. Nor is there there eviden evidence ce that that the progra program m fails fails to provid provide e genuin genuine e opportu opportunit nities ies for Clevel Cleveland and parents parents to select select secula secularr educati educationa onall options options:: Their Their children may remain in public school as before, remain in publ public ic scho school ol with with funded funded tutor tutorin ing g aid, aid, obta obtain in a schola scholarsh rship ip and choose choose to attend attend a religi religious ous school school,, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet magnet school. school. The Establishment Establishment Clause question question wheth whether er Ohio Ohio is coerci coercing ng parents parents into into sendin sending g their their chil childr dren en to relig religio ious us scho school ols s must must be answ answere ered d by evaluating all opti option ons s Ohio Ohio prov provid ides es Clev Clevel elan and d scho school olch chil ildr dren en,, only only one one of whic which h is to obta obtain in a scho schola lars rshi hip p and and then then choo choose se a reli religi giou ous s scho school ol.. Cl land land's 's nd of ligi ligi ly affi affili liat ated ed























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. . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity . . . ." no part part of the the proj projec ectt may may be used used for for sectarian sectarian instruction instruction,, religious religious worship, worship, or the programs of a divinity school. If, during this period (a period of 20 years), the the recipient ent viola olates the statut tutory ory conditions, the United States is entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to the original cost of the facility. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut receiving federal cons constr truc ucti tion on gran grants ts unde underr Titl Title e I were were named named as defenda defendants nts.. Federa Federall funds funds were were used used for five projects ects at these four our institutions institutions:: (1) a library library building building at Sacred Heart Heart Univer Universit sity; y; (2) a music, music, drama, drama, and arts arts buil buildi ding ng at Annh Annhur urst st Coll Colleg ege; e; (3) (3) a science building at Fairfield University; (4) a libr librar ary y buil buildi ding ng at Fair Fairfi fiel eld; d; and and (5) (5) a langua language ge labora laboratory tory at Albertu Albertus s Magnus Magnus College. Appellants attempted to show that the four recipi recipient ent instit instituti utions ons were were "secta "sectaria rian" n" by introducing evidence of their relations with religio religious us author authoriti ities, es, the the content content of their their curricula, and other indicia of their religious character. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliation

religi religious ous activi activity." ty." Every Every analys analysis is must must begin begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or absent. There is only a cumulative criteria which is this: Against this background we consider four questions: a)

does does the Act refle reflect ct a secula secularr legisl legislat ativ ive e purpose? Yes

~> Unit United ed Stat States es requi require re that that the the yout youth h be assu assured red ample opportunity for the fullest development of their intel intelle lect ctua uall capa capaci citi ties. es. This This expre express sses es a legi legiti tima mate te secular secular objective objective entirely entirely appropriate appropriate for governmental governmental action. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect effect advanc advances es religi religion. on. The Act itself itself was careful carefully ly drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants and loans only for academic facilities that will be used for define defined d secula secularr purpos purposes es and express expressly ly prohib prohibits its their use for religious instruction, training, or worship. None of the four church-related institutions in this case has violated the statutory restrictions. There had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them; There e is no used used solely solely for nonrel nonreligi igious ous purpos purposes. es. Ther evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination.























indoct indoctrin rinati ation on so there there is less less likeli likelihoo hood d than than in primar primary y and second secondary ary school schools s that that religi religion on will will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities. ~> The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the nonideological character of the aid that that the Government Government provides provides.. Neutral, Neutral, or non-ideologi non-ideological cal services, services, facilities, facilities, or materials materials are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the the scho school ol that that they they atte attend nd.. Faci Facili liti ties es are are religiously neutral. ~> Gove Govern rnme ment nt aid aid here here is a oneone-ti time, me, sing single le-purpose construction grant. There are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies. *these *these three three taken taken togeth together er shape shape a narrow narrow and limited relationship bet church and govt to become in danger of realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect. d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion in violation of the 1 st amendment? No. except of course that part of 20 year limitation… ~> Appellants, however, are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.

ISSUES:

1. Did Did the the Peti Petiti tion on for for Decl Declar arat ator ory y Reli Relief ef rais raise e a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did Did respon responden dentt have have any any legal legal stan standi ding ng to file file the the Petition for Declaratory Relief? 2. Did Did the the RTC RTC Deci Decisi sion on conf confor orm m to the the form form and and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public public office office? ? Coroll Corollari arily, ly, may they they be banned banned from from campaigning against said candidates?" HELD & RATIO:

1. NO. NO. SJS SJS mise misera rabl bly y fail failed ed to alle allege ge an exis existi ting ng controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. respondents. Further, the Petition Petition did not sufficiently sufficiently state what specific legal right of the SJS was violated by the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. Constitution. There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate facts on which it relies on its pleading for its claim. SJS merel merely y spec specul ulat ated ed or anti antici cipa pated ted witho without ut fact factua uall moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men to public office who would in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government" & "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the the peop people le’s ’s fait faith h in the the elec electo tora rall proc proces ess; s; & reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine























2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused refused due course course or denied denied without without stating stating the basis therefor." Elementary Elementary due process process demands demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how how the the cas case was was dec decided ided,, as well ell as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The significance of factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reachi reaching ng judgmen judgment, t, the judge judge did so throug through h the processes of legal reasoning.

Indeed, Indeed, the assail assailed ed Decisi Decision on was render rendered ed in clear clear viol violat atio ion n of the the Const Constitu ituti tion on,, beca becaus use e it made made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally legally inexistent. inexistent. Consequently, Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify. Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned."

MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS

Essential Parts of a Good decision: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Stat Statem emen entt of of the the cas case e Stat Statem emen entt of the the fac facts ts Issues Cour Courtt ruli ruling ng,, in whic which h each each issue issue is, is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved 5. Disp Dispos osit itiv ive e port portio ion n

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA

FACTS: o

The assailed decision did not include a resolutory or disp dispos osit itiv ive e port portion ion.. It is merel merely y an answ answer er to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively

the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippines agency established in November of 1898























(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila Manila,, Nos. Nos. 3000, 3000, as amende amended, d, and 2529, 3028 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!! (2) whethe whetherr said said ordina ordinanc nces es are inappl inapplica icable ble,, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged busine business ss of distri distribut bution ion and sale of bibles bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YES invalid! HELD:

*The only essential difference that We find between between these two provision provisions s that that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles articles mentioned mentioned therein, therein, shall not be in excess excess of P500 P500 per annum, annum, the corres correspon pondin ding g section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the the orig origina inall stat statut ute e are are pres preserv erved ed and and may may be enforc enforced, ed, since since the reenact reenactmen mentt neutra neutraliz lizes es the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without inte interr rrup upti tion on", ", We hol hold that that the the ques uestion tioned ed ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect. *The *The cons consti titu tuti tion onal al guar guaran anty ty of the the free free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and

of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading Spreading religious religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . . *It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engage engaged d in the busin business ess or occupa occupation tion of sellin selling g said said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. *Ord *Ordin inan ance ce No. No. 3000 3000 cann cannot ot be cons consid ider ered ed unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordi Ordina nanc nce e No. No. 2529 2529 of the the City City of Mani Manila la,, as amende amended, d, is not applic applicabl able e to plaint plaintiff iff-ap -appell pellant ant and defenda defendantnt-app appell ellee ee is powerle powerless ss to licens license e or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated befo before, re, it woul would d impa impair ir plai plaint ntif iff' f's s righ rightt to the the free free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

























Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to rema remain in sile silent nt and and stan stand d at atten attenti tion on.. SecE SecEd d denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued. ISSUE:

WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional RATIONALE:

The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield.

Thi This s cour courtt lean leans s towar towards ds Gobit Gobitis is deci decisi sion on.. Spec Specia iall circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the students although attendance in schools is mandatory turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories. Fortunately Fortunately,, the law requiring requiring compulsory compulsory enrollment here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to attend school. When Whenev ever er a man man enjo enjoys ys the the bene benefi fits ts of soci society ety and and community life he becomes a member and must give up some some of his his righ rights ts for for the the gene genera rall welf welfar are e just just like like everyb everybody ody else. else. The practi practice ce of religi religion on is subjec subjectt to reason reasonabl able e and non-di non-discr scrima imantor ntory y regulat regulation ion by the state. Prin Prince ce vs. vs. Commo Commonw nwea ealt lth h of Mass Massac achu huse sets ts:: Sara Sarah h Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religious pamphl pamphlets ets.. Court Court said said that that state state can limit control control of parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoes























ISSUE:

Wheth Whether er or not not scho school ol chil childr dren en who who are are members members of a religi religious ous sect sect known known as Jehova Jehovah’s h’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and and priv privat ate) e) for for refu refusi sing ng,, on acco accoun untt of thei theirr religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony. RATIO:

It has been held previously in the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a system of complete separation between church and stat state, e, the the flag flag is utte utterl rly y devoi devoid d of any any reli religi giou ous s sign signif ific ican ance ce and and there therefor fore e salu salutin ting g it is not not a reli religi giou ous s cere ceremon mony. y. The The requ requir ireme ement nt of the the flag flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory scho school ol regu regula lati tion on appl applic icab able le to stud studen ents ts and and teachers regardless of their religion. While the necessity to develop such respect for the flag and respect for the country still persists unti untill toda today, y, there there is recog recogni niti tion on that that reli religi gious ous

expulsion of the members will violated their right as citizens under the Constitution to receive free education which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education applicable to all. 

closin ing, g, the the cour courtt hope hopes s that that it will will not not take take  in clos anot anothe herr fore foreig ign n inva invasi sion on of our our coun countr try y for for our our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag as what happened during WWII.

NEWDOW vs. U.S. CONGRESS

FACTS:

1.

Newdow is an atheist whose daughter attends publ public ic eleme element ntar ary y scho school ol in the the Elk Elk Grov Grove e























Yes. Yes. Case Case rema remand nded ed for for furt furthe herr proc procee eedi ding ngs s consistent with our holding. Plaintiff to recover costs on his appeal. Court used three tests to determi determine ne the RATIO: Court validity of the added words. Lemon test - To survive the "Lemon test," the government conduct in question (1) must have a secular purp purpos ose, e, (2) (2) must must have have a prin princi cipa pall or primar primary y effect effect that that neithe neitherr advanc advances es nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excess excessive ive governm government ent entang entangleme lement nt with with religion. Hist Histor oric ical ally ly,, the the prim primar ary y purpo purpose se of the the 1954 Act was to advance religion, in conflict with the first prong of the Lemon test. The federal defendants "do not dispute that the wor words ds 'und 'under er God' God' were were inte intend nded ed"" "to "to recognize a Supreme Being," at a time when the the gove govern rnmen mentt was was publ public icly ly inve inveig ighin hing g

-

Similarly, the school district policy also fails the Lemon test. Although it survives the first prong of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes, the school district had the secular purpose of fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon prong asks whether the challenged government action action is suffic sufficien iently tly likely likely to be perceiv perceived ed by adherents adherents of the controlling controlling denominations denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disa disapp ppro rova val, l, of thei theirr indi indivi vidu dual al reli religi giou ous s choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as disc discus usse sed d abov above, e, part partic icul ular arly ly with within in the the conf confin ined ed envi environ ronme ment nt of the the clas classr sroo oom, m, the the policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible message of endorsement to some and disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and fails the Lemon test























2) (Reversed and Remanded)

ANUCENSION vs. NLU

FACTS:

In a Colle Collect ctiv ive e Barg Bargai aini ning ng Agree Agreemen mentt betw between een Hacienda Hacienda Luisita Luisita and the United United Luisita Luisita Workers’ Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for those who were members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the time time of the the agree agreemen ment, t, all all emplo employee yees s woul would d be required to join the Union and must stay in the Unio Union n to be able able to reta retain in empl employ oyme ment nt in the the Hacienda. In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting any any of thei theirr membe members rs from from join joinin ing g any any outs outsid ide e associ associati ation on or organi organizat zation ion.. Members Members of Ingles Inglesia ia

The cons onstitutiona onality of RA 3350 was attacked the Union and struck down by the Cour Courtt of Indu Indus stria triall Relat elatio ions ns on the the following grounds: A) it abrid abridges ges the freedom freedom of work workers ers to form associations B) it impai impairs rs the the obligat obligation ion of of contra contracts cts C) it discriminates in favor of the religi religious ous sect sect Ingles Inglesia ia ni Cristo Cristo in viol violat atio ion n of the the con constit stitut utio ion nal provision provision prohibiting prohibiting legislation legislation for the support of any religious sect D) it deni denies es equa equall prote protect ction ion A) On the the first first clai claim, m, the the Cour Courtt said said that that both both the the Cons Consti ti and and RA 875 875 (the (the origin original al Indust Industria riall Peace Peace Act, Act, later amended by RA 3350) recognized recognized freedom of association association.. RA 875 875 prov provid ides es for for the the formi forming ng,, joining or assisting of labor























tem tempor poral, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve rve the secula secularr purpose purpose of advanc advancing ing the consti constituti tutiona onall right right to the free exercise of religion. D) The The Cour Courtt here ere dis discus cussed sed on equa equall prot protec ectio tion, n, not bein being g a guaran guaranty ty of equali equality. ty. It allows allows classification. Here we see that the classi classific ficati ation on is based based on real and important differences, differences, as religious beliefs are not mere beliefs or ideas, bit are motives of certain rules of human conduct. conduct. Such classific classification ation is therefore valid.

IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA

the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the responden respondentt Board Board did not act with grave grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhib exhibit itio ion n on TV of the the thre three e seri series es of “Ang “Ang Igle Iglesi sia a ni Cris Cristo to”” on the the grou ground nd that that the the materials constitute an attack against another religi religion. on. It also also found the the series series “indecen “indecent, t, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”

ISSUES:

1.

WoN th the Bo Board ha has th the po power to to re review peti petiti tione oner’ r’s s TV prog progra ram m “Ang “Ang Igle Iglesi sia a ni Cristo,”

2.

Assuming it it ha has th the po power, wh whether or or no not the Board Board gravel gravely y abused abused its discre discretio tion n when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an

























belief belief is translat translated ed into external external acts that affect fect the pub public welfare fare.. Where here the the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State (Isagani Cruz) •

(Cruz) It is error to think that the mere invo invoca cati tion on of reli religi giou ous s free freedo dom m will will stalemate the State and render it impotent

“attacks against another religion” in x-rating the

religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order order prohib prohibiti iting ng the broadc broadcas astt of petiti petitioner oner’s ’s televi televisio sion n program. program. The ground ground “attack “attack agains againstt anoth nother er relig eligiion” on” was was mere merely ly added dded by the the i respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the doctrine that administrative























Ponente: CJ Burger FACTS:

McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chat Chatta tano noog oga, a, Tenn Tenn., ., filed filed as a cand candid idat ate e for dele delega gate te to the the cons consti titu tuti tion onal al conv conven enti tion on.. An opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that that McDani McDaniel el was isqualif isqualified ied from from servin serving g as a

government-sponsored, church. In light of this history and a widespread awareness during that period of undue and often often dominan dominantt cleric clerical al influe influence nce in public public and political political affairs here, in England, England, and on the Continent, Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were held by some that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep clerg clergym ymen en out out of publ public ic offi office ce.. As the the valu value e of the the disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some types of public office gradually abandoned that limitation. The essence























FACTS:

On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50 busine businessm ssmen, en, studen students ts and office office employe employees es and who who were were membe members rs of the the Aug Augus ustt Twent Twentyy-On One e Movement (ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jud Jude e Chap Chapel el,, whic which h adjo adjoin ins s the the Mala Malaca caña ñang ng grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow t-

admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties… observe honesty and good faith." Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of reli religi gion on is genu genuin ine e and and vali valid, d, stil stilll resp respon onden dents ts reaction reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action action may not be charac characteri terized zed as violat violative ive of the freedom freedom of religi religious ous wor worsh ship ip.. Sinc Since e 1972, 1972, when when mobs mobs of demon demonst stra rator tors s crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its























2. Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street reet,, the wisdom and reas reason onab able lene nes ss of whic hich have have alr already eady been een discussed, discussed, is allowed allowed under the fundamental fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national security. Petition dismissed.

Resp Respon onden dents ts them themse selv lves es in the the Soli Solici citor tor Gene General ral's 's commen commentt admit admit that that "true, "true, there were were only only about about 80 persons persons in petitio petitioners ners'' group group on Octobe Octoberr 2 and this numb number er coul could d hard hardly ly pose pose the the dang danger er feare feared," d," but but expressed the fear that petitioners' ranks could within hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful dispersal becomes impossible as in recent demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full control and there is no question as to the capability of the the secu securi rity ty forc forces es to ward ward off off and and stop stop any any























ISSUES:

WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to provide medical services to a child. -  YES The duty to provide sufficient support for a child is lega legall lly y enfor enforce ceab able le in a civi civill proce proceedi eding ng agai agains nstt a pare parent nt.. A brea breach ch of that that duty duty is a misdeme misdemeano anor. r. Where Where necess necessary ary to protec protectt a chil child' d's s well well-b -bei eing ng,, the the Comm Common onwea wealth lth may may intervene, over the parents' objections, to assure

•

•

phys physic ical al,, educa educati tiona onall or mora morall care care and and guidance shall be punished." The STP was added in 1971. Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1 any reference reference to willful willful failure failure to provid provide e nece necess ssar ary y and and prop proper er phys physic ical al care care and and limited any violation to matters of failure to supp suppor ort. t. Neve Nevert rthe hele less ss,, the the STP STP was was retained. Because of the 1986 amendment, the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RATIO:

When Whenev ever er a defe defend ndan ant, t, at the the trial trial of his his case case,, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-exami cross-examination nation but compelled to write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse vs. Com. However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specim specimen en of his handwrit handwriting ing.. We cite cite this this case case particularly because the cour ourt the there gave promine prominence nce to the defendant defendant's 's right right to declin decline e to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against against the petitioner petitioner for the supposed supposed falsificat falsification, ion, and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; fingers; writing writing is not a purely purely mechan mechanica icall and attention attention;; and in the the case case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the peti petiti tion on of the the resp respon onden dentt fisc fiscal al clea clearl rly y stat states es.. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his hand handwr writ itin ing, g, for for in both both case cases, s, the the witn witnes ess s is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evid eviden ence ce whic which h does does not not exis exist, t, and and whic which h may may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's hand handwr writ itin ing g is not not gran grante ted, d, the the crim crime e woul would d go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a munic municip ipal al treas treasur urer, er, acco accord rdin ing g to Exhi Exhibi bitt A, it shoul should d not not be a diff diffic icul ultt matt matter er for for the the fisc fiscal al to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or spec specim imen ens s with withou outt reso resort rtin ing g to the the mean means s comp compla lain ined ed of here herein in,, that that is not not reas reason on for for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the consti constituti tution. on. It might might be true true that that in some some cases cases crim crimin inal als s may may succ succeed eed in evad evadin ing g the the hand hand of

Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other witnesses witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be under underst stoo ood d to have have waiv waived ed thei theirr cons constit titut utio iona nall privilege, as they could certainly do. "The privil privilege ege not to give give self-i self-incr ncrimi iminat nating ing eviden evidence, ce, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it."

CABAL vs. KAPUNAN

FACTS:

Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint chargi charging ng Manuel Manuel Cabal, Cabal, then then AFP Chief Chief of Staff, Staff, with with “gra “graft ft and and corr corrup uptt prac practi tice ces, s, unexp unexpla lain ined ed weal wealth th,, conduct unbecoming…dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the Preside President nt create created d a committ committee ee (3 former former justic justices, es, 2 generals) generals) to investigate investigate the administrat administrative ive charge charge and submit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right against self-incriminatn. Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to his right to refuse refuse to answer incrimina incriminatory tory questions. questions. Cabal still still refused. refused. Committee Committee referred matter matter to City Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal of contem contempt pt under under sectio section n 580 of RAC. RAC. Respon Responden dentt jud judge ge Kapu Kapuna nan n ordere ordered d peti petiti tione onerr to show show caus cause. e. Instea Instead d petiti petitioner oner tried tried to have have charges charges against against him quashed. Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to answer answer incrim incrimina inatory tory ?s and take take the witnes witness s stand. stand. Thus, the issue is: ISSUE:

WON the procee proceedin dings gs before before the committee committee is civil civil or crim crimin inal al,, deter determi mini ning ng won won Caba Caball may may invo invoke ke righ rightt against self-incrimination HELD

Yes. Yes. Alth Althou ough gh techn technic ical ally ly a civi civill proce proceed edin ing, g, as a cons conseq eque uenc nce e of forfe forfeit iture ure bein being g in the the natu nature re of a pena penalt lty, y, proc proceed eedin ings gs for for forf forfeit eitur ure e of prop proper erty ty are are deeme deemed d crimi crimina nall in subs substan tance ce and and effe effect ct.. Henc Hence, e, exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be witnesses against himself is proper. RATIO:

The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft Law which which author authorize izes s the forfeitur forfeiture e of the State State of























transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to the sovereign power.

4.

WON the the inquiry inquiry viol violate ates s the petiti petitione oners’ rs’ right right to due due process. NO.

Moreov Moreover, er, where where the position position of the witness witness is is virtually that of an accused on trial, as in the case at bar, he may invoke the right against self elfincrim incrimina inatio tion n in suppor supportt of a blanket blanket refusal refusal to answer any and all questions.

RATIO:

1. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Consti Constituti tution on provid provided ed for an elabora elaborate te system system of chec checks ks and and bala balanc nces es to secu secure re coor coordi dina nati tion on in the the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.

BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

(20 November 1991) Ponente: J. Padilla FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Gove Govern rnan ance ce (PCGG PCGG), ), fil filed a compl ompla aint int with with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG PCGG alle allege ge,, amon among g othe others rs,, that that:: defe defend ndan ants ts (petitioners (petitioners therein) Benjamin Benjamin “Kokoy” “Kokoy” Romualdez Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of former former Presid President ent Marcos Marcos and First First Lady Lady Imelda Imelda Romu Romual alde dezz Marc Marcos os,, enga engage ged d in sche scheme mes s and and strata stratagems gems to unjust unjustly ly enrich enrich themse themselves lves at the expe expens nse e of the the Fili Filipi pino no peop people le.. Amon Among g thes these e stra strata tage gems ms are are (1) (1) obta obtain ined ed cont contro roll of some some bigb bigbus usin ines ess s ente enterp rpri rise ses s such such as MERA MERALC LCO, O, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that that P2 bill billio ion, n, (3) (3) coll collab abor orat ated ed with with lawy lawyer ers s (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misu misusi sing ng the the Mera Meralc lco o Pensi Pension on Fu Fund nd wort worth h P25 P25 millio million, n, and in clever cleverly ly hiding hiding behind behind the veil of corporate entity.

On 13 Septemb September er 1988, 1988, Sen. Sen. Juan Juan Ponce Ponce Enrile Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-o take-over ver of SolOil SolOil Incorpo Incorporat rated ed by Ricard Ricardo o Lopa Lopa (who (who died died during during the pendenc pendency y of this this case) case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Senate Committee Committee on Accountability Accountability of Public Public Officer Officers s or Blue Blue Ribbon Ribbon Commit Committee tee (SBRC) (SBRC) starte started d its investig investigati ation on throug through h a hearin hearing g on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The The SBRC SBRC reject rejected ed petition petitioner er Bengzo Bengzon’s n’s plea plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that that the SBRC, SBRC, in requir requiring ing their their attend attendanc ance e and testimo testimony, ny, acted acted in excess excess of its jurisd jurisdict iction ion and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES:

2 and 3. Sec 21 2 1, Ar A rt V I of of th t he Co C onsti pr p rovides: “The Senate… may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The The powe powerr of both both hous houses es of Cong Congre ress ss to cond conduc uctt inquries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unli unlimit mited ed.. With With rega regard rd to the the righ rights ts that that shal shalll be respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of Rights Rights,, partic particula ularly rly the the right right to due process process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contem contempla plated ted legisl legislati ation; on; he merely merely called called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of Pres Presid iden entt Aqui Aquino no,, part partic icul ular arly ly Rica Ricard rdo o Lopa Lopa,, had had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 36/39 corpor corporati ations ons of Kokoy Kokoy Romual Romualdez dez to the Lopa Lopa Group. Ther There e appe appear ars s no inte intend nded ed legi legisl slat atio ion n involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 4 (SR 212), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 212 is to look into the charges agai agains nstt PCGG PCGG file filed d by stoc stockh khol olde ders rs of Orie Orient ntal al Petrol Petroleum eum in connec connection tion with with the impleme implementa ntation tion of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution. Mr. Lopa and the the peti petiti tion oner ers s are not not conn onnecte ected d with ith the the government and did their acts as private citizens; hence, such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. In fact, the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before before the SBRC did. did. The inquiry inquiry of the the respon respondent dent committee committee into the same justiciable justiciable controversy controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction. 4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti to an individual individual is the right against self-incri self-incriminati mination. on. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them (Chavez v CA ). ). This extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if























Held: Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from compel compellin ling g the petiti petitione oners rs and interv intervenor enor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

GALMAN vs. PAMARAN

Cuevas, J. 08/30/85 FACTS:

After the death of Ninoy, Marcos issued PD 1886, crea creati ting ng the the Agrav grava a Factact-F Findi indin ng Boa Board to invest investiga igate te on the traged tragedy. y. The statut statute e gave gave the board broad powers, among them : Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in direct direct or indire indirect ct contem contempt, pt, and impose impose appropriate penalties. A person person guilty guilty...i ...incl ncludi uding. ng...re ..refus fusal al to be swor sworn n or to answ nsweras eras a witne itness ss or to subscribe to an affidavit or disposition when lawful lawfully ly requir required ed to do so may be summarily summarily adjudged adjudged in direct direct contempt contempt by the Board. Sec. Sec. 5 No pers person on shal shalll be excus excused ed from from attending and testifying...on the ground that his testimony testimony or eviden evidence ce requir required ed of him may to incriminate him...but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any trans transac actio tion, n, matt matter er or thin thing g conc concer erni ning ng which he is compelled, after having having invoked his privilege privilege against against self-incri self-incriminat mination, ion, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual son testifying shall not be exempt from from pros prosec ecut utio ion n and and puni punish shme ment nt fro fro perjury committed in so testifying... Sec 12. The findings...shall be made public. Should Should it warran warrantt the prosec prosecuti ution on of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint complaint with the appropriate appropriate gov't agency. Among those who were called in by the Board were private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of the the Agra Agrava va Boar Board d and and both both were were pres presen ente ted d to Marcos; the majority report by board chair Justice Agra Agrava va and and the the mino minori rity ty repor reportt auth author ored ed by 4 others. They were turned over to the Tanodbayan, who filed two informations for murder (for the death of Ninoy, Ninoy, anothe anotherr for Roland Rolando o Galman Galman the other

resp respond onden ents ts befo before re the the Agra Agrava va boar board, d, to whic which h the the respondents respondents objected. objected. The Sandiganba Sandiganbayan yan resolved resolved to admit all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimoni testimonies es in view of he immuni immunity ty given by PD 1886. Peti etitioner oners s: (Saturni rnina & Reyn eynaldo Galman, Tanodbayan) 1. said said test testim imon onie ies s are are admi admiss ssib ible le beca becaus use e the the respondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by PD1886 2. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver. 3. righ rightt agai agains nstt self self-i -inc ncri rimi mina nati tion on func functio tions ns only only criminal cases Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al) 1. evidences cannot be used against against them as mandated mandated by Sec 5 PD1886 2. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause of Sec 5, the legal compulsion imposed by the 1st clause of the same Sec would be uncons unconstit titutio utional nal for being being violative of the right against self incrimination. ISSUE/HELD: w/n the testimonies of the respondents before the Board are admissible as evidence - NO RATIO: Though Though designated designated as a fact-findi fact-finding ng commission commission,, the Agrava board was for all intents and purposes an entity char charge ged d with with the the dete determ rmin inat atio ion n of the the pers person on/s /s crimin criminall ally y respon responsib sible le so that that they they may be brought brought befo efore the bar bar of justice. In the course of the the inves investi tiga gati tion on it is but but natu natura rall that that those those who who are are suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called in. And when suspects are summoned & called to testify, they are not merely "sheding light' on the incident, they are are in fact fact unde underg rgoi oing ng inve invest stig igat atio ion n (the (the crim crim law law defini definition tion,, which which in this this case case can be analog analogize ized d to a prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed to be read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to afford themselves the full protection of the law, which includes the right against self incrimination. In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents to testify on pain of contempt, that option has effectively been elimin eliminate ated. d. Howeve However, r, the rights rights of the accused accused,, being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act of cont contin inui uing ng to testi testify fy befor before e the the boar board d cann cannot ot be accepted as a valid waiver of the right to remain silent, because in the first place they had no option to do so. The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of Lefkowi owitz tz v NJ. NJ. The compulsion. Lefk The right right agains againstt selfselfincrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of te proceedings that controls. Cabal v Kapunan . The Court continues to rule that the private respondents were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but more broadly broadly the right right to due process. process. While it is true true that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of immunity,























from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. This the Court said is contrary to due process, as they were not appraised of their rights and also because such a "confession/ "confession/testi testimony" mony" is inadmissib inadmissible le under the exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti. In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality, the Court held that in view of the potent sanction found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec 5 of the same. Petition dismissed.

Makasiar, Makasiar, C.J. concurring: concurring: There can be no implied waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also, beca becaus use e of the the natu nature re of the the proc procee eedi ding ngs, s, the the invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature of a crim crimin inal al proc proceed eedin ing. g. the the respon responden dents ts were were under the impression it was not, thus they were not fully appraised of their rights. (Escolin, (Escolin, Dela Fuente, Fuente, Alampay Alampay hold essentially essentially a similar view) Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used in any subsequent proceeding. (Plana holds a similar view) Teeha Teehankee nkee,, dissen dissent: t: It is wrong wrong to exclud exclude e totally totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent nts. s. The The righ rightt agai agains nstt self self-incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is consid considered ered an option option of refusal refusal to answer answer,, not a prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at the proper time (according to him, the proper time was was during during the testim testimony ony to the the board) board);; a person person summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a Gonzal ales es v Sec Sec of crimin criminati ating ng answer answer is asked. asked. Gonz Labor . Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, they were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness before the Board could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right & privilege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntary or by subpoena, to invo invoke ke the the priv privil ilege ege and and refus refuse e to answ answer er as and and when when a ques questi tion on call callin ing g for for an incrim incrimina inatin ting g answer answer is propound propounded. ed. Failur Failure e to invoke this personal privilege automatically results in loss ipso facto .

E. Unlawful Search & Seizure STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO

Respondents-Judges : Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag, Mencias, Jimenez FACTS:

Upon application application of respondentsrespondents-prosec prosecutors, utors, several several judges judges issued, issued, on different dates, 42 search search warrants warrants agains againstt petiti petitione oners rs and/or and/or the corpor corporati ations ons of which which they were officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing all business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of the offense in violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.” Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null & void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court (ROC) because: 1. they do not desc escribe w/ particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized 2. cash cash money money not not mentio mentioned ned in the warr warrant ants s were were actually seized 3. they they were were issu issued ed to fish fish evide evidenc nce e agai agains nstt the the petiti petitioner oners s in deporta deportatio tion n cases cases filed filed agains againstt them 4. sear search ches es and seiz seizure ures s were made made in an illega illegall manner 5. the thing things s seized seized were were not deliv delivered ered to the the courts courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with the law Respondents-prosecutors alleged: 1. the search warrants are valid & issued in accordance with the law 2. the the defe defect cts, s, if any any were were cure cured d by peti petiti tion oner ers’ s’ consent 3. the the effe effect cts s seiz seized ed are admi admiss ssib ible le in evid eviden ence ce agai agains nstt here herein in peti petiti tion oners ers regar regardl dles ess s of the the alleged illegality of the searches and seizures The The SC issued issued writ writ of prelim prelim injunctio injunction n prayed prayed for. for. Howeve However, r, it was partiall partially y lifted lifted insofa insofarr as the papers, papers, docume documents nts,, and things things seized seized from from the offices offices of the corpor corporati ations ons are are concer concerned ned;; but, the injunc injunction tion was maintained as regards those seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the residences of petitioners. ON FIRST GROUP Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason that said corporations ons have their respecti ectiv ve personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the the part party y whos whose e righ rights ts have have been been impa impair ired ed thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search























corpor corporate ate office officers rs in procee proceedin dings gs agains againstt them them in their individual capacity.

things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to defeat its major objective, the elimination of general warrants.

(Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…) ISSUES: 1. WON WON the searc search h warran warrants ts in quest question ion,, and the searches and seizures are valid. NO 2. if inval invalid, id, WON WON said said docu documen ments, ts, pape papers, rs, and and thin things gs may may be used used in evid eviden ence ce agai agains nstt petitioners. NO RATIO:

Art III, Sec 1, par 3: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, houses, papers, papers, and effects effects against against unreasonab unreasonable le searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath oath or affi affirm rmat atio ion n of the the comp compla lain inan antt and and the the wit witne ness sses es he may may prod produc uce, e, and and part partic icul ular arly ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ISSUE #2 The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by respondents respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers and thin thing gs are admi admiss ssib ible le in evid eviden ence ce mus must be This ruling ruling is in line line with with Ameri America can n abandoned. This common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed to go free just “because the constable has blundered” upon the theory theory that that the consti constituti tutiona onall prohib prohibitio ition n against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by mean means s othe otherr than than the the exc exclusi lusion on of evi eviden dence unlawf unlawfull ully y obtain obtained ed (i.e. (i.e. action action for damage damages s agains againstt searching officer).

Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing only practica practicall means means of enforc enforcing ing the that this is the only constitutional injunction against against unreasonab unreasonable le searches searches and seizures. Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and

ISSUE #1 Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None None of thes these e has has been been comp compli lied ed with with in the the cont contes este ted d warr warran ants ts.. They They were were issu issued ed upon upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons persons named named had committed committed a “viola “violation tion of CB Laws, Laws, Tariff Tariff and Custom Custom Laws, Laws, Interna Internall Revenu Revenue e Code, and RPC.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probab probable le cause, cause, for the same same presup presuppos poses es the the intr introd oduc ucti tion on of comp compete etent nt proof proof that that the the part party y against who it is sought has performed particular acts, acts, or commit committed ted specific omissions, omissions, violating violating a given provision of our criminal laws. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental Const’l rights, for it would place the sanc sancti tity ty of the the domi domici cille and the the priv privac acy y of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general warrants . The The grav grave e viola iolati tion on of the the Cons Consti ti made made in the the application for the search warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects

seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of fishing eviden evidence ce of the commis commissio sion n of the crime. But then, this fishing expedition is indicative indicative of the absence absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

A. Citizenship & Alienage Art IV – CITIZENSHIP Section Section 1. The following are citizens of the

Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at

the time of the adoption of this Constitution; Those se whos whose e fat fathers hers or mot mothers hers are are [2] Tho citizens of the Philippines; Those born before before January January 17, 1973, of [3] Those

























Natural-born citizens are those Section 2. Natural-born who who are are citi citize zens ns of the the Phili Philippi ppine nes s from from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citiz citizens enship hip.. Thos Those e who who elect elect Philip Philippin pine e citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), (3), Sect Sectio ion n 1 here hereo of shall hall be deeme eemed d natural-born citizens. Section Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be

lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who

marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Dual al alleg allegia ianc nce e of citi citizen zens s is Sectio Section n 5. Du inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA

FACTS: July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immi Immigr grat atio ion n as a nati native ve born born Fili Filipi pino no citi citize zen n foll follow owin ing g the the citi citize zens nshi hip p of his his natu natura rall mothe mother, r, Marc Marcia iana na Gatcha Gatchali lian an.. Befo Before re the the Citi Citizen zensh ship ip Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has has 5 chil childr dren en with with his his wife wife Chu Chu Gim Gim Tee, Tee, name namely ly:: Jos Jose, Glor Gloria ia,, Franc rancis isco co,, Elena lena and Benjamin.

June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, then a twelve year year old minor, minor, arrived arrived in Manila Manila from from Hongko Hongkong ng together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They had had with with them them Certi Certifi fica cate tes s of Regis Registr trat ation ion and and

Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commis Commissio sioners ners to review review all cases where where entry entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citize citizen. n. Among Among those those cases cases was that of Willia William m and others. On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after proprio of the procee a review review motu proprio proceedin dings gs had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latt latter er and and ordere ordered d the the excl exclus usio ion n of, of, amon among g othe others rs,, respond respondent ent Gatcha Gatchalia lian. n. A warran warrantt of exclus exclusion ion was issu issued ed alle allegi ging ng that that "the "the deci decisi sion on of the the Board Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory.” Sometime in 1973: r espondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquir Inquiry y where where the deport deportion ion case case agains againstt them them was assigned. Marc March h 14, 14, 197 1973: the the Boa Board of Spec pecial ial Inq Inquiry uiry recommended recommended to the then Acting Acting Commissione Commissionerr Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then then Boar Board d of Comm Commis issi sion oners ers and and the the recal recalll of the the warrants of arrest issued therein. March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Spec Specia iall Inqu Inquir iry y ther thereb eby y admi admitt ttin ing g resp respon onde dent nt Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him. June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice Justice recommending recommending that respondent respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940. August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the reco recomm mmend endat ation ion of the the NBI NBI to the the Comm Commis issi sion oner er of Immigration for investigation and immediate action. August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration Immigration and Deportation Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent























alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in exce excess ss of juri jurisd sdic icti tion on in the the inst instit ituti ution on of deporta deportation tion proceed proceeding ings s agains againstt Willia William. m. On the same same day, day, res respond ponden entt Capu Capulo long ng issu issued ed the the questioned questioned temporary temporary restraining restraining order restraining restraining petiti petitioner oners s from from contin continuin uing g with the deporta deportatio tion n proceedings against William Gatchalian.

129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the the same same level evel or ran rank of the the RTC exc except ept thos those e specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.

Argument of the Petitioners: 1) resp respon onde dent nt judg judges es have have no juri jurisd sdic icti tion on over over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subjec subjectt matter matter of the the case, case, appell appellate ate jurisd jurisdict iction ion being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming assuming respondent respondent judges judges have jurisdiction, jurisdiction, they they acte acted d with with grav grave e abus abuse e of disc discre reti tion on in pree preemp mpti ting ng peti petiti tion oner ers s in the the exer exerci cise se of the the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discre discretion tion in ruling ruling that the issues issues raised raised in the deportation deportation proceedings proceedings are beyond the competence competence and jurisdiction of petitioners; and 4) resp respon ond dent ent judg judge e Capu Capulo long ng shoul hould d hav have dism dismis isse sed d the the case case in Vale Valenz nzue uela la for for foru forummshopping.

On the Bureau of Immigration’s jurisdiction to hear cases cases agains againstt alleg alleged ed alien aliens s and and determ determine ine their their citizenship Petitioners: Petitioners: Bureau of of Immigration Immigration has has the exclusive exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citize citizensh nship. ip. And a mere mere claim claim of citize citizensh nship ip cannot cannot operate operate to divest divest the Board Board of Commis Commissio sioner ners s of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.

Argument of the Respondents: 1) assu assumi ming ng that that the the evid eviden ence ce on reco record rd is not not suff suffic icie ien nt to decla eclare re him a Filip ilipin ino o citi citize zen, n, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously judiciously and fairly resolve resolve the question of respondent's respondent's citizenship citizenship in the the depor deporta tati tion on case case beca becaus use e of thei theirr bias bias,, prepre judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed On Appellate Jurisdiction Petitioners: under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court Court of Appe Appeal als s whic which h has has exclu exclusi sive ve appel appella late te juris jurisdic dictio tion n over over all final final judgme judgments nts or orders orders of quasiquasi-jud judici icial al agenci agencies, es, boards boards or commis commissio sions, ns, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry

Supreme Court: the Petitioners contention contention admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. concerned. Judicial Judicial intervention intervention,, should be granted granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that that there there are reason reasonabl able e ground grounds s to believ believe e that that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial intervention intervention should should be allowed. allowed. The competent competent court court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals. Ordina Ordinaril rily, y, the case would would then then be remande remanded d to the the Regi Region onal al Tria Triall Cour Court. t. But But not not in the the case case at bar. bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. On Arrest as Necessary Consequence of Warrant of Exclusion Petitioners: the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962.

Supr Supreme eme Court Court:: From From a peru perusa sall of Sec. Sec. 37 (a) of Commonw Commonweal ealth th Act No. 613, 613, as amende amended, d, otherw otherwise ise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clear that in matters of implementing implementing the Immigration Immigration Act insofar insofar as























Inqu Inquir iry y (BSI) (BSI) some someti time me in 1973. 1973. The The Boar Board d of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hea re-hearin ring, g, submit submitted ted a memoran memorandum dum to the then then Acti Acting ng Comm Commis issi sion oner er recom recommen mendi ding ng the the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board Board of Commis Commissio sioner ners s which which revers reversed ed the the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against against applicants applicants.. The memorandum memorandum infe inferr rred ed tha that the the "ver "very y bas basis of the the Boa Board of Commi Commiss ssio ioner ners s in revers reversin ing g the the deci decisi sion on of the the Boar Board d of Spec Specia iall Inqu Inquir iry y was was due due to a forg forged ed cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Hong Kong Kong auth author oriz izin ing g the the regi regist stra rati tion on of applic applicant ants s as P.I. P.I. citize citizens. ns."" The Board Board of Special Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity whi which ch took took the the plac lace of a pas passport port for for thei theirr authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applic applicant ants s could could have have entered entered illegal illegally, ly, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles entitles them to remain in in the country.” country.” On March March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. No. 1 deci decisi sion on date dated d July July 6, 1961 1961 admi admitt ttin ing g resp respond onden entt Gatc Gatcha hali lian an and and othe others rs as Fili Filipi pino no citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated revalidated their Identification Certificates. The order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent respondent William William Gatchalian Gatchalian continually continually exerc exercis ised ed the the righ rights ts of a Fili Filipi pino no citi citize zen n to the the pres presen ent. t. Cons Conseq eque uent ntly ly,, the the presu resump mpti tion on of citi citizen zensh ship ip lies lies in favo favorr of resp respon onde dent nt Will Willia iam m Gatchalian.. On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (procedural) Supreme Court: Court: There should should be no question question that that Sant Santia iago go Gatc Gatcha hali lian an,, gran grandf dfat athe herr of Will Willia iam m Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reve revers rsed ed the the July July 6, 1961 1961 BSI BSI orde order, r, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. In said order it was found that the applicants therein have have not not sati satisf sfac acto tori rily ly prove proven n that that they they are are the the chil childr dren en and/ and/or or gra grandc ndchild hildre ren n of Sant Santia iago go

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact fact that that respon responden dent's t's arrest arrest came came twentytwenty-eig eight ht (28) (28) yea years rs afte afterr the the alleg alleged ed caus cause e of depo deport rtat atio ion n aros arose. e. Sect Sectio ion n 37 (b) (b) of the the Immi Immigr grat atio ion n Act Act stat states es that that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause cause of deportation deportation arises." arises." The petitioners' petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein resp respond onden entt aros arose e in 1962 1962.. Howe However ver,, the the warr warran antt of arres arrestt of respon responden dentt was was issu issued ed by Commi Commiss ssio ioner ner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforc enforced ed by petiti petitione oners rs agains againstt respond respondent ent Willia William m Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. Nituda. The Court, Court, therefore, therefore, holds that that the period period of effecting effecting deportation deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse lapse of a certai certain n time, time, while while prescr prescript iption ion of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time. Thus, in the case at at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings proceedings against respondent respondent William William Gatchalian Gatchalian in 1990. 1990. Undoubt Undoubtedly edly,, petiti petitioner oners' s' cause cause of action action has alread already y prescri prescribed. bed. Neither Neither may an action action to revive revive and/ and/or or enfor enforce ce the the deci decisi sion on date dated d July July 6, 1962 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years. On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive) (substantive) Respon Responden dent’s t’s argument arguments s on his citize citizensh nship: ip: he has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports passports and earlier pass passpor ports ts as a Fili Filipi pino no.. He is a regi regist stere ered d vote voterr of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the the Inter nterna nati tion ona al Poly Polyme merr Corp Corp.. and and Rope Ropema man n























marr marria iage ges s cann cannot ot be cons consid idere ered d vali valid. d. Henc Hence, e, Santiago's Santiago's children, children, including including Francisco, Francisco, followed followed the citize citizensh nship ip of their their mother, mother, having having been born born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been een demons demonstra trated ted,, Willia William m and Johnso Johnson n follow followed ed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santia Santiago go Gatcha Gatchalia lian n much much more more on respon responden dentt William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Jap Japan anes ese e occu occupa pati tion on of Chin China. a. Neit Neithe herr was was Francisco Francisco Gatchalian Gatchalian's 's testimony testimony subjected subjected to the same same scru scruti tiny ny by the the Boar Board d of Spec Specia iall Inqu Inquir iry. y. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Franci Francisco sco Gatcha Gatchalia lian n before before the Philip Philippin pine e consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as stat statem emen ents ts or decl declar arat atio ions ns rega regard rdin ing g fami family ly reput reputat ation ion or trad tradit ition ion in matt matters ers of pedi pedigr gree. ee. celebrationis onis , Philippine Philippine law, following following the lex loci celebrati adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see Art. 26 of the Family Family Code). Code). Thus, Thus, he who asserts asserts that that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. Having declared the assailed assailed marriages as valid, valid, respondent respondent William Gatc Gatcha hali lian an foll follow ows s the the citi citize zens nshi hip p of his his fath father er Franci Francisco sco,, a Filipi Filipino, no, as a legiti legitimat mate e child child of the latter. Francisco Francisco,, in turn is likewise a Filipino Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latt latter er)) is admi admitt tted edly ly a Fili Filipi pino no citi citize zen n whos whose e Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting: On Appellate Jurisdiction I can easily easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the proces process, s, determi determine ne also also their their citize citizensh nship, ip, and that that "a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the petit etitio ion ners ers in G.R G.R. No. No. 95122 5122--23, 23, the the Boa Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred referred to as the Boards Boards,, are quasiquasi-jud judici icial al bodies bodies.. However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that that this this Court Court should should,, in this instan instance, ce, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the excepti exceptions ons for the benefit benefit of Mr. Gatchalia Gatchalian. n. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine . On Respondent’s forum shopping William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counterpeti petiti tion on,, he is now now befo before re this this Cour Courtt in an acti active ve offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately deliberately chose, chose, instea instead, d, to separa separately tely go to the wrong wrong court, court, eviden evidently tly to delay delay the proceed proceeding ings s before before the Boards Boards,, which they accomplished when the two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation























Accordi Accordingl ngly, y, a warran warrantt of exclusi exclusion, on, also also dated dated 6 Jul July y 1962 1962,, was was issu issued ed by the the Comm Commis issi sion oners ers comm comman andi ding ng the the depo deport rtat ation ion offi office cerr to excl exclud ude e William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their remov removal al from from the the coun countr try y on the the firs firstt avai availa labl ble e transportation in accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were nationals. If indeed indeed Santia Santiago' go's s parents parents,, Pablo Pablo Pachec Pacheco o and Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that that he, is an illegi illegitim timate ate son? The only possib possible le reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to the presump presumptio tions ns of validi validity ty of marria marriage, ge, the indi indiss ssol olub ubil ilit ity y of the the marr marria iage ge bonds bonds and and the the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among among the presum presumpti ptions ons which which the ponencia precise precisely ly applie applied d when when it reject rejected ed the petiti petitioner oners' s' claim that Santiago failed to establish his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find any any vali valid d just justif ific icat atio ion n why why these these pres presum umpt ptio ions ns shoul should d be libe libera rall lly y appl applie ied d in favo favorr of clai claimed med marriages marriages allegedly celebrated celebrated abroad abroad but denied to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines. Assumi Assuming ng that that indeed indeed Willia William m is the grandson grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not not ment mentio ion n him him in his his test testim imon ony y befo before re the the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that that the the proc proceed eedin ing g init initia iate ted d by Sant Santia iago go was was principally for the benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two successiv successive e dates, dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June June 1961 1961 his his alle alleged ged chil childr dren en Jose Jose,, Elena Elena,, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his

are not of any help to Willia William m Gatcha Gatchalia lian. n. For, For, they they neith neither er conf confer er nor nor stre streng ngth then en his his clai claim m of Fili Filipi pino no citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision. On prescription I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because because it is already already barred by prescription prescription considering considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause cause of deportation arises. arises. Note that the five year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) (a) of the Section. Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2), which reads: “Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was was not not lawf lawful ully ly admi admiss ssib ible le at the the time time of entry entry.” .” Moreov Moreover, er, the warran warrantt for his exclusion exclusion was issued issued within a period of five years following his entry. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued beyond beyond their their jurisdict jurisdiction, ion, ORDER the DISM DISMIS ISSA SAL L of Civi Civill Case Case Nos. Nos. 90-5 90-542 4214 14 of the the Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts, however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid Warr Warran antt of Excl Exclus usion ion cove coveri ring ng resp respond onden entt Will Willia iam m Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission. 2.

The

6

July

1962

Decision

of

the

Board

of

























in 1965, 1965, but also also agains againstt Pedro' Pedro's s co-app co-applic licant ants, s, which include respondent William Gatchalian. The validi validity ty of the claim claim to Philip Philippin pine e citize citizensh nship ip by Pedro Pedro Gatcha Gatchalia lian, n, as a suppos supposed ed descen descendan dantt of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs . Vivo (supra ). ). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the substantiated their Gatchalian Gatchalian applicants applicants had not substantiated claim to Philippin Philippine e citizenship citizenship , this this Court Court in effec effectt were not not ruled ruled that that the Gatcha Gatchalia lian n applic applicant ants s were Philippine Philippine citizens citizens , whatev whatever er their their true true nation nationali ality ty might be. 4. Should this Court now determine to examine once mor more the the clai claim m to Phil Philip ippi pin ne citi citizzens enship hip of resp respon ond dent ent Will Willia iam m Gatc Gatcha hali lian an,, a deta detail iled ed examin examinati ation on of the facts, facts, includi including ng the suppos supposed ed status status of Santia Santiago go Gatcha Gatchalia lian n as a natura naturall born born Philippine Philippine citizenship, citizenship, shows that those claims claims to Philippine Philippine citizenship citizenship were indeed not proven proven by resp respon ond dent ent Will Willia iam m Gatc Gatcha hali lian an and his his coapplic applicant ants. s. Since Since respond respondent ent Willia William m Gatcha Gatchalia lian n does does not not clai claim m to have have been been natu natura rali lize zed d as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen. 5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with with this this Cour Courtt whic which h is char charge ged d with with the the application of the law as it is in fact written, but with the political branches of the Government. It is those

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Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Deportation Board of his power to conduct conduct investigati investigations ons for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin code

ISSUE (PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS) ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD: WON WON the the Pres Presid iden entt has has the the powe powerr to depor deportt aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigation (on the ground that such power is vested in the legislature and that there must be a legislation authorizing the same) ~> The Pres has the power to carry out order of depo deport rtat atio ion n but but may may not not orde orderr arre arrest st duri during ng investigation. And no, power may not be delegated. •

RATIO: •

Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code Deportation n of subject subject to foreign foreign SEC. 69 Deportatio power . — A subject of a foreign power residing in

the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his his own own coun countr try y by the the Pres Presid iden entt of the the Philip Philippin pines es except except upon prior prior invest investiga igation tion,, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is























ther therefr efrom om,, with with the the excep excepti tion on of sect sectio ion n sixtysixty-nin nine e of Act Numbere Numbered d Twenty Twenty-se -seven ven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). • •

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Re: the exten xtentt of the Pres’ es’ power to inve invest stig igat atee- does does it incl includ ude e auth author orit ity y to arres arrest? t? May May it be dele delega gate ted? d? Here’ Here’s s the the history… Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien under investigation Pres Pres Qu Quir irin ino o (EO (EO 398) 398) in Janu Januar ary y 1951 1951 reorganized the deportation board to issue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release 3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, persons, houses, papers and effects effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall iss issue but but upon upon prob proba able ble caus cause, e, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and and the the witn witnes esses ses he may may prod produc uce, e, and and part partic icul ular arly ly desc descri ribi bing ng the the plac place e to be searched, and the persons or things to be seiz seized ed." ." (Sec (Sec 1, Art. Art. II III, I, Bill Bill of Righ Rights ts,, Philippine Constitution).

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Justice Laurel said that this consti provision

serv serve e the the curt curtai ailm lmen entt or limi limita tati tion on on the the fund fundam ament ental al righ rightt of a pers person on,, such such as his his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution. The The guaran guarantees tees of human human rights rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue war warra rant nt of arres arrestt upon upon the the fili filing ng of forma formall char charge ges s against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arre arrest st,, decr decree eed d canc cancel elle led. d. With With the the fore forego goin ing g modi modifi fica cati tion on,, the the decis decisio ion n appe appeal aled ed from from is here hereby by affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO

FACTS: •

The The case ase stems tems from from the the app apprehe rehen nsion ion of peti petiti tion oner ers s on 27 Febr Februa uary ry 1988 1988 from from thei theirr respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commis Commissio sioner ner Miriam Miriam Defenso Defensorr Santia Santiago go of the CID. Petiioners are presently detained at the CID























Admin Adminis istr trat ativ ive e Code Code,, whic which h lega legall lly y clot clothes hes the the Commi Commiss ssio ioner ner with with any any auth author orit ity y to arres arrestt and and detain detain petiti petitioner oners s pendin pending g determi determinat nation ion of the exi existen stence ce of a prob proba able ble caus cause e leadi eading ng to an administrative investigation. 2. Repondent violated Sevtion 2, Article III of the 1987 1987 Cons Consti titu tuti tion on proh prohib ibit itin ing g unre unreas ason onab able le searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothe clothed d with with valid valid Warran Warrants ts of arrest arrest,, search search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3. Mere confidential information made to the COD agen agents ts and and thei theirr susp suspic icio ion n of the the acti activi viti ties es of petitioners petitioners that they are pedophiles, pedophiles, coupled with their association association with other suspected suspected pedophiles, pedophiles, are are not not vali valid d lega legall grou ground nds s for for thei theirr arre arrest st and and detention unless they are caught in the act. They furt furthe herr alle allege ged d that that bein being g a pedo pedoph phil ile e is not not punishable by any Philippines Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. HELD: 1. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of wa warra rrants nts of arre arres st by the the Comm Commis iss sione ionerr of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts wit with h para paragr grap aph h 3, Sect Sectio ion n 1 of Arti Articl cle e II IIII of the the COnstistution” (referring to the 1935 Constituion) is not invocable invocable herein. herein. Respondent Respondent Commissioner Commissioner’s ’s warrant of Arrest is issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they shoul ould not be depo eported. ted. They were issued specifically “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised

cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Tho Those se arti articl cles es were were seiz seized ed as an inci incide dent nt to a lawful lawful arrest arrest and, and, are therefo therefore, re, admiss admissibl ible e in evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). •

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of peti petiti tion oners ers was was not not vali valid d at its its ince incept ptio ion, n, the the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable undesirable aliens, aliens, on March March 4, 1988. 1988. Warran Warrants ts of arrest arrest were were issued issued against them on March 7, 1988 “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Sect Sectio ion n 69 of the the Admi Admini nist stra rati tive ve Code Code.. The The restra restraint int again against st their their persons persons,, theref therefore, ore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed. 3. The petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make make their their arrest arrest illega illegal. l. Petiti Petitione oners rs were were found found with with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the COID COID agents agents had reason reasonabl able e ground grounds s to believ believe e that that peti petiti tion oners ers had had comm commit itted ted “ped “pedoph ophil ilia ia”” defi define nes s as “psy “psych choo-se sexu xual al perv perver ersi sion on invo involv lvin ing g chil childr dren en”. ”. “Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object”. While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it •

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WON he should still be considered a citizen of the Phil Philip ippi pine nes s desp despit ite e acqu acquis isit itio ion n and and use use of a Portuguese passport HELD: No RATIO: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Phil citizenship acqu acquir ired ed thro throug ugh h natu natura rali liza zati tion on.. In Boa Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to interference or implication.

Yu, with with full full knowle knowledge dge,, and legal legal capac capacity ity,, after after havi having ng renoun renounce ced d Portu Portugu gues ese e citi citize zens nshi hip p upon upon natu natura rali liza zati tion on as a Phil Phil citi citize zen n 1) resu resumed med and and reacquired reacquired his prior status as Portuguese Portuguese citizen, 2) applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and 3) represented himself as such in official documents after after he had become become a natura naturaliz lized ed citiz citizen en of the the Phil Phils. s. Such Such is gros grossl sly y inco incons nsis iste tent nt with with his his maintenance of Phil citizenship. Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil citizenship and has failed. As such, while normally the the ? of WON WON a perso person n has has reno renoun unce ced d his his Phil Phil citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law law in adve advers rsar ary y proc proceed eedin ings gs,, this this has has beco become me unnecessary as the SC, no less, upon insistence of petitioner, looked into the facts and satisfied itself on WON petitioner’s claim to continued Phil citizenship

Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on January 26, 1988 seekin seeking g to disqua disqualif lify y the petiti petitione onerr on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee was was paid paid on that that date date.. This This fee fee was was fina finall lly y paid paid on Febr Februa uary ry 10, 10, 1988 1988,, or twen twenty ty-o -on ne days days afte afterr his his proclamation. The The peti petiti tion oner er says says that that he alle allega gati tion on that that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any any inqu inquir iry y into into this this matt matter, er, cons consid ideri ering ng that that the the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten day reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time since since when he first filed his petition petition for quo warranto it was trea treate ted d as a prepre-pr proc ocla lama mati tion on controversy and it was only on February 8, 1988 decided warranto . The Court to treat his case as solely for quo warranto has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warran to was was filed on time. Considering that the sole issue raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him, this matter should normally end here. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall address it now























renunciation allegiance.

of

"all

other

The petitioner also categorically declared that he was a citiz itizen en of Aus Austra tralia lia in a numb number er of sworn worn stat stateme ement nts s volun volunta tari rily ly made made by him him and. and. even even sought sought to avoid avoid the jurisd jurisdict iction ion of the barang barangay ay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. The COMELEC COMELEC in 1982 said that these mistakes mistakes did not dive divest st the the petit petitio ione nerr of his his citi citize zens nshi hip. p. This This is rejecte rejected d by the Court. Court. He beca became me a citi citize zen n of Austra Australia lia becaus because e he was was natura naturaliz lized ed as such such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case case beca becaus use e he was marri arrie ed to an Australia Australian n citizen citizen. As a condition for such natu natura rali liza zati tion on,, he form formal ally ly took took the the Oath Oath of Alle Alleg gian iance and/ and/or or mad made the the Affi Affirm rma ation tion of Allegiance. Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as an Australian citizen maed him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine Philippine citizenship. citizenship. Such an argument cannot stand against the clear prov provis isio ions ns of CA no. no. 63 whic which h enume enumera rates tes the the modes by which Phil. Citizenship may be lost: (1) naturaliz naturalizatio ation n in a foreign foreign country; country; (2) express express renuncia renunciation tion of citizens citizenship; hip; and (3) subscribi subscribing ng to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country , all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

requir requiremen ements ts of the the Local Local Governm Government ent Code Code and the Constitution. The fact that petitioner has been disqualified does not by defa defaul ultt make make priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent nt,, the the pers person on who who obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor of Baguio City. The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos stat states es that that,, “…The The fact fact that that the the cand candid idat ate e wh who o obta obtain ined ed the the high highes estt numb number er of vote votes s is late laterr declar declared ed to be dis disqua qualif lified ied or not not eligib eligible le for for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily enti entitl tle e the the cand candid idat ate e wh who o obta obtain ined ed the the seco second nd highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office…” On the importance of Phil. Citizenship: Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily easily recove recovered red after after its renunciat renunciation ion.. It may be rest restor ored ed only only afte afterr the the retur returni ning ng rene renega gade de makes makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and and he sole solemn mnly ly affi affirm rms s once once agai again n his his tota totall and and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

AZNAR vs. COMELEC

Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990 The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was annulled after it was found that his marriage to an Australian was bigamous does not concern us here

FACTS:

























Osmeña: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: alleging: that he is the legitimate legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and and that that he has has been been a regis registe tered red voter voter in the Philippines since 1965.

On Marc March h 3, 1988, 1988, COME COMELE LEC C (Fir (First st Divi Divisi sion) on) direct directed ed the the Board Board of Canvas Canvasser sers s to proclai proclaim m the winni winning ng candid candidate ates. s. Having Having obtain obtained ed the highes highestt number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. The Therea reafte fter, r, on June June 11, 11, 1988, 1988, COME COMELE LEC C (Fir (First st Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for for not not havi having ng been been time timely ly file filed d and and for lack of suffic sufficien ientt proof proof that that privat private e respond respondent ent is not a Filipino citizen.

respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. N aturalization Laws." Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered as an American under US laws do not concern us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the pres presum umpti ption on that that priv privat ate e respo respond ndent ent is a Fili Filipi pino no remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that that priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent nt had had lost lost his his Phil Philip ippi pine ne citizenship. Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both cases the evidence, as well as by their own admissions, shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian citize citizens ns respec respectiv tively ely and therefr therefre e no longer longer owe any allegiance to the Philippines. In the instan instantt case, case, privat private e respon responden dentt vehemen vehemently tly denies having having taken the oath of allegianc allegiance e of the United States. He is a holder of o f a valid and subsisting Philippine























orga organi niza zati tion on and and hav have sign signed ed the the prepreincorporation incorporation papers — with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members — with "no right right to vote or be voted for" — to which category category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members , so made by the board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion" thereof — due to "ass "assis ista tanc nce, e, hono honor, r, pres presti tige ge or help help ext extended in the prop ropagation" of the objectives of the Organization — without any pecu pecuni niar ary y expen expense ses s on the the part part of said said honorary members. 2. On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Central Bank of the Philippi Philippines nes — here herein inaf afte terr refe referr rred ed to as the the Bank Bank — rendered an opinion to the effect that the Organi Organizat zation ion and others others of simila similarr nature nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the following:

6. Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the the Court Court of Firs Firstt Inst Instan ance ce of Mani Manila la,, an origin original al action action for "certiorari , prohibi prohibitio tion, n, with with writ writ of prelimi preliminar nary y injunc injunctio tion n and/or and/or writ writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said munic municip ipal al cour court, t, the the Sher Sherif ifff of Mani Manila la,, the the Manila Manila Polic Police e Depart Department ment,, and the Bank, Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the the grou ground nd that that,, in issu issuin ing g the the same same,, the the munic municip ipal al cour courtt had had acted acted "wit "with h GA GADA DALE LEJ" J" becaus because: e: (a) "said search search warran warrantt is a roving roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use use of the the word word 'and 'and othe others rs'' in the the sear search ch warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) (c) "no "no court ourt in the the Phil Philip ippi pine nes s has has any any jur juris isdi dict ctio ion n to try try a crimi crimina nall case case agai agains nstt a corporation . . ." - pend pendin ing g hear hearin ing g of the the case case on the the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction parte e restra be issu issued ed ex part restraini ining ng the the aforementioned search and seizure, or,























mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that the Organization was engaged in the the trans ransac acti tion ons s menti ention oned ed in his his deposition — deserved of credence or not. Obviou Obviously sly,, however however,, a mere disagr disagreeme eement nt wit with h Judg udge Canc Cancin ino, o, who who iss issued ued the the warrant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municip municipal al Judge Judge had committ committed ed a grave grave abuse abuse of discre discretio tion, n, amounti amounting ng to lack lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.

-

Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the kind contemplated in the contested action of the officers of the Bank, must must alwa always ys conn connot ote e the the exist existen ence ce of a "vic "victi tim." m." If this this term term is used used to deno denote te a party party whose whose interes interests ts have have been been actually injured , then the assumption is not necess necessari arily ly justifi justified. ed. The law requir requiring ing compliance with certain requirements before bod in bankin bankin obviou obviously sly

-

It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws — as their their "sav "savin ings gs." ." and and that that the the depos deposit itor ors s thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursor cursory y examin examinati ation on of said said docume documents nts will will readily show that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so rais raised ed may may be lent ent by the the Orga Organi niza zati tion on.. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and "participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for , their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limite limited d to those those which which the board of trustee trustees s discretion n , determi may, in its discretio determine ne from time time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the "parti "particip cipati ating ng members members"" is purely purely nomina nominall in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with with th uir ts of said said Act befo th























When Anita asked if she could examine and inspect inspect the packag packages, es, appell appellant ant refused refused saying saying that that the packages merely contained books, cigars and gloves. The boxes were then packaged for shipment. Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, Job Reyes, husband of Anita, opened the boxes for final inspection (SOP). He smelled a peculiar odor and felt dried leaves inside one of the packages. He opened one of the packages and took several grams of the the cont conten ents ts and sent ent a lette etterr to the the NBI requesting a lab exam of what he had found. NBI and Job Reyes went to the latter’s office and proc procee eede ded d to open open the the pack packag ages es,, find findin ing g dry dry marijuana leaves. The NBI then took custody of the conten contents ts of the packa packages ges.. Appell Appellant ant could could not be contacted, but was later “invited” by the NBI when he was claiming mail at the Central Post Office. On that that same same day, day, a fore forens nsic ic chem chemis istt in the the NBI NBI cert certif ified ied the the cont conten ents ts of the the pack packag ages es as being being marijuana leaves.

Walk Walker er v. Stat State: e: “...s “...sea earc rch h and and seiz seizur ure e clau clause ses s are are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals...” Bern Bernas as v. US: US: “... “...th the e governmental action.”

amen amendm dmen entt

only only pros proscr crib ibes es

Presence of NBI

The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI did not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere observation is not a search. The search was conducted merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins: “where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure...” The Court here again stressed that “the Bill of Rights is not not mean meantt to be invo invoke ked d agai agains nstt acts acts of priv privat ate e indivi individua duals” ls” and this this is seen seen in the intention intention of the the framers framers as Bernas Bernas states states that that they they are a protec protectio tion n against the State. In this case we see that the search and seizure was done























"org "organ aniz izer er"" allu allude ded d to in peti petiti tion oner er Borj Borjal al's 's columns. In a subs subseq eque uent nt lette etterr to The The Philippine Star, he refuted the matters contained in Borjal's columns.

of the confer conferenc ence e organi organizer zer since since these these contai contained ned only an enumeration of names where Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer.

3. Wenc Wences esla lao o filed filed a comp compla laint int with with the Nation National al Press Club (NPC) Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm. In turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character assassination.

3. It is also lso not not suff suffic iciient ent that that the the offe offend nded ed part party y reco recogn gniz ized ed hims himsel elff as the the pers person on atta attack cked ed or defamed defamed.. It must be shown that at least least a third third pers person on coul could d ident identif ify y him him as the the objec objectt of the the libelous libelous publication. publication. Wenceslao Wenceslao himself himself entertained entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the the subj subjec ectt arti articl cles es.. Iden Identi tifi fica cati tion on is gros grossl sly y inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack.

4. Wenc Wences esla lao o fil filed a crimi rimina nall case for for libe libell agai agains nstt petit etitio ion ners ers Borj Borjal al and Soliv oliven en (publisher). The Prosecutor handling the case dismissed dismissed the complaint complaint for insufficien insufficiency cy of evidence. evidence. He instituted instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. The RTC decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered

4. Publ Public icat atio ions ns whic which h are are priv privil ileg eged ed for for reas reason ons s of public public polic policy y are protecte protected d by the consti constituti tutiona onall guara uarant nty y of free freedo dom m of spee speec ch. A priv privil ileg eged ed communication may be either absolutely privileged or qual qualif ifie iedl dly y priv privil ileg eged. ed. Abso Absolu lute tely ly priv privil ilege eged d

























Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a public figure.

8. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i .e ., ., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.























i

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