LAND CLASSIFICATION CASE DIGEST SECOND SET (EDITED BY: ALYSSA AFRICA) SUBMITTED TO: ATTY. ERWIN TIAMSON SUBMITTED BY: CAPINO, JOSE ANTON (CASES 1 AND 2) AMBAS, KATRINA MARIE (CASES 3 AND 4) PENAS, ANDREA (CASES 5 AND 6) RENOVALLES, MARA (CASES 7 AND 8) VELASCO, MA. BLESILDA (CASES 9 AND 10) RUBA, ERICSON INFANTE (CASES 11 AND 12) KOH, PAT (CASES 13 AND 14) HERNANDEZ, CARMI (CASES 15 AND 16) CANDELARIA, MICHELLE DULCE (CASES 17 AND 18) ESPIRITUO GLEN (CASES 19 AND 20) LORETO, SHARLENE PAULA (CASES 21 AND 22) SAYSAY, JP (CASES 23 AND 24) QUIAMBAO, RAYMART JOHN (CASES 25 AND 26) PERLAS, VAN REGINE (CASES 27 AND 28) TOTANES, TANIA (CASES 29 AND 30) MEDRANO, MERVIN PAUL (CASES 31 AND 32) VILLENA, ROXANE MAE (CASES 33 AND 34)
1. Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (GR No. L-48321, August 31, 1946) Facts: Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas. On June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands. The inspector of the Bureau of Lands stated that the land is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision overruling the opposition decreeing the registration prayed for the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed the decision. The Solicitor General maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and void. Oh Cho invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). He invokes further that his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940. Issue: Whether Oh Cho is qualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question. Held: It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he, having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This is what the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. Thus, it is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows: "All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ."
2. Andres Pitargue vs. Leandro Sorilla (GR No. L-4302, September 17, 1952) Facts: On July 30, 1941, Pitargue filed a miscellaneous sale application for a parcel of land known as cadastral lot No. 2777 situated at Elang, Kidapawan, Cotabato, and paid a deposit of P5 therefor. The Bureau of Lands acknowledged receipt of his application on November 22, 1941, and informed that it had referred to the district land office of Cotabato, Cotabato. Upon receipt of his acknowledgment he started the construction of a small house on the lot, but the same was not finished because of the outbreak of the war. In 1946 he had another house constructed on the lot, which he used both as a clinic and as his residence. He placed one Cacayorin in charge of the house, but Cacayorin left it on December 13, 1948. Thereupon, Sorilla demolished the house and built thereon one of his own. On December 17, 1948, Pitargue went to Sorilla and asked the latter why he had constructed a building on the land, and the latter gave the excuse that there was no sign of interest on the part of the one who had applied for it. Pitargue instituted an action of forcible entry in the justice of the peace court, praying that Sorilla be ordered to vacate the lot usurped and removed the construction he had made thereon. Sorilla filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Sorilla further contended that the Bureau of Lands had jurisdiction because the lot is an unawarded public land, which is already under investigation by the said bureau. On June 4, 1949, the justice of the peace court declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the subject matter of the action is the subject of an administrative investigation, prompting Pitargue to appeal. Issues: 1. Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry instituted by a bona fide applicant of public land; and 2. Whether or not a public land applicant Pitargue, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied. Held: 1. Yes, courts have jurisdiction over the controversy. Before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Its power is limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another ultimate purpose: the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon. 2. It has been held that entry based upon priority in the initiatory steps, even if not accompanied by occupation, may be recognized as against as against another applicant. One of the reasons of policies supporting the recognition of a right in a bona fide applicant who has occupied the land applied for. Recognition of the right encourages actual settlement; it discourages speculation and land-grabbing. Even pending the investigating of and resolution on, an application by a bona fide occupant, by the priority of his application and record of his entry, he acquires a right to the possession of the public land he applied for against any other public land applicant.
3. In Republic vs. Heraclio Diaz (G.R. No. L-36486, August 6, 1979) Facts: On 31 March 1955, the then Director of Lands, acting for and behalf of the Bureau of Lands which succeeded the defunct Rural Progress Administration, entered into a lease contract with defendant Heraclio Diaz over Lot No. 1467 of Santa Rosa Cadastre for a period of 10 years. The said land formed part of the so-called “Crisostomo Estate” which was donated in favor of the State by non-secular priest on February 15, 1918. Thereafter, portions of the said land were actually cultivated by 13 “helper-tenants” of Diaz and remaining area was possessed by the latter. In the meantime, the Bureau of Lands was abolished by RA 1400 and transferred its powers and functions to the Land Authority. Before the expiration of the lease contract, the defendant addressed a letter to the Governor of the Land Authority and gave notice for the renewal of the lease contract for another period of 10 years. In response, the Governor did not approve the letter because it is contrary with the policy stated in the Agricultural Land Reform Code which favors the actual tillers of the land to be the direct lessees thereof and contract stipulation was contrary to Article 1878 of the New Civil Code. The Solicitor-General filed a complaint before the CFI of Nueva Ecija for the recovery of possession against the defendant. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the defendant, therefore, the Solicitor-General appealed to the CA. But the CA issued a resolution lifted the case to the SC by reason of pure question of law. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands has power to convey by way of lease the property owned by the State for a period longer than 1 year. Held: Yes. The SC ruled that the Director of Lands acted within his powers and authority as head of the Division of Landed Estates when he entered into a lease contract with the defendant. When power or jurisdiction is delegated to any public officer over a subject matter, and its exercise is confided to his or her discretion, the acts done in the exercise of the authority are, in general, binding and valid as to the subject matter. At the time of the lease, the immediate objective was to generate funds to carry out the purpose of the donation, and lease was one of the avenues therefore. However, defendant’s option of renewal of contract is now considered moot academic because the defendant is still occupying the disputed land in 1979 therefore, he is now considered a usurper and a possessor in bad faith and has no legitimate right to continually use the premises.
4. Ortua vs. Encarnacion (G.R. No. L-39919, January 30, 1934) Facts: Petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for the purchase of a tract of public land situated at San Jose, Camarines Sur. His application was rejected but he was allowed to file a sale or lease application for the portion of the land classified to be suitable for commercial purposes. The reason why he was rejected was because of the certain provisions of the Public Land Law which states that Filipino citizenship was one of the conditions in order to be approved of such application since the Director of Lands held in the contrary that Ortua was a Chinese citizen. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands acted within his power and authority to reject Petitioner’s application. Held: Yes. The Director of Lands performed his functions pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Law. A discretion lodged by law in the Director of Lands which should not be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of Lands on the construction of the Public Land Law are entitled to great respect by the courts.
5. Geukeko vs. Araneta (G.R. No. L-10182, December 24, 1957) Facts: Jose Geukeko appears to be the registered lessee of Lot No. 18, Block 20 of the Tambobong Estate, a portion of which he sub-leased to Elena Jacinto, Hilarion Encarnacion, Leonila Rocal, Mercedes Veles, Francisco Simeon and Onofre Enriquez. When the Republic of the Philippines acquired the Tambobong Estate by purchase in 1947, Jose Geukeko filed an application with the Director of Lands to purchase the lot leased by him, but the sub-leases opposed and likewise filed applications to purchase the respective portions actually occupied by them. The Director of Lands rendered a decision approved his application and dismissed the protests and counter-application of the sub-leases. The parties adversely affected by said decision instituted Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to annul the same and praying for the approval of their application. Two years after, the Court issued an order holding that they failed to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources before going to Court and the action for mandamus could not be entertained and thus dismissed the 2 civil cases filed. The sub-lessees then brought the matter on appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on October 23, 1954, (DANR Case No. 987) Jose Geukeko interposed an objection to the institution of this appeal and filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for mandamus and prohibition praying among others that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be restrained from taking cognizance of DANR Case No. 987. He alleged as ground for the petition that the period to appeal had already prescribed and that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had lost jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the decision of the Director of Lands was already final and executory. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources filed an answer contending that he could lawfully take cognizance of the appeal filed in DANR Case No. 987 because the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1826 and 1865 with the Court of First Instance of Rizal suspended the running of the Director of Lands, as provided for by Land Administrative Order No. 6; that the decision of the Director of Lands had not become final. Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can take cognizance of DANR Case No. 987. Held: Yes. The main question at issue hinges in the interpretation of Section 2 of the Land Administrative Order No. 6, promulgated by the Secretary of Agricultural and Commerce providing for the filing of appeals from decisions or orders of the Director of Lands to the said Department Secretary. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation given by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the provisions of section 2 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 appears to be reasonable for it merely reflects the intent of the law in placing the disposition of lands within the Tambobong Estate in the hands of the official as of the Land Department. The underlying idea seems to be that those officials are considered in a better position to decide controversies regarding the disposition of said Estate.
6. Vital vs. Anore, (GR No. L-4136, Feb. 29, 1952) Facts: Sometime in November 1945, Montano Vital found out in the office of the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal that the parcel of land that he and his predecessorsinterest have been openly, continuously, notoriously, exclusively and adversely in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial had been granted as free patent to Ambrosio Arabit and that a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46833 for the same parcel of land was issued by the same Registrar of Deeds in the name of the defendant Francisco Anore. He brought an action on December 1945 against Francisco Anores, Petra de los Santos and the Director of Lands praying that he declared owner of a parcel of land. The answer of Petra de los Santos, the widow of the late Ambrosio Arabit, admits all the allegations as to possession by the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest of the parcel of land covered by the free patent granted to Ambrosio Arabit; that her late husband was never in possession of the parcel of land; and that the defendant Francisco Anore knew that the parcel of land had never been in the possession of the late Ambrosio Arabit in his lifetime.. While defendant Francisco Anore filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by the statue of limitations, more than ten (10) years having elapsed from 20 January 1934, the date the free patent issued to Ambrosio Arabit was registered and original certificate of title No. 535 was issued to him by the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal, to 13 December 1945, the date of the filing of the complaint in this case. Issue: Whether or not the action brought by Vital is barred by the statute of limitations. Held: No. A Torrens Title issued upon a free patent may not be cancelled after the lapse of ten years from the date of its registration because the statute of limitations bars such cancellation. However, if the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens Title belonged to another who together with his predecessors-in-interest has been in possession thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then the statue barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent does not apply, and the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled. Furthermore, if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titled issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof.
7. Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157 (1957) Facts: The plaintiff was one of the three (3) applicants for a homestead patent over the same parcel of land. It appears that in at least two of such application, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of the corresponding patents upon favorable recommendation of the property by public land inspector. The records, however, fail to prove that a patent was actually issued in favor of the plaintiff. Ultimately, the homestead was granted to defendant Durian. Plaintiff in this action prays for the reconveyance of the homestead. Issue: Whether plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Held: Yes. He never claimed the property to be his. In fact, he even admitted that his application was cancelled for violations of the provisions of the Public Land Law. It is thus imperative in an action for reconveyance that the party seeking relief must prove that he is the owner of the property registered in the name of another through fraud. Hence, plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
8. Garingan vs. Garingan (G.R. No. 144095, 12 April 2006) Facts: Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, et al., herein respondents, alleged that their grandfather Sauri Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully planted with coconut and other fruit bearing trees, containing an area of 11.3365 hectares. Saupi Moro acquired the land through purchase from Gani Moro. Saupi Moro then donated the land to his daughter Insih Saupi, mother of Hadji Munib, et al. and petitioner Haymaton S. Garingan. After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954, Haymaton and and husband Pawaki, who was also known as Djayari Moro, herein petitioners, took over the administration of the land. Later, petitioners declared the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation purposes. Petitioners refused to share with the respondents the income from the sale of fruits from the land. Petitioners claimed that on 22 September 1969, Pawaki alleged that he bought the land from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin (Jikirum) and a TCT was issued in the name of Djayari Moro. Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of an owner in the same year. He declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675. Respondents filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against petitioners with the Shari'a District Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City. The Shari'a District Court then ordered to partition the land in equal shares among the respondents and their sister petitioner. Each of them was entitled to one-fourth share of the aforesaid property. The TCT in the name of Djayari Moro was ordered annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City was ordered to issue a new TCT in the names of the respondents and their sister petitioner. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated 19 July 2000. Issue: Whether or not the Shari'a District Court erred in ordering the partition of the subject property and annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title. Held: Yes. Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro bac then. The land in dispute was part of the public domain before the issuance of OCT No. P-793. If it were otherwise, there would be no need for Gani Moro’s son, Andaang, to file a homestead application. The rule on this matter is clear. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Hadji Munib, et al.’s action for partition effectively seeks to cancel the homestead patent and the corresponding certificate of title. However, even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title are cancelled, Hadji Munib, et al. will not acquire the land in the concept of an owner. The land will revert to the government and will again form part of the public domain.
9. Suzi vs. Razon (G.R. No. L-24066, December 9, 1925) Facts: Plaintiff-Appellee Valentin Susi is third of subsequent owners of the land coming under dispute. Susi’s occupation and possession of said land for twenty-five (25) years has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption until defendant Angela Razon came to commence action to recover the possession of the land. Razon after incurring an unfavorable judgment from the Trial Court, elevated her plea to the Director of Lands, this time gaining a favorable judgment with the land sold to her. With the acquisition of a Certificate of Title, Razon resolved to evict Susi from the land, giving rise to the action instigated by Susi. Issue: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the parcel of land. Held: Yes, Valentin Susi having been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years and so, by legal fiction, had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. When Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874. The land in question already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property and thus beyond even the control of the Director of Lands and consequently cannot dispose of it. Thus, the sale transacted with Razon was void and of no effect, nor did she acquire any right by it. Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it for the land under dispute had already become, by operation of law, his private property thus lacking only the judicial sanction of his title. The Supreme Court ruled that no error was found in the judgment appealed from and was thereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs.
10. Balboa vs. Farrales (G.R. No. L-27059, February 14, 1928) Facts: Plaintiff-Appellant, Buenaventura Balboa filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for Homestead, situated at Hermosa in Bataan, in accordance with Act.No.926. After five years, Balboa submitted proof attesting to his cultivation of and residence upon said land. In addition, he also submitted proof of compliance to all other requirements mandated under Section 3 of the same Act No.926, enabling Balboa to acquire approval from the Director of Lands. Subsequently, Act No.926 was repealed by Act No.2874. After almost a year that Act No.2874 took effect, a Homestead Patent (Certificate of Title No.91) was issued by the Governor-General to Balboa. Later, Balboa sold the land to Defendant-Appellant, Cecilio Farrales. Farrales, consequently secured a Transfer Certificate Of Title in his name. Balboa then filed action to declare the sale null and void on the ground that the transaction was contrary and in violation of the provisions under Section 116 of Act No.2874 which paved the way to the dispute at hand. Issue: Whether or not Act No.926 should be applied to determine the validity of the sale in question. Ruling: Yes, Act No. 926 must be the law applied. The Supreme Court ruled that the right, title and interest of Buenaventura Balboa, having become vested under the provisions of Act No. 926. His rights cannot be affected by any law passed subsequent thereto since his ownership of the land in question already ripened into a vested right, a right or interest in property which has attained permanency and is so established as to no longer be open to doubt or controversy. The fact that the homestead patent or certificate of title had already been issued even after the repeal of Act No.926 cannot prejudice the vested right acquired by under the provisions of section 116 of the repealing Act No. 2874. In fact, a perfected homestead may be sold and conveyed even without a patent for it is a property right in the fullest sense. The issuance of the certificate of title was a mere ministerial act, and the certificate, an outward symbol of his vested right to the land, of which he was virtually recognized as owner by the Government. The judgment appealed from was reversed and the defendant absolved from all liability under the complaint, with costs against the Plaintiff-Appellant.
11. Diaz and Reyes vs. Macalinao, et al, 102 Phil. 999 Facts: Plaintiffs-appellees brought this action, alleging that they are absolute owners of land situated in Barrio Aneg, Tumauini, Isabela; that said land wasacquired as a homestead by Maria Diaz in the year 1939, by virtue of herH.A. No. 229763 (Entry No. 138890), approved by the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resouces on November 29, 1950; that plaintiffs herein, parents of Maria Diaz, succeeded to the possession of the said homestead. The defendants illegally took possession of a portion of the said homestead, containing area of 6 hectares and yielding an annual harvest of 480 cavans of palay valued at P7.00 per cavan. The defendants Pascual Macalinao is another homestead applicant and his application conflicts with that of the late Maria Diaz, predecssor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, and that the other defendants have no interest or right over the land subject matter of the action. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to determine which of the rival homesteaders should be entitled to possess is without merit. Held: Yes. A homestead entry having been permitted by the Director of Lands the homestead is segregated from the public domain and the Director of Lands is divested of the control and possession thereof. The only exception is if the application is finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.
12. Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 19 SCRA 223 11 Facts: This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares of public land in Bambang, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Vizcaya. The land was originally applied for as homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death, Aquino was succeeded by his children who sold their rights to the land to the present appellee, Serapio Dauan on December 16, 1943, appellee sold his rights to one-half of the land to appellant Simon Ilarde and that on July 24, 1951, he sold his rights to 4 hectares to appellant Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to appellant Basilia Tomas. On March 28, 1955, Calangan and Tomas in turn sold their rights to some part of the land to Santos Baysa. These sales were all made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Issue: Whether the transfer of homestead right is valid even without the approval of the Director of Land? Held: No, the court ruled that under of Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141). Sec. 20 states that if at any time after the approval of the application and before the patent is issued, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all requirements of the law. However, such cannot continue with his homestead if through no fault of his own, there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation. In this case, the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead. Such transferee may legally acquire the land should the he file a homestead application to the land so acquired including the rights and obligations of the previous homesteader from the date of application. Any person who has so transferred his rights may again apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent.
13. Pascua vs. Talens (G.R. No. L-348 April 30, 1948) Facts: Sinforoso Pascua obtained ownership of a homestead. On March 23, 1936, Florentino Pascua acquired said homestead by inheritance. On August 2, 1940, Florentino sold the above-mentioned land to Jose Talens. In 1943, Florentino demanded reconveyance of the land pursuant to section 117 of Act No. 2874. The defendant refused. Issue: Whether or not an heir may exercise right of repurchase by the homesteader under Act no. 2874. Held: Yes, the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. Section 117 of Act No. 2874 states that "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of the conveyance."
14. Encinares vs. Achero (G.R. No. 161419, August 25, 2009) Facts: Encinares alleged that he bought several parcels of land from Roger U. Lim as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Properties6 dated April 9, 1980. Among these was the subject property. He, however, discovered that, sometime in June 1987, Achero was able to register the said property and cause it to be titled under the Free Patent System. On July 13, 1989, Ecinares filed a Complaint4 for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance against Achero. Ecinares asseverated that he is the owner and actual possessor of the subject property which is covered by Tax Declaration No. 07132. Issue: Whether or not tax declarations and tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership Held: No. Petitioner's heavy reliance on the tax declarations in his name and in the names of his predecessors-in-interest is unavailing. We hold that while it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, the same must be accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive prescription to set in. By themselves, tax declarations and tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership.
15. Alcaraz vs. Republic (G.R. No. 131667, July 28, 2005) Facts: Siblings Carlos, Timotea and Igmedio Alcaraz succeeded in the possession and occupation of the land from Julian Alcaraz, their father allocating to each other one-third portion. Although there was no deed of extra-judicial settlement or partition of property that was left by Julian, the heirs made a physical partition among themselves by separating the property into three clusters. On 1974, Gomez, representing the heirs of Carlos, filed with the Bureau of Lands, a free patent application covering the entire subject parcel of land which was then granted and an original certificate of title was issued covering this free patent. A formal protest was filed by the heirs of Timotea and Igmedio protesting the validity of the free patent issued and alleging that the same was obtained thru fraudulent acts and misrepresentation. The lower court ordered the cancellation of the free patent and recognized Timoteo and Igmedio’s co-ownership of rights and decreed the division of the property. An appeal was filed by Gomez to the Court of Appeals wherein the court affirmed the lower court’s decision but ordered that the land be reverted to the mass of the public domain. Issue: Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title issued by the register of deeds is indefeasible and conclusive of Gomez’ title although the free patent covering title is alleged to be obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. Held: No. Clearly the failure to state in the free patent application the possession of the coheirs Timoteo and Igmedio of the land clearly constitutes a concealment of material fact amounting to fraud and misrepresentation. This falls under the context of Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, sufficient enough to cause the cancellation of the patent and title. It is settled that a title emanating from a free patent secured through fraud and misrepresentation does not become indefeasible since the patent where the title sprung is itself void and of no effect whatsoever. The defect in Gomez’ free patent application and thus title, has the effect of reverting the ownership of the land to the public domain. Not being owners of the land, neither heirs of Carlos, Timoteo and Igmedio can ask for the reconveyance of the property. Their remedy is to file their respective public land applications with the Bureau of Land as the land in question is still public land and procedure laid down by law for acquisition of title over public land must be followed.
16.Torres vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 32243, September 3, 1930) Facts: Cristina Gonzales owned a tract of land mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank of the Philippines which was later foreclosed and sold to the government. Pending the period of redemption, Gonzales applied and was granted a provisional permit to occupy and cultivate the land applying for a lease of 25 years. Inasmuch as she had become a Swiss citizen by marriage to a Swiss citizen, she was no longer entitled to the lease. In line with this, Gonzales wrote a letter to the Director of Lands stating the assignment of her rights of priority to the lease to Cristina Gonzales, Inc. which was given due course. After which, a public bidding for the lease of the land was executed wherein Cristina Gonzales, Inc. was accepted even though her bid in the application was the lowest of all the other bids and a public auction was not done as the law required. Issue: Whether or not the land officials have any legal right to execute the lease of the land in favour of Cristina Gonzales, Inc. Held: No. The proceedings under Section 35 of Act No 3219 were not followed. The section provides that if the bid of the applicant is not one of such equal and higher bids, the Director of Lands shall at once submit the land for public bidding with the person making the highest bid awarded the lease of the land. Having the lowest bid, Gonzales, Inc. should not be given opportunity to raise her bid to equal that of the plaintiff’s and in effect being awarded the lease of the land. Further, the plaintiff contends that since the contract of lease to Gonzales, Inc. is null and void, it follows that the lease should be awarded to them. The court declared that the law does not operate on this logic thus when the government proposes to lease land, it must follow and conform to the provisions of Act No 3219, requiring public bidding.
17. De Gaerlan vs. Martinez, de Santos and Santos (G.R. No. L-3282, January 28, 1950) Facts: On August 23, 1941, Juliana R. de Santos purchased at public auction from the Bureau of Lands a lot of 120.9 square meters located on Barbosa Street, Quiapo, Manila, which was patrimonial property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, for the sum of P1, 511.25, and obligating herself to pay the balance in not more than ten equal annual installments. The balance was fully paid on August 1, 1944. One of the conditions of the sale was that the buyer should commence the construction of improvements appropriate for the purpose for which the land was purchased within six months and should complete said construction within eighteen months from the date of the sale. On March 17, 1948, the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources allowed the buyer to commence the construction of her building based on the condition. On March, 1945, the buyer Juliana R. de Santos leased the lot in question to the herein petitioners Victoriano A. Gaerlan and Salvador Gaerlan, who constructed a building thereon and who paid her a rent. In September, 1947, the herein respondents Juliana R. de Santos and Simplicio Santos commenced an action of desahucio (eviction) against the herein petitioners Victorina A. de Gaerlan and Salvador Gaerlan. On February 5, 1948, the municipal court rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the premises in question and to pay the plaintiffs P150 a month until said premises are completely vacated. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources revoked his order of March 17, 1948, canceled the sale of the lot in question to Juliana R. de Santos, and declared the forfeiture of the purchase price paid by her for said lot, at the same time ordering that said lot be again sold at public auction and that pending the oral public bidding Victorina A. de Gaerlan be required by the Director of Lands to pay the necessary occupation fee for occupying and utilizing the land in question. During the pendency of the desahucio /EVICTION case on appeal in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the petitioners made attempts to be exempted from depositing the rent in court on the ground that the plaintiffs were no longer the owners of said land. On November 20, 1948, the petitioners managed to secure the order from respondent judge, Honorable Felix Martinez provided they filed a bond of P1,800. When such bond was presented for approval, the respondents opposed it and moved for the reconsideration of the order of the respondent judge of November 20, 1948. The petitioners ask for the annulment of the abovementioned orders of the respondent judge on the ground that Rule 72, requiring the deposit of the rentals in court during the pendency of an appeal in a desahucio case, is not applicable because "plaintiffs' title has been cancelled and the property reverted to the ownership of the Government." Issue: Whether the petitioners are required to deposit rentals in court even though the plaintiffs' title has been cancelled and the property was reverted to the ownership of the Government. Held: No. The SC finds the petition for certiorari to be completely devoid of merit for the following reasons: The order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cancelling the sale of the lot in question and ordering the forfeiture of the purchase price is not yet final, it being contested by the purchaser in civil case No. 7336 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which has not yet been decided. The petitioners as tenants of the respondent Juliana R. de Santos are estopped from denying the title of their landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Moreover, the orders complained of were issued by the respondent judge not only with the consent but upon petition of the petitioners themselves. The petition is denied.
18. de Santos vs. El Secretario de Agricultura (G.R. No. L-4321, August 27, 1952) Facts: A request for inhibition and mandamus was filed by Juliana R. Santos and her husband to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands to order and desist from putting in place their orders for June 21, 20 September and November 9, 1948 and to grant the deed of sale of the sublot 2-B , Psd - 17273 City of Manila in favor of them. The reason is that, they were awarded by the Director of Lands on September 3, 1941 the said land in question subject to the following conditions: (1)the successful bidder shall commence the construction of the improvements appropriate for the purpose for which the land is purchased within six months, and shall complete the said construction within 18 months, from the date of award; (2) the land shall be subject to the easements and servitudes provided for in sections 109-114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended; (3)the land shall not be encumbered or conveyed without the previous consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; and (4) the successful bidder shall not permit, either by contract or otherwise, any person, corporation, association or partnership disqualified to acquire public land to have any interests in, or rights to, the improvements now existing or that may hereafter be introduced on the land applied for. This is by reason that part of said land is necessary for road widening. However, in March 1945 the lot acquired in compra was leased to the Gaerlan spouses. As a result, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources revoked his order of March 17, 1948, canceled the sale of the lot in question to Juliana R. de Santos, and declared the forfeiture of the purchase price paid by her for said lot, at the same time ordering that said lot be again sold at public auction and that pending the oral public bidding, and that the Gaerlans be required to pay the necessary occupation fee for occupying and utilizing the land in question. Issue: (1) Whether or not the sale of the lot in question is valid; and (2) Whether or not the appellee violated the provisions of Sec 90 and and 91 of the Public Land Act. Held: 1. Yes, the sale is valid. In this case, the applicants had already paid the entire agreed price, and already had in his possession the purchased sub-lot the sales contract was completely consummated. Since then the applicants were already owners of the sub-lot. Just missing the deed of sale, this had become due. According to Article 1450 of the Civil Code, "The sale was perfected between buyer and seller, and will be mandatory for both, if they had agreed on the subject matter of the contract, and the price, although neither one nor the other will have delivered "on sale consummated with more reason have the right to require the seller to grant the deed buyers because" If the law necessary for the execution of the deed or other special way to enforce those of a contract obligations, contractors will be able to compel each other mutually to fill that form since had intervened consent and other requirements for validity. " 2. No, there was no violation. In 1945, the applicants gave the sub lot on lease to Victorina A. de Gaerlan, they have the right to exercise the exclusive (rights) to enjoy and dispose property, corresponding to every owner. Nobody could stop the owner because he had the absolute control over it. The cession in lease with Gaerlan does not constitute breach of the conditions of the order of adjudication. The evident purpose and intent of Section 90 in requiring that the purchaser buy land for his exclusive benefit and not for the benefit of others is to prevent the acquisition of lands through dummies. The purchase was made by appellee for herself, not for her lessee. It is evident from the fact that the latter paid a consideration for the lease, the lessee was actually ejected by her, and she has already acquired ownership of the building constructed by the lessee thereon.
19. Republic vs Animas (G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974) Facts: An original certificate of title was issued by the Bureau of lands to Isagani Du Timbol, transferee of rights and improvements of free patent and title from Precilla, original applicant of Free Patent and Title. Learning this, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint to declare the Original Certificate of Title null and void and to order the reversion of the land on the following grounds: (1) that the land covered is a forest and timber which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; (2) that it is situated in Bureau of Forest and plotted in Bureau of Forest Map which was to be reverted to category of Public Forest; (3) that the applicant obtained the patent and title fraudulently and never occupied and cultivated the land; and (4) that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual survey. Issue: Whether or not the certificate of title obtained fraudulently or void may be ordered cancelled and be reverted to the government. Held: Yes. A fraudulent Certificate of Title may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
20. Cebedo vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-12777, May 23, 1961) Facts: Septemio Cebedo and Abelardo Cebedo filed their respective Free Patent applications. Free Patent No. V- 1637 was issued to Septemio and an Original Certificate of Title was entered in the books of the Register of Deeds. Free Patent No. 1635 was likewise issued to Abelardo and an Original Certificate of Title RP 67 was entered in the same register in his name and on the same date. However, Pescadero et al, respondents claimed to be actual occupants and owners of the lot covered by Free Patent title of Septemio ,with this respondents filed for the annulment of Septemio’s title on the ground that it5 was secured through fraud, likewise, a similar case filed against Abelardo. Both were dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs had not exhausted the administrative remedies available. Motion for reconsideration filed but denied. Appellees filed a protest with the Director of Lands against the Free Patent Tittles, then Director of Lands issued an order for cancellation for Free Patent issued to Abelardo and Septermio. Thereafter, appellants filed MR alleging lack of previous investigation and jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Land has no authority and jurisdiction to issue order in relation to reversion of state properties. Held: No, the Director of Lands has authority. It is clear from the facts that the investigation complained of is merely preliminary. Its purpose is to determine whether steps should be taken in the proper court for the annulment of the titles issued to appellants. The Supreme Court holds the position that it is not only the Director of Lands’ right but his duty to conduct the investigation complained of and to file the corresponding court action for the reversion of the properties to the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of the investigation so warrant.
21. Garcia, et al vs. Aprotadera (G.R. No. L-34122 August 29, 1988) Facts: Marcela Garcia, father of the petitioner, filed an application for homestead patent with the Bureau of Lands. After the death of Marcelo, Fructuoso Garcia renewed the application under his name. Due to the failing health of Fructuoso, he requested Borres to cultivate the land to which the latter hired other persons including the private respondent herein, Ampig. Ampig allegedly “surreptituously and fraudulently” filed in his own name over the land on May 1955. On October 25, 1965, a Homestead Patent was issued to Ampig after compliance to the legal requirements. Such portion of the land subject to the application of Garcia was later on transferred to Suerte who transferred it to Sablay. Both are co-petitioners in this case. Petitioners seek for the annulment of the patent and cancellation of Patent title issued under the name of Ampig. Issue: 1. Whether or not the case involves an action for reversion; and 2. Whether or not the petitioners can initiate the action. Held: 1. Yes. Respondent Judge was correct in holding that petitioners' action was in effect an action for reversion of a homestead under Section 101 of the Public Land Act which provides: Sec. 101.—All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 2. No.The action should be in the name of the Government for even if Ampig's homestead patent were annulled for fraud, it would not necessarily follow that the court may award the land to the petitioner. The courts have no authority to do that for, as provided in the Public Land Act, the Director of Lands is the official vested with direct executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain. This action may not be treated as an action for reconveyance for that is the remedy of an owner whose land has been erroneously registered in the name of another. The petitioner is not the owner of the homestead in question. He is only an applicant for a homestead patent. The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
22. Director of Lands vs. Jugado and PNB (G.R. No. L-14702, May 23, 1961)’ Facts: On November 26, 1956, the Director of Lands filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition seeking to annul and cancel Homestead Patent No. V-28407 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2644. Named respondent in the petition was Lelita Jugado to whom the homestead patent was issued on May 4, 1954, and the ground relied upon was that the patent aforesaid was fraudulently issued in favor of said respondent because the land is covered by a prior and subsisting approved homestead application of one Conrada Villavera. On October 25, 1957, the Philippine National Bank, claiming to be a mortgagee in good faith of the property subject of the petition, moved to intervene in the proceedings and after its motion was granted, the said entity filed an answer. This was soon followed by a motion to dismiss filed by the same intervenor, alleging as ground therefor, that inasmuch as the petition to cancel was filed on December 5, 1956, more than one year had already elapsed since the issuance of the patent and the certificate of title in favor of respondent, and that, therefore, the said title had already become perfect, absolute and indefeasible. Issue: Whether or not the appellant’s petition to cancel or annul Homestead Patent issued to Jugado could prosper under the circumstances. Held: Yes. Well settled is the rule that once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. And a public land patent, when registered, is a veritable torrens title and becomes indefeasible as a torrens title upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance thereof. As such it can no longer be cancelled and annulled. There is, however, a section in the Public Land Law, which affords a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. As the party in interest in this case is the Director of Lands and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action cannot prosper in favor of the appellant. In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, but without prejudice to the Government's right to institute the proper action for reversion.
23. Republic vs. Alejada, Sr. (G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002) Facts: This is a case where the state wanted to take back a land granted through free patent due to fraud in obtaining the same. The Regional Trial Court found that there was fraud in the process of granting the free patent to the respondent; on the other hand, the Court of Appeal reversed the RTC decision and stated that there was no fraud committed, thus the free patent and the title to the land is valid. The following are some important dates: 1. Dec 28, 1978 – respondent filed with the District Land Office the Free Patent Application 2. Dec 27, 1978 – Efren L. Recio, land inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office 3. Mar 14, 1979 - the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of Free Patent to the applicant 4. Mar 16, 1979 - the patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title. Issues: 1. Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the free patent 2. Whether or not the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain Held: 1. Yes, There was fraud committed in obtaining the free patent based on the record: (1) the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141; (2) there was no sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims; (3) the report by the land investigator was dated before the application by the respondent; and (4) there was no signature of the land inspector in the Verification & Investigation Report itself. 2. Yes. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 49 the State — even after the lapse of one year — may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Furthermore, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than education, charity, or easement of way. In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 60 was approved and issued on March 14, 1979. The corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 61 was issued on the same date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan 62 in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15. 63 In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction.
24. Panimdim vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No. L-19731, July 31, 1964) Facts: This is a case where the Director of Lands wanted to amend a free patent and re-issue the same due to a protest by another and with an investigation that concluded that the petitioner has received a patent which was erroneous and improper for it covered more area than what he was entitled to. The following are some important dates: 1. Dec 27, 1927 - the free patent application of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest was approved by the Director of Lands 2. Jul 8, 1957 - petitioner had succeeded to the rights of his father over the land a free patent was issued in his name; and thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. 9040 was also issued in his name by the register of deeds of Camarines Sur 3. Aug 24, 1959 – the Director of Lands declared the patent erroneous and improper Issue: Whether or not the Director of Lands has the authority to adjudicate the land in question Held: No. The Director of Lands losses jurisdiction over lands no longer part of the public domain. Once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor. The Director of Lands can no longer take administrative action because the land in question was already registered and more than two years have already lapsed.
25. Carlos vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 164823, August 31, 2005) Facts: On December 19, 2001, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land. Petitioner alleged that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership. Also, she claimed that she has been in possession of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to petitioner’s application. On the witness stand, petitioner’s daughter (Victoria) stated that her mother was in possession of the subject property until she passed away on January 6, 2001. Petitioner Victoria admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of petitioner made a commitment to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The trial court granted the application. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to the confirmation of title over the parcel of land. Held: No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second. It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant no longer had possession of the property at the time of the application for the issuance of a certificate of title. The application was filed in court on December 19, 2001. Victoria, the daughter of petitioner, admitted during the hearing that her mother had sold the property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.
26.Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co. Inc. (G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986) Facts: Respondent Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. acquired five parcels of land from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. The possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. And that ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government. The Director of Lands takes issue to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. He asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares, it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Issue: Whether the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed. Held: Yes. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registerable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
27.Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties (G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008) Facts: T.A.N Properties, Inc. (respondent) filed an application for registration before the RTC covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741, with an area of 56.4007 hectares, which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. According to testimonies of witnesses, Prospero Dimayuga had peaceful, adverse, open and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon Kabesang Puroy’s death, he was succeeded by his son Antonio, who transfer the lot to his son Fortunato. Fortunato, upon being given another portion of land, reconvey the donated land, and this was adjudicated in the name of Prospero. The latter, thereafter, sell the land to respondent. The trial court granted the application stating that respondent and its predecessor-ininterest was able to prove possession beyond 30 years which was affirmed by the CA in toto giving credence to the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses. Issues: 1. Whether or not the subject land is alienable and disposable. 2. Whether or not the respondent was in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Held: 1. No. the rule based on the Regalian Doctrine is that all lands belong to the state, and the burden of proof of proving that the land being applied is a private land belongs to the applicant. In the present case, respondent failed to prove its claim to the land as the 2 certificates it presented as evidence (CENRO certificate and the certificate issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Service of the DENR) lacks probative value. DENR Administrative Order No. 20 stated that the power to certify the land which is already alienable and disposable if having the land area of more than 50 hectares belongs to the PENRO, clearly then, CENRO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the certificate. Also the FMS-DENR cannot issue such certificate being not included in its powers and duties. Furthermore, it is not enough to provide CENRO or PENRO certificate, what is required is the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. It is provided in Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence that a document to be a public document, it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy, clearly, CENRO is not the person provided here. 2. No. the Court did not give credence to the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses having no corroboration. Respondent was not able to prove the possession and occupation of its predecessor-in-interest for 30 years. The tax declaration presented was only in 1955. Although the same was not conclusive evidence of ownership but only mere proof of ownership, the respondent was not able to provide an explanation why it only paid its taxes on 1955. It is then presumed that the Dimayuga’s possession of the land is only beginning that time. The corporation is prohibited in owning public land under Sec 3, Article III of the Constitution.
28.Malabanan vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009) Facts: On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite consisting of 71,324 sq.m. He claimed that he purchased the land from Eduardo Velasco and he and his predecessor-in-interest is in open, continuous, notorious adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. Velasco, then, appear as a witnesses alleging that the land belonged to his great grandfather Lino Velasco, wherein upon the latter’s death, it was transferred to his 4 sons, Esteban, Eduardo, Gregorio and Benedicto. Magdalena, Esteban’s wife, became the administrator of the whole property and upon the death of Esteban and Magdaleno was transferred to their son, Virgilio. This was the property that was sold by Eduardo. They also presented a CENRO certificate that the land was alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the application, which was, however reversed by the CA. Malabanan died pending case before the CA. The CA alleged that the land became alienable only on 1982 as evident by the CENRO’s certificate. The case was referred to the Court En Banc where oral arguments was held. Issues: 1. Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable; and 2. Whether or not the respondent and his predecessor-in-interest had an open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and peaceful possession of the land for 30 years. Held: 1. Yes, the property was declared alienable and disposable in 1982, however, there is no competent evidence that the same is not intended for public use service or for the development of national evidence, in order to conform to Article 422 of the Civil Code. There must be an express declaration from the State, either through enactment of congress or Presidential Proclamation in cases the law authorized the President to do so, that the public dominion is no longer intended for public use or the national wealth, or the same is already converted to patrimonial property. Absence of which, the prescriptive period will not begin to run. 2. No. respondent failed to prove through evidence his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession over the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the latest evidence of possession that respondent had presented was through the tax declaration dated 1948.
29. Republic of the Philippines vs. East Silverland Realty Development Corporation (G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012) Facts: The Republic assails the decision of the CSA, affirming the RTC’s grant to East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation (ESRDC) of its petition for registration of a parcel of land situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. ESRDC purchased a portion of the subject property from Francisca Oco in November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan on April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945. The Republic alleges that the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of time CA No. 141 and PD No. 1529. Issue: Whether or not the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the CA No. 141 and PD No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Held: No. On the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply. While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990. Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone. Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription. The respondent’s application was filed after only four years from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR’s October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. Furthermore, the phrase “adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner,” by which the respondent describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law. It is therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. The respondent’s claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone because it is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
30. Republic vs. De la Paz (G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010) Facts: RTC granted respondents’ application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari. Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents, who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay” dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than 50 years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner opposed the application for registration on several grounds, one of which is that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty 30 years. Issue: Whether or not the respondents, by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest, have proven that they possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Held: No. Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-ininterest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
31. Maximo Cortes vs. City Of Manila (G.R. No. L-4012, March 25, 1908) Facts:
On 26th of September, 1906, Cortes filed a written application for the registration of a parcel of land owned by him, free of all encumberances, situated in Calle Aguilar corner Calle Ceciliain Binondo. The land was purchased by Cortes from Prospero. The property was the assessed for the purpose of taxation of the last fiscal year. The buildings erected were paid for by Cortes and the applications is accompanied by a deed of sale, plan ,and technical description of the land. The examiner of titles reported, in due course, that the said building lot was attached by reason of certain proceedings instituted against the applicant for treason and rebellion, yet, inasmuch as the land was acquired by him more than ten years previously, he could be considered the real owner thereof by prescription; but that, in order to obtain title, it was necessary for him to show that said attachment had been discharged or canceled, for which reason he considered the title of the applicant to be defective and that it could not be registered. City of Manila claims that the land belongs to the city alleging that both the plan and technical description of the land title contained errors. There was an excess in the measurement which affected the interests of the city particularly the Meisic Creek and that the creek belonged to the city of Manila Issue: Whether or not the parcel of land belongs to Cortes. Held: The court ruled in favor of Cortes saying that the portion of land included in the technical description presented by the applicant, situated between the lot to which said instrument refers and the bed of the Meisic Creek, has been gradually formed alluvion, as the result of the current in the said stream. The said portion of land belongs by right of accretion to the owner of the land. The Law of Waters provides that the accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of the land bordering on streams, torrents, lakes and rivers. Furthermore, there is no evidence to prove that the addition to the said property was artificially made by the owner. This means that the accretion is a work of nature and lawfully belongs to the owner.
32. Republic vs. C.A. and Tancinco, et al. (G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984) Facts: Tancincos were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond but because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of the two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness. The Bureau of lands argues that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man made. Respondents counter that their evidence shows that accretion happened without human intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after. Issue: Whether or not accretion took place. Held: No. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is no evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the two rivers. The lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public property. Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed.
33. Republic vs. Santos III and Santos, Jr. (G.R. No.16045, November 12, 2012) Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the defendant. Issue: Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD 1529). Held: No. By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State.Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
34. Ignacio Grande vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962) Facts: The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the title. By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 19,964 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs, however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933. The CFI rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed. Issue: Whether or not respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription. Held: Yes. Art. 457 dictate that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.
