CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Nelson Valleno y Lucito vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 192050 January 9, 2013 FACTS:
The Information charged petitioner of illegal possession of shabu. It reads: That on or about the 12th day of March, 2004, in Barangay San Antonio, Milaor, Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without any authority of law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, control and have in custody nine (9) transparent plastic sachets, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a prohibited drug, weighing no less than 34.7011 grams, with an estimated cost or market value of P69,402.20, to the great damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. Five police officers, two barangay officials and one on e forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On 13 June 2008, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of shabu. In convicting petitioner, the trial court lent credence to the straightforward testimonies of the police officers over the mere denial of the accused. The trial court ruled that the chain of custody custod y over the illegal drugs seized was properly established. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner‘s conviction on 29 October 2009 and denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration on 13 1 3 April Ap ril 2010. Petitioner now seeks relief before this Court via a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: YES. Thus, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 29 October 2009 Decision and the 13 April 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03433 are hereby AFFIRMED.
In order for prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited
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or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. During the search, PO3 Edrano found a bag on top of a cabinet inside the house of petitioner. He handed the same to PO3 Villano, who in turn opened it, and found nine (9) plastic sachets of shabu. Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on petitioner‘s person, it was found inside a bag which was hidden on top of a cabinet in the house of petitioner. Thus, petitioner is deemed in possession thereof. Petitioner was not lawfully authorized to possess the same. It can also be inferred that petitioner was privy to the existence of the shabu. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession – the the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. With the burden of evidence shifted to the petitioner, it was his duty to explain his innocence about the regulated drug seized from his possession. This, petitioner failed to do. The petitioner‘s proposition that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt is anchored on his claim that the prosecution failed to prove and establish the chain of custody of the subject prohibited drugs allegedly allegedl y seized from his house.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs, to wit: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; xxxx The provisions of Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 provide: xxxx
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or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. During the search, PO3 Edrano found a bag on top of a cabinet inside the house of petitioner. He handed the same to PO3 Villano, who in turn opened it, and found nine (9) plastic sachets of shabu. Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on petitioner‘s person, it was found inside a bag which was hidden on top of a cabinet in the house of petitioner. Thus, petitioner is deemed in possession thereof. Petitioner was not lawfully authorized to possess the same. It can also be inferred that petitioner was privy to the existence of the shabu. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession – the the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. With the burden of evidence shifted to the petitioner, it was his duty to explain his innocence about the regulated drug seized from his possession. This, petitioner failed to do. The petitioner‘s proposition that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt is anchored on his claim that the prosecution failed to prove and establish the chain of custody of the subject prohibited drugs allegedly allegedl y seized from his house.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs, to wit: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; xxxx The provisions of Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 provide: xxxx
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(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. The Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. The prosecution established that PO3 Edrano recovered the white plastic sachets, later on confirmed positive for traces of shabu. PO3 Edrano handed them over to PO3 Villano, who made markings on the seized items and prepared an inventory of the same while inside petitioner‘s house. It was also shown that PO3 Villano brought the seized illegal drugs to the police station where he himself prepared the inventory. While he presented the same to a certain PO3 Molina, it was still PO3 Villano and SPO4 Fabiano who first brought the seized illegal drugs to the court, who in turn ordered him to bring it to the PNP Crime Laboratory. In the letter request addressed to the forensic chemist, it was PO3 Villano who signed as the requesting party. Clearly therefore, the recovery and handling of the seized illegal drugs were more than satisfactorily established in this case. This Court notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly that of barangay tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place where one of the plastic sachets was found and to the person who brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory, respectively. We however brush aside these inconsistencies as inconsequential. Indeed, one can hardly expect their testimonies to be in perfect agreement. As held in the past, it is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses. For a successful appeal, the inconsistencies brought up should pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to peripheral matters. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
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Finally, there was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioner‘s house. There were variations in the witnesses‘ testimonies as to whe ther petitioner was inside the house during the search. One witness testified that petitioner was coming in and out of the house during the search while the other witnesses claimed that petitioner was waiting just outside the house. Assuming that petitioner was indeed outside the house, it does not taint the regularity of the search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two witnesses are present. The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner.
Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816 January 9, 2013 FACTS:
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-Affidavit charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Matsuura vehemently denied Tan‘s charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a scheme resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution in a complaint for estafa against Tan. Matsuura further explained that the transfer of the shareholdings covered by the subject Deed of Trust was a result of Tan‘s offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute. He insisted that it was Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was a condition for Matsuura‘s acceptance of the compromise. For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tan‘s admission of having pre-signed the subject deed only proved that he had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed to present any proof of her participation in the deed‘s falsification, and explained that she had not yet known Matsuura at the time of the supposed notarization.9 For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who represented himself as Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan presented his community tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have conducted her duty in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having any business or interest whatsoever with the law offices of Tanjutco. ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there exists no probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of falsification.
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HELD: 5
The courts may review probable-cause findings of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. While the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the Department of Justice (DOJ), this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising their powers of review with respect to the DOJ‘s findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals (CA) may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate court‘s exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justice‘s appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge of his functions.
Raul B. Escalante v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 192727 January 9, 2013 FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations that were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Samar against the petitioner, charging him for violation of Section 261 (q) of BP 881 (Election Gun Ban) and Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). The two cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC as the crimes charged against the petitioner arose from the same incident. The RTC rendered a judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. On June 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision which affirmed in toto the May 23, 2003 Judgment of the RTC. ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to deny the appeal filed by the petitioner despite the fact that one of the essential elements of the offense of violation of COMELEC Gun Ban is absent
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HELD: 6
The period to file a petition for review on certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. Here, the petitioner received a copy of the CA‘s May 5, 2010 Resolution, which denied his second motion for reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he only had until June 4, 2010 to file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. This he failed to do. ―The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable.‖25 Thus, the petitioner‘s failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary period rendered the CA‘s June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final and executory.
In any case, assuming arguendo that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy, the petition would still be dismissed. That the petitioner was in possession of a firearm with live ammunition outside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority therefor is a finding of fact by the RTC and the CA which cannot be disturbed by this Court in this original action for certiorari. Moreover, ―it has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.‖30 Here, the Court sees no compelling reason to depart from this rule.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA G.R. No. 201447 January 9, 2013 FACTS:
Before the Court is the appeal of accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistosn) of the Decision dated August 25,2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012, affirming with modification the Decision dated March 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, which found Amistoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the qualified rape of his daughter AAA. That on or about the 10th day of July 2000, at about 8:00 o‘clock in the evening thereof, at Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd design and with intent to have carnal knowledge with AAA, a 12-year
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
old girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and without her consent. With the aggravating circumstance of relationship, accused being the father of the victim. When arraigned on July 23, 2002, Amistoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On March 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Amistoso‘s conviction for qua lified rape but modified the penalties imposed. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION‘S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. HELD:
ART. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. – Rape is committed – 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. xxxx ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases supplied.)
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Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the victim‘s father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation, as the Court expounded in People v. Fragante. It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further OHDERED to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," G.R. No. 188603 January 16, 2013
Related Rules of Court Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court (Dying declaration) FACTS:
On or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named appellant, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and
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there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Arnel M. Florendo. Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m., while victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant in court. Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo died on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about P2,896.00 for his hospitalization and P25,000.00 for his funeral. Petitioner‘s contention: In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Ruling of the Trial Court: He was found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by Sit-Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant] has no leg to stand on. Under prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify. Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the May 29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jar‘s positive identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes precedence over appellant‘s defense of denial and alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper motive to falsely testify against him.
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Hence, present petition. 10
ISSUES:
Whether or not the dying declaration of the victim can be given credence. Whether or not the appellant is guilty of murder. HELD:
First Issue: Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. Under the rules, statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. Second Issue: The prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the victim‘s assailant in contrast to the appellant‘s defense of denial and alibi. The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant‘s bare alibi that he was working as a farm administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there at the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the alleged physical impossibility that he committed the crime charged, moreso in the face of positive identification by the witness, who was not motivated by any improper motive to falsely testify against him. Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant‘s act of suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Here, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the
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Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the 11 crime. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Benjamin Petaluna and Abundio Binundo G.R. No. 187048 January 23, 2013 FACTS:
On 11 June 1996, appellants were charged with the murder of Pablo before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. On arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective witnesses. The prosecution presented sixteen-year old Romeo Pialago (Romeo), who was with Pablo at the time of the incident, and Dr. Dympna Aguilar (Dr. Aguilar), Municipal Health Officer of the Barili District Hospital. On the other hand, the appellants themselves and the father of appellant Abundio, Teofilo Binondo (Teofilo), appeared for the defense. The evidence for the prosecution shows that on 30 April 1996, Romeo and Pablo watched a cockfight during the fiesta of Barangay Lamak, Barili, Cebu. On their way home at about five o'clock in the afternoon, Pablo, followed by the appellants, with the young Romeo behind them, walked along the road of Sitio Liki, BarangayMayana, Barili, Cebu. Romeo, who knew appellants because they used to pass by his house, noticed them whispering to each other. He saw the appellants place their arms on Pablo's shoulder, after which they struck Pablo with stones each of which was as big as the size of a fist. Pablo pleaded the appellants to stop but they did not. When Pablo fell to the ground, Benjamin smashed his head with a stone as big as Pablo's head. Afterwards, appellants dragged him downhill towards the farm of one Efren Torion (Efren) in Sitio Liki. Romeo did not know what happened next because he ran to seek help. He went to the house of Espiridion Presbitero (Pideon), the barangay captain of Mayana. Pideon, in turn, coordinated with a certain Simo, the barangay captain of Bagacay. Romeo escorted Pideon and Simo to the place where the incident took place but Pablo was no longer there. They went to the house of appellant Abundio at Barangay Cangundo but the appellant was not there. The two captains then proceeded to the house of appellant Benjamin, who accompanied them to the farm of Efren. There they found the body of Pablo, which Dr. Aguilar later examined. TDcHCa Before the court, Dr. Aguilar testified that Pablo sustained eleven (11) wounds caused by blunt instrument(s) like stone(s). There were blood clots in the cranium and meninges. The death,
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according to her autopsy report, which she identified in court to have been prepared and signed 12 by her, was caused by "cerebral hemorrhage due to laceration and contusion of the head. Appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not attendant in the commission of the crime considering that there was no element of surprise when Pablo was attacked. Pablo had the opportunity to defend himself. Appellant Benjamin, in his Supplemental Brief, further argued that even if there was suddenness of the attack, Pablo could have chosen to retreat.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was treachery in the commission of the crime. 2. Whether or not the accused committed murder. HELD:
The court sustains the conviction of both appellants. The crime committed was murder. To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. Appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not attendant in the commission of the crime considering that there was no element of surprise when Pablo was attacked. Pablo had the opportunity to defend himself. Appellant Benjamin, in his Supplemental Brief, further argued that even if there was suddenness of the attack, Pablo could have chosen to retreat. The court is not convinced. SECAHa We have time and again declared that "[t]he essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape," and that it may still exist even if the attack is frontal so long as the same is sudden and unexpected. In this case, it was clear that the elderly victim had no inkling of the impending danger against him. The attack was sudden notwithstanding the prior act of placing the assailants' arms on the shoulder of the victim because such was done in a friendly manner.
People of the Philippines vs. Patricio Rayon, Sr. G.R. No. 194236 January 30, 2013
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FACTS:
Patricio Rayon, Sr. (appellant) was charged before the RTC in two separate informations with: a. violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 (Crim. Case No. 2006-174); and b. qualified rape (Crim. Case No. 2006-175). Prosecution Appellant‘s wife (XYZ) testified that they had five childr en, one of which (AAA) was mentally deficient. She stated that one time, when she arrived at their house after buying rice, she saw the appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs; the appellant then put his hand on AAA‘s breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina. When the appellant noticed her presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare food. XYZ felt ―bad and afraid,‖ but did not confront the appellant. On December 16, 2005, BBB (another daughter) revealed to XYZ that the appellant had raped her. XYZ requested assistance from a municipal social worker who, in turn, told her to file a case before the police. BBB recalled that while she was in her room in December 2005, the appellant grabbed her and removed her short pants and panty; the appellant then removed his short pants, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain, but could not shout because the appellant covered her mouth with his hands. Afterwards, the appellant inserted his penis into her anus. BBB disclosed the incident to XYZ who, in turn, accompanied her to the police. The Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI examined both children: AAA had a healed hymenal laceration at 7 o‘clock position while BBB had an intact hymen but said there could have been a penetration of BBB‘s inter -labia. XXX, the sister of AAA and BBB, narrated that every time the appellant came home from work, he would instruct AAA to sit on his lap; the appellant would also embrace AAA and touch her vagina. XXX added that the appellant allowed AAA to watch him take a bath BBB also disclosed to her that the appellant ―sodomized‖ her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. A psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center testified that she conducted a psychological test on AAA, and found her to be autistic. She declared that AAA lacked motor coordination, and had a very low intelligence quotient. The psychiatrist found AAA to be incompetent to testify in court. Defense Appellant claimed his wife falsely accused him of raping AAA because he disallowed her to have an American ―pen pal.‖ He further maintained that AAA was usually in their neighbor‘s house when he comes home from work. The appellant also denied BBB‘s allegation that he sodomized her. He confirmed that AAA is a ―special child.‖ He also maintained that he is close to his two daughters.
13
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RTC and CA Rulings RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two charges. The CA affirmed 14 the RTC Judgment in toto. ISSUE:
WON appellant is guilty of the crimes charged; proper penalties HELD:
a. The Information in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 charged the appellant with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The body of the Information, however, alleged that the appellant sexually molested AAA; kissed her; mashed her breasts; fondled her; and forcibly opened her legs. These described acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. ―[t]he character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, xxx but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.‖
Penalty and Indemnity: Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the RPC against the appellant, since it has been established that the appellant is AAA‘s father there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, that is, reclusion perpetua Section 31 of R.A. No. 7610 expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is the parent of the victim Pay AAA P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and pay a P15,000.00 fine
b. Prosecution established that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his eight-year old daughter, BBB, in December 2005. The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship raises the crime of statutory rape to qualified rape. CA was therefore correct in affirming the appellant‘s conviction. Penalty and Indemnity: Article 266-B of the RPC: death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim we cannot impose the death penalty in view of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines‖ reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
pay BBB P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 15 as exemplary damages
Baron A. Villanueva and the Secretary v. Edna Caparas G.R. No. 190969 January 30, 2013 FACTS:
As the CA summarized in its decision, an altercation occurred between Renato Caparas, husband of respondent Edna R. Caparas, and Villanueva in the morning of August 24, 2005, which altercation led to the death of Renato. On September 7, 2005 Edna Caparas filed a criminal complaint of murder against Villanueva During the preliminary investigation both parties submitted their respective affidavits including the affidavits of their witnesses Edna also includes the autopsy reports of the Philippine National Police-Central Police District Crime Laboratory. Villanueva also submitted the opinion of Dr. Valentin T. Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Division (NBI opinion) as to the cause of Renatos head injuries. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed criminal information for homicide against Villanueva on October 3, 2006. Villanueva file for a reconsideration. The prosecutor denied the motion on March 22, 2007 and before arraignment, Villanueva filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice. The DOJ Secretary found the evidence against Villanueva insufficient to support a prima facie case and set aside the prosecutors resolution and direct the same for the withdrawal of the information. Edna filed for certiorari. The CA reversed the decision of the DOJ secretary for the reason that the Secretary exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary investigation in passing upon the validity of matters essentially evidentiary in nature and there is a grave abuse of discretion intervened when he passed upon the merits of Villanuevas defences. Villanueva filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the CA.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ISSUE: 16
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutor‘s resolution finding probable cause to indict Villanueva f or homicide and ordered the withdrawal of it
HELD:
We find the CA decision and resolution in accord with law and jurisprudence in finding that the Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutor‘s resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva with homicide. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged, homicide in this case, should be present. Jurisprudence laid out the elements of homicide as: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide which all of this is present in Edna‘s autopsy report. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. In sum, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set aside the resolution rendered by the Secretary with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the C A also did not err in ordering the reinstatement of the prosecutor's resolution of probable cause and its accompanying information.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 193507 17
January 30, 2013
Related Rules of Court: •
Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape incident. She and appellant, who was then 17 years old are neighbors − their respective houses are adjoining each other. In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sari-sari store of AAA‘s mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari store. Shortly, thereafter, appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house. AAA acceded and went ahead. Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look for her one peso coin, followed them until she reached a papaya tree located three and a half meters away from the place. Analiza hid under the papaya tree and from there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing the latter‘s shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB what she saw. Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home. When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother, BBB, where she came from and why she came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant brought her there and had sexual intercourse with her. The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr. Nochete. Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those complete healed hymenal lacerations more than a month prior to the date of the examination. He also clarified that even though AAA has no fresh hymenal laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse was committed on her on 9 December 2002. Petitioners contention: Appellant denied having raped AAA. He then claimed that on the same day, he was out on a drinking spree with a certain Pio and Dinnes Samson which ended at around 6 in the evening and only woke up the next day as he was so drunk. Appellant‘s testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his father, Cesar, who also admitted that he personally knew AAA as she is their neighbor. Cesar also knew that AAA is suffering from mental disorder. Both Pio and Cesar confirmed that on 9 December 2002, they brought appellant to his bedroom and let him sleep there because he was too drunk.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Ruling of the Trial Court: 18
The appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape of a demented person and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with damages. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto. Hence, present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Rules of Court regarding the filing with the prosecutor was complied with. Whether or not the trial court and the court of appeals erred in ruling that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubts due to inconsistencies and improbabilities.
HELD:
No. The Court affirms appellant‘s conviction.
First Issue: Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, both the Complaint and the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of Northern Samar, which formed the basis of the Information and copies of which were attached in the records, stated that AAA is suffering from mental abnormalities – she looked like a retardate and her focus is not normal. Even, the Resolution of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred with the aforesaid findings. From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAA‘s mental disorder or mental disability is that of being a mentally retarded and not demented. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution was able to prove that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said mental condition of the victim. Second Issue: Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate through, (1) the testimony of her mother; (2) the trial court‘s observation; and (3) the mental examination and actual interview of AAA conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, who found AAA to be suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the "specific form of below average 19 intelligence which has a low reproduction functioning which result to impairment functioning." It is also worthy to note that the defense did not dispute, even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental retardation. The findings of the lower courts about AAA‘s mental condition must be upheld. The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress between appellant and AAA. Despite the latter‘s mental condition, she narrated before the court in the best way she could her ordeal in the hands of appellant. As stated by the appellate court, AAA conveyed her ideas by words and demonstrations. Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA‘s testimony, she positively identified the appellant as the person who raped her. Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution. The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete as regards the exact date and time the alleged rape incident happened, as well as the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA‘s vagina, pointed to by appellant cannot work in his favor. Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive identification of appellant as her assailant and the lack of illmotive on her part to falsely testify against appellant, the latter‘s defense of denial and alibi must necessarily fail. All told, appellant‘s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, thus, his conviction stands.
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages are awarded to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, this Court likewise affirms the lower courts award of exemplary damages but increased the same from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.
People of the Philippines v. Saiben Langcua G.R. No.190343 February 6, 2013
Facts:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This case is a drug case wherein two different versions of the facts are presented. 20
Version of the Prosecution: 1. On October 4, 2006, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs and Special Operations (PAID-SO) at Camp Valentin, San Juan, Laoag City got a report from a police informant about the selling of illegal drugs by accused Langcua.
2. A team was immediately formed to conduct the buy-bust operation. Pre-operation activity was well recorded in the Police Blotter. They then proceeded to the place where Langcua, the poseur buyer (PO1 Domingo) and informant agreed to meet. 3. Langcua initated the sale by asking for the money. PO1 Domingo handed the marked money (P11,000) to Langcua and thereafter the latter handed out one light blue colored folded paper which contained a big heat-sealed plastic sachet with crystalline substance. 4. PO1 Domingo secured the plastic sachet and called the cellular phone of their team leader. After which, he then grabbed the right arm of Langcua. 5. Langcua was subjected to a body search where the buy-bust money, his cellular phone and wallet were recovered. 6. The confiscated white crystalline substance was brought to the Provincial Crime Lab for examination.
Version of the Defense: 1. Langcua testified that upon returning home from the mosque, his wife instructed him to buy medicines for their sick child.
2. Together with his friend, Ombawa Ali, they drove a motorcycle until they were flagged down by three male persons who introduced themselves as police officers. Langcua was allegedly forced by the police to go with them after the latter kicked his motorycle and strangled him. Ali ran away when he saw this. 3. Langcua was brought to the police station where he was frisked. The police recovered his wallet containing P11,000. When asked why he had such amount, he explained that he and his wife owned a carinderia and were saving to go home to Mindanao. He also claimed to have been physically maltreated by the police officers and was accused of being confiscated with a plastic sachet of shabu.
► Langcua was arraigned on April 16, 2007 where he pleaded NOT GUILTY. ► On March 7, 2008, the trial court found the Langcua GUILTY of violation of S ec 5, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 where he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. ► Langcua appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Issues:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INITIAL CONTACT ON THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS AND THE APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY THAT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROOPERLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION Ruling:
The Court does not agree. The prosecution has adequately proven all the elements constituting sale of illegal drug. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of illegal sale merely consummates the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by seller, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. PO1 Domingo in open court identified the white crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachet as the one handed by Langcua to him during the buy-bust operation. The substance yielded positive result for shabu. In the case of People vs Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratoy examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. The Court finds that the different links to establish the chain of custody are sufficiently established. Be it granted that there was no strict observance of the procedure, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
21
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
police officers, substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of custody is 22 sanctioned. Instant appeal is DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DE JESUS Y GARCIA GR No. 198794 February 06, 2013 FACTS:
A report reached the office of the PDEG Bulacan about the alleged drug selling activities of one alias Vic, herein appellant Victor De Jesus y Garcia along Baliuag, Bulacan. He was arrested in a buy-bust operation conducted on March 31, 2003 and was charged with violation of Article 2, Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 otherwise known as ―Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.‖ Meanwhile, PO2 Bernardo declared in his testimony that the buy-bust operation was conducted on March 29, 2003, which was two days earlier than the March 31, 2003 date he stated in his joint affidavit and the date in the Information filed against De Jesus. The arresting of ficers‘ also failed to conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the items seized from De Jesus. The Trial Court and Court of Appeals found De Jesus guilty. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS’ FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND IDENTITY OF THE SEIZED SHABU? WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE ERROR IN THE WITNESSING OFFICER’S TESTIMONY? HELD:
It is a settled rule that the trial court‘s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place , coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Non-compliance with the requirements in chain and custody of evidence is allowed under 23 justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Elements were all duly established by the prosecution. After De Jesus was validly arrested for the illegal sale of drugs, he was searched and frisked pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. RTC AND CA‘s DECISION IS AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO G.R. No 191726 February 06, 2013 Facts:
On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU) in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials BP . It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 2003, the team members positioned themselves in the vicinity of a store. The informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the store and dropped a cigarette butt in front of the person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of the cigarette butt. Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which he handed the marked ₱100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic sachet containing white substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, another member of the team, confiscated the marked ₱100.00 bill from the suspect, who was identified as Noel
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Bartolome y Bajo. Paras immediately marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolome‘s 24 initials NBB. Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid? Held:
Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust operation, the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is consummated, the pusher is validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the buyer. Here, Paras asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There is no question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA G.R. No. 187496 February 06, 2013 FACTS: PO1 Solarta said that their office had received reports of Manalao‘s drug pushing and using activities in the area of Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Thus, upon instructions of their Officer-in-Charge,Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Renato Salazar, they prepared to conduct an entrapment or buy-bust operation against Manalao. PO1 Solarta narrated that on June 15, 2004, the buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp. Salazar, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Expedito Daulong, and himself, prepared two P100.00 bills as drug money by having them signed by P/Insp. Salazar and then photocopying them. At around seven in the evening, the team, together with a civilian agent who was to act as the poseur-buyer, proceeded to the carenderia of Josephine Tamarong, located along the national highway, Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. At the carenderia, the team pretended to be customers and had some coffee while waiting for Manalao, who arrived at around 8:00 p.m. PO1 Solarta, who claimed to have been only around three to four meters away from the scene, testified that when Manalao arrived, the civilian agent immediately established contact with him. Following a brief conversation, the civilian agent handed Manalao the buy-bust money and in turn, Manalao "got something from his pocket, opened it, and gave something" to the civilian agent. After the "give and take" transaction, the civilian agent approached the buy-bust team, who without delay arrested Manalao. During the arrest, the buy-bust team introduced themselves to Manalao and bodily searched him, from which three decks of shabu and money, including the buy-bust money of two pieces ofP100.00 bills, were recovered. Manalao, together with the items seized from him, were brought to the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
police station. Thereafter, P/Insp. Salazar marked the seized items in front of the other apprehending officers and Manalao. PO1 Solarta, aside from narrating his account of the 25 entrapment operation, also identified the certificate of inventory of the items seized from Manalao, which he enumerated to be one deck of shabu, three decks of shabu, two P100.00 bills, and one small, black and white, lady‘s purse. He likewise identified the shabu the shabu presented in court to be the same one recovered from Manalao and examined by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo. In two separate Informations filed before Branch 7, RTC of Lanao del Norte, Manalao was charged with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The RTC of Lanao found the accused guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA failed to prove p rove Manalao‘s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. doub t. HELD: SC sustained the judgment of the the RTC and CA. SC held that the prosecution prosecution successfully established the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took place together with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in evidence. Manalao was caught in flagrante delicto in the entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Moreover, the corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness. Manalao handed to the poseur-buyer one deck of shabu upon his receipt of the P200.00 buy-bust money. The Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had been maintained as required Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. P/Insp. Salazar, who was one of the apprehending officers, marked the seized items in front of Manalao and the other apprehending officers. P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer, thereafter signed a request for the laboratory examination of the seized drugs, which was received by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo, together with the items enumerated therein. She then testified in open court on how her examination confirmed that the seized items, which she submitted in court, tested positive for shabu. When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession p ossession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.33 The prosecution was able to satisfy all the foregoing elements during the joint trial of the cases. The three decks of shabu subject of the case for illegal possession of drugs were validly obtained upon searching Manalao after he was arrested in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The following section in Rule R ule 126 of the Rules of Court Cou rt provides: Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest . — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Mere possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under Republic Act No. 9165. Since Manalao failed to adduce any evidence showing that he had legal authority to possess the seized drugs, then he was correctly charged with its illegal possession.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
26
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA y BAUTISTA G.R. No. 177158 February 06, 2013 FACTS:
That on or about the 4th day of Feb., 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. When arraigned on March 21, 2003, both Linda and Elizabeth pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and stipulated that they were arrested without a warrant of arrest. arrest. At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer (PO) 2 Edsel Ibasco (Ibasco), the poseur-buyer, and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Edgardo Reburiano (Reburiano), a member of the buy-bust team. The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Analyst Leonard Jabonillo (Jabonillo), Chemist II of thePhilippine National Police (PNP) Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office (CPDCLO), as the defense already admitted (1) the Memorandum dated February 4, 2003 of Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Oliver Magtibay Villanueva (Villanueva) requesting laboratory examination of a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing an undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance, suspected as shabu; and (2) Chemistry Report No. D-198-2003 prepared by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo stating that the examined specimen positively tested for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Accused-appellants Linda and Elizabeth and Linda‘s daughter, Ronalyn Alviz (Ronalyn), took the witness stand for the defense. RTC RULING The RTC promulgated its Decision on December 7, 2004, convicting and sentencing Linda and Elizabeth as follows: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused Linda Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth dela Vega y Bautista GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing penalized under Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and each is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos. The drug involved in this case weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram is ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) thru the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
27
Linda and Elizabeth appealed to the Court of Appeals which reviewed the parties‘ conflicting versions of the events of February 4, 2003, when Linda and Elizabeth were arrested.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING In its Decision dated September 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC against Linda and Elizabeth. The appellate court found that the testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and SPO4 Reburiano were credible and deserved full faith and credit; that the defenses of denial and frame-up of Linda and Elizabeth could not prevail over their positive identification as the persons who sold a sachet of shabu during the buy-bust operation; that the defense failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the police officers‘ performance of official duty as there was no proof establishing improper motive on the part of said police officers in effecting the arrest of Linda and Elizabeth with the latter two even admitting that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest; and that the police team properly observed the procedure outlined by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Initially, both Linda and Elizabeth appealed before the Court. However, Linda executed a Motion for Withdrawal of Appeal on August 14, 2007. The Resolution dated September 3, 2007 granted Linda‘s Motion for Withdrawal of Appeal, and the case insofar as she was concerned was considered closed and terminated. The judgment against Linda was accordingly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on October 24, 2007 Now, only on ly Elizabeth‘s appeal is left for consideration by the Court. In her Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Elizabeth assigned the following errors purportedly committed b y the RTC:
I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED. II THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF THE POLICE OFFICERS. III THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165. Elizabeth insists that there was no buy-bust operation and what actually took place was an unlawful warrantless arrest. She claims that none of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Courtwas Court was present. Elizabeth argues that whatever evidence was obtained from her and Linda on occasion of their arrest is inadmissible being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
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The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserts that the warrantless arrest of Linda and Elizabeth was lawful because the police officers caught them in flagrante 28 delicto selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco in exchange for P100.00. The Court generally relies upon the assessment and factual findings of the RTC. It is a fundamental rule that factual findings of the trial courts involving credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals such as in this case. The Court, therefore, has no reason to deviate from this rule. Jurisprudence has identified the elements that must be established for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz : (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. In other words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place. The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals eventually affirmed, that all these elements have been amply proven by the prosecution. In this case, there is absolute lack of evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were stirred by illicit motive or had improperly performed their duties in arresting Linda and Elizabeth. Both Linda and Elizabeth admitted that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest. Hence, there could not have been any bad blood between them and said police officers. The Court further quotes with approval the following observations of the R TC on the matter: Both accused made inconsistent statements, which are significant and material in nature. The Court is not swayed. The inconsistencies adverted to by Elizabeth are trivial and insignificant and refer only to minor details. Time and again, the Court has steadfastly ruled that inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution‘s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses‘ honesty. These inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is important is that the testimonies agree on the essential facts and
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that the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a 29 consistent and coherent whole. Indeed, in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, both of which were satisfactorily complied with by the prosecution in this case. Finally, Elizabeth argues that the police officers blatantly ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly, the requirements on making an inventory report and taking photographs of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or the latter‘s representative or counsel. Once more, the Court is not swayed. Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment . - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The above rule is implemented by Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which expounds on how it is to be applied, and notably, also provides for a saving mechanism in case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said item.
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The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the 30 chain of custody of the same are duly established. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing Republic Act No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the Dangerous Drug Act: chain of custody not sufficiently established fatal to the prosecutions‘ case? HELD:
Given the law, rules, and jurisprudence, the failure of the police officers to make an inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as required by Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not automatically fatal to the prosecution's case, as it was able to trace and prove the chain of custody of the same: after arresting Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust operation All told, there is no reason for the Court to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Elizabeth is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal- of Elizabeth de Ia Vega is DENIED and the Decision dated September 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in convicting her for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
Dan Djowel Sales v. People of the Philippines G.R. No.191023 February 6, 2013 Facts Factual version of the Prosecution: 1. On May 24, 2003, petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the old Manila Domestic Airport. As part of the routine security check at the pre-departure area, petitioner passed through the
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Walk-Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) 31 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG). 2. While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants. PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open his hands. Petitioner initially refused but eventually opened his right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. 3. PO1 Trota-Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd Police Center for Aviation Security where the evidences were marked. 4. When subjected to chemical analysis at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug. ► Factual
version of the Defense: 1. Petitioner testified that on May 24, 2003, he, together with his girl friend and her family were headed to Boracay Island for a vacation.
2. On the way to the comfort room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This male person wearing a white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets which he did. The male person then said it was ―okay‖ but as petitioner proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the male person called him again saying that ―this fell from you‖ and showing him two ―small white wrappings which seemed to be marijuana.‖ Petitioner told the male person that those items were not his but the latter said they will talk about it in the comfort room. 3. Petitioner was then held in custody by the airport security personnel. RTC found Petitioner GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 ► CA affirmed the trial court's ruling Issues: a) IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE APPELLANT WERE THE VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS; ►
b) THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSECUTION‘S IMPROBABLE SCENARIO AT THE AIRPORT WHERE, FOR NO SPECIAL REASON GIVEN, THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED EVEN AFTER HE HAD TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THROUGH THE DETECTOR. Ruling: 1. The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty:
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(a) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; 32 (b) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. The Court finds no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the frisker‘s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner‘s short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance. 3. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person of accused the marijuana fruiting tops, an illegal substance, contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airport‘s pre-departure area. Accused‘s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker‘s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. The search of the contents of petitioner‘s short pants p ockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED
People of The Philippines v. P02 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez GR NO. 175602 Febuary 13,2013 Facts: P02 Eduardo Valdez and his brother Edwin Valdez was convicted for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of appeals upheld the Regional Trial Court‘s decision. Both the Accused appealed to the Supreme Court, but Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw the appeal, which the court granted, thereby deeming Edwin‘s appeal closed and terminated. On January 18,2012, the Supreme Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of P02 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murderbecause the prosecution failed to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery on the information. Thereafter, Edwin Valdez sent to the Court Administrator a self explanatory letter, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18,2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. Issue: Whether or not the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court on Jan 18 2012 which is favorable to the accused will apply to Edwin Valdez despite the withdrawal of his appeal. Ruling: According the Supreme Court, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality
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of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out 33 is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy. The Supreme Court granted the plea for reduction of Edwin‘s sentences based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) Anappeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Ramon Martinez y Goco v. People of The Philippines GR No.198694 Febuary 13,2013 Facts:
At around 9:35 in the evening of dec. 29,2007, p02 Eoque, p02 Cepe and p02 Zete conducted a foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putangina Mo! Limangdaanbaito?" The police officer then apprehended the man and asked to empty his pockets for allegedly violating sec. 844 of the manila city ordinance which punishes breaches of peace. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The man, later identified as Ramon was brought to the police station. The police chemist identified the substance as Shabu which resulted to the charging of complaint against Ramon for possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC convicted Ramon and upheld the validity of Ramon's warrantless arrest on the grounds that Ramon was disturbing the peace in volition of the city ordinance during his apprehension. The CA upheld the RTC's ruling. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC in convicting Ramon. Ruling:
The SC ruled that for a warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search to be valid, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person in flagrante delicto, under sec. 5(a), rule 113 of the rules of court. The term probable cause, specifically with respect to arrest, has been understood to mean that such facts and circumstance which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Based on the testimonies, Balingkitstreet was thickly populated and everyone in the streets were altogether conversing with each other during the arrest of Ramon. The act of shouting in a thickly populated place, with many people conversing with each other on the street, does not constitute a breach of peace that is punishable under the manila ordinance. The words allegedly shouted by Ramon are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to
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disturb the peace considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkitstreet was still populated with people and alive with activity. The evidence obtained by the police officers cannot be used 34 against Ramon because the manner on how it was ontained violates Ramon's Constitutional right to br secure under sec. 2, art. 3 of the constitution. Consequently, the evidence cannot be admissible in courts under thr exclusionary rule found in sec.3(2), art. 3 of thr Constitution.
Teodera Reyes v. Ettore Rossi G.R. No. 159823 February 18, 2013 Facts:
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Reyes and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems, represented· by its Executive Project Director, respondent Rossi, executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed that Reyes would pay the 3,000,000 downpayment while the balance of 7,000,000 would be paid through 4 post-dated checks. Reyes requested restructuring of the obligation by replacing the 4 post-dated checks to 9 post-dated checks. Reyes issued and delivered nine postdated checks. Rossi deposited several checks but the checks were dishonored. Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages. On the other hand, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg . 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks. Reyes argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings. Issue: Whether the civil action for rescission of contract is prejudicial to the criminal proceedings against Reyes? Ruling:
The civil action is not prejudicial to the criminal proceedings. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
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Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (a) 35 the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties.
Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013 Facts:
The prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Ruben Bernardo on May 3, 1994 being hacked to death by the brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand and their first cousin Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja (herein petitioners). As a result, Ruben died. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that it was Ruben, together with his sons, who first attacked Reynante. On 15 July 1994, an Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel. The RTC issued a decision finding herein petitioners guilty of homicide. Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA sustained the decision. SC issued a Decision dated 21 July 2006 affirming the Decision of the CA. On 23 October 2006, SC denied the motion with finality. On 6 November 2006, petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment to remand the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence. Later, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening Event alleging that on 29 November 2006, the police had finally arrested Plaridel. Attached was a statement executed by Plaridel admitting therein that he had killed Ruben. SC treated the motion as a second motion for reconsideration of the 21 July 2006 Decision and denied it on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rules. In a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Ferdinand prayed for the reopening of the case on the basis of the confession of Plaridel. Issue: Whether or not there reopening of the case is permitted by law in the case at bar.
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Ruling: 36
No, it is not. We resolve to DENY petitioners‘ motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, the petitioners‘ judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – date on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained. Furthermore, petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel‘s extrajudicial confession. Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. Gerry Salapuddin v. CA, Gov. Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama J. G.R. No. 184681 February 25, 2013 Facts: On November 13, 2007 a bomb exploded in Batasan Complex Quezon City which led to the death of four people and causing serious physical injuries to 7 people. Acting on confidential information, this led to a raid of an Abu Sayaf Group safe house wherein a firefight ensued, killing 3 people: Bong, Redwan Indama, Saing Indama, and arresting Caidar Aunal, Ikram Indama, and Adham Kusain. Days after their arrest, sworn statements were made. Ikram made several affidavits. On the first 3 affidavits, he never mentioned Salapuddin‘s involvement for the execution of their bomb explosion plan but on his 4th affidavit, claiming that it was Salapuddin who ordered Redman to kill Cong. Akbar (one of the people who died on the incident). In fact, on his 5th affidavit, he amended the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavit After conducting preliminary investigation, the Chief State Prosecutor approved a Resolution dated December 6, 2007 where he: (1) found probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram, and Kusain for multiple murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2) recommended the conduct of further investigation for their indictment for multiple frustrated murder; and (3) recommended the conduct of preliminary investigation as to the other respondents who were not under detention
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Meanwhile, On February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuño approved the Department of Justice (DOJ) Investigating Panel‘s Supplemental Resolution recommending the amendment of the Information 37 in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin. On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. The Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued, refused to give probative weight to the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the Hataman brothers, but relied on the very same statements in finding probable cause to indict him. Moreover, he maintained that there is no evidence independent of Ikram‘s statements that will support the finding of probable cause to indict him for murder and multiple frustrated murder. On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel. The Secretary of Justice predicated his modificatory action on the interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the statements of Ikram. However, Ikram‘s statements are laden with irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be considered worthy of belief. What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on record that will indicate that x x x Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the offense charged." The Secretary of Justice observed that the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as they were obtained through force and intimidation contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later recanted. In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justice‘s Resolution before the CA, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating to the admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable cause. There is, so respondents claimed, overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill Congressman Akbar. The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. As held, the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime," the CA adding in this regard that "the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits." And to the CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim of torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were "unsupported by competent proof." Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the authority to exclude Salapuddin in the information filed for the criminal case. Ruling:
Yes he has.
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The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, a 38 violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue. The Executive Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus, given ample latitude to determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person. In the landmark Crespo v. Mogul ,112 We ruled, thus: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons x x x. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. (Emphasis supplied.) This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day. This rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person to be free from "the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon" and to guard the State against the "burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges." Hence, even at this stage, the investigating prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the documents, objects, and testimonies to determine what may serve as a relevant and competent evidentiary foundation of a possible case against the accused persons. They cannot defer and entirely leave this verification of all the various matters to the courts. Otherwise, the conduct of a preliminary investigation would be rendered worthless; the State would still be forced to prosecute frivolous suits and innocent men would still be unnecessarily dragged to defend themselves in courts against groundless charges. Indeed, while prosecutors are not required to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, a preliminary investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case so that the investigating prosecutor is not excused from the duty to weigh the evidence submitted and ensure that what will be filed in court is only such criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant. The prosecutor‘s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors. This much is clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:
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Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision 39 over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code. Thus, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutor(s), he or she can direct the prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties." This action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution. Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave abuse of discretion. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" connotes "a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law." In CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, the appellate court, in reversing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, has evidently neglected this elementary principle. In fact, the CA has assumed, but has not sufficiently explained, how the Secretary of Justice‘s decision finding the absence of probable cause to indict Salapuddin amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the CA glossed over the testimonies presented by the parties and adopted the reversed conclusion of the Investigating Prosecutors that the totality of the evidence presented points to the probability that Salapuddin has participated in a conspiracy that culminated in the Batasan bombing. Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the records, however, show that theonly direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. Tamargo v. Awingan elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz:
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On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man‘s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only 40 be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.130 In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin‘s association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy, ruling thus: Respondent Gerry Salapuddin‘s participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence.
Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 181354 Febuary 27, 2013 Facts: Flores was charged with the crime of Homicidein an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle. During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded ―Not Guilty‖ and waived the pretrial. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective witnesses, evidence and narrated their versions of the case. According to the prosecution, on August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitorswere drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 o‘clock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors only at around 11:00 o‘clock after he and his wife arrivedtried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children.The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle. Witnesses presented by the prosecution who included Duran (one of the visitors), Gerry Avenido (son of the victim) and Elisa Avenido (wife of the victim), all testified to have seen the accused talking to the victim and thereafter shot the victim. The victim was brought to the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him. He was pronounce dead on arrival. To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense. He allege that at around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them for some ―bisperas‖ snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house.Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with four others.
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In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following day‘s fiesta procession. Flores 41 claimed that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and approached him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus‘ right hand, which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder. Flores claimed that existence of an unlawful aggression which he was forced to repel resulting to the killing of the victim. He also claimed the lack of sufficient provocation on his part. The Sandiganbayanissued the assailed decision finding Flores guilty of the offense charged.According to the Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused‘s Motion for Reconsideration. In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and rendered the assailed judgment of the Court as FINAL and EXECUTORY. Issues: 1. Whether or not the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. 2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, First Division, commited a grave error in not acquitting petitioner of the crime charged Ruling: 1. Flores points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.He argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.
Flores‘ argument fails to persuade this Court.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads: SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
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42 Section 2, Rule 37 provides: SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal. Section 4, Rule 121 states: SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X xx. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor. As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP ), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. ―As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. 2. Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was legally justified under the circumstances. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
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The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self- 43 defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense." ―Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger –– not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one‘s life.‖ ―Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.‖ In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. First , the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accused‘s shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried to make it appear later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones located in that area of his shoulder. Second , Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder at the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the preliminary investigation when it was crucial to divulge su ch fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for trial before finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply stretches credulity. Third , in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the incident. Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such as a bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 o‘clock midnight when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were treated, the blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even definitively shown to be human blood.
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Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only 44 at 11:00 o‘clock in the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused. Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a policeman. In addition, the latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We find it much less acceptable to believe how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience handling, while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted) The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores‘ credibility and reliability, his story being contrary to ordinary human experience. ―Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind.‖
People of the Philippines v. Jose Alex Secreto y Villanueva G.R. No. 198115 February 22, 2013 Facts: In two (2) separate Informations both dated 10 July 2003, accused appellant was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. From the prosecution‘s evidence, it is gathered that on 09 July 2003, a tipster gave information to the Office of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group (DAID-SOG) about the drug trade of accused-appellant at LibisEspina, Caloocan City. A team went to the area and validated the report. They saw accused-appellant sell Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" to three (3) persons. Consequently, a buy-bust operation was planned and immediately implemented on the same day. In his defense, accused-appellant denied ever having possessed, sold, or delivered shabu to PO2 Lagmay. He claimed that on 09 July 2003, he was drinking soft drinks with his friend, BonetSoria when four (4) policemen suddenly arrested him. He was forcibly frisked but nothing illegal was found on him. The men also unlawfully entered his house looking for a certain
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LitoPonga, a drug pusher in their area. His mother was surprised by the presence of the policemen in their house and she yelled at them. He was brought to the police station where he 45 was manhandled and apprised of drug charges against him. Then the police demanded that he raise Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in exchange for his release and the dropping of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, but he had no money to pay them. Issue: Whether or not the police officers complied with the procedures laid down in Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165). Ruling: No. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, it is necessary to prove the following essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." And, in the prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles has been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The Supreme Court found some irregularities in the performance of duties by the police officers and inconsistencies in the statements per trial and affidavit. 1. Contrary to the testimony of PO2 Lagmay that the team used two tricycles in the operation, the vehicle type issued to the team as reflected in the Pre-Operation Report dated 9 July 2003 supported the claim of accused-appellant that they boarded an ownertype jeep 2. PO2 Lagmay testified that a civilian informant came to their office at around 7:00 o‘clock in the evening of 9 July 2003 to report about the illegal peddling of shabu by one alias Alex at LibisEspina, Caloocan City. A buy-bust team was organized and dispatched at around 7:30 in the evening. However, the Pre-Operation Report appeared to have been issued for the surveillance and buy-bust operation against three different persons, namely, alyas Boy, Tess, and Jun. Also, pursuant to the said report, the operation was to start at 1:00 o‘clock in the afternoon of 9 July 2003. Interestingly, this was clearly ahead of the time the DAID-SOG supposedly received the information from the confidential informant at 7:00 o‘clock in the evening of the same day 3. In their PinagsamangSinumpaangSalaysay, it was made clear that: (1) PO1 Ameng and PO1 Reyes were the ones who caught accused-appellant; while (2) PO2 Lagmay frisked the suspect and recovered from the latter‘s right po cket the buy-bust money together with another sachet containing white crystalline substances.PO2 Lagmay, however, gave a different version when he testified in court. First, he claimed that it was he who arrested the accused-appelant. 4. Contrary to his statement that he frisked accused-appellant and recovered the seized items from the latter‘s pocket, PO2 Lagmay testified on cross-examination that he ordered the accused-appellant to empty his pocket.
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Serious uncertainty arises as to the integrity and the evidentiary value of the shabu allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellant. The explanation of how he identified each of the seized 46 items at the police station, after confiscating the two sachets and the marked money all with his right hand without comparing the one bought from the one in possession of the accused-appellant and after the same transferred hands from PO2 Lagmay to SPO1 Edgar Pamor to the former again was unacceptable. Obviously the steps outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence of corpus delicti were not followed. That being the case, it is necessary for the prosecution to show that inspite of the non-observance of the requirements in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were nonetheless preserved. This was not done in this case. The prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor ensured the integrity of the seized items from the time it was entrusted to him at the place of confiscation until the team reached the police station until he eventually handed them over again to PO2 Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. Neither did the prosecution show to whom the confiscated articles were turned over and the manner they were preserved after the laboratory examination and until their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Clearly, these lapses raise doubt on the integrity and identity of the drugs presented as evidence in court. As held in the case of People v. Sanchez, ―Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. ― It is also clear from the foregoing that aside from the markings that PO2 Lagmay alleged to have been made in the presence of PO1 Llanderal, who did not testify on this point, the buy-bust team did not observe the procedures laid down in Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165. They did not conduct a physical inventory and no photograph of the confiscated item was taken in the presence of the accused-appellant, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. In fact, the prosecution failed to present an accomplished Certificate of Inventory. There being a "gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards" the presumption of regularity m the performance of official duties is overturned.
People v. Judge Lagos, Dy, Estacio, and Castro. G.R. 184658 March 6, 2013
Related Rules of Court: Rule 117 (Double Jeopardy - curing an erroneous acquittal; grave abuse of discretion) Rule 119 (Demurrer to Evidence, grant thereof amounts to acquittal).
FACTS:
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A Buy-Bust operation was conducted by the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) in response of the information relayed by a confidential informant (CI) that the 47 respondents were engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. The hereby respondents were then arrested in flagrante delicto. The respondents were informed of their constitutional rights upon frisking them, seizing the corpus delicti of the crime as evidence of the illegal sale such as the buy-bust money and the plastic sachet containing 30 pink pills among others. A day after, a laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet confirmed that the pills found inside were positive for ecstasy. Hence, an information was filed against respondents in violation of RA 9165. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Sagum. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. As trial ensued, the prosecution presented its pieces of evidence. Thereafter, respondents filed a Petition for Bail and Motion for leave of court to file a demurrer, all of which, however, was denied by Judge Sagum. Respondent Estacio sought for the inhibition of Judge Sagum, a move subsequently adopted by the other respondents. The case was then re-raffled to public respondent Judge Lagos. Judge Lagos issued the first assailed order granting the previously-denied Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. Later on, he issued the second assailed order acquitting all the accused on the ground that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp. Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the culmination of the illegal sale, or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell and the acceptance thereof, and that it was the CI who had personal knowledge of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills, and the subsequent acceptance of the offer. Hence, the prosecution argues in its Motion for Reconsideration that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus deli cti, and the arrest in fl agrante deli cto. In response, private respondents counter that the Motion is dismissible on the ground of Double Jeopardy and is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE:
With the respondents already been acquitted from their criminal charges, is the constitutional right against Double Jeopardy a ground for the dismissal of the Motion?
HELD:
NO. Although it has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal, and that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal, this rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double
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jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power 48 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The trial court‘s assessment that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the i llegal sale starkly contrasts with the facts borne out by the records. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit.
Most importantly, requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential doctrine. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. The fact of the illegal sale has already been established by testimonies of the members of the buy bust team, Judge Lagos need not have characterized the Cl's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case. We find and so hold that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against respondents, subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial. The assailed Orders granting the demurrer and acquitting the respondents were REVERESED and the criminal case was REINSTATED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JAIME FERNANDEZ Y HERTEZ A.K.A. “DEBON” G.R. No. 188841 March 06, 2013 FACTS:
At about 10:00 p.m. of July 21, 2001, combined elements of the Bula Police and the Camarines Sur Provincial Intelligence Forces implemented a search warrant at the residence of respondent in Sagrada Familia, Bula, Camarines Sur and found inside the house of appellant four transparent plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu, one tin can containing dried marijuana leaves, 49 pieces of rolled suspected dried marijuana leaves, one roll aluminum foil and cash money
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amounting to P3,840.00. After seizing these items, an inventory was conducted in the presence of Barangay Chairman Cesar Dolfo and Barangay Kagawad Pedro Ballebar. Pictures of the 49 seized items were also taken by the police photographer while SPO1 Nilo Pornillos marked and brought the seized items to their office. The suspected marijuana leaves were later brought by SPO1 Pornillos and the suspected shabu by PO3 Jamie S. Villano to the Camarines Sur Crime Laboratory. The items were both received by P/S Insp. Ma. Cristina Nobleza who, in turn, transmitted them to the Regional Office. After receiving the same, Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Josephine M. Clemen conducted chemical examination of the specimens and yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, respectively. Criminal cases for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana were filed against respondent and his son Erick. Appellant and Erick pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. They interposed denial and frame-up as their defenses. The RTC acquitted Erick but found respondent to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed appellant‘s conviction. Like the RTC, the appellate court gave full faith and credit on the evidence for the prosecution over that of the defense. ISSUES:
I.
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
HELD:
The present appeal lacks merit. This Court accords respect to the findings and conclusions of the RTC with regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. When a case involves violation of the Dangerous Dr ugs Act, ―credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary.‖ In this regard and as this Court held in People v. Dela Cruz, ―the rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court because in such a case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.‖
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In this case, the RTC found the witnesses for the prosecution credible. The appellate court sustained these findings and conclusions of the RTC after satisfying itself that there was no clear 50 misapprehension of facts. In view of the CA‘s affirmance of the said findings of the RTC, and there being no material facts that were overlooked by the lower courts, this Court finds no reason to disturb their findings and conclusions and, hence, accords respect to the same. Appellant next contends that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. The Court finds otherwise. The totality of the prosecution‘s evidence sufficiently proved the identity of the seized prohibited items despite the intervening changes in their custody and possession. The chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were confiscated and eventually marked until the time they were presented during the trial has likewise been established The chain of custody was clearly not broken. ―Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with‖ in which the burden of proof falls on the appellant. Appellant failed to discharge this burden. Appellant‘s defenses of denial and frame-up were properly rejected by the lower courts. Appeal is dismissed and decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES [MTCC], BRANCH 4, CEBU CITY AND MR. REYNALDO S. TEVES, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, SAME COURT A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 March 12, 2013 FACTS:
The Presiding Judge of the subject court is Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Judge Tormis), while the Clerk of Court is Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves (Mr. Teves). Her service was, however, interrupted because of the administrative cases wherein she was either suspended or preventively suspended. During the absence of Judge Tormis, Judge Carlos C. Fernando (Judge Fernando) of the MTCC, Branch 2, Mandaue City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge pursuant to Administrative Order Nos. 110-2007 and 2-2008 dated July 9, 2007 and January 7, 2008, respectively. The report revealed that Branch 4 does not maintain a docket book or any similar system of recordkeeping and monitoring. Specifically, the Audit Team found irregularities committed by Branch 4. ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Rosabella M. Tormis be found guilty of (a) undue delay in rendering a decision or order; (b) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars
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resulting in the mismanagement of the court; and (c) gross ignorance of the law for ordering the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L. 51 Librando and ; Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty ? HELD:
The present administrative case refers to not just one but several acts allegedly committed by Judge Tormis and Mr. Teves said to be violative of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court rules, regulations and directives. Judge Tormis is hereby accused of committing the following irregularities: (1) undue delay in the disposition of cases; (2) mismanagement of the court and case records; (3) nonpromulgation of decisions; and (4) issuing a warrant of arrest without first apprising the accused of the charge against him. For his part, Mr. Teves is here charged with (1) mismanagement of case records; and (2) failure to set case for promulgation. Un due Delay in the Di spositi on of Cases
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the timehonored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. In this case, Judge Tormis had been remiss in her duty to dispose of cases within the mandatory period to do so.Judge Tormis is thus liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide cases within the reglementary period. M ismanagement of Cour t
As held by the Court in In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br.45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan: An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for rendering the judgments and dispositions, and the review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a system necessarily includes the regular and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order. In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of periodic inventory definitely causeunwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Here, the OCA found the court‘s failure to maintain a general docket book. Although the 52 duty is vested with Mr. Teves, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff perform their duties. As found by the OCA, Judge Tormis is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply with her duty of providing an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof.
As for Mr. Teves, he admitted that: He failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court wherein he is mandated to keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and, under the heading of each case and a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference to a single page the history of the case may be seen. With these infractions, Mr. Teves shall be liable for simple neglect of d uty. Non-promul gation of J udgment
The alleged practice of Branch 4, Cebu City of not promulgating judgments in criminal cases was not substantiated except for the Datan case wherein Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when Judge Tormis was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x. Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated first and at the time when the judge who rendered the decision was serving her suspension. This negligence on the part of Mr. Teves, does not, however, wholly exempt Judge Tormis from administrative liability even if the same took place at the time when she was prohibited access to her court. I ssui ng a Warr ant of A rr est Wit hout A ppri sin g the Accused of the Charge
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required. In this case, Judge Tormis claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Librando case was justified because of the accused‘s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA, Judge Tormis‘ order requiring the 53 accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter- affidavits and other countervailing evidence.
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency, Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves is likewise found GUILTY of two counts of Simple Neglect of Duty, and in view of his past infractions, he is meted the supreme penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.
EFREN S. ALMUETE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 68 of 54 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the ―Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,‖ as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672. On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner‘s counsel informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. The RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled. Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren and issued warrants of arrest against them.
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed. On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit. Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA. On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332. On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner‘s acquittal and reinstated the RTC‘s September 8, 1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005. On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment. Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied by this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification on whether he could still appeal the RTC‘s September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July26, 2006 Resolution.
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision. The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order, denied the Motion for Repromulgation. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its February 20, 2007 Order.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for 55 Certiorari with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its Resolution which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its September 4, 2007 Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the promulgation of the Decision of the [RTC] convicting the petitioner was valid despite the absence of the petitioner and regardless of petitioner‘s intention to be present at the promulgation of the Decision. HELD:
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final. It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC‘s September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals. The promulgation of judgment is valid. Petitioner‘s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC‘s September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals. As this Court has explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because petitioner‘s absence was unjustifiable. Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of petitioner. It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February 15, 2005. Petitioner‘s right to appeal has prescribed.
People v. GERALD SORIANO ALIAS PEDRO G.R. 191271 March 13, 2013
Related Rules of Court: Rule 133 (Circumstantial evidence - sufficiency)
FACTS: Prosecutor’s facts
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Around 8:00 a.m. of 31 December 1998, Soriano arrived with the nephew of Alice Hibaya 56 (Hibaya) to drink liquor at her house until about 10:00 a.m. Hibaya saw Soriano drink some more at the house of one Noel Quinatadcan (Quinatadcan), who lived about two meters away from her. She then witnessed Soriano leave with his other companions at approximately 3:00 p.m. Around that time, Vicky Bearneza (Vicky) was grazing her carabao on a palm road when she saw Soriano, clad in a yellow t-shirt and blue denim, walk drunkenly towards the shortcut to Wao. She did not see anyone else pass by the area until she went home about 5:00 p.m. At roughly 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Vicky‘s sister BBB saw Soriano, whom she later similarly recalled was in yellow t-shirt and pants, pass by her house as he walked to the direction of Wao. It was also around the same time that she was expecting her eight-year-old daughter, AAA, to take the same shortcut on her way home from harvesting palay. Thereafter, at approximately 6:00 p.m., BBB asked for help in looking for AAA. The other residents assisted in the search, which lasted until midnight and turned out to be unsuccessful. On 1 January 1999, about 8:00 a.m., Tomas Bearneza (Tomas), the husband of Vicky, found the lifeless body of AAA in a canal along the shortcut. The victim was naked except for her shorts, which loosely hung below her knees. Her face and breast revealed bite marks Defense’s facts
Soriano averred that at 8:00 a.m. on 31 December 1998 at Hibaya‘s house, he and three other men drank Tanduay while they roasted a pig. By 2:00 p.m., they had transferred to the house of Quinatadcan, where they had a couple of beers. At around 3:30 p.m., Soriano claimed that he was not quite drunk when he went home using the shortcut to Wao. He was home by 5:00 p.m. Some policemen came to his house the following morning. Thinking that he was being hired to harvest corn, he voluntarily submitted himself to them. However, he was detained at the police headquarters.
Soriano claimed that, without informing him of the contents of the document, SPO4 Bacerra made him sign it in front of Oyangoren. Mayor Balicao purportedly questioned Soriano inside the former‘s vehicle, threatened him that he would be fed to the crocodiles if he would not confess, and promised to help him if he would admit to having perpetrated the crime. Allegedly for these reasons, Soriano confessed to killing AAA ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to hold Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. HELD:
Ruling in the negative , this Court finds the appeal meritorious.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court , circumstantial evidence is sufficient for 57 conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the accused. To an unprejudiced mind, the fact that Soriano was the only one whom Vicky saw pass through the shortcut to Wao from 3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead to any conclusion regarding his participation in the raping and killing of AAA. It is a mere conjecture that can be refuted by other equally conceivable and rational inferences. It is possible that Vicky might have failed to see the perpetrator, because he came from the same place as AAA; but, instead of traversing the shortcut after raping and killing the victim, actually went back to his point of origin. Neither can the mere fact that Soriano's clothes were soiled isolate him as the only probable suspect, considering that his garments were not found anywhere near the scene of the crime, but at his own home. As a consequence, the circumstances borne out by the records are severely insufficient to establish the culpability of Soriano as one may reasonably extrapolate other possible scenarios other than those pointing to his guilt. The evidence in this case having fallen short of the standard of moral certainty, any doubt on the guilt of the accused should be considered in favor of his acquittal. The law enforcers' missteps in the performance of the investigation and the prosecuting attorney's careless presentation of the evidence cannot lead to any other conclusion other than that there are doubts as to the guilt of the accused. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision issued by the CA, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. He is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is being confined for another lawful cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NAZARENO VILLAREAL Y LUALHATI G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FACTS: 58
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 am, PO3 Renato de Leon (police) was driving his motorcycle on his way home when he saw Nazareno Lualhati (appellant), from a distance of about 8 – 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he previously arrested for possession of illegal drugs. Upon seeing the police, the appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. Thereafter, the police brought appellant to the police station, and then preceded to Station Antiillegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit office, where the police was a member, to turn-over the marked and seized plastic sachet to the investigator for purposes of a laboratory examination. Upon the qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dan gerous drug. Consequently, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. After the trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the appellant of the said crime giving full faith and credit to the police‘s testimony while giving a scant consideration to the defenses of denial and framed-up proffered by the appellant, being uncorroborated. Moreover, RTC found the plain view doctrine as applicable as the confiscated item was in plain view at the place and time of arrest. When it was appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the appellant‘s conviction, finding clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest.
HELD:
No. The rule on a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest, as enshrined in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the RRCP, requires two elements to concur: 1. The person arrested must execute an OVERT ACT indicating that he just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. 2. Such overt act is done IN THE PRESENCE or WITHIN THE VIEW of the arresting officer. However, this requisites were not fully met as there was an absence of an overt act on the part of the appellant which would arouse suspicion in the mind of the police and even if the appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for the police to effect a lawful warrantless
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
arrest. Without the overt act, the police was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account 59 of the latter‘s previous charge for the same offense. Considering the second kind, it neither falls squarely since it requires for the crime to have been in fact committed and for the police to have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it and not personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant‘s person and past criminal record. Another point to consider is that it was inconceivable how the police, from a distance of about 8-10 meters and while simultaneously driving, could identify with reasonable accuracy that the powdery substance was an illegal drug. And that despite of all the effected numerous arrests, involving shabu, he had done, it is still insufficient to create conclusion that what he purportedly saw was indeed shabu. As to appellant‘s act of darting away, it should not be construed against him, as flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attri buted to one‘s consciousness of guilt.
With the foregoing, Nazareno Lualhati was ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD V. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013 FACTS:
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani ―Chase‖ Callo Claridad, whose lifeless body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007. Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body. On account of this together with the testimonies of the sister of Chase and the security guards attending the crime scene etc., Philip was accused to be the suspect of the said crime. When the case was filed in the prosecutor‘s office (OCP), it was dismissed due to lack of evidence, motive and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge the Philip; the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the crime etc. The petition moved for reconsideration but same was denied. So the petitioner petitioned with the Secretary of Justice to review the decision of the OCP but to no avail. After it moved for a reconsideration which was again denied, it elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rule of Court. Again, it was dismissed along with the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition to review the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals which upheld the resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint for the murder filed against the petitioner.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ISSUES: 60
Whether or not there is a probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder. Whether or not there was an error made by Court of Appeals in affirming the resolution of the Secretary of Justice when it sustained the findings of the public prosecutor that there is no probable cause for a case to ensue. HELD:
In the issues raised, the court answered both in the negative. To the first issue, probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of a probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. This demands more than the suspicion. The aforementioned requirements was however unmet by the circumstances presented, as there was no eyewitness of the actual killing; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of the killing and there was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents. As to the determination of the existence of a probable cause, it lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation. Generally, the public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation and may be subject only for a judicial review if it was clearly established that the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner or patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Same goes with the Secretary of Justice, when it resolves a certain issue under his executive function. But this was again not clearly shown or was not substantiated by the petitioner. Needless to say that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice is part of the executive branch of the government and under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. So the mode of appeal taken by the petitioner, by way of Rule 43, was improper remedy as this is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of the said rule. And the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. From the foregoing, the Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170863
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
March 20, 2013 61
INFORMATION:
An Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with Concordia O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft. That sometime in the month of October, 2001 accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site , wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR, Inc. Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Loyao remains atlarge. FACTS:
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies as well as documentary evidence. The prosecution‘s pieces of evidence, tak en together, established the facts recited below. In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building‘s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction materials. On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking‘s truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar‘s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio City.
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS‘ project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar‘s warehouse on
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard‘s logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return 62 took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to P2,269,731.69.
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr. Marigondon‘s motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials. ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC‘s decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the commission of the crime Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds: Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words 63 "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG (all at large), REYNALDO MALLARI G.R. No. 179041 April 1, 2013
FACTS:
On September 12, 1998,the accused-appellant, in conspiracy with a band, carnapped one motor vehicle valued at less than 300,000 pesos and killed its driver as well. On January 31, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC‘s ruling with modification finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide.The CA further held that the trial court‘s determination on the credibility of Mahilac must be given great respect and, found no ill-motive on the part of Mahilac to testify falsely against Mallari. According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari, whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the straightforward testimony of the former. However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.
ISSUE:
WON there is sufficient material evidence to justify conviction.
HELD:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The SC affirmed the CA‘s ruling that the crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial 64 evidence.
The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven by Medel after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and appellate courts found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of the carnapping. Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. In this case, the trial court considered as aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty. However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is favorable to the appellant. Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group." Hence, the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article 63(2) of the RPC, which provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Mallari is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9346.
People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No. 201449 April 3, 2013 FACTS: The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters Perlie Salvador and Nely Salvador y Palisoc along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of Perlie which contained money and fatally stabbing Nely. The RTC found that Perlie‘s testimony was more credible; that Perlie‘s positive identification of accused-appellants, without showing of ill motive on her part, prevailed over accused-appellants‘ denial; and that there was conspiracy among accused-appellants in the commission of the crime Robbery with Homicide. The RTC further determined that with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime present in this case, accused-appellants should be sentenced to death, but said sentence could not be imposed because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. On appeal, the accused attacked the credibility of Perlie as a witness by citing the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness is credible. HELD:
Yes. In finding against the accused, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that findings of the trial court on such matters involving the credibility of witnesses cannot be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. Perlie is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving victim of the crime. Her testimony, as described by the RTC, was ―categorical and straightforward.‖ Perlie had positively identified all the accused. There is therefore no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013 FACTS:
On October 18, 1994 the (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation with a search warrant against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills. All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect with 2 witnesses. On January 4, 1995, the Prosecutor filed a motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. But the RTC did not act on the motion. The ruling of the RTC, which is also affirmed by the CA, convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited drug on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 was necessarily included in the offense in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the CA‘s ruling on correctly declaring that the illegal possession of marijuana
65
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was "a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause 66 of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. He was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. The crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS, also known as TAKYO G.R. No. 182417 April 3, 2013 FACTS:
Antecedents On June 16, 2003, Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). At arraignment, Gonzales entered a plea of not guilty. Version of the Prosecution On June 12, 2003, an informant reported to the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group (PDEG) that Gonzales was engaging in illegal drug pushing. On June 13, 2003, Police Chief Inspector Celedonio I. Morales planned to mount a buy-bust operation against Gonzales, and designated PO1 Eduardo B. Dimla, Jr. to act as the poseur buyer and PO2 Roel S. Chan to serve as the back-up/arresting officer. PO1 Dimla marked with his own initials "ED" each of the two P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded the marked bills in the police blotter. At noontime of that same day, PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chan met with the informant at San Rafael, Bulacan, and the three of them proceeded to where the house of Gonzales was located. After PO2 Chan posted himself beyond possible view of the suspect, PO1 Dimla and the informant approached Gonzales, with the informant introducing PO1 Dimla to Gonzales as a buyer of shabu worth P200.00. Gonzales handed to PO1 Dimla a plastic sachet containing white
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substances, and in turn PO1 Dimla handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. At that point, PO1 Dimla removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal, in reaction to which PO2 Chan then 67 rushed forward and arrested Gonzales. PO1 Dimla then immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials "ED.‖ The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that the contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu. Version of the Defense Gonzales denied the accusation. He attested that he was only resting in front of his house in the afternoon of June 13, 2003, when five armed men approached and forced him inside his house; that they queried him on the whereabouts of his father, but he told them he did not know; that they prevented his mother from leaving the house to seek help from barangay officials; and that after searching his house, they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. 5 Almarie, Gonzales‘ sister, corroborated his ver sion. She narrated that the five armed men entered their house; that when she tried to follow them inside, they shut the door at her; that, however, she was able to see inside through the window; that she heard the men querying her brother on the whereabouts of their father; and that she reported the incident to the barangay chairman, but when she and the barangay chairman reached the house, the men and her brother were no longer there.6
Ruling of the RTC Giving credence to the narrative of PO1 Dimla as the Prosecution‘s sole witness, the RTC convicted Gonzales of the crime charged and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF P500,000.00. Ruling of the CA Finding no error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA affirmed the conviction of Gonzales ISSUE:
Gonzales has appealed, still insisting that the Prosecution did not prove his guilt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt. HELD:
The appeal has merit. To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same 68 dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. To achieve that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly provides: xxxx (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; xxxx Similarly, Section 21(a), IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently states: xxxx (a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; xxxx These provisions obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict compliance may be eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that they are intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. The procedures underscore the value of establishing the chain of custody vis-à-vis the dangerous drugs.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 69 Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged. The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Affixing the initials of the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Although PO1 Dimla, testified that he had marked the sachet of shabu with his own initials of "ED" following Gonzales‘ arrest, he did not explain, either in his court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, then to the laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence was the same article that had been the subject of the sale by Gonzales. The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimla‘s marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1 Dimla nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and photographing of the shabu subject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest, PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not mention any inventory and photographing. The omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR. Although Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both gave an exception of the noncompliance with the procedures provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved, the noncompliance with the procedur es, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State‘s agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the noncompliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for we cannot deny that the observance of
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the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In 70 this connection, the Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower courts. WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals; and ACQUIT appellant ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS, a.k.a. TAKYO, due to the failure of the Prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL CATACUTAN, TOLENTINO Y G.R. No. 187740 April 10, 2013 FACTS: On or about the 20th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], 11 years of age, minor, against her will and without her consent. AAA‘s and appellant‘s families own separate watermelon stores located along a highway in Bulacan. Their stores are adjacent to each other. At around 3:00 a.m. of 20 January 2000, AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping beside her 10-year old brother and 2-year old nephew inside the store when she was awakened by a mosquito bite and saw appellant lying on top of her. Her parents meanwhile were sleeping in an adjacent room. Appellant ordered AAA to follow him. AAA asked permission to urinate first before appellant brought her to a vacant lot at the back of the store. Appellant undressed her, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina while pointing a knife at her chest, and threatening to kill her family if she reports the incident. Afterwards, appellant took her earrings and watch and other valuables inside the house. BBB, AAA‘s mother, woke up at dawn and found their store in disarray. She immediately went out of the store and saw appellant, together with a certain Doro and Noel, inside a jeep. She asked Doro why the latter did not notice the robbing of her store and the person who did it. Before Doro could answer, BBB saw AAA stand up and say: ― Nanay, Nanay umalis na po tayo dito ninakaw po iyong hikaw ko, yung relo ko. Umalis na po tayo papatayin po tayo.‖ It was at that point when AAA intimated to BBB that she was raped by appellant and who also threatened to kill her whole family. Upon learning of the rape incident, BBB fainted. When she regained consciousness, there were already police officers inside the store. On the same day, AAA was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory to undergo medical examination. Dr. Ivan Richard Viray (Dr. Viray) conducted a physical examination on AAA. Dr. Viray testified that he found fresh laceration on the vagina that could have been caused only within twenty-four (24) hours. ISSUE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 71 Questioning the credibility of the victim‘s testimony. HELD: AAA‘s testimony is indeed clear and straightforward. Her sworn statement 29 taken before the police station jived in all material details with her testimony during trial. Moreover, the medico-legal‘s finding of fresh laceration bolstered AAA‘s claim that she was raped only a few hours before she underwent medical examination. AAA‘s failure to shout for help, although her si blings were sleeping beside her and her parents were on the other room, does not detract from the credibility of her claims. She explained to the court‘s satisfaction that appellant,while holding a knife, had threatened to kill her family if she reported the incident. An 11-year old child like AAA can only cower in fear and submission in the face of a real threat to her life and her family‘s posed by an armed assailant. Appellant‘s alibi that he was sleeping at the time of the rape incident deserves scant consideration. It is an oft-repeated principle that alibi is an inherently weak argument that can be easily fabricated to suit the ends of those who seek its recourse. Thus, an alibi must be supported by the most convincing evidence – a credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses. Further, for alibi to prosper, appellants must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime or within its immediate vicinity. Appellant‘s alibi, in the case at bar, was corroborated by his relatives and a neighbor who are not considered impartial witnesses. Moreover, there was no showing that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the rape. Appellant was allegedly seen sleeping in a wooden bed in the store situated adjacent to the store of AAA with an estimated distance of only 8 meters. Alibi cannot prevail over the victim‘s positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, especially when the victim remained steadfast in her testimony when subjected to the rigors of cross- examination. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 28 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02505 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Manuel Tolentino y Catacutan is ordered to pay AAA the following amount: 1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pe os (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; 2) SeventyFive Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages; and 3) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT G.R. NO. 189280 April 17, 2013 FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00495MIN dated August 29, 2008, which affirmed with modification the conviction of accusedappellant Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot for the crime of rape. The undersigned accuses ALBERTO DELIGERO Y BACASMOT, grandfather of herein complainant, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sometime on December 15, 2000 and any time thereafter, and until July 2002, at x x x, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 72 accused, with the use of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own granddaughter, one AAA, a minor, 15 years of age, against her will. On September 9, 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented complainant AAA and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Edgar S. Savella of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Caraga Regional Office. We quote with approval the summary of the testimonies of the witnesses by the Court of Appeals: AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the court a quo. She was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her. Appellant is AAA's granduncle, being the brother of her paternal grandfather. Appellant had eight (8) children from his estranged wife who lived in another barangay. AAA fondly calls appellant "Papa." In the early part of 2000, appellant resided with AAA's family for about four (4) months. After building his own house, appellant moved in to his new house. AAA also transferred to appellant's new house. AAA's parents were promised by appellant that he would send AAA to school. AAA recalled that she lived with appellant for about three (3) years and during those years, AAA claimed to have been raped by appellant many times. Sometime on December 15, 2000, while inside the bedroom of appellant's house, AAA was awakened from her sleep when she felt appellant inside her "malong" which she used as blanket. Appellant, who was already naked, held AAA's hands and mounted her. While on top of AAA, appellant threatened AAA not to tell her parents because he would kill her. Appellant then inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt appellant's penis penetrating her four (4) times. AAA could not offer any resistance because of the threat earlier made by appellant. She felt pain and noticed that her vagina bled. AAA further testified that her parents later on came to know of her defilement when appellant started telling the people in the neighborhood that she was pregnant. At the instance of her father, AAA and appellant were invited to the police station to be investigated. They then proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation, Caraga Regional Office, where AAA executed her sworn statement on October 7, 2002. In the said sworn statement, AAA narrated that when the rumors of her pregnancy had spread in the neighborhood, appellant instructed her to admit that it was her boyfriend, Boyet, who was responsible for her pregnancy. Fearing for her and her family's lives, AAA claimed that she was forced to admit that it was Boyet who got her pregnant. However, the truth was that it was appellant who got her pregnant. Dr. Edgar S. Savella, medico-legal officer of NBI Caraga Regional Office testified that when he examined AAA, the latter was already pregnant. He found no laceration in AAA's hymen. He explained that 60% of rape victims have distensible hymen, which means that no laceration can be found in the hymen. A distensible hymen admits a 2.5 cm tube, which is the average size of an adult male organ in full erection. So, if an object with a 2.5 cm diameter is inserted into the vagina with distensible hymen, the hymen will not break. When asked during
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cross-examination whether it was possible that the sexual act could be consensual in the absence 73 of laceration, Dr. Savella explained that it is the type of hymen that determines such possibility. For the defense, appellant testified that AAA's father is his nephew, being the son of his brother. Appellant disclosed that sometime on June 2000, he lived with AAA's family and stayed with them for about four (4) months. During his four (4) month stay with AAA and her family, he slept in the sala of the family house with AAA. He claimed that since the sala was at the first floor of the house and the bedrooms were at the second floor, AAA's parents and siblings would often see him and AAA sleeping together. Oftentimes when he and AAA would sleep together at the sala, appellant testified that they shared only one (1) "malong," which they used as a blanket. After four (4) months, appellant transferred to his new house which he built fronting the house of AAA and her family. Appellant further testified that when he moved in to his new house, AAA moved in with him as well. Appellant claimed that from that time on, he and AAA were already living together as husband and wife. The alleged amorous relationship between him and AAA was known to the public, particularly their neighbors. Sometime on June 14, 2002, AAA's mother came and fetched AAA. AAA then worked at a videoke bar. After three (3) months, AAA went home to her family but stayed there for one (1) night only. Appellant testified that AAA went back to his house and confided that she would be getting married. AAA told appellant that she ll be marrying her boyfriend, Boyet, a "tricykad" driver. In the course of their conversation, AAA confided also to appellant that her menstrual period had been delayed. Afterwhich, appellant informed AAA's father that [his] daughter could be pregnant. Instead, he was arrested and was then brought to the police station to be investigated. At the police station, AAA allegedly admitted that it was Boyet who got her pregnant. Appellant claimed that there were people at the police station who witnessed AAA's declaration. Together with AAA's mother, appellant then brought AAA to a public hospital to have her medical examination. On cross-examination, appellant claimed he courted AAA, which the latter accepted. During his four (4) month stay with AAA's family, he had sexual intercourse with AAA when they both slept together at the sala. When asked whether they exchanged letters professing their love for each other, appellant answered in the affirmative. The latter testified that when he visits Gingoog City, he would send letters to AAA. On the other hand, AAA allegedly wrote him letters as well. However, appellant disclosed that he tore the letters sent to him by AAA because the latter requested him to do so for fear that her father would discover the said letters. To bolster his claim that he and AAA were lovers, appellant testified that he intended to marry AAA. He even made AAA as one of his beneficiaries in his Social Security Service retirement plan. Appellant also claimed that AAA's father could have been impelled by revenge in filing the case against him. According to appellant, AAA's father harbored ill-feelings towards him because he reported to his previous employer that AAA's father sold four (4) hectares of land owned by the said employer without the latter's knowledge.
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Corroborating appellant's testimony that he and AAA were living together as husband and wife was Rudy L. Escatan (hereafter referred to as Rudy). Rudy testified that he knew 74 appellant and AAA because both were his neighbors. During those times that AAA lived with appellant, Rudy would often see appellant and AAA together. Both acted as husband and wife. Further, Rudy testified that he saw appellant and AAA kissing each other numerous times. On September 20, 2006, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA instead of death by lethal injection, which penalty has been abolished. Further, he is ordered to pay private complainant and her family the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. In the service of his sentence, he shall be credited with the full time benefit during which time he has undergone preventive imprisonment if he agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, if not only 4/5 as provided under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. According to the trial court, the testimony of AAA was straightforward. Accusedappellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of AAA to impute such a grave offense against her granduncle. The trial court was not convinced with the sweetheart theory advanced by accused-appellant, and observed that the latter did not admit that he and AAA were lovers when they were brought to the police substation in Butuan City. Accused-appellant instead insinuated at that time that a certain Boyet could have impregnated AAA. Pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Mateo,7 the Court of Appeals conducted an intermediate review of the decision of the trial court. On August 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming with modification the findings of the trial court WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Butuan City, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of simple rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case No. 9740, with no possibility for parole. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000,00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant. While the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact by the trial court, it held that the crime committed by accused-appellant was only simple rape. Primarily, the Court of Appeals held that the unauthenticated photocopy of AAA's baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. Furthermore, while it was alleged in the Information that accusedappellant is AAA's grandfather, what was proven during the trial was that he was AAA's granduncle, being the brother of AAA's paternal grandfather.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court through a Notice of Appeal. 75
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the prosecution‘s evidence despite its incredibility. HELD:
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of Ecatan and accused-appellant, on one hand, and that of AAA, on the other, concluded that it was AAA who was telling the truth. We have repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, for we accept that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court's domain, not that of a reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified."22 Thus, where the accused-appellant, as in the case at bar, fails to show that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome, or misappreciated a circumstance of consequence in their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their respective versions, this Court is constrained to affirm such uniform factual findings. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court of Appeals modified the Decision of the trial court and adjudged accusedappellant to be liable only for simple rape, ruling that the unauthenticated photocopy of AAA's baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. The Court of Appeals furthermore ruled that while it was alleged in the Information that accused-appellant is AAA's grandfather, what was proven during the trial was that he was AAA's granduncle, being the brother of AAA's paternal grandfather. We agree with the modification of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, we note that even if the correct blood relationship of being AAA's granduncle was alleged in the Information, and the age of AAA was proven by sufficient evidence, accused-appellant would still be liable for simple rape. The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victim's grandfather, is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. DANTE L. DUMALAG G.R. No. 180514
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April 17, 2013 76
FACTS:
At around 2:00 o‘clock in the afternoon of January 5, 2005, a female police informant from Pasuquin, IlocosNorte went to the office of the Special Operations Group (now Provincial AntiIllegal Drugs Special Operations Team or PAID-SOT) located at Camp Juan, Laoag City and reported that a certain DatoDumalag, a known drug personality of Brgy. 2, Pasuquin, IlocosNorte was at Sexy Beach Resort owned by BebotFerrer selling shabu to customers. Acting upon the report, PO3 Rousel Albano and PO2 Danny Valdez relayed the information to their team leader, Police Inspector Rolando Battulayan, who then organized a team composed of PO3 Albano, PO2 Valdez, SPO4 Salvatierra and PO2 Harold Nicolas to conduct a buy bust operation against the suspect. PO3 Albano was assigned to act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team will act as perimeter back up. PO3 Albano was also tasked to mark the two pieces of P100 bills provided by Inspector Battulayan to be used as buy bust money and placed the letter "R" between the letters G and P of Republika Ng Pilipinas on the face of the bills. The pre-operation activity was also recorded in the police blotter. Afterwards, the team proceeded to the target place located in Brgy. Estancia, Pasuquin at around 2:30 o‘clock that same afternoon. Upon reaching the place at around 3:00 o‘clock, the police asked the caretaker of the beach resort if a person is occupying Room 03 as reported by the asset. The caretaker who was with another caretaker and both of whom were female gave them the information that indeed a male person was occupying the said room. After they prepared for the plan and have surveyed the area for five to seven minutes, they proceeded with the drug bust. The members of the back up security positioned themselves on the southern part of the alley about 15 meters away from Room 3 while PO3 Albano and the police asset went to the said room of the suspect which was located at northernmost part of the main building of the resort. When they were already at the door, the asset called out the name of the suspect Dato and PO3 Albano knocked at the door. After the asset also knocked at the door, a male person peeped through and upon recognizing the police asset, DatoDumalag told her, "Mano Alaenyo, sumrekkay pay langngarud" (How much will you get, come in then). As they were already inside the room, PO3 Albano told the suspect, "Balor dos tialaenmi" (We will get worth two). The suspect then went to the dresser located on the southern part of the room and west of the door and took one small plastic sachet and handed the same to PO3 Albano who immediately handed the two marked P100 bills.
After the suspect had pocketed the money on his right front pocket, he told them, "Rumamankay pay ngarud tig-P50.00 (Taste first,P50 worth for each of you). At that instance, PO3 Albano gave the pre-arranged signal to the members of the back up security that the sale was already consummated by pressing the button of his cellphone to retrieve and call the last dialed number which was the cell number of PO2 Valdez. After making the signal, PO3 Albano grabbed the right hand of the suspect and informed him of his authority. The suspect scuffled with the police officer who was however able to subdue him. In the meantime, after PO2 Valdez received the miss call of PO3 Albano, he and his companions rushed inside the room of the suspect. PO3 Albano had already handcuffed the suspect by then and was holding him at that time. While PO3 Albano frisked the accused where he confiscated
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a P50 bill in which three other sachets of suspected shabu were inserted, PO2 Valdez searched the room and confiscated some items which were on top of the dresser, such as five crumpled 77 aluminum foil, stick of cigarette, cigarette foil, a lighter and a cellphone. Afterwards, they brought the suspect and the confiscated items to their headquarters in Laoag City where PO3 Albano marked the sachet of shabu bought from the suspect with his initials "RA". He also marked the other three sachets and the P50 bill in which he found the said sachets with the letter "R" on one side and the letters "DD" on the other side. He also prepared the confiscation receipt which the accused signed and the post operation report. On the other hand, PO2 Valdez marked the items that he confiscated with his initials "DUV". They then brought the confiscated items for laboratory examination together with a letter request. Upon receipt of the specimens, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the IlocosNorte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office in Camp Juan, Police Senior Inspector Mary Ann Cayabyab, examined the same. Particularly with respect to the four sachets, she found the contents thereof to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. This is shown in her Initial Laboratory Report as well as in her confirmatory report, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2005. The said Forensic Chemical Officer also found the urine sample of the accused positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride as shown in Chemistry Report No. CDT-002-005 ISSUE:
Whether or not the credence and weight accorded by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution as opposed to those of the defense is correct. HELD:
It is an established rule that factual findings of the trial court, if supported by evidence on record, and particularly when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court, unless significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case. Moreover, questions as to credibility of a witness are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness‘ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity op portunity is denied to the reviewing tribunal Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidoro‘s failure to mark the confiscated shabu immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drug‘s identity. People v. Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said marking should be done: What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence –
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should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon 78 confiscation. To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
RODRIGO RONTOS y DELA TORRE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188024 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Rodrigo Rontos y Dela Torre was charged of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Dan gerous Drugs Act). He was arrested without warrant. The RTC convicted him. On appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that, since his warrantless arrest was illegal, the allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible in evidence. He further claimed that the police officers failed to faithfully comply with the procedure for ensuring the identity and integrity of the plastic sachets containing shabu.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner correct in raising the issue of the legality of his warrantless arrest upon appeal?
HELD:
The CA correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. "It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment.
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In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely and 79 voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged."Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court. However, on the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, the Supreme Court resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MYLENE TORRES y CRUZ G.R. No. 191730 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
On or about 17 January 2007, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, herein appellant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Jayson Rivera, a police poseur[-]buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
In a Decision dated 11 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court. It held that all the elements of the crime charged, i.e., illegal sale of drugs, have been proven and established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The same was coupled with the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. It also found the prosecution witnesses‘ testimonies sufficient to establish the various links in the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drug. This, despite the police officers‘ failure to take photographs and to inventory the drug seized from appellant, the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drug. The police officers were found not to have any motive other than their duty to enforce the law.
Appellant is now before this Court contending that the police officers did not comply with the mandatory procedure for handling dangerous drugs set forth in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly the physical inventory and the taking of photograph of the seized item; and that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that was admitted in evidence during trial was the same item seized from her during the buy-bust operation. Such gap in the chain of custody of the seized item created reasonable doubt on appellant‘s culpability, thus, merits her acquittal from the crime charged.
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80
ISSUES:
1. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165. 2. What is the effect when the. appellant raised the buy- bust team‘s alleged non -compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 only on appeal.
HELD:
1. Section 21 RA 9165 is complied with. Equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation in evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.32 In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of the iden tity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
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The chain of custody is, however, not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated 81 persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations35 of Republic Act No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied). Clearly, what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." In the present case, as contrary to the claim of appellant, the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution leads to an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated item from appellant. Though there were deviations from the required procedure, i.e., making physical inventory and taking photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellant were duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished. 2. Appellant raised the buy- bust team‘s alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 only on appeal. Failure to raise this issue during trial is fatal to the case of appellant, as this Court had succinctly explained in People v. Sta. Maria: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers‘ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MOISES CAOILE G.R. No. 203041 June 05, 2013
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FACTS: 82
Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-496 That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],3 a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice. FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-497 That on or about May 12, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice. Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, this Court would like, at the outset, to address the validity of the Amended Informations vis-à-vis the crime Caoile was actua lly convicted of.
ISSUE:
Will the validity of the amended information exonerate Caoile?
HELD:
No. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented. Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual‘s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.1Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is ―deprived of reason,‖ and not one who is ―demented.‖
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The mistake, however, will not exonerate Caoile. In the first place, he did not even raise this as an objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was ―a person with a mental age of seven (7) years old.‖ Elucidating on the foregoing, this Court, in People v. Valdez, held: For [a] complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not cause material and substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly, particular facts stated in the Amended Informations were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of the charges against him.
People v. Ibañez G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013
FACTS:
On July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC) and told Henessy Auron, WSC‘s Secretary and Sales Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the company‘s gun show in SM Megamall. Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSC‘s firing range and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was
83
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WSC‘s only female employee. At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the 84 firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company‘s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy‘s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company‘s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex. Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other persons involved in the crime. Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms from Cachuela‘s house. The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. Ibañez directed the asset to bring the prospective buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibañez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where the firearms were. Ibañez brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was already becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez. At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by Nabilgas during the custodial 85 investigation is admissible as evidence?
HELD:
The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement. After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas‘ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing." We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. In People v. Rapeza, we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas‘ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas‘ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas‘ open declaration to the agency‘s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas‘ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
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To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An ‗effective and vigilant counsel‘ necessarily and logically requires that the 86 lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.
People v. Diaz G.R. No. 200882 June 13, 2013
FACTS:
The accused Diaz and the 17 year-old offended party Mara were neighbors in a subdivision in Tarlac City. Mara was living alone in a studio-type unit beside her elder sister‘s (Ditse) house and the accused lived five houses away. Both were familiar with each other as the accused used to bring her to school and previously made a cable TV installation in her unit. Early dawn on 30 March 2003, Mara was raped by the accused. Though the lights were switched off, the light from the outside illuminated the unit and allowed her to recognize the accused. There was struggle but the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Mara. After the incident, she told her sister (Ditse) about what had happened. Together with her other sister (Ate), they reported the incident to the police. They also went to Tarlac Provincial Hospital where she was examined with the results that confirms the possibility of rape. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the offended party and rejected the alibi of the accused. The appellate court rejected the contentions of the accused in which he questioned the identification of the accused because the lights were off and she was not wearing her glasses with 1.25 grades.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court and the appellate court were correct in identifying the facts which relied primarily on Mara as the primary witness?
HELD:
In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
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case, the trial court‘s findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. On the one hand, this judicial deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact- 87 finding – trial judges have the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe first-hand the details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and the drama during the trial. On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this Court of the limitations of its review in appealed cases – this Court stands outside the trial court, is farremoved from the witness stand, and relies solely on the records of the case. Acutely aware of the Court‘s position as the last resort of litigants, we have nevertheless carefully sifted through the records of this case but found nothing that indicates to us that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. Thus, we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that Mara made a clear and positive identification of the accused-appellant as her sexual assaulter. The records bear this out. People v. Rebotazo G.R. No. 192913 June 13, 2013
FACTS:
On February 27, 2003, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, informant Orly Torremocha went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) office in Dumaguete City to report that appellant was selling several sachets of shabu in his possession. The informant also told the NBI that he was going to meet with appellant later, as the latter was looking for a motorcycle to be used in looking for his missing wife. Based on this information, the NBI planned a buy-bust operation and formed a buy-bust team, which was composed of: (1) NBI Agent Miguel Dungog; (2) Atty. Dominador Cimafranca; (3) Louie Diaz; and (4) Torremocha. For lack of personnel, Diaz, son of the NBI Dumaguete chief, volunteered to be the poseur-buyer. It was planned that appellant and Torremocha would pass by Shakey‘s Pizza Plaza in Rizal Boulevard on board a motorcycle. Diaz would then flag them down and discreetly ask where he could buy shabu. After a briefing, at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team, with the exception of Torremocha, proceeded to Shakey‘s and positioned themselves in strategic locations to ensure that they can witness the entrapment. With the team was media representative Ivan Bandal. As planned, appellant and Torremocha passed by Shakey‘s on board a motorcycle. Diaz flagged them down, and Torremocha introduced him to appellant. After a brief conversation, Diaz told appellant that he was interested in buying shabu and handed to him the P300 marked money. In exchange, appellant handed to Diaz a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
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Upon completing the transaction, Diaz executed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap. Dungog and Cimafranca then rushed to Diaz and appellant‘s location and effected the 88 latter‘s arrest. Appellant was subjected to a body search, and, in the process, voluntarily informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks. Dungog recovered the said sachet, as well as some money from appellant‘s wallet, including the marked money given by Diaz. Dungong also marked the two (2) plastic sachets with the following initials: (1) NBI-DUMDO-02/20/03/REBOTASO/BB/01; and (2) NBI-DUMDO02/20/03/REBOTASO/Pos/02. Photographs were also taken of appellant with the seized items. After being informed of his constitutional rights, appellant was brought to the NBI office. At the NBI office, Dungog conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of appellant, media representative Maricar Aranas, and a representative from the Department of Justice. The NBI Dumaguete Chief likewise prepared a letter request for laboratory examination of the seized substance, which Dungog brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Negros Oriental Provincial Office. Police Inspector Josephine L. Llena received the request and examined the specimen, which tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The results of the laboratory examination were embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-026-37. Appellant also underwent a drug test, and tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted during the buy-bust operation valid?
HELD:
Buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. These operations are often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. A busy-bust operation is one form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of committing an offense, and must be undertaken with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards. However, as we have observed in People v. Garcia, while this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, it has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. Thus, in People v. Tan, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jurisprudence has consistently held that the procedural safeguards enunciated in Section 89 21 of R.A. 9165 must be strictly observed, among which are provided as follows: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination. The '"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine cannot apply in the face of a valid buy-bust operation. Given the circumstances above, appellant‘s arrest cannot be considered illegal. Time and again, we have ruled that the arrest of the accused in flagrante during a buy-bust operation is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. From the very nature of a buy-bust bu y-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. As we held in People v. Marcelino, the illegal drug seized was not the "fruit of the poisonous tree," as the defense would have this Court to believe. The seizure made by the buy bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was not needed to conduct it.
Lucille Domingo v. Merlinda Colina G.R. No. 173330 June 17, 2013 FACTS:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The petitioner was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The defense filed a 90 Demurrer to Evidence and was granted by the MTCC. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and In The Alternative To Reopen the Civil Case Aspect of the Case. However, the MTCC denied their motion and stated that the accused's act from which his civil liability in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist. Respondents appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Davao City. The RTC modified the judgment of the MTCC and ordered the accused-appellee Domingo to pay complainant Colina the civil liability arising from the offense charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but RTC denied it. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petitioner's petition for review and affirming the RTC Decision in toto. Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding that the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal interposed which was violative of Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when the Trial Court had already ruled that the act from which the civil case c ase arise did not exist HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Sec 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Moreover, the second paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules states that: In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC did not contain any such finding or determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting the petitioner in its Order, MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. While it subsequently held that "the act form which the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant did not exist," the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion which would
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then act from which the civil liability might arise did not ex ist. Petition DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONICA TRINIDAD MENDOZA G.R. No. 191267 June 26, 2013
FACTS:
15 May 2013, an informant approached PO2 Joseph de la Cruz in their office stating that a certain Monica Trinidad Mendoza, alias Monica, was having a rampant sale of illegal drugs within their compound in Makati. A buy-bust team was formed to effect the arrest of the accused. PO2 de la Cruz posed as buyer, tasked to buy two hundred pesos worth of shabu, and marked two hundred bills for the transaction. Transaction having been consummated, de la Cruz signaled the back-up team. PO2 Wilfredo Sangel then approached the area of transaction, introduced himself as a police officer and placed accused-appellant under arrest. Accusedappellant was then appraised of the nature n ature of the arrest and of her constitutional rights. After the
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the trial court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the seized dangerous drugs despite being the products of an unlawful arrest.
HELD:
The warrantless arrest conducted was valid for under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates situations when a person may be b e arrested without warrant, thus: Section Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
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establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court held that the accused-appellant was arrested in in flagrante delicto and failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment. In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any that may have tainted her arrest.
G.R. No. 178947 June 26, 2013 VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND G.R. No. 179079 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIMOTHY J. DESMOND
FACTS:
In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale),4 was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI. They decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEI‘s Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-killer whales and sea lions. In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another US$1,000,000.00 in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project (Miracle Beach), which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure.
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Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints (subject criminal complaints) for estafa (a) through false 93 pretenses under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, both against Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor‘s Office (City Prosecutor‘s Office), docketed as IS Nos. 04-M-992 and 04-M-993. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes, to wit: The foregoing clearly applies in the instant two (2) cases as borne out by the following facts, to with [sic]: (1) Desmond, as the Chairman and Chief Executive Office of SBMEI and in order to persuade Dio to invest, represented that he possessed the necessary influence, expertise and resources (in terms of credit and property) for the project knowing the same to be false as he never had the capital for the project as borne out by his correspondences with Dio; and (2) Dio fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profit offered by Desmond, thereby being induced to invest the amounts of $1,150,000.00 and $1,000,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of her company. In an Order dated October 21, 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present.There being no probable cause, the cases against the accused must be dismissed as they are hereby DISMISSED. As such, it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Relatedly, Dio also filed a petition-in-intervention before the CA, praying for the reinstatement of the subject criminal complaints. In its November 8, 2006 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC‘s authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause. In the same manner, the facts in the case at bar that would allegedly constitute a criminal charge of estafa under par. 1(b) are wanting. Be it noted that under the said paragraph, estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or conversion of the money, goods or any other personal property must be received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation which involves the duty to make delivery thereof or to return the same. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that there is no sufficient evidence adduced to support the criminal charges of estafa against Desmond. The City Prosecutor and Dio filed their
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied in a Resolution dated July 19, 94 2007. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject information for lack of probable cause. HELD:
The petitions are meritorious. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter‘s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. While a judge‘s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz: SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC‘s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes therein. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The November 8, 2006 Decision and July 19, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 88285 which affirmed the October 21, 2004 Order of Dismissal issued by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 are SET ASIDE. The two (2) criminal information for estafa against respondent Timothy J. Desmond in Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004 are hereby REINSTATED. Accordingly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LINDA y GEROLAGA G.R. No. 200507 June 26, 2013
FACTS:
On February 22, 2008, the team of SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos received a reliable information from a confidential informant regarding the illegal drug activity of Gerolaga along Ma. Orosa Street, Malate, Manila. Thus, SPO1 Ramos ordered his team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant and designated PO2 Archie Bernabe as poseurbuyer, who was given two (2) P100 bills as buy-bust money. The money was then marked as "DAID" and a coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was made. After the preparation, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to the target area. Upon arrival, appellant approached PO2 Bernabe and the informant who is known to
95
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appellant. The informant and the appellant talked to each other while PO2 Bernabe stayed two (2) meters away. Afterwards, the informant called PO2 Bernabe and introduced him to appellant 96 as a friend who is buying "shabu." PO2 Bernabe told the appellant that he was buying the illegal drug worth "P200." Appellant answered "wala pong problema" and accepted the buybust money tendered by PO2 Bernabe. The former then handed to the latter one transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with the resemblance of "shabu ." Thereafter, PO2 Bernabe arrested appellant and introduced himself as police officer. The other members of the team arrived at the scene. PO2 Bernabe informed appellant of his constitutional rights and marked the plastic sachet with the letters "PGL" from the initials of the appellant. The former frisked appellant and recovered the marked money form the latter. When the substance was examined by Forensic Chemist Elisa G. Reyes, the white crystalline substance tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. During pre-trial, Forensic Chemist Elisa G. Reyes brought with her the specimen she examined and other pertinent documents. The parties thereafter stipulated on the qualification of Reyes, the genuineness and due execution of the documents, and the specimen, which she herself brought to the court. On trial, the prosecution presented PO2 Archie Bernabe (PO2 Bernabe) of the District AntiIllegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group (DAID-SOG), Manila Police District. The defense, on the other hand, relied on the sole testimony of accused-appellant. The defense, countered that: On February 22, 2008, Peter Linda was doing nothing when suddenly, several persons entered the house and went upstairs looking for his parents, Lorenzo Linda and Marlita Linda. He told them that his parents were no longer living there. Afterwards, he was told to go with the police. At the precinct, he was asked again the whereabouts of his parents but he reiterated his earlier reply. He was then frisked but nothing was recovered from him. He was not informed of the charges, only knowing it in court. On February 27, 2008 accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila to which he pleaded not guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUES:
1. WON the warrantless arrest is invalid; hence, the item seized is inadmissible in evidence 2. WON the chain of custody was broken; 3. WON the prosecution fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and 4. WON the penalties imposed are in order.
HELD:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. The court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Absent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers, as in 97 this case where accused-appellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the team, the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty finds application. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. By upholding the credibility of the testimony of the witness for the prosecution on the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused-appellant, the court cannot give credence to the contrary version of the defense that the warrantless arrest was made inside the house of the accused-appellant after the arresting officers failed to find his parents, whom he admitted were also involved in drug-related illegal activities. The argument of the defense that the warrantless arrest was invalid and that the item seized is inadmissible in evidence must, therefore, fail. 2. The court finds that the essential requisites for illegal sale of shabu were all present in the instant case. These are: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. The prosecution has likewise complied with the following material requirements: (1) proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, PO2 Bernabe testified in court and both the item subject of the sale and the marked money were presented in court. The defense now argues that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the identity of the item seized because the chemist who examined the specimen did not take the witness stand. Neither did anyone allegedly testify on how the said specimen was delivered to the court. There is no iota of doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved.1âwphi1 The Letter-Request for Laboratory Examination shows that it was PO2 Bernabe who personally delivered to the crime laboratory the specimen that he earlier marked. Moreover, specifically stated in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court was the fact that Reyes herself, the very chemist that examined the specimen, brought the same to the court. And, while the court dispensed with her testimony, the parties already stipulated on the material points she was supposed to testify on. Clearly, the chain of custody was not broken. 3. The last argument of accused-appellant, that is, that "it matters not that the defense is weak, what matters is that the prosecution prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt," must also fail. First, the evidence for the prosecution was, in fact, sufficient to establish the guilt of accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt. Second, the defense of denial, when not substantiated by
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
clear and convincing evidence as in this case, is negative and self-serving, and cannot prevail 98 over the affirmative statements of a credible witness. The prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 4. The penalties imposed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in order. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the quantity of shabu is not material in the determination of the corresponding penalty therefor. A person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Considering the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) were, thus, correctly imposed. These are within the period and range of the fine prescribed by law.
Espino v. People [G.R. No. 188217. July 3, 2013.] FACTS: Accused- Espino, being then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein represented by Honesto Raquipiso, tasked with liasoning with the import coordinators of the complainant‘s various clients including the delivery of their commissions, said accused received in trust from the complainant Metrobank check no. 1640443816 in the amount of P12,675.00 payable to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay, with the obligation to deliver the same but said accused failed to deliver said check in the amount of P12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the same, forged the signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check rediscounted and far from complying with his obligation, despite demands to account and/or remit the same, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds thereof to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of P12,675.00.39
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal‘s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to 99 be paid to the company‘s import coordinators.
Upon trial, accused in his testimony claimed that what precipitated the charges was his employer‘s discontent after he had allegedly lost an account for the company. He was eventually forced to resign and upon submission of the resignation, was asked to sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers written on it. He complied with these demands under duress, as pressure was exerted upon him by complainants and later on filed a case for illegal dismissal,in which he denied having forged the signature of Mr. Banaag at the dorsal portion of the checks. RTC convicted the accused of Estafa under article 315 paragraph 2a. In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence to support his conviction. Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated. RTC Denied the motion, CA also denied his appeal, stating that the alleged facts sufficiently comprise the elements of estafa as enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a).25 His subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
Accused filed petition for Review under rule 45. Specifically claiming that he was denied due process when he was convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa un der Article 315, paragraph 1(b) ISSUE/s: WON a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible. HELD: Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him" in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in People v. Manalili:
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that "what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law." This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently
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apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa. 100
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling words of the Information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows: The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Court‘s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is instructive: ―Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice ― From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It 101 is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to two offenses,41 all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 24 February 2009 and Resolution dated 25 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.] FACTS: ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City Government are accused of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. commonly involving willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee. The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances. The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60. Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the 7 May 2009 Decision. Their motions impugned the sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and unwarranted benefit. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because the three modes of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee. Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information. ISSUE/S: Whether the Information was sufficient. HELD: An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed. c
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The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the 102 three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" – in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the consequences of one's actions or omissions.
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 191411. July 15, 2013.] FACTS: Coscolluela was governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales' subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
A Final Evaluation Report was issued which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was prepared and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB. Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB. On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela's motion. In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim. The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion to Quash for lack of merit as well as their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
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103 ISSUE/S: Whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
HELD: A person's right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides: SEC. 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The Court holds that petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated. First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. Section 4, Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer's recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares' preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint. Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman's resolution of the case largely remains
unjustified. Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their
right to speedy disposition of cases.
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They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with 104 the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay
in the proceedings against them. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. For the SB's patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against petitioners be dismissed. While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, un less the judgment of acqui ttal expl icitl y declar es th at th e act or omi ssion fr om which th e civi l liabi lity . As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People, citing Banal v. Tadeo, may ari se did n ot exi st
Jr.:
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered ." xxx xxx xxx In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared: "While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
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things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to 105 another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law ." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Based on the violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners' alleged malfeasance.
People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.] FACTS: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent's petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died.
In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy. On February 5, 2008, Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. RTC Denied the motion. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals and for which said court granted. ISSUE/S: WON the grant of Motion to Quash by Court of Appeals proper. HELD: As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be sure,
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a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts 106 charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, as held in Antone: To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
Jose v. Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: Carolina filed two Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu, one concerning 14 Chinabank checks totalling P1.5 million and the other pertaining to 10 Chinabank checks in the aggregate amount of P2.1 million. However, the checks were dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa.
In her two Counter-Affidavits, Purita claimed that her transactions with Carolina are civil in nature; they are mere loans and the checks were issued only to guarantee payment. In a Joint Resolution dated December 7, 2004, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. The corresponding Information was filed against her. Stressing that her transactions with Carolina did not constitute estafa, Purita promptly filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). THAICD The DOJ found merit in Purita's Petition for Review. It ruled that the transactions between Purita and Carolina do not constitute estafa and are merely contracts of loan because Carolina was not deceived into parting with her money. On the contrary, Carolina parted with her money on the expectation of earning interest from the transactions. Hence, the DOJ reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor in its July 5, 2005 Resolution Carolina moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
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Thus, pursuant to the DOJ's directive, City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Sellon moved for the 107 withdrawal of the Information before the RTC. RTC, in its December 9, 2005 Order, denied the motion by simple stating that the motion in “unmeritorious”.
The CA ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the Resolution of the DOJ. The December 9, 2005 Order of the RTC merely stated that the motion to withdraw was 'unmeritorious' while the March 10, 2006 Order only declared that Purita's defense was 'a matter that must be addressed to the trial court'.|| ISSUE/S: WON RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw Information without stating its reason for the denial. HELD: The RTC failed to make its independent evaluation of the merits of the case when it denied the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw Information.
When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information", it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion."
Avelino y Bulawan v. People [G.R. 181444. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: At around two in the afternoon at the Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila, Chairman Hispano was gunned down by three men wearing bonnets. Manalangsang, who was in a tricycle which was at the scene, and a Mary Ann Canada, was able to recognize Bobby Avelino as one of the gunmen. During the trial testimonies of PO2 Galang, Bantiling and SOCO PSI Cabamongan were presented in favor of Avelino. Avelino contended that he was at the LTO of Pasay City when the incident happened. RTC found Avelino guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery and the CA upheld the said decision as well. ISSUE/S: 1. Does the defense of denial and alibi prevail over the witness‘ positive identification of the accused-appellants? 2. Was the expert opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan, who was considered as ordinary witness, rightfully determined by the CA as immaterial? HELD: 1. NO. According to the Supreme Court, for denial or alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
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commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, selfserving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, 108 is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Pharaoh Hotel, where petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime, is in Sta. Cruz, Manila is not far from the scene of the crime, which is in Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila. Indeed, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. These, the defense failed to do. 2. Yes. SC held that expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. In the case, the defense failed to provide the qualifications needed for him to be of such.
People v. Marvin Cruz [G.R. 201728. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: Marvin Cruz was filed with three criminal cases of rape. The victim was one of AAA, a minor of 17 years old. They got to know each other through the exchange of text messages which then eventually led to a relationship. The victim said that she consented with the relationship because Cruz told her that he was dying of leukemia. The prosecution contended that she was forced by Cruz on the three separate incidents, and presented the following pieces of evidence: (1) Cruz threatened AAA that he will circulate a copy of their sex video to her family and schoolmates if she refused to go to his house and meet him in order to assure sexual congress. Alarmed by the consequence of his threat, AAA had no choice but to go to his place as he wanted, in the hope that he would keep his word that he will give her the disk containing their sex video; (2) When Cruz and his friends were having a drinking spree in his house, he threatened AAA that he will ask them to rape her if she puts her clothes back on. Again, AAA had no choice but to do what he demanded, and thereafter repeatedly sexually molested her; and, (3) Cruz held a lighted cigarette near her chest and warned her that he will burn her skin if she continues to resist his sexual advances. Helpless, AAA had no choice but to succumb to his demand.
However, the defense denied the contention of the prosecution by saying that Cruz professed his love for AAA and that AAA consented to the sexual acts, or ―sweetheart defense.‖ Cruz was arraigned and pleaded ―not guilty.‖ The RTC acquitted Cruz in one of the three criminal cases of rape. CA af firmed the RTC‘s decision.
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ISSUE/S: Did the Court rightfully determined that the testimony of AAA positively identified the accused 109 as the one who sexually abused her? HELD: Yes. The Court held that the clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly established how Cruz sexually molested her on November 6, 2007 with the use of force, threat and intimidation. Indeed, ―[a] rape victim is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.‖
As to the ―sweetheart defense‖, it is said that love is not a license for lust. ―A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.‖ Cruz‘s argument that they are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been proven to be consensual.
Anita Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan et.al. [G.R. 160739. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: On June 16, 2003, seven complaints of syndicated estafa were filed against petitioner and four others. These involved the modus of the petitioner of recruiting persons for employment as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada without acquiring from the POEA a permit to do so. The next day, Judge Pangilinan conducted a preliminary investigation. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City. She was then apprehended on June 18, 2003. Petitioner contends that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest. ISSUE/S: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention? HELD: No. According to the Supreme Court, there is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving ―all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictio ns.‖ His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. – The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
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(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a) It further explained by saying that under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila‘s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
People v. Victorino Reyes [G.R. 173307. July 17, 2013.] FACTS: On December 26, 1996, Reyes allegedly raped minor AAA while she and her sister BBB were on the way to their home from school. AAA was dragged to the sala of his house and therein, he was able to perform sexual acts which include the insertion of his penis into her vagina, which created a slight penetration to the latter, and made push and pull movements. ISSUE/S: 1. Did the CA and RTC erred in ruling that the testitmonies of AAA and BBB were credible and reliable? 2. Did the evidence adduce by the State competently proved that the crime reached the consummated stage? HELD: 1. No. The Supreme Court held that consequently there was a good reason or cause to have us depart from the age-old rule of according conclusiveness to the findings of the RTC that the CA affirmed. The Court is not a trier of facts, and has to depend on the findings of fact of the trial court by virtue of its direct access to the witnesses as they testified in court. Only when the appellant convincingly demonstrates that such findings of fact were either erroneous, or biased, or unfounded, or incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the findings of fact of the CA would the Court assume the rare role of a trier of facts. But that convincing demonstration was not done here by Reyes.
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2. Yes. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 111 7659, the law applicable at the time of the rape of AAA, defined and punished rape thusly: Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court reiterated that the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of consummating rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." This understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia con summates the crime.
People vs. Clara [GR No. 195528. July 24, 2013.] FACTS: This case involves a buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of the accused JOEL CLARA Y BUHAIN (Joel). Upon the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, it was evident that there were contradictions between the versions of the testimonies of the police officers who claimed to have conducted the buy-bust operation. The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the recollection of event of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of shabu. ISSUE/S: Was there failure in the part of the prosecution to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence? HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court defines ―Chain of Custody‖ as the duly recorded authorized movement and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third , the turnover by the
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investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to 112 the court. In Mallillin v. People, it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness‘ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Accused is acquitted.
People v. Roman [G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.] FACTS: The accused-appellant, Wilson Roman, was charged with murder. The incident happened in the morning of June 22, 1995, at the wedding party when the accusedappellant hacked Vicente Indaya, the victim, with his bolo. The victim was hit on his head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he fell on the ground and then died. There were several witnesses including Elena Romero, Asterio Ebuenga, Martin Borlagdatan, Elisea Indaya, Ramil Baylon, SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos and Dr. Teodora Pornillos. Each testimonies were positive, clear and consistent in all material points.
However, there was a different version of the incident according to the accused-appellant. He said that on that day, he went to the house of his parents-in-law to bring the bamboos. On his way back, he met his close friend who invited him to come to the wedding party. At the venue, he pacified his brother-in-law and Indaya, the victim who were having a heated exchange of words and told the victim to leave. After 20 minutes, the victim came back. He got mad because he was pacified by the accused-appellant and threatened to kill him. But he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving, he heard a shout that he was about to be hacked. Then, he saw the victim, aiming to hit him with a bolo, but he was able to get the bolo. He lost control of himself, he hacked the victim instead. His testimony was supported by Delia Tampoco. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals rendered a decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the accused-appellant may invoke self-defense. 2. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery ex ists.
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HELD: 1. No. Self-defense was used as an alibi, an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate. In 113 order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one‘s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim of self-defense shrinks into incredulity. It is worth noting that the incident transpired in broad daylight, within the clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no wonder that the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent in all material points. They all confirmed that before the crime was consummated, the victim was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not the least provocation done by the victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the thought that there was a need to defend himself. The victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that could show that he was out to inflict harm or injury. On the contrary, the witnesses all point to the accused-appellant as the unlawful aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he collapsed lifeless on the ground. Moreover, the severity, location and the number of wounds suffered by the victim are indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm not merely that he wanted to defend himself from an imminent peril to life. Also, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one bolo, specifically that which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been recovered from the crime scene. This belies the accused-appellant‘s claim that the victim was also armed at the time of the incident. 1. Yes. There was treachery and accused-appellant contention that he should be convicted only of homicide, not murder was dismissed.
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There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its 114 execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It takes place when the following elements concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. But, in the case, the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. He was then unarmed and unsuspecting, was deprived of any real chance to mount a defense, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to accused-appellant. This is also buttressed by the fact that the wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the back. At the time that the crime was about to be committed, the victim does not have the slightest idea of the impending danger to his person. He was not facing the accused-appellant and unarmed, hence, lacked the opportunity to avoid the attack, or at least put up a defense to mitigate the impact. On the one hand, the accused-appellant was armed and commenced his attack while behind the victim.
Lihaylihay and Vinluan v. People [G.R. No. 191219. July 31, 2013.] FACTS: Acting on the special audit reportsubmitted by the Commission on Audit, the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted an internal investigation on the purported "ghost" purchases of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) worth P133,000,000.00 which were allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System (SSS) and delivered to the PNP General Services Command (GSC). As a result of the internal investigation, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP officers, including, among others, Vinluan and Lihaylihay, for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
Gen. Nazareno in his capacity as Chief, PNP and concurrently Board Chairman of the PNP Service Store System, surreptitiously channeled PNP funds to the PNP SSS through "Funded RIVs" valued at P8 [M]illion and Director Domondon released ASA No. 000-200-004-92 (SN1353) without proper authority from the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and caused it to appear that there were purchases and deliveries of combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the General Service Command (GSC), PNP, by deliberately and maliciously using funds for personal services and divided the invoices of not more than P500,000.00 each ISSUE/S: WON evidence was admissible.
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HELD: Finally, on the matter of the admissibility of the prosecution‘s evidence, suffice it to state that, 115 except as to the checks,the parties had already stipulated on the subject documents‘ existence and authenticity and accordingly, waived any objections thereon. In this respect, petitioners must bear the consequences of their admission and cannot now be heard to complain against the admissibility of the evidence against them by harking on the best evidence rule. In any event, what is sought to be established is the mere general appearance of forgery which may be readily observed through the marked alterations and superimpositions on the subject documents, even without conducting a comparison with any original document as in the case of forged signatures where the signature on the document in question must always be compared to the signature on the original document to ascertain if there was indeed a forgery.
Lee v. Lee [G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013.] FACTS: Petitioner Paul Lee is the President of Centillion Holding, Inc. (CHI), affiliated with Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC Group). Respondent Chin Lee is the elected treasurer of CHI. Paul lee filed a verified petition for the issuance of an Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), covering a property owned by CHI. He claims he originally had in his possession an owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT but subsequently lost it. In a Complaint -Affidavit, respondent Chin Lee alleges that as treasurer of CHI, she was tasked with the duty of keeping all vital financial documents including the said TCT. She claims that Paul Lee knew of this fact and made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, thereby accusing him of perjury. Paul Lee‘s counsel then moved in open court that respondent Chin Lee and her counsel should be excluded from participating in the case, since perjury is a public offense, and there is no private person injured by the crime. ISSUE/S: WON there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest. HELD: YES. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable . . . is also civilly liable ." Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. |||
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For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is 116 allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110: SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.‖ It has also been held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI.
Chavez v. Fria [GR No. 183014. August 7, 2013.] FACTS: A case was decided in favor of the plaintiff, wherein the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda ans Aseoche (The Law Firm for brevity), herein petitioner, acted as counsel. A writ of execution was to be issued to enforce said judgment. Atty. Fria, respondent in the case at bar, was the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, and refused to do her ministerial duty if issuing said writ. She posited that the draft writ was addressed to the Branch Sheriff who was on leave, and she did not know who was appointed as special Sheriff on his behalf. The prosecutor then issued a memorandum recommending that she be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. It ruled that not all the elements of the crime were present, especially the second element, that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the MTC‘s ruling. ISSUE/S: WON the RTC erred in upholding the MTC‘s decision. HELD:
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NO. Under Section 5 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable 117 cause||| Sec. 5.When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause . If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.||| It must, however, be observed that the judge's power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. A clear-cut case of lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. it must be stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged . On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause ; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. MTC‘s dismissal should be sustained.
The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made with in the scope of i ts ju ri sdicti on and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203's lack of jurisdiction over the said case. The third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to
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implement or, conversely, disobey. Besides, as the MTC correctly observed, there lies ample legal 118 justifications that prevented Atty. Fria from immediately issuing a writ of execution.
Neri v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 202243. August 7, 2013.] FACTS: Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection with the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Ombudsman filed two criminal informations, the first against Abalos, and the second against Neri. The Office of the Special Prosecutor then moved for the two cases‘ consolidation, to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction. ISSUE/S: WON Consolidation of the two cases is proper. HELD: NO. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules.
The term "consolidation" is used in three (3) different senses or con cepts, thus: a (1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation) (2)Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) (3)Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
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To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of 119 Court is entitled "Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides: Section 1.Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added.) As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states: Section 2.Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled. The prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.||| Joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties." More elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial. ||| Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.| A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute
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thereby delaying the resolution of his case. Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) 120 before the case against the latter may be resolved – a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.
Hasegawa v. Giron [G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.] FACTS: Respondent Giron filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa and several John Does. Leila Giron and Leonarda Marcos were allegedly kidnapped by orders of Masayuki Hasegawa. The kidnapping were done to threaten them as Giron and Marcos filed a case against Hasegawa for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Prior to the complaint of kidnapping, respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Hasegawa denied the accusations and asserted that Giron and Marcos only want to extort ex tort money from him.
The State prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review to the Department of Justice praying for reversal of the prosecutor‘s resolution. The Department of Justice found no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor and affirmed its decision that there was a lack of probable cause. She then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner. Henc e, this petition. Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons why no probable cause exists in this case. Petitioner argues that a review of facts and evidence made by the appellate court is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the appellate court should have dismissed outright respondent's petition for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the wrong mode of appeal. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction? 1. Was there probable cause? 2. What kind of evidence is needed for preliminary investigation? 3. HELD: 1. YES. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
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Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, 121 where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, un l ess these these are patent patentll y shown shown to h ave bee been made with grave abuse abuse of di scretion creti on . We find such reason for judicial review here present . We sustain the appellate court's reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ 2. YES. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of o f the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. I n or der der to arr ive at probable caus cause e, the el ements of t he cri me char ged ged shou shou ld be pr pr esent. nt . All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. 3. Only evidence to support a finding of probable cause, not a conviction, is needed for preliminary investigation. All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24 hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes pu rposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained co mplained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Investigating Prosecutor, however, ruled that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication. The Supreme Court said that the Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a
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full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that 122 cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecution‘s evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a party‘s defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
People v. Pepino-Consulta [G.R. No. 191071. Aug. 28, 2013.] FACTS: Prosecution evidence showed that on February 7, 2005 at 5:10 in the afternoon or thereabouts, a buy- bust bust operation was conducted condu cted in front of Akim Restaurant located at Cleofer‘s building City of San Fernando against a certain ‗Manang‘ who was later identified as the accused Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta. The operation yielded a positive result – 5 5 sachets of shabu weighing 0.3001 gram were recovered from the poseur buyer. The substance confiscated from the accused turned out to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit ―C‖).On the other hand, the accused denied that there was a buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she was only framed up. She, however, failed to establish by convincing proof any motive or reason why the arresting officers will falsely impute the crime charged on her. The RTC found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused-appellant in its assailed Decision. The Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant was validly arrested after she was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer. We found that the police officers indeed committed serious lapses in procedure in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on February 7, 2005. Additionally, the prosecution adduced evidence that fell short of the exacting degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required under our criminal laws. ISSUE/S: Did the chain of custody sufficiently prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the accused to be convicted? HELD: Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme Court here held that while there were indeed five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more broken links in the chain of custody. In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the same. However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely relied on the stamp of PO2
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Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to the crime laboratory. In view of the evident 123 breaks in the chain of custody, very serious doubts arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently, there can be no absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very same drugs handed by accused-appellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually presented before the trial court. Accusedappellant was thus acquitted of the crime charged.
People v. Amistoso y Broca [G.R. No. 201447. August 28, 2013.] FACTS: Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, with the rape of his daughter alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The Information2 specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 finding Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Court of Appeals affirmed Amistoso‘s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 93466 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages. Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa City. ISSUE/S: Is the Civil and Criminal liability extinguished upon death of the accused? HELD: Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the accused prior to final judgment; effect of death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction on his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that, ―Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.‖ Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistoso‘s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Supreme Court (SC) of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still pending and unresolved. The SC ruled upon Amistoso‘s
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appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistoso‘s death on December 11, 2012 renders the SC‘s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso‘s 124 conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the SC still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
Republic (PCGG) v. Bakunawa [G.R. NO. 180418, AUGUST 28, 2013.] FACTS: Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property ―in unlawful concert with one another‖ and ―in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment.‖The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had served as Imelda Marcos‘ Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income;and that Luz Bakunawa, ―by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems,‖particularly: 1) acted as dummies, nominees, and/or agents of the Marcos spouses and, with the active collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of the other defendants, established several corporations engaged in a wide range of economic activities, such as construction and cattle ranching;
2) secured favorable contracts with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the construction of government projects through grossly undercapitalized corporations and without complying with such usual requirements as public bidding, notice and publication of contractors; 3) unlawfully acquired heads of cattle from the government dispersalprogram and raised them on ranch lands encroaching on forest zones; 4) unlawfully encroached upon a mangrove-forested section in Masbate, and converted it into a fishpond; 5) unlawfully amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government financial institutions, and incorporating into their contracts a cost-escalation adjustment provision to justify collection of grossly arbitrary and unconscionable amounts unsupported by evidence of increase in prices;
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6) unlawfully imported hundreds of brand-new units of heavy equipment without paying customs 125 duties and other allied taxes amounting to millions of pesos, by falsely representing said heavy equipment to be for official government use and selling them at very low prices to avoid paying the required taxes. ISSUE/S: Are the properties and assets of the accused considered as ill-gotten wealth and the holding of the position in the Marcos administration proved the guilt of the accused? HELD: The mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate of Marcos. There are two concurring elements that must be present before assets or properties can be considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have ―originated from the government itself,‖ and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. As can be gleaned from the above, evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1.
Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or employee. In this case, the Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos, and mentions several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos‘ Social Secretary, but a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacañang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
People v. Manalili y Jose [G.R. No. 191253. August 28, 2013.] FACTS: According to the prosecution‘s evidence, the offense transpired on 16 March 1998 at around 7 o‘clock in the evening in the house of Manalili located on YYY Street.
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AAA, the victim who was then barely 11 years old narrated what transpired during that night Manalili was drinking with 3 of his friends in front of his house on ZZZ Street. While AAA was 126 chatting with the son of the store owner asked her to go to his other house on YYY street, to get a dustpan because one of his drinking mates vomited. AAA readily complied and went to Manalili‘s house. No one was around at that time and it was dark inside the house. When inside the house, accused proceeded in committing acts of lasciviousness and thereafter attempted to rape the victim by trying to insert his penis into the vagina of the victim, when this became unsuccessful, the accused inserted his finger into the victim‘s vagina and thereafter directed the victim to hold his penis. Manalili also kissed her neck and breasts. After Manalili satisfied his lust, AAA was directed to go home and was instructed not to let anyone see her leave the house of Manalili. The next day, CCC, AAA‘s mother, saw the marks on AAA‘s neck and breast and asked AAA what happened. AAA kept quiet, refused to answer and left for school. Eventually, AAA confided to her aunt, DDD, what actually happened on the night of 16 March 1998. This prompted CCC and DDD to file a complaint before investigator. AAA was subjected to a medico genitalia examination conducted by a Medico Legal Officer of the Medico Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila. AAA also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 18 March 199812 assisted by her mother, CCC. According to the victim, she was molested more than three (3) times by Manalili before the incident at hand. AAA claimed that she never told anybody because she was scared.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Manalili of statutory rape. The CA affirmed with modification the judgement of conviction of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the essential elements of statutory rape beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE/S: WON the trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the identification of the accused-appellant as the alleged perpetrator of the offense charged was not clear, positive, and convincing. HELD: The Court finds no reason to disturb the decisions of the courts below.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court had always been guided by the well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while accusation of rape is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The trial court noted that during AAA‘s cross-examination, her testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, as she remained consistent on material points. The trial court‘s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
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fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Moreover, this Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that 127 no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Although she failed to report the incident immediately, such reaction is deemed normal considering that she was only 10 years old at that time. With regard to the results of the medical examination, this Court holds that the absence of laceration and semen does not preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainant‘s private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at the very least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the complainant‘s vagina, consummates the crime.32 Likewise, the absence of semen in AAA‘s vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse. The first element of statutory rape, (a) that the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented, was substantiated by the presentation of the Birth Certificate of the victim, while the second element, (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim, was evidenced by the testimony of the victim herself. Thus, the lower court was correct in sentencing accused-appellant to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No. 160316. September 02, 2013.] FACTS: At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, met the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others. Because of verbal exchanges, this irked Jose Gregorio and slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. In the course of the melee, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.|||
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Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the 128 other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the Office of the City Prosecutor. On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law. On March 23, 2000, the DOJ modified the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief, and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents in the above cases. Upon review, the DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations.|| On January 11, 2001, the complainants elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate informations. On September 29, 2003, the CA annulled and set aside Resolutions of the DOJ. According to CA that probable cause exists in the subject complaints for malicious mischief and theft. ISSUE/S: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when the court interfere the DOJ in determining the existence of probable cause? HELD:
YES, the court committed grave abuse of discretion. The conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court , as amended, provides: Section 5.Who must prosecute criminal action . – All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
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The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the 129 questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Kummer v. People [G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.] FACTS: On one fateful night, the evidence of the prosecution reveals, Johan Kummer, a minor, the son of Leticia Kummer, shot a certain Jesus Mallo, Jr. According to the eyewitness, Amiel Malana, he and Jesus Mallo went to the house of Krummers. Jesus knocked on the door of the Krummers‘ house, declaring that he is ―Boy Mallo‖. Then, according to the testimonies of Malana, Johan shot Mallo dead with a shotgun.
Being a minor, Johan was released at the cognizance of his father. Then he left the country without notifying the court. In defense, Leticia Kummer produced another version of the story which shows that they were sleeping innocently in their house on that fateful night, when there was a commotion outside their house, admitting however that, when they were practically disturbed by the said commotion, Johan got a shotgun and fired outside their house, without intention to kill or injure anybody, especially Jesus. An Information was filed with the Court on January 12, 1989, which was later on modified. This modification was about the date of the commission of the crime. Th e modif ication , however, happened af ter she was arr aign ed.
The RTC convicted her and Johan, who was out of the Philippine Legal System‘s reach. She appealed the case to the CA, which denied them and affirmed the RTC decision, arguing, among others, that by virtue of the amendment of the Information, she should have been arraigned again; and, since she was not, there was a blatant violation of her right to be informed of the nature of her case, since an amended Information is a new Information. Hence, all proceedings which the case had undergone were void. ISSUE/S: Does she have to be arraigned again? HELD: No. She does not have to be arraigned again.
Note that only the date was amended. Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, ―[a] complaint or an Information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a for mal amendment may only be done with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.‖
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Accordingly, a change in tim e in th e commission of t he crim e, when the disparity is not so great, is only a for mal amendment. In view of the foregoing, the amendment was from ―July‖ to ―June‖ 130 can only be regarded as formal amendment. Moreover, it does not and could not prejudice the rights of the accused, because (1) it does not change the nature of the crime, and (2) it does not render the defenses prepared for the former Information as it stood invalid. Having said all these, a formal amendment does not require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. Since the nature and cause of the accusation are not changed by a formal amendment, a re-arraignment is not necessary, as she was already informed of these things. Hence, there has been no violation of her rights as accused. Thence, no, she does not have to be arraigned again.
Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.] FACTS: Disini, and company were charged with corruption of public officials by the Sandiganbayan, penalized under Art. 212, in relation to Art. 210 of the RPC and violation of Sec. 4(a) of RA 3019, for having allegedly conspired with the former President Ferdinand Marcos, in appropriating public funds for their personal use amounting to billions of pesos. Disini filed a motion to quash, arguing among others, that the criminal Informations filed against him failed to comply with the required substance and form of information, thereby violating his right to be informed as the accused. ISSUE/S: Did the Information comply with the required substance and form? HELD: Yes. the Informations filed complied with the required substance and form.
An Information must state every single fact or circumstance that constitutes an element of the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash may be properly sustained. Included in the things that must be in the Information are: (1) the name of the accused, (2) the designation of the offense given by the statute, (3) the acts or omissions constituting the offense, (4) the name of the offended party, (5) the approximate date of the commission of the crime, and (5) the place where the crime was committed. Note that, when the offense has been committed by more than one person, all of them must be included in the Information.
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After factual examination, the SC held that the Informations filed against him and his companions were able to comply with the prescribed forms and substance of an Information. Hence, his 131 motion to quash could not be properly sustained. Withal, the Informations filed against Disini and company complied with the required substance and form.
People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013.] FACTS: The accused has been charged for violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs act of 2002. Two separate information was charged against the accused. The prosecutors version is as follows. SPO2 David received reports from the barangay office about drug-dealing activities. SPO2 David together with his team on a weekly basis conducted a surveillance on the area. They were able to confirm that indeed the accused was conducting drug-dealing activities. Thereafter SPO2 David with his team conducted a test-buy. David together with a civilian asset conducted a test buy and was able to obtain P200 worth of shabu from the asset. Afterwards the team of SPO2 David conducted a buy-bust operation. SPO2 David went to Enriquez who was at the sari-sari store. The team were right across the sari-sari store hiding behind a dump truck. SPO2 David immediately gave to Enriquez P200 without saying anything. Enriquez thereafter went to get a sealed pack of shabu and handed it over to SPO2 David. SPO2 David after receiving the shabu signaled his team and arrested the accused. The version of the defense on the facts are as follows. Enriquez was eating alone where suddenly a team of police officers in civilian clothing asked him if he knew anyone selling Shabu, this was done while a gun was poking at the accused. He denied having knowledge and was afterwards arrested. The sari-sari girl corroborated with the testimony of the accused. The RTC however found accused guilty. ISSUE/S: WON the ruling of the RTC was correct based on the current evidence HELD: No. The SC ruled that as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness‘ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The following are the requirements in the chain of custody of a buy bust operation. First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. In the
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case at bar the prosecutor failed to prove that the seizure of items made by Enriquez were already marked or was marked by his representative. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial 132 custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires. Second, the chain of custody in the turnover of the illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. They failed to identify as to who they gave the illegal drug to. Therefore it is not shown what happened to the illegal drug after it was handed over by the apprehending officer. Third, the chief of police was not presented to testify the court. The testimony of Chief of Police Erese is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link between the testimony of SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon, which the parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for whereabouts of the seized items from the time they were brought to the police station to the time they were submitted to P/Insp. Dizon for examination constitutes a clear break in the chain of custody. Moreover, no one testified as to how the confiscated items were handled and cared for after the laboratory examination. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal to the case as we can no longer consider or safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drugs were safely preserved.
Singian vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos.195011-19. September 30, 2013.] FACTS: Atty. Salvador held several positions such as the Presidential Commission on Good Government Consultant as well as being the coordinator of the Technical Working group. He was to study the reports and recommendations of the asset privatization trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions. One of the accounts which acted by the committee were the loans granted to Intergrated Shoe. Inc (ISI). ISI applied for a letter of credit on January 18, 1972 which amounted to $2,500,000 which was to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery and equipment. The letter of credit was recommended by the Board of Directors of PNB. The loan was subsequently approved and it was secured by several collaterals. ISI further extended more loans and the committee upon investigation found that the loans of ISI bore characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste. As a result Atty. Salvador filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners and his co-accused for violation of Sec3 paragraphs (e) and (g) of RA#3019.
On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered the plea of not guilty during arraignment. All other accused also entered into arraignment except for Bautista who died prior to the scheduled arraignment. Several of the petitioners had died which forced the Sandiganbayan to issue a resolution to dismiss the case. Afterwards the remaining criminal case initiated where the prosecution presented all its witnesses and evidence. Later the petitioner filed a demurer to evidence.In response the prosecution opposed the demurer to evidence of petition. The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied the demurer of evidence of petitioner. ISSUE/S: WON the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the demurer of evidence.
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HELD: 133
Yes. The Sandiganbayan was correct. First a demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Second, sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. The SC ruled therefore that the Sandiganbayan found sufficient evidence to establish that there was violation of sec 3(g) of RA#3019. It was shown that petitioner connived with his co-accused. The loan transactions entered into by ISI and PNB were discovered to be disadvantageous to the government. Lastly the SC also ruled that a lower court's order of denial shall not be disturbed , that is, appellate courts will not review the prosecution's evidence and decide whether such evidence has established guilt beyond reasonable doubt unless the accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, thereby amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegation of such abuse will not suffice. Petitioner was unable to prove abuse of discretion.
Chua v. Executive Judge-MTC Manila [G.R. No. 202920. October 2, 2013.] FACTS: On 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. After conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP found probable cause and, on 22 March 2012, filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC. Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a totalof P540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. Finding the said amount to be beyond his means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once. The MeTC clerk of court opined that petitioner could not. Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees. Due to non-payment of the required filing fees, the MeTC designated the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as undocketed cases under UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96. Subsequently, the OCP moved for consolidation of the said cases. On 18 April 2012, petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of the MeTC a motion entitled "Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per Case Basis" (Urgent Motion). ISSUE/S: Was the motion filed by the petitioner entitled ―Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per Case Basis‖ the correct remedy?
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134 HELD: No. The correct remedy for the petitioner, in view of the unavailability of an appeal or any other remedy in the ordinary course of law, is a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. But then again, the petitioner should have filed such a petition, not directly with this Court, but before the appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of courts. In the weightier interest of substantial justice, however, this Court forgives such procedural lapses and treats the instant appeal as a certiorari petition filed properly before this Court. To this Court, the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Judge was patent on the undisputed facts of this case and is serious enough to warrant a momentary deviation from the procedural norm. Thus, we come to the focal issue of whether the Executive Judge of the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing petitioners request of paying filing fees on a per case basis.
We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition. In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety. Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner‘s request. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26 July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in UDK Nos.12001457 to 96 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, is hereby directed to accept payments of tiling fees in UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96 on a per information basis.
Ramirez v. People [G.R. No. 197832. October 2, 2013.] FACTS: Anita Ramirez (herein petitioner) and Josephine Barangan were convicted of Estafa. The judgment was promulgated on March 25, 2009 after several re-settings and warrants of arrest were accordingly issued.
According to petitioner, she failed to attend the promulgation of judgment because she had to attend to the wake of her father. On June 6, 2009, three months after the promulgation, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest and to Reinstate Bail Bond. This was denied by the RTC.
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Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion to admit notice of appeal and to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the RTC Order. She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on 135 November 17, 2010. CA denied the omnibus motion. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner did not also prosper, denying her application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of conviction against her. The CA denied the said petition on the ground of failure to file the motion within the reglementary period. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner‘s motion on the ground of to lapse of time 2. Whether or not petitioner can rely on the ground of substantial justice in failing to abide by the rules on reglementary period of filing an appeal HELD: Petition is denied for lack of merit.
1. When appeal to be taken . Section 6, Rule 122 of the RRCP provides: ―xxx An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. xxx" In the case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioner's motion inasmuch as by the time the petitioner filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege . The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
2. Period of perfecting an appeal may be relaxed on the grounds of substantial justice or other special meritorious circumstances and issues . In the case, petitioner, however, failed to present any exceptional, special or meritorious circumstance that will excuse the belated filing of her notice of appeal.
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Her assertion that her counsel failed to communicate to her the status of her case is a "tenuous and implausible" excuse. The rule is that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. 136 Petitioner did not also show that she took steps to show her diligence to be updated by the status of the case. Lastly, petitioner did not even inform the judge about the demise of her father. At the very least, she should have filed a motion to reset the promulgation of judgment. People v. Cuaycong [G.R. No. 196051. October 2, 2013.] FACTS: In this case, two (2) Information were filed charging Appellant Jade Cuaycong of having carnal knowledge with the 7-year old daughter of his ‗live-in‘ partner. At the end of the trial, the RTC convicted appellant on two counts of statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 6(5) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed appellant‘s conviction of the felony of statutory rape in the first case. However, it did not uphold the conviction in the second case because, while the Information alleged rape by carnal knowledge, the prosecution was able to prove rape by sexual assault since the rape incident at issue involved penile penetration of the victim‘s anus. Hence, in the second case the CA ruled that instead of statutory rape, appellant should be convicted for acts of lasciviousness as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ISSUE INVOLVED: Whether the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which downgraded the charge of rape in the second criminal case to act of lasciviousness, is correct.
HELD: Yes, the downgrading was correct. In upholding the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court referred to the case of People v. Abulon which held that:
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read: SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
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alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute 137 or form part of those constituting the latter. Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape.
Carbajosa v. Judge Patricio [A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834. October 02, 2013.] FACTS: Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion against accused Dolores Bieles (Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz, in the sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge stemmed from Bieles‘ menacing and intimidating attitude in preventing Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading the same out of the latter‘s Efren Bus Liner. In a Decision dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) months of arresto mayor as maximum, and ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and (2) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its equivalent value as the first lien on judgment. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed Bieles‘ conviction but modified her sentence by increasing the maximum penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. This modified judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision dated October 26, 2006 and eventually by this Court when Bieles‘ petition for review on certiorari was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2008 for late filing and for absence of reversible error in the appealed judgment. Likewise denied was Bieles‘ ensuing motion for reconsideration. The Court thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the Resolution of August 13, 2008 has become final and executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment but the same was denied in the Resolution dated June 1, 2009. Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the court of origin for proper execution. The motion was granted in the RTC‘s Order dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits. She claimed that the letter was favorably acted upon as evidenced by the first endorsement dated January25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of the Third Division to include the case in its agenda. Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order11 dated April 7, 2010 wherein he reckoned that it will be best to hold in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosa‘s Motion for Execution of Judgment and await the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution is made. On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and insisted on the issuance of a writ of execution averring that in the absence of any restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice. ISSUE/S:
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Was the action of the respondent judge in violation of his responsibilities as a judge? 138
HELD: Yes. Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties‘ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial. Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against Bieles. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricio‘s actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Jadewell Parking v. Judge Lidua Sr. [G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.] FACTS: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure owned by Edwin Ang and on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car belonging to Jeffrey Walan. Both cars were considered illegally parked. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is 26,250.00 pesos. In Lieu of this, Jadewell filed two criminal cases against herein respondents for violation of such ordinances. Respondents filed a Motion to Quash on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash sought the quashal of the two Informations on the ground that the criminal liability is already extinguished by prescription as stated in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, which provides that violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed after two months. The Information was filed on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.
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ISSUE/S: WON the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled 139 the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does." HELD: The Petition is denied.
Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents.
People v. Dizon [G.R. No. 199901. October 9, 2013.] FACTS:
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Accused-appellant Dizon was accused and convicted of the crime of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as ―shabu‖, violation of RA 9165 otherwise 140 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The prosecution posited that a certain PO2 Tuzon received telephone call from an unknown caller tipping him off that accused-appellant is engaged in drug-pushing activity. Acting upon the information, he and his colleagues went to investigate and engaged the help of a civilian to act as poseur-buyer when they decided to have a buy-bust operation and said accused-appellant was eventually caught in said buy-bust operation and was brought to the San Nicolas Police Station. There at the police station, PO2 Tuzon just marked the confiscated item with his initials ―EAT‖ and prepared the certification/inventory of seized/confiscated item. The defense countered that he never committed such crime of drug-pushing and went on to say that he was framed-up by the police. The RTC convicted said accused, and, on appeal at the instance of the accused-appellant, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE/S: WON the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the RTC. HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the RTC. In Reyes v. CA, the Court emphasized that a "conviction must stand on the strength of the prosecution‘s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense which the accused put up. Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter of course."
In the instant case, Guzon was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which prohibits the sale of illegal drugs. The elements of the crime include: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. The Court explained in People v. Bautista that in drug-related prosecutions, the State bears the burden not only of proving these elements of the offense under R.A. No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti , the body of the crime. The dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. The prosecution committed the fatal error of committing a breach in the chain of custody. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. Unfortunately for the part of the prosecution, there was significant difference in the weight of the confiscated substance during the confiscation and during presentation. Furthermore, the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation failed to mark the seized item immediately after its confiscation from Guzon. The Court explained in People v. Coreche the
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importance in the chain of custody of the immediate marking of an item that is seized from an accused, to wit: ―Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other 141 related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.‖ The Court has also determined that although a physical inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust operation forms part of the case records, the buy-bust team failed to fully comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for its preparation and execution. Under the law, the inventory must be made "in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom the items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." Besides these deficiencies in the preparation of the inventory, no photograph of the seized item, which is also required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, formed part of the case records. In addition to the foregoing, the Court finds merit in Guzon‘s argument that the non -presentation of the poseur-buyer to the wit ness stand was fatal to the prosecution‘s cause. We emphasize that in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must convincingly prove that the transaction or sale actually transpired. However, in the instant case, the civilian who acted as poseur-buyer was never presented as witness.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is hereby acquitted.
People v. Galicia [G.R. No. 191063. October 9, 2013.] FACTS: Accused-appellant and his partner (who remain at large) were charged with the crime of murder and after trials of the merits ensued, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was convicted by the RTC. Pertinent portion of the RTC‘s decision reads as follows.
―That on or about 11:45 in the morning of June 10, 2004, at N. Gonzales St., cor. F. Platon St., Barangay II, Poblacion, Tanauan City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused JUN ASUNCION y NOBERO, armed with a firearm, and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
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feloniously in an unexpected manner, shot Judge Voltaire Rosales, hitting the latter on his head and neck thus causing fatal injuries which resulted to the instantaneous death of said Judge 142 Rosales. Said accused escaped through the use of a motorcycle then driven by the accused ALDRIN GALICIA y MICOSA.‖ Two civilians were presented by the prosecution as witnesses for said crime. One was able to talk to the perpetrators and one was able to witness directly the shooting. The defense on the other hand countered that the victim was shot by men in ―black bonnets‖ and no one could identify the perpetrators.
On appeal at the instance of the accused, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ISSUE/S: WON the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC HELD: No, the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Accused questions the credibility of the witnesses presented and further presented the discrepancies committed by the witnesses in their affidavits and testimonies however the SC ruled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness‘ affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. What is important is, in the over-all analysis of the case, the trial court‘s findings and conclusions are duly supported by the evidence on record. This Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial court‘s assessment of the witnesses‘ credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the CA sustained such assessment, as in this case, where it affirmed the trial court‘s findin gs of fact, the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses, the determination of physical evidence and conclusions.
Decision by the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
People v. de Jesus y Mendoza [G.R. No. 190622. October 7, 2013.] FACTS:
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"AAA" was born on November 26, 1992. On July 24, 2004, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, then 11-year old "AAA" went to the Pasig public market to buy a pair of slippers. 143 However, "AAA" was not able to buy her pair of slippers because appellant suddenly grabbed her left arm and pulled her towards the nearby Mega Parking Plaza. "AAA" was surprised and confused. She cried and tried to free herself from the grasp of the appellant, to no avail. Upon reaching the fourth floor of Mega Parking Plaza, appellant pulled "AAA's" shorts and panty down to her knees. Appellant likewise pulled down his pants. Appellant then sat on the stairs, placed "AAA" on his lap, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed push and pull movements. "AAA" was overcome with fear and she felt pain in her vagina. Meanwhile, Boca, the security guard assigned at the Mega Parking Plaza, was conducting a roving patrol when he heard the cry of "AAA." He went to the fourth floor of the building which was at that time unoccupied by any vehicle. He was however surprised to see "AAA" seated on the lap of the appellant. Boca also saw appellant insert his penis into the vagina of "AAA" and then perform sexual movements. Immediately upon seeing the sexual molestations, Boca grabbed appellant's arm, handcuffed him and brought him to the barangay hall. The defense, on his part, at the time of the incident, he was 63 years of age and worked as a porter at the Pasig public market. He claimed that even before the July 24, 2004 incident, he already knew "AAA" as the latter used to ask money from him. He denied having raped "AAA." He narrated that on July 24, 2004, he saw "AAA" urinating near the stairs of the second floor of the Mega Parking Plaza while he was just standing nearby. Suddenly, Boca, the security guard, arrived and handcuffed him. He was thereafter brought to the authorities. He could not think of any reason or motive why "AAA" would file a rape charge against him.||| RTC convicted him of statutory the victim being 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and was subsequently affirmed by the CA. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rape despite failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that there was indeed a sexual intercourse between the accused-appellant and the private complainant. HELD: No. The trial court did not err in convicting accused-appellant. Rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the female‘s deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. In statutory rape, there are only two elements that need to be established, to wit: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that
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the woman is below 12 years of age. In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established the fact of carnal knowledge. It is likewise beyond dispute that ―AAA‖ was only 11 years of age at the 144 time she was raped. Her Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on November 26, 1992. The lower courts therefore correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The present petition denied.
People v. Hadji Socor Candidia [G.R. No. 191263. October 16, 2013.] FACTS: Hadji Candidia was bound for Butuan City on board the Cebu Pacific Airline. At around 6:30 in the morning, upon her entry at the departure area, prosecution witness Marilyn Trayvilla, while performing her duty as a female frisker, frisked the accused Candidia and noticed something unusual and thick in the area of the latter‘s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia‘s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang.
The accused, on the other hand, has another story to tell. She alleged that Trayvilla and Bagsican held her arms and asked her if she was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two women said that she might be carrying gold or jewelries. Despite her denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room and told her she might be carrying shabu. She again denied the allegation but the two women told her to undress. When she asked why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she was having her menstrual period. Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They later frisked her body but failed to recover anything. Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from her. At this moment, Cadidia became afraid and called her relatives for money. Her relatives arrived at the airport at around 1 o‘clock in the afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them because she has already been brought to Camp Crame for drug examination. She called her relatives again to ask forP200,000.00 and to bring the amount at 7 o‘clock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived on the agreed day and time but managed to bring only P6,000.00 which the police officers found unacceptable. As a consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings.
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After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. 145 Thereafter, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses‘ Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear. Another contradiction pressed on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room, they immediately handed him the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the prosecution‘s witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed to affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the alleged contradictory statements of the prosecution‘s witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they pertained only to minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the more important matter was the positive identification of the accusedappellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drug. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the conflicting testimonies given by the witnesses. HELD: The contention of the accused is untenable. The Supreme Court ruled that in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, the SC affirmed the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.
Upon review, the SC found no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang,
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in turn, testified that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room, they handed to him what was taken from the accused. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and 146 unbroken recollection of events. Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses‘ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses‘ testimonies corroborate one another on material details surrounding the commission of the crime. Indeed, travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
People v. Jose y Lagua [G.R. No. 200053. October 23, 2013.] FACTS: This case involves the accused being charged and convicted for the crime of kidnapping. The RTC as well as the CA affirmed this conviction. The accused questions the validity of these convictions in which the Supreme Court affirmed. However, an issue regarding the validity of imposing liability for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping was further looked into by the court in this case for the reason that the RTC and CA differed in their rulings regarding the amount to be awarded as civil indemnity. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the accused is liable for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping and if so, how much is apt for civil indemnity HELD: The petition was denied. In People v. Bautista, the court ruled the following amounts to be imposed: PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime warrants the imposition of death penalty; PhP 75,000 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, without need of proof; and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
Even though the penalty of death was not imposed, the civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 was still proper because the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. This Court ordered Bulauitan to pay Editha P75,000.00 as civil indemnity37 and an additional P35,000.00 as moral damages. The CA‘s imposition of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages was sustained, but Mangahas was held to only be solidarily liable with Bulauitan up to
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the amount ofP25,000.00 awarded by the RTC. The difference of P75,000.00 between the RTC and the CA‘s awards shall be Bulauitan‘s sole liability. The additional liabilities for civil 147 indemnity and damages, which this Court imposes solely upon Bulauitan, are in accordance with Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Century Chinese v. Ling Na Lau [G.R. No. 188526. November 11, 2013.] FACTS: Ling Na Lau, respondent, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy, and, is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap by the Intellectual Property Office for a period of ten years. Ping Na Lau, her representative, wrote a letter to NBI requesting assistance for an investigation on drugstores selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the appearance of their products.
Petitioners were among of the listed drugstores which were selling fake whitening soaps. Agent Furing and Esmael conducted an investigation and able to confirm Ping‘s complaint that such counterfeit products are being sold to several drugstores. Esmael added that the products seized were different from the genuine quality of the original whitening soap. Agent Furing applied for search warrants before the RTC against the petitioners for violation of unfair competition and trademark infringement. RTC granted and issued the Search Warrant for trademark infringement and unfair competition against petitioners. Petitioners filed for Motion to Quash the Search Warrants contending that it violated the rule against forum shopping, that Benjamin Yu is the sole owner and distributor of TOP-GEL and not Ling Na Lau, and there was the existence of a prejudicial question which was a pending case against Ling Na Lau. Respondent filed her opposition arguing the non-existence of forum shopping; that the pending case is immaterial and irrelevant in this case; and that Yu cannot be considered as the sole owner and distributor of TOP-GEL. RTC issued its Order sustaining the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants finding that the issuance of the questioned search warrants were not supported by probable cause, hence, the grant of the Motion to Quash. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Respondent then appealed with the CA. CA rendered its decision by granting the appeal and setting aside the order issued by the RTC. CA found that the search warrants were applied for and issued for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal actions which are to be instituted against petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It also ruled that
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the basis for the applications for issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and unfair competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; 148 that respondent was the registered owner of the said trademark, which gave her the right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it b y seeking assistance from the NBI. Petitioners filed its motion for reconsideration but CA denied it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search warrants. HELD: We find no merit in the petition. SDEITC The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155 and 168, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition.
Thus, we agree with the CA that the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies. A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched." And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. The petition for review is DENIED.
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149
People v. Castillo y Alignay [G.R. No. 190180. November 27, 2013.] FACTS: The trial court convicted Castillo Marissa Castillo y Castillo of violation of Section 5 and Section 11 (sale and possession of illegal drugs, respectively), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Castillo seeks to appeal the Decision.
On or about October 24, 2006, Castillo not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Thaddeus Santos, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containin g four centigram (0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. PO2 Santos had arrested accused Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then put markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the Castillo. The accused was brought to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from Castillo were brought to crime laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu. Castillo argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation. ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not properly established HELD:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
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First, it is important to note that Castillo did not raise the issue of the alleged non-compliance 150 with Section 21 when the case was still being heard in the trial court. This assertion must be argued before the trial court and not on appeal for the first time. Nevertheless, the Court passed upon this question considering the gravity of its consequences on the liberty of Castillo. We take this opportunity to reiterate jurisprudence which states that non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Second, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses, to wit: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied.) Third, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of the seized drugs to be used in evidence must be complete and unbroken. We have defined "chain of custody" as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. We reiterated the importance of the chain of custody as a means of validating evidence in the recent case of People v. Del Rosario, where we held: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness‘ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
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Lastly, while testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential 151 when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substation and exchange. In other words, the exhibit‘s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering – without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. With regard to the first link in the chain of custody, the testimony of PO2 Santos confirms the fact that three heat-sealed plastic sachets each containing 0.04 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu were seized from Castillo during a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Santos, PO1 Chavez and an unnamed confidential informant. The seized drugs were immediately marked at the place where Castillo was apprehended. The illegal drugs seized from Castillo were then turned over to Police Senior Inspector Hoover SM Pascual (PSI Pascual), the team leader and investigator of the buy-bust operation, who prepared and signed a Memorandum16r equesting the laboratory examination of the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance previously marked by PO2 Santos as "MCA-1," "MCA-2" and "MCA-3," respectively. This document together with the marked specimens was then transmitted to the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office to determine if they contained dangerous drugs. As per Physical Sciences Report No. D-486-06E,17 signed by Police Senior Inspector Isidro L. Carino (PSI Carino), the qualitative examination of the contents of the three plastic sachets yielded a positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same marked specimens were later identified by PO2 Santos in open court as the same items that he seized from Castillo when confronted with them by Prosecutor Conrado Tolentino (Tolentino). After PO2 Santos positively identified them, Prosecutor Tolentino then requested the trial court that the three plastic sachets containing shabu be marked as Exhibits "G," "G-1," and "G-2," respectively.18 From the foregoing narrative, it is readily apparent that the other links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs have been sufficiently established. In the case at bar, we concur with Castillo‘s assertion that the arresting officers involved were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with Castillo‘s argument does not sway us towards granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
People v. Roberto Velasco [G.R. No. 190318. November 27, 2013.] 152
FACTS: Roberto Velasco was charged by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA of three (3) counts of rape as charged in Crim. Case Nos. 3579-M-02, 3580-M-02, and 3581-M-02 beyond reasonable doubt and of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in Crim. Case No. 145-M-03.
Velasco was arraigned for the two charges of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002 and 3581M-2002; and one charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 on February 3, 2003 to which he entered a plea of not guilty on all charges. He was later arraigned on March 12, 2003 for the third charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 to which he likewise pleaded "not guilty." Velasco now wants to appeal the case questioning the validity of his warrantless arrest. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Velasco is stopped from assailing the validity of his arrest if he fails to do so before arraignment HELD: With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellant‘s warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of consideration.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if Velasco‘s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to Velasco‘s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
People vs. Montevirgen [G.R. No. 189840. December 11, 2013.] FACTS: On July 18, 2005, P/Supt. Valerio of the Makati City Police received a report from an informant
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
that appellant Montevirgen was selling shabu in Malvar Street, barangay South Cembo, Makati City. Based on this information, he immediately formed a buy-bust team. The buy-bust team went 153 to the said location but could not locate appellant. The next day, the team returned and found the appellant as the informer introduced him to the team as buyers. Shortly thereafter, the team was able to buy 200 Pesos worth of Shabu from the appellant. Appellant was then taken to Police HQ where he was booked and the evidence, after being subject to laboratory exam, tested positive for Shabu. In his defense, Montevirgen avers that on the night of the supposed arrest, he was at home, sleeping with his wife and child until several armed men entered his house, told him to board the vehicle and showed him the packet containing the white crystalline substance. The RTC and the CA were not convinced. Hence this petition stating among others the Police officers' noncompliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under RA 9165. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the accused was validly searched after his arrest in flagrante delicto HELD: Yes. The two plastic sachets containing shabu subject of the case for the illegal possession of drugs were found in appellant's pocket after a search on his person was made following his arrest in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu . It must be remembered that according to Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant.
Antiquera y Codes v. People [G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013.] FACTS: While several police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City during midnight, they saw two unidentified men rush out of a certain house who immediately boarded a jeep. They suspected that a crime had been committed and so they approached the house. Upon reaching the house, they peeked through a partially opened door and saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and lighter. Thereafter, the police introduced themselves and arrested Antiquera and his companion, Cruz. One of the police officers also inspected the immediate surroundings and was able to confiscate several drug paraphernalia. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest on the accused 1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest gave the police officers the right to search the living 2. room and seize the paraphernalia found there HELD:
