INTERPRETATION OF STATUES Words spoken or written are the means of communication. Where they are possible of giving one and only one meaning there is no problem. But where there is a possibility of two meanings, a problem arises and the real intention is to be sorted out. The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the Legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Salmond definition – The term interpretation or construction means the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.1 Cross in his book “Statutory interpretation” defines :- Interpretation is the process by which the courts determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them”. Cooley and Crawford in “Constitutional Limitations” referred in In re sea customs Act, AIR 1963 :- Interpretation differs from construction in that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is.the sense which their author is intended to convey and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in spirit though not within the letter of the law”. In Commissioner of wealth Tax v Hastmatunnisa Begum (1989) – The judges believed that the word “construction” is one step better than “interpretation”. In United states v F.W.Keitel – “ Justice White stated that “on common usage interpretation and construction are usually understood as having the same significance”. STATUTE The word statute is derived from the latin verb Statuere which means to be made or to set up. A "Statute" is the will of the Sovereign Legislature according to which the Governments function. The executive must act and the Judiciary in the course of Administration of Justice must apply the law as laid down by the said legislative will. Very often occasions will arise where the courts will be called upon to interpret the words, phrases and expressions used in the statute. In the course of such Interpretation, the Courts have, over the centuries, laid down certain guidelines which have come to be known as "Rules of Interpretation of Statutes" .More often than not the Statutes contain "Statement of Objects and Reasons" and also a "Preamble" both of which provide guidelines for Interpreting the true meaning of the words and expressions used in the Statute. Judges have to interpret statutes and apply them.
1
Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th edition, p.152
A statute is an edict of the legislature and the conventional way of interpretating or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. (ICAI V. Price Warehouse, AIR 1998). The first and primary rule of construction, stated by Gajendragadkar .J, “is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. (Padmasundararoa v state of TN 2002). According to Blackstone. “the most fair and rational method for interpreting a statue is by exploring the intention of the legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are ‘either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law’. A statute is a will of legislature conveyed in the form of text. The Constitution of India does not use the term ‘Statute’ but it uses the term ‘law’. ‘Law’ includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law. [Article 13 (3) (a) of the constitution]. DUTIES OF JUDGES 1. To interpret the laws 2. To bring out the intention of the legislature without changing the meaning. 3. Duties of judges is to expound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule. 4. Judges cannot interpret the statutues in the light of their views as to policy; but they can adopt a purposive interpretation if they find in the statute read as a whole or in the material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of parliament’s purpose or policy.(Sundaram pillai v Pattabiram 1985) 5. Judge is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. (Idul Hasan v Rajendra Kumar Jain) RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUES The Superior Courts have formulated certain principles of interpretation to find out the real intent of the Legislature. These principles may be enumerated as follows:1. LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION In construing a statutory provision the first and the foremost rule of construction is that of literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is, what does the provision say? The Courts are bound by the mandate of the Legislature and once it has expressed its intention in words which have a clear significance and meaning, the Court is precluded from speculating. If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, the other rules of construction of statutes need not be called into aid. They are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear. Statues often contains a "definitions" section, which explicitly defines the most important
terms used in that statute. However, some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or fail to define a particular term. The literal rule, which is also known as the plain meaning rule, attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself. According to this rule, when a word does not contain any definition in a statute, it must be given its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning. If the word is clear, it must be applied, even though the intention of the legislature may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means. This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges are not supposed to legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal wording. Literal rule of interpretation is one of the oldest methods of interpretation adopted by the Judiciary CASE LAWS :In Kannailala Sur vs Parammindhi Sadhu Khan 1957, J Gajendragadkar says that if the words used in statute are capable of only one construction then it is not open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged objective and policy of the act.. In M V Joshi vsM V Shimpi, AIR 1961, relating to Food and Adulteration Act, it was contented that the act does not apply to butter made from curd. However, SC held that the word butter in the said act is plain and clear and there is no need to interpret it differently. Butter is butter whether made from milk or curd. ADVANTAGES 1. Literal rule of interpretation being a traditional rule of interpretation is often advocated by jurists of the plain meaning rule who claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in legislative or political issues. T 2. they also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive access to secondary sources. 3. It is also argued, that extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. 4. It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation 5. It encourages precision in drafting. 6. Restricts the role of the judge 7. Provides no scope for judges to use their own opinions or prejudices 8. Upholds the separation of powers 9. Recognises Parliament as the supreme law maker DISADVANTAGES
1. Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. Words are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives. 2. Sometimes the use of the literal rule may defeat the intention of Parliament. For instance, in the case of Whiteley vs Chappel (1868; LR 4 QB 147), the court came to the reluctant conclusion that Whiteley could not be convicted of impersonating "any person entitled to vote" at an election, because the person he impersonated was dead. Using a literal construction of the relevant statutory provision, the deceased was not "a person entitled to vote." This, surely, could not have been the intention of Parliament. However, the literal rule does not take into account the consequences of a literal interpretation, only whether words have a clear meaning that makes sense within that context. If Parliament does not like the literal interpretation, then it must amend the legislation. 3. It obliges the courts to fall back on standard common law principles of statutory interpretation. Legislation is drawn up with these principles in mind. However, these principles may not be appropriate to constitutional interpretation, which by its nature tends to lay down general principles. It is said that it seems wrong to parcel the Constitution as if it were a Finance Act. 4. Clearly, the literal approach has another disadvantage in that one judge’s literal interpretation might be very different from another’s. Casey says: “What may seem plain to one judge may seem perverse and unreal to another.” 5. It ignores the limitations of language. 6. To place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship. 7. Judges have tended excessively to emphasize the literal meaning of statutory provisions without giving due weight to their meaning in wider contexts. 8. There can be disagreement as to what amounts to the ordinary or natural meaning 9. Creates awkward precedents which require Parliamentary time to correct 10. undermines public confidence in the law 2. GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION Argument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in interpreting a statute. However, if the language so permits, it is open to the Court to give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislation. A Court has the power to depart from the grammatical construction, if it finds that strict adherence to the grammatical construction will defeat the object the Legislature had In view. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning. If the word only has one meaning, and applying this meaning would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.
This rule of statutory interpretation allows a shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if the overall content of the document demands it. This rule is a modification of the literal rule. It states that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, then the court should look for another meaning of the words to avoid that absurd result. The rule was evolved by Parke B (who later became Lord Wensleydale) in Becke v Smith, 1836 and in Grey v Pearson, 1857, who stated, "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther." APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE Golden rule may be employed in two ways – 1. NARROW SENSE 2. WIDER SENSE This rule may be used in two ways. NARROW SENSE :It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves. For example, imagine there may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under the literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby. C.L :- LEE V KNAPP 1967 where the interpretation of the word "stop" was involved. Under Road Traffic Act, 1960, a person causing an accident "shall stop" after the accident. In this case, the driver stopped after causing the accident and then drove off. It was held that the literal interpretation of the word stop is absurd and that the requirement under the act was not fulfilled because the driver did not stop for a reasonable time so that interested parties can make inquiries from him about the accident. WIDE SENSE :The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Bedford vs Bedford, 1935, is another interesting case that highlighted the use of this rule. It concerned a case where a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother's family, or the son's descendants. The mother had not made a will and under the Administration of Justice Act 1925 her estate would be inherited by her next of kin, i.e. her son. There was no ambiguity in the words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let the son who had murdered his mother benefit from his crime. It was held that the
literal rule should not apply and that the golden rule should be used to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. The court held that if the son inherits the estate that would amount to profiting from a crime and that would be repugnant to the act. Thus, the Golden rule implies that if a strict interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd result then the meaning of the words should be so construed so as to lead to the avoidance of such absurdity. A further corollary to this rule is that in case there are multiple constructions to effect the Golden rule the one which favors the assessee should always be taken. This rule is also known as the Rule of Reasonable Construction. Advantages 1. This rule prevents absurd results in some cases containing situations that are completely unimagined by the law makers. 3. It focuses on imparting justice instead of blindly enforcing the law. 4. Errors in drafting can be corrected immediately Disadvantages 1. The golden rule provides no clear means to test the existence or extent of an absurdity. It seems to depend on the result of each individual case. Whilst the golden rule has the advantage of avoiding absurdities, it therefore has the disadvantage that no test exists to determine what is an absurdity. 2. This rule tends to let the judiciary overpower the legislature by applying its own standards of what is absurd and what it not. 3.Judges are able to add or change the meaning of statutes and thereby become law makers infringing the separation of powers.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 1. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable. 2. It may rather become operative than null i.e., to uphold the constitutionality if statutes whenever it can rationally be done. 3. The courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. 4. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative ‘on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 5. It is an application of this principle that courts while pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute start with a presumption in favor of constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the statute within the competence of the legislature.2 6. Therefore, whenever alternative constructions are possible the court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted and not to that which would put hindrances or obstacles in its way.
2
Corporation of Calcutta v Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107
7. If two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would make it intra vires and other ultra vires, the court must lean to that construction which would make the operation of the section intra vires. 8. In the field of interpretation, the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part of it with a purpose and legislative intention is that every part of statute should have effect. It may not be correct to say that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or without any purpose to serve, unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the statute and having regard to the object and purpose sought to be achieved by it ( Sankar Ram and co v Kasi Naiker, 2003) 9. The importance of the principle can be judged from the fact there is hardly any reported decision, where a statute may have been declared void for sheer vagueness, although theoretically it may be possible to reach such a conclusion in case of ‘absolute intractability of the language used or when ‘it is impossible to resolve the ambiguity,3 ie. When the language is absolutely meaningless. 10. As laid down by FAREWELL.J., “unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning, and not to declare them void for uncertainty”. 11. Lord Denning, approving Farewell said that “But when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity”. (Fawcett properties v buckingham County council 1960) 12. Lord Dunedin, “It is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be operative, and not inept, and nothing short of impossibility should in my judgement allow a judge to declare a statute unworkable. (Murray v IRC, Tinsukhia Electric Supply co. ltd v State of Assam). The principle was reiterated by him in a later case where he observed: “A Statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof of a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that attainable. (Whitney v IRC) 13. If the choice is between two interpretation, :the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. – Viscount Simon LC . 14. C.L :- K.B.Nagpur, M.D v Union of India, 2012 – In this case Section 7(1) of the Indian Medicine central council Act, 1970, which provides that the president, vice president or member of the central council shall continue until his successor shall have been duly elected or nominated. The supreme court, while repelling a challenge to the provision made under Article 14 and 16 of the constitution, observed that the provision 3
Kartar singh v State of Punjab – A law may not be declared void for mere vagueness, K.A.Abbas v union of India, It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
was made by parliament to take care of situations when election to the post of president, vice president or member is delayed for various reasons and upheld the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act applying the principle that a statute is to be construed so as to make it effective and operative as expressed in the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 15. C.L :- State of Gujarat and Anither v justice R.A.Mehta, 2013 – while interpreting section 3(1) of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, 1986, which provides that the Governor shall appoint the Lokayukta ‘after the consultation with chief justice of the High court’, the supreme court held that the opinion of the chief justice has to be given primacy and can be overlooked only for cogent reasons. C.L :- Avtar Singh v State of Punjab, the supreme court held that if the crime is committed against the Act the requirement of the Act must be followed. In this case, the appellant was convicted for theft of electricity under Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 but he contended that he could not be convicted because the process against him was not started as per the direction of section 50 of the Act. But the respondent contended that the punishment under Indian penal code must be imposed. The Supreme Court applied the principle of effectiveness rule and held that since the crime is against the Act and not against the Code, the requirement of Section 50 must be followed. As section 39 of the Act provides that an accused found guilty under section 39 of the Act has to be punished under Section 379 of the Indian penal code, the accused will have to be punished under IPC. Section 39. Theft of energy.—Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees, or with both: and if it is proved that any artificial means or means not authorized by the licensee exist for the abstraction, consumption or use of energy by the consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has been dishonestly caused by such consumer. Section 50. Institution of prosecutions.—No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against this Act or any rule, license or order thereunder, except at the instance of the Government 1[or a State Electricity Board] or an 2[Electrical Inspector], or of a person aggrieved by the same. Section 379. Punishment for theft.—whoever commits theft shall be pun-ished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. C.L :- Corporation of Calcutta v Liberty Cinema, the respondent was paying a sum of money as licensee fee to the appellant on the basis of yearly valuation. But on change in the basis of valuation by the appellant, the respondent challenged the change and SC held that on the interpretation of the statute on the basis of principle of effectiveness rule, it was clear that the expression fee used in section 548 of the Calcutta municipal corporation Act means a tax
because a fee means some amount of money in lieu of services rendered by someone who is absent in the present case, C.L :- Githa Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India, it was held that court would lean in favour of the constitutionality of the statutory provision where two meanings are possible. C.;L :- N.C.Singal v UOI, while interpreting the rules relating to seniority and promotion in medical services, the court observed : “The construction which makes the rule otiose or unworkable should be avoided where two constructions are possible and the court should lean in favour of the construction which would make the rule workable and further the purpose for which the rule is intended.
STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE Whenever the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is proper and legitimate to read that provision in its context. This means that the statute must be read as a whole. (Raghunath v State of Karnataka). 1. What was the previous state of the law, 2. Study of other statutes in pari materia i.e., on the same manner, if there any 3. What is the general scope of the statute 4. what is the mischief which it wanted to remedy, all this questions need to be considered. According to Lord Davey : Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to subject matter. (Canada Sugar refining co V R, 1898) According to Lord Greene, MR said:To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute the courts must look at the whole statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself and the method of construing statutes that I prefer, is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question : In the state , in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word.(Re Beide deceased, 1948) SIR John Nicholl :- “The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law maker, expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole.” It is the duty of a court to construe a statute justly. The maxim is lex injusta non est lex which means that an unjust law is no law at all. Where two views are possible, the view which satisfies the constitutional rights or requirements must be preferred. The same word used in different sections of a statute or even when used at different places in the same clause or section of a statute may bear different meaning. That is why it is necessary to read the statute as a whole in its context. It is spoken of construction ‘ex visceribus actus’. (within the four corners of the Act), the reason is that there should not be any contradiction between one part of a statute and another and also one part will help in the understanding of the another.
The rule is referred to as an elementary rule by Viscount Simonds and Subba rao compelling rule by Lord Somervell of Harrow Settled rule by B.K.Mukherjee. C.L :- D.Sanjeevaya v Election tribunal, in interpreting section 150 of the Representation of the people Act 1952 which requires that on the happening of a casual vacancy, ‘the election commission shall, by a notification in the official gazette call upon the assembly constituency to elect a person for the purpose of filling the vacancy, the supreme court pointed out that the section cannot be read in isolation without reference to part III of the Act which prescribes the machinery for calling in question the election of a returned candidate. It was held that on a reading of all these provisions together the duty of the elction commission to hold a bye election on resignation of a member imposed by section 10 need not be discharged forthwith if the election of that member has been called in question by an aelection petition in which the petitioner has also been claimed a relief that he should be deemed to be duly elected and the election commission can await the final adjudication of the election petition for if the petitioner succeeds in getting the declaration that he has been duly elected, there would be no necessity of holding any bye election. C.L:- Jennings v Kelly, it was held that the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section. The section must be construed as a whole whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. C.L:- Ajay Maken v Adesh Kumar Gupta and Anr, the court in this case held that section 82(b) of the representation of people Act, 1951, on a plain reading, seems to require that all candidates against whom allegations of commission of corrupt practice are made in the petition must be made parties to the election petition but the provision must be interpreted in the context and scheme of the Act. When interpreted in the context of sections 80,81,83,84 and 100 of the Act, it is seen that the provision requires that the returned candidate, his election agent or any other person committing a corrupt practice with the consent of either the returned candidate or his election agent or any other agent commiting a corrupt practice falling within the scope of section 100(1)(d)(ii) of the Act, are to be made parties to the election petition. C.L :- State of Rajasthan v Leela Jain, the respondent made certain unauthorized constructions in jaipur and the municipal authority ordered the matter to be compounded by the payment of a fine. An aggrieved person moved the state government under section 4(1) of the Rajasthan city municipal appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950, and the state government set aside the order of the municipal authority. The High court, however, held that the state government had no jurisdiction to interfere. Setting aside the order of the High court, the supreme court held that :
“ The purpose of the Act was to provide a uniform appellate authority as appeals lay to different authorities in different cities of Rajasthan. Under Section 3, if the appeal was provided for by a municipal Act, the appeal was to be disposed of by the commissioner, and under Section 4, the order of the commissioner, and the order of a municipal authority which was not subject to an appeal, were subject to revision by the state government…”. C.L :- Workmen v Dimakuchi tea estate, on the question whether the dispute in relation to aperson who was not a workman within the meaning of the Act still fell within the scope of section 2(k) , it was held : the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and the scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and the provisions of the Act.
CASUS OMISSUS According to Francis J McCarffrey: It is the rule of statutory construction that a casus omissus (i.e., a case omitted from the language of the statue, but within the general scope of the statute and which appears to have omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen) cannot be supplied by the courts. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (Mohan and state of Maharashtra) This principle says that a matter which should have been provided, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction’ – Kanta devi v UOI. It is a well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or rewrite a provision which is plain and unambiguoys. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute or any statutory provision is the determinative factor of legislative intent of policy makers. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpretation of statures is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal, if deemed necessary. (Padma sundara Rao v State of TN.) C.L :- Ramesh Mehta v Sanwal Chand Singhvi, AIR 2004 In this case the question was if ;whole number of members; is construed as ‘whole number of elected members’ whether it would amount to casus omissus, it was held that although a court cannot supply casus omissus, it is equally cleat that it should not interpret a statute so as to create a casus omissus when there is really none. The court found no merit in the argument that if the words are construed as;whole number of elected members; it would amount to supplying casus omissus.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS Where there are general words of description, following an enumeration of particular things, such general words are to be construed distributively, reddendo singular singulis; and if the general words will apply to some things and not others, the general words are to be applied to those things to which they will, and not to those to which they will not apply; that rule is beyond all controversy. (M.Neil v Crommelin) Ex:- “ I devise and bequesth all my real and personal property to ‘A’ will be construed reddendo singular singulis by applying ‘devise; to ‘real’ property and ‘bequeath’ to personal property. The different portions of a sentence , or different sentences are to be referred respectively to the other portion or sentences, to which we can see they respectively relate, even if strict grammatical construction should demand otherwise. This rule has been applied in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads : “Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the president. It was held by the supreme court that the word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’ to ‘Amendment’. (Kotteshware Vittal Kamth v K Rangaapa Baliga )
EJUSDEM GENERIS According to the rule of ejusdem generis, when particular words pertaing to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, they are construed as limited to the things of the same kind as those specified. Ejusdem generis is a latin expression which means ‘of the same kind’, for example, where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed. In other words, it means words of similar class. According to Blacks law dictionary, the principle of ejusdem generis is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. It is a canon of statutory construction that where general words follow, the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general wirds will be construed as applying only to things of same general class as those enumered ( Parakh foods Ltd V State of AP) This rule applies under the following situations : 1. When the statute contains an enumeration of specific words 2. The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category, 3. That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration
4. The general terms follow the enumeration and 5. There is no indication of different legislative intent. This rule reflects an attempt ‘to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of other rules of interpretation that all words in an statute are given eggect, if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. The rule of ejusdem generi has to be applied with care and caution. This is not an inviolable rule of law, but it is only a permissible inference, in the absence of any indication to the contrary. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a canon of construction like many other rules which gives way to the clear intention of the legislature. This rule is a facte of noscitur a sociis. It apples only when there is no contrary intention. C.L :- Siddheswari Cotton mills Pvt Limited v UOI, 1989 In construing the words ‘any other person’ in section 2(f) (v) of the central excises and salt act, 1944, this rule was applied. This section defined ‘manufactured’ in relation to goods in Utem number 19-I of the schedule to the central excise tariff Act, 1985, to include ‘bleachingm mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water proofing, rubberizing, shrink proofing, organdie processing or any other process;. It was held by the supreme court that the processes enumerated contemplate processes which import change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. Then ‘any other processes’ in the section must share one or other of these incidents which constitute manufacture in the extensed sense.
