India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 2004

India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency Author(s): Rabindra Mishra , Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September/October 2004), pp. 627-646 Published by: University of California Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.627 . . Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.627 Accessed: 21/06/2014 20:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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INDIA’S ROLE IN NEPAL’S MAOIST INSURGENCY Rabindra Mishra

Abstract This article examines India-Nepal relations, namely, India’s role in Nepal’s ongoing Maoist insurgency. It argues that the insurgency’s trajectory is heavily influenced by transboundary links and should be viewed in the context of India’s role in shaping the past 50 years of Nepal’s political history.

Introduction The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. —Hans Morgenthau, The Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

Nepal is in the midst of arguably the most successful Maoist insurgency the world has witnessed in recent decades. The so-called People’s War, started by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) in 1996 as a small armed movement in four remote districts (Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha, and Sindhuli), has now spread to all of the country’s 75 districts, taking the lives of over 9,000 people. The Maoists, who appear to model themselves on Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas, have shaken the country’s 14-yearold, multiparty democracy to its very foundation. Following the conspicuous failure of the police to contain the insurgency, the army was mobilized from late 2001, with little effect. The second ceasefire, declared in January 2003, collapsed after seven months, and a resolution of the crisis does not ap pear in sight. Political commentators such as Deepak Thapa have observed Rabindra Mishra holds an MSc in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and works as a Senior Broadcast Journalist with the BBC World Service. He is grateful to Dr. David Robson, Dr. Sudipta Kaviraj, Dr. Surya P. Subedi, Dr. Seira Tamang, Dr. Pratyoush Onta, Dr. Saubhagya Shah, and Sudheer Sharma for their highly constructive inputs. Email: [email protected]/[email protected] . 0004-4687, electronic electronic ISSN 1533-838X. Asian Survey, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 627–646, ISSN 0004-4687, © 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

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that the conflict has evolved into the most serious internal crisis facing the nation-state of Nepal since its founding in the mid-eighteenth century. 1 This could not be more true. Given the magnitude of the crisis, the exploration of its causes and continued success has become a subject of interest to commentators and scholars in Nepal and beyond. Popular wisdom holds that the insurgency is a direct result of the increasing despondency felt by the poor and the socially marginalized in the country. While there is an element of truth in these prevailing analyses, evidence suggests that the underlying causes of the insurgency’s origins, rapid growth, and continuing success are far more complex. My study will focus not on the causes of its origins or domestic factors relating to its success but on the insurgency’s transboundary links, which have heavily influenced its trajectory. This crucial aspect has been subject to little scholarly scrutiny to date. As noted by scholars such as Saubhagya Shah, the epicenter of the insurgency—the Rapti Zone in mid-western Nepal—is not the most backward region in the country. He argues that “if social and economic marginalisation alone were responsible for the emergence of the communist revolt, the hill districts of Karnali, Seti and Mahakali zones would be far more likely candidates, not only because of their grinding poverty and chronic food shortage, but also because of the nature of their terrain and their remoteness from state centres.”2 Thus, it would be wrong to explain the causes of the Maoists’ continuing success only in terms of internal political, social, and economic factors. What, then, has sustained the insurgency so effectively for so long? Departing from the popular analytical tradition, it will be argued in this study that the answer should be sought in Nepal’s inter-state relations with its giant neighbor India and India’s role in Nepal’s domestic politics. Nepal is a land-locked country, surrounded by India on three sides. The remaining northern one is separated from the economic might of China by the Himalayas. This geopolitical situation forces Nepal to be totally dependent on India for trade, commerce, and access to the sea. Without India’s cooperation, Nepal’s engagement with the rest of the world and quest for stability and economic development will not bear much fruit. This allows Delhi to play a manipulative role in Nepali politics to serve India’s interests. For example, India played a major role in the removal in 1951 of Nepal’s 104-year-old Rana dynasty, the continuation for 30 years of a partyless monarchical rule, and the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. It is important to understand 1. Deepak Thapa, “The Maobadi of Nepal,” in State of Nepal , eds. Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran (Lalitpur: Himal Books, 2002), p. 77. 2. Saubhagya Shah, “A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadows of the Legacy Raj,” in Himalayan “People’s War”: Maoist War in Nepal , ed. Michael Hutt (London: Christopher and Hurst, forthcoming).

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the political crisis Nepal is currently facing within the historical context of India’s role in Nepali politics, rather than only as a phenomenon nurtured at home by political, social, and economic factors. In what follows, an overview of relevant Indian-Nepali relations since India’s independence in 1947 will present evidence cataloging the extent of India’s role in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. Then, an analysis will explain why India has continually interfered in the internal affairs of Nepal. Finally, it will be argued that India’s role will be crucial in any future resolution of the Maoist crisis in Nepal. As countries around the world continue to act in their national interest rather than follow idealistic slogans, Nepal should reflect on its shortcomings in its dealings with India, instead of seeking to blame Delhi for interfering in Nepali affairs.

Historical Perspective The decisive battles in [the power] struggle had not been fought in the hills of Nepal but in the halls of New Delhi. ––Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival

From 1846 to 1951, Nepal was ruled by a dynasty of hereditary prime ministers, that is, the Rana family, and the monarchy was merely kept as a figurehead institution to be manipulated at the rulers’ whims. This dynasty maintained cordial relations with the British raj to its south and retained supremacy in Nepal with a policy of international isolation. When the British departed from India in 1947, the Ranas were concerned about their future. A growing anti-Rana movement of exiled Nepali opposition groups, based on Indian territory, and the establishment of a democratic regime in India put increasing pressure on the Ranas to open up their polity. Though India recognized Nepal’s sovereignty, Delhi was determined to continue with British “Himalayan frontier policy” by keeping Nepal in India’s sphere of influence. Nepal, which lies on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, shares 500 miles of open border with India. From the British raj onward, Indian rulers have considered the Himalayas to be a “second frontier,” protecting India from “military expeditions and undesirable influences” from the north (read: China).3 To keep Nepal under Indian influence, especially in the context of China’s declared objective to “liberate” Tibet just across the Himalayas, they felt it was becoming more important for India to strike a deal with the rulers in Nepal than to please those Nepalis who, from Indian soil, were fighting for democracy. At the same time, the Ranas were under pressure to 3. Surya P. Subedi, “Indo-Nepal Relations: The Causes of Conflict and Their Resolution,” in Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia, eds. Subrata K. Mitra and Dietmar Rothermund (Delhi: Manohar, 1997), p. 220.


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sustain their regime. Against this background, India “drafted” the 1950 India Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was signed “virtually as pro posed” in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950.4 Although the Rana regime that signed the treaty collapsed within a year, the treaty survives even today. It provides a framework for what is described as a “special relationship” between the two countries and sets out various provisions relating to security, economic, and commercial matters, in a manner conducive to Indian interests.5 Soon after the 1950 treaty was signed, events that would directly affect the security interests of India took place across the Himalayas. China’s October 1950 attack on Tibet greatly worried Delhi, particularly as the Tibetan plateau was considered a buffer state between the two countries. Now, China’s frontier extended up to Nepal, which had been listed by Sun Yat-sen in 1924 as one of the territories that had been “lost” by China. 6 Any further Chinese military ambition southward would directly expose India to an emerging communist power. Meanwhile, with the help of India, Nepal’s King Tribhuvan, Crown Prince Mahendra, and his eldest son Birendra sought refuge at the Indian embassy in Kathmandu on November 6, 1950, and were flown to Delhi four days later. After King Tribhuvan left the palace, the Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher deposed him, placing the king’s four-year-old, second grandson, Gyanendra, on the throne. But this enthronement was never recognized by the international community. India feared that the instability in Nepal could further jeopardize its own security, prompting Prime Minister Nehru to declare in the Indian Parliament on December 6 that India could not “risk her own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier [Himalayas] to be crossed, or otherwise weakens our frontier.”7 In this context, a com promise deal for Nepal’s political future was envisaged by India, which Nehru called a “middle way.” The deal included a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and an interim government with “popular” (i.e., Nepali Congress Party) representation, but with a Rana prime minister and recognition of King Tribhuvan. Surprisingly, the three Nepali parties involved in the deal were neither consulted properly by India nor given a chance to sit together and discuss the matter. All communication took place through Prime Minister

4. Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 185. 5. See S. D. Muni, India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992), pp. 188–92, for the entire text of the treaty and the letter exchanged with it. 6. Michael Yahuda, “The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism” in Asian Nationalism, ed. Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 27. 7. See A. S. Bhasin, ed., Documents on Nepal’s Relations with India and China, 1949–1966 (Bombay: Academic Books, 1970), p. 25.


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Nehru, who never spoke about terms concretely.8 Nevertheless, the “Delhi compromise” was agreed upon by all parties, and the king and the Nepali Congress leaders returned to Kathmandu to form the new government on February 7, 1951. This is how, to put it in Kumar’s words, India “midwifed” the birth of democracy in Nepal.9 India’s influence in Nepal’s domestic politics has remained strong to this day. In the early years of Nepal’s first experiment with democracy, Indian advice was solicited by Kathmandu on virtually all political, administrative, security, and foreign policy matters. However, with the death of King Tribhuvan on March 13, 1955, and the succession of his son, Mahendra, Nepal’s domestic and international politics underwent a massive transformation. In an effort to reduce the country’s excessive dependence on India, Mahendra took a num ber of measures: the Nepali government established diplomatic ties with China and several other countries; issued an order that the medium of instruction in all schools should be Nepali, effectively barring Indians from teaching jobs; barred all foreigners—again, aimed indirectly at Indians—from purchasing fixed property in Nepal; and requested that India withdraw its military mission from Kathmandu. B. P. Koirala, who headed the government after his party, the Nepali Congress, emerged victorious in the country’s first general election in 1959, tried to follow King Mahendra’s policy of “equal friendship” with all countries, es pecially India and China. However, his strong relationship with Nepal’s southern neighbor was apparent on several occasions. 10 When after little over a year, on December 15, 1960, King Mahendra took over the reins of power by dismissing and arresting the Koirala ministry, one of the charges directed against Koirala was that his government had encouraged anti-national elements to a large degree, clearly hinting at India and its supporters. The dismissal shocked Nehru, who described the king’s action as a reversal of the democratic process in Nepal. However, India once again appeared to be clearly guided more by the desire to secure its own national self-interest than by its public commitment to democracy in Nepal. Within six months of the dismissal of the Koirala government, India had signed four aid agreements 8. Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad Koiralako Aatmabrittanta (Audio auto biography of Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala), recorded and edited by Ganesh Raj Sharma (Lalitpur: Jagadamba Press, 1998), p. 146. 9. Dhruba Kumar, “Asymmetric Neighbours,” in Nepal’s India Policy (Kathmandu: Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, 1992), p. 5. 10. Cf. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival , pp. 219–31; Ramakant, Nepal-China and India (Nepal-China Relations) (Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1976), pp. 111–61; S. K. Jha, “Policy Toward India: Quest for Independence,” in Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy, ed. S. D. Muni (Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977), pp. 209–10; Shiva Bahadur Singh, Indo-Nepalese Relations: Discord and Harmony (Varanasi: Ganga Kaveri Publishing House, 1994), pp. 53–56.


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with Nepal,11 and after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, during which Nepal was supposed to have followed a carefully neutral line, New Delhi ordered all antiroyal Nepali exiles in India to cease their activities. These actions virtually ensured the continuity of the king’s absolute rule, and it lasted for the next 30 years, primarily as India found it conducive to support the monarchical regime. The regime only collapsed in 1990 as a direct result of its decision to ignore the wishes of New Delhi in what was, superficially, a trade and transit dispute. Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul have argued that Nehru’s approach to foreign policy can be divided into two periods: from late 1946 to 1954, idealism was more prominent than realism, while from 1954 to 1964, as challenges mounted to India’s national security, realism became progressively salient. 12 However, in dealings with Nepal, Nehru’s policy always seems to have been governed by realism—idealism only being used as a veil to cover the “sins” of inter-state relations. If he struck deals in the late 1940s with the crisis-ridden Ranas to achieve favorable conditions for India, he did exactly the same in the early 1960s with the royals. This approach continued to be the norm after Nehru’s death. King Mahendra wanted to ensure that the Indian government would not help the Nepali opposition politicians based in India, and New Delhi wanted to make sure that Nepal remained completely within its sphere of influence. It is argued that this must be the reason why the monarchy signed a “secret” arms supply agreement in January 1965. The agreement gave India first priority for supplying arms and ammunitions to Nepal, adding that Kathmandu would be obliged to consult Delhi while purchasing such materiel from India or transporting consignments through Indian territory.13 In 1968, Koirala and several other Nepali Congress leaders were released from jail in Nepal. They immediately fled to India where they once again planned for an armed revolt against the Nepali state. However, according to the “supreme leader” of the Nepali Congress, the late Ganesh Man Singh, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi not only ignored their request for arms but, after the 1975 declaration of the state of emergency in India, asked them to cease all their political activities. 14 Once again, India’s role proved instrumental in the unimpaired continuation of the monarchical Panchayat regime in Nepal. The real crisis for the regime arose in 1989 when India imposed a so-called economic embargo on Nepal after the two countries failed to reach an agreement 11. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival , p. 234. 12. Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116. 13. See Muni, Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy, pp. 196–98 (emphasis added), for the full text of the agreement. 14. Ganesh Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on April 28, 1997.


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on the renewal of trade and transit treaties. India closed down 19 of the 21 trade routes and 13 of the 15 transit routes through India used by Nepal, causing chaos in the day-to-day life of Nepalis. Superficially, the embargo was related to trade and transit issues, but the underlying cause was Nepal’s apparently hard-line moves to distance itself from Indian influence. For exam ple, in 1975, King Birendra proposed that Nepal be declared a “Zone of Peace,” and this was interpreted by India as Nepal’s attempt to ignore the basic security arrangements made by the two countries through the 1950 treaty. In 1987, Nepal tried to introduce a system of work permits for Indian nationals working in Nepal, and most importantly, in 1988, Nepal purchased arms that were delivered directly overland from China. India argued that Nepal should have consulted New Delhi under the 1950 treaty before purchasing the arms. However, Nepal insisted that the provision of the treaty did not require any consultation unless the import of arms was done in transit through India. This response did not satisfy India. In Nepal, all the mainstream political parties decided to launch a mass movement against the monarchy’s Panchayat system, blaming the “economic embargo” and the resultant hardship on citizens on flawed government policy. India backed the mass movement in Nepal in several ways: 207 members of the Indian Parliament appealed to the Indian government to help the restoration of democracy in Nepal; an all-party Nepal Fund was established to sup port the pro-democracy movement; and on January 5, 1990, in an address at a convention of opposition parties in Kathmandu, Chandra Shekhar, a senior leader of the ruling Janata Dal who later became prime minister of India, declared that while India could not give democracy to Nepal, India would stand by the Nepali people on the question of democracy and human rights. However, once again, India’s public commitment to Nepal’s democracy appears to have been an idealistic veil intended to cover its true intentions, which were focused on securing another crucial agreement with Nepal. On March 31, India forwarded a draft treaty proposal to Nepal that 1. forbade Nepal to enter into any military alliance with any other state or organization without prior consultation and agreement with India; 2. obliged Nepal to consult in advance with India when importing arms, training armed personnel, and raising additional military units; 3. gave India or its nationals first preference in Nepal’s development and industrial projects whenever Nepal sought foreign assistance for such purpose; and, 4. ensured India’s preferential involvement in exploiting water resources originating from shared rivers.15 15. See Kumar, “Asymmetric Neighbours,” pp. 144–47, for the full text of the draft proposal.


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According to the Nepali prime minister at the time, Marich Man Singh Shrestha, accepting these proposals would have enabled the regime to survive but the country would have lost its sovereignty completely.16 His argument may be true, given the fact that Nepal’s agreement to the proposal would have immediately restored day-to-day normality in the country, allowing the government to focus on suppressing the growing movement for multiparty democracy. But King Birendra decided instead to “give in” to the demands of the pro-democracy activists rather than “surrender the country’s sovereignty” to India.17 Even after the restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal, New Delhi’s attitude to its Himalayan neighbor remained resolutely unchanged, and it still continues to carve the path of Nepali politics as exemplified by the contemporary case of the Maoist insurgency.

India’s Role in the Insurgency India might have expected more from the Nepali democrats on the basis that Nepal’s democratic and communist movements were made possible only thanks to India’s support. However, its expectations may not have been met in the new political scenario that emerged after 1990, hence it may have decided to use the Maoists as a bargaining tool. —Puskar Gautam, a former Maoist commander who deserted the guerrilla war in 1999 and became a leading commentator on the Maoists’ strategy, Himal Khabarpatrika

On February 4, 1996, the Maoists submitted the now-famous 40-point demands to the Nepali government, and the top three demands directly related to India. The first demand proposed the removal of “all unequal stipulations and agreements” from the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The second urged the Nepali government to admit that the “anti-nationalist” India Nepal Tanakpur (hydro-electric) Agreement was “wrong,” and together with the Mahakali (river) Treaty, which incorporated the former, should be “nullified.” The third demand stipulated that the entire Nepal-India border should be systematically controlled, and vehicles with Indian number plates “should not be allowed free entry.” All of these were categorized as demands related to Nepal’s nationalism. However, today, they have rarely been an issue for the Maoists, and anti-India rhetoric is practically non-existent in their official documents. They still talk in general about Indian “hegemony” and the danger of “Sikkimization” (that is, Nepal becoming like Sikkim, which was merged into India in 1975). But these terms have been largely emptied of meaning by their

16. Marich Man Singh interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on July 23, 1997. 17. Ibid.


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constant use in nationalist rhetoric, primarily by the Nepali left and right. Hence, the essence of Nepal’s attitude toward India should be sought in deeds, not words. The Period of Suspicion

The public, press, and politicians first began to suspect a link between the Maoists and India after the Maoists’ lukewarm reaction to the India-Nepal Kalapani border dispute that grabbed national attention in 1998. The status of Kalapani, an arid mountainous region on the Nepal-India-China (Tibet) tri junction in Nepal’s northwest, where India is alleged to have been stationing its troops since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, was first reported in 1996. But it only became a national issue in 1998 after several follow-up reports on the subject. The dispute still continues. During the height of the controversy, in 1998, nationalistic sentiment in Nepal was used as political capital by several political parties—but not by the Maoists. Until then regarded as one of the most vocal critics of India, the Maoists were conspicuously absent from the whole saga. This fueled suspicion that the Maoist leadership had taken shelter in India and hence was not in a position to engage in any anti-India activities. In September that year, there were reports that Nepali and Indian Maoists had held a two-week-long secret meeting in the Indian city of Kolkata. By early 1999, concrete evidence surfaced regarding links between the Maoists and like-minded groups in India. On the third anniversary of the “People’s War” in Nepal, Indians and thousands of expatriate Nepalis staged a solidarity rally in the Indian capital, Delhi. Following the Delhi rally, suspicion in Nepal grew. Meanwhile, toward the end of 2000, anti-India sentiment swept the Himalayan Kingdom after some newspapers wrongly reported that the Indian film star Hritik Roshan had made insulting comments about Nepal and the Nepali people. Students rioted across the country—but the presence of the Maoistaffiliated All Nepal National Free Students’ Union (Revolutionary) was not evident. In early 2001, reports about the Nepali Maoists’ connections with the likeminded Indian Maoist organizations, the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), were gaining prominence in the Indian media. Quoting intelligence reports, the Times of India claimed that the PWG was planning to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone from Hyderabad to Kathmandu, taking Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand into its area of influence with the help of other outfits.18 Within two-and-a-half months of the above report, a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations 18. Cf. Kalyan Chaudhuri, “A Spurt in Maoist Attacks,” Frontline, April 28–May 11, 2001; Dipak Mishra, “Nepalese Extremists Being Trained in Bihar,” Times of India, April 16, 2001.


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of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was launched on July 1 to unify and coordinate the revolutionary process in the region. By now, there was no doubt left that the Nepali Maoists were receiving moral and materiel support from their counterparts across the border. However, Nepal’s suspicion that the top Maoists leaders had been living in India with New Delhi’s knowledge still remained to be substantiated by hard evidence. Such evidence is very unlikely to surface in the foreseeable future given the sensitivity of the matter. Interestingly, India’s attitude to Bhutan’s anti-establishment groups has remained diametrically opposite to its attitude toward Nepal’s anti-establishment groups. While Nepal’s anti-establishment politics has succeeded only with covert or overt Indian support, any sign of political activities on Indian soil that might be harmful to Bhutan, whose foreign and defense policies are guided by Delhi under the 1949 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries, have been immediately quashed. In 1997, India arrested Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, the founder of the Druk [Bhutanese] National Congress (DNC) and chairman of the United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD), and initiated extradition proceedings for his return to Bhutan’s capital, Thimpu. Currently, he is fighting extradition in Delhi and needs permission to travel outside the capital. The Beginning of Revelation

In August 2001, there was a dramatic report that the entire front rank of the Nepali communist leadership, including the main parliamentary opposition leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had met the Maoist chairman, Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), at Champasari, a village near Siliguri, in the Indian state of West Bengal. It was commented at the time that such a jamboree of top-ranking aboveground and underground Nepali communists in the socalled strategically important Chicken Neck could not have taken place without the knowledge of Indian security agencies. The argument appears valid, given that Siliguri and the adjoining areas are regarded as “a popular transit corridor for ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence] operatives,” and for extremist groups from the northeast of India, making the security agencies extra vigilant about activities in the region.19 A couple of extracts from two of the leading Nepali commentators below indicate Nepali thinking after the re ported Siliguri meeting: Since our southern pals claim to know everything that happens inside the smallest madarassa (Muslim religious schools) in the tarai [plains of Nepal], it is highly unlikely that they have not been aware of the honoured guests in their strategic 19. See Times of India, November 27, 2001.


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Chicken Neck. The fact that the Maoists have safe havens in Indian territory has affected their image back home. So was their rabid anti-Indianism just to hide the shame of being at the mercy of their benefactors?. . . So, what are the many Nepalis who believed Maoism was born out of their misery going to do now? 20 After the Siliguri meet between Prachanda and other Nepali communist leaders and its coincidence with the Indian minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Nepal, some Nepali analysts are already beginning to say a new kind of Delhi Agreement is in the making. In other words, it is not outrageous to surmise that the Indian ruling establishment is already making sure that whatever the outcome of the current talks between the Government and the Maoists, both parties will follow the former’s “sound” advice in letter and spirit.21

Following the Siliguri revelations, no one in Nepal, except perhaps Maoist supporters, was ready to believe that Delhi was unaware of the Maoist leaders’ whereabouts on Indian territory. It was also evident to Nepal that the Maoist problem would not be resolved without Indian cooperation. The possi ble difficulties faced by Nepal in seeking Indian cooperation were temporarily eased by the declaration of war on terrorism after September 11, 2001. Against this background late that month, the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, labeled the Maoists as terrorists and stated that India supported the Nepali government in its fight against them. For Nepal, this was certainly a welcome and surprising move by India. At the time of Mr. Singh’s declaration, Nepal itself had not labeled the Maoists as terrorists, and the Nepali government and the Maoists were engaged in political negotiations. It is unclear why India wanted to outdo even Nepal in attaching the terrorist label to the Maoists. This labeling by India did not easily correspond with the fact that during the peace talks, the leader of the Maoist negotiating team in Kathmandu, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, traveled to and from India. On the morning of November 13, he arrived from Delhi to participate in the third round of talks held later that day.22 The Maoists proceeded to walk away from the third round of talks, and ten days later, to the shock of the nation, attacked the army for the first time, killing 40 security personnel, including 14 soldiers, in the midwestern district of Dang. The government announced a state of emergency on November 26, mobilized the army, and for the first time officially declared the Maoists to be terrorists. The following day, India extended its support to the declaration of the state of emergency, deeming it a necessary step by a democratic government to preserve order. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Nirupama Rao, prom20. C. K. Lal, “The Chicken Neck,” Nepali Times, August 24–30, 2001. 21. Pratyoush Onta, “Neighbourly Interests in Nepali Troubles,” Kathmandu Post , September 7, 2001. 22. See, for example, Kantipur daily and Kathmandu Post , November 14, 2001.


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ised that India would not allow its territory to be used by those inimical to Ne palese interests. However, the top Maoist leaders appeared to be able to function without restriction in Delhi: they issued frequent statements and talked to the world media—from Delhi.23 During the state of emergency in Nepal, they also published their weekly, Janaawaj, from the Indian capital. Despite this, the Indian authorities continued to insist that they had no knowledge of the Maoist leaders’ presence in the capital, and that action would be taken if any evidence of their presence were found. Delhi’s public stand against the Maoists was matched by military assistance and an offer of two helicopters to Nepal. However, the feeling in Nepal was that it would have been a more significant gesture had India also driven the Maoists back into Nepal, where they could not evade the military and the donated helicopters so easily. In fact, when there was no external backing of any kind to another armed campaign against the Nepali state by the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) in the early 1970s, the Nepali government had easily quashed it: only seven “class enemies” were killed before the leaders were jailed and the movement ended. 24 The resumption of violence with the Maoists’ attack on the army prompted great international concern, especially as it happened only two months after September 11. Seizing the opportunity, the Nepali government began a diplomatic crusade against the Maoists. Declaring that the “top Maoists are in India,”25 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba went to Delhi in March 2002. After returning to Kathmandu, he said India had pledged to provide full sup port to Nepal in curbing the Maoist’s activities. However, there was nothing more to the promise than the usual diplomatic niceties. Many Nepalis found a different news report about Deuba’s visit far more interesting. During his visit, three senior Maoist leaders, Mohan Vaidhya, C. P. Gajurel, and Top Bahadur Rayamahi, were said to have visited Kolkata to meet the Nepali prime minister. An article in the reputable Himal South Asian magazine suggested that the three Maoist leaders were escorted by members of the Indian intelligence service.26 When I asked the prime minister during his London visit two months later to confirm these reports, he acknowledged that the Maoists had unsuccessfully tried to meet him in Kolkata but expressed ignorance about who they 23. Interview conducted by the author with politburo member Dinanath Sharma, aired on December 18 and 19, 2001, on the BBC Nepali Service and “The World Today” program, respectively. A report based on the interview can be accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/ 1718056.stm. On May 10, 2002, Mr. Sharma again spoke from Delhi with the BBC Hindi Service. 24. See Origins of the Nepalese Maoist Insurgency , http://www.mypage.bluewin.ch/ raonline/pages/story/np_mao14.html , accessed July 16, 2003. 25. See interview with Prime Minister Deuba in Outlook , April 1, 2002. 26. Deepak Gyawali, “Reflecting on Contemporary Nepali Angst,” HIMAL South Asian, April 2002.


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were escorted by. Regardless of who was escorting them, the Maoist leaders’ attempt to meet the prime minister on an official visit could not have gone unnoticed by the Indian security agencies. When I met Mr. Deuba, who was on his way to Kathmandu after his meeting with President Bush in the U.S., he looked delighted with the international support Nepal was receiving for its fight against the Maoists. In a first-ever visit by a U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell traveled to Nepal in January 2002. A series of high-level visits from American and British officials followed. A former Indian ambassador to Nepal, K. V. Rajan, says that India does not feel comfortable about the U.S.-U.K. involvement in Nepal. He argues that there is not much Delhi can do about it, however, and also predicts a substantial dilution of India’s influence in Nepal in the coming years. 27 Publicly, the Indian government has not expressed any displeasure at the growing U.S.U.K. influence. Despite the international support against the Maoists, the political situation in Nepal remained extremely grim: killings from both the army and the Maoists were growing, and the Maoists had made clear that they would disrupt the planned general elections scheduled for November 13, 2002. When Prime Minister Deuba recommended to King Gyanendra that the scheduled elections be postponed for a year, the king, in a surprising move, sacked him instead and took over executive power on October 4. In response, the Maoists intensified their anti-monarchy stance, hoping that the king’s move would spark a wave of protest against him. It did not. The mainstream political parties strongly condemned his move but insisted that their protest was not directed against the institution of the monarchy. The king has repeatedly emphasized that his move is temporary, and as soon as peace is restored, elections for Parliament will be held. The international community remained uncritical of Gyanendra’s move but called for the preservation of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. The Indian stand was exactly the same. The Indian Foreign Ministry noted that there are two pillars for stability in Nepal—multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and both should remain strong. While Delhi’s statement may appear logical and well intentioned, the question remains: would not these “two pillars of stability” have become much stronger had Delhi been more sincere in its dealings with Nepal? After the announcement of the ceasefire in January 2003, the king traveled to India, his second visit within nine months; in contrast, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had not made a bilateral visit to Nepal in the previous 27. K. V. Rajan, “Recent US/UK Activities in Nepal,” Observer Research Foundation, http:// www.observerindia.com, accessed July 4, 2003.


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five years. Officially, the king’s visit in March 2003 was described as a pilgrimage to a number of Hindu shrines in southern India, but most Nepalis were convinced that he was “not just seeking divine blessings, but also that of India’s political leadership.”28 If that was his real strategy, then it was certainly good diplomacy, especially since most observers in Nepal maintained that any resolution of the Maoist crisis would only come after ensuring India’s consent. But not only the establishment was engaged in the “make India happy” mission; it was also the Maoists, who probably wouldn’t have come to talks had there been no pressure from Delhi—a fact later acknowledged by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai himself. By then, the Maoists’ anti-India rhetoric had virtually vanished, and India was accepted as a neighbor with whom Nepal needed to maintain cordial relations. It is difficult to predict who will emerge victorious in this “please India” competition. The resignation in late May 2003 of the India-unfriendly but devoutly royalist Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand after only eight months in power––and the appointment of the India-friendly royalist, Surya Bahadur Thapa, in June 2003––was interpreted as a move to please Delhi. But that does not seem to have satisfied India. After Thapa’s appointment as prime minister, peace talks remained stalled for some time, and the Maoist leaders, who had remained aboveground for the negotiations, went underground again, and were reportedly back in Delhi. To the astonishment of many Nepali observers, they issued an ultimatum to the Nepali government, which included a new condition echoing the Indian concern voiced by Indian Ambassador K. V. Rajan, about the growing U.S.-U.K. influence in Nepal. The Maoists demanded that the government annul the Memorandum of Understanding on “terrorism” signed with the U.S. government and “expel” all “U.S. security advisors currently in Nepal”29 prior to any resumption of peace talks. This might be consistent with the Maoists’ hatred of the U.S. However, it was intriguing that they did not mention a word about India’s help to the Nepali Army but argued that the U.S. presence in Nepal was part of its wider policy to encircle China by “keeping an eye on India.” This new development can be seen as India’s covert attempt to neutralize Western influence in Nepal. Peace talks ultimately resumed on August 17, only to be broken within a week. Just before the breakdown, reports came in that Indian authorities had arrested a high-profile Maoist politburo member, C. P. Gajurel, at Chennai International Airport, when he had attempted to board a flight to Frankfurt, on his way to London, with a forged British passport. The Maoist leader, Prachanda, immediately appealed to the Indian government, using genuinely 28. Rajendra Dahal, “Everything on Hold for Two Weeks,” Nepali Times, March 21–27, 2003. 29. See Kathmandu Post , Kantipur daily, Himalayan Times, July 29, 2003.


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polite language, to release Mr. Gajurel. However, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu said that it did not recognize Prachanda’s appeal, and added that Mr. Gajurel may have visited Chennai to meet the leader of the PWG. This certainly gave the impression that India was putting pressure on the Maoists by arresting its senior leader as the peace talks faltered. However, subsequent events suggest otherwise. Despite Mr. Gajurel’s arrest, the Maoists’ decision to end the ceasefire clearly implied that its leadership still felt fully assured of being able to coordinate their activities from Indian soil. The famous meeting between the leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist [UML]) and the Maoists in the northern Indian city of Lucknow, in November 2003, was a glaring example. Nepal’s largest-selling daily, Kantipur , reported in advance that the three-member UML team, headed by the party’s general secretary and former deputy prime minister, Madhav Kumar Nepal, had gone to Lucknow for a meeting with the Maoist leadership. The Indian government expressed ignorance about the meeting, which reportedly took place in a well-maintained suburban house. Analysts in Nepal were baffled as to how, despite advance reporting of the planned meeting, the Indian security agencies could be unaware of it. After the Lucknow meeting, accusations against India of harboring the Maoist leadership intensified in Nepal. The Indian foreign minister, Yaswant Sinha, appeared in an exclusive interview with Nepal Television in late December to defend India’s role. Just over a month after Mr. Sinha’s interview, India arrested two senior Maoist leaders in Lucknow, Matrika Prasad Yadav and Suresh Alemagar, and handed them over to Nepal. This was condemned by the Maoists immediately. However, a week later, on February 15, the Nepal Human Rights Protection Committee-India, regarded as the successor to the All India Nepali Unity Society that was banned by the Indian government in 2002, held a public meeting in Delhi to celebrate the ninth anniversary of the People’s War in Nepal. According to a Maoist news portal, the meeting was held “right under [the] Nepali Embassy’s nose,” where thousands of Nepalis raised slogans against the monarchy. Reportedly, the meeting was addressed by several Indians, including Jahwaharlal Nehru University’s well-known scholar on Nepal, Professor S. D. Muni, and by several Nepalis, including the general secretary of the Maoist-affiliated peasants’ organization, Chitrabahadur Shrestha, and the president of the Maoists’ student wing, Lekhnath Neupane.30 Back in Nepal, people asked why Mr. Yadav and Mr. Alemagar were arrested and handed over to Nepal, but Mr. Shrestha and Mr. Neupane were allowed to address a public meeting in the center of the capital. 30. See KrishnaSenOnline, accessed February 16, 2004.

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http://www.cpnmaoist.org/index/krishnasen/newsksna.htm


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The Maoists’ prompt “high-command” decisions, and their rapid and efficient communication using sophisticated email and internet technologies would be virtually impossible to sustain from within the borders of Nepal, given the very limited network of electronic communication outside the major cities. Without being able to operate from Indian soil, the Maoists’ abilities would be greatly hampered. Had the top Maoist leadership any doubt about the ability to function from outside Nepal, their course of action would have been different. So far, India has arrested and handed over around 60 Maoist leaders and activists to Nepal.31 However, that seems to have made no difference whatsoever to the functioning of the Maoist leadership on Indian soil.

The Enigma The quality of friendship is important. The number of treaties you have with your neighbours is inconsequential. If friendship is there, even one treaty suffices. If it isn’t, then even a thousand treaties will not make a difference. ––Former Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, quoted in V. Sudarshan, “Next Door Boor,” Outlook

India’s interference in Nepal’s domestic politics is influenced by three related factors: India’s “attitude” to Nepal, Nepal’s “attitude” toward India, and bilateral issues. Most analyses of the problems concerning the relationship between the two countries focus on the third factor. However, it will be argued here that though bilateral issues are crucial in determining the immediate nature of the relationship, the essence of the problem in Indo-Nepali relations lies in “attitude” rather than “issues.” Obviously, attitudes are influenced by issues and vice versa. However, attitude is much broader and reflects the overall mind-set that is instrumental in determining the issues and the approach toward them. Except for Bhutan and the Maldives, India has strained relationships with all of its South Asian neighbors. An analysis in a leading Indian magazine, conducted with the help of senior journalists from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, identified the main reasons for this as follows: India • • • •

takes its neighbors for granted; insists it is always right on all issues; does not grant concessions to its smaller neighbors; is not serious about correcting trade imbalances created by its becoming a regional economic power; and • is excessively paranoid about its own security, placing undue emphasis on security at the cost of all other facets of a relationship. 32 31. See Kantipur daily, February 11, 2004. 32. See V. Sudarshan, “Next Door Boor,” Outlook , September 2, 2002, http://www.outlookindia. com/full.asp?fodname 20020902&fnameIndiaNeighbours&sid1, accessed June 29, 2003.


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Though such attitudes may not be new phenomena in the realm of international politics, where “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states,”33 such realist approaches are coming under increasing challenge. Notions like “neo-Wilsonian” idealism, “idealpolitik,” and “neoidealism” are being taken more and more seriously. 34 When considered in these theoretical contexts, it would be quite justifiable to question whether it is appropriate, or even advantageous, for India to constantly seek a hegemonic role in the region, rather than equitable deals with its smaller and weaker neighbors. But that is not how India would generally like to argue. Rather than take a neutral viewpoint, the common Indian approach is to blame neighbor countries for not taking India’s concerns seriously. “Size doesn’t matter. India faces a bagful of woes from the folks next door that puts it in a quandary,” argued an analysis last year in a leading Indian weekly, noticeably without discussing possible grievances that neighbors might have.35 While India suffers from this biased “victim” psychology, it also believes that its foreign policy has to predicate itself on realpolitik , rather than on purely moral considerations or an idealistic worldview.36 Perhaps it is the combination of the two that makes India “paranoid” about its own interests. That might also explain why India has become increasingly preoccupied with what it views as the growing activities of the Pakistani intelligence services, the ISI, in Nepal. India believes that the ISI is taking advantage of the porous border between Nepal and India and is using Nepal as a launching pad for anti-India activities. Circumstantial evidence suggests that there is a degree of truth in the Indian accusation. Following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu in 1999, the Nepalese government arrested and deported a Pakistani embassy official, who allegedly served as the lynchpin of the ISI in Nepal. The plane was flown to Kabul before the hijackers demanded the release of certain Kashmiri militants, and the incident was generally thought to be closely linked with ISI operations in Nepal. However, the reporting and detailed analysis of ISI activities in Nepal appearing regularly in leading Indian publications contrasts starkly with their continued silence on Nepal’s main concern—the alleged links between the Maoists and the Indian state. 33. Hans Morgenthau, The Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 12. 34. Cf. Francis Fukuyama, “The Beginning of Foreign Policy,” New Republic, August 17 and 24, 1994, pp. 24–32; Stanley Kober, “Idealpolitik,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, pp. 3–24; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Movement in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities,” International Studies, June 1993, pp. 131–46. 35. Raj Chengappa, “A Neighbourhood of Trouble,” India Today International , February 10, 2003. 36. J. N. Dixit, Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy (Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 407.


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This Indian attitude is further complicated by the Nepali attitude toward India, which has remained consistently unfavorable to Delhi from the 1950s. Whatever the covert intentions, India helped Nepal free itself in 1951 from 104 years of autocratic rule. But by 1954, anti-India demonstrations were already taking place in Kathmandu. Anti-India feeling has continued to date, and perhaps with more vigor. Any statement or incident originating from across the border that is allegedly directed against Nepal or a Nepali—however insignificant it might be—can immediately trigger violent anti-India protests in Nepal. When the Indian film star Hrithik Roshan was wrongly reported in late 2000 to have made an anti-Nepal slur, neither the Nepali press nor the government tried to establish the truth. Rather, the government banned his movies from cinema halls in Nepal, and several people died in violent antiIndia protests. For many Nepalis, the stronger one’s hostility toward India, the better a Nepali nationalist one is. This oppositional sense of nationalism is reflected in the Nepali press as well. Just as the mainstream Indian press only re ports on Indian concerns vis-à-vis Nepal, the Nepali mainstream press focuses on Nepali concerns vis-à-vis India. Anti-India attitudes among Nepali leaders are even more worrying. They try to secure support by overtly appealing to the public’s anti-Indian sentiment, while covertly trying to keep India happy, reinforcing the common perception that Delhi’s favorable attitude helps the careers of aspiring Nepali politicians. This duplicity on the part of the leadership, and irrational nationalism on the part of the public, coupled with the ever-suspicious approach toward Delhi’s motives, make the Nepali attitude toward India ever confused. Between the two—a self-centered attitude based on principles of realism (on the Indian part), and a suspicious and confused attitude emanating from the lack of sincerity and rationalism (on the Nepali part)—lie a number of bilateral issues. These include Nepal’s “insensitivity” toward India’s security concerns; on-going reviews of the 1950 treaty, trade, transit, and water dis putes; India’s construction of dams in the bordering region; and its alleged encroachment into Nepali territory at several places. However, such issues have come and gone. Relations have been strained and normalized, but the attitudes that form the root cause of these problems have remained constant for the past half-century of India-Nepal relations. The responsibility for changing these attitudes largely lies in the hands of India, because of its size and power. With this realization, I. K. Gujral attempted to change India’s regional foreign policy between 1996 and 1998, first as foreign minister and then as prime minister. The so-called “Gujral Doctrine” argued that India should not insist on reciprocity with its immediate neighbors such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka but give and accommodate what it can in good faith and trust. Gujral’s time in office is often referred to as a period of good neighborliness, and if this doctrine had continued


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to steer Delhi’s foreign policy after his departure, there might have been positive changes in Indo-Nepali relations. However, since Gujral’s departure, his doctrine has largely been confined to foreign policy debates among commentators and scholars. Because Indian interference is closely related to its attitude, Nepal has always found it difficult to identify true Indian intentions. It would have been much easier for Nepal to deal with Delhi if Kathmandu had had a list of issues on which India expected Nepal’s compliance, in return for a stop to interference in Nepali affairs. However, India’s attitude has been rather insatiable. This puts Nepal in a difficult position, because it does not want to reduce itself to the status of Bhutan vis-à-vis India, but Nepal does not know what India ex pects other than deference. This is why no one has been able to explain what India may have expected to achieve from its alleged link with the Maoists. Politicians of all persuasions, from the avowedly anti-Indian to moderates, to the allegedly pro-Indian, have been in and out of revolving-door-governments since the Maoist insurgency began in 1996. Many of them—prime ministers, deputy prime ministers, home and foreign ministers, who would have had direct access to all confidential documents and knowledge of secret negotiations—have directly and indirectly spoken about India’s role in the insurgency. But none has articulated a definitive understanding of India’s goals or expectations. That is not surprising, as India has never commented on the existence or character of its motives for maintaining secret links with Nepal’s anti-establishment groups. Remaining discreet, India has used these links to keep the Nepali state in a constant state of fear in an effort to extract continued subservience.

Conclusion India, from the time of its independence, has played a crucial role in Nepal’s domestic politics. However, India’s role has remained largely covert, except in the early 1950s. The covertness of the Indian role appears to be characterized by a Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest, regardless of its effect on Nepal’s future or impact on India’s own image. This is probably why Delhi seems little bothered by inconsistency and duplicity in its dealings with Nepal. The Machiavellian approach, coupled with India’s asymmetrically large size, influence, and location vis-à-vis Nepal, means that any search for a motive behind India’s role has to be sought primarily in India’s foreign policy attitude, rather than in other factors such as Nepal’s attitude toward India or issues of immediate bilateral concern. Therefore, unless Nepal resolutely focuses on developing strategies to bring about a change in Delhi’s attitude toward Kathmandu, India will always exercise its geopolitical supremacy and power to manipulate developments in Nepal. Such a focused Nepali approach would necessarily involve a realization that, though judicially both India and


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Nepal are equal, empirically the two are vastly unequal in every sense of the word, and a country like Nepal cannot in any way try to show brinkmanship with a country like India. To put it in India-friendly and many-time Prime Minister Thapa’s words, such brinkmanship would “just be foolishness.”37 Thus, Nepal should first try to change its own attitude toward India, before expecting any good-will gestures from her. It will also be imperative for Nepal to develop a well-woven India policy. To date, Kathmandu’s attitude toward Delhi has remained consistently inconsistent and clearly flawed. This can be attributed partly to Nepal’s Foreign Ministry, which, in the words of Kumar, is “regrettably useless,” and partly to the politicians, who, in the words of Pandey, use nationalism opportunistically “in respect of relation with India” and to seek its blessings to feel “secure.”38 Any solution to the Maoist problem must involve winning the hearts and minds of the Indian authorities, perhaps more so than winning the hearts and minds of the Maoists themselves. It would be diplomatically immature for Nepal to expect an automatic change in Delhi’s attitude, unless an idealist like I. K. Gujral were to come to power once again. However, such political idealists are rare, and Wilsonian idealism is still a feeble cry in international politics, which continues to be governed by the rules of realism. It might be too early to judge, but the new government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in India has not appeared any different than its predecessor in dealing with Nepal. The only way for Nepal, then, is to reflect on its own shortcomings and put as much effort as it can into safeguarding its national interest through a more mature and sophisticated use of diplomacy. Because of its geopolitical location, Nepal cannot expect to completely remove itself from India’s influence, at least in the foreseeable future. However, with more wisdom in dealing with Delhi, the degree of that influence can be reduced. Or else Nepal will continue to suffer more from exogenous interferences than endogenous imperatives.

37. Surya Bahadur Thapa interview, conducted by the author for the BBC series Down Memory Lane. Interview broadcast by the Nepali Service of the BBC on June 16, 1997. 38. See Kumar, “Asymmetric Neighbours,” p. 32; Devendra Raj Panday, Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on Missions and the Maladies (Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center, 1999), p. 347.


India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 2004

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