INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897
By Iyalpari.S.R 527 VI Semester
Legislative History² The first enactment of t he kind was Lord Broug ham¶sAct.1
Th e
provisions of that statute were adapted to India, and somew hat amplified, by t he General Clauses Act (I of 1868), and t he General Clauses Act (10 of 1897) was a furt her extension of the same principle. It is obviously expedient t hat the legislative dictionary, as it may be called, should be contained in a single enactment and t hat the two Acts above referred to should be consolidated, and it seems desirable to take t he opportunity of making any additions t hat later experience may
have
suggested, and in particular to incorporate suc h
provisions of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vict., c.63), as are applicable to India. The
statute, like t he Indian Act of 1887, was drafted by Sir C. Ilbert, and is in effect a careful
revise and extension of t he latter. For example, t he definition of ³British India´ in t he English Act of 1889 is merely an expansion of t he definition given by t he Indian Act of 1868. Its legal effect is t he same, but it is more intelligible, and it avoids a reference to anot her statute. The
proposed measure will have t his furt her advantage t hat it will tend to secure uniformity
of language and construction in Indian and Englis h legislation, in so far as bot h have to deal with the same subject matter Application² The General Clauses Act will apply to a provision w hich has been framed by
the Central Legislature. It is doubtful if it can apply to a provision framed not by an aut hority competent to pass a Central Act or Regulation, but by an aut hority competent only to make a local or State amendment.4 General Clauses Act is enacted in order to s horten language used in parliamentary legislation and to avoid repetition of t he same words in t he course of t he same piece of legislation. Suc h an Act is not meant to give a hide-bound meaning to terms and phrases generally occurring in legislation.
That
is t he reason why the definition section
contains words like ³Unless t here is anyt hing repugnant in t he subject or context.´ Words and phrases have either a very narrow significance or a very wide significance according as t he context and subject of t he legislation requires t he one or t he ot her meaning to be attac hed to those words or p hrases.5 When a function is vested by a statute in t he State Government t he statutory provision, or a notification issued by t he President, it has to be interpreted wit h the aid of t he General Clauses Act.6 Object² This Act does not propose to effect any c hange in t he law. Its object, like t hat of
the Acts it consolidates, is to s horten t he language of statutory enactments and to provide for uniformity of expression in cases w here there is identity of subject matter. Legislative intent² Where t he words used in a statute afford no guidance as to intention of
the legislature, t he court s hould presume t hat t he legislature intended an equitable and not an
inequitable result.3 Beaumoni C.J.4 explained t he duty of Judge in interpreting an Act of t he Legislature thus
³The learned Magistrates, I t hink, fell into an error not uncommon in
construing Acts of t he Legislature. He made up his mind, apart from t he Act what was t he intention of t he Legislature in passing t he Act, and construed t he Act so as to give effect to his
preconceived idea as to t he Legislature¶s intention. He made up his mind t hat the object of
the Legislature was to protect employee and not hing else and construed t he Act so as to make every part of it fit in wit h that object. With all respect to t he learned Magistrate, t hat is not t he way to construe t he Act. One has to take the language as one finds it alt hough, of course, one has to look at t he Act as a whole and construe it so as to give effect to w hat appears from t he language of t he w hole Act to be intention of t he Legislature.´ INDIAN POSITION AND PRACTICES AND CASE LAWS ON REPEALS
In India, t he earliest attempt that was made to guard against t he normal legal effect of a repeal is to be found in section 6 of Act I of 1868.
This
provision was furt her elaborated by section
6 of t he General Clauses Act of 1897 w hich is on t he same lines as section 38(2)of t he Interpretation Act of England.
The
section is reproduced below for ready r eference:
EFFECT OF REPEAL. ² Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after t he
commencement of t his Act, repeals any enactment
hitherto
made or hereafter to be made,
then, unless a different intention appears, t he repeal shall not ²
(a) revive anyt hing not in force or existing at t he time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect t he previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anyt hing duly done or suffered t hereunder; or (c)
affect any rig ht, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punis hment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e)
affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any suc h
right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punis hment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any suc h penalty, forfeiture or punis hment may be imposed as if t he repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. INDIAN AND UK POSITION-CASE LAWS The
position t herefore now in India as well as in England is t hat a repeal has not t he drastic
effect which it used to have before t he enactment of t he Interpretation Act in England or t he General Clauses Act in t his country. But t his is due entirely to t he fact t hat an express provision has been made in t hose enactments to counteract t hat effect. Hence, in those cases which are not covered by t he language of t he General Clauses Act, t he principle already enunciated will continue to operate. It s hould be remembered t hat the soundness of t he law which has been consistently applied to cases governed by statutes w hich have ceased to be in force, by reason of having been repealed or having expired, has never been questioned, and it cannot be brus hed aside as if it embodied some arc haic or obsolete rule peculiar only to the common law of England. It is t he law which has been enunciated by eminent Judges bot h in England and in America and is based on good sense and reason[.Kes havan of Madhava Menon.vs. The State Of Bombay. 1951 AIR 128]³ ENGLISH RULE:EFFECT OF REPEAL TO OBLITERATE THE STATUTE Thus
t he effect of repealing a statute to be, to obliterate it as completely from t he records
of Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be considered as a law t hat never existed except for t he purpose of t hose action which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law.[ibid]" CHANGE IN ENGLISH RULE AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGES This
was t he rule of t he Englis h common law which was applied in cases of statutes w hich
were repealed and under t his rule all pending actions and prosecutions could not be proceeded with after t he repeal of t he law under w hich they were started This rule was however
changed by t he Interpretation Act of 1889, section 38.
Therein
it was enacted t hat
unless t he contrary intention appears, no repeal is to affect any investigation, legal proceeding, including the initiation of criminal proceedings, or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punis hment and any suc h investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punis hment may be imposed as if t he repealing Act had not been passed. A similar provision exists in India in section 6 of t he General Clauses Act of 1868 and 1897.
The
High Court held that the provisions of article 13(1) were analogous to t he
repeal of a statute and t herefore section 6 of t he General Clauses Act had application to t he construction of «. Provisions. [ibid]´ GENERAL DISCUSSION ABOUT SCOPE OF ENGLISH AND INDIAN THEORY SCHEME OF SECTION 6 OF GENERAL CLAUSES ACT,1897
Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act occurs in group of Sections 5 to 13 and t he heading of that group of Sections is, "General rules of construction". In cases w here a provision of t he Act by its terms does not apply, Courts
have
applied its principle because of t he
inconvenience t hat would ot herwise result. [Swarnat h Bhatia - Appellant, AIR (35) 1948 Madras 427]. Calcutta Hig h Court in t he case of Benoari Lal Sarma and Ot hers v. Emperor, , took t he view t hat, "The rule of interpretation in Section 38 of t he Interpretation Act, 1889 is a principle w hic h exists independently of t he Interpretation Act and, t herefore, applies as effectually to t he Letters Patent as to a statute. It is true t hat the Letters Patent is not an Act, but it is granted by the Sovereign by virtue of an Act passed by t he Parliament and s hould be construed in t he same way as an Act. Furt her, even if Section 38, Interpretation Act, does not apply in terms to t he Letters Patent, t he principle underlying Section 38 s hould be applied in construing clause 44 of t he Letters Patent." ENGLISH AND INDIAN DOCTRINE
Supreme Court in t he case of National Sewing
Thread
Co. Ltd., C hidambaram v. James
Chandwick and Bros. Ltd. - observed, "The Canon of construction of statutes enunciated in Section 38, Interpretation Act, and reiterated with some modifications in Section 8, General Clauses Act, is one of general application where statutes or Acts have to be construed and t here is no reasonable ground for holding t hat t hat
rule of construction s hould not be applied in construing t he charters of t he
different High Courts.
These
charters were granted under statutory powers and are subject to
the legislative power of t he Indian Legislature. Assuming however, but not conceding, t hat strictly speaking t he provisions of t he Interpretation Act and t he General Clauses Act do not for any reason apply, t here is no justification for holding t hat the principles of construction enunciated in t hose provisions have no application for construing t hese charters." Applying t his, it was
held
in State v. Fateh Chand, AIR 1955 M.B. 82, t hat, if for some
reason or ot her, t he General Clauses Act cannot be applied in terms, its principles (and, in particular, t he principle of Section 6 can be extended to construe t he law. Madhya Pradesh High Court in t he case of Bhupendra Kumar Jain v. Y. S. D harmadhikari and Ot hers, observed,
"No doubt. Section 13 of t he Act is applicable to Central Acts and Regulations only; but unless t he context ot herwise requires, t he same rule of construction s hould be applied to t he State Bar Council Election Rules framed under t he Advocates Act, 1961, which is a Central Act." Govinda Menon, J. in t he case of Swarnat h Bhatia, AIR 1948 Madras 427, observed, "The defense of India Rules s hould be interpreted in accordance wit h the principles laid down in the General Clauses Act." Even when t here is no express saving, t he principles of Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act have
been applied and it
has
been
held t hat
Section 6 applies to repeal and t his principle
applies to amendment of prior enactments. Heading of t he group of Sections 5 to 13 of t he General Clauses Act s hows t hat these are merely General Rules of construction w hich have been codified but they are not rules of construction w hich were for t he first time created by the General Clauses Act.
These
rules were t here under Common Law. General Clauses Act
applies to Central Acts and Regulations but t hat does not mean t hat Courts cannot take advantage of t he settle principles of construction of Central Acts being applied to t he Subordinate Legislation as well. What is t he effect of repeal and w hat should be t he line of approac h of Court in case of repeal has
been succinctly broug ht out in t he case of State of Punjab v. Mo har Singh Pratap Sing h
AIR 1955 S.C. In para 6 learned Judge noticed t he Law of England as it stood prior to t he Interpretation Act of 1889 and also noticed t he consequences of t he Interpretation Act, 1889. Learned Judge observed as under : "Under the law of England, as it stood prior to t he Interpretation Act of 1889, t he effect of repealing a statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely from t he records of Parliament as if it
had
never been passed, except for t he purpose of t hose actions, w hich were
commenced, prosecuted and concluded w hile it was an existing law : Vide Craies on Statute Law : 5t h edn. page 323. EFFECT OF REPEAL WITHOUT A SAVING CLAUSE
A repeal t herefore wit hout any saving Clause would destroy any proceeding w hether not yet begun or whether pending at t he time of t he enactment of t he Repealing Act and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right; Vide Crawford on Statutory Constitution pp. 599-600.
To
obviate suc h results a practice came into existence
in England to insert a saving clause in t he repealing statute wit h a view to preserve rig hts and liabilities already accrued or incurred under t he repealed enactment.
Later on, to dispense wit h the necessity of having to insert a saving clause on eac h occasion, Section 38(2) was inserted in t he Interpretation Act of 1889 w hich provides t hat a repeal, unless t he contrary intention appears, does not affect t he previous operation of t he repealed enactment or anyt hing duly done or "suffered under it and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of any rig ht, liability and penalty under the repealed Act as if t he Repealing Act has not been passed. Section Section 38(2) of t he General Clauses Act, as is well known, is on t he same lines as Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of England. Under Section 30 of t he General Clauses Act, w hich corresponds to Section 27 of t he Punjab Act, the provisions of t he Act are applicable to Ordinances as well. Of course, t he consequences laid down in Section 6 of t he Act will apply only w hen a statute or regulation having t he
force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application w hen a statute, which is
of a temporary nature, automatically expires by efflux of time.
The
Ordinance in t he present
case was undoubtedly a temporary statute but it is admitted t hat the period during which it was to continue had not expired w hen the Repealing Act was passed.
Th e
repeal t herefore
was an effective one w hich would normally attract t he operation of Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act.
The
controversy t hus narrows down to t he s hort point as to whether t he fact of
the repeal of t he Ordinance being followed by re-enactment would make t he provision of Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act inapplicable to t he present case." Again in para 8, learned Judge observed, "Whenever t here is a repeal of an enactment, t he consequences laid down in Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act will follow unless, as t he section itself says, a different intention appears. In t he case of a simple repeal t here is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But w hen t he repeal is followed by fres h "legislation on t he same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to t he provisions of t he new Act, but only for t he purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The
line of enquiry would be, nor w hether t he new Act expressly keeps alive old rig hts and
liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy t hem. We cannot t herefore subscribe to t he broad proposition t hat Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act is ruled out w hen there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fres h legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless t he new legislation manifests an intention incompatible wit h or contrary to t he provisions of t he section. Suc h incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all t he relevant provisions of t he new law and t he mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material.
INDIAN CASE LAWS
Following decided Indian cases would reveal, t hat Indian courts have interpreted Section 6 of the said Act in t he same manner as t he similar provisions
have
been interpreted by t he
English and American courts. IN 1919 Oud h 217, it has been held t hat where an Act repeals a previous Act and provides that all orders issued under t he repealed Act s hall, so far as may be, be deemed to have been issued under t he new Act, or is repealed wit h proviso 'except as to t hings done under it' t he provision is designed to safeguard t he validity of orders, appointments, etc., issued under t he repealed Act and not to give retrospective effect to t he new Act. NO.1
A Seven Judge Benc h of t his Court by majority laid down in Kes havan Madhava Menon vs. The
State of Bombay,(1951) SCR 228, t hat t he Court was concerned wit h the legality of t he
prosecution of the appellant for contravention of t he Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.
The
offence
had
been committed before t he Constitution came into force and a
prosecution launched earlier was pending after January 26, 1950.
The
enactment whic h
created t he offence was held to be void under Article 19(1)(a) read wit h Article 13 as being inconsistent wit h one of t he Fundamental rig hts guaranteed by Part III of t he Constitution. In the circumstances, t he point t hat was debated before t his Court was w hether t he prosecution could be continued after t he enactment became void. In t his case, t he Court by a majority judgment held that the Constitution was prospective in its operation and t hat Art. 13(1) would not affect t he validity of t hese proceedings commenced under pre-Constitution laws w hich were valid up to t he date of t he Constitution coming into force, for to hold t hat t he validity of these proceedings were affected would in effect be treating t he Constitution as retrospective. Therefore,
it was considered t hat there was no legal objection to t he continuance of t he
prosecution. No.2 The
controversy in issue was dealt wit h comprehensively with meticulous precision by a
Constitution Benc h of t his Court in State of Punjab vs. Mo har Singh (1955) 1 SCR 893. Respondent Mohar Singh filed a claim as an evacuee under t he East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948.
The
claim was investigated into and it was found to
be false; it was held to be an offence under t he Act. At the trial, on
his
confession, t he
respondent was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. On suo motu revision, t he District Magistrate found t he sentence to be inadequate and referred t he case to t he High Court. High Court found t hat since t he ordinance was repealed,
he
The
could not be convicted under
Section 7 of t he Act.
This
Court, on appeal, reversed t he decision and upheld t he conviction
applying Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act.
The
principle which has been laid down in
this case is t hat whenever t here is a repeal of an enactment, t he consequences laid down in section 6 of t he General Clauses Act will follow unless, as t he section itself says, a different intention appears. In t he case of a simple repeal t here is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But w hen the repeal is followed by fres h legislation on t he same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to t he provisions of t he new Act, but only for t he purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention.
Th e
line of enquiry would be, not
whether t he new Act expressly keeps alive old rig hts and liabilities but w hether it manifests an intention to destroy t hem. We cannot t herefore, subscribe to t he broad proposition t hat Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act is ruled out w hen there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in suc h cases also unless t he new legislation manifests an intention incompatible wit h or contrary to t he provisions of t he section. No.3
In t he case of Bri han Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate vs. Janardan AIR 1960 SC 794, it was observed as under: "Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act provides t hat where an Act is repealed, t hen, unless a different intention appears, t he repeal s hall not affect any rig ht or liability acquired or incurred under t he repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of suc h right or liability and t he legal proceeding may be continued as if t he repealing Act passed.
There
had
not been
is no dispute t hat Section 153- C of t he Act of 1913 gave certain rig hts to t he
share-holders of a company and put t he company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities.
The
application under t hat section was for enforcement of t hese
rights and liabilities. Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act would t herefore preserve t he rights and liabilities created by Section 153-C of t he Act of 1913 and a continuance of t he proceeding in respect thereof would be competent in spite of t he repeal of t he Act of 1913, unless of course a different intention could be gat hered." No.4
A Constitution Benc h of t his Court in State of Orissa vs. M.A.
Tulloch
and Co., (1963) 4
SCR 461, also had an occasion to examine t he controversy regarding repeal of t he Act.
Th e
submission in t his case was t hat the supersession of t he Orissa Act by t he Central Act was neither more nor less t han a repeal.
The
reference was made to Section 6 of t he General
Clauses Act, 1897 w hich has been reproduced (supra). In t he said case, t he submission was
that the interpretation of t he Section was two-fold: (1) t he word 'repeal' used in t he opening paragraph was not confined to express repeal but t hat the word was compre hensive enoug h to include cases of implied repeals; (2) it was submitted t hat if t he expression 'repeal' in Section 6(b) be deduced as being confined to express repeals, still t he principle underlying Section 6 was of general application and capable of being attracted to cases of implied repeals also. In M.A. Tulloch's case (supra), t he Court aptly observed t hat we have to inquire t he principle on which the saving clause in Section 6 is based. It is manifest t hat every later enactment w hich supersedes an earlier one or pouts an end to an earlier state of t he law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under t he superseded enactment unless t here were sufficient indications - express or implied - in t he later enactment designed to completely obliterate t he earlier state of t he law. The
next question is w hether t he application of t hat principle could or oug ht to be limited to
cases where a particular form of words is used to indicate t hat the earlier law repealed.
Th e
has
been
entire t heory underlying implied repeals is t hat there is no need for t he later
enactment to state in express terms t hat an earlier enactment has been repealed by using any particular set of words or form of drawing but t hat if t he legislative intent to supersede t he earlier law is manifested by t he enactment of provisions as to effect suc h supersession, t hen there is in law a repeal notwit hstanding t he absence of t he word 'repeal' in t he later statute. Now, if the legislative intent to supersede t he earlier law is t he basis upon w hich the doctrine of implied repeal is founded, could t here be any incongruity in attributing to t he later legislation t he same intent w hich Section 6 presumes w here t he word 'repeal' is expressly used. No.5 EXPRESS OR IMPLIED REPEAL AND EFFECTS
So far as statutory construction is concerned, it is one of t he cardinal principles of t he law t hat there is no distinction or difference between an express provision and a provision w hich is necessarily implied, for it is only t he form t hat differs in t he two cases and t here is no difference in intention or in substance. A repeal may be broug ht about by repugnant legislation, wit hout even any reference to t he Act intended to be repealed, for once legislative competence to effect a repeal is posited, it matters little whether t his is done expressly or inferentially or by t he enactment of repugnant legislation. If such is t he basis upon w hich repeals and implied repeals are broug ht about it appears to us to be bot h logical as well as in accordance wit h the principles upon which the rule as to
implied repeal rests to attribute to t hat legislature which effects a repeal by necessary implication the same intention as t hat which would attend t he case of an express repeal. Where an intention to effect a repeal is attributed to legislature t hen t he same would, in our opinion, attract t he incident of t he saving found in Section 6 for t he rules of construction embodied in t he General Clauses Act are, so to speak, t he basic assumptions on w hic h statutes are drafted.
The
Court examined t he ambit and scope of Section 6 of t he General
Clauses Act, 1897 in
T ulloch's
case.
According to t he ratio of t he said judgment, t he principal underlying Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act, 1897 is t hat every later enactment w hich supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of t he law is presumed to intend t he continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under t he superseded enactment unless t here were sufficient indications expressed or implied in t he later enactment designed to completely obliterate t he earlier state of the law. In view of t he interpretation what follows is absolutely clear t hat unless a different intention appears in t he repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under t he repealed Act as if t hat Act was in force at t he time of repeal. In ot her words, w henever t here is a repeal of an enactment t he consequences laid down in Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act will follow unless, as t he section itself says, a different intention appears in t he repealing statute. In case t he repeal is followed by fres h legislation on t he same subject t he court has to look to the provisions of t he new Act for t he purpose of determining w hether they indicate a different intention.
Th e
question is not w hether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rig hts and
liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy t hem.
The
application of t his
principle is not limited to cases where a particular form of words is used to indicate t hat the earlier law
has
been repealed. As t his Court
has
said, it is bot h logical as well as in
accordance wit h the principle, upon w hic h the rule as to implied repeal rests, to attribute to that legislature whic h effects a repeal by necessary implication t he same intention as t hat which would attend t he case of an express repeal. W here an intention to effect a repeal is attributed to a legislature t hen t he same would attract t he incident of saving found in Section 6. No.6
In t he case of Muns hilal Beniram Jain Glass Works vs. S. P. Sing h , (1971) II S.C.J. JulyDecember p. 307, t his Court held that under Section 6 would apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention appears from t he new enactment.
No.7
In Qudrat Ulla h vs. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202, t he Court
held t hat t he
general principle is t hat an enactment which is repealed is to be treated, except as to transactions passed and closed, as if it
had
never existed. However, t he operation of t his
principle is subject to any savings w hic h may be made, expressly or by implication, by t he repealing enactment. If a contrary intention appears from t he repealing Statute, t hat prevails. No.8
A three-Judge Benc h of t his Court in India held t hat
T obacco
Co. Ltd. vs. C TO, (1975) 3 SCC 512,
repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance, depending on t he intention of
the legislature. If t he intention indicated eit her expressly or by necessary implication in t he subsequent statute was to abrogate or wipe off t he former enactment w holly or in part, t hen it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal. If t he intention was merely to modify t he former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an exemption, or by super-adding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or suspending its operation, suc h modification would not amount to a repeal. Broadly speaking, t he principal object of a repealing and amending Act is to 'excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject clearly inconsistent enactments'. WHAT IS REPEAL AND SIMULTANEOUS RE-ENCATMENT
When t here is a repeal and simultaneous reenactment, Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act would apply to suc h a case unless contrary intention has been gat hered from t he repealing Act. Section 6 would be applicable in suc h cases unless t he new legislation manifests intention inconsistent wit h or contrary to t he application of t he section. When the repeal is followed by a fres h legislation on t he same subject, t he Court would undoubtedly
have
to
look to t he provisions of t he new Act only for t he purpose of determining w hether the new Act indicates different intention.
Th e
object of repeal and reenactment is to obliterate t he
Repealed Act and to get rid of certain obsolete matters. No.9
In Commissioner of Income
Tax
vs. S hah Sadiq and Sons AIR 1987 SC 1217, t his Court
observed t hat a right which had accrued and had become vested, continued to be capable of being enforced notwithstanding t he repeal of t he statute under w hich that right accrued unless the repealing statute took away suc h right expressly or by necessary implication. effect of Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act, 1897. No.10.
This
is t he
In M/s Gurc haran Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh and Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 428, the Court observed t hat the objective of Section 6(c) of t he General Clauses Act, 1897 is to ensure protection of any rig ht or privilege acquired under t he repealed Act. exception to it is legislative intention to t he contrary.
That
The
only
is, t he repealing Act may expressly
provide or it may impliedly provide against continuance of suc h rig ht, obligation or liability. No.11
In Gajraj Sing h and Ot hers vs. State
Transport
Appellate
Tribunal
and Ot hers (1997) 1 SCC
650, a permit under Section 47(3) of t he Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was granted to t he appellant for a period of 3 years. from 1.7.1989.
The
The
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force wit h effect
question arose w hether t he renewal of t he permit of t he appellant granted
under t he repealed Act is a permit under t he Act and its operation was saved by Section 217(2)(a) read wit h sub-section (4) t hereof. Section 81 was valid in law.
Th ere
Therefore,
t he second renewal granted under
was no need for t he appellant to obtain a fres h permit
under t he Act as t he renewal is a continuation of t he original permit which is a vested rig ht. The
effect of saving provisions in Section 217(2) (a) is to allow all t he permits granted under
the Repealed Act to continue after renewal under t he Act. Section 217(2) (a) and sub-section (4), t hus, obviate t he need to obtain fres h permit under t he Act and, t herefore, it would be unnecessary. According to t he appellant, t he Act is not intended to lay down t hat after the Act came into force, all t he holders of stage carriage permits granted under t he Repealed Act would be required to obtain fres h permits under t he Act. Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act, 1897 read wit h Sections 217(2) (a) and (4) saves operation of all t hose permits whic h were alive when t he Act came into force. Consequently, renewals granted under Section 81 were valid. WHEN PROCEEDINGS UNDER REPEALED ACT TO CONTINUE:
In Gajraj Singh's case (supra), t he Court observed t hat the proceedings under t he Repealed Act would be continued and concluded under t he Act as if t he Act was not enacted. The
Court observed t hat four t hings would emerge from its operation.
Condition One, t here must exist a corresponding provision under t he Act pari materia with the Repealed
Act; two, the order of permit granted must exist and be in operation on t he day on which the Act had
come into force;
three, it must not be inconsistent wit h the provisions of t he Act and,
f ourth, t he
positive act should have been done before 1.7.1989. Positive Act s hould have
been done before the repeal of t he Act to furt her secure any rig ht. All the four conditions should be satisfied as conditions precedent for application of Section 6 of t he General Clauses Act.
