Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961
The Power of Eminent Domain Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain. Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919] Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. REPUBLIC VS. PLDT [26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969] Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.
Held: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974] Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the
request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, thegovernment used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote thePresident of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaintagainst the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legalprocess of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the governmentappears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to thegovernment, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at
this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. REYES
Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgement of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987] Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS VS. BURGOS Facts: On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-rightof-way purpose. On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines). Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the nonsuability of the government was invoked. In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775. The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken. Held: Not applicable. Ratio: Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only when there is an agreement that the inflation will make the value of currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment, the basis for payment.
The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, not P49,459.34, and the interest in the sum of P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be reduced. SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO [NO. L-48685,SEPTEMBER 30, 1987] Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Nat’l Bank, representing the “total market value” of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.” On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due process. Issues:
(1) Whether “socialized housing” as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not “public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people, bereft of public character,” hence it is not a valid exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain. (2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated. (3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. (4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge. Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as, “the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities.” The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, “socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use.” (2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA’s choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. (3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.’s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation. (4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing. RAYMUNDO Z. FAMILARA, vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
The Barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, in behalf on 1,500 other occupants of the Tatalon Estate, sought to enjoin the JM Tuason Corporation from bulldozing and fencing any portion of the Estate. They claim that the Land Tenure Administration was already directed to commence the expropriation proceedings of the Estate. They rely on RA 2616, which provided that after expropriation proceedings have been initiated, no ejectment proceedings can be made. The corporation however argued that there is no expropriation proceeding actually instituted before the courts yet.
SC: CORPORATION IS CORRECT. In the absence of any proceeding for expropriation instituted before the courts, petitioner has clearly no cause of action. it is true that Republic Act No. 2616, insofar as it expropriated singularly a particular private property, had survived the challenge of being discriminatory, and was declared free from constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, this Court has also ruled that the provision which places a restraint upon the exercise and enjoyment by the owner of certain rights over its property, is justifiable only if the government takes possession of the land and is in a position to make a coetaneous payment of just compensation to its owner. To hold that the mere declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting the corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts, with assurance of just compensation, would already preclude the exercise by the owner of his rights of ownership over the land, or bar the enforcement of any final ejectment order that the owner may have obtained against any intruder into the land, is to sanction an act which is indeed confiscatory arid therefore offensive to the Constitution. For it must be realized that in a condemnation case, it is from the condemnor's taking possession of the property that the owner is deprived of the benefits of ownership such as possession, management and disposition thereof. Before that time, the proprietary right of the owner over his property must be recognized. The mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants can not by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property." Here, there was no proof that expropriation proceedings have actually be instituted and being pursued by the government. There is also no proof that the supposed amount of P10M has been available for the alleged expropriation. Thus, the corporation retains its rights over their property.
MANOTOK V. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision. HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional. Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. PULIDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The President of the Philippines reserved 94 lots, 2 of which owned by the gov’t, 49 owned by Phil. Nat’l Co., corp. owned by gov’t and the rest owned by private landholders for the construction of the Export Processing Zone Authority(EPZA). Some owners abided; some refused. The private land owners appealed to the Municipal Agrarian Reform which failed to act. The 76 farmers filed complaint against Cornelio T. Rivera, OIC, Cavite Export Processing Zone and J.H. Pajara Const.Corp to the Court of Agrarian Relations which issued a TRO.Later on, the case was dismissed for the lots were no longer agricultural lots by operation of law . Farmers appealed to the Court of Appeals which issued a TRO. The same was lifted upon posting of the bond of P500,000.00. Hence, the recourse to annul and set aside the appellate court’s decision. The Court issued TRO.
Other farmer’s withdrew the petition. The court lifted TRO except to the lands of Avelino Pulido. However, the latter was also lifted after payment of 10@ of the just compensation for the land of Pulido.ISSUE:Whether or not the court was justified in lifting the TRO upon payment of 10% of the just compensation of the property of Avelino PulidoHELD: The complaint for expropriation of the property occupied by Pulido had been filed with the Court of First Instance, Cavite. The
amount of P17,027.00equivalent to 10% of the just compensation of the property had already been deposited with the Cavite Branch of the PNB. Furthermore,the Court had already issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution over the property occupied by Avelino Pulido. Hence, the issue is moot and academic.Wisdom of converting their rice lands into an industrial site is within the proper exercise of Presidential prerogatives and the court may not inquire into it. The necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domains are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. Interest of family should not stand in the way of progress and benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country. HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA V. REYES 123 SCRA 220 FACTS: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS.SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM Facts: In a consolidated petition to review the decision of the respondent, the petitioners contends that the implementation of the CARP (RA 6657) is violative of due process and their right of equal protection. The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands.They question the validity of the implementation of the CARPLaw, contending that it is violative of their right to the equalprotection clause.The Act in question primarily states that landownerswill retain five to the maximum of seven hectares of their landand the excess will be given to tenant farmers, depending onthe terrain, viable family size and fertility of the soil.They alleged that in the CARP law implementation,agricultural landowners are the only class that will carry theburden of the effects of the law and not any other landowners, thus, violating their right to equal protection of thelaw? Issue: Does the contention tenable? Held: No.The equal protection clause provided by the constitution is defined as all person or things similarly situated must be treated alike as to both rights conferred and liabilities imposed. And as held in the Cayat case, the valid classification test should occur.In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class so as not to be bounded by the CARP Law. All of the petitioners are in the same class such that they are all agricultural landowners as contemplated by legislation. There are substantial distinction between agricultural landowners and non-agricultural landowners. The purpose of the law is to give land to the landless to balance the distribution of ownership of land resources among the people, not to mention the constitutional provision that the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. And this purpose of the law does not only meant to answer existing condition since such condition of imbalance opportunity and ownership to one of the most important resource in earth has been existent long before the implementation of the CARP Law. Thus, base from the case at bar, the requirement of valid classification has been met. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: “Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.” Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. DE KNECHT V. BAUTISTA 100 SCRA 660 (1980) FACTS: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route with save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. REPUBLIC V. DE KNECHT, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) FACTS: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws.
Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) FACTS: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor''s lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines. RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just cOmpensation.
