Digested Cases

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS CARLOS

DIGESTED CASES CONSTI II – Atty. Joan Largo U.S. vs GOMEZ Facts: In this case, defendant was found guilty by the trial court with the crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of Section 8, Act 30 of the Philippine Commission which provides: “The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any any of the the foll follow owin ing g cert certifi ifica cate tes s prov provid ided ed for for there therein in to an indivi individua duall convic convicted ted by a court court of compe competen tentt jurisd jurisdict iction ion of any offen offense se involv involving ing immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the reason therefore shall be stated to the applican applicantt in writing. The Board Board may also revoke revoke any suc such certi ertifi fic cate ate for lik like cause, use, or for for unpr unprofe ofessi ssiona onall condu conduct, ct, after after due due notice notice to the perso person n holdi holding ng the certif certifica icate, te, and a hearin hearing, g, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be final.” Defendant contends that the court erred in declaring the aforementioned provision are no in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 1902 and and in whic which h he relie relies s on para paragr grap aph h 1, section 5 thereof which states: “That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any perso person n of life, life, libert liberty, y, or prope property rty withou withoutt due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.” Held: Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because the Board of Medical Examiners where given such a responsibility through the exercise of the State’s police power. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons, and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public public safety, safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. inhabitants. This power of the state is generally denominated in its police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived of its right to exercise exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the cornerstones of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit it to be deprived of the the righ rightt to enac enactt laws laws to prom promot ote e gene genera rall prosp prosperi erity ty and wel welfar fare e of its inhabi inhabitan tants, ts, and promote public health, public morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objec objects ts of the state. state. No legisl legislatu ature re can bargai bargain n away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. servants. Governme Governments nts are organize organized d with a view to preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi) In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under cert certai ain n cond condit ition ions s beco become me nece necess ssar ary y to deprive its citizens of property and of a right provid providing ing for the contin continuan uance ce of proper property ty,, when when the the prop proper erty ty or the the exerc exercise ise of the the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the

gener eneral al welf welfar are e and and prosp rosper erit ity y of its its inhabitants. (Slaughter House Cases) Upon police power of the state depends the security of social orde order, r, the the life life and and heal health th of the the citi citize zens ns,, the the comfor comfortt of an exist existenc ence e in a thick thickly ly popul populate ated d communit community, y, the enjoyment enjoyment of private private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the the prot protec ecti tion on of the the live lives, s, limb limbs, s, heal health th,, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all all prop proper erty ty with within in the the stat state. e. Perso ersons ns and and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. BINAY vs DOMINGO Facts: The Burial Assistance Program Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who who only earn less than P2,000/month P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the the muni munici cipa pall char charte ter, r, wa was s refer eferre red d to the the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary cert certif ifie ied d the the disb disbur urse seme ment nt of four four hund hundre red d thou thousa sand nd peso pesos s for for its its impl implem emen enta tati tion on wa was s disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any percep perceptib tible le connec connectio tion n or relat relation ion betwee between n the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public lic safet afety y, gener enera al we wellfar fare, etc etc. of its its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. Held: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental functi function, on, an inher inherent ent attrib attribute ute of sovere sovereign ignty, ty, which which was born born with with civili civilized zed govern governmen ment. t. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental fundamental purpose is securing securing the general general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Poli Police ce powe powerr is the the powe powerr to pres prescr crib ibe e regulations regulations to promote promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sens sense e it is the the grea greate test st and and mo most st powe powerf rful ul attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be respo respons nsive ive to variou various s social social condi conditio tions ns.. The care care for the poor is genera generally lly recogniz recognized ed as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an acce accept pted ed exer exerci cise se of poli police ce powe powerr in the the promotion of the common good. AGUSTIN vs EDU Facts: The The letter letter of instru instruct ction ion provi providin ding g for an early early

CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources -1-


warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed in the the case case at bar bar as bein being g viol violat ativ ive e of the the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided, "one‐sided, onerous onerous and patently illegal and immoral immoral because because [they] [they] will will ma mak ke ma manu nufa fact ctur urer ers s and and deal dealer ers s inst instan antt millionaires at the expense of car owners who are comp compel elle led d to buy buy a set set of the the so‐ca so‐call lled ed earl early y warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set. set."" 14 are are unla unlawfu wfull and and unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al and and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the the part part of the the mo moto tori rist sts s who who coul could d very very we well ll provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a bett better er subs substi titu tute te to the the spec specif ifie ied d set set of EWD's." Held: Petitio Petitioner’s ner’s contentio contention n is erroneou erroneous s because because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereig sovereignty nty.” .” In the leading leading case of Calalang Calalang v. police power Williams, Justice Justice Laurel Laurel identified identified police with state authority to enact legislation that may may inte interf rfer ere e with ith perso erson nal lib liberty erty or proper property ty in order order to promot promote e the general general welfare. Perso Persons ns and and prope property rty could could thus thus ‘be ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order der for for the the genera nerall com omfo fort rt,, heal healtth and prosp prosperi erity ty of the state. state.’’ This This doctri doctrine ne was later later Primicias ias v. Fugos Fugoso o which reite reiterat rated ed again again in Primic referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulation regulations s to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and genera generall welfar welfare e of the people. people.’’ The concept concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a prepre-Co Comm mmon onwe weal alth th deci decisi sion on as ‘that inhe inhere rent nt and and plen plenar ary y powe powerr in the the Stat State e which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comf omfort ort, safet afety y and and welf welfar are e of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exige exigenci ncies es of the times, times, even even to antici anticipat pate e the future future where it could could be done, done, provides provides enough enough room room for for an effi effici cien entt and and flex flexib ible le resp respon onse se to condition conditions s and circumst circumstances ances thus assuring assuring the grea greate test st bene benefi fits ts.. In the the lang langua uage ge of Just Justic ice e Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynam dynamic ic agency agency,, suitab suitably ly vague vague and far from from precisely precisely defined, rooted in the concepti conception on that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional righ rights ts did did not not inte intend nd ther thereb eby y to enab enable le an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unre unreaso asonab nably ly the the enactm enactment ent of such such salut salutary ary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts: Thi This s Cour Courtt has has befo before re it the the delic delicat ate e task task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legi legisl slat ativ ive e enac enactm tmen ent, t, fund fundam amen enta tall and and far‐ far‐ reach reaching ing in signif significa icance nce.. The enactm enactment ent poses poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disput disputed ed law law purpo purports rts to remed remedy y reall really y or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer retailer.. Through Through it, and within the field of econ econom omy y it regu regula late tes, s, Cong Congre ress ss atte attemp mpts ts to tran transl slat ate e nati nation onal al aspi aspira rati tion ons s for for econ econom omic ic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free free the the nati nation onal al reta retail iler er from from the the comp compet etin ing g dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic depe depend nden ence ce and and bond bondag age. e. Do the the fact facts s and and circumstances circumstances justify the enactment? Held: police e powe powerr is so far far ‐ It has been said the polic reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its exis existe tenc nce e from from the the very very exis existe tenc nce e of the the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined defined in its scope; scope; it is said said to be co‐ extensive with self‐protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all all gove govern rnmen menta tall proc proces esse ses, s, the the most most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under under a modern modern democrat democratic ic framew framework ork where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public inte intere rest st and and publ public ic welf welfar are e have have beco become me almost all‐embracing all‐embracing and have transcended human human foresig foresight. ht. Otherw Otherwise ise state stated, d, as we cannot cannot foresee foresee the needs and demand demands s of public interest and welfare in this constantly chan changi ging ng and and prog progre ress ssiv ive e worl world, d, so we cann cannot ot delim delimit it befo before reha hand nd the the exte extent nt or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not not defi define ne the the scop scope e or exten extentt of the the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations limitations thereof thereof.. The most impo import rtan antt of thes these e are are the the due due proc proces ess s clause and the equal protection clause. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail busi busine ness ss and and free free citi citize zens ns and and coun countr try y from from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the the law law does does not not viol violat ate e the the equa equall prot protec ecti tion on



warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed in the the case case at bar bar as bein being g viol violat ativ ive e of the the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided, "one‐sided, onerous onerous and patently illegal and immoral immoral because because [they] [they] will will ma mak ke ma manu nufa fact ctur urer ers s and and deal dealer ers s inst instan antt millionaires at the expense of car owners who are comp compel elle led d to buy buy a set set of the the so‐ca so‐call lled ed earl early y warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set. set."" 14 are are unla unlawfu wfull and and unco uncons nsti titu tuti tion onal al and and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the the part part of the the mo moto tori rist sts s who who coul could d very very we well ll provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a bett better er subs substi titu tute te to the the spec specif ifie ied d set set of EWD's." Held: Petitio Petitioner’s ner’s contentio contention n is erroneou erroneous s because because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereig sovereignty nty.” .” In the leading leading case of Calalang Calalang v. police power Williams, Justice Justice Laurel Laurel identified identified police with state authority to enact legislation that may may inte interf rfer ere e with ith perso erson nal lib liberty erty or proper property ty in order order to promot promote e the general general welfare. Perso Persons ns and and prope property rty could could thus thus ‘be ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order der for for the the genera nerall com omfo fort rt,, heal healtth and prosp prosperi erity ty of the state. state.’’ This This doctri doctrine ne was later later Primicias ias v. Fugos Fugoso o which reite reiterat rated ed again again in Primic referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulation regulations s to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and genera generall welfar welfare e of the people. people.’’ The concept concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a prepre-Co Comm mmon onwe weal alth th deci decisi sion on as ‘that inhe inhere rent nt and and plen plenar ary y powe powerr in the the Stat State e which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comf omfort ort, safet afety y and and welf welfar are e of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exige exigenci ncies es of the times, times, even even to antici anticipat pate e the future future where it could could be done, done, provides provides enough enough room room for for an effi effici cien entt and and flex flexib ible le resp respon onse se to condition conditions s and circumst circumstances ances thus assuring assuring the grea greate test st bene benefi fits ts.. In the the lang langua uage ge of Just Justic ice e Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynam dynamic ic agency agency,, suitab suitably ly vague vague and far from from precisely precisely defined, rooted in the concepti conception on that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional righ rights ts did did not not inte intend nd ther thereb eby y to enab enable le an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unre unreaso asonab nably ly the the enactm enactment ent of such such salut salutary ary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts: Thi This s Cour Courtt has has befo before re it the the delic delicat ate e task task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legi legisl slat ativ ive e enac enactm tmen ent, t, fund fundam amen enta tall and and far‐ far‐ reach reaching ing in signif significa icance nce.. The enactm enactment ent poses poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disput disputed ed law law purpo purports rts to remed remedy y reall really y or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer retailer.. Through Through it, and within the field of econ econom omy y it regu regula late tes, s, Cong Congre ress ss atte attemp mpts ts to tran transl slat ate e nati nation onal al aspi aspira rati tion ons s for for econ econom omic ic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free free the the nati nation onal al reta retail iler er from from the the comp compet etin ing g dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic depe depend nden ence ce and and bond bondag age. e. Do the the fact facts s and and circumstances circumstances justify the enactment? Held: police e powe powerr is so far far ‐ It has been said the polic reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its exis existe tenc nce e from from the the very very exis existe tenc nce e of the the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined defined in its scope; scope; it is said said to be co‐ extensive with self‐protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all all gove govern rnmen menta tall proc proces esse ses, s, the the most most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under under a modern modern democrat democratic ic framew framework ork where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public inte intere rest st and and publ public ic welf welfar are e have have beco become me almost all‐embracing all‐embracing and have transcended human human foresig foresight. ht. Otherw Otherwise ise state stated, d, as we cannot cannot foresee foresee the needs and demand demands s of public interest and welfare in this constantly chan changi ging ng and and prog progre ress ssiv ive e worl world, d, so we cann cannot ot delim delimit it befo before reha hand nd the the exte extent nt or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not not defi define ne the the scop scope e or exten extentt of the the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations limitations thereof thereof.. The most impo import rtan antt of thes these e are are the the due due proc proces ess s clause and the equal protection clause. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail busi busine ness ss and and free free citi citize zens ns and and coun countr try y from from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the the law law does does not not viol violat ate e the the equa equall prot protec ecti tion on



clau clause se of the the Cons Consti titu tuti tion on beca becaus use e suff suffic icie ient nt grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prosp prospect ective ive in operat operation ion and recogn recognize izes s the the priv privil ileg ege e of alie aliens ns alre alread ady y enga engage ged d in the the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but but actual actually ly necess necessary ary — and that in any case such such matter matter falls falls within within the the prero prerogat gative ive of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial Judicial department department of the Government Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embrac embraced ed in the title, title, and this suffer suffers s from from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segmen segmentt of the popula populatio tion n affect affected; ed; and that that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with with treat treaty y obliga obligatio tions ns becaus because e no treat treaty y has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treat eaty or any other conventiona onal agreement. THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act Act regul regulati ating ng the regis registra tratio tion, n, brand branding ing,, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial trial court court found found that that appell appellant ant slaugh slaughter tered ed or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a perm permit it from from the the muni munici cipa pall trea treasu sure rerr of the the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the the animal animal but was not given given one because because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carab carabao ao in a plac place e othe otherr than than the the muni munici cipa pall slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos carabaos unfit for agricultur agricultural al work can be slaughtered. Held: The The exten extentt and limits limits of what what is known known as the poli police ce powe powerr have have been been a frui fruitf tful ul subj subjec ectt of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abat abatem emen ent, t, by summ summar ary y proc procee eedi ding ngs, s, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order order the the destr destruct uction ion of a house house fallin falling g to deca decay y or othe otherw rwis ise e enda endang nger erin ing g the the live lives s of passers‐by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the the regu regulat lation ion of railwa railways ys and other other mea means ns of publi public c convey conveyanc ance, e, and of inter intermen ments ts in burial burial

grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain certain localities localities;; the compulsa compulsary ry vaccinatio vaccination n of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants vagrants,, beggars, beggars, and habitual habitual drunkar drunkards; ds; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places places where where intox intoxica icatin ting g liquor liquors s are are sold. sold. Beyon eyond d this, his, howe howeve verr, the the State tate may may inte interf rfer ere e wher wherev ever er the the publ public ic inte intere rest sts s dema demand nd it, it, and and in this this part partic icul ular ar a larg large e disc discre reti tion on is nece necess ssar aril ily y vest vested ed in the the legislature to determine, not only what the inte intere rest sts s of the the publ public ic requ requir ire, e, but but what what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests interes ts. ( Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State State in thus thus interposi interposing ng its authority authority in behalf behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a partic particula ularr class, class, requi require re such such interf interfere erence nce;; and, and, seco second nd,, that that the the me mean ans s are are reas reason onab ably ly necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the the publ public ic inte intere rest sts, s, arbi arbitr trar aril ily y inte interf rfer ere e with with priv rivate ate busin siness, ess, or impo impose se unu unusua sual and and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the the enac enactm tmen entt of the the prov provis isio ion ns of the the statute under consideration was required by "the "the inte intere rest sts s of the the publ public ic gene genera rally lly,, as dist distin ingu guis ishe hed d from from thos those e of a part partic icul ular ar class lass;" ;" and and that that the proh prohib ibit itio ion n of the the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private owners ownership hip,, to protec protectt the commun community ity from from the loss of the services of such animals by thei theirr slau slaugh ghte terr by impr improv ovid iden entt owne owners rs,, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. Chief Chief Justic Justice e Redfiel edfield, d, in Thorpe Thorpe vs. Rutlan Rutland d & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and and burd burden ens, s, in orde orderr to secu secure re the the gene genera rall comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfec perfectt right right in the legislat legislatur ure e to do which which no quest question ion ever ever was was,, or, upon upon acknow acknowled ledge ge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY Facts: The The case case arises arises from from the the fact fact that that defend defendant ant,,


CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case? Held: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." "The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services

in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create



irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particularstrip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides

with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in



favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation用rice or value of the lot at the time of the taking. REPUBLIC VS. PLDT Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement. Held: Yes, the state may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC Facts: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal

protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period. Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national



historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose. Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted. Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines. EPZA VS. DULAY Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the

legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. DE KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’ property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished. The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation. Issue: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject. Held: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said land. The Knechts'



right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, the order of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government. Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law 8 one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility.Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,

because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. Issue:Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard US vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil 104 Facts: Defendant, Ling Su Fan, is accused of attempting to export Philippine silver coins from the Philippines contrary to Act No. 1411 of the Philippine Commission. His defenses, among others, involved the deprivation of due process due to the confiscation of the coins. Held: ...phrase "due process of law" was defined by Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as " the law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice." Due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribed for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, says: "Due process of law" is process or proceedings according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is not that the law shal l be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply — First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;



Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class. Lower court's decision was affirmed convicting him guilty with costs against him White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila Facts: City of Manila passes an Ordinance preventing hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments offer ing shorttime admission as well as pro-rated or wash up rates for abbreviated stays. Petitioners allege, among others, that the Ordinance deprives their customers the Constitutional guaranty to the right of due process. Held: The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absol ute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relie ve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality. Petition was granted by the Court and held the Ordinance unconstitutional. Banco Español vs. Palanca, 37 Phil 921 Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property in Manila. The debt amounted to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly. Property's estimated value was about P292,558. After the instrument's execution, mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and died on January 29, 1810. The foreclosure proceeding

needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was made in a newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office in a stamped envelope of the summons and complaint directed to defendant. The clerk, however, failed to comply with the mail publication requirement. The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant. After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal. His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced. Held: 1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; 2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; 3. The defendant must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and 4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful HEARING. The essentials of procedural fairness inn judicial proceedings are: Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is accordingly affirmed. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR FACTS: Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union. The National Labor Union’s case: they alleged that Toribio Teodoro, who dominated the National Workers’ Brotherhood of Ang Tibay,made a false claim that there was a shortage of leather soles in ANg Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off workers, however, claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs & the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adapted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, inc., from work. · Unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.· That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due



diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein. HELD: motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new trial granted. Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. Court of Industrial Relations 10 an administrative court - exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees - has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in a ccordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of le gal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. have something to support the decision 4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion." 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its

judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. 7.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The court observed that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest of justice, a new trial should commence giving the movant the opportunity to present new evidence. Diosdado Guzman vs National University Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.” Held: Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitionersstudents had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism,

CREATED BY: JNMONTECLARO, KVALMORIA, ADULOSA, and other sources - 10 -


coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court Facts: The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A which prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. Held: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an

implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional. Tanada vs Tuvera Facts: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. Issue: WON publication is needed for laws that were to become effective immediately.



Held: It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law is effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Halili vs Public Service Commission Facts: A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and annulment of an order by respondent Public Service Commission dated July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall, Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public convenience to operate autotruck services between Balara and various points in the City of Manila and its suburbs. On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent Commission alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence presented in the hearing, and

praying that the certificate be amended. On the following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the petition. Issue: WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the Commission. WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated. Held: The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued and petitioner’s right to due process was violated. In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly authorized. In the second place, the change ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent in character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those may be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We declare it is not, because due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated. In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tri bunal having jurisdiction to determine the question in dispute. By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full power to grant relief. Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself.



A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. Serrano vs Commission

National

Labor

Relations

Facts: A petition was filed seeking a review of a resolution made by the National Labor relations commission which reversed the decision rendered by theLaborArbiter and dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store. Sometime in 1991, as a costcutting measure, said respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency. A memorandum was subsequently wrote to petitioner informing him of his termination immediately (date of effectivity of termination was exactly the same as the date the memorandum was made). Issue: WON there was a violation of petitioner's right to due process when respondent-employer failed to give the required 1 month notice provided in the Labor Code. Held: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process." There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff. The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods. The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the

power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282. We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. Lao Gi v Court of Appeals Facts: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the of the order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest but was denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari in the CFI of Manila which was dismissed fo lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens. Held: The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and



extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.

be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:

Facts: “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.

c)No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent commission on immigration and deportation is hereby set aside. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should

PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the nonChristian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the nonChristian tribes” The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of lif e and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of nonChristians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on



sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:

(1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The SolicitorGeneral adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. Villegas vs Ho Facts: A petition for certiorari is filed to review the decision rendered by the CFI of Manila wherein Ordinance 6537, which prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of fifty pesos xxx, was declared null and void for it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Issue: WON respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that ordinance 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.



Held: No, respondent judge did not commit the errors assigned. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing Facts: Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than their counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreignhire would necessarily uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as local-hires. Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. Hence the present petition.

Issue: WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification made by respondent-school. Held: Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. Republic vs

Sandiganbayan

Facts: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all illgotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,



subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order” and the power “(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.” Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters. The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00. The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas. Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim

that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income. This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known. The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Board’s consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60. Issue: WON the bill of rights was operative at the time of President Aquino issued E.O. 1 Ruling: The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution .” The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”) remained in effect during the interregnum. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights



during the interregnum. It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election . Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution. Manalili v CA

(GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police AntiNarcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis. Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence. Held: The general rule is a search and seizure must be

validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding. The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched. Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent court. Agcaoili vs Molina Facts: In the aforecited order, complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the offense charged. Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause from an examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses." 2 Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must be something more concrete. Consequently, in the same order, complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest and the order directing its issuance and directed the National Bureau of Investigation, through Regional Office No. 2, Ilagan, Isabela, to conduct an investigation in order to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice. In his Comment, respondent admitted that he was



the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation of the above entitled case and finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri, Cagayan. 3 Respondent explained that since the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which has the final say and disposition on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, should carry the brunt of the responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause. 4 Respondent judge argued that the findings of complainant judge in his 9 August 1993 order is his opinion-argument and contended that "the proper remedy for a seemingly weak probable cause finding is a reinvestigation." 5 Issue: WON there was probable cause in the issuance of a warrant. Ruling: Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 8 Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in determining probable cause, an elementary legal principle must not be compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause. The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. 9 Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever. PEOPLE VS ESTRADA FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of

the present case are as follows: > Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant) >Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products. > On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void. Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant 958. Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged — for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case — and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same.



But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefore during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. Stonehill v Diokno Facts: Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices,

warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized. Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized PARTICULARLY. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued. Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court. Held: The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners. The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is because corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties. As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly. In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid search warrant. The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants. The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and void.



People vs Court of Appeals Facts: The properties consisted of 27 units of distribution transformers of various sizes sold to the University of the Philippines-Iloilo (UP, for short) and delivered on June 15, 1987. The agreed price, including installation cost, was $39,516.00 and was fully paid by UP to the seller, Varona Trading, through its general manager, Danilo Varona. On June 27, 1987, these same properties were pulled out by Varona on the excuse that they had certain factory defects that had to be repaired. When Varona failed to comply with UP's demand for their return pending their replacement, UP referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, which found that the properties were in the warehouse of Ruben Siao, herein private respondent. NBI applied for and secured the questioned search warrant, 1 which was issued by Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on September 25, 1987. On the strength of this warrant, NBI seized the said transformers, which were later ascertained to be the same transformers sold to UP, not only by their serial numbers but also because the crates where they were contained were marked "UP-Iloilo." On September 28, Siao filed an urgent motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that Nissen-Denki Philippine Corporation, of which he was the manager, had bought the said transformers from Varona for the sum of P702,483.00. The motion was denied on December 10, 1987, after a lengthy exchange of pleadings between the parties. However, on July 7, 1988, again after a spirited debate between the petitioner and the private respondent, Judge Dayrit granted Siao's motion for reconsideration and dissolved the search warrant. He also ordered the NBI to return the seized transformers to Siao. UP had filed a complaint for estafa against Varona and Siao and the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City had lodged the corresponding information before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Upon reinvestigation of the complaint, however, it was found that there was no cause to hold Siao for trial and accordingly, on motion of the prosecution, the case against him was dismissed by the trial court on October 13, 1989. Issue: WON the search warrant was valid. Ruling: The search warrant issued by the trial court left the space in the caption intended for the nature of the offense in blank, indicating the uncertainty of petitioner and the court as to the crime committed and for which the search warrant was issued. On the other hand, all that the body of the search warrant stated was that the transformers were "Stolen or Embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense." But, since the particular offense was not

mentioned, the reason for the issuance of the search warrant could be anything under the sun. There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno 2 and of Section 3 of Rule 126 providing as follows: Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant . — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to searched and the things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.) Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue that it was in connection with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit's own words "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrant was totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by the very judge who had issued it. Probable cause is defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious person to rely on them, and to act in pursuance thereof." 3 At the time he issued the search warrant, there was in Judge Dayrit's view probable cause that a crime had been committed by Siao, who had possession of the subject properties. However, such probable cause no longer exists now because the information for estafa against Siao has already been dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on motion of the prosecution itself. Siao's guilt is no longer open for conjecture. Abdula vs Guiani Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City, was filed before the Supreme Court. A complaint for murder was filed but was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the gorund that there was no prima facie case for murder again a number of accused (6). However, he recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents (accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial prosecutor for further investigation since there was no necessary resolution required under the Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8 respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it was assigned for



reinvestigation to another prosecutor who then recommended the filing of charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners. On January 2, 1995, an information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The following day, January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. On January 4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside of saide warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the warrant of Arrest be set aside and declared void ab initio. Issue: WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside and declared void ab initio. Held: Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Ho vs. People 41 summarizes existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows: Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to

emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. CONSEQUENTLY, THE WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID. PICOP vs. Asuncion GR 122092 May 19, 1999 Facts: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the Quezon City RTC, stating:



1. The management of PICOP located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which … are being kept and concealed in the premises described. 2. That the Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties: a. 70 M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56 b. 10 M16 US rifles c. 2 AK-47 rifles d. 2 UZI submachine guns e. 2 M203 Grenade Launchers cal. 40mm f. 10 cal. 45 pistols g. 10 cal. 38 revolvers h. 2 ammunition reloading machines i. Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms j. 10 hand grenades After propounding several questions to SPO3 Bacolod, Judge Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion complied with the requisites for a valid issuance. Held: Sections 3 & 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide in detail the requisites for the valid issuance of search warrants. The requisites are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is INVALID because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Bacolod had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. Chief Inspector Pascua was asked was not asked nor said anything more in his application. He even failed to affirm it. The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions. Judge Asuncion heavily relied on their affidavits. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make

his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. SPO3 Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. However, his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives in violation of PD 1866. Lastly, the search warrant failed to describe particularly the place to be searched. It merely authorized the search of the aforementioned premises. The warrant thus gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. Since the evidences are illegally obtained, they are deemed inadmissible in Court. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED, & the Search Warrant declared NULL & VOID. PEOPLE VS CA (291 SCRA 400) FACTS A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. >An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and f irearms. ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. HELD: The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied



for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. VALLEJO VS CA FACTS: A SW was applied for and subsequently issued by respondents to be served in the Registry of Deeds, provincial capitol of Isabela in which it enumerated the things to be seized: 1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith; 2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds; 3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps. A motion to quash the SW was filed by the respondent contending that the things to be seized were not described with particularity and was in a nature of a general warrant, therefore, is a violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures but was denied by the RTC and the CA. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. (The OSG in its comment agreed with petitioners.) ISSUE: WON the warrant issued by the RTC was valid.

HELD: Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant . – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record . – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other property(test of particularity). As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used in the warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the records pertaining to all the transactions of the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of the things to be seized. PEOPLE VS LAGUIO JR. FACTS: Respondent was acquitted on 3 different cases filed against him (dangerous drugs act, illegal possession of firearms and comelec gun ban) after his demurrer to evidence (inadmissibility of the evidence) was granted due to the illegal/unlawful arrest, search and seizure that was conducted by the police officers contending that he was arrested in flagrante delicto but the defense further presented that respondent did not do any overt act to make him be subject to a warrantless arrest under the exceptions in section 5 of rule 113. ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a WOA and/or SW. HELD: There are actually two (2) acts involved in this



case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. Section 5, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. PEOPLE VS. TABAR

FACTS: Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which provided that: That on or about the 8th day of February 1989, at about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell and deliver, without authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol. of Sec. 4, Art. 11, of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Act of 1972. The accused were then convicted of the offense charged against them in the trial court. On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower court erred in admitting the evidence against her when there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore, violating the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: WON there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. RULING: The second assigned error is without merit. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of the team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without the corresponding arrest and search warrants Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were without a warrant, the appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the seach and seizure. In People vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled: When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. PEOPLE VS. DORIA



FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers searched for the marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Both accused were convicted of the crime chared. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid. HELD: We hold that the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for

appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT Facts: In an information filed against the accusedappellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the



third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed f our (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug

which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. ACCUSED’S DEFENSE During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him. Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the



NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant. PEOPLE VS. AMINUDIN Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal. Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged. MALACAT vs. CA Facts: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspici ously when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Musli m-looking men. When the policemen approached t he group of men, they scattered in all directions w hich prompted the police to give chase and petitio ner was then apprehended and a search was made on his person. He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein petition er contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of th e hand grenade from him was an appropriate incid ent to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the h and grenade as evidence since it was admissible b ecause it was a product of an unreasonable and ill egal search. Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by t he police was valid. Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of



facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’ At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry , thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear

for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-andfrisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. GO VS. CA FACTS: Petitioner was the primary suspect of killing of Maguan when he was seen by a security officer near the place where his and the victim’s car almost collided at the corner of a street, after which he went of out of his car and shot Maguan, which caused his death later on, then went back to his car and left the scene. He was then arrested days after the crime happened. ISSUE: WON a lawful warratless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go. HELD: We do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal



knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. Information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. Held: Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is

serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted. UMIL VS. RAMOS Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Binan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested. Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as i t can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON Facts: Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession more than



500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu were seized from her. Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that her constitutional rights were infringed when such search was conducted. Issue: WON a valid search was made. Held: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)

(b)

when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and…

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.[18] The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked

luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers ordinary constitutional on notice that protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto. PAPA VS. MAGO Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made without any search warrant and whether the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods. Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid? Held: Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising



police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. ROBIN PADILLA VS. CA Facts: Petitioner was involved in a hit and run accident and was later apprehended by the police after he was chased by them. During the arrest, petitioner was found to have in his possession two different firearms and 2 other firearms were found inside his vehicle after the policemen saw the first two firearms he was carrying. Petitioner was then convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Hence the present petition. Issue: WON the warrantless search and arrest conducted on petitioner was valid Held: Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

(i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46, 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested



In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which wasimmediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that: (W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers f or the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53 Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant. With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the twotiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or

probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS Facts: Respondent was found guilty of violation of the dangerous drugs act. She was arrested after she was carrying a bag alleged to have prohibited drugs inside. The bag, before it came to her possession was found inside a passenger jeepney with no owner so the policeman looked inside it only to find packs of marijuana. The policeman was acting on a report made about the bag by an agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network. Issue: WON the warrantless search conducted was valid. Held:Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time. Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.13 The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18



Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. 19 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. PEOPLE VS. SUZUKI Facts: Appellant was found guilty of illeal possession of prohibited drugs and was sentenced to death. Hence, the instant review. The facts of the case are: Appellant was in the airport for his flight to Manila. PASCOM and NARCOM agents were in the airport to follow on reports on drug trafficking. When he walked through the metal detector, the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and nothing was found on his person so they proceeded to check his luggage but appellant refused then consented eventually and opened it. There they found packs of aluminum foil and when opened, it was found to be marijuana. Issue: WON the PASCOM agents were authorized to conduct the search. WON accused consented to the search. WON the search was conducted was incidental to a lawful arrest. WON the confiscated items were in plain view. Held: In PPvs.Canton and PPvs.Johnson we validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons, thus: "Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.xxx" It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving

his right by giving consent to the search or seizure.9 Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents. It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.12 Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 13 The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.14 Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the "plain view" of the police officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities. Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful arrest before the search can be made. SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE Facts: Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable goods (branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were observing their conduct and found it to be suspicious during a special mission given to them to make a routine surveillance to check on reports of alleged trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by PAL employees. Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the present petition. Issue: WON the seized items are admissible in evidence. Held: Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under



the customs law.

In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar. In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individual’s private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm. EPIE JR. VS. ULAT-MARREDO Facts: Petitioners were caught to have in their possession lumber and subsequently could not produce any permit from the DENR for them to cut and transport the same. Such incident happened after the police came about a report of a vehicle transporting lumber without permit and after which set up a roadblock to catch said vehicle. After the described vehicle was spotted by the police they intercepted it. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same. Issue: WON the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant. Held: In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency

circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case. Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure. In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. VALMONTE VS. GEN. DE VILLA FACTS: On January 20, 1987, the NCRDC was activated with the mission of conducting security operationswithhin its area of responsibility and peripheral areas for thepurpose of establishing an effective territorialdefense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the NCR. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that because of the institution of said checkpoints, the Velanzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups especially at night or at dawn without a search warrant or a court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. HELD: Petitioner’s concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se illegal.



No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners’ right against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search which is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. PEOPLE VS ESCANO Facts: Accused-appellants were violation of PD 1866 and violation of gun ban due to a checkpoint search the police which search was questioned by herein petitioners.

convicted of the COMELEC conducted by subsequently

Issue: WON the checkpoint search conducted valid? Held: This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.47 For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against

unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated.49 Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting the three accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police of the trunk of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. WHO VS. AQUINO Facts: An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action Center) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO (World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the matter. Issue: WON diplomatic immunity is applicable. Held: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. 9 Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."



PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY FACTS: Respondent was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in which he was convicted in the lower court. The information provides That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died. Contrary to law. 3 Respondent made an extra-judicial confession during the custodial investigation which was then admitted as evidence against him but he subsequently pleaded not guilty of the offense charged against him and further contended that when he was apprehended, he heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession but evidence proved otherwise. HELD: Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the socalled Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the

arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; 8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;


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