EMILE DURKHEIM On the Division of Labor in Society. Book1, Chp 1: 'The method of determining this function' In this chapter, Durkheim asks what the d ivision ivision of o f labor (DOL) in society is. First, he states that since the DOL increases both the t he reproductive capacity and skill of the workman, it is the necessary condition for the intellectual and material development in societies (12). However, t he DOL also has a moral mora l character which is more important. It can create a feeling of solidarity between two or more people (17). To explain how the DOL contributes to feelings of solidarity, Durkheim (DH) uses the simple example of a married couple. He claims that if the DOL between the sexes were reduced to a certain point, material life would disappear, o nly to leave behind sexual relationships. The DOL goes beyond purely econo mic interests; it it constitutes co nstitutes the establishment of a social and moral order sui generis. However, DH admits that in marriage people are also bounded because of their similarities. similarities. In this sense, they t hey are bonded outside the DOL (22). The marriage analogy cannot explain the significance of the DOL for large soc ieties. ieties. DH asserts, 'these great political societies cannot sustain their equilibrium save by the spec ialization of tasks; the DOL is the source...of social soc ial solidarity solidarity (23). DH states here that Comte was the first to point out that the DOL was something other than a purely economic phenomenon. Comte argued that it was the 'continuous distribution of different human tasks which co nstitutes the principal element in social solidarity' (23). The DOL has a moral character because the needs which it fulfills for social solidarity, solidarity, order, and harmony are moral needs (24). Law The most visible symbol of social solidarity is law (24). Law is the organization of social life in its most stable and precise form. All the essential varieties of social solidarity are reflected in law (25). We can classify different types of law to see which types of social solidarity correspond to them. Two types of law exist. The first type is repressive (covers penal law), which imposes some type of 'damage' on the perpetrator. The second type is restitutive, which does not necessarily imply any suffering on the part o f the perpetrator but consists of restoring the previous relationships which have been d isturbed from their normal form form (covers civil, communal, procedural law). Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society. Book1, Chp2 'Mechanical So lidarity, lidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities,' In this chapter, DH demonstrates how repressive law reflects a so ciety characterized by mechanical solidarity. Penal rules express the basic conditions of collective life for each type o f society (32). The nature of crime 'disturbs those feelings that in any one type o f society are to be found in every healthy conscious' (34). in 'Lower forms' of society (those most simply organized) law is
almost exclusively penal or repressive (37). Penal law demonstrates the strength of the resistance of collective sentiment to a given crime (38). The collective conscience is the tot ality ality of o f beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society that forms a determinate det erminate system with a life of its own (39). Durkheim defines an act as criminal when it offends the collective conscience (39). It is actually public opinion and opposition o pposition which constitutes the crime. An act o ffends the common consciousness not because it is criminal, criminal, but it is criminal because it offends that consciousness. A crime is a crime because we condemn it (40). All crimes floe floe directly d irectly or indirectly from the collective conscience (43). The role of an authority aut hority with power to govern is to ensure respect for collective practices and to defend the common consciousness from its 'enemies.' In lower societies, this authority is greatest where the seriousness of the crime weighs the hea viest. Here the collective consciousness posses the most power (43). DH argues that in antiquity, people punished for the sake of punishment. However, nowadays society punishes in order to instill fear in potential cr iminals (46). Yet, punishment has still remained an act of vengeance and expiation (atonement). What society avenges, and what the criminal must expiate, is the 'outrage to morality' morality' (47). It is the attack upon society that is repressed by punishment. Punishment is a 'reaction of passionate feeling, graduat ed in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organized body over those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct' (52). Punishing P unishing crime sustains the common consciousness. Two consciousnesses exist within humans: one which represents individual personalities personalities and the other which represents the collectivity (61). The force which is shocked by crime is the result o f the most vital social similarities and its effect is to maintain the social cohesion t hat arises from these similarities (61). Punishment publicly demonstrates that the sentiments of the collectivity are still unchanged (despite the deviant ways) of the offender and thusthe injury that the crime inflicted on society is made good. In fact, the primary intent of punishment is to affect affect honest peo ple (63). In this chapter, Durkheim shows that a social solidarity exists exists because a certain number of states of consciousness are common to all members of the same society. This is the solidarity which repressive law embodies. Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society Book1 Chp 3 'Solidarity Arising From the DOL, or Organic Solidarity' To start his discussion of restitutory law which corresponds to t he organic state of society, DH contrasts it to repressive law. Whereas repressive law corresponds to the 'center o f common consciousness,' restitutory sanctions either constitute no part at all of the co llective
consciousness, or subsist in it weakly. Second, whereas repressive law tends to stay diffused throughout society, restitutory law works through more specialized bod ies: ie, courts, magistrates, and lawyers (69-70). Despite the removed role of restitutory law from society, soc iety still intervenes in restitutory sanctioning. The formation of a contract directly concerns the parties involved: nonetheless, if a contract has a binding force, it is society which confers that force. If society does not give its blessing to the obligations that have been contracted, then these obligations are reduced to only moral promises. Hence the presence of society in restitutory law, although not necessarily felt, is nonetheless essential. Part of restitutory law, the corpus of real rights (the right to property and mortgage), corresponds to negative solidarity. Negative solidarity can co nsist of links between persons and things. However, relationships between people, thoug h in no way 'real,' can a lso express negative solidarity. This occurs when the relationships are created to prevent or repair damage. These relationships do not imply co-operation (74). Hence, the rules relating to real rights form a definite system whose function is not to link the d ifferent parts of society together, but to clearly mark the barriers which separate them. Negative solidarity is actually only possible where po sitive solidarity is present. for a man to recognize that others have rights, he must limit his own. This 'mutual limitation' is only realizable in a spirit of understanding and harmony. To need peace, men must already be united in a bond of sociability (different from Hobbes). Aside from 'real' rights which DH considers ultimately expressive of negative solidarity, the rest of restitutory law (domestic law, contractual law, co mmunal law, procedural law)expresses a positive cooperation which derives essentially from the DOL (77). For instance, civil law (adoption, divorce, etc)determines how various family functions are a llocated and expresses the solidarity that unites the members of the family as a result of the domestic DOL (78). The relationship of the DOL to contractual law is similar. Contracts typically involve reciprocal obligations that involve co-operation. Law plays a part in society analogous to the nervous system in an organisms. The system regulates the various body functions so they work together in harmony. The nervous system thus expresses the degree of concentration that the organism has reached as a result of the physiological DOL. Likewise, we can ascert ain the measure of concentration that a society has reached through the social DOL, according to the development of cooperative law with its restitutory sanctions. There are two types of positive solidarity. The first kind, mechanical solidarity, links the individual to society without any intermediary. Soc iety is organized collectively and is composed of beliefs common to all members of the group. The bond which u nites the individual with society is completely analogous to that which links the thing to the person. The individual consciousness depends on the collective consciousness.
In the second kind of solidarity, organic solidarity, the society is a system of different functions united by definite relationships (83). This brings about the DOL. Here each individual must have a sphere of action and a personality which is his own. Individuality grows at the same time as the parts of society. Society becomes more effective at moving in concert though at the same time each of its elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own. Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society Book1 Chp4 'Another Proof of the Preceding Theory' The preponderance of repressive law over cooperative law must be greater when the collective type of solidarity is more pronounced and the DOL more rudimentary. yet to the degree that tasks become specialized, the balance between society and the type of law becomes upset and begins to change (88). The more primitive a society is, the more resemblances there are between its members. By contrast, members of advanced, 'civilized' soc ieties are quite distinguishable from one another (89). Organic similarities correspond to psychological similarities between members of pr imitive societies. Furthermore, members of advanced soc ieties are increasingly organically and psychologically different. Diversity becomes greater as types beco me more developed (91). Hence, the higher the social type, the more developed the DOL. The two forms of law Durkheim distinguishes preceding this chapter vary at diverse levels on the social scale. In the lowest societies, the state of law seems wholly repressive. DH shows from the Pentateuch (ancient Hebrew law) that cooperative and restitutory law amounted to little in primitive societies (93). In fact, the whole society under He brew law appeared repressive. Society insisted on expiation and not mere reparation (94). Repression dominates the entire corpus of law in lower societies because re ligion (repressive in nature) permeates all legal activity (94). Although repressive law has not diminished in importance in modern times, restitutory law has expanded greatly and has grown more complex with the development of society (97). Yet, contractual law (procedural/restitutory)is still not entirely separated from penal (repressive law), because often the refusal to comply with a contract results in a fine (97). However, repressive and restitutory law still vary fairly directly with the degree o f society's development. Repressive law, typically involving sanctions for crimes against the whole community is common in lower, mechanical societies. law is simply an expression of morals. Where acts of violence are frequent, they are tolerated. their criminal character is in inverse proportion to their frequency. Thus, in lower societies crimes against the individual are common and placed on the lower rung of the penal ladder. Instead, crimes against the community take priority. This is because in lower societies the evo lution of the collective consciousness is widespread and strong, while the DOL has not yet taken place (99). Durkheim, Emile. On the division of Labor in Society Book1 Chp7 'Organic solidarity and Contractual Solidarity'
Durkheim bases this detailed discussion of organic solidarity and contracts on a dispute against Spencer. Spencer claims that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a coercive apparatus to produce or maintain it. Social harmony is simply established of its own accord. Durkheim asserts that, were this the case, the sp here of social action would diminish greatly because it would no longer be needed except to enforce negative solidarity (149). This is not the case. Spencer also argues that the normal form of exchange is contract. For this reason, the extent of central authority diminishes. As freedom of action increases, contracts beco me more general. This general social contract requires the free agreement o f human wills and is irreconcilable with the DOL. DH states that this type of spontaneous, general social contract has never existed. Societies are spontaneously contractual only to the extent that an individual choo ses to remain in the society in which he was born, and hence he abides by that society's rules. For Spencer, society would be no more than the establishment of relationships between individuals exchanging the products of their labor without any social action intervening to regulate that exchange (152). Durkheim disputes Spencer by claiming that social intervention is on the rise. the legal obligations which society imposes on its members are becoming more and more complex. restitutory law is growing. If social intervention no longer has the e ffect of imposing certain uniform practices on everybody, it consists more in defining and regulating the special relationship between the different social functions (153). Spencer would answer that not every kind of control has decreased, just positive control. Durkheim counters that positive control is far from disappearing; in fact, restitutory law is continually growing (154). [negative control = regulations which make a person refrain from acting e.g., do not help a farmer with his crop, simply prevent him from stealing his neighbor's.] [positive control = regulations which make a p erson act eg,impose a certain method of farming upon a farmer] Durkheim next states that although Spencer is correct in claiming that contractual relationships are multiplied as society is divided up, he has failed to note that non-contractual relationships are developing at the same t ime (155). Durkheim argues that 'private law,' typically contractua l, is really quite public. For instance, marriage and adoption, although private matters, were formerly endorsed by the church and are now endorsed by civil authority (155). As domestic obligations become more numerous, they tend to take on a private character. The role played by contract is continually decreasing, and social control over the way obligations are regulated is increasing. This is due to the progressive disappearance of segmentary organization. Everything segmentary is increasingly absorbed into larger society.
The contracts that remain are entirely removed from the sphere of individual negotiation and are submitted to the regulatory force of society. contractual law exists to determine the legal consequences of our acts which we have not settled beforehand. It expresses the normal conditions for attaining equilibrium and constrains us to respect o bligations for which we have not contracted. it is the role of society to determine what contractual conditions are capable of being executed, and if necessary, to restore them to their normal form (162). And just as society plays a role in shaping contracts, contracts play a role in shaping society. An extensive network of relationships which contribute to social solidarity can stem from contracts. Durkheim also disputes Spencer's idea that exchange of information takes place freely on t he market place without a need for a regulating apparatus. Using a biological analogy, Durkheim insists that the 'sympathetic nerve system of society must include, apart from a system of transmission paths, truly regulatory organs which amplify or moderate stimuli according to need (165). The state's role as regulator beco mes increasingly larger and diverse the higher the type of society (167). The growth of government is attributable to the progress of the DOL and to the process of transformation from segmentary societies to organized societies. First, the central organism faced with less resistance from the segmented forces, begins to develop and become more powerful. The local organs, instead of preserving their individuality, come to merge into the central mechanism (168-9). As a society becomes more and more organically organized, d isturbances even of a general character begin to have repurcussions on higher centers, which then become obliged to intervene (170). Social life is derived from a dual source: the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the social DOL (172). The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to rules, which under t he threat of repressive measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices. The more p ronounced the similarity, the more completely social life is mixed up with religious life (172). On the other hand, the DOL gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature of a divided up society, but punishment for law breakers in this case involves only reparative measures which lack any expiatory character (172). In organic society, members' dependence on the state continues to grow. As a result, they are continually reminded of their common so lidarity. Thus DH argues that altruism is not Spencer's conception of an ornament to social life, but it is the fundamental basis of social life. Every soc iety is a moral society, because men cannot cohabitate without agreeing and cooperating. Hence, even societies characterized by organic solidarity and the DOL are moral because cooperation has an intrinsic morality. this morality grows as the individual personality grows stronger (as oppo sed to in mechanical solidarity when morality depends on common sentiment) (173-4). There are 'two great currents of social life.' The first has origins in social similarityand is segmentary. it gradually becomes overshadowed by the second type of society, which is
composed of individual differences and organic cooperation. Nonetheless, the segmentary structure never completely disappears (174). Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society. Book 2 chap 2 'The Causes' In this chapter, DH explains the causes of the DOL. First, the segmentary o rganization of society must recede. The segments lose their individuality and they coalesce so that the 'social substance' is free to enter upon new combinations. Social life becomes more general and re lationships become more numerous. Individuals who were formerly separated from each other draw to gether and engage in active exchanges (moral or dynamic density) (201). The DOL is in direct proportion to the moral density of society. (Moral density also increases with the growth of physical density). the increase of social density can occur in three ways: 1: the increasing spatial concentration of a people 2: the growth of towns (towns do no exist in segmentary societies) (the development of urban centers is not pathological, but is representative of higher society) 3: increase in number and efficacy of means of communication (201-2). Although societies can increase in volume (absolute size), they do not necessarily increase in density. A society which grows larger but does not increase its social contacts can remain segmentary and not evolve into a division of labor (204).The growth and condensation of societies does not permit a greater DOL, but they necessitate it. Spencer claims that the variety of environments in which individuals live channels them to specialize in different paths of labor (eg: seashore ---]fisherman). If this specialization increases with the size of societies, it is because the internal differences increase at the same time. Durkheim asks however, is this diversity alone sufficient to bring about the DOL (206)? If such differences make the DOL possible, they do not impose that division. WHY do men specialize (208)? Labor become increasingly divided as societies grow in density not because of external circumstances, but because the struggle for existence becomes more strenuous (208). Men differentiate their specialties in order to decrease competition and to coexist (DH draws a comparison to Darwin's law of animal differentiation --]survival) (209). Hence, any concentration in the social mass necessarily determines the pro gress of the DOL (210). To the extent that the social constitution is segmentary, each segment has its own organs that are kept at a distance from similar organs by social partitions. but as these partitions disappear with the advancement of society, the segments begin to struggle to substitute each other. This struggle eventually diminishes, resulting in specialization. Thus higher societies make roo m for all their members (213). humans specialize and increase the DOL in order to survive in new co nditions of existence. Greater economic productivity is merely a consequence of the DOL, and not a cause or motivation (217).
The DOL must be carried out between members of a society that is already 'constituted.' (Those people facing competition who are not already in a bounded society will simply flee each other.) The DOL actually causes the activities which it differentiates to converge and brings peop le closer together (217). For this to occur, the members of society must not only be liked materially, but they must have moral ties (218). Thus, organic society must arise from a mechanical soc iety which already has a structure of collective beliefs. (this is directly opposite to Spencer's theory that a society is produced by cooperation. DH argues that cooperation necessarily supposes the pre-existence of society (219). For the DOL to function, groups which apparently perform distinct tasks must actually intermingle and be absorbed into one another (221). Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society Book2 Chp5 'Consequences of the Foregoing' In very simple societies, members can easily replace each other in tasks. Comte and Spencer would argue that in higher societies, as social organization is perfected, it becomes more and more impossible for members to switch out of roles. Ho wever, DH disagrees. He claims that the phenomena of substitution is also observable in even t he highest levels of society (271). A member of society must always be ready to change functions to accommodate a break in social equilibrium. as labor is divided up more in human societies, this elasticity increases. consequently the function becomes more and more independent of the organ (member of society) which performs it. For instance in higher soc ieties, men performing different social functions are distinguished less and less by physical features (2 The DOL is a necessary consequence of the growth of volume and density of society. as the number of individuals between whom social relations are established increases, men can only maintain their position by specializing more. Men g o forward because they must. Civilization is but an after-effect (not a cause) of the DOL (276). Furthermore, individuals are more a product of common social life than a determining factor in it. Individuals depend on the diversity of social conditions to differentiate themselves (277). The more numerous and d iverse individuals are, the more strongly and rapidly they react together . As a result, social life becomes more intense. This intensification constitutes civilization (278). The product of these soc ial relationships becomes an entity in itself (society sui generis). Spencer purports that the individual has every interest in establishing relationships which serve him alone. This activity shapes society, and social progress consists solely of improving these relationships for the maximization of individual ends. Durkheim contends, 'Spencer does not see in societies a true reality, existing by itself by virtue of specific and necessary causes, one that consequently bears down upon man, imposing upon him its own nature and to which he is forced to adapt in order to continue living' (281). (society sui generis) In effect, man does not shape society. according to DH, 'it is because society changes that we must change' (282). DH labels this concept a mechanistic theory of progress.' Because the ideal of civilization depends upon the ever changing social environment, we will never be without our goals for society (282). According to DH, man is more or less entirely guided by social life. He cred its very little to the
human psyche alone. He claims that man develops his psychological life in response to his level of sociability (284). Plus, man has only gained the ability to reason because he is a social animal. Social life even influences his emotions. as man's social life grows in complexity, so does his psyche. We should not present social life as the result of individual natures alone -- as does S pencer. Individual natures emerge from social life; consequently, social facts are not just a mere development of psychological facts (286). Everything found in the consciousness of individuals comes form society. Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society Book3 Ch1 'The Anomic DOL' The DOL is typically a normal phenomenon, but from time to time it enters a pathological state (291), In certain points of the social organism, certain functions are not adjusted to o ne another. As labor becomes increasingly divided up, these phenomena become more frequent .(eg: bankruptcies, commercial crises, hostility between labor and cap ital). DH applies the following ideas from Comte: The DOL, if pushed too far, can become a source of disintegration, The individual may isolate himself in his own special activity, forget his fellow workers, and no longer have any idea of what the common task co nsists (294). Although the diversity of functions is both useful and necessary, unity does not arise spontaneously. The task of realizing and maintaining it must be carried out by the state (295). DH states that the organ of government develops with the DOL, by mecha nical necessity. As social functions grow and differentiate, more events impact upon the controlling organ whose role as regulator consequently increases. However, the government cannot be omnipotent; in reality, the unity of organized soc ieties stems from the spontaneous co nsensus of its parts. the government can only 'bestow its blessing' on society. thus, as labor is divided up, a progressive decomposition over the whole of society can occur (297), furthermore, functional diversity creates a moral diversity . The co llective sentiments become powerless to contain the centrifugal tendencies brought about by the DOL. Although Comte saw the DOL as a source of solidarity, he did not perceive this solidarity as sui generis. for this reason, he saw the d isappearance of order in the DOL as a morbid phenomenon and a threat to social cohesion. However, DH contends that the weakening of the collective consciousness id normal. It is not possible for social life to be without struggle. Solidarity between organs in society cannot abolish competition but only moderate it (302). The regulatory process which stems from solidarity emerges form the DOL. T he DOL evokes definite ways of acting that relate to the unchanging conditions of social life. these ha bits become transformed into rules of conduct. If solidarity does not arise from the DOL, it is because the relationships between the organs in the system are not well regulated -- t hey are in a state of anomie. The ru les which stem from social solidarity where organs are in close contact fix the conditions of equilibrium to some degree. however, if contacts between organs are blocked, they cannot be repeated enough for rules to take on a definite form. Hence, the rules constituted from these relationships are only general and vague (304). For example, the conditions of industrial life create low levels of contact between organs (worker and worker, worker and family, worker and capitalist). Because these transformations occur with such rapidity, conflicting interests which result from the change
have not had time to strike a new equilibrium (306). DH recognizes that the DOL has bee n blamed for turning workers into 'lifeless cogs' (306). But, he argues that the DOL does not produce these circumstances as a result of its nature. Under normal conditions, the DOL requires that the individual worker interact with his coworkers. he works toward a goal which he ca n conceive of fairly distinctly, and he feels that he is of some use. Then, the DOL is a source of solidarity. Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society Book 3 Chp2 'The Forced DOL' For the DOL to create social solidarity, it is not enough that everyone have a task -- the task must be agreeable to him. If the DOL produces unrest, it is because t he distribution of social functions does not correspond to t he distribution of natural abilities. Constraint binds people to their functions, and only a troubled form of solidarity can exist (311). Normally, labor is divided according to the distribution of aptitude in society. The DOL prod uces social solidarity when it arises spontaneously (32). perfect Spo ntaneity corresponds to absolute equality in the external conditions of struggle for a position in the DOL. Constraint occurs when this struggle becomes impossible (313). Perfect spontaneity cannot exist in any society. inequalities build up through time. For instance, the hereditary transmission of wealth makes the ext ernal conditions of the 'struggle' very unequal. The 'higher' the society, the less these inequalities exist (313-4). In an organic society, the sentiments held in common do not possess a great deal of strength to keep the individual bound to the group. Subversive tendencies emerge more readily than in mechanical societies. hence, in organized societies it is indispensable that the DOL work to attain the goal of spontaneity. these societies should attempt to eliminate all external inequalities. They cannot sustain solidarity unless their constituent parts are solidly linked (315-6). Equality in the external conditions of the struggle is needed to secure each individual to his function and to link these functions with each other,. This proposition introduces a long discussion from DH on the importance o f equality in contracts. He states that contracts necessarily develop with the DOL. There is a consensus of a certain kind that is expressed in contracts and represents (in the 'higher species' an important factor in collective thought (316). Durkheim also contends that 'there can be no rich or poor by birth without there being unjust contracts' (319). these injustices are found more o ften in less advances societies, where contractual relations are less developed. Yet as labor becomes more divided up and the social doctrine weakens, these injustices become more un bearable and people start creating contracts to make relationships more fair. Lastly, DH makes a pitch for the importance of society over nature. Contracts regulate social life because if not, people will take advantage of each other. In the broad scheme, liberty and equality are products of regulation. Man as a social being regulates things in nature, 'stripping them of their amoral character.' '[Man] cannot escape from nature save by creating another world in which he dominates it. that world is society' (321). Durkheim, Emile. The DOL in Society Book3 chp 3 'Another Abnormal Form.'
The last abnormal form of the DOL o ccurs when the 'organs' of the system do not function smoothly and continuously together to furnish efficient production of social solidarity. Although the DOL might be highly developed, it is very poorly integrated. This does not always occur because there is a lack of a regulatory organ, but because the regulator does not distribute work in such a way that each individual is kept sufficiently busy to increase the functional activity of every worker (324). Every increase in functional activity can create an increase in social solidarity when as a result o f becoming more active, the functions become more continuous. When all funct ions at the same tame become even more active the continuity of each one of them will be increased even more (326). As actions are more solidly linked to one another , they become more dependent on one another (326). The more individuals which work in a society, the more each individual will specialize. At the same time, each worker must increase his activity to meet the needed amount of product. Hence, a second reason for why the DOL fosters social cohesion: 'It fosters the unity of the organization by the very fact that it adds to its life.' EMILE DURKHEIM The Elementary Forms of Religious Life Intro. 'Subject of our Study: Religious Sociology and the Theory of Knowledge.' According to DH, a religious system is most p rimitive when it is found in a society with the simplest form of organization, and when it is possible to explain the religious system without using any element borrowed from a previous religion. The study of simple religions shows us an essential and permanent aspect of humanity, as well as leads to an understanding of the religious nature of man (13). At the foundation of all systems of beliefs there are a number of fundamental representations, concepts, and ritual attitudes which, despite the d iversity of their forms, have the same objective significance and fulfill the same functions everywhere (17). Primitive civilizations offer privileged cases of the study of religion. These societies are characterized by simplicity and conformity of tho ught and conduct. The religion Durkheim will analyze in this book is foreign to any idea of a go d or divinity. The 'forces' to which the rites are addressed are very different from those in modern religions, yet they aid us in understanding modern religions (19). When primitive religious beliefs are systematically analyzed, the principal categories of understanding are found . In fact, they are a product of religious thought (22). Religion is eminently social. Religious representations express collective realities. Religious rites are a manner of acting which arises from assembled groups and are destined to excite certain mental states in these groups. The categories of understanding are of religious origin; they are social affairs and the product of collective thought (22). these categories include time, specie, class, force, personality, and efficacy (23-5). DH states that society is the highest representation o f nature. 'The social realm is a natural realm which differs from the others only by greater co mplexity' (31). However, nature does not differ radically from one case to another. The relations that exist between things are essentially similar across realms (31). Although the categories of time, space, class, cause and personality are
constructed out of social elements, their social origin po ints to the fact that they have a foundation in the realm of nature (32). Thus DH unites two opposing viewpoints in his theory of knowledge (the catego ries of understanding). The apriorists believe that knowledge is made up of empirical fact and representation. On the other hand, the empiricists only study positive knowledge. DH claims that the theory of knowledge (wherein the categories of thought have a dual social and natural nature) combines all the principles of the apriorists and the empiricists. According to him, the categories of understanding are no longer single empirical facts but are 'complex instruments of [human thought]' (32). _________________________ In this chapter DH also postulates on the dual nature of man. There are two beings in man: an individual whose foundation is in his bod y and whose circle of activity is very limited, and a social being which represents the intellectual and moral order of society (29). Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life Book 1 Chp1 'Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion' In this chapter Durkheim defines religion. In the first two sections, he sets forth definitions of religion which are erroneous, in order to assist readers in freeing their minds of misconceptions. to begin with he argues t hat the supernatural is not a characteristic of the religious (39). in order to say something is supernatural, it must happen o ut of the natural order of things (41). However, the idea of a necessary order did not exist before the construction of the positive sciences. Furthermore, religion's main goal is to explain every day events. It is not true that the notion of religion coincides with the extraordinary or the unforeseen. hence the idea of the supernatural is not of primitive origin; man has forged it as he has developed science (43). Next, DH asserts that all religions cannot be associated with divinity or the worship of a supreme deity. Some religions, Buddhism for example, stress other p ractices instead. In Buddhism, salvation is the worshippers' primary concern -- not Buddha (47). DH also contends that even with the deistic religions, there are many rites which are completely independent of any idea of gods (e.g.: the Bible forbids wearing garments of flax and hemp) (49). hence, all religious powers do not emanate from divine personalities (50). DH now begins his discussion of religion. first, he character izes all the elementary phenomena which comprise religion (51). Religious phenomena can be classified in two fundamental categories: beliefs and rules. Beliefs are states of opinion and co nsist in representations, whereas rites are determined modes of action (51). All religious beliefs classify things as either profane or sacred. Sacred th ings are considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, particularly men (52). Men typically consider themselves inferior to anything sacred; yet if man depend s on gods, this dependence is reciprocal. without the offerings and sacrifices of man, go ds would die (53).
Despite the heterogeneity of sacred and profane things, it is possible for the profane to pass into the world of the sacred. For example, this occurs when men are initiated into religious life with certain ceremonies (54). However, the sacred and the profane are so heterogeneous that their differences eventually break down into antagonism. men are e xhorted to withdraw themselves completely fro the profane world in order to lead an exclusively religious lives. the profane and the sacred cannot approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time (55). Hence, we arrive at the criteria for religious beliefs. 'Religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of the scared things and their relations with each other or with profane things. Rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects' (56). The totality if these beliefs, when organized in a way so as to form a system having a certain unity and a strict independence from other systems, constitutes a religion . A religion is not made up of a single idea; it is a whole made up of distinct parts. All religions recognize a plurality of sacred things, in addition to the system of cults -- each with some autonomy (56). Because of the variety of cults, there exist groups of religious phenomena which do not belong to any specific religion. If a cult survives while the group of people which practiced it disintegrates, the cult may remain as folk lore. There is a distinction between magic and religion. Magic , like religion, is made up of beliefs and rites. It also has its dogmas, but they are less speculative because they have utilitarian ends. However, whereas religion has a church a nd a community of worshippers with common beliefs, there is no church in magic (60). The magician has a clientele and it is quite possible that none of them know each other (59-60). magic lacks the moral community formed by all the believers in a single faith (61). From this DH derives a more detailed definition of religion: 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things...things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite all those who adhere to them into one moral co mmunity ' (62). Because religion is inseparable from the church, it is clear that religion is eminently collective (63). Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life Book 3 Chp 4 'The Positive Cult -- cont'd' Religious rites are observed not for the physical effects they might produce, but to remain faithful to the past and to maintain the groups normal physiognomy. Rites remake individuals and groups morally (414-5). DH uses the cases of the Warramunga, the Intichuma, and the Arunta to illustrate the above proposition. Although they are separate entities, each t ribe has a rite which commemorates a single ancestor. This rite recollects the past and also brings it to the present through a dramatic representation. The officiant is not an incarnation of the ancestor, but an actor playing a role(416).
These ceremonies are dramas which are believed to act on the course of nature (418). However, their most important function is to sustain the vitality of the mythic beliefs common to the group, and hence, revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through ritual, individuals are strengthened in their social natures. The rite exercises a moral action more so than a physical action. Not all rituals are performed with the external goa l of acting on nature for material ends. Some simply represent the past for the sake o f representing it (420). When the participants leave the ceremony, they go with a sense of moral well being (423). Ceremonies attach themselves to totems, which are incapable of physical effect. They can only exist in representations whose object is to commemorate the past (424). Aside from illustrating the nature of a certain cult, r itual representations also serve recreative and aesthetic purposes. Rituals restore the moral of the gro up. They allow men to pass from the real world to an imaginary one. They even pass from the commemorative rite to public merrymaking. Some religious ceremonies, whose soul object is to distract, were probably ancient rites. Even games and art have retained a religious character (425). Recreation is one of the forms of moral remaking, which is the principal goal of the rite. A religious rite can have a p lurality of specific purposes. For instance, fasting is a penance, a preparation for communion, and it even confers 'positive virtues.' Inversely, many rites can produce the same effect and mutually replace one another. For instance, to assure the reproduction of the totemic species, one can resort to oblations, imitative practices, or commemorative representations. This proves the plasticity and extreme generality o f useful action which stems from the rites (431). Most importantly, co mmon sentiments are expressed in common acts. The particular nature o f these acts is secondary. Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 'Conclusion' In the final chapter, Durkheim equates religion to society. He says that society is the cause of the sui generis sensations of the religious experience. Furthermore, social action do minates religious life (466). In addition, the fundamental categories of thought and science have religious origin. In fact, nearly all great social institution, moral and legal ru les, have a basis in religion. Religion is the concentrated reflection of collective life, and its principal purpose is to influence moral life (4667). Religion systematically idealizes. Collective life 'awakens' religious thought in order to bring about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Thus man places another world -- a sacred, ideal; world -- above his every day profane life (469). In creating new ideals, society remakes itself (470). Although certain religious symbols mat disappear with time, every soc iety will always feel the need to reaffirm the collective sentiments which make up its unity (474-5).
There are two elements of religious life. Feasts and rites (the cult)are a system of practices oriented toward action. The second is a system of ideas whose object is to explain the world (476). religion attempts to explain realities by connect ing things with each other -- to systematize them. Scientific logic actually stems from the methodology of religion. DH next begins a discussion on the concept as a collective representation. Although a concept may not apply to every individual, it corresponds to the way in which soc iety considers the things of its own experience (483). By the mere fact that society exists, there is a whole system of representations by means of which men understand each other. A collective representation guarantees objectivity because it is collective. It was been able to maintain and generalize itself because it has sufficient reason -- the men who accept it verify it by their own experience. Thus, DH takes it as an axiom that religious beliefs contain a truth which must be discovered (486). DH reiterates that the categories of knowledge (time, space ,etc.)are social. Since they are concepts themselves, they are the wo rk of the group (488). The re lationships which they express could only have been learned through society (491). Time, space, and class were all created out of cooperation (492). Yet logical organization differentiates itself from its original social organization as societies expand and integrate. Social moulds must readapt. human thought is not a primitive fact, but it is a product of history (493). Hence there is not really such a great antinomy between science and religion. Both systems of thought are directed toward the universal and imply that the individual can ra ise himself above his own point of view and live an impersonal life. Impersonal reason is synonymous with collective thought. Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Book 2 Chp 7 'Origins of these Beliefs' In this chapter, DH discusses how men have constructed the belief in totems. A tot em in religion is ' a symbol, a material expression of something else' (236). it symbolizes god, but also the society which worships it (the clan). In fact, t he god of the clan is nothing else than the clan itself, personified under the visible form of the totem (typically animal or vegetable) (23 6). The totem's efficacy comes from its psychical power over its worshippers as well as its moral authority over the society (238). Because people do not perceive what the cause of the force of the collective conscious is, they believe it comes from a force o utside themselves. This is the moral conscience and men have always represented it with religious symbols (242). Consequently humans get the impression that there are two sorts of reality: on the o ne hand there are profane things, and on the other, there are sacred things. Society constantly creates sacred things out of ordinary ones (243). humans add sacred qualities to objects (261). So ciety consecrates men and ideas.
The individual cannot penetrate the sacred without 'entering into relations with extraordinary powers that excite him to the point of frenzy' (250). Hence, in the midst of this effervescence, DH contends, the religious idea seems to be born (250). By concentrating itself almost entirely on in specific moments, collective life has bee n able to attain its greatest intensity and efficacy, as well as give men a more active sentiment of the double existence they lead (251). DH explains how collective forces come to be thought of under the forms of totems, especially in the shape of an anima or plant. he first contends that the transfer of sentiments to a thing comes from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely related in our minds. The result is that emotions provoked by the one extend to the other. Since widespread emotions are common to a group, they must be associated to something that is common to all (primitive clans: plants and animals). This is the totemic emblem(252). The totemic emblem is like the visible body of god; it represents the collective force of the clan - its religious force (253). Religious forces are moral powers because they translate to the way in which the collective conscious acts on individual consciousnesses (254). Totems have a dual purpose: they animate and discipline minds, but they also [are believed to] make plants grow and animals reproduce. Religion is a system of ideas with which individuals represent to themselves their own society, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it (257 ). Religion strengthens the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member (258). The clan chooses to rally around an emblem because not o nly does it clarify the sentiment society has of itself, but it also serves to create this sentiment (262). If social sentiments are connected with something that endures (emblem), the sentiments themselves become more durable. Emblems constantly bring collective sentiments to the fore (263). Social life is only made possible by a vast system of symbols. Yet the clan is not t he only society which uses totemic practices. generally speaking, a collective sentiment can become 'conscious of itself' only by being fixed on some material object. Social necessity brings about t his fusion of things and social life facilitates their union. Durkheim also reiterates that because religion fostered the idea that there are internal connections between things, it opened up the way for science and philosophy. This is of course, because religion is a social affair which stems from collective thought. Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life Book 3 Chp1 'The Negative Cult and its Functions: the Ascetic rites.' In this chapter DH will illustrate the characteristic attitudes which the primitive observes in the celebration of his cult, and will classify the most general forms of his rites as well as explain their origins. DH asserts that every cult has a d ouble aspect --negative and positive. Two sorts of rites are closely associated to this double aspect (337).
The purpose of the negat ive cult (or rites) is to separate sacred and profane beings. T hese rites forbid certain ways of acting in the form of interdictions. Religious interdiction implies the notion of sacredness (338-9). Some examples of religious interdictions are: Australian tribe members (profane) are forbidden to carry the bones of a dead men (sacred) unless they are wrapped in bark. A moral general example is: people (profane) cannot consume certain forbidden animal meats (sacred). (341-2). moreover, if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, other foods are forbidden to sacred person because they are profane. In either case, contact between the two is forbidden. Nothing which either directly or indirectly concerns the profane life should be confused w ith the religious lie (344). In general all acts character istic of the ordinary life are forbidden while religious events are taking place (345-6). These rules are strongest for the public cult, or public practice of religion, as opposed to an individual's private practice of religion (which DH contends is still influenced by social religion) (347). Up to this point, the negative cult appears only to be a system of abstentions. Nonetheless, it is found to exercise a positive action on the religious and moral nature o f the individual. The individual cannot lead any religious life unless he begins to withdraw somewhat from temporal life. In this manner then, the negative cult is a condition of access to the positive cult (348). For instance, the result of the numerous interdictions of the negative cult in primitive religions is to bring about a radical change in the initiate to the given religion. after he takes part in the rather primitive negative rites, he acquires a sacred charact er and is considered reborn by the rest of the group (350). y The understanding o f the positive effects of negative rites allows us to better understand the purposes of asceticism. Both ancient and modern religions attribute a sanctifying and strengthening power to suffering (354-5). DH explains the reason for this :'suffering is the sign that...certain of the bonds attaching [t he individual] to his profane environment are brok en; so it testifies that he is partially freed from his environment' (355). In o rder to serve his gods (the positive cult), the individual must sacrifice his profane interests (356). But asceticism and the negative cult do not serve only religious purposes. Re ligious interests are only the symbolic form of social and moral concerns. Not only do the gods demand suffering and abnegation from their followers, but so does society. To fulfill his duties to society, the individual will always have to suppress his instincts, whatever the dogmas or mythologies of the time (356). The main reason for the necessity of the separating powers of the negative cult is the 'contagiousness' of the sacred world. Certain rites, objects, or people are sacred, yet they cannot help but to come into contact with the profane, by virtue o f the multitude of other things they are associated with. The sanctity of sacred things is contagiously transmitted to everything which evokes the idea of them (359). Hence, even the least proximity (material or moral) can draw religious forces out of their domain. Precautions in the form of the negative cult are essential to keep things in their separate domains (358-360). From this, DH concludes that 'every profanation implies a consecration'(560).
The extreme facility with which religious forces d iffuse is not surprising. Religious forces are collective moral forces which are made up of ideas that stem from society sui generis (362). The sacred contagion' is not a process where religious forces leave the objects in which t hey are embodied. The religious value of objects was conferred to them by society. Thus, the same religious principle can animate very different ob jects and this explains how plants, animals, people, and even rocks are made into totems (i.e. Jesus - lamb - fig leaves- -crosses). To close this chapter, DH draws a relationship between religion and the sciences ( for the ten millionth time). Scared contagion, by showing the connectedness of things, opened the way for future scientific thought which utilizes the important concept of relationships between t hings that do not appear to be connected (365). Note: negative rites: separate the sacred from the pro fane via prohibitions positive rites: stess the individual's commitment and membership in the soc ial community piacular (expiatory) rites: confirm the loss of group members by specifying ways of cpoing. 'funeral are for the living.' EMILE DURKHEIM'Anomic Suicide'TS 916-29 DH prefaces this chapter with the statement t hat society not only attracts the sentiments and activities of individual with unequal force, but it is a power controlling them (241). He then asserts that it is a well-known fact t hat economic crises have an aggravating effect on suicidal tendency (241). in both Vienna and France of the late 19th century, suicides increased with the number of bankruptcies 242. The increase in poverty, however, is not the cause for the increase in suicides. In fact, even fortunate crises which enhance a co untry's prosperity affect suicide like economic disasters (243). If financial crises increase suicides it is not because they increase poverty, it is because they are disturbances of the collective order. During a disturbance of the social equilibrium, men become more disposed to self destruction (246). No person can be happy unless his needs are insufficient proportion to his means (246). Moreover, satisfactions received only stimulate needs further; thus the more one has, the more one wants (248). Any obstruction to man's actions to satisfy his needs can be qu ite painful Human passions must be limited by an exter ior, regulating force. This must be a moral force which regulates moral needs (248). Society must play this moderating role; it is the only moral power superior to the individual (249). If the individual respects regulations, is docile to collective authority, and has a 'wholesome moral constitution,' he will know better than to ask for more. Hence, this puts an end to his desires. Yet it is not enough that the average level of needs for an individual be fixed by public opinion. Society must also fix the way opportunities are open to individuals (250). It must require sacrifices and concessions of its members in the name of public interest (251). Typically, the people subject to social regulation are in agreement with it (251). However, a state of upheaval can occur when society is going through some sort of abnormal crisis. When society is so disturbed, it is incapable of exercising a regulatory influence. From this comes the rise in suicide rates (252). During this time of upset, individuals must struggle to readjust to new so cial classifications. Society cannot adjust them instantaneously to t heir new lives (252). individuals no longer know limits to their own desires, thus worsening the state o f deregulation or anomy (253). Poverty
protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. On the other hand, the less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears (254). Anomy is actually a chronic stat e in the sphere of trade and industry. The pro gress of capitalism has freed industrial relations from all regulation (254). religion has lost its power o f preaching asceticism, and the government has become a tool and a servant to economic life. the liberation of human desires has only been made worse by the development of industry (255). Anomy, therefore, is a regular factor in suicide in modern societies. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for his own existence and altruistic suicide occurs because man believes his basis for existence is situated beyond life. Yet, anomic suicide results from man's activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings (258). Economic anomy is not the only anomy which may give rise to suicide. domestic anomy can also cause suicide. In countries where divorce is prohibited, wives are more likely to commit suicide than husbands. However, wives are less likely to commit suicide in countries where d ivorce is allowed. On the contrary, in countries where divorce is allowed, the husband is more likely to commit suicide (266). DH explains the above phenomena by explaining his idea of the purpose of marriage. According to him, it is the regulation of sexual relations. It forces a man to attach himself to t he same woman forever and this forms the state o f moral equilibrium from which the husband benefits (270). On the other hand, the unmarried man faces a different situation. His desire for women can go unchecked. The uncertainty of his indeterminateness condemns him to constant change and anomy (271). Women's sexual needs are less developed because their mental lives are less developed. hence, they do not require strict social regulation as men do. Thus, marriage is not as useful to them for limiting suicides. Marriage only makes it more d ifficult for women to change their living situations if they become intolerable. Consequently, anything t hat makes marriage more flexible can only improve women's situation. D ivorce protects them from suicide (272). EMILE DURKHEIM'Types of Suicide'TS 213-18 At the onset of this article, DH sets up three propositions: 1: Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of religious society 2: ' ' ' ' ' domestic society 3: ' ' ' ' ' political society Thus, suicide varies inversely with the degree o f integration of the social groups, of which the individual forms a part (213). Egoistic suicide springs from excessive individualism, wherein the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego (214). Egoism is the generating cause of egoistic suicide. In addition, the bond attaching man to life relaxes because the o ne attaching him to society is weak. The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstance because the state o f society has made him a ready prey to suicide (216). Just as excessive individuation can lead to suicide, so can insufficient individuation. In altruistic suicide, society binds the individual too tightly. In this case, the ego is not its own property; it is completely blended into a group spirit. Since this type of suicide is characteristically performed as a duty to a group, DH calls it 'obligatory altruistic suicide.' However, DH does acknowledge
that not all altruistic suicide is obligatory (217). Other forms are 'opt ional altruistic suicide,' and 'acute altruistic suicide' (this second one can be likened to mystical suicide from religious fervor ). Altruistic suicide was typically found in lower, ancient societies which were based on mechanical solidarity. today, the most common t ype of altruistic suicide is death in war (217). DH concludes by contending that there is really not such a big d ifference between altruistic and egoistic suicide. he recognizes that many people find something moral in altruistic suicide, but he asks, 'isn't the notion of individual autonomy in egoistic suicide also moral?' furthermore, when a man commits altruistic suicide, he still values the individual personality, even in others. thus, every sort of suicide is merely the 'exaggerat ed of deflected form of a virtue.' The way those types affect moral conscience then, do es not differentiate them into separate types (218). EMILE DURKHEIM --- Rules of the Sociological Method pp50-146 In chapter 3, DH presents the rules sociologists should use to distinguish normal social phenomena from pathological social phenomena. Average types depict normal phenomena and all others are morbid (pathological) phenomena, which have dire consequences for society. Pathological types can only be defined in relation to a given species. What is pathological for one group may not be for another (56). Three rules for establishing the normality of phenomena: 1: a social fact is normal, in relation to a given social type at a given phase of its development, when it is present in the average society of that species at the corresponding phase of its evolution. 2: one can verify the results of the preceding method by showing that the generality of the phenomenon is bound up with the general conditions of the collective life of the social type considered. 3: this verification is necessary when the fact in question occurs in a social species which has not yet reached the full course of its evolution. (64). DH contends that many essential social phenomena come to light when the proper methodology is used. for instance, although many criminologists assume crime is pathological, they are incorrect (65). First of all, crime is normal because no society is exempt from it (67). If the collective conscience of a soc iety is strong, it will designate certain acts as criminal. What confers the criminal character of an act is not its intrinsic quality, but the definition which the collective conscience assigns to it. Crime is necessary because it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of social life and it is useful because these conditions are indispensable to the evolution of morality and o f law (70). Through crime, individual originality is able to express itself. it directly prepares changes in society because where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form. Crime sometimes helps determine the form they will take (71). Hence, the criminal plays a de finite role in social life. In fact, if a crime in a soc iety drops below an average rate, this could be indicative of a severs social disorder. with a drop in the crime rate, a revision in the theory of punishment becomes necessary (72).
DH closes this chapter by stating that the principal object of all sciences is to define and explain the normal state and distinguish it from its opposite (74). T he generality of phenomena must be taken as a criterion of their normality (75). In chapter 4, 'The Classification of Social Types,' Durkheim asserts that it is not possible to institute the laws of science only after reviewing all the facts they express. Too many varied facts exist (79). It is better to substitute a limited number o f types for the indefinite multiplicity of individuals. This will not only order pre-existing knowledge, but will create new knowledge (80). Because the nature of the group depends on the nature and number of component elements and their mode of combination, we must use these general characteristics as their basis. the general facts of social life follow from this basis. We can call the c lassification of social types 'social morphology.' DH proposes to classify social groups according to t he degree of complexity in organization which they represent. The simplest group is the 'horde,' and then the 'clan' which is a compound of hordes, and then the 'city -state' which is an aggregate of clans, etc (83-84). Within these types, one can distinguish between groups by the level of integration o f their sub-groups (85). However, the more complex a social group is, the less definite its contours. Nonetheless, DH chooses to call each social group a 'species,' even if it is formed only once (86-7). In chapter 5, DH establishes guidelines for the explanation of social facts. He argu es that to show the usefulness of a fact, it is not enough to explain how it originated or why it is what it is. Instead, 'when the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills' (95). the question is not whether the cause has a distinct purpose, but whether or not a correspondence between the function and the result exists which is useful to the organism (95). DH asserts that theories of psychology are insufficient as premises for social reasoning, but t hey can test the validity of propositions established inductively. The u ltimate explanation of collective life consists in showing how it emanates fro m human nature in general (98). Social phenomena do not derive from individual consciousnesses and hence, sociology is not a corollary of individual psychology. So cial life is not merely an extension of the individual being. the external impulse to which he submits cannot come from within him (101). Thus, we must seek to explain social life in the nature of society itself. a whole is not identical to the sum of its parts; hence, society is not just a mere sum of individuals. It is the system formed by individuals' association (103). The group act s differently than its members would if they were isolated (104). The concept of the social milieu as the determining factor o f collective evolution is of utmost importance to DH. The pressure it exerts on groups within the milieu modifies their organization (116), If we reject the social milieu, sociology ca nnot establish any relations of causality (117). The causes of social phenomena are internal and do not spring from the individual (121). Many attempts to explain social facts have lost all ideas of social discipline. On the co ntrary, DH's principle creates a sociology which sees t he spirit of discipline as the essential condition of all common life (124) In chapter 6, DH sets forth rules for the establishing of sociological proofs. Since social phenomena are not within the control of the sociological experimenter, he must employ the
comparative method by conforming to the principal of causality. the basis of soc iological comparisons must be the following proposition: A given fact always has a single corresponding cause (128). If suicide appears to depend o n more than one cause, it is because in reality there are several kinds of suicides (129). However, social phenomena are much too complex for the effect of all the cause s to be removed except for one in a given case. DH suggests using the method of concomitant correlations or variation. With this method, it is not necessary that the var iables outside those which are being compared be excluded (130). Concomitant variation shows how two facts can mutually influence each other in a continuous manner (130). Sometimes this method introduces a common cause to two or more social phenomena (132). Because societies are formed by many elements from preceding historical eras, one cannot explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its complete development through all social species (139). Furthermore, to arrive at a fair comparison across societies, one must compare the societies at the same per iod in their development (140). In his conclusion, DH first contends that his method is entirely independent of philosophy; it abandons generalizations and enters the world of facts (142). Second, his method is 'objective;' it is dominated by the idea t hat social facts are things and must be treated as such. If sociological phenomena are only systems of objectivized ideas, to explain them is to rethink them in their logical order. Only methodical experiments can e xtract the 'truth' from things. Third, DH's method is exclusively sociological (144). A social fact can be explained only by another social fact, and this explanation is possible by pointing out the principal factor in co llective evolution -the social milieu. The above three characteristics make sociology a distinct and autonomous science (145). EMILE DURKHEIM'On the Normality of Crime,' pp. 87 2-75 in Theories of Society, edited by Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts. New York: Free Press. Crime is normal, an inevitable and necessar y part of every society. (It may take abnormal forms, such as when the crime rate is unusually high.) 'A society exempt from it wou ld be utterly impossible' (872). Since people differ from 'the co llective type,' there are some divergences which tend toward the criminal. However, whatconfers a 'criminal character' on divergences from the collective type is not 'the intrinsic quality of a given actbut that definition which the collective consciousness lends them' (873). Crime has an 'indirect utility' (874): In order for t ransformations in law and morality to be possible, 'thecollective sentiments at the basis of morality must not be hostile to change, and consequently must have butmoderate energy.... Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that the first pattern is inflexible'(873-4). This 'moderate energy,' which per mits change, also permits crime. If there were no crime, it wouldbe evidence that change was no t possible: 'To make progress, individual originality must be able to expressitself' (874).
However, crime also has a direct utility. Crime 'in certain cases directly prepares these changes [progress]. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new form, and crime sometimeshelps to determine the fo rm they will take' (874), Example, Socrates; freedom of thought was once a crime. Socrates' crime prepared the way for a 'new morality and faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditionsby which they had lived u ntil then were no longer in harmony with the current conditions of life' (874). Thus,'[c]ontrary to current ideas, the criminal no longer seems a totally unsociable being.... On the contrary, heplays a definite role in social life' (874). Then Durkheim goes on a little jag about pathology and how the normality of phenomena should be defined,which I am not going to give much more shrift than this, though you may want to read it in detail: 'If,however, the most widely diffused facts can be pathological [for instance, crime], it is possible that the normaltypes never existed in actuality; and if that is the case, why study the facts?... The principle object o f allsciences of life, whether individual or social, is to define and explain the normal state and to distinguish it fromits opposite.... In order that sociology may be a true science of things, the generality o f phenomena must betaken as the criterion of their normality' (875). This is actually an important issue, and sheds light on whyEmile sets up his concepts the way he does.
http://ssr1.uchicago.edu/PRELIMS/Theory/durkheim.html
