Ship to Ship (STS) Transfer οf Cargo: Latest Developments and Operational Risk Assessment
Deskripsi lengkap
Basic Knowledger about ship related, design, manufacturing, and how it worksFull description
Ship structure, different structural elements. Systems of framing.Full description
sDescripción completa
Ship Construction
Full description
describing any detail of ship unloader
Warmaster Building a Ship Fanatic Mag
Full description
Full description
sandi
mimetDescription complète
Basic Knowledger about ship related, design, manufacturing, and how it works
Descrição: Basic Knowledger about ship related, design, manufacturing, and how it works
Descrição: Doors Crystal Ship
Piano Vocal score
Full description
ship constructor
Ship to Ship Operations Operations Liabilities – Risk Assessment – Case Study The onlineSTS.net onlineSTS.net Concept INTERTANKO INTERTANKO European Panel Meeting 9/10/2014 9/10/20 14
0
1
2
1. VESSEL NOMINATION NOMINATION 2. VESSEL ACCEPTANCE ACCEPTANCE 3. QUALITY ASSURANCE OF SERVICE PROVIDER PROVIDER 4. RISK ASSE ASSESSMEN SSMENT T 5. COMMENCEMENT OF STS OPERA OPERATION TION A. APPROACHING B. MOORING C. CARGO ARGO TRAN TRANSF SFER ER D. PAPE APER R WORK BOL-F BOL-FACT ACT SHEET SHEET E. UNMOORING 6. POST EVALUA EVALUATION TION (POST ASSESSMENT) ASSESSMENT) 3
Who has a contract with whom ??
A Discharging Ship
A Service Provider P rovider
A Receiving Ship
4
Where is the Contract ???
Charterer/ Cargo Owner
A Service Provider A Receiving Ship A Discharging Ship 5
So, how safe STS Operations be ensured ?
A Service Provider A Receiving Ship A Discharging Ship
6
So, how safe STS Operations be ensured ? A safe STS Operation does not rely on a contract, but on DUE DILIGENCE ……………
DUE DILIGENCE requires: Expertise-Experience Information resources Past STS Record Assessments Understanding of Liabilities, Exposures Supporting Reputation and Risk Mitigating issues 7
8
1.
Right to review the details....
2.
Decision on suitability...
3.
Proper and detailed planning...
1.
DUE DILIGENCE from the TANKER OPERATOR
2.
Provision of tools and information to the Master
3.
Assessment of Safety issues
Due Diligence in STS Operations is: easy to be described, difficult to be recorded and challenging to provide proof that is being followed.
9
DESIGNING THE CONCEPT
Latest OCIMF Guidelines IMO MARPOL Chapter 8 of Annex I ISM & TMSA Charter Party STS Clauses P&I and H&M
10
What is the problem ??
1. Limited expertise in STS due diligence practices; 2. Limited risk estimation data 3. Time constrain for decision making 4. Excessive administration burden
11
And what is your proposed solution ??
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Adopt SCREENING POLICIES Screen the SERVICE PROVIDER and POAC Assess the STS RECORDS Share your Experience Use your STS KNOWLEDGE during the CLEARANCE Phase
12
Clearance Request
Charterer
Examination of available records. VESSEL SUITABILITY
Clearance Reply COMMITMENT WITH THE STS
Tanker Operator
Screening Policies 1. Standard & justified procedure 2. Access to information resources 3. Access to available past STS records
13
ASSESSMENT PHASE
Proper and Detailed Planning
Risk Hazards STS Location
Risk Mitigating Measures
Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
Tanker Operator
14
Proper and Detailed Planning Tanker Operator s task ASSESSMENT PHASE Risk Hazards STS Location Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
15
Proper and Detailed Planning Tanker Operator s task ASSESSMENT PHASE Risk Hazards STS Location Joint Plan of the STS
The risk assessment should encounter all identified hazards. Consolidated past performance data should be taken into account.
Service Provider
16
Proper and Detailed Planning Tanker Operator s task ASSESSMENT PHASE Risk Hazards STS Location Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
The STS location assessment should consider: Weather data; Past Service Provider performance; Reported Incidents; Performance of STBL or Receiving vessels. Other restrictions
17
Proper and Detailed Planning Tanker Operator s task ASSESSMENT PHASE Risk Hazards STS Location Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
The Joint Plan prepared by the Service Provider should be assessed by the Master for compliance according to latest OCIMF guidelines and STS PLAN.
18
Proper and Detailed Planning Tanker Operator s task ASSESSMENT PHASE Risk Hazards STS Location Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
The Service provider should be assessed with respect to Safety, reliability and efficiency. STS Equipment (Fenders Hoses) Characteristics and Maintenance Certificates should be requested from the provider and be assessed.
19
Tanker Operator
Service Provider
STS OPERATION
20
Tanker Operator
KPIs
Records
Assessment of Records
STS Experience Statistics
becomes an asset to the Operator
Lessons Learned
21
Clearance Request
Examination of available records. VESSEL SUITABILITY
Clearance Reply COMMITMENT WITH THE STS
ASSESSMENT PHASE
Proper and Detailed Planning
Risk Hazards
Risk Mitigating Measures
STS Location Joint Plan of the STS Service Provider
STS OPERATION KPIs
Records
Assessment of Records
STS Experience Statistics
becomes an asset to the Operator
Lessons Learned
22
Tanker Operator 1
Clearance Phase
Proper & Detailed Planning
STS Operation
Due Diligence Procedures
Assessment of Records
STS Experience
23
Tanker Operator 1
Tanker Operator 2
Tanker Operator 3
Clearance Phase
Clearance Phase
Clearance Phase
Proper & Detailed Planning
Proper & Detailed Planning
Proper & Detailed Planning
STS Operation
STS Operation
STS Operation
Assessment of Records
Assessment of Records
Assessment of Records
STS Experience
STS Experience
STS Experience
24
Tanker Operator 1
Tanker Operator 2
Tanker Operator 3
SHARE OF INFORMATION - DUE DILIGENCE
Performance of Vessels
POAC Assessment
STS Equipment Assessment
Location Assessment
Assessment of Records
Assessment of Records
Assessment of Records
STS Experience
STS Experience
STS Experience
25
SHARE OF INFORMATION - DUE DILIGENCE
26
SHARE OF INFORMATION - DUE DILIGENCE
Assessments 1. 2. 3. 4.
464 98 62 421
Individual POAC Different Locations Service Providers Individual Tanker Operators 5. 1556 Individual Vessel Performance 27
SHARE OF INFORMATION - DUE DILIGENCE
28
Safeguards and barriers in place, are in line with anti-trust and anti-corruption requirements in order to ensure that sensitive information is not compromised.
29
Tanker Operator
Becomes a member
Clearance Phase
Screening Report – PART - A
Proper & Detailed Planning
STS Operation
Assessment of Records
STS Experience
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
30
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
31
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
4
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
3
24 x 7 support to the Master
2
OSIS – Record Keeping
1
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
32
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
33
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
34
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
35
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
36
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
37
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
38
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
39
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
40
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
41
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
42
Becomes a member
Screening Report – PART - A
Assessment of STS Elements – PART - B
24 x 7 support to the Master
OSIS – Record Keeping
OSIS – Consolidated Knowledge
43
COMPANY ALMI TANKERS SA ANDRIAKI SHIPPING CO LTD AMPTC CO ARCADIA SHIP MANAGEMENT CO LTD ATHENIAN SEA CARRIERS LTD BERNHARD SCHULTE SHIPMANAGEMENT (DE) GMBH BERNHARD SCHULTE SHIPMANAGEMENT CY BERNHARD SCHULTE SHIPMANAGEMENT UK ENESEL SA EURONAV SHIP MANAGEMENT (HELLAS) LTD EURONAV SHIP MANAGEMENT SAS GRACE MANAGEMENT SA IONIA MANAGEMENT SA MARAN TANKERS MANAGEMENT INC MARE MARITIME CO SA MEDCARE SHIPPING SA NAVIOS TANKER MANAGEMENT INC RHL HAMBURGER LLOYD TANKER GMBH CO KG THENAMARIS (SHIPS MANAGEMENT) INC TMS TANKERS TSAKOS COLUMBIA SHIP MANAGEMENT SA WESTERN SHIPPING PTE LTD
An obvious observation is that the responsibility lays with the maneuvering vessel rather the constant heading vessel. Although the case was considered to end in favor of the constant heading vessel, a close examination of both Masters responsibilities as per OCIMF guidelines altered the course from the initial case settlement, probably ending as a knock-for-knock.
48
Constant Heading Vessel
Maneuvering Vessel
WHAT WENT WRONG The primary pennant fender rope broke during the initial contact ( Figure 1) ending in dislocation for fenders. No backup pennant fender rope existed. The condition and type of the forward pennant fender rope was not according to manufacturer requirements, thus not as per ISO 17357:2002. Although secondary fenders were fitted those did not prevent the collision.
49
Constant Heading Vessel
Maneuvering Vessel
WHAT WENT WRONG The primary pennant fender rope broke during the initial contact ( Figure 1) ending in dislocation for fenders. No backup pennant fender rope existed. The condition and type of the forward pennant fender rope was not according to manufacturer requirements, thus not as per ISO 17357:2002. Although secondary fenders were fitted those did not prevent the collision.
50
Constant Heading Vessel
Maneuvering Vessel
FAILURE TO MEET OCIMF GUIDELINES According to OCIMF guidelines the following should have taken place: 1. A joint plan should have taken place prior the STS operation as per paragraph 5.2 of OCIMF guidelines. 2. Both Masters should have requested certificates of fenders, hoses and also the qualification of the POAC according to paragraph 2.5 and 9.1.3 of OCIMF 3. In case the rigging of the fenders was not as per OCIMF guidelines, then the operation should not started. 51
Constant Heading Vessel
Maneuvering Vessel
WHAT (IF) ?? According to OCIMF guidelines the following would have taken place: 1. A joint plan would have taken place prior the STS operation as per paragraph 5.2 of OCIMF guidelines. 2. Our Master would have requested certificates of fenders, hoses and also the qualification of the POAC according to paragraph 2.5 and 9.1.3 of OCIMF 3. In case the rigging of the fenders was not as per OCIMF guidelines, then the operation would not have started. 4. Most likely past performance data for vessel and service provider would provide an indication . 52