GROUP 4 - Case Digests Topic: Part V - Union Representation: Establishing Union Majority Status CASE #1 ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION v. COMPANIA COMPANIA MARITIMA | G.R. L-22952 | January 31, 1967 FACTS: During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT , AFWU rendered
satisfactory service by which there satisfactorily performance was renewed by MARITIMA. These harmonious relations between MARITIMA and AFWU did not lasted when the MARITIMA complained to the AFWU of unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work. Deteriorating situation was admitted by AFWU's president. To remedy the situation since MARITIMA's business was being adversely affected. Teves, the branch manager of MARITIMA in Iligan City, was forced to hire extra laborers from among "stand-by" workers, which was not affiliated to any union, to help in the stevedoring and arrastre work. The wages of these extra laborers were paid by MARITIMA through separate vouchers and not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not cha rged to the consignees or owners of the cargoes. AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. They demanded to embody certain terms and conditions of employment different from the provisions of the CONTRACT, but No reply was made by MARITIMA. AFWU filed a case beforeIndustrial Court praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with MARITIMA's vessels in Iligan City. City. As a result MARITIMA informed informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. MARITIMA then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and stevedoring work and agreed to perform the work subject to the same terms and conditions of the CONTRACT. AFWU charged before the Industrial Court of unfair labor practices under Sec. 4(a), (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Rep. Act No. 875 agains MARTIMA. AFWU, together with those of the Mindanao Workers Alliance, a sister union, formed a picket line, which lasted for 8 days at the wharf of Iligan City. Thus preventing the Iligan Stevedoring Union from carrying out the arrastre and stevedoring work it contracted for. MARITIMA filed an action to rescind the CONTRACT, enjoin AFWU members from doing
arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with its, vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWU and its officers. Incidentally, this civil case has been the subject of three proceedings already which have reached this Court. Which as follows: a) The first involved a preliminary injunction issued therein on by the trial court prohibiting AFWU from interfering in any manner with the loading and unloading of cargoes from MARITIMA's vessels; b) Second incident, the CFI decision ordered the rescission of the CONTRACT and permanently enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection with MARITIMA's vessels. This enabled MARITIMA to engage the services of the Mindanao Arrastre Service to do the arrastre and stevedoring work on January 8, 1961; c)Third incident that reached the SC involved an order of the same trial court in the same civil case. Upon motion of MARITIMA, the trial court issued an order for the execution of the decision ousting the 225 AFWU members-laborers from their work. Accordingly, MARITIMA was again able to engage the services of the Mindanao Arrastre Service. After almost 10 years of hearing the two cases jointly, the Industrial Court dismissed for lack of substantial evidence and merit. Further in pursuance of the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act 875 and the Rules of this court on certification election, the Secretary of Labor requested to conduct certification election among all the workers and/or stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring and arrastre service aboard Compañia MARITIMA vessels docking at Iligan City port in order to determine their representative for collective bargaining with the employer, whether their desire to be represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither; and upon termination of the said election, the result thereof shall forthwith be submitted to the court for further consideration. The union present payroll may be utilized in determining the qualified voters, with the exclusion of all supervisors. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in making its directive to the holding of a
certification election among the laborers then doing arrastre and stevedoring work. RULING: Yes. The court a quo erred an error in ordering for certificate of election. The court
noted that to uphold the court a quo's conclusion would be tantamount to the imposition of an employer-employee relationship against the will of MARITIMA. This cannot be done, since it would violate MARITIMA's exclusive prerogative to determine whether it should enter into an employment CONTRACT or not. The court stressed that on the case of Pampanga Bus Co. vs. Pambusco Employees' Union: 1. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due process clause of the constitution; 2. The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses; 3. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the constitution. 'If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's
will, this is oppression. Therefore, it would appeal unreasonable and unjust to force such a relationship upon MARITIMA, when it had clearly and continuously manifested its intention not to have any more business relationship whatsoever with AFWU because of its inefficient service, if the purpose is to only to comply with injunctions and other judicial mandates that MARITIMA continued to abide by the status quo, extending in fact and in effect the operation of the MARITIMA contract. The Court stated, the duty to bargain collectively exists only between the "employer" and its "employees". However, the actual negotiations are carried on between the "employer" itself and the official representative of the "employees" in most cases, the majority labor union. Since the only function of a certification election is to determine who is the official representative or spokesman of the "employees" will be.
Thus, the order for certification
election in question cannot be sustained. There being no employer-employee relationship between the parties disputants, there is neither a "duty to bargain collectively" to speak of. And there being no such duty, to hold certification elections would be pointless. Further, there was no reason to select a representative to negotiate when there can be no negotiations in the first place. The court therefore hold that where there was no duty to bargain collectively, it is not proper to hold certification elections in connection therewith. The court a quo's objective in imposing the employer-employee relationship may have been to do away with the "cabo" system which, although not illegal, is in its operation regarded as disadvantageous to the laborers and stevedores. The rule however remains that the end cannot justify the means. For an action to be sanctioned by the courts, the purpose must not only be good but the means undertaken must also be lawful. The remedy against the "cabo" system need not be sought in the courts but in the laborers themselves who should organize into a closely-knit union "which would secure the privileges that the members desire thru the election of officers among themselves who would not exploit them.” Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
was
reversed and set aside insofar as it ordered the holding of a certification election and the petition for certification in said case was dismissed. CASE #2 NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTO, ALLIED INDUSTRIES, MANILA PAVILION CHAPTER v. SEC. OF LABOR | G.R. 181531 | July 31, 2009 FACTS: A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of our
private respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results: EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS LIST = 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3 SEGREGATED = 22
The result did not satisfied, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU) referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel. Petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169. Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) affirmed the Med-Arbiters Order. SOLE held that pursuant to Section 5, Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code on exclusion and inclusion of voters in a certification election. The SOLE ruled that even if the 17 votes of the dismissed and supervisory employees were to be counted and presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes garnered by HIMPHLU. SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. It held that the ruling in Airtime Specialist, Inc. v. Ferrer Calleja stating that in a certification election, all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent, are entitled to vote, is inapplicable to the case at bar. the appellate court continued: The appellate court brushed aside petitioners contention that the opening of the 17 segregated votes would materially affect the results of the election as there would be the likelihood of a run-off election in the event none of the contending unions receive a majority of the valid votes cast. The CA added that that the majority contemplated in deciding which of the unions in a certification election is the winner refers to the majority of valid votes cast, not the simple majority of votes cast, hence, the SOLE was correct in ruling that even if the 17 votes were in favor of petitioner, it would still be insufficient to overturn the results of the certification election. ISSUE: Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent. RULING: The court noted that a certification election is the process of determining the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. The significance of an employees right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be overemphasized. For he has considerable interest in the determination of who shall represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his
employment. As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170. HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable. It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: a. To determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone; b. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them. Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees. A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.[8] With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice NO UNION receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolutions dated Secretary of Labor and Employment are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations is DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-off election between petitioner, National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).
CASE #3 WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION v. BLR | G.R. L-76185 | March 30, 1988 FACTS: This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the petitioner
and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985. On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election, alleging compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that there exist a C.BA between the respondent and the Warren Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to expire on July 31, 1986. While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed on July 25,1985, stipulating, among others, as follows: To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August 25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by MOLE. It
is cleanly
understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date on July 31, 1986. On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this Office, directing that a consent election be held among the rank and file workers of the company. On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held, and yielded the following results: PACIWU—————————-94 WMWU—————————-193 Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an Election Protest. On December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed by the union this time with the Valenzuela branch office of this Ministry, and after conciliation, the parties finally agreed.On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election Protest filed by the PACIWU was ordered dismissed. On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed by the filing of a petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing CorporationAlliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-year no certification election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent, therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification election be dismissed. As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Ministry
of Labor and Employment, ordered on August 8, ‘t 986 the holding of a certification election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren se Manufacturing Corporation, with the abovementioned choices. Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with the company itself opting not to appeal. ISSUE: WON the election held last Aug. 25 is a consent or certification election. RULING: Consent Election. Certification Election; Distinction between a consent election and a
certification election; Consent election does not shorten the terms of nor entitle the participants to immediately renegotiate an existing collective bargaining agreement—The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25, 1985 a t the Company’s premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election and not a certification election (italics supplied), As correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period. Election held in case at bar only to determine which labor union shall administer the existing CBA.—It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being an existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to determine which labor union shall administer the said existing contract.
CASE #4 ALGIRE v. DE MESA | GR 97622 | October 19, 1994 FACTS: Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU) filed on
September 4, 1990 a petition for the holding of an election of union officers with
the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). This was done through De Mesa. DOLE’s med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such an election be held. In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the 3 Section 3, Rule V, Implementing Rules and Regulations, election by secret ballot be conducted on November 16, 1990 between Catalino Algire, et al. (petitioner) and Regalado de Mesa, et al. (respondents) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer. In filling out the ballots, instructions were given to mark choices with either a check mark or an ‘X’ mark. There should also be no other markings on the ballot. De Mesa and Algire both got 133 votes each. Total votes cast were 272. 6 were declared as spoiled ballots. Algire filed a petition, alleging that one of the ballots which had two check marks was erroneously declared to be a spoiled ballot. The checks supposedly made it clear as to the choice made by the voter. The med-arbiter (De la Cruz) issued an order in Algire’s favor and certified the latter’s group to be the unions validly elected officers. De Mesa appealed to the DOLE secretary which was granted. Another order for a new election of officers was made by the Med-Arbiter and another preelection conference was scheduled. Algire’s group filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Algire, et. al. contend that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on- thespot questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. ISSUE: WON the act of the DOLE secretary in denying Algire’s motion was in excess of its
authority since the case is an intra-union activity. RULING: NO. The certification election was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to
determine the issue of majority representation of all the worker s in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.What is at question in this case was a consent election, not a certification election. If indeed petitioner’s group had any opposition to the representation officer’s ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot’s validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election. Petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE #5 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PREMEX v. SEC. OF LABOR | G.R. 107792 | March 02, 1998 FACTS: On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of
respondent Premex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the elections were as follows: National Federation of Labor (NFL) – 235, No Union – 466, Spoiled Ballots – 18, Marked Ballots – 9, Challenged Ballots – 7.However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Mangagawasa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa PermexPhilippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by the MedArbiter in an order on August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer. ISSUE: WON the order of the Public Respondent of the conduct of certification election valid. RULING: Yes, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are
AFFIRMED. Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself The Contract Bar Rule is not applicable in this case. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees had not been established yet.
CASE #6 ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION v. SEC. OF LABOR | G.R. 116751 | August 28, 1995 FACTS: Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the company) is
engaged in the manufacture of tin can containers and metal sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company’s rank-and-file employees authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. On March 10, 1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver by 115 of the signatories who, along with other employees totaling 897, ratified the CBA on the same date. On March 18, 1994, armed with Charter Certificate No. IV-MEE-089, respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union — Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-FFW) filed a petition for certification election with the National Capital Region office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), pursuant to Article 256 of the Labor Code. Purporting to represent the regular rank-and-file employees of the company, the petition was accompanied by the “authentic signatures” of 25% of the employees/workers in the bargaining unit. The above petition for certification elections was opposed by the OTCLU. For its part, the company filed a comment alleging inter alia that the new CBA was ratified by 897 out of the 1,020 rank-and-file employees within the bargaining unit. The OTCLU then filed a motion to dismiss and/or position paper reiterating its position that the petition did not comply with the 25% signature requirement and maintaining that the new CBA was a bar to a certification election. The certification election was allowed. ISSUE: WON the company has a personality to challenge the conduct of a certification
elections. RULING: NONE. The company has no personality to challenge the conduct of a certification
elections. It is a well-established rule that certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other. The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation activities is when it has to file the petition for certification election because there is no existing CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor code. After filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. The company’s interference in the certification election below by actively opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it
intends to establish a company union. The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only when representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of representation arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the employees’ representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the supervision of the proper government authority. NOTE: It is uncontroverted that the petition for certification election in this case was filed on March 18, 1994, twenty-eight days before the expiration of the existing CBA on April 15, 1994, and well within the 60-day period provided for by the Code. The OTCLU, however, is concerned with the effect of the employees’ ratification of the new CBA on the timely filing of the petition for certification election. Would such ratification nullify the petition? The law dictates a negative reply. The filing of a petition for certification election during the 60-day freedom period gives rise to a representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA has been entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary where the employees are one in their choice of a representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said provision of the Omnibus Rules manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow, if not encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to hold a certification election during the freedom period. The agreement prematurely signed by the union and the company during the freedom period does not affect the petition for certification election filed by another union. As regards the 25% support requirement, the same has been met. As previously held by the SC, once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the employees’ withdrawal from union membership (waiver in this case) taking place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not a ffect the petition. On the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration. Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the 6 employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted from the previous number who had signed up for certification. CASE #7 COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILS. v. OPLE | G.R. | FACTS: On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their
membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union. In its position paper, petitioner pointed out that — There is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused to bargain collectively with the union considering that the alleged union is not the certified agent of the company salesmen; Upon verification of the records of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, it appeared that there is a petition for cancellation of the registration of the alleged union was filed by Monchito Rosales on behalf of certain salesmen of the company. The company never coerced or attempted to coerce employees, much less interferred in the exercise of their right to self-organization; the company never thwarted nor tried to defeat or frustrate the employees' right to form their union in pursuit of their collective interest, as long as that right is exercised within the limits prescribed by law; in fact, there are at present two unions representing the rank and file employees of the company. The respondent Union in its position paper, reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No. 10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen (nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which: “found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage unionism, and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when he directly
certified the Union solely on the basis of the latter's self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioner's company. RULING: The Constitutional mandate that the State shall "assure the rights of the workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work," should be achieved under a system of law. When an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded. When respondent Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. Contrary to the respondent Minister's observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a compelling legal
reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also claim majority status. Even in a case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged disrespect for the law.
CASE #8 GEORGE PETER LINES, INC. v. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION | G.R. L-51602 | January 17, 1985 FACTS: George and Peter Lines, Incorporated (GP Lines), is a domestic corporation engaged in
shipping, while Associated Labor Unions (ALU) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor. Petition for Direct Certification was filed by ALU praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of corporation there being no labor union organized thereat. George and Peter Lines opposed, stating that ALU does not represent the majority of the employees concerned; and that more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels claim that they are not members of any union and have no desire to join any. And so, GP Lines filed a Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all whether the employees wanted ALU to be their sole bargaining representative. After the filing of the petition for direct certification by ALU, a written manifestation duly signed by about 80% of the employees concerned, retracting their membership from said union, was submitted by them to the MOLE. Union submits, however, that the employees were merely pressured by management into withdrawing their membership. On the other hand, the corporation argues that the retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged majority representation of the Union. However, Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the licensed and unlicensed employees of the corporation, opining that the majority membership status of any union is determined before or at the time of filing of the petition and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime. BLR Director modified the Order by directing a certification election among the rank and file employees of the corporation. Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration, argued that public BLR Director erred in finding its majority status doubtful as the same was proven during the hearing of the case before the Med-Arbiter. Thus, BLR Director reconsidered and directly certified ALU as the sole bargaining age it of all the rank and file employees of the corporation.
ISSUE: W/N a certification election shall proceed. RULING: YES. The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization
which it desires to join. The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a certification election the bargaining unit to represent them. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. The best forum to determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification election itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive bargaining representative. That there are no competing Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification election.
CASE #9 BARBIZON v. NAGKAKAISANG SUPERVISOR | G.R. 113204-05 | September 16, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner (formerly the Philippine Lingerie Corporation) filed a petition for
certification election among its rank-and-file employees. As a consequence thereof, two (2) unions sought recognition, namely: PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB (ALAB) and BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION (BUKLOD). PLW then moved for the exclusion of number of employees who were holding supervisory positions but was denied for lack of merit. On certification election, BUKLOD garnered the highest vote and Buklod is the certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc., (formerly Philippine Lingerie Corporation). The CBA was then signed and took effect for five years. While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBP) and the Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon, Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBI) allegedly because they were excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA between petitioner and BUKLOD. Two separate Petitions for certification of election was filed but was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent “supervisors” local union form a supervisors union when
their members are incompatibly rank-and-file employees. RULING: YES. The exclusion of petitioner’s “supervisors” from the bargaining unit of the
rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtailed the right to these employees to selforganization and representation for purposes of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by our labor laws and “accorded the highest consideration.” In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner’s “supervisor” employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. The “one union – one company” rule is not without exception. The exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the CBA is indefinitely a ”compelling reason” for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no recourse but to group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization.
CASE #10 NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION v. SEC. OF LABOR | G.R. 106446 | November 16, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry. On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFWSMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region a petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank and file employees of QCC. Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC. On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro. On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification
election of respondent FFW-SMQCC. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter. ISSUE: WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law. RULING: YES. First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he
had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992. Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are nonlitigious but merely investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election. Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein. Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not question the same. Petition dismissed.
CASE #11 CRUZVALE, INC. v. LAGUESMA | G.R. 107610 | November 25, 1994 FACTS: Private respondent, Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner. Petitioner filed its comment to the petition
for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition, among the grounds enumerated is that the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company’s place of business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction over said petition. Med-Arbiter found petitioner’s claim unmeritorious and rendered a decision in favor of respondent union. ISSUE: WON petitioners correctly interpreted Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which states: “Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.” RULING: NO. Ratio The word “jurisdiction” as used in said provision refers to the venue where
the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought. Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. Reasoning Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker. Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila. Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch
office which has territorial jurisdiction over the “workplace of the complainant/petitioner” (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the workplace as follows: “For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. . .”
