Healt Hazard Identification_Final

FINA FI NAL L REP REPOR ORT T

for

TABLE TABLE CONTEN CONTENTS TS EXECUTIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SUMMARY

1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 3 3.1 3.2 3.2

INTR INTROD ODUCT UCTIO ION N B ACKGROUND STUDY OBJECTIVES SCOPE OF T HE STUDY

2 2 2

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW H EALTH H H AZARD I DENTIFICATION T ECHNIQUE F ACILITY SYSTEM R R EVIEWED H EALTH H H AZARD I DENTIFICATION GUIDEWORDS R ISK A ASSESSMENT

5 5 6 7 8

FACILI FACILITY TY DESCRI DESCRIPTI PTION ON LOCATION SYSTEM D D ESCRIPTION – P ROCESS A REA SYSTEM D D ESCRIPTION – U TILITIES TILITIES A REA

12 12 16

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Joint Operating Body (JOB) Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati is currently undertaking TelukBerau A (TBA) and TelukBerau C (TBC) Field Development, which is located in the Seram Sea East Indonesia. It will provide Petrochina with the FPSO to process, store and offload crude oil. The study shows that consequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/or fatalities due to health issues. These hazards are those identified as health hazards, which results consequence to personnel. Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address the significant hazards identified for health issues occurrence of high severity consequences, based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

B ACKGROUND

Joint Operating Body Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati (Petrochina) is currently undertaking the development of TelukBerau-A (TBA) and TelukBerau-C (TBC) fields, which are located in Seram Sea, East Indonesia. The facilities to be installed under this development will comprise of the following major components: • Two fixed wellhead platforms (TBA in Phase 1 and TBC in Phase 2); • One Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel i.e. a refurbished 60,000 tonne DWT vessel which will be spread moored. The FPSO will be named Brotojoyo FPSO; and • One inter-field multiphase sub sea hose. During production, a flexible high-pressure marine hose into the process facilities on the Brotojoyo FPSO for treatment transports the well fluids produced from the wellhead platform separately. Oil exporting is performed via offloading operation to a shuttle tanker moored in tandem during the offloading operation. The FPSO will become the control center of the overall oil field and provides the Living Quarters (LQ) for the operators. Detailed design is now being carried out for the FPSO. In support of this design work, a Health Hazard Identification study is required to be performed.

to identify possible consequences which contributes to Health, Safety, and Environmental issues and operating problems. The Health Hazard Identification study includes reviewing previous general Hazard Identification (HAZID) in 2008(BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006) and new additional facility such as lift gas compression system and fuel gas system. All recommendations during previous HAZID have been re-visited in this Health Hazard Identificationreview (especially for health issues) by referring the previous Hazard Identification document (BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006).

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2

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY

2.1

OVERVIEW

Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to define all the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harm personnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company. The Health Hazard Identification workshop took the form of a structured discussion based upon a series of hazard guidewords. For each identified hazard, the discussion was structured so as to consider the following: •

Health Hazard description, including cause (potential with which the hazard could rise), consequence/effect (the possible hazardous incident scenarios which could occur) and from what equipment the hazard could occur (if applicable);

•

Preventive measures, including any existing aspects of the design that prevent, detect, control or mitigate against the hazard; and

•

Recommendations, further measures that should be considered to reduce the levels of risk associated with the identified hazard.

A qualitative risk ranking is then made to determine the possible frequency of occurrence of these accident events and the severity of their results. The high-risk events arising from the hydrocarbons handled in the facilities, leading to fires orexplosions and events, which are mainly related to working practices, known as hydrocarbon hazards, are identified so that they can be subjected to detailed

A. Step 1: Identify Hazards and Potential Effects

Systematically identify the hazards, the threats and potential hazardous events and effects that may affect, or arise from, a company's operation throughout the total life cycle of the operation. B. Step 2: Evaluate Risk

Systematically evaluate (assess) the risks from the identified hazards againstaccepted screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of any consequences to employees, assets, the environment and the public. This includes the risks associated with deviation from limits set for environmental and occupational health hazards. C. Step 3: Record Hazards and Effects

Record all those hazards and effects identified as significant in relation to the screening criteria in relevant documents. D. Step 4: Compare with Objectives and Performance Criteria

Compare the evaluated risks against the detailed HSE objectives and targets for the project or installation. For all cases these targets must be maintained and be consistent with the Company Policy, and Strategic Objectives. Performance standards at all levels must meet the criteria set in the HSE Case, which in turn

1. Incoming Piping Line 2. HC Process Module 3. Flare System 4. Compression System (Additional HC Process Module) The hazards from these systems are identified for the operation phase of the facility’s life cycle. Ship Systems

The ship systems were divided into the following to enable detailed review of their hazards: 1. Oil Storage and Offloading 2. Accommodation 3. Machinery and Systems 4. Mooring The hazards from these systems are identified for the production phase of the facility’s life cycle.

Guide Word Code

2.4

8

Electricity

9

Ultramagnetic Radiation

10

Ionizing Radiation

11

Biological Hazards

12

Ergonomic Hazards

13

Psychological Hazards

R ISK ASSESSMENT

The likelihood and effects of the hazards to people, environment, asset and reputation has been assessed based on the risk-screening matrix presented in Table 2. A semiquantitative approach, assigning numbers and letters to consequ nces and likelihood based on their severit and frequency, is used. This approach sep rates the hazards in the primary two dimensions of likelihood and consequence, with a third dimension of impact i.e. what is affected (people, environment, asset and rep tation) assessed for increased resolution of the assessment. The objective of this approach is to separate the hazards allowing for further specific analysis and focused action. Table 2. Risk Matrix

2.4.1

Likelihood/ Probability Assessment The assessment of likelihood of occurrence of an event is independent of its effects or consequences. The likelihood/probability categories stipulated for use by the PHA methodology are presented in Table 3. Table 3. Likelihood/Probability Categories used in PHA Analysis Probability Category A

2.4.2

Definition Has not happened in the oil and gas industry

B

Has happened in the oil and gas industry in the last 10 years

C

Has happened in our company in the last 10 years

D

Happened once in the last 12 months in our company

E

Happens several time per year at this location

Consequence Assessment The consequence categories specified by the PHA methodology are based on the specific impacts of a hazard especially for people due to health issues.

Probability Category

Potential Impact

Definition possibility of multiple fatalities (maximum of 3) in close succession due to the incident e.g. explosion

5

Multiple Fatality

May include four fatalities in close succession due to the incident, or multiple fatalities (four or more) each at different points and/or with different activities


3

FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3.1

LOCATION

Teluk Berau-A (TBA) and Teluk Berau-C (TBC) fields are located in Seram Sea, East Indonesia and ismanaged by Thome Offshore Management (TOM) from Singapore. The facility is located approximately 01o 33’35” south and longitude 130o 31’11” east at a heading of 270.10. Management and engineering support is provided from Thome offices in Singapore. A supporting office is located in Sorong. 3.2

SYSTEM D ESCRIPTION – P ROCESS A REA

Topside Separation Process, Flare system and Produced Water processing facility is presented in the formof simplified block diagram below.

• Total Oil Flow rate

:

15,000 BOPD

• Produced water flow rate :

18,000 BWPD

•Water Cut

0-90%

:

Separation is carried out in three stages. In order to produce stabilized crude oil specification as per Exhibit-M Attachment 5 to ITB, viz., RVP of max. 10 psi and water in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, a three stage separation system consisting of First Stage Separator V-100, Second Stage Separator V-200 and Electrostatic Coalescer V-300 has been adopted. Gas separation from the liquids is achieved in the First stage Separator V-100. This separator design allows up to 2250 BWPD water to be carried over to the Second Stage Separator V-200. The produced water from Electrostatic Coalescer is returned to the First Stage Separator by means of one of two 100% capacity Produced Water Pumps. The produced water from the pumps is also used for sand jetting the First stage Separator in future. The First stage Separator (V-100) is designed to operate at a pressure of 215 psia and temperature 72°F (22°C). Heating of the fluid at the inter-stage between First stage Separator V-100 and Second Stage Separator V- 200 is provided to flash off the volatile components in Second stage separator V-200. This is required to reduce the RVP of crude to storage.

Degasser Drum (V-400). The Hydrocyclone contains centrifugal devices that are enclosed in pressure vessel. After the centrifugal separation produced water is flashed in Produced Water Degassing Drum (V-400) operating at near atmospheric pressure to release any dissolved gas. Treated produced water is discharged overboard through level control. Off-spec water can be diverted to slops tank manually. Diverting the produced water to overboard or slop tank is decided based on the results of analyzer AT-400. C. Condensate Stabilization System

In order to produce stabilized crude oil meeting export specification to ITB, viz., RVP of max. 10 psia and water in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, Crude from the Electrostatic Coalescer is sent to Condensate Stabilization system. Condensate Stabilization System consists of Stabilizer column C-100 and Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200. The stabilization process reduces vapour pressure, thereby making the crude safe for shipment in tankers. Vapour pressure is exerted by light hydrocarbons, such as methane, ethane, propane, and butane, changing from liquid to gas as the pressure on the crude is lowered. If a sufficient amount of these light hydrocarbons is removed, the vapour pressure becomes satisfactory for shipment at approximately atmospheric pressure. Crude from Electrostatic Coalescer V-300 is fed into the Condensate Stabilizer column C-100. Condensate Stabilizer column C-100 is a packed column where crude from the Electrostatic Coalescer flows downward to the Reboiler while gas from the Reboiler flows upward stripping the light hydrocarbonfrom the Crude. Condensate Stabilizer

D.HP/LP Flare System

There are two flare headers collecting relief loads and vent loads from various equipment. HP flare is designed to handle 30 MMSCFD continuous relief and 75 MMSCFD Emergency relief at higher radiation levels. Capacity of HP Flare is 75 MMSCFD. LP flare is designed to flare the flashed gas from the Second stage separator, Condensate stabilizer Column and Degassing Drum. LP flare capacity is 13 MMSCFD. Note:During blow down/depressurization of subsea lines Thome will ensure that hydrates are not formed due to pressure reduction. Separate knockout drums have been provided for LP and HP flare headers. In addition gas outlet from the Degassing Drum and Stabilizer column will also be routed to the LP flare knockout drum. Two LP Knockout drums 1 & 2 have been provided for handle large quantity of LP gas. Liquid with lower vapor pressure than the operating pressure of the HP flare Knockout drum will be routed to LP Flare knockout drum through the level control system. Drains from the separation Process module will also be routed to the LP Flare Knockout Drum 1. Excess heavy liquids from both the LP Flare Knockout Drums have been routed to Slops tank. 2 x 100% pneumatic type LP Flare Knockout Drum Pumps have provided for boosting the LP Flare Knockout Drum drains to Slops Tank. The LP Flare Knockout

by hot flue gas from burner. The burner uses the fuel gas from the First stage separator outlet at required pressure using pressure control and air from external blower assembly. The hot oil obtained in this process is sent to the Reboiler for heating the unstabilized crude. F. Closed Drain

All process equipment with hydrocarbon liquid inventory under normal operating conditions are provided with closed drains to enable draining of liquid during maintenance of these equipment. All hydrocarbon level instruments will also drain in to the closed drain header. A systematic collection system is provided to collect closed drains from different equipment. The collectors are connected to a central closed drain header that will route all collected fluid to the LP Flare knockout drum. G. Hazardous Open Drains

Drains from process pancakes shall be collected and routed to the slops tank through liquid seal. Each pancake is provided with coaming plates to contain the maximum liquid inventory on the pancake. Each pancake is also provided with drain channels to collect, hold and route the liquid to Hazardous open drain header. H. Chemical Injection

Chemical injection is envisaged to aid production of oil, gas and water and to control corrosion. Corrosion properties and settling characteristics of are not available. Hence based on the best available information and experience the chemical injection system is designed. Provisions are available for addition of any chemicals that may be found

Figure 2. Utility Flow Diagram


4

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1

R ESULTS OF H EALTH H AZARD I DENTIFICATION STUDY

The two main elements i.e. Process and Ship Systems of the Brotojoyo FPSO facility were systematically reviewed using the detailed PHA Health Hazard Identification checklists. The completed sheets are included in Appendix A. Every hazard that was identified was assessed with a corresponding frequency and consequence estimated for each initiating event. The risk-screening matrix was then used to rank the risk as 'Low', 'Med/Marginal' or 'High'. The following are list of recommendation related to health issues in facility. Table 4. Recommendation from Health Hazard Identification Rec. No

1

Recommendation

Perform noise mapping and create noise map to warn personnel regarding to noise hazard

Noise can be potential hazard as new installation of compressor in facility. High noise of compressor can lessen capacity to hear for human. Noise mapping is required to defined adequate procedure of personal protection when entering facility area, especially compressor system including its engine room. Noise mapping shall be attach and publish in certain area so that every personnel can be informed regarding


5

CONCLUSION

Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to define all the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harm personnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company. In total, 2 recommendations raised during the review. Those are related to health issues especially noise related to new installation of compressor. The study shows that consequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/or fatalities. Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address the significant hazards identified for Process and Ship Systems, the occurrence of high severity consequences, based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.


Appendix A

Health Hazard Identification Review Worksheets

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT

JANUARY 2015

Brotojoyo FPSO Project

Hazard Identification Worksheet

Health Risk Assessment

Functional Group

FACILITY AREA Risk Matrix

Hazard ID 1,1

Hazard Toxic / Asphyxiating Gas Release

Cause Cloud of hydrocarbon vapour released

Effect Risk of asphyxiation if personnel are trapped in gas cloud and cannot escape quickly

1,2

Toxic / Asphyxiating Gas Release

Toxic gas release (H2S) contained in gas within its IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health)

Immediate Fatality due to toxic (i.e. H2S)

1,3

Toxic / Asphyxiating Gas Release

Excessive N2 while performing purging activity

Risk of asphyxiation if personnel lead to fatality

2,1

Toxic Liquid

Personnel injury.

2,2

Toxic Liquid

Spill of chemicals and other toxic liquid materials in facility area Oil based sludges


Personnel injury.

Preventive Measures Gas detection system in process area. Single solid deck, well ventilated. Air intake points for TR are located aft, which is away from process area. Sufficient pocket gas detectors have been provided onboard for the person working around incoming pipe line and process area. Gas detection system in process area. Single solid deck, well ventilated. Use adequate respiratory protection while working.

Health Risk SIG

Gas detection system while perform purging. Use adequate respiratory protection while working. Use adequate personnel protection while handling toxic liquid. Use adequate personnel protection while handling toxic liquid.

SIG

Rec. No

Reccommendations

SIG

LOW

LOW

JANUARY 2015

3,1

Toxic Solid

No issues applicable for this scenario

4,1

Dropped Objects

Object dropped from deck crane damages process module and causes leak

Potential injury and fatality to personnel.

5,1

Noise

High Noise in lift gas compression system

Potential to hearing dissability

6,1

Heat

Heat exposed to human from high temperature containment surface.


6,2

Heat


7,1

Cold

8,1

Electricity

Heat exposed from engine and turbine exhaust system. No issues applicable for this scenario High voltage exposed to human

8,2

Electricity

Lightning discharge

9,1

Ultramagnetic Radiation

No issues applicable for this scenario


Control of lifting operations where work permit and safe job analysis were in place. Consider restriction on crane operational were be in place in material handling philosophy. Wear proper ear protection while working and aware to working period in high noise area.

MED

Attach proper insulation at high temperature containment, attach warning sign at the area, wear proper PPE while working. Heat shall be exhaust to safe location where personnel rarely to be there.

MED

Potential Fatality to personnel.

Attach sign/ warning at high voltage area. Wear proper PPE for high voltage use.

SIG

Potential Fatality to personnel.

Attach lightning strike, apply procedure to avoid any activities regarding to ligthning hazards.

LOW

MED

1

Perform noise mapping and create noise map to warn personnel regarding to noise hazard

MED

JANUARY 2015

10,1

Ionizing Radiation

11,1

Biological Hazard

11,2

Biological Hazard

12,1

Ergonomic Hazard

12,2

Ergo nomic Haz ard

13,1

Psychological Hazard

No issues applicable for this scenario Contaminated food and/or improperly cleaned foods, hands, etc. Influenza due to wheather changes

Potential sick to personnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth, etc properly.

LOW

Potential sick to personnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth, etc properly.

LOW

Inappropriate equipment handling

Potential injury to personnel

Adequate working procedure.

MED

I nsu fficient ligh t whil e working Fatigue

potential to lessens eyesight. Potential sick and injury to personnel.

Adequate light on working area. Time management while working.

LOW


LOW

JANUARY 2015

Healt Hazard Identification_Final

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