Maguid T. Makalingkang
Governance for the Bangsamoro:
The need for a paradigm shift
Introduction Te Bangsamoro armed struggle in southern Philippines is one o the longest, i not the longest, sel-determination struggle in the world. Tis struggle caused loss o lives and damage to property, rendered massive dislocations, and hindered many important socio-economic development opportunities in the Bangsamoro homeland. Te Philippine Human Development Report (2005: 65) stressed that the contemporary Moro armed struggle waged by the Bangsamoro liberation ronts is the sharpest expression o the problem in the relationship between the Philippine and the Bangsamoro. Tis is characterized by the historical and symmetric sy mmetric marginalization and minoritization o the Islamized Islamize d ethno-linguistic groups, collectively called Bangsamoro, B angsamoro, in their own homeland by Spain (rom the 16th to the 19th centuries), the United States (in the rst hal o the 20th century), and, more more recently, by the colonial successor the Philippine government since its ormal independence in 1946. Te armed conict might be viewed as a clash between two nations, Filipino and Moro, each with their own narratives o the conict. For the Bangsamoro liberation ronts, it has been a conscious struggle to regain the historical sovereignty o the independent independen t Moro nationstates, called sultanates, over their homeland. For the Philippine government and the Philippine nation-state, it has been a matter o deending the territorial integrity o the country against secession and dismemberment. Tis has made the conict a veritable case o “irresistible orces, immovable objects”. Te government has undeniably undertaken various approaches to address the problem but it seems these were not eective because the Moro armed struggle continues to exist. However, However, stakeholders stakeholders o peace p eace and development de velopment in this part o the
Dr. Maguid . Makalingkang is Associate Proessor V in the College o Public Aairs and ormer dean o the Graduate School o the Mindanao State UniversityMaguindanao.
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country are hopeul that the administration o President Benigno Aquino III could nally bring about peace in Mindanao. Tis paper briey traced the Moro assertion o the right to sel-determination as well as the Philippine government government’’s approaches to resolve this concern, and discusses proposed Bangsamoro governance.
Te Mindanao Confict Te conict in Mindanao between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro was once described by Majul (1973) as “multi-aceted and represents a constellation o various problems.” Moros were the dominant group in the archipelago beore the arrival o the Spanish colonizers. Tey dominated both local and international economies and possessed the most advanced technology o that period which enabled them to engage in oreign trade. In politics, they had an organized and centralized orm o government (PHDR, 2005; Glang, 1969). Albeit eudal, the sultanates as a political organization already existed in 1450 AD (PHRD, 2005). Furthermore, the Bangsamoro nation-states existed beore colonizers arrived in the archipelago. Te Sulu and the Maguindanao sultanates had, at the time o Spaniards’ arrival, already perected pere cted the requisites o nationhood—namely nationhood—namely,, territory, territory, people, government, and sovereignty. Hence both Spanish and American colonial regimes had to contend with small but ercely independent Bangsamoro sovereign nation-states. Islam had arrived in Sulu in the last quarter o the 13th century and the Sulu sultanate was established in 1451, more than a century beore the Spanish period in 1565. Te Spanish colonial period was marked by bitter Spanish-Moro wars (the so-called “Moro Wars”) ought in six stages spanning our centuries (or details, see Majul, 1999: 121-375). Te colonialists called the Muslim natives “Moros” ater their hated enemies, the Moors, who had previously ruled Spain or eight centuries. Te Spaniards ostered Christianized indio (Filipino) prejudice against Moros through such cultural institutions as the moro-moro plays. American rule started in the Philippines in 1898 and military pacication or the Moros began in 1903 190 3 with the organization o the Moro province, a military government distinct rom the rest o the Philippines. Although the Moro people had remained ree o Spain, by 1913 the American colonialists slowly challenged the Bangsamoro. At that time, Dr. Najeeb M. Saleeby, an American educator and historian who joined the Tomasites, dened what to the Americans was the “Moro Problem”:
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By Moro Problem is meant that method or orm o administration by which the Moro and other non-Christians who are living among them, can be governed to their best interest and welare in the most peaceul way possible, and can at the same time be b e provided with appropriate measure or their gradual achievement in culture and civilization, so that in the course o a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government o the Philippine Islands as members o a republican national organization. (Saleeby, 1913)
One might say that the post-colonial Philippine government’s denition o the “Moro Problem” remains essentially the same, including its corresponding policy solution o national integration ( (anggol, anggol, 1982). Full-edged Filipino nation-statehood was marked in 1946 when the Philippines was granted independence by the US government despite opposition rom the Moros. Tis was also the beginning b eginning o the contemporary contemporar y Moro struggle because bec ause the Bangsamoro homeland was incorporated into Philippine Philippin e territory (or annexed, as some Moro nationalists would say). Tis is where it becomes difcult or or the Government o the Philippines and the Bangsamoro to resolve their concerns. While the Government Governm ent o the Philippines ounded its solution on the contemporary contemporar y situation, the Bangsamoro premised theirs on their past history. According to George (1980: 11-12): “Te theories that ran the gamut rom religion to misgovernment were relevant only in so ar as they were pieces o an enormously complex jigsaw puzzle. o pick anyone o them as the outstanding causes or the upheaval would be a hindrance to understanding unde rstanding the total picture.” Santos (2001: 43) added that: “Te problem is historical, political, economic, social, educational, cultural, religious, moral, ideological, legal, and more. It is not only multi-dimensional but also evolving, with dierent dimensions coming to the ore at dierent times—as shown by the MNLF and MILF tracks on the Moro ront.” A clear picture o the above contention is summarized in the book o Muslim (1994) that revealed 10 undamental causes c auses o the “Moro Problem Problem”” tracing rom 1898 to 1972. Historical roots include: (1) the orcible/illegal annexation o Moroland to the Philippines under the reaty o Paris in 1898; (2) military pacication; (3) imposition o conscatory land laws; (4) indioization (or Filipinization) o public administration in Moroland and the destruction o traditional political institutions; (5) governmentnanced/induced land settlement and migration to Moroland; (6) land-grabbing/ conicts; and (7) cultural inroads against the Moros. Contemporary causes are (8) the Jabidah Massacre in 1968; (9) Ilaga (Christian vigilante group) and military atrocities in 1970-1972 and; (10) government neglect and inaction on Moro protests and grievances. Te catalyst o the contemporary Moro armed struggle was President Ferdinand E. Marcos’s declaration o martial law on September 21, 1972. Aside rom marginalization, destitution and disorder issues in the Bangsamoro homeland, the
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conict in Mindanao became more complicated. Tis is best captured in the view o anggol (1993: 42-43): Is the Mindanao problem a Muslim or Moro problem, a Christian problem, or a Lumad (Highlander) problem? Tis is not meant to discriminate but to properly identiy the various interest groups and demands competing or policy action. Tis will help government identiy common and conicting demands so it can better crat what policies it can and or whom. And so that it will know k now which client cl ient to respond to and to what extent. It is wrong to assume that Mindanao has no conicting policy demands. It is our contention that the problem in the South is basically a Muslim or Moro problem. History History is i s much in avor o this contention.... c ontention.... By saying that the Mindanao problem is a Muslim problem, it is not to deny the other group in Mindanao their due rom the government… A Christian or Lumad problem is possible should the government envision a response to the Muslim problem that will not be acceptable to the ormer. Tis is a potential one and it must be considered as a constraint to the adoption o any solution to the Muslim problem… One implication that must be derived here is that the Moros, while having demands commonly shared with the other groups in Mindanao, have demands unique to themselves and demands conicting with those o the other groups.
It must be pointed out the government attempted to resolve the armed conict locally or even with the participation o the international community, yet the problem persists.
Government Approach to the “Moro Problem” Te Philippine government, in addressing the so-called “Moro Problem”, employed the same divide-and-conquer devices used by the colonizers, suusing modications generally with the same impact. Since the inception o the Moro struggle, the Philippine government approach remains to be that o the carrot-and-stick variety (Muslim, 1994). But the stick aspect—the use o state’s superior instruments o violence—has certainly been given more emphasis. However, more than a decade o this strategy demonstrates the inefcacy o the military approach that erroneously views the armed struggle and the mujahideen as the problem and not the conditions that brought them to existence. Tis means that, unless the government addresses the root causes o the Moro struggle, there is not much else that can be done. It has become obvious that the government’s continued use o its military might has only sustained and intensied the armed struggle. It has only provided the armed struggle with substantial centripetal orce. More Moros, including women, have been pushed
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to the struggle by the government’s large-scale militarization and militarism in the Muslim areas in Mindanao (Muslim, 1994; see also Jubair, 2007). 2007). Te carrot aspect is designed to entice mujahideen mujahideen,, especially their leaders, and their sympathizers. Tese include the granting o amnesty to Moro “rebels” who returned to the olds o the law, law, the pampering o a ew o the leader-returnees through oers o posts, mostly nominal and ad-hoc, in the government and some business opportunities, mostly short-term. Some so-called special agencies were created not only to create the impression that the Muslims’ welare was being attended to, but also to co-opt some o the mujahideen leaders. Occasionally, some grandiose “programs or Muslim Mindanao” were announced (Muslim, 1994). Another carrot component in the government’s peace-making eorts is the autonomy experiment. Te Marcos regime succeeded in producing the ripoli Agreement in 1976 which only created controversy in the implementation. Under the Aquino administration, RA 6734 or the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) came into being and a subsequent plebiscite was conducted on November 19, 1998. Tese did not oer solutions to the “Moro Problem.” President Fidel V. Ramos succeeded in luring the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leader Nur Misuari to accept the post o Regional Governor o the ARMM ater the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the 1996 peace accord. Misuari was later charged with rebellion. rebel lion. President President Joseph Estrada E strada returned to the classic approach, the stick, while President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Macap agal-Arroyo used both the carrot and the stick, ending with the declaration o the MOA-AD as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008 (see Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Domain , G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402). In sum, the peace-making eorts by the government were all designed or propaganda purposes and did not address the grievances and aspirations o the Bangsamoro people.
Paradigm Shit Te government has used various strategies: assimilation and integration, carrot and stick, “all-out war”, and decentralization through autonomy, all to no avail. Tere is thereore a need or a paradigm shit shi t to address the problem. p roblem. Te approach has to be
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comprehensive and implementation impleme ntation should be simultaneous. Important components o this approach are the political and the administrative aspects.
Te Political Aspect Te Bangsamoro aspiration or an Islamic system o lie and governance in predominantly Moro areas in Mindanao is a legitimate aspiration o a people to ully secure their identity and way o lie, and to rule themselves accordingly. However, an Islamic system cannot be accommodated within the present Philippine constitutional ramework. Tis constitutional problem will have to be resolved, and it can be resolved. But it will require rom both sides political politic al will, rethink rethinking, ing, compromi compromise, se, and creativity. creativi ty. Te eort—intellectual, rational, dialogical, political and constitutional—to make the pieces t should be taken. Constitutional negotiations should be conducted. I a constitutional solution cannot be ound, or i ound but cannot be agreed upon, then and only then may there be a principled parting o ways. It can be gleaned rom the above statement that the option or eective resolution to the “Moro Problem” is within the reach o Filipino creativity and may not require imported political, administrative thoughts, and principles. Te government needs only to steer Filipino potential and use their intellectual lenses to rethink and revisit the 1987 Constitution with the intention o exacting appropriate provisions or Filipino cultural unity in diversity diversity.. Only Only then can we hope or a solution. Te ocus o paradigm p aradigm shit may include the ollowing: 1. o ocus government eorts on the real problem, instead o the symptoms. Revolutionary organizations organiz ations and revolutionaries are just symptoms (Muslim, 1994). Te problem that should be given emphasis is the reormulation o national policies that provide the Bangsamoro people a just power relationship with the national government to chart the administration o their economic, social, political, and cultural conditions based on the Islamic system. 2. Non-violent alternative approaches by the government in addressing Bangsamoro problem. Te archipelagic nature and composition o the Philippine territory, and plurality and diversity require a setup in which each o the component groups is given substantial control in charting their individual and collective interests. For the Bangsamoro people—given the deplorable conditions in which they nd themselves and how they are neglected and discriminated against as a group by the government, in addition to their being a distinct people with dierent history, way o lie, culture, and religion—the consequent grant o a new government is a ormal and urgent need. 3. o abandon the “melting pot” concept adhered to by many countries including the Philippines, to assimilate their diverse constituent cultural communities
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into mainstream politics. Tis inevitably entails orcible subordination or ineriorization o minority ethnic communities to the dominant group, not only culturally but also politically and economically. Te assimilation mode o political integration is inherently unsuited to Bangsamoro society. Te assimilationist mode obscures the class, ethnicity, religion, and social status o its citizens, citiz ens, and and unites them in terms o their subscription to a common system o authority, which is similarly abstracted rom the wider structure o social relations. Tis measure would urther disempower national minorities minoritie s and eliminate any sense o possessing poss essing a distinct national identity id entity.. Tis was justied on the grounds that minorities view themselves as distinct “nations” would be disloyal and potentially secede (Parekh, 2000, cited in Muslim, 2003). Te task o creating a new political structure in the Philippines is indeed not colossal. Te Philippines has experienced three constitutional amendments or national survival (1935, 1973, and 1986). Te best way to do this would be to start with the basic aspects. A ocus on the political aspirations o the Bangsamoro is in order, particularly the need to develop a governance ormula suited to the cultural diversity o the Bangsamoro in their homeland. Aside rom the above experiences, experien ces, political solutions used by other countries, countri es, such as in the Bougainville problem in Papua New Guinea and the South Sudanese in Sudan, among others, can serve as model or the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro in the interest o peace and development. de velopment. Te initial agreements between the government o the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have illustrated an honourable way to reinvent a new political system. Te ormula has initially explored a new kind o political politic al structures, processes, and policies which are compatible with their respective circumstances. It must be emphasized that reaching a political settlement is one thing and administration o that settlement is another. Te ollowing points are necessary to make politics and governance in Bangsamoro societies inclusive and to ensure ownership o government (sub-state or ederalism) by the Bangsamoro constituent communities: •
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Shared management o the economy and resources to ensure that all constituent communities or groups receive a just share o its ruits; A system that recognizes cultural and religious dierences and provides or some collective protection o religious, political, and cultural rights mandated under UN resolutions, documents, and standards; Political decision-making that provides ample protection or the voice o Bangsamoro and other ethnic minorities; and
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4. Afrmative administrative policies and programs or the Bangsamoro and other minorities.
Realizing these eatures would help in addressing the principal oundations o the Bangsamoro people’s assertion o their right to sel-determination, particularly in view o government neglect and discrimination in the allocation o resources, lack o participation and control over local or community aairs, inadequate representation in the central government, and lack o respect or the right o minorities to be dierent. Te latter includes demands or a separate legal system, syste m, a separate educational system, sys tem, and the power to create local policies warranted by the cultural groups’ otherness or peculiarities. In other words, the above eatures have bearings on issues associated with the politics o redistribution or social justice, and the politics o recognition or identity politics (Muslim, 2004), which are at the core o many violent conicts in the Bangsamoro homeland.
Te Administrative Aspect Given the above eatures, and in the context o Bangsamoro in their homeland, governance and development developmen t initiatives remain to be the issue. Te top-down politicoadministrative mechanism is still used, although some indications o the bottom-up approach can be seen. Some examples are the recent cultural recognition-oriented initiatives o ormer President Arroyo and her major socio-economic development programs in the Southern Philippines (including the depressed Moro communities) under the 2004-2006 Mindanao Min danao Investment Program. Although these recent cultural diversity-riendly diversity-riend ly initiatives o the Arroyo administration are indeed encouraging, the Philippine state, like many other modern states, remains preoccupied with ensuring national political and cultural homogeneity. Despite some initiatives in regional and local autonomy and decentralization, governance in the Philippines remains substantially assimilationist and continues to emphasize hegemonic control and the derivative techniques o coercive coe rcive domination and elite co-optation (Muslim, 2004). Te Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has existed since 1989. erritorially, the present ARMM based on the new autonomy law (RA 9054) is slightly bigger, with the addition o Basilan to the original our provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and awi-awi) and Marawi City. But the 2006 Rights-Based Approach (RBA) Orientation Manual reported the country’s countr y’s national poverty incidence o 24.7% while CARAGA and ARMM have the highest poverty incidence rate o 47.3% and 45.7%, respectively (cited in RBA, 2006; see also PHDI, PH DI, 2005). In this connection, the RBA RBA (2006) observed obser ved that the government has ailed in its obligation to respect, protect, and ull the needs o the masses wallowing in
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poverty, deprivation, and discontent. Such ailure o government has led to various orms o internal security concerns conce rns that yielded human rights violations, oremost o which is the violation o the peoples’ right to development both at the individual indi vidual and collective levels. In addition, the ARMM has its legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It has its own administrative system and some s ome degree o scal autonomy autonomy.. Te Philippine government implemented the provisions o RA 9054 on Moro representation in the central government by appointing Muslim leaders and proessionals to certain positions in some national agencies. Moreover, the Philippine government has completed the integration o 7,500 qualied MNLF combatants into the Armed Forces o the Philippine (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Some socio-economic development programs were implemented in the region by oreign donors and the national government, while others are presently being implemented. Tere are many other gains made under the present regional autonomy experiment in Muslim Mindanao. However, the continued persistence o the Moro armed struggle can be taken However, to suggest that the existing governance system sy stem or the region (i.e., Muslim Mindanao) has not been responsive. Despite the reported socio-economic development programs or the southern Philippines, Philippine s, the ve predominantly Muslim provinces have remained the country’s poorest. Te region had the worst poverty index in 2000 and in 2005, our years ater the signing o the GPH-MNLF Peace Agreement (Muslim, 2004). Reective o the government’s continuing assimilationist thrust and a heavy slant towards hegemonic control are some cultural diversity or identity-related issues. One is the too limited jurisdiction o the Shari’ah S hari’ah courts, i.e., they decide only in cases involving persons and amily relations (Pigkaulan, 2008). Te establishment o the Shari’ah Appellate Court, which was mandated by the autonomy laws (Article VIII, Administration o Justice, Sections 1-12, RA 6734; Article VIII, Administration o Justice, Sections 7-17, RA 9054); the Ofce o Jurisconsult in Islamic Law (Article VIII, Administration o Justice, Section 15, RA 6734; Article VIII, Administration o Justice, Section 20, RA 9054); and ribal ribal Courts C ourts (Article (Artic le VIII, Administration o Justice, Section 14, RA 6734; Article VIII, Administration o Justice, Section 19, RA 9054), remains unimplemented. unimplemented . Despite the gains o the integration o 7,500 qualied MNLF combatants into the AFP and the PNP, the Special Regional Security Force and regional command o the AFP or the ARMM, expected to have substantial Moro elements mandated under the old and new autonomy laws, have remained unimplemented until today. Te taxing powers o the region are hollow because, aside rom the widespread poverty
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in the region, no signicant national taxing powers were transerred to the ARMM. Te control-oriented governance o the region is indicated by the emphasis e mphasis in the old and new autonomy laws (RA 6734 and RA 9054 respectively) on the limitations o the powers o the ARMM. Like Like RA 6734, many o the provisions p rovisions o RA 9054 have to do with what the ARMM cannot c annot do instead o what it can do (Muslim, 2004). A clear maniestation o this limited taxing power o the ARMM is the enactment o the Revenue Code No. 50, which can generally be considered add-on tax. Te ARMM has difculty in expanding its tax measures because almost all taxable transactions are designated to the barangay, municipality, city, province, and the national government. Tis is because the ARMM has to deal with national laws, existing laws, and special laws apportioned to other tax collecting agencies o the government in enacting revenue generation or the region. Despite the gains and accomplishments made with the current unitary regional autonomy experiment in Muslim Mindanao, governance in the Philippines cannot be classied as autonomous in the real meaning o the word. What has been achieved so ar is largely in the nature o ormal and not substantive compliance with the characteristics and requirements o autonomous governance. Te gains are in those aspects with signicant signic ant co-optation unctions (e.g. appointment o mujahideen o mujahideen leaders to some government positions, integration o MNLF combatants into the AFP and PNP). It should be noted that the core issue o autonomy as a policy response to ethnic conict is the right o the minorities to be dierent. But the gains and accomplishments discussed earlier, while largely ormal, can lead to the desired desi red governance. It must be pointed out that autonomy as a policy response to ethnic conict is a signicant phase in the cultural diversity-riendly interventions continuum. Being in the initial phase o the road towards Islamic governance as envisioned by the MILF, the task at hand is how to utilize lessons learned in the current autonomy experiment in Muslim Mindanao to lead to more responsive, non-violent and non-secessionist politico-administrative politico-admini strative alternatives, and to develop a durable ormula that ensures the territorial integrity o the country and addresses the principal Moro grievances underpinning the conict. As to the other concerns not addressed in RA 9054—such as broadening the power o the Bangsamoro or sel-governance, sharing o resources between the central government and the Bangsamoro state, recognition o Bangsamoro identity and homeland—these should be part o the political thrusts in the uture. Te current peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF provides a good opportunity to address these neglected but signicant items.
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Te Way Way Forwa Forward rd Tere are two appropriate starting points in looking or an authentic and peaceul resolution to the Bangsamoro problem. First is recognizing the various socio-economic, political, and cultural dierences o the Filipino F ilipino peoples, people s, and and second is giving minorities space in the undamental law through policy reormulation and strengthened administrative bureaucracy bureaucracy.. It must be stressed that the Filipino nation is deeply dee ply divided; there are signicant dierences in socio-economic s ocio-economic and political structures, as well as in the history, culture, and way o lie. Tis should be recognized i we are interested in pursuing good governance and development, or what the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation called the “indigenization o development.” o acilitate peace, governance, and development in the Bangsamoro communities, a constitutional rethinking (not rejecting constitutionalism and sovereignty) is necessary. James ully provided an excellent ormula or eshing governance and development, labelled as “Contemporary Constitutionalism.” In this ormula, the Constitution itsel is reconceived as a orm o accommodation o cultural diversity (ully, 1995: 62). Tis can be airly done through intercultural dialogue or multilogue between and among peoples or nations in one country in accordance with three important conventions: mutual recognition, consent, and cultural continuity. Tese principles guide the negotiations towards just orms o constitutional association. Te aim o negotiations is to recognize dierences in appropriate institutions and similarities in shared institutions. In this regard, even sovereignty is seen in a new ne w light as the authority o a culturally diverse people to govern themselves them selves by their own laws and ways, ree rom external subordination. It oers peace, based not on some abstract theory o justice, but on mediation o concrete claims between and among the diverse parties using the aoresaid three conventions (Santos, 2001: 121-122 citing ully, 1995). Santos (2001: 122) explained urthermore that this contemporary constitutionalism has the potential o mediating “six types o demands or cultural recognition that constitute the most intractable conicts o the present age: supranational associations, nationalism and ederalism, linguistic and ethnic minorities, eminism, multiculturalism, and Aboriginal sel-government.” ully ully’s ’s conception o contemporary constitutionalism did not just drop rom the skies. It comes rom the historical practice pr actice o “treaty constitutionalism” between Aboriginal peoples o North America and the
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British Crown (later, the Canadian and US governments) as equal, sel-governing nations, resulting in relations o protection and inter-dependency, not discontinuity and subordination. In the case o the US, ully singles out Chie Justice Marshall’s decision in Worcester vs Georgia as the denitive American jurisprudence on US-Indian relations, much like Justice Malcolm had highlighted it in Rubi, thereby incorporating it into Philippine jurisprudence. Santos (2001: 122) elaborated that in Rubi , the Indian policy o the US, as denitely enunciated in Worcester , was afrmed to have been adopted or the “non-Christians” in the Philippines, which include Moros and Igorots, among other tribes mentioned in the dissenting opinion o Justice Moir. Te 1919 Indian-Moro connection is conrmed by a 1977 research paper by the oremost authority on American-Moro relations. O course, the Indian policy o the US was a mixed bag o the good and the bad. Fortunately, the best o that policy, namely Worcester , had been directly linked by Rubi by Rubi to to the Moros and other indigenous tribes o the Philippines. Beyond the guardian-ward aspect o US-Indian relations, Worcester Worcester detailed detailed other more important aspects o relevance to our constitutional problem: ...Te mutual desire o establishing permanent peace and riendship, and o removing all causes o war, is honestly avowed and in pursuance o their desire, the rst article declares that there shall be perpetual peace and riendship between all citizens o the United States o America and all the individuals composing the Cherokee Nation.
Te Implementation Aspects o implement the political and administrative approaches to address the Bangsamoro question, the ollowing are helpul he lpul to consider: 1. Relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro state. Te relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro state shall be determined by certain principles princi ples and policies that will guide the Bangsamoro state and its governance. Based on the provisions o the initialled GPH-MILF MOA-AD, the relationship between the central government and the proposed Bangsamoro state shall be associative in character. Te central government and the Bangsamoro state shall have a dened or shared power relationship. Te power relationship may be stated in general terms as, all those powers and unctions deemed appropriate or the national government to exercise shall be retained by the national government, while those deemed appropriate or the Bangsamoro state to perorm shall be decentralized to the Bangsamoro state, with each having the obligation, responsibility, responsibility, and accountability to the other.
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Te central government shall maintain public policy ormulation and administration o oreign aairs, national deense and security, postal services, and coinage (currency), citizenship and naturalization. It shall be the unction and responsibility o the Bangsamoro State to maintain and administer all internal aspects o governance within the Bangsamoro homeland including, but not limited to: legislation, taxation taxation and budgeting, banking and nance, public borrowing, economic development planning, and inrastructure development, social services (such as education, health, housing, etc), election, civil service, judicial system and correctional institutions, and policing and internal security securit y. Te sharing o income between the central government and the Bangsamoro state shall be xed to give them power to determine revenue generation without restraints rom statutory laws. Te granting o authority to the Bangsamoro state in creating its own tax base, rates, customs duties and collections colle ctions shall be provided in the comprehensive compact. 2. Drating an organic charter. Te drating o an organic charter or the Bangsamoro is necessary. It will be an opportunity to generate wide political support rom the Bangsamoro i done without intererence rom the central government and in a participatory manner. Te drating o an organic charter or the Bangsamoro state has to involve all sectors o the Bangsamoro society to generate sense o ownership. Te selection process or membership to a body that will drat the organic charter should ensure equitable representation rom all ethno-linguistic groups, including indigenous peoples p eoples and other sectors o the Bangsamoro society. For the organic charter to be acceptable to the Bangsamoro, direct participation o the aected people in the drating shall be considered. Te composition o the body must be decided through popular choice and must be proportional to the number o people represented. Te body that will drat the charter should be cautioned by the experiences o the Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) and the consequent result o the past drating o the Organic Act or Muslim Mindanao Autonomy in 1988, which was rejected by the MNLF as it was not responsive to the needs and demands o the Bangsamoro people and the spirit o the ripoli Agreement. It has been said that many o the proposed provisions submitted by the RCC, especially by the Muslim Commissioners, were not considered in the enacted RA 6734 (PHDR, 2005). Te RCC, especially the Muslims, complained about the intererence inte rerence o national ofcials in their work o drating the organic charter, and they said that they “did not have a ree hand charting the proceedings o the RCC” (Basman, et, al, 1989, anggol, 2002, Muslim, 2001).
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Te organic charter can only be legitimate i the charter maniests the needs and demands o the Bangsamoro people and other sectors through discovering the Bangsamoro problem in their own homeland. Tis means that the Bangsamoro people, pe ople, via their chosen representatives, must have the ull capacity to drat the charter char ter,, including the methods o ratications consistent with the principle o direct democracy. Te composition o a body that will be responsible or the drating o the organic charter shall ensure the equitable representation o the 13 ethno-linguistic groups. Te geographic conguration o the Bangsamoro homeland is highly dispersed disperse d though contiguous. Tis makes access to center o political power difcult or many who live in the islands and remote areas. Among others, the organic charter shall include inc lude the structure o a Bangsamoro government and a system to ensure good governance. 3. Government structure. Presented Presented below is the present Philippine Phi lippine government structure which can be among the subjects o negotiation and reormulation in the GPH-MILF talks to acilitate a more comprehensive peace ormula or the Bangsamoro peoples. Executive Branch. Branch. Executive power is the power to execute laws and rule the country as chie executive, administering the aairs o government (Nolledo, 1996). Te president heads the executive branch. Te vice-president replaces the president when the latter dies, is permanently disabled, or is removed rom ofce or resigns. Te president and vice-president are elected by a direct vote o the people and may only be removed by impeachment. Te ormer is limited to one six-year term, while the latter is prohibited rom serving or more than two successive six-year terms. Te president also has the general supervision o the local government units (LGUs). At present, there there are our tiers o local government units: they are the province; city or highly urbanized urbaniz ed city; city ; municipality, municipality, and; and; the barangay, barangay, while the ARMM and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) are considered to be special local government governme nt units. Legislative Branch. Branch. Legislative power, or the power to make laws, is vested in the bicameral Congress consisting o the Senate and the House o Representatives. However, under the Initiative and Reerendum Act (Republic Act. No. 6735), the people can directly propose, amend, or repeal laws or any provision thereo. Te Senate is composed o 24 senators elected at-large nationwide. Unless otherwise provided by law, the membership o the House o Representatives should not be more than 250, consisting o elected representatives o legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system, as provided in the Party-List Act (Republic Act. No. No. 7941).
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Judicial Branch. Branch. Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in lower courts as may be established by law. Section 1, Article VII, o the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty o the courts o justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enorceable and the power o judicial review to determine whether or not an abuse o discretion occurred that amounted to a lack or excess o jurisdiction on the part o any branch or instrumentality o government. Te Supreme Court is composed o a chie justice and 14 associate justices. Te members o the Supreme Court and judges o lower courts are appointed by the president without need or conrmation and hold ofce during good behavior until they are 70 years o age or cannot discharge their duties due to incapacitation. Judges are chosen rom a list o nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, whose principal unction is to recommend appointees. Te Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over cases aecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls and petitions or certiorari, ce rtiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Te Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over nal judgments and orders o lower courts in such cases as are enumerated in the Constitution o the Republic o the Philippines. It promulgates rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and admission to the practice o law. Moreover, the Supreme Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. Te Constitution o the Republic o the Philippines also vests the judiciary with scal autonomy.
Figure 1: Organizational Structure of the Philippine Government
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According to Section 2 and Section 3, Article VII o the Constitution o the Republic o the Philippines, appropriations or the judiciary may not be reduced by Congress below the amount appropriated or the previous years and, ater approval thereo, shall be automatically and regularly released. Tese sections also state that no law can be passed to reorganize the judiciary when it undermines the security o tenure o its members. Figure 2: Relationship and Organizational Structure of the Philippine Government and the Bangsamoro State.
A proposed structure or a Bangsamoro government requires reorganization o the tiers o local government units. Under this proposed government structure o the Bangsamoro state, there will only be two tiers o local units. Te proposed structure is as ollows: Te structure o government diers rom the present orm. It will have only two tiers o local government units instead o our. It must be noted that there will be no provincial government. Te Te advantages o the proposal are: •
Direct access o the municipal government to the state government;
•
Reduce bureaucracy;
•
Direct supervision o the state government over municipal government;
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•
Te municipal government can directly decide on development programs and projects in the area;
•
Fewer sharers in the tax collected, col lected, which means bigger shares;
•
Public transactions are conned to the municipal government;
•
Direct access to government line-agency assistance; and
•
Fewer personnel
Managing the Bangsamoro State1 Managing the Bangsamoro state is a major concern, or which proportional representation, good governance, meritocracy, and promotion o Islamic values in governance are most required. Proportional Representation. Representation. Te Bangsamoro constitute 13 ethno-linguistic groups with the Maguindanaons, Maranaos and au-Sugs as the dominant groups. Aside rom these 13 groups, it is possible that a uture Bangsamoro state may include other indigenous peoples. In the present autonomous setup, some o the indigenous peoples (IPs) live within the ARMM. A system o proportional representation in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and the bureaucracy or every ethno-linguistic group, including indigenous peoples, is necessary to generate wide political support. Preerence has to be given to representation by ethnic groups because they are more cohesive and generally live in contiguous areas. Teir representation in the bureaucracy is also necessary to ensure delivery o services to and by them. o be successul, a governing institution will need to balance the powers o the executive and legislative branches and to be characterized by a concept o good governance, including commitment to eradicate corruption. Good Governance . Former University o the Philippines president Dr. Jose Abueva dened good governance as “the sustained capacity o the government and related political institutions to make and carry out timely policies and decisions that eectively respond resp ond to our problems, challenges, and goals as a nation. Good governance 1
Ideas in this section were drawn heavily rom Pro. Abhoud Syed M. Lingga’s paper Designing Bangsamoro Politica Political l Institution,, Cotabato City, Philippines, 2007. Institution
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is a process wherein public resources and problems are managed eectively, efciently, and in response to critical needs o society.” In the World Bank’s denition, good governance “is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with proessional ethos acting in urtherance o the public good, the rule o law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public aairs.” Participation. Participation is a process in which the people are actively involved in decision-making and in planning and implementation o development projects. It could be direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation reers to enhancing the people’s access to and involvement in all levels and acets o policy and decision-making, including acilitating processes o ree and open dialogue and building consensus between a government and the people to ensure that development is pursued or or,, with, and by the people. Consensus-oriented . Tere are many stakeholders in a given society and oten there are also diering views. Good governance requires that these interests reach a broad consensus on what is or the good o society and how can this be achieved. Equity and inclusiveness. inclusiven ess. Members o society eel e el that they have a stake and do not eel excluded rom mainstream society. Rule of law. Tere are legal rameworks that are enorced impartially by an independent judiciary and a air and incorruptible police orce. Accountability. Section 1, Article XI o the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: “Public ofce is a public trust. Public ofcers and employees must at all time be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efciency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” Accountability thereore relates to making public ofcials answerable to citizens citize ns or the actions and decisions o the government and ensuring that in the perormance o their unctions and their actions public ofcials are responsive to and aithully saeguard the welare and interests o the people. Promoting accountability involves establishing criteria to measure perormance o public ofcials and institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure that these criteria or standards are met. Simply put, government institutions are accountable to the public and those aected by their decisions or action. ransparency. ransparency reers to the availability and accessibility o ransparency. inormation to the public and clarity o government rules and regulations. It ensures swit access to accurate and timely inormation about government policies, programs, and activities.
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Responsiveness. Tis means that government institutions respond to the needs Responsiveness. o people within a reasonable timerame. Responsiveness also involves predictability and relates to the consistent and equal application o laws, regulations, and policies. It involves establishing and sustaining appropriate legal and institutional arrangements to uphold the rule o law and maintain consistency o public policies and programs. Te challenge to a Bangsamoro state is how to achieve good governance. It is an ideal and difcult to achieve in its totality totality.. However, However, it is helpul to: •
Install a mechanism that will ensure all Bangsamoro ethnic groups as well as the indigenous tribes and the marginalized sectors are represented in the legislative and the executive, and in planning and implementation o development programs.
Other than the legislative body, which is a law-making body, a consultative assembly composed o representatives o all ethnic groups, sectors o women, youth, business, labor, armers, sherolk, the religious and the marginalized shall be created. Te main unction o a consultative assembly is to harmonize divergent views and interests o the groups and sectors and come out with a consensus.
•
•
•
Strict implementation o laws, especially on grat and corrupt practices. Ensure the relevance o policy and implement the same based b ased on the goals and needs o the people.
Preventing Corruption. Corruption. Preventing corruption is a serious challenge that is pervasive not only in Muslim Mindanao but in the Philippines as a whole. Corruption in government can also mean misuse o governmental powers by government ofcials or illegitimate private gain. Corruption weakens democracy and good governance because it subverts the ormal procedures. It grinds down the institutional capacity o government. Corruption also undermines economic development as resources are siphoned o and it generates inefciency in public service perormance. Te ollowing are possible causes o corruption: •
Excessive desire or good lie
•
Poor example set by leadership
•
Low salary o government workers
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oo much bureaucracy
•
•
Cumbersome justice system
Tese happen because o an employee-client relationship that creates opportunities or bribery, grat, patronage, nepotism, cronyism, embezzlement, and kickbacks. Meritocracy. Meritocracy is a system o a government or other organization Meritocracy. wherein appointments are made and responsibilities assigned to individuals based upon demonstrated talent and ability (merit). In a meritocracy, society rewards—through wealth, position, and social status—those who show talent and competence as demonstrated by past actions or by competition. Evaluation systems, such as ormal education, are are closely closel y linked to notions o meritocracy meritocrac y. o promote meritocracy, government bureaucracy must prevent other value systems where reward and legitimacy is based upon possession o wealth (plutocracy), origin (aristocracy), amily connections (nepotism), property (oligarchy), riendship (cronyism), seniority (gerontocracy), popularity, or other historical determinants o social position and political power. echnocracy is a orm o meritocracy, whereby appointments or positions are made based on demonstrated technical expertise. Islamic Values. Values. Te promotion o good governance, meritocracy, and prevention o corrupt practices is not only a structural issue but also an attitudinal one. Te attitude o people greatly inuences their actions. For For example, many Bangsamoro see the Philippine government as gobirnu as gobirnu na saruang a tao (oreign government) and this causes their lack o concern or good governance and indierence towards issues o corruption (Lingga, 2007). Muslims can violate the constitution but not the Qur’an and Hadith o the Prophet o Islam which greatly inuence Bangsamoro attitudes. Islam is rich with reerences to values o good governance. A Bangsamoro political institution should harness these values to promote good governance and to ght corruption. Tis can be done i people have sense o ownership and legitimacy o government.
Conclusion Te conict between the government o the Philippines and the Bangsamoro people involves a multiaceted problem, deeply rooted in history, culture, and governance. Tis conict can be resolved by simultaneously and comprehensively addressing the political and administrative issues that compel the Bangsamoro people
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to struggle or their right to sel-determination with the participation o a third-party guarantor. Tis Moro struggle cannot be eectively resolved through the traditional strategies o assimilation and integration, carrot-and-stick, “all-out war”, and the current version o autonomy in redressing Moro grievances. Te approach should be non-violent, comprehensive, and simultaneously political and administrative in nature because o the inherent opposing perspectives o the Bangsamoro and the Philippine government, such as subordination o the Qur’an and Hadith o the Prophet o Islam to the Philippine Constitution; the sovereignty o Allah against sovereignty o the people; and the separation o the church and the state. Tere is only a slim possibility that the concerned stakeholders can expect to end the contemporary Moro armed struggle through the use o the might o government.
Recommendations o address these issues, the ollowing are suggested: 1. Te Government o the Philippines and the MILF must proceed with negotiations with utmost sincerity and integrity rom both sides to produce a comprehensive and acceptable peace policy package or the Muslims and all those who will be aected. Tis package will have socio-economic, political, and administrative components. Both negotiating panels must have blanket authority to represent each group’s group’s interests. 2. Consider constitutional accommodation as a way to a lasting, comprehensive, peaceul, and non-violent solution to the “Moro Problem”. Problem”. 3. Models can be developed rom the approaches and experiences o other countries in dealing with their constituents to address the Bangsamoro issues, such as reerendum on the type o political relationship the Bangsamoro desire with the central government and the type o government they want or themselves, to ensure a sense o ownership o government. 4. Tere should be transparency in governance, employee recruitment, nancial allocations, institutional arrangements, systems and processes, and access to timely and relevant inormation about government programs and policies. 5. Te administrative capability o local government units should be strengthened, ocusing on key areas that could best enhance their efciency and eectiveness eectivene ss in the implementation o development programs and projects. 6. Laws must be strictly enorced.
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Reerences Chaudry, Muhammad Shari. An Shari. An Introduction to Islamic State and Governance. Saat, Kuwait: Islamic Book Publishers, 1996. Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., Designing Bangsamoro Political Institution, Institution, Cotabato City, Philippines, 2007. (Unpublished research paper) ______________________, “Assertion o Sovereignty and Sel-Determination: Te PhilippineBangsamoro Conict.” Mindanao Conict.” Mindanao Horizons, Vol. I, No. 2010-01, 2010. Muslim, Macapado A. Te Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: Te Non-Violent Autonomy Alternative . Marawi City: City : Ofce o the President and College o Public Aairs, Mindanao State University, 1994. ______________________, “Managing Conicts in Multicultural ______________________, Multicultur al Societies: Te Peace and Development Nexus.” A Paper read at the “Bilateral Conerence on the Dialogue Among Civilization Between the Philippines and Iran”, sponsored sponsored by the DFA, Republic o the Philippines and the Embassy o the Islamic Republic o Iran, New World Rennisance Hotel, Makati City, Philippines, August 4-6, 2003. ______________________, Poverty Alleviation and Peace ______________________, Peace in Multiethnic Societies: Te need or Multiculturalist Governance in the Philippines, A Paper Read at the Launching Conerence o the Network o the Asia-Pacic Schools o Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG) (NCPAG) Organized by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Cooperation with the National Institute o Public Administration (INAN)-Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 6-8, 2004. Revolution, Quezon City: UP Majul, Cesar Adib. Te Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution, Press, 1996. Majul, C. A. (1999). Muslims (1999). Muslims in the Philippines. Philippines. Quezon City: University o the Philippines Press. Santos, Soliman M., Jr., Te Bangsamoro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process. Quezon City: UP Press, 2001. Santiso, Carlos. “Promoting “Promoting Democratic Governance Gover nance and Preventing the Recurrence o Conict.” Conict.” Journal Journal of Latin American Studies, Studies, 2002. anggol, Sukarno D., Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Responsible and Implementable Policy, A Doctoral Dissertation, NCPAG, UP, Quezon City, Philippines, 1992. GRP-MILF Peace Process, Compilation of Signed Agreements and other Related Documents (1997-2010). Najeeb Mitry Saleeby Saleeby,, Te Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands. Manila: E.C. McCollough & Co., 1913. Salamat Hashim, Te Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities. Responsibilities . Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985. Philippine Human Development Report 2005. Quezon City: Human Development Network, 2005. Glang, A. C. (1969). Muslim (1969). Muslim Secession or Integration? Quezon Integration? Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing Company. George, . J. S. (1980). Revolt in Mindanao: Te Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxord University Press. Pigkaulan, P. R. (2008). “Te Shari’ah Court: Its Role in Resolving Conicts.” Unpublished EdD Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School S chool o Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, March 2008.
