Digested Cases in Civil Law Review 1 Family Code ART.1 55 4S 2017 2018

AUTHORITY OF SOLEM NIZING NIZING OFFICER OFFICER (ART. (ART. 7) 1. Rodol fo G. G. Navarro v. Judg e Hernando C. Dumagto Dumagto y A.M A.M.. No. No. MTJ-9 MTJ-96-10 6-1088 88;; July July 19, 19, 1996 1996 ROMERO, J.: FACTS: On October 27, 1994, the Judge Dumagtoy Dum agtoy allegedly performed perfor med a marriage ceremony cerem ony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction. jurisdiction. Such wedding wedding was solemnized at the the respondent’ respondent’s s residence residence in municipality municipality of Dapa, Dapa, which does not fa ll within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos. For his defense, Dumagtoy maintained that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage “Marriage may be solemnized by: by: (1) ( 1) Any Any incumbent incum bent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”; jurisdiction.”; and that that Article 8 thereof thereof applies applies to the case in questio question. n. ISSUE: Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction. HELD: NO. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." officer ." Under Artic Article le 7, marriage may be solemnized solemniz ed by, among others others,, "any incumbent incum bent memb mem ber of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative administ rative liability. liability. Article 8, which whic h is a directory provision, refers only to the venue venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge judge's 's chambers chambers or or courtroom courtroom only only in the follo following wing instances: instances: (1) at the point point of death, death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario Ros ario was at the point of death or in a remote rem ote place. place. Moreover, Moreover, the written request presented pres ented addressed address ed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

|| CIVREV I (PERSONS (PERSONS & FAMIL Y RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILL S AND SUCCESSION): SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO, ANDE, ANDE, APA, BAACO, BULU SAN, COS-AGON, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORPUS, CORTEZ CORTEZ,, DALUDADO, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, ROSARIO, DENILA, DENILA, DENOSTA, DENOSTA, EDDING EDDING , EDILLOR, HUAB, MABANGLO, MABANGLO, MACALINO, M ARAJAS, MI NA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VI RAY ||

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VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE 2. Raquel Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippi nes and and Veronica Veronica B. Kho G.R. No. 187462; June 1, 2016 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel's parents instructed the clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to arrange and prepare the necessary papers required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. Petitioner and respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972.

Twenty-five (25) years later, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and respondent on the ground of the absence of marriage license. He argued that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage marr iage license. licens e. He He presented pres ented a Certification Certific ation issued iss ued by the Municipal Municipal Civil Registrar Regis trar of of Arteche, Artec he, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972. ISSUE: Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record or copy of the marriage license adequate to prove the non-issuance of such license, thus, sufficient to declare the marriage null and void? HELD: Yes. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code C ode spells out out the es sential requisites of marriage as a contract contrac t which include “a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character”. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void. In this case, cas e, petitioner was w as able to present a Certification issu is sued ed by the Municipal Civil Registra Registr ar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed presum ed validity of the marriage of petitioner petitioner and respondent has been been overcome overc ome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such suc h validity. However, However, the respondent r espondent was not not able to discharge that burden. Respondent failed to present their alleged marriage m arriage license licens e or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate Certif icate of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent and the marriage mar riage cannot be characterized characteriz ed as as among among the exceptions, the marriage m arriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.


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VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE 2. Raquel Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippi nes and and Veronica Veronica B. Kho G.R. No. 187462; June 1, 2016 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel's parents instructed the clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to arrange and prepare the necessary papers required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. Petitioner and respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972.

Twenty-five (25) years later, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and respondent on the ground of the absence of marriage license. He argued that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage marr iage license. licens e. He He presented pres ented a Certification Certific ation issued iss ued by the Municipal Municipal Civil Registrar Regis trar of of Arteche, Artec he, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972. ISSUE: Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record or copy of the marriage license adequate to prove the non-issuance of such license, thus, sufficient to declare the marriage null and void? HELD: Yes. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code C ode spells out out the es sential requisites of marriage as a contract contrac t which include “a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character”. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void. In this case, cas e, petitioner was w as able to present a Certification issu is sued ed by the Municipal Civil Registra Registr ar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed presum ed validity of the marriage of petitioner petitioner and respondent has been been overcome overc ome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such suc h validity. However, However, the respondent r espondent was not not able to discharge that burden. Respondent failed to present their alleged marriage m arriage license licens e or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate Certif icate of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent and the marriage mar riage cannot be characterized characteriz ed as as among among the exceptions, the marriage m arriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.


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3. Engrace Niñal v. Norma Bayadog Bayadog G.R. No. 133778; March 14, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot s hot by Pepito Pepito resulting res ulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, thereaft er, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Subsequently, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. licens e. The case cas e was filed under the ass umption that the validity validity or invalidity invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. ISSUE: May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death? HELD: Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage marr iage that is annullable annullable is valid until otherwise otherw ise declared declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or pres cription while the other can never never be ratified. A voidable voidable m arriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper proper interested party may attack attac k a void marriage. marr iage. Void Void marriages m arriages have no legal effects eff ects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding coownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, matt er, the court may pass pass upon the validity of marriage marr iage even in a suit not not directly direc tly instituted inst ituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the


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basis of a final judgment declaring s uch previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMIL Y RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILL S AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO, ANDE, APA, BAACO, BULU SAN, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING , EDILLOR, HUAB, MABANGLO, MACALINO, M ARAJAS, MI NA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VI RAY ||

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4. Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado v. Lui s G. Anson G.R. No. 204494; July 27, 2016 REYES, J.: FACTS: Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the survivng s pouse of the late Severina de Asis -Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8 During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties. Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code for lack of marriage license. RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis. ISSUE: Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license? HELD: No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor.

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code. Article 77 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer


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be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the m arriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.


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5. Republic of the Philippine s v. Jose A. Dayot G.R. No. 175581; March 28, 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Jose and Felisa were married. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

Thereafter, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.In o pposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. RTC rendered that the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid, and affirmed by the CA. The latter ruled that did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemniz ing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. ISSUE: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. HELD: Yes. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law.

The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, s o must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.


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Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabita tion, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.


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FOREIGN M ARRIAGE – DIVORCE (ART. 26(2)) 6. Grace J. Garcia, a.k.a. Grace J. Garcia-Recio v. Rederi ck A. Recio G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001 PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a divorce decree was issued by an Australian family court dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent, were married in 1994 in Cabanatuan.

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree. On July 7, 1998, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia dissolving his marriage to petitioner. Hence, he moved for the dismissal of the case. The RTC declared the marriage dissolved because of the divorce decree. Hence, this Petition. Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. He also contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, their marriage was void ab initio. ISSUES: 1. Does respondent need to comply with the abovementioned registration requirements? 2. Is respondent legally capacitated to remarry? HELD: 1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

2. No. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidenc e that proves respondent’s legal c apacity to marry petitioner. Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Hence, the case was remanded to the lower court.


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7. Republic of the Philippine s v. Cipriano Orbecido III G.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines. A few years later, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Later on , Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. OSG contends that Article 26 paragraph 2 is not applicable because it only applies to valid mixed marriage and that the proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Since there is also no law governing Cipriano’s case, it is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. ISSUE: Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the m arriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? HELD: YES. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Supreme Court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.

The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to c ases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and


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Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.


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8. Alice Reyes Van Dorn v . Hon. Manuel V. Romillo , Jr. G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1995 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: Alice Van Dorn, petitioner, is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton, private respondent, is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the parties got divorced in Nevada, United States. Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Is a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse binding in the Philippines? HELD: YES, it is binding provided they are valid according to the alien’s national law.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Here, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before s aid Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Moreover, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Hence, the divorce decree obtained by respondent and validly recognized in Nevada is binding in the Philippines.


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9. Republic of the Philippine s v. Crasus L. Iyoy G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Respondent Crasus Iyoy, married to Fely with whom they had five children, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Fely’s alleged psychological incapacity. He discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.

Later, Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A, leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Cras us because of financial reasons. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent argued that Fely’s acts brought danger a nd dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Fely refuted the allegations and counter- argued that she left for the U.S because of respondent’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.

The RTC declared the marriage of respondent and Fely null and void ab initio which decision the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the acts as abovementioned are s ufficient to support a finding of Fely’s psychological incapacity HELD: NO. The totality of evidence presented during the trial and the acts of Fely leaving her family, among others, are insufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, on psychological incapacity may be defined as “a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and f idelity and render help and support.” Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: a) Gravity. It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; b) Juridical Antecedence . It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and c) Incurability. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there


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is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. According to the Court, “[H]er hot -temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; noneth eless, the root cause for such was not identified . If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satis factorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither c ould it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.” Therefore, the Court granted the petition and declared that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. [SC: At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy , give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem .]


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10. Mino ru Fujiki v. M aria Paz Galela Marinay G.R. No. 196049; June 26, 2013 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. Marinay later met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki later filed a petition under Rule 108 in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed, inter alia, that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC immediately issued on Order dismissing the petition. It ruled that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. ISSUES: 1. Is the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) applicable? 2. Can a husband or a wife of a prior marriage file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy? HELD: 1. No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sec tions 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial, and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that “[i]f every


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judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering i mmaterial the previously concluded litigation.” A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 2. Yes. The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph o f Arti cle 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry und er the laws of his or her countr y. If the for eign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have juri sdiction to exten d the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the forei gn judgment does not contravene domestic p ublic policy. A criti cal diffe rence between the case of a foreign div orce decree and a foreign j udgment null ifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine p ublic policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Articl e 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.


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11. Corp uz v . Sto. T omas G.R. No. 186571; August 11, 2010 BRION, J.: FACTS: The petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Later, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He left for Canada soon after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Thus, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Da isylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and requested that she be considered as a party-in- interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. However, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition, holding that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. ISSUE: Whether or not the alien spouse can claim a right under Art. 26 of the Family Code HELD: NO. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. In other words, only the Filipino


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spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.


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B IGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE MARRIAGE (ART. 34 (4)) 12. 12. Leonil a Santiago Santiago v . People of the Philippi nes G.R. No. 200233; July 15, 2015 SERENO, CJ: FACTS: Petitioner Leonila Santiago was convicted of bigamy for her marriage with Nicanor Santos who, during the celebration of their marriage, was still married to Estela Galang.

Petitioner Petitioner reiterates reiterates that she cannot cannot be a co-accus co- accused ed in the case, c ase, because because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. Furthermore, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven. She contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of the exemptions from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. Without completing the five-year requirement, requirement, she posits that their marriag m arriage e without a license is is void. void. The RTC appreciated the testimony of Galang that 2 months before said marriage, she already introduced herself to petitioner as Santos’ legal wife, and that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. Similar to the t he RTC, the CA gave gave more m ore weight to the prosecution’s prosec ution’s evidence. evidence. It likewise disbelieved disbelieved the testimony of Santos and also simply stated that the claim of lack of marriage license was a vain attempt to put the validity validity of her marriage marr iage to Santos in question. ISSUE: Should the validity of the second sec ond marriage marr iage be first firs t proven in order for one to be convicted convict ed of bigamy? HELD: Yes. For the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential ess ential requisites for validity. If the accused accus ed wants to raise the nullity nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.

In this case, petitioner has consist cons istently ently questioned the validity validity of her marriage to Santos on on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. Record Rec ord shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only only less than four f our years. Although they did not submit an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 FC, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited c ohabited for at least least five years. Thus, the SC cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for the SC to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conv c onviction. iction. Note: The second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.


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13. 13. James James Walter Walter P. Capili Capili v . Peopl e of the Phil Phil ipp ines G.R. No. 183805; July 03, 2013 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner James Walter P. Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. James was mar married ried to Karla Y. Medina-Capili Medina-Capili and without s aid marriage marr iage having having been legally dissolved diss olved or annulled, annulled, he contracted another marriage m arriage with Shirley G. Tismo. Tism o.

James filed a Motion Motion to Suspend Proceedings Proc eedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending pending civil c ivil case for declaration of nullity of the second sec ond marriage marr iage before the t he RTC of Antipolo Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it wo uld exculpate exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as as a prejudicial question in the instant c riminal case. Meanwhile, the t he RTC of Antipolo Antipolo rendered r endered a decis decision ion declaring dec laring the voidness voidness or invalidity invalidity of the second marriage between James and Shirley on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. James filed a Motion Motion to Dismiss Dism iss,, praying praying the dismis sal of the bigamy case c ase on the ground that the second sec ond marriage had already been declared void by the t he RTC. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, dismiss , but but on appea appeall the CA reversed reversed the dismissal. dism issal. ISSUE: Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case c ase for bigamy? bigamy? HELD: NO. The declaration of nullity of the second sec ond marriage marr iage is not a ground for the dism issal iss al of the bigamy bigamy case. c ase.

The elements elements of the crime cr ime of of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally legally married; marr ied; (2) the marriage m arriage has has not been legally dissolved dis solved or, in case his or her spouse s pouse is absent, absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the foregoing elements are present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Kar la Y. Y. Medina-Capili contracted contrac ted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the t he RTC of Anti Antipol polo o City itself itself decla declared red the bigamo bigamous us nature nature of the second marriage marriage betwee between n petitio petitione nerr and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution prosec ution of of petitioner for f or the crime cr ime of bigamy. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration dec laration of nullity, the crime crim e had already been consumm cons ummated. ated. W hat makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment judgment of competent courts courts


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and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.


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14. Veroni co Tenebr o v . Court of Appeals G.R. No. 150758; February 18, 2004 YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner and it was confirmed by Villareyes in a handwritten letter that the petitioner was her husband. Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. ISSUES: 1. WON the first marriage exists despite absence of record in the Civil Registry 2. WON the petitioner was guilty of bigamy HELD: 1. Yes. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the acc used himself. 2. Yes. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision


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penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.


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15. Mer linda Cipriano Montañez v . Lourdes T ajolosa Cipri ano G.R. No. 181089; 22 October 2012 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter, filed a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent, Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano.

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the g round of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint for bigamy alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior when he married Silverio. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the compliant for bigamy. ISSUE: Is the declaration of nullity of the first marriage justifies the dism issal the case of bigamy? RULING: NO. The subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial.

The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. The subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio, her first marriage with Socrates was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were present at the time respondent contracted the second marriage. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. Therefore, the complaint for bigamy filed should not be dismissed.


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PRESUMPT IVE DEATH (ART. 41) 16. Repub lic v . Tampus G.R. No. 214243; March 16, 2016 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: FACTS: Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. Three days thereafter, Dante, a member of AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.

Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried ev erything to locate• him, but her efforts proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead. RTC granted Nilda's petition. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed away especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death. CA affirmed the RTC Decision. ISSUE: Whether Dante has been correctly declared as presumptively dead. HELD: No. Dante was incorrectly declared as presumptively dead.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. She could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief' of his death. Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even named. Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief' that her husband is dead.


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17. Republic of t he Philippines v . Jose Sareñogon G.R. No. 199194; February 10, 2016 DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before the RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie). Said petition was directed to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then followed.

Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home aft er his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. In its Decision, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. ISSUE: Whether or not the efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife is sufficient to support a wellfounded belief that resp ondent’s wife is probably dead HELD: No, respondent failed to show that he exerted diligent and reasonable efforts in locating his missing wife to support a well-founded belief that his wife was already probably dead.

The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: 1. That the absent spouse has been miss ing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circ umstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and, 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.


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With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that the mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "wellfounded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-togoodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s wherea bouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well- founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.


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VOID SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE – WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF PREVIOUS VOID MARRIAGE (ART. 40) 18. Robert o Doming o v . Court of Appeals and Delia Soled ad Av era G.R. No. 104818; September 17, 1993 ROMERO, J.: FACTS: Delia Soledad A. Domingo (Domingo) filed a petition for the "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage" against petitioner Roberto Domingo alleging among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; and that she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. He argued that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. The trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, explaining that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. A motion for reconsideration was filed. Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. ISSUES: 1. Is a judicial decree necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage? 2. Should the petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage be filed only for purposes of remarriage? HELD: 1. Yes. The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the


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judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 2. No. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage" in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.


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19. Renato A. Castillo v. Lea P. De Leon -Castil lo G.R. No. 189607; April 18, 2016 SERENO, CJ.: FACTS: On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon-Castillo married Benjamin Bautista. On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo.

On 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to his subsisting marriage with Benjamin. Lea opposed the petition and contended that her marriage with Benjamin was null and void as they did not secure a marriage license. On 2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage with Benjamin void. The RTC granted such. Meanwhile, Lea filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that Renato’s proof was insufficient to prove bigamy. On the other hand, Renato contends that the belated judicial dec laration of nullity did not erase the fact that she entered into marriage with him when her first marriage was subsisting. The RTC declared the second marriage null and void ab initio. Benjamin moved for MR insofar as the distribution of their properties is concerned, but this was denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision and upheld the second marriage. The CA noticed that Lea’s marriages were celebrated in 1972 and 1979 which is prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (1988). Thus, the applicable law should be the Civil Code which does not dictate that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of marriage. ISSUE: What is the status of the second marriage? HELD: The second marriage is valid. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents m ust be determ ined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83, 85 and 86. The Civil Code differentiates void and voidable marriages: “in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,” while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

At that time, the first marriage Lea was void for lack of license and consent. Thus, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before she could contract a second marriage. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license.


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20. Mer linda Cipriano Montañez v . Lourdes T ajolosa Cipri ano G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012 PERALTA, J: FACTS: Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married Socrates Flores (Socrates) on April 8, 1976. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On 2003 the RTC declared the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates as null and void. On May 14, 2004 Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the firs t marriage, filed a complaint for Bigamy against Lourdes alleging that the latter failed to reveal to Silverio the fact that she was still married to Socrates.

Lourdes argued that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on Januar 24, 1983. Hence, the element of bigamy requiring that there be two valid marriage is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. For the part of the prosecution, it argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her 2. Whether Article 40 of the Family Code should be given a retroactive effect because Lourdes’ 2 marriages were contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code HELD: 1. NO. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged

2. NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the responde nt’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.


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21. Norbert o A. Vitangcol v. People of the Philippin es G.R. No. 207406; January 13, 2016 LEONEN, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol was charged with the crime of bigamy. The complaint was filed by Norberto’s second wife, Alice G. Eduardo -Vitangcol.

It was alleged that Norberto contracted his first marriage on July 17, 1987 (prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988) with a certain Gina M. Gaerlan. Said first marriage was evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice with whom he had three children. Alice later heard rumors of her husband’s first m arriage which lead to the discovery of the aforementioned m arriage contract and the filing of the present complaint. Norberto countered that Alice had always known that he had a “fake marriage” with a college girlfriend. He also claimed that the first marriage was void for it was celebrated without a marriage license. Lastly, he claims that the present complaint was filed by Alice because the latter was having an affair with another man. ISSUE: May Norberto validly raise as a defense the invalidity of his first marriage to escape the charge of bigamy against him? HELD: NO. Norberto’s first marriage was not judicially declared void and neither was his first wife declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Even assuming that petitioner’s fir st marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, the first marriage is still valid and subsisting. As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. That “parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.” The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code. Therefore, even if Norberto’s first m arriage was celebrated prior the effectivity of the Family Code, the judicial declaration of nullity is still required before any person can enter into a second marriage without any fear of being prosecuted for the crime of bigamy.


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22. Susan Nicdao Cariño v . Susan Yee Cariñ o G.R. No. 132529; February 2, 2001 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño; and the sec ond was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig, while respondent received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).

Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00. During the trial, respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required m arriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila that the office has no record of the marriage license of the said marriage. ISSUES: 1. Is the marriage between petitioner and the deceased valid? 2. Is the marriage between respondent and the deceased valid? HELD: 1. No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The Court held that a certific ation is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. However, petitioner failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, the first marriage, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is void ab initio.

2. No. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of


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remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.


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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (ART. 36) 23. Republic of t he Philippines v . Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina G.R. No. 108763; February 13, 1997 PANGANIBAN, J.: MOLINA DOCTRINE. Specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) challenging the decision of the CA which affirmed in toto the decision of RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Molina (wife) to Reynaldo Molina, void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Because of this case, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code, also known as the Molina Doctrin e .

Respondent Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on 1985 at the San Agustin Church and that they have a son, Andre O . Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Later, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. Later, the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances. Solicitor General : Insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

The Republic argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."


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ISSUE: Whether the marriage of respondent Roridel to Reynaldo Molina should be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: NO. The trial court, as well as the CA, erred in interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code, and in applying the ground of psychological incapacity in this case.

In another landmark case of Santo s v . CA, the Court ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence , and (c) incurabilit y." In this case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. Expert testimony (of Dr. Sison) showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court adopted the following guidelines 1 in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the FC and handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any do ubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity . This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be ( a) medically or clinically identified, (b ) alleged in the complaint, ( c ) sufficiently proven by experts and ( d ) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid ass umption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis , nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness


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and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage . The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable . Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arti cles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Arti cles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation/s must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be giv en g reat re spect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 2 of the New Code of Canon Law. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuti ng attor ney or fi scal and the Solicitor Gener al to appear as counsel for the state . No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within 15 days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. Hence, the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. ——————————————————


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1

The Court was able to come up with the guidelines with the help of 2 amici curiae: the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. 2 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.


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24. Br enda B. Marcos v . Wilso n G. Marcos G.R. No. 136490; October 19, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Wilson G. Marcos and Brenda B. Marcos first met in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace. The couple got married in 1982.

After leaving the military, Wilson engaged in different business ventures that did not prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often have violent quarrels. He would beat her and even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. By 1992, the two were already living separately. In the case study conducted by Social Worker, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them. Brenda submitted herself for psychological evaluation, while Wilson, on the other hand, did not. The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. The CA reversed the RTC decision holding that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented because Wilson was not subjected to psychological or psychiatric evaluation. ISSUE: Is personal medical or psychological examination of respondent a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity? HELD: NO. Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The guidelines in Republic v. CA and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.


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25. Mirasol Castillo v. Republic of the Philipp ines and Felipe Impas G.R. No. 214064; February 06, 2017 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Mirasol and Felipe were sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with 2 children.

In 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. She alleged that after 13 years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder. Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Montefalcon who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality structure that rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations. The RTC declared the marriage null and void. The CA reversed and set aside the, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe is null and void on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. HELD: No. The Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.

Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she did not interview Felipe personally and evaluated Felipe’s psycholog ical condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality disorder was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or presented before the trial court. True, the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required. However, the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically identified," and adequately established by evidence. Here, the manner by which such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.


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In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the res pondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's s exual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable. The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established. J LEONEN, dissenting

The totality of evidence presented by Mirasol is more than enough to prove Felipe's psychological incapacity. Hence, Mirasol and Felipe's marriage is void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Because of the intimate nature of marriage, Mirasol knows best whether Felipe has fulfilled his marital obligations as well as his responsibilities to his children. Felipe's continuous philandering, albeit having his own family, manifests an incurable psychological disorder of utmost gravity. If Felipe's sexual infidelity were merely caused by his "refusal or unwillingness" to assume his marital obligations, then he would not have been indifferent about being seen publicly with the other women with whom he had other affairs. What Felipe has done apparently caused much pain to his family and should be put to an end. It is cruel for this Court to rule that Mirasol should remain married to Felipe. Republic v . Court of Appeals and Molina interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code to introduce restrictions not found in the text of the law. Worse, it was inspired by a conservative, religious view of what marriages should be. This has caused untold hardships and costs for many Filipinos. It is time we review this doctrine and allow intimate relationships to be what they truly are: a life of celebration, rather than a living hell.


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26. Chi Min g Tsoi v . Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi G.R. No. 119190; January 16, 1997 TORRES, JR., J.: FACTS: This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Chi Ming Tsoi appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the Gina Lao (plaintiff) married the Chi Ming Tsoi (defendant) at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night, and even in succeeding nights of their marriage. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their s eparation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) c entimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft


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erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the annulment case filed by the plaintiffrespondent. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Should the annulment case be granted on the ground of psychological incapacity? HELD: YES. The annulment case should be granted, as Chi Ming Tsoi is psychologically incapacited. It must be noted that contrary to Chi Ming Tsoi’s argument, the size of his penis is not the indication of psychological incapacity, but rather his failure to engage in sexual intercourse with his wife from the beginning of their marriage.

We are not impressed by petitioner's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform th e sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. Chi Ming Tsoi (petitioner) further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and Gina Lao (respondent) to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months. It must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes im material. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is ac tually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is


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so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled s elf. The egoist has nothing but hims elf. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem , respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in whic h the parties found thems elves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.


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27. Noel B uenaventu ra v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127358; March 31, 2005 AZCUNA, J.: FACTS: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated, s uch act being willful warrants t he award of moral damages HELD: No. The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated.

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.


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28. Juanita Carating -Siayngco v. Manuel Siayngco G.R. NO. 158896; October 27, 2004 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel Siayngco are married. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy. After 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. Respondent Manuel is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. Respondent Manuel presented Dr. Garcia who concluded that both petitioner and respondent contributed to the marital collapse. In her defense, Juanita allege that they were happily married until respondent Manuel s tarted having extra-marital affairs. Dr. Maaba testified for Juanita finding the latter psychologically capacitated. The trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage holding in part that the psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The CA reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel and Juanita are both psychologically incapacitated HELD: NO, they are both not psychologically incapacitated.

"Psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL The only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point." RE: PSYCHOL OGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrim onio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in- laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Dr. Garcia’s


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report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination. Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.


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29. Edward Kenne th Ngo T e v . Rowena Ong Gutierr ez Yu-Te G.R. No. 161793; February 13, 2009 NACHURA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. Three months after their first meeting, Rowena and Edward eloped. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu. Since they could not find a job, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home.

Rowena kept on calling Edward threatening him that she would commit suicide if Edward does not agree to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. Soon, Rowena and Edward got married. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family. Edward asked Rowena to live with him in his parent’s house . Unmoved by his persistence and upon knowing that Edward was disinherited by his parents, Rowena said that it was better for them to live separate lives. After almost four years, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the b asis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. The trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. For its part, the OSG contends that the purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity HELD: Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and void.


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By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. While there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, the totality of evidence presented should be enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. In the present case, the psychological assessment produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders. Petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. With respect to respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted is thus, null and void.


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30. Nicolas S. Matudan v . Repub lic of t he Philip pin es and Mari lyn** B. Matudan G.R. No. 203284; November 14, 2016 DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard from again. Twenty-three years later, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, alleging that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition. ISSUE: Whether respondent’s 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder amounts psychologically incapacity. HELD: Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.


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Versi on 2 Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republi c of th e Philippi nes and Marilyn B. Matudan G.R. No. 203284; November 14, 2016 DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: Nicolas S. Matudan filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Marilyn B. Matudan when the latter went to abroad and never heard of again. Matudan alleged that Marilyn was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother ,and that based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable. ISSUE: Whether Marilyn Matudan is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code HELD: NO. Psychological incapacity m ust be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the only reason why he wants their marriage dissolved. Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.


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VOID FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (ART. 38) 31. Oscar P. Malli on v . Edit ha Alcantara G.R. No. 141528; October 31, 2006 AZCUNA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara alleged psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. After the decision in the latter attained finality, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata. On the other hand, respondent, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised former case, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. ISSUE: Whether or not a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? HELD: Yes. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment”. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.


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Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the former case, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. Therefore, having express ly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision in the former case.


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32. Republic of the Philippi nes v. Merlin da Olaybar G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014 PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Respondent Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002. She denied having contracted said marriage and that the signature in the certificate was forged. She filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract.

The RTC ruled in favor of Olaybar. Petitioner moved for MR, but was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that granting the cancellation of the entries is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio, thus the petition is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of m arriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contrac t, in effect, which nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? HELD: Yes. It was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necess ary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC and other related laws.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as s et forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. Hence, petition is denied.


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33. Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenn eth Quiazon and Maria Jennif er Quiazon v. Ma. Lourd es Bele n, for and in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon G.R. No. 189121; July 31, 2013 PEREZ, J.: FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common -law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. In a Decision, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. ISSUE: Is the Amelia’s m arriage to Eliseo void ab initio, as it was claimed to be bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage? HELD: YES. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it c annot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:


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Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.


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GROUNDS MUST EXIST AT TIME OF MARRIAGE (ART. 45) 34. Fern ando Aqui no v. Conchi ta Delizo G.R. No. L-15853; July 27, 1960 GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: FACTS: Fernando Aquino, petitioner, filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo. The complaint was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man (petitioner’s brother, Cesar Aquino). That about four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a child. In her answer, respondent claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the petitioner.

During the trial, only petitioner testified. The only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Respondent did not appear nor presented any evidence. The CFI dismissed petitioner’s complaint, which was affirm ed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions. ISSUE: Does concealment of pregnancy constitute fraud and may be a ground for annulment of marriage? HELD: YES, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband, constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage pursuant to Article 85, par. (4) in relation to Article 86, par. (3) of the New Civil Code.

Respondent was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus , that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Hence, it is sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by petitioner.


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35. Aur or a Anaya v . Fern ando Palaro an G.R. No. L-27930; November 26, 1970 REYES, J.B.L., J.: FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora Anaya and defendant Fernando Palaroan were married on 4 December 1953. Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of marriage and granted Aurora’ s counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated to settle the judgment, Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with his close relative. Defendant, in his Answer, denied having pre- marital relationship with a close relative and denied having committed any fraud against her. ISSUE: WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. HELD: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.


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DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION 36. Sarao v . Guevara G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263 REYES, A.J.: FACTS: In the afternoon of their wedding day, plaintiff tried to have coitus with defendant but the latter begged for him to wait until that evening. When night came, plaintiff again attempted to have carnal knowledge with his wife but the latter complained that her vagina was in pain. Plaintiff noticed purulent matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital. Afterwards, several attempts were made by the plaintiff to have coitus but to no avail because defendant was still in pain.

After a visit to the physician, defendant was advised to submit herself to an operation wherein her uterus and ovaries will be removed because they were affected by a tumor. Defendant was operated on with the consent of the plaintiff. The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation, but not of copulation. Plaintiff declared that from the time of the operation, he lost all desire to have sexual relations with defendant and has not tried since then. He filed a complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency. The CFI dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Can the defendant’s incapacity to procreate be construed as “physically incapable of entering into the married state” and is such a valid ground for annulment? HELD: No, it may not be construed as such. According to Article 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be annulled if “either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable”. It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate.

In this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendant’s sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate. ALTERNATIVE RULING

The annulment cannot be granted because the apparent impotence of the wife was merely temporary, and as a matter of fact, she is no longer impotent. Sterility, on the other hand, is not a ground.


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If both the husband and wife are impotent, the marriage cannot be annulled because neither can claim that he or she has been aggrieved by the other.


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ROLE OF PROSECUT ING ATT ORNEY OR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 37. Tuason v. Cour t of Appeals G.R. No. 116607; April 10, 1996 PUNO, J.: FACTS: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the RTC a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, she alleged that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward. She claimed that her husband inflicted physical injuries on her, used dangerous drugs, cohabited with three women in succession, refused to pay their children’s tuition fees, among others. In ad dition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him.

After the issues were joined, trial commenced. 2 days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement to the first week of June, which was granted. However, petitioner failed to appear on the reset date. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. The RTC declared the nullity of the marriage. Petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment. The same was denied. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the appeal was dismissed. Petitioner contended that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment should be set aside due to prosecuting attorney’s failure to intervene for the state. HELD: NO. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.


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EFFECT OF TERM INATION OF MARRIAGE 38. Espirit u v . CA and Masaudin g G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995 MELO, J.: FACTS: Respondent Teresita Masauding filed a petitioner for habeas corpus against petitioners Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Layug to gain custody over her 2 children with Reynaldo. Reynaldo and Teresita’s marriage deteriorated until they decided to separate. During the marriage, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio right there in the family home in Pittsburg. The record shows that the daughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When Perdencio was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.

The RTC awarded full parental authority in favor of Reynaldo but on appeal, the CA reversed the judgment and gave full parental authority to Teresita. ISSUE: Is the CA correct in reversing the decision of the RTC based on Art. 363? HELD: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, Art. 363 presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the FC. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.


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39. Susan Li m-Lua v . Danilo Y. Lua G.R. Nos. 175279-80; June 05, 2013 VILLARAMA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.

After hearing, the judge granted support pendente lite in the amount of P250,000 monthly, and the amount of P135,000 needed for the medical attendance expenses needed by Lim -Lua. According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, thus, the court ordered the payment of P1,750,000 as support in arrears from the time complaint was filed up to the date of the hearing. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount to P115,000 monthly and respondent was ordered to pay the arrears. This decision became final. In Compliance, respondent submitted a copy of the check in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. He contends that he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalling P2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16. These advances were expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars (a Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i for the 2 children), payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but to petitioner as well. Petitioner questioned the deduction from the support in arrears of the advances, claiming that such deduction is not proper, as the items purchased are not indispensable to the sus tenance of the family or in keeping them alive. Respondent counters that these items are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals at “carinderias”. Hence, the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-today living, the value of which was properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite. ISSUE: May certain expenses already incurred by the respondent be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children? HELD: YES. Some but not all, of the expenses incurred may be deducted from the total support in arrears.

Article 194 provides that support comprises everything i ndispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Rulings by US Courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. The general rule is that the parent cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the


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children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. The monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears “less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support,” the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children: (1) medical expenses of Susan LimLua (P42,450.71); (2) dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan (P11,500.00); (3) credit card purchases of Angelli (P365,282.20); and (4) credit card purchases of Daniel Ryan (P228,869.38), in the total amount of Php 648,102.29.


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40. Ma. Belen B . Mangonon v . Court o f Appeals G.R. No. 125041; June 30, 2006 CHICO- NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite. On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975.

Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. However, despite admission to universities, Rica and Rina were financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education. Petitioner made demands to respondent Federico and Francisc o, the grandfather of twins. However, these demands remained unheeded. As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) [14] and 199(c) of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in case of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children. On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON respondent Francisco, the grandfather, should be held liable for the support pendente lite. HELD: Yes. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education.

In view, however, of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francis co, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. It having been established that respondent


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Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.


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41. Robert o Domingo v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104818; September 17, 1993 ROMERO, J.: FACTS: Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property against petitioner Roberto Domingo.

Unknown to private respondent, petitioner had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. While on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consen.The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect. Petitioner contends that petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private res pondent must be dismissed for being unnecess ary since their marriage is a bigamous one. On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture. RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. ISSUE: Is a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage necessary only for purposes of remarriage? HELD: NO, it may be obtained for other purposes.

Article 40 denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. Petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. Therefore, he lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.

|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMIL Y RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILL S AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO ANDE, APA, BAACO, BULUSA N, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING , EDILLOR, HUAB, MABANGLO, MACALINO, M ARAJAS, MI NA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VI RAY ||

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GROUNDS OF LEGAL SEPARATION (ART. 55) 42. Gandion co v . Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda G.R. No. 79284; November 27, 1987 PADILLA, J.: FACTS: Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed a complaint against petitioner Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendente lite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case. ISSUE: Should the civil action for legal separation be suspended pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage? HELD: No, the civil action for legal separation may proceed independently notwithstanding the pendency of the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. Futhermore, it may be noted that under Article 55(6) of the Family Code of the Philippines, sexual infidelity or perversion of either spouse has replaced adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband as defined by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 97, New Civil Code) as one of the grounds for legal separation.


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43. Samson Sabalon es v . Court o f Appeals G.R. No. 106169; February 14, 1994 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios GaviolaSabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.

Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partners hip. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent. CA granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife. The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Can a court issue a preliminary injunction in favor of the wife to prohibit a husband from interfering with the administration of their conjugal properties?


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Digested Cases in Civil Law Review 1 Family Code ART.1 55 4S 2017 2018

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