Daza v Singson G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989. Facts: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. Issue: Whether petitioner’s removal is unconstitutional; Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional; Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs. Ratio: If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political
party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
In view of the Allied Majority of 1961 In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.
In view of Congress’ authority Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
In view of the Courts intervention
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013 Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed. Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials. Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal. 2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection. 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise. 5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function. RULING: The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) vs The Secretary of Budget and Management, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012 FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal. HELD: I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. II. The Court rules in the negative. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.” The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. PORK BARREL: The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. _______________ NOTES: POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam” is entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print. Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act. Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS: 1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; o
• Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
o
• Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;
o
• Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and
o
• Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ
can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech. 2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS: 1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech: o
• imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;
o
online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of speech;
o
• with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression;
o
• gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes online libel;
o
• respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o
• Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
o
• the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution;
o
• Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure: o
• No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except “due cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
o
• While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
o
• Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to privacy;
o
No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
o
• No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority o
• The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right to due process;
o
• The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related complaints;
o
To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under Section 6, it • follows that: 1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites and content upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement; 2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade Law; 3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice services without securing a license from the National Telecommunications Communication; 4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code.
o
• The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test 1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking of content. No limits upon the takedown power of the respondent DOJ Secretary; 2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER: 1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; 2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; 3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises. 5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel – subject to one condition. 6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state the power to take down online content without a court warrant. 7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 a little over a year afteroral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013. 8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC cybercime ruling') 9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online libel to be constitutional but with an exception – that is, in cases where it covers persons other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who react to a potentially defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel.
Unconstitutional provisions Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence – was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law. Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial determination." Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time. Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional. A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.
Nuances in other provisions Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned. Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime." Aiding a nd abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover certain players in the online industry. Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography. The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding on Section 7. Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act. A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the coverage of a single law.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APRIL 22, 2014
DISPOSITIVE: “WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES with finality the various motions for reconsideration that both the petitioners and the respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ”
TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL. FACTS: On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.
ISSUES: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate HELD: 1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction.
RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers. 2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman.
PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan concerns.
LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because: 1. 9-member ET mandate violated 2. right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate
3. process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power) 4. SC arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET members under certain circumstances The refusal of Tañada to nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.
Daza V. Singson Facts: Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments andwas listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganizedand 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Becauseof this, the House of Representatives revised its representation bywithdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formedLDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance toproportional representation. Issues: 1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable politicalparty 2.Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to beentitled to proportional representation in the CA Held and Ratio Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a year. They command the biggest following. They not only survived but prevailed. Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its
registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.
