1. Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668; 1989 FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travelfrom the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the rightto travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining tothe liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return tothe Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
2. Soliven v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)FACTS Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others were charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaintaffidavit? HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, asidefrom requiring all of the office- ]holder’s time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the court resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
3. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents. FACTS: Due to the the confirmed leakage during the 2006 Philippine Nursing Licensure Examination, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 556 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations). Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. - A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to public and private institutions of higher. - In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI. - Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.
Issue: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. Held: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. Hence, it is unconstitutional. 2. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Therefore, it is unconstitutional.
4. Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA). ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
5. Biriago vs. Phil Truth Commission Dec. 7, 2010 FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasijudicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that. It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation; The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. It violates the equal protection clause ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
6. Dennis Funa vs. Agra February 19, 2013 The Facts: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, Dennis A.B. Funa (petitioner) alleges that on March 1, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto Agra in order to replace outgoing Secretary Agnes Devanadera who resigned to run for Congress; on March 5, 2010, Agra was designated in a concurrent capacity as Acting Solicitor General. As a taxpayer, Funa challenged the appointments as unconstitutional being in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Agra, on the other hand offers a different angle. He was then Government Corporate Counsel when he was designated as Acting Solicitor General in place of Devanadera who had been appointed Secretary of Justice; when Devanadera resigned, he was designated as Acting Secretary of Justice. What differentiates the case from the challenged posed by Funa in Funa vs Ermita1 was that the appointments in this case were In acting or temporary capacities, which the petitioner believes were still unconstitutional as the constitutional prohibition does not distinguish between an appointment and a designation of a member of the Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity; the position of Solicitor General, being an autonomous and independent office attached to the Secretary of Justice, is not an ex-officio position in relation to the office of the Secretary of Justice; that Agra was extended an appointment as the Acting Solicitor General showed that he did not occupy the office in a ex-officio capacity
because the latter does not require any further warrant or appointment. The respondent argue otherwise, advancing the view that Agra’s appointment was only an imposition of additional duties; an appointment, to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere designation, as in the case of Agra. Even assuming his appointment constituted multiple offices, his service as Acting Solicitor General was merely in a hold-over capacity; upon his appointment as Acting Secretary of Justice, his term as Acting Solicitor General expired; he did not receive additional salary or emoluments from the OSG after becoming Secretary of Justice on March 5, 2010. The independence of the OSG are defined by the powers and functions conferred to that office by law, not by the person appointed to the position; and DOJ’s authority over the OSG is limited to budgetary purposes. In reply, Funa asserted that there was no “prevailing special circumstance” that justified the non-application of the constitutional provision on Agra; the permanence or temporariness of the appointment does not excuse the disregard of the constitutional prohibition. Agra’s concurrent designations violated the Administrative Code of 1987 which mandated the OSG to be autonomous and independent. The Issue: Whether or not the concurrent designations of Agra as Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice was unconstitutional. The Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
7. Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317) Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317) FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of
Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution. RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
8. Funa vs Executive Secretary Feb. 11, 2010 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution . On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin. Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants. Held: The petition is meritorious. Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
9. AYTONA VS CASTILLO 4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment] FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void. ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid. RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
10. In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01SC, November 9, 1998
Facts:Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII Held:During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban
11. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) [G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010] ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) 1 . C h i e f J u s t i c e Re y n a t o S . P u n o h a d h i s c o m p u l s o r y re tire me nt on May 17, 2010, se ven days a fte r the Pre side ntial e le ctions on Ma y 10, 2010. 2.A ll the pe titions now be fo re the Cou rt pose as the p r i n c i p a l l e g a l q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e i n c u m b e n t President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. 3.The JBC, in i t s en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. 4.The announcement was published on January 20, 2 0 1 0 i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e D a i l y I n q u i r e r a n d T h e Philippine Star. 5 . O n Fe b r u a r y 8 , 2 0 1 0 , t h e J B C r e s o l v e d t o p r o c e e d t o t h e n e x t s t e p o f a n n o u n c i n g t h e n a m e s o f t h e following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,not later than February 22, 2010. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and ThePhilippine Star issues of February 13, 2010. Issue: Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the Judiciary. Ruling: 1. No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The f r a m e r s d i d n o t n e e d t o e x t e n d t h e p r o h i b i t i o n t o a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e J u d i c i a r y , b e c a u s e t h e i r establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of thel ower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fi ll the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.2. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fi ll a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period f rom the occurrence of the vacancy.. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part. 12. Binamira Vs. Garrucho 183 SCRA 154 Facts: Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira’s demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights. Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority. Issue:whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority or merely designated Held:Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he
is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet. 13. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III & Juanito G. Arcilla, petitioners vs Salvador Mison & Guillermo Carague, respondents Commission on Appointments, intervenor 156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987 FACTS: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional. HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read: Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence. On the other hand, the 2nd
amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence, namely: The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e., (1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)] (2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)]; (3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)]; (4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)]; (5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.) The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone.
14. Mary Concepcion-Bautista, petitioner vs Senator Jovito Salonga, CA Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, and Hesiquio R. Mallillin, respondents Ponente: Padilla, J In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office. Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison. Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR. In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation. HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Membersof the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163. The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson. There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and members
of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad interim. Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process. 15. QUINTOS-DELES VS. CA
177 SCRA 259 – Political Law – Appointment of Sectoral Representatives Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
16. Calderon vs Carale 208 SCRA 254
FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
RULING: The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights) 17. Tarrosa vs Singson 232 SCRA 553
Case Digest Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation. Held: No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. (Tarrosa vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243,
18. FLORES V DRILON 223 SCRA 568 FACTS :Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority. ISSUES: (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. (3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post. (4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. (5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment. HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents. (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits. 19. Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327 Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment. Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
20. Pobre v. Mendieta Facts: The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as amended. The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner. In a Memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered the queries as follows: Based on the foregoing premises, it is our view that Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. A contrary interpretation would taint the provision with unconstitutionality since it would countenance a usurpation by the legislature of a power which does not belong to it but pertains to the executive. It has been said that "those matters which the Constitution specifically confides to the executive, the legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control" (Gov't. of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, citing Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed., pp. 126-131; l57-162). (p. 50, Rollo of 106696). On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC. His prayer for a restraining order was set for hearing on February 19, 1992 at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because President Aquino had already appointed him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact, already taken his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Judge Somera denied the prayer for a restraining order as well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot and academic. Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre's appointment as chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. Issue:whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner Held: Yes. The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that: “. . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal,” whereby the legality of Pobre’s appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined. 21. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
