Cirminal Procedure Case Digests

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A

People vs Bautista GR No. 168641 April 27, 2007 Plaintiff: People of the Philippines Respondent: Clemente Bautista Crime: Slight Physical Injuries MeTC: Not prescribed RTC: Affirmed MeTC CA: Reversed RTC SC: Reversed CA

Facts: Private complainant Felipe Goyena filed with the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against Bautista. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a recommendation for the filing of an Information against Bautista. Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000. Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed.

Issue:


Whether or not the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against the respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor

Ruling:

No. The crime has not yet prescribed. The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court. The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.8 Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 Petitioner: LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., Respondents: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Crime: violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) Lower Court Decision: dismissed the charges against Tongson Court of Appeals Decision: dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.’s (petitioner’s) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.


Supreme Court Decision: GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. Factsw 

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to P1,979,459.

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In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson issued 3 checks as payment

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Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not Cawili’s

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business associate. On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only

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against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was indeed

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possible for Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 

Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.

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Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.

Issues 1. Whether or or not the rule rule on prescription prescription as provided provided for for in Act No. 3326 applies applies to offenses under B.P. 22


Ruling We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that onc e a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40] *************** Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner ’s filing of his


complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

#4 [SECTION 2 OF RULE 110]: NAME OF PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FE ARCILLA Y CORNEJO G.R. NO. 116237 (MAY 15, 1996, 256 SCRA 757) Facts: Fe Arcilla, accused, is married with Antonio Arcilla, victim and both have 5 children. In 1983, accused left to work in Singapore leaving her children in their conjugal home in Camarines Sur and her husband who stayed most of the time in Albay. Unknown to accused, Antonio has an illicit relationship with Lilia Lipio that their amorous union bear fruit of 2 children. Later on, the accused learned of her husband's infidelity and decided to go home in 1988. However, it brought no effect. In May 1, 1992 at around 9 AM, the illicit relationship came to a tragic end when the accused went to Lilia's residence looking for her husband. Thereon, she saw her husband having a drinking spree with friends. The meeting immediately turned to be violent that the accused slapped Antonio. Both went to Lilia's house and the three proceeded to the bedroom where one of Lilia's children was sleeping. A heated altercation heated between Fe and Antonio forcing Lilia to go out of the room leaving the door half-closed. At the height of the argument, Lilia saw the accused bringing out a knife from her bag and stabbed Antonio on his chest. She barged inside the room


pulling Antonio away from Fe and the accused once again stabbed the victim on his left thigh. Accused immediatrly fled the premises and the victim was rushed to the hospital where he died due to hypovolemic shock and due to massive hemorrhage. However, during the trial accused gave a different version of the story telling the court that it was the victim who attacked him first and the knife she used was from a cabinet which she saw when Antonio pushed the accused. The trial court finds the accused guilty of parricide. On appeal, the court dismissed apellant's contention for lack of merit. Issue/s: WON the court erred in admitting the testimony of Lilia Lipio despite the absence of a Public Prosecutor in the taking thereof? WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Lipio relative to the circumstances which led to the death of Antonio? WON the trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of the accusedappellant relative to the circumstances which led to the death of her husband Antonio Arcilla? Ruling: 1. Remedial law; evidence; credibility; fleeting absence of fiscal, not sufficient ground to invalidate testimony of prosecution witness. – The fleeting absence of Fiscal de Joya is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the testimony of Lilia Lipio as urged by appellant. To begin with, appellant herself did not object to the continuation of the testimony of Lipio despite the momentary absence of the prosecutor. Appellant has not also shown any prejudice caused to her by the incident. Through counsel, she was able to fully cross-examine Lipio and test her credibility. To be sure, appellant misappreciates the reason requiring the public prosecutor to be present in the trial of criminal cases. 2. Criminal procedure; Public prosecution has the right and duty to protect rights of the people in the trial of the accused; absence of prosecution cannot be raised to invalidate testimony of state witness in the absence of personal prejudice. – A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines [Section 2 of Rule 110] . For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110


provides that "all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." Only private crimes like adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. The presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests at stake in the prosecution of crimes, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. As the representative of the State, the public prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an accused . It ought to be self-evident that the right belongs to

the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar. 3. Evidence; credibility; trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses deserves great respect. – For the nth time, we reiterate that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect since it has the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-settled rule. 4. To be believed, it must not only come from the mouth of credible witness but also must be credible in itself; case at bar. – Anent the third assignment of error, we have examined the testimony of appellant and we are not convinced that the stabbing at bar was merely accidental and through the own doing of the victim. The location of the victim's wounds, the position of the accused and the victim, and their relative strength negate the credence of appellant's story. Indeed, her claim that she twisted her body at an angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and pierce the victim's chest and left thigh, is incredulous. Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed amended decision is AFFIRMED, with modification that accused FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No costs. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur .


Francisco vs People G.R. No. 177720 February 18, 2009

Petitioner: Eliseo R. Francisco Respondent: People of the Philippines Crime: Estaffa

RTC: Guilty CA: Affirmed RTC w/ modifications as to penalty SC: Affirmed CA

Facts: Eliseo R. Francisco is the Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor of Bankard Inc. Bankard is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from purchases. The company serves as an intermediary between the credit card holder and a bank. Petitioner Francisco was tasked to convert the Equicom reports send through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format used by Bankard. Francisco was the only one assigned to perform this task. Bankard found several discrepancies between the original reports of Equicom with those converted by Francisco. There was a reversal of charges from 4 different establishments to Francisco’s account. Upon a closer look, there was no record of actual transactions or purchases. Since there were no original purchase transactions charged against Francisco’s credit cards, the reversal of charges and the crediting of sums of money to Francisco’s credit cards appeared to be fictitious. Due to this, Bankard was


made to pay the same to Solidbank, the actual bank of Francisco, the amount credited to Francisco’s credit card. Due to these fraudulent transactions, Bankard filed a criminal case of estaffa against Francisco. The RTC and the CA all ruled in favor of Bankard.

Issue: Whether or not Bankard is the offended party in this case

Ruling: Yes and even if not, the complaint would still be valid. Petitioner Francisco further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint, since the credit card companies were the ones which really suffered damage in the case at bar. Thus, argued petitioner Francisco, the third element of estafa under Article 315(a) was lacking: Stated otherwise, this element speaks of an offended party which undoubtedly may only refer to Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa simply because it was these two credit card companies that extended credit facilities to herein petitioner when the latter used his credit cards. Firstly, as discussed above, it was duly proven that Bankard also suffered damages by reason of fraudulent acts committed by petitioner Francisco. Secondly, even assuming for the sake of argument that Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa were the proper offended parties in this case, petitioner Francisco is mistaken in his assertion that it was essential for either Solidbank Mastercard or AIG Visa to have filed the complaint for estafa. Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness,10 a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed


instituted with the criminal action.11 A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL

Case Name: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL G.R. No: G.R. No. 159450 Date: March 30, 2011 Plaintiff: People of the Philippines Respondent: Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal Crime: Qualified Theft Lower Court Decision: Guilty Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed Lower Court (modified only the penalty) Supreme Court Decision: Affirmed CA decision FACTS: The accused, Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal, is one of the tellers of Prudential Bank in its branch in Angeles City. She was charged of the crime of qualified theft “…with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank…” Among the six tellers of Prudential Bank in the said branch, she was the only teller assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals. Virgilio Frias, Prudential Bank’s


Senior audit examiner, inventoried the cash accountabilities of the said bank by manually counting the money in each of the teller’s cash boxes. The books of the branch showed that appellant, Olivia, had a cash accountability of $15,040.52, the money in her cash box was only $5,040.52. When asked about the shortage, appellant explained that there was a withdrawal of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after the cut-off time which would be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996 and showed to Frias a withdrawal memo dated January 2, 1996. The next day, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and found a "hold jacket" indicating that no withdrawal from the said account should be allowed to reduce its balance below $35,000.00; he also found in the ledger that a deposit of $10,000.00 was made on January 2, 1956. He found the deposit memo on file. Thereafter, Frias compared the signature on the withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures of the depositors in their signature card. Finding a "big difference" in the signatures, he referred the matter to the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio. Asked by Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was made after the cut-off time on December 29, 1995. Doubting her explanation, Frias conducted another cash count. At that time, appellant’s accountability based on the books of the bank was $21,778.86, but the money in her cash box was only $11,778.86, thus, short of US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to explain, the latter started to cry and said she would explain to the bank president. The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told Panlilio that she gave the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29, 1995 because her family was being threatened. In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant apologized and explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another shortage of P2.2 Million which the audit team had also discovered, stating the same reason that she and her family was threatened. Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the

charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the

basis that her filing her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by


Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the information filed against the accused was fatally defective 2. Whether or not the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her defense 3. Whether or not the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the accused to the president of Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence. RULING: Whether or not the information filed against the accused was fatally defective The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly transpired on December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her defense. But the petitioner’s submission is untenable. The sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable, provide: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.


Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense through the words "on or about the

2nd of January, 1996," and the accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her defense. The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Whether or not the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her defense Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present her evidence. The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court, viz: Section 15. Demurrer to evidence . – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.


If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Whether or not the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the accused to the president of Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence. The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26,23 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter. Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30,26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with


one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense." The phrase does not cover all kinds of investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein "a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty." 27 The

situation of the accused was not similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty. People v Teodoro Date: December 2, 2009 GR NO: 172372 Topic: When complaint or information is sufficient Facts: 

Appellant Romar Teodoro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas. However, there are three different sets of facts that were laid down during his trial. The said set of facts contained different dates but of the same crime.

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The dates stated were:

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In criminal case no 8538 – June 18, 1995, in the morning

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In criminal case no 8539 – First week of July, in the morning

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A 

In criminal case no 8540 – March 30, 1996, about 10:00 in the evening

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In his defense, the appellant invoked denial. He denied raping the victim on June 18, 1995 and on the first week of July 1995, but admitted having a consensual sexual intercourse with AAA on March 30, 1996. We shall only discuss the incidents of June 18, 1995 and of the first week of July 1995 (subject of Criminal Case Nos. 8538 and 8539), as the appellant had already been acquitted in Criminal Case No. 8540.

Issue/s: W/O/N the Information in the Criminal Case (Criminal Case 8539) was defective for failure to state the exact date of the commission of the crime. Ruling: No. An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense.40 In the present case, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that the offense was committed "in the first week of July 1995"; it likewise alleged that the victim was "below 12 years old" at the time of the incident. These allegations sufficiently informed the appellant that he was being charged of rape of a child who was below 12 years of age. Afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense,


he cannot now complain that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime.41 It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to prove that the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Given the victim’s established date of birth, she was definitely short of 12 years under the allegations of the Information and on the basis of the evidence adduced. Moreover, objections relating to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant had found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. Failing to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information. 42 CRIM PRO

TOPIC: WHEN COMPLAINT / INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT

GR No. 174065 Date: February 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROLLY CANARES Y ALMANARES, Accused-Appellant.


CRIME: Statutory Rape

RTC: Guilty Statutory Rape

CA: Affirmed RTC with modification on payment of cost

SC: Affirmed CA with Modification (In addition to the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages, he is further ordered to pay P25,000 as exemplary damages to AAA.)

FACTS:

Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99 = STATUTORY RAPE (CONVICTED = ON APPEAL, INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM) That sometimes (sic) between the year 1992 to 1995 at Barangay Sabutan, Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who was then nine (9) years old, did, then and there, willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. SC-3261-00 = ATTEMPTED RAPE (ACQUITTED) That on or about the 25th day of March, 1999, at Brgy. Sabutan, Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who was sixteen (16)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A years old, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to have carnal knowledge of one AAA, against her will and consent, the above-named accused, having thus commenced the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes other than accused own spontaneous desistance, that is, by reason of the timely arrival of BBB who hit the head of herein accused with a base (sic) thereby preventing him from further consummating the crime, to the damage and prejudice of said AAA. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Evidence: PGH Child Protection Unit for medical examination. The findings showed that she had a healed laceration at the 6:00 position of her hymen indicating previous penetration

AAA, the victim, was born on September 8, 1982 and was only about 9 or 10 years old when Canares, a helper in AAA’s grandmother’s house at Barangay Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, allegedly first sexually abused her (1 st complaint 1992). AAA narrated descriptively the criminal informations filed. (inside the bedroom of AAA, more than 10 times sexually abused from 1992-1995 – first complaint… bodega of the house where appeallant sleeps on 1999 – 2nd complaint)

Defense: He claimed that the charges were filed against him at the instance of AAA’s grandmother and uncle because of the nonpayment of his salary as a farm hand and as a tricycle driver. AAA’s uncle also allegedly failed to pay him a previous loan of P10,000.20 He also claimed that it was impossible for him to rape AAA because she came to live at her grandmother’s house only in 1997.21 He argued that the rape could not have possibly occurred considering the number of people staying in the house; a shout from someone being assaulted could easily be heard in the house.


RTC and CA, affirming RTC, convicted the appeallant for Statutory Rape, the court believed AAA’s testimony which it found straightforward, truthful, and convincing. The trial court observed that AAA’s young age and gender rendered it unlikely that she would concoct a story of defloration that would subject her to public trial and ridicule. The RTC acquitted Canares of the crime of attempted rape for the prosecution’s failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Appeallant then appealed to SC stating that the testimonies were insufficient and contended that the Information in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99was defective for failure to state the exact date of the commission of the crime. He argues that the allegation that the rape was committed "sometime between the year 1992 to 1995" is very broad, considering particularly AAA’s testimony that she was raped more than 10 times. He posits that since the specific incident of rape for which he was convicted is uncertain, the doubt should be resolved in favor of his acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal should be granted.

RULING:

No.

We find no reason to overturn the conviction of Canares and hereby confirm his guilt for the crime of statutory rape committed against AAA sometime in 1992.


1. The Procedural Issue The argument that the Information in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99 is defective for the prosecution’s failure to allege the date and time of the rape is far from novel. We have repeatedly met and debunked this line of argument in rape cases. An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense.

In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during the trial and any objection based on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of accused-appellant’s failure to object before arraignment. XXX People v. Lizada, specifically involving the charge of rape, followed the above general principle; we stated that an information for rape is not rendered defective for failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed. The reason for this is plain: the precise date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the woman under any of the circumstances provided by law.


Thus, we have ruled that allegations of rape in the information committed, "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "on or about and sometime in the year 1988," or "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," "sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto," and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto," all constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11 of Rule 110. In People v. Salalima, we also ruled that the allegation that the sexual assaults were committed, "sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout," or "sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout," and also, "sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout" substantially informed the accused of the crimes charged since all the elements of rape were stated in the informations.

2. Substantive Issue Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.55 Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary; force is not an element of statutory rape and the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the complainant is below the age of twelve. The law presumes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.The first and second elements have been established by the presentation of a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite dated April 21, 1999 stating that AAA was born on September 8, 1982.59 Hence, she was only 9, or at most 10, years old when the rape was committed in 1992. In and out of court, she consistently identified Canares as her rapist. Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the female organ; the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape. The prosecution proved this element when AAA narrated during the trial the details of her rape, committed sometime in 1992. (also with the medical examination)


XXX Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a female victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, because no woman would willingly undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation except to condemn the injustice done and to secure the offender’s apprehension and punishment. Testimonies of youthful rape victims are, as a general rule, given full faith and credit, considering that when a girl says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.70 In this case, she could not have come up with a detailed narration of what she suffered if the rape, in fact, did not really happen. Canares mainly interposed the defense of denial, an inherently weak defense that must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Case Name: Manuel V. Baviera vs. Esperanza Paglinawan, in her capacity as Department of Justice

State Prosecutor et al.

G.R. No: 168380 Date: February 8, 2007 Topic: WHO MUST PROSECUTE (CRIMINAL ACTION IN GENERAL)

Petitioner: Manuel V. Baviera Respondent: Esperanza Paglinawan in her capacity as Department of Justice State Prosecutor et al. Petition: For Review on Certiorari against CA's decision DOJ Decision: Dismiss petitioner’s complaint against Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed DOJ Supreme Court Decision: Denied petition and affirmed CA decision

FACTS: -Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.


-Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the HR Service Delivery and Industrial Relations of Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein respondents. SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to Resolution No. 1142 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB’s business in this jurisdiction is subject to the following conditions: 1. At the end of a one-year period from the date the SCB starts its trust functions, at least 25% of its trust accounts must be for the account of non-residents of the Philippines and that actual foreign exchange had been remitted into the Philippines to fund such accounts or that the establishment of such accounts had reduced the indebtedness of residents (individuals or corporations or government agencies) of the Philippines to non-residents. At the end of the second year, the above ratio shall be 50%, which ratio must be observed continuously thereafter; 2. The trust operations of SCB shall be subject to all existing laws, rules and regulations applicable to trust services, particularly the creation of a Trust Committee; and 3. The bank shall inform the appropriate supervising and examining department of the BSP at the start of its operations. -Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above conditions. Instead, as early as 1996, it acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local residents foreign securities called "GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS" (GTPMF), denominated in US dollars. These securities were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). -SCB’s counsel, advised the bank to proceed with the selling of the foreign securities although unregistered with the SEC, under the guise of a "custodianship agreement;" and should it be questioned, it shall invoke Section 723 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.337) In sum, SCB was able to sell GTPMF securities worth around P6 billion to some 645 investors. -Petitoner enter into an Investment Trust Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased US$8,000.00 worth of securities upon the bank’s promise of 40% return on his investment and a guarantee that his money is safe. -petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal and Compliance Department, that the latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities.


-Petitioner then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint demanding compensation for his lost investment. But SCB denied his demand on the ground that his investment is "regular." -petitioner filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), a complaint charging the abovenamed officers and members of the SCB Board of Directors and other SCB officials, private respondents, with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059. -petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section 8.19 of the Securities Regulation Code against private respondents, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-229

THE DOJ -DOJ rendered its Resolutiondismissing petitioner’s complaint for syndicated estafa in I.S. No. 2003-1059; -DOJ also dismissed petitioner’s complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of Securities Regulation Code), holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.

THE CA -Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petion for certitorari alleging that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa and also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing violation of the Securities Regulation Code. However, CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation Code and his complaint in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa .

HELD: For violation of the Securities Regulation Code Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:


SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses .– 53. 1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency, other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish information concerning any such violations and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code relates: Provided, however , That any person requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation: Provided, further , That all criminal complaints for violations of this Code and the implementing rules and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary

investigation

and

prosecution

before

the

proper

court: Provided,

furthermore, That in instances where the law allows independent civil or criminal

proceedings of violations arising from the act, the Commission shall take appropriate action to implement the same: Provided, finally ; That the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority. -The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229. A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical


and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted. We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.

For Syndicated Estafa Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that all criminal actions, commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. This mandate is founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution of the offense.13 This representative of the State is the public prosecutor, whom this Court described in the old case of Suarez v. Platon,14 as:

[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers. Concomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie case exists or not.15 This is done through a preliminary investigation designed to

secure the respondent from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the investigating prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction is that courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for


the filing of the corresponding information against an offender.18 Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.19 Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.20 Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an ar bitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.21 Records show that public respondents examined petitioner’s evidence with care, well aware of their duty to prevent material damage to his constitutional right to liberty and fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that a public prosecutor’s duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons where the complainant’s evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on the other hand, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.22 Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for review against private respondents and in concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On petitioner’s complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation Code, suffice it to state that, as aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the DOJ. Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing petitioner’s complaint, the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions and AFFIRM the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.


Case Name: ADAZA vs ABALOS G.R. No. 168617 Date: February 19, 2007 Plaintiff: Bernadette Adasa Respondent: Cecille Abalos Crime: Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City: Ordered the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification against Adasa DOJ Decision: Reversed the decision of Office of the City Prosecutor Court of Appeal: Reversed the DOJ’s ruling

Facts The two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa. Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. Petitioner, however, recanted and alleged instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks which are the subject matter of the complaints. On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document. The trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782 issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a reinvestigation. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the finding of probable cause against petitioner.


On 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001. The DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. The DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language "may" utilized in Section 12. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Issues W/N the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned? Ruling Petition Denied. The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried to construe Section 7 side by side with Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. First sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to wit: If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. (Emphasis supplied.) Applying the principle in statutory construction - that when a statute or provision contains words of positive prohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot," or "ought not" or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute or provision is mandatory thus rendering the provision mandatory


– it opined that the subject provision simply means that the Secretary of Justice has no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the petition for review. The Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word "may" in Section 12 would seem to imply that the Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned . This provision should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7. The two provisions, taken together, simply meant that when an accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it outright. Petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into account of whether the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Just like in the Crespo case, the accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed before the DOJ. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated three basic rules in statutory construction. In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal. Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory import. It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the Resolutions of the DOJ after it had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance of the petition for review filed by petitioner. Having been rendered in grave abuse of its discretion, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void. That respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void, there was nothing for respondent to oppose. A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions and


not to resolutions on reinvestigation. The rule stating that "when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish” find application in this regard. Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was improvidently conducted. Again, this contention is without merit. Records reveal that petitioner’s arraignment was without any restriction, condition or reservation. In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to the charge. In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Another digest - http://breakingomerta.wordpress.com/2012/03/28/adasa-vs-abalos/ Adasa vs. Abalos Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.:

Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner later filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed and set


aside the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw Information. Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ. In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language “may” utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned? Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the same. If the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being out rightly dismissible, such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section


12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also render its other mandatory provisions – Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.

CRESPO VS MOGUL

FACTS:

Assistant Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. The respondent denied the motion. Court of Appeals restrained the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

Then, Usec of Justice resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal. However, the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating. A motion and restraining order was filed again in the CA but was dismissed. Thus, this case. ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.


RULING:

YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.


The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

DISMISSED.

UY vs. People GR. 174899, September 11, 2008

Facts:


Private complainant Eugene Yu first met petitioner Ramon L. Uy in Bacolod City in 1993 during a convention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. (CREBA, INC.), Petitioner represented himself as a businessman and developer of lowcost housing and President of Trans-Builders Resources and Development Corporation. Becoming friends, petitioner and private complainant entered into a business venture in 1995 where petitioner proposed to private complainant a plan to develop low-cost housing in Cagayan de Oro. Eventually, petitioner was able to get private complainant to agree to an investment portfolio to give the amount of P3,500,000.00 to petitioner who, in turn, would pay private complainant the amount of P4,500,000.00 by the end of May 1996. The additional P1,000,000.00 was the interest on his investment. Subsequently, checks issued by petitioner to private complainant were dishonored. Petitioner filed Estafa against UY which the RTC ruled in favor of private complainant. For the defense, it argued on appeal that it was merely a loan and not an investment agreement and that he should only be charged of violation of BP 22. CA nevertheless affirmed RTC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process of law when he was convicted of estafa instead of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 Held: We find his contention untenable. Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In the case before us, the prosecutor, after going over the complaint found probable cause to charge him with estafa. This was the prosecutor’s prerogative, considering that he was the one who would prosecute the case. The prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled to file a particular criminal information. The fact that the demand letter may suggest a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cannot control his action as to what charge he will file, if he sees evidence showing probable cause to charge an accused for another crime. It is the


prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence before him which will prevail, and not what is contained in a demand letter. Moreover, there can be no denial of due process because petitioner was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when he was arraigned. He was charged with estafa, and he pleaded not guilty thereto. He was given the opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. The fact that he was arraigned and was tried according to the rules of court undeniably shows he was accorded due process.

WILSON CHUA et al.v. RODRIGO PADILLO AND MARIETTA PADILLO GR. 163797, 24 April 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Sandoval-Guitierrez, J.)

The representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

The respondents, spouses Padillo, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in a money lending business in Lucena City. The firm’s manager, Marissa Padillo-Chua, is the wife of herein petitioner, Wilson Chua, and the niece of the spouses Padillo. One of the functions of Marissa is to evaluate and recommend loan applications subject for approval by the respondents. Sometime in September 1999, a post audit was conducted and it was found that Marissa was involved in illegal activities. Marissa would recommend the approval of loans from fictitious borrowers. She would alter the name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another name as alternative payee. This alternative payee would personally encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amount received would be turned over to Marissa and her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts.


The respondents filed complaints against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, and several John Does with the NBI. Forthwith, the prosecutor filed an information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the RTC. The charges against other respondents were subsequently dismissed.

However, the Padillos were convinced that a more serious offense should have been charged against them. They interposed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice, who, in turn, issued a resolution removing Wilson and Renita from the criminal charge of estafa. The Secretary of Justice believed there was no conspiracy that ensued. The respondents appealed with the CA and the resolution of the DOJ was reversed. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita

Held: Petition DENIED.

Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases, the public prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a prima facie case exists; (b) decide which of the conflicting testimonies should be believed free from the interference or control of the offended party;and (c) subject only to the right against self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in court. Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the evidence before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to complainant’s evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.


We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute. First , the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of

Justice who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the President. 9 Second , the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.10 Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only Marissa should be charged. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 11 We have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s practice of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities.


Case Name: Ramiscal Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No: 140576-99 Date: December 13, 2004 Plaintiff: Luwalhati R. Antonio Defendant: Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal Jr. Crime: Graft and Corruption, Falsification by Public Officer Sandiganbayan: Issued a resolution Denying the plea of petitioner Ramiscal Jr. for denial of appearance of Albano and Associates as private prosecutors for Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGPOI) as represented by Gen. Navarro and Appari as offended parties Supreme Court: Resolution of Sandiganbayan reversed and set aside. Facts: On September 24, 1997, in General Santos City, Philippines, JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN both of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) took advantage of their official positions as they misappropriated public funds and depreciated the government of millions of pesos in capital gain and documentary stamp taxes. They committed the offenses in relation to their offices willfully, unlawfully and criminally executed and/or caused the execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other taxes should have been P524,475.00 and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby shortchanging and causing undue injury to the government through evident bad faith and


manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less. The petitioner Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and the others are accused of violations namely violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification by public officer as defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. On June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Reinvestigation” with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his unresolved motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the resolution of the reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. In the meantime, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s plea for the denial of the appearance of the Albano and Associates as private prosecutors for two alleged offended parties namely AGPOI as represented by Gen. Navarro and Appari. The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this resolution which was opposed by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the same on October 22, 1999. As a result, the petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court. Issue: W/N AGPOI as represented by Albano and Associates are private injured parties entitled to intervene as the private prosecutor in the subject cases. Ruling: The AGPOI and/or Commodore Aparri and/or Brig. Gen. Navarro are not the offended parties in the information filed before the Sandiganbayan. As gleaned from the Information for violation of Graft and Corruption Act, the offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Furthermore, AGFOI is not even the offended party for falsification of public documents. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of


public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person. Sec 16 (Intervention of the offended party in criminal action) , Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action

pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.” Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED. Domondon vs Sandiganbayan (Criminal prosecution cannot be restrained; exceptions) Facts On February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. In May 1994, an additional information was filed against petitioner and several others before the First Division of the


Sandiganbayan. Petitioner was included as an accused from a complaint filed on May 11, 1993 against certain officials of PNP due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP Commands. On May 12, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for consolidation before the First Division of the Sandiganbayan seeking the consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192 and 20576, all pending before the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. A Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26, 1997 and included petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent cases have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has revested" in the latter and "…it is grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating these cases Issue : WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE HEARING AND OTHER INCIDENTS OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20574 AGAINST THE PETITIONER DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PETITION Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court explained : “Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances:

(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;


(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; ella (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.”

Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due an d proper form.

However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, we proceed to determine whether the respondents Ombudsman Desierto and Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Such arbitrariness or despotism does not obtain here. With regard to respondents’ denial of petitioner’s motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No. 20574 with Crim. Case Nos. 20185, 20191, 20192, 20576 and 22098, we find the same to be well-founded. While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court.


Thus, the Court dismissed the petition for prohibition and prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction to nullify the order of the Ombudsman. Jalandoni vs Drilon 115239-40 March 2, 2000

Petitioner: Mario Jalandoni Respondent: Secretary of Justice Franklin M Drilon, Robert Coyiuto, Jr., Jaime Ledesma, Ramon Garcia, Amparo Barcelon, Antonio Ozaeta, and Carlos Dyhongpo Crime: Libel

Facts: Private respondents, Coyjuto, Ledesma, Garcia, Barcelon, Ozaeta and Dyhongpo published full sized advertisements in 5 major daily newspapers. These advertisements contained allegations naming herein petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts, and other wrongdoings constituting graft and corruption, relative to the dacion en pago financing arrangement entered into by Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. Petitioner filed for libel before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The information was approved by the Rizal Provincial prosecutor recommending the indictment of the private respondents for the crime of libel. Aggrieved, the private respondents appealed to the Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. He decided that the questioned resolutions are set aside and the complaints dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the power to dismiss complaints


Ruling: Yes. The Secretary of Justice has the power to dismiss complaints. Sec. 1 (d) of P.D. No. 911 likewise empowers the Secretary of Justice, where he finds that no prima facie case exists, to authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements of evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation. The power of supervision and control by the Minister of Justice over the fiscals cannot be denied. As stated in Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47, Section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code defines the extent of a department secretary's power. The power of control therein contemplated "means the power (of the department head) to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." "The power of control . . . implies the right of the President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers." For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court. As he has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of Justice has the ultimate power to decide which as between conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be believed. 11 It is a well-settled rule that the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or decisions of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the secretary of


justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings as he may deem fit. STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner vs. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et. al., respondents. G.R. No. L-44723-EN BANC Date: August 31, 1987 Petitioner: STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY Respondent: ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN DOJ Decision: reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petition: Petition for Mandamus Supreme Court Decision: Petition was granted, and that a public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, was thereby ordered to continue prosecuting

FACTS: March 21, 1974 -Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre, who thereafter filed an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft. The Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to elevate entire records and to review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review. The letterrequest for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice, alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been


filed against private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft. The Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. A motion to dismiss was filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976 which was thereafter reset to April 23, 1976. At that time, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. April 19, 1976- Respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case which was thereafter denied by the trial court. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, a petition for mandamus was filed against respondent fiscal. ISSUE: Whether or not a fiscal can, after a case has been filed in court, be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss said case has been denied. RULING: There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal and he may or may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so. However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court". It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending to


grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914). In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State. This is so because the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. The rule therefore is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The petition was granted, and that a public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, was hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and Cortes, JJ., concur.

ELVIRA O. ONG Petitioner, vs. JOSE CASIM GENIO, Respondent. Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the CA Resolution.


Ong filed a criminal complaint against Genio for Robbery which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati City. However, pursuant to the Resolutions of the Department of Justice, respondent was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information which reads: That in or about and sometime the month of January, 2003, in the City of Makati, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, divest and carry away kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal things valued at Php 700,000.00, belonging to complainant, ELVIRA O. ONG, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned amount of Php 700,000.00. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View of Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Motion to Dismiss). Petitioner filed an Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss. RTC of Makati City dismissed the case because the other elements of the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in the Information filed against respondent. Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating that the Information should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed her Opposition to this motion. RTC granted respondent’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner filed her MR, claiming that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information against respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the Public Prosecutor. RTC denied petitioner’s MR, holding that the provision authorizes the RTC to evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and


eventually filed the Information in court, but also the evidence upon which the resolution was based. In the event that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, raising the issue of lack of personality of petitioner to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case, because the authority to do so lies exclusively with the State as represented by the OSG. CA observed that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as petitioner without showing, however, the OSG's participation. Thus, the CA ordered petitioner to furnish the OSG with a copy of the Petition, and the latter to comment thereon. OSG filed its Comment, taking the stand of respondent that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The OSG submitted that, for being fatally defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to pursue the civil aspect of the case. CA rendered its Resolution, dismissing the case without prejudice to the filing of a petition on the civil aspect thereof on the basis of the arguments raised by both respondent and the OSG. Petitioner filed an MR which the CA denied. Issue: WHETHER THE PETITIONER AS THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS NO PERSONALITY TO ELEVATE THE CASE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT THE COMFORMITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL EVEN BEFORE THE ACCUSED IS ARRAIGNED WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHEN IT HAS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SAME INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE Held: Yes to both. Ratio:


Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code states that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. Before this Court, petitioner failed to advance any justification or excuse why she failed to seek the assistance of the OSG when she sought relief from the CA, other than the personal belief that the OSG was burdened with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to disturb the CA's ruling. Petitioner, however, is not without any recourse. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, we held: It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.


On this ground alone, the instant Petition fails. Even on the issue of the RTC's dismissal of the case, the Petition ought to be denied. Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides: “Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.” 1avvphi1

It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in this case. Case Name: Perez vs Hagonoy Rural Bank Inc. G.R. No: 126210 Date: March 9, 2000 Petitioner: Cristina Perez Private Respondent: Hagonoy Rural Bank Inc. Crime: Estafa thru falsification of commercial documents Lower Court Decision: denied the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent of an order allowing the amendment of the information which excludes petitioner as one of the accused. Court of Appeals Decision: annulled and set aside Order & directing Judge Masadao to resolve with dispatch the private respondents motion for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack thereof.


Supreme Court Decision: petition for certiorari is DENIED and the decision of C.A AFFIRMED

Facts:

Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/FieldManagers. From August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm , conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28)savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings account went below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by depositor. This prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang ( "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the information against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her.


On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan. The prosecutor granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration. April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner,Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice,Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion,however, was denied with finality by the latter. Pursuant to the directive of the Sec. Of Justice, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused Presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao granted the motion. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the petitioner.

ISSUES 0. Whether or not Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter.


1. Whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor.

RULING: 2. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dimiss the criminal charges against the petitioner in the basis solely of the recommendation of theSecretary of Justice. Rationale: Judge Masadao's reliance on the prosecutor's averment that the Sec. Of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in violation of this Court's pronouncement in CRESPO v MOGUL. As aptly observed by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.

2. YES While it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law. Rationale In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we held that: "In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the


trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of the said complainant." Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for certiorari,then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors. COMELEC vs Silva

Petitioner: COMELEC Respondent: Lorenzo R. Silva Jr, . ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO, respondents. Crime: Election fraud

Facts: Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of §27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan. In each information, the three were accused of having


tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections. The cases were raffled to 3 branches of the RTC namely to Judge Silva and judge Vianzon. Tanciongco and Castillo filed a petition for the dismissal of cases. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. On the other hand, the complainant, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. expressed no objection to the dismissal of the cases against the two. Judge Vianzon and Silva summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents. The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals by filing notices on April 18, 1997, 3 but the judges denied due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the denials was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the designated prosecutor has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal

Ruling: We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices."

Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election


Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in court. 10 The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. 11 Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. 12 Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed. Case Name: Benga-Oras vs Evangelista G.R. No: L-8558 Date: September 28, 1955

Plaintiff: Leodegario Benga-Oras Respondent: Jose Evangelista Crime: Abduction Lower Court Decision: Petition to dismissed DENIED Court of Appeals Decision: none Supreme Court Decision: Petition for certiorari DENIED

Facts: Norma Ballos, a 14 yrs old girl was allegedly abducted against her will by the petitioner Jose Evangelista. Because of that, her father Silvestre filed a complaint before the Justice of Peace. The petitioner in turn, filed a motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the complaint which served as the information was not signed by the offended party, who was already in the age of discernment. The Justice of Peace court denied the motion.


The petitioner alleges that since the offended party is already achieved the age of discernment, she should be the one who should have filed the complaint, not her father. Since it was not the case, the court did not acquire jurisdiction on the matter.

Issue: Whether or not the offended party has the exclusive right to file a complaint if she passed the age of discernment

Ruling: Petition denied. The law (Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code) does not state or does not intend to state that the right of the offended party to file the complaint against the offender, in the cases mentioned, is hers exclusively in the sense that when she does not file the same, her parents, grandparents, or guardian cannot file it. What it means to say that it in fact says it, that when the offended party is a minor and she does not file a complaint, this may be done by her parents, grandparents or guardian, in the order named. If the offended party, who is under age, does not file or does not want to file the complaint against her offender, her parents may do so "being under obligation to render protection to those under their power and lawful guardianship and to represent them in the exercise of all the actions which may redound to their benefit.


Formal Requisites of Complaint of Information (Sufficiency of Complaint or Information) – Sec 6 Designation; acts or omissions Case name: Flores v. Layosa Petitioners: Rafael T. Flores, Herminio C. Elizon, Arnulfo S. Soloria Respondents: Hon. Lydia Layosa in her capacity as Judge of RTC, Benigno Montera and People of the Philippines GR No: 154714 Date: August 12, 2004 Crime: Estafa through Falsification of Public Document Place: National Food Authority central office, Quezon City



The Office of the Ombudsman, after conducting a preliminary investigation, filed an Information charging petitioners with the offense of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents with the RTC. Subsequently, the prosecutors filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite.



RTC issued an order suspending petitioners pendente lite for a period of 90 days pursuant to “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” which mandates that a public official charged under a valid Information for an offense under said Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution against him is pending in court.



Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC




Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Sandiganbayan.



Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for lack of merit.



Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Sandiganbayan but was denied.

Hence, the instant petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the offense charged in the information falls within the coverage of “Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” to warrant suspension pendente lite . Petitioners’ contention: while the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense of falsification of public document, it does not contain an averment of fraud or deceit on their part. Hence, the Information does not charge them with estafa but only falsification of public document. The Information reads: The undersigned accuses JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, Department Manager, RAFAEL T. FLORES, Asst. Department Manager, HERMINIO C. ELIZON, Division Chief III, ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, Security Officer, RONALDO VALLADA, Security Guard, all from the National Food Authority Central Office, Quezon City, of the Crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under Article 315 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows: That sometime in or about July 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused taking advantage of their respective official positions, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously falsify the Daily Time Record of the said accused Ronaldo Vallada for the month of July 1991, by making entries therein to make it appear that Vallada reported for work as Security Guard at the National Food Authority, when in truth and in fact said accused very well knew that Vallada never reported for work for the


month of July 1991 and with the use of said falsified Daily Time Record, accused were able to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada amounting to Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Four Pesos and Four Centavos (P2,244.04) which the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated and converted to their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of NFA in said sum. CONTRARY TO LAW RULING: There is no merit in the petition. Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found that the Information alleges the elements of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document and that the offense falls within the ambit of Section 13 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, thereby making their suspension pendente lite mandatory. Any error in the Information , with regard to the specification of the particular mode of estafa, allegedly committed by petitioners will not result in its invalidation because the allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners that they are being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under Article 318) and the absence of the words “fraud” or “deceit” in the Information , the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and


satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general committed through the offense of falsification of public document In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. In the case at bar, although the word “deceit” or “fraud” was not specifically alleged in the information, nonetheless, the same alleges the manner by which deceit or fraud was committed; that it was committed by falsifying the daily time record of accused Vallada; and that it was committed by using said falsified daily time record to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada to the damage and prejudice of the National Food Authority. To our mind these allegations are sufficient to maintain the validity of the information. The language is clear and explicit, and is equivalent to an allegation that the crime was committed with fraud or deceit. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the deceit or fraud was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. Furthermore, the fraudulent intent of the accused can be gleaned from their act of using the falsified document to draw the salary of the accused Vallada. The accused would not have made use of the falsified document except and unless to defraud the government.


Case Name: People vs Tano G.R. No: 133872 Date: May 5, 2000 Plaintiff: People of the Philippines Respondent: ALEXANDER TAÑO y CABALLERO Crime: Separate crimes of Robbery and Rape Lower Court Decision: Guilty of special complex crime of robbery with rape Court of Appeals Decision: No decision. The case was directly forwarded to Supreme Court for automatic review since the penalty imposed to the accused is death. Supreme Court Decision: Lower court’s assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED.

Facts: Amy de Guzman was tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and cousin, Ana Marinay. Thereupon, accused-appellant Alexander Taño, a relative of Ana’s husband Gerry Marinay, arrived at said shop. Accused asked Amy about the time when Gerry and Ana would be coming home, to which she replied, 10:00 p.m. (id.). He then asked about the time when Ana


would be coming home and Amy replied that she did not know. The accused kept on going in and out of the Video Shop, and on the last time that he went inside said shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to where Amy was and seized the latter by placing one of his arms around Amy’s neck, while his other hand held a knife which he poked at her neck. Amy started shouting for help but the accused increased the volume of a karaoke. He then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where he started raping her. Somebody knocked at the door of the shop and so he instructed Amy to go upstairs to the 2 nd floor to change clothes. He said he will be taking her with him. Suddenly, he punched her in the stomach thrice causing her to lose balance. He became violent again and banged Amy’s head on the wall causing the latter to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness she found herself and the accused inside the toilet of the shop and the latter again banged her head, this time on the toilet bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose consciousness. The accused went upstairs and took valuables of Amy’s employer. Amy, herself lost her ring, bracelet and wristwatch during the incident in question. Ana arrived and found the shop very disorganized. She found Amy in the toilet, bathed in blood. Amy was brought to the hospital.

Issue WON the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape despite the prosecution’s insufficiency of evidence. Ruling: I.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was inflicted on her; and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. We have no reason in the instant case to deviate from this settled jurisprudence.


Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances: (1) force or intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (3) she is under twelve years of age. We find the necessary elements of rape duly established by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman. As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, perceived Amy to be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also found to have been consistent and unwavering despite the rigid cross-examination of the defense counsel. We note from the transcript of stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory questions upon Amy.Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained consistent as well as convincing. Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the conviction of the appellant. Trial judges are in a better position to assess the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the truth or not because they could directly observe them in court. The reviewing magistrate, on the other hand, has only the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings to rely upon. With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property, (3) the taking is with the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things. There is no question on the unlawful taking of valuables belonging to Amy and her employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful asportation. II. CRIMES COMMITED We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.


Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he ordered her to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of robbery because, before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer. Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totaling P16,000, he committed two separate offenses -- rape with the use of a deadly weapon and simple robbery with force and intimidation against persons. Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and robbery notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged in the Information is only "Robbery with Rape." In a similar case, People v. Barrientos, this Court held: "x x x Controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. Neither is it the technical name given to the offense by the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by him, that should predominate in determining the true character of the crime. There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate complaints or informations."


In the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have sufficiently alleged all the elements necessary to convict him of the two separate crimes of rape and robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed, before his arraignment, to move for the quashal of the Information which appeared to charge more than one offense. He has thereby waived any objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those charged in the Information and proven during the trial. [40] WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero is found guilty of two separate offenses: rape and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and to pay Private Complainant Amy de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual damages.

ROBERT LICYAYO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. 169425, 4 March 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.)

Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely directs that the information must state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

The victim, Rufino Guay, attended a wedding together with his friends at Mabbalat, Igufao. The petitioner and his group of friends likewise attended the same wedding. After the ceremonies, both the group of the victim and the petitioner went to a store to buy some gin. In the midst of their drinking session, a brawl occurred between petitioner and the victim. The friends of both petitioner and victim joined the brawl. Some time after, police assistance arrived to pacify the scene. The brawl continued notwithstanding the presence of police officers. Licyayo then approached Guay, who was then wrestling with


Paul, Licyayo’s friend, and stabbed him in different parts of the body. The police officers fired a warning shot and Licyayo was brought to a nearby police station.

Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao. Although the information accuses him of the crime of homicide, it does not categorically state that he is being charged with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. According to him, the information should have been more explicit by stating

that he is being indicted for homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code . He argues that the specification in the information of the law violated

is necessary to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense, and that to convict him under such defective information would violate his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue: Whether or not the information filed is not sufficient as it did not specifically charged petitioner for the crime of "homicide" defined and penalized under article 249 of the revised penal code Held: Petition DENIED. The fact that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code as the law, which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make it defective. There is nothing in the afore-quoted Rules, which specifically requires that the information must state the particular law under which the accused is charged in order for it to be considered sufficient and valid. What the Rules merely require, among other things, is that the information must designate the offense charged and aver the acts constituting it, which in this case, were obviously done. People v. Gatchalian categorically stated that there is no law that requires that in order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision that penalizes the act charged be mentioned in the information. Besides, it should be stressed that the character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information.The sufficiency of an information is not


negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

PEOPLE V. MEJIA | G.R. No. 185723| August 4, 2009| Plaintiff: AAA| Accused: Edwin

Mejia| For: Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness| J. Chico-Nazario TOPIC: Rule 110, Sec. 8 Designation of Offense 

FACTS: Two (2) informations were filed against Accused Mejia for having carnal knowledge of his step-daughter AAA twice, morning and afternoon of March 2, 2003, contrary to Art. 266-A of the RPC. The factual antecedents show that Accused took advantage of the absence of AAA’s mother and used overwhelming force, with bolo, in order to deflower the minor AAA. The abominable bestial act impregnated AAA. The trial court (TC) adjudged Accused Mejia guilty of rape for the morning assault, Crim


Case No. SCC-4081, and acts of lasciviousness (Art. 336) only for the afternoon, Crim. Case No. SCC-4080, as the prosecution failed to prove on that occasion any penetration on AAA. The TC appreciated minority and relationship as aggravating circumstances, thus, amplifying the penalty to reclusion perpetua (supposedly death following Art. 266-B, but R.A. No. 8353 has suspended such penalty). The decision, however, was modified by the Court of Appeals (CA) by removing minority and relationship and awarding moral damages. 

ISSUE: W/N the CA was correct in disregarding minority and relationship as qualifying circumstances due partly to the absence of such allegations on the informations and partly to the failure of the prosecution to adduce proof on AAA’s age at the time of the crimes were committed.



HELD: The decision appealed from is affirmed, Accused is guilty of simple rape and acts of lasciviousness, and modified as to the award of moral damages, from PhP 50,000.00 to PhP 30,000.00.



RATIO: As amended, Secs. 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provide that aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proven during trial; if absent, they cannot be considered against the accused. As to proof of age, it cannot consist merely of testimony or stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age. A duly certified certificate of live birth, or other competent evidence such as school records must be submitted to give effect to an allegation of minority (People v. Tabanggay ). The graver penalties of death and exemplary damages attached to qualified rape can only be meted out when minority and another circumstance are duly proven. In the instant case only the circumstance of relationship was substantiated, hence, the crime of simple rape only. By the import of Art. 266-B (1), both minority and relationship should be present to adjudge an accused guilty of qualified rape.



NOTA BENE: Accused interposed alibis that he was leagues away from the locus criminis and that AAA is impelled by ill-motive to avenge her mother who is being

battered by the Accused. The Court rehashed, and decided along jurisprudential policies of denying frail and self-serving alibis especially as to lousy allegation of physical and temporal impossibility of reaching the crime scene with facility, according great respect to the calibration of the TC as to the credibility of the principal witness –


the victim, and sustaining conviction on the basis singly of an affirmative testimony coupled with positive identification of the Accused. 8. Vested rights cannot be impaired by subsequent law| pages 86 to 88| L.T.D. by J. Agcaoili

Case Name: Evangelista v People G.R. Nos: 108135-36 Date: August 14, 2000 Plaintiff: Potenciana Evangelista Respondent: People of the Philippines and the Honorable Sandiganbayan Crimes: Violations of Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) **Note: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of previous Supreme Court decision** Supreme Court Decision (Sept. 1999): Acquitted of the charge of violation of NIRC but convicted for violation of RA 3019. Motion for Reconsideration-SC (August, 2000, present case): Acquitted of violation of RA 3019. Facts: Tanduay Distillery, Inc, filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an application for tax credits for allegedly erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes (taxes based on value of property). Tanduay claimed that a previous BIR ruling only made Tanduay liable to pay specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes.


Thus, Tanduay requested the BIR to check and verify whether Tanduay previously paid ad valorem taxes. After making necessary verification, a certification was issued, stating that Tanduay was a rectifier not liable ad valorem tax with a recommendation that the application for tax credit be given due course. Sometime thereafter, BIR received a complaint, alleging that the grant of tax credit was irregular and anomalous. Due to this, petitioner, along with three other officers of BIR, was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the NIRC and RA 3019. They were convicted, except for one officer, of crimes pursuant to said violations. In a consolidated petition for review, the two officers were acquitted, except for Evangelista, who was found guilty of gross negligence in the exercise of his duty; thus, this Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Ruling: “Motion for Reconsideration is well-taken.” The certification issued by petitioner did not endorse approval of said application for tax credit but actually showed that Tanduay was not entitled to such. Contrary to allegations, petitioner did not cause any undue injury to the Government, give unwarranted benefits or preference to Tanduay, display manifest partiality to Tanduay, and act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Furthermore, the acts from which her conviction was based on were different from those described in the Information under which she was charged with. It is a well-settled rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offence unless it is clearly charged in the complaint of information. Finally, petitioner’s act of issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt practices as defined in Section 3(e) of RA 3019; thus, the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime where there is no law punishing it) is applicable. “WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s Decision dated September 30, 1999 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge against her.”


-- Nothing follows --

Peoplevs. Gallarde G.R.No.1330 25 Date:February17,20 00

Plaintiff:PEOPLEOFTHE PHILIPPINES Respondent:RADELGALL ARDE


Crime:Murd er RTC:Guil ty SC:ModifiedtoHomici de

Fact s: ThisisanappealfromthejudgmentoftheRTCofTayug,Pangasinanfindingtheaccusedguiltybe yond reasonabledoubtofthecrimeofmurderofEdithaTalan(10yearsold).Howeverinaninformation he waschargedwiththespecialcomplexcrimeofrapewithhomicidewithoutanyqualifyingcircumst ances mentioned. ThecauseofEditha’sdeathasrevealedinthepostmortemexaminationshowedsuffocationofth e lungsasaresultfrompowerfulcoveringofthenoseandmouthassociatedwithlacerationoftheva gina andrupturedhymen.TheRTCwasabletoconvictGallardeofmurderbeyondreasonabledoubtb utwas notabletoprovethecrimeofrape.Hismotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedthus,heappealedto the SC. Issue:WhetherornottheRTCerredinconvictingGallardeofthecrimeofmurderinaninformation for rape with homicide.


Held : Ye s. TheSupremeCourtsustainGallarde’scontentionthatthetrialcourterredinconvictinghimofmur der inan

informationcharginghimof

rapewith

homicide. Areadingoftheaccusatoryportionoftheinformationshowsthatthere

wasnoallegationofany

qualifyingcircumstance.Althoughitistrue term"homicide"asusedinspecialcomplexcrime

thatthe of

rapewithhomicide

istobeunderstoodinitsgenericsense,andincludesmurderandslightphysical injuriescommittedbyreasonorontheoccasionofrape,itissettledinthisjurisdictionthatwherea complexcrimeischargedandthe evidencefailstosupportthechargeastooneofthecomponent


offense,theaccusedcanbeconvictedoftheother.Inrapewithhomicide,inordertobeconvictedo f murderincasetheevidencefailstosupportthechargeofrape,thequalifyingcircumstancemustb e sufficientlyalleged andproved.Otherwise,itwouldbeadenialoftherightoftheaccusedtobe informedofthenatureoftheoffensewithwhichheischarged.Itisfundamentalthateveryelement of theoffensemustbeallegedinthecomplaintorinformation.Themainpurposeofrequiringthevari ous

elementsofacrimetobesetoutinan

informationistoenabletheaccusedtosuitablypreparehis

defense.

Heispresumed

tohavenoindependent knowledgeof thefactsthat constitutetheoffense. Intheabsencethen

inthe

informationof

an

allegationof

anyqualifyingcircumstance,GALLARDEcannot beconvictedofmurder.Anaccusedcannotbeconvictedofanoffensehigherthanthatwithwhich heis

chargedin

thecomplaintorinformationunderwhichheistried.Itmattersnothowconclusiveand convincingtheevidenceofguiltmaybe,butanaccusedcannotbeconvictedofanyoffense,unles sitis chargedinthecomplaintorinformationforwhichheistried,orisnecessarilyincludedinthatwhichi s charged.Hehas arighttobeinformed of thenature of the offensewith whichheis charged beforeheis putontrial.Toconvictanaccusedofahigheroffensethanthatchargedinthecomplaintorinformat ion underwhichheistried wouldbeanunauthorized denial of thatright.


G.R. No. L-8267; December 27, 1913 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. APOLINARIO CUNANAN, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: Apolinario Cunanan was charged with the crime of desertion. Cunanan, before the term of his enlistment had expired, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously absent himself for more than ten days, without license from his superiors, and with the intention not to return, by then and there abandoning said steamship Rover in said port of Cebu, Philippine Islands and deserting from the service, in order not to return, in violation of section 9 (c) of Act No. 1980, enacted by the Philippine Legislature.

ISSUES: Whether or not the court had no jurisdiction of the person, Cunanan or of the subject of the action

HELD: Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, sustained the demurrer, holding that the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila did not have jurisdiction to try Cunanan, and ordered that he be held and delivered to the proper authorities of the Province of Cebu, where the crime was alleged to have been committed, for accusation and trial, in accordance with the provisions of section 23 of General Orders, No. 58. Attorney-General appealed and contends in his argument that the offense is a continuing offense, and that any court, in the jurisdiction of which the defendant is found,


may try the defendant. The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain well-defined territory. They cannot take jurisdiction of persons charged charge d with an offense alleged to have been bee n committed outside of that limited territory. There are well-defined offenses which are continuing or transitory offenses. Such offenses are well recognized at common law and may be tried by the court of any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found. Such offenses are continuing or transitory upon the theory that there is a continuance or repetition of the offense wherever the defendant may be found. The theory upon which the accused in the continuing or transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction in which he is found, is based upon the ground that there is a new commission of the offense in the county or state in which he is found. However, the complaint presented in such cases does not, like that in the present, allege that the crime was committed in some other county or state. The Court does not feel at the present time to decide whether the offense of desertion under Act No. 1980 is a continuing offense or not. The Court decides that, inasmuch as there is no allegation in the complaint alleging that the crime with which Cunanan is charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, that said court is without jurisdiction to try said offense. US vs. Dichao G.R. No. L-8781 March 30, 1914 Plaintiff-Appellant: The United States Defendant-Appellee: Antonio Javier Dichao Crime: Rape Supreme Court Decision: AFFIRMED. Orders the information amended so as to set forth the correct date and may grant an adjournment for such length of time as will enable the defendant to prepare himself to meet the variance in the date which was the cause of surprise.

Facts


The accused Antonio Javier Dichao is charged of raping his step daughter Isabel



de la Cruz “On or about and during the interval between October, 1910, to August, 1912” 

As a result, Isabel de la Cruz gave birth on August 5, 1912.



A demurrer was issued saying that the allegations of the information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform the defendant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed. Unless the accused is informed of the day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent, ex tent, deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.

Issues Whether or not the allegations of the information are sufficiently definite as to time and question, which arises on a variance between the allegations and the proof are different in nature and legal effect, and are decided on different principles.

Ruling In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain that it does not give the accused the information required by law. To allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a certain girl between October, 1910, and August, 1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense, and that indefiniteness is not curd by setting out the date when a child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit the allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and when that has been done by any date may be prove which does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It does not authorize the total omission of a date of such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing. As before intimated, we are not to be understood as saying that a variance between the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and that as proved on the trial warrants necessarily the acquittal of the accused. The result of what we intend to say is that, if such a variance occurs and it is shown to the trial court that the defendant is


surprised thereby, and that, by reason of that surprise, he is unable to defend himself properly, the court may, in the exercise of sound discretion based on all the circumstances, Order the information amended so as to set forth the correct date and may grant an adjournment for such length of time as will enable the defendant to prepare himself to meet the variance in the date which was the cause of surprise. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Case Name: People vs. David Garcia GR No. 120093 Date: November 6,1997 Lower Court decision: Guilty of Multiple Rape ( 183 times ) and sentenced to suffer 183 penalties of reclusion perpetua


SC decision: Judgement MODIFIED to 10 simple rape and sentenced to suffer 10 penalties of reclusion perpetua FACTS: Complainant Jackielyn Ong and her younger brother, Darwin, were under the care and custody of their aunt,Elizabeth Ong. Jackielyn was only eight years old when she, together with Darwin and a stepbrother, Allan, were left to the care of appellant Garcia, the live-in partner of their aunt, when Elizabeth left for the United States sometime in November, 1990. Appellant Garcia stayed with the children in the house of Elizabeth Ong at Fontaine Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. Garcia started raping Jackielyn on the day that Elizabeth had left for the airport on November 1990. Garcia told her to go upstairs and ordered her to remove her shirt and panty and, when she refused, the former was the one who removed them. He made her lie on the bed and he then removed his pants and brief. Thereafter, he climbed into the bed with her, spread her legs apart and inserted his private organ into hers. She felt pain when he forced himself upon her and he was moving up and down. Jackielyn narrated that Garcia pulled out his organ when a whitish substance was discharged therefrom. Then he ordered her to put back her shirt and panty. Since that day up to July 21, 1994, appellant Garcia raped her almost weekly which happened in all the three places where they lived, that is, at Fontaine Street, East Bajac-Bajac, at 12th Street, Pag-asa, and at #40 14th Street, East Tapinac, all in Olongapo City.

ISSUE: WON the information for multiple rape filed against appellant is defective for failure to state the exact dates and time when the alleged acts of rape were committed since it was merely stated therein that the offense was committed “from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994.

RULING: It bears stressing that Section 11 of Rule 110 does not require that the precise time when the offense was committed be stated in the information, except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In rape cases, the date or time is not an essential element of the crime and, therefore, need not be accurately stated. **Other notes on Defective Information as a Ground for dismissal:


Where the allegation in the information as to the date or time of the commission of the offense is so uncertain, indefinite or ambiguous as to constitute a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the proper disposition where a motion to quash is filed on that ground, is for the trial court to overrule the motion and order the prosecution to amend the information by stating the date or time with particularity, within such period as the trial court may deem proper under the circumstances. This rule finds support in Section 4 of Rule 117 which provides that “if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made.” Corollarily, Section 14 of Rule 110 states that “the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.” In the event that the public prosecutor still fails to make the necessary amendment within the time allowed therefor by the court, only then may the court order the dismissal of the case. Hence, if herein appellant Garcia had filed a motion to quash, the case would not require an outright dismissal.


DATE OR TIME OF COMMISSION. SEC. 11 OF RULE 110 PEOPLE V CINCO Facts: AAA was in the custody of her aunt BBB when she was 12 years old since then she lived with her aunt who has a live-in partner, accused. On 1 November 1998, at around 6:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was inside the house watching television. Appellant entered the house and proceeded to the kitchen and took a knife therefrom and poked it at AAA. He threatened her not to shout and tied her hands at the back of her head and removed her skirt and panty. In pain, she began to cry, but he told her to stop doing so. He went on top of her, spread her thighs, and inserted his penis into her vagina and satisfied his lust. After satisfying his lust, he untied her hands, put on his shorts and left her. AAA then stood up and put on her clothes. She proceeded to the comfort room and saw her panty stained with blood. In the latter part of November 1998, at about 4:00 p.m., AAA was inside the house while appellant was drinking with friends outside. Later, appellant, then armed with a knife, entered AAA’s room and approached AAA. He pointed the knife at her neck and told her not to make noise. He covered her mouth with a handkerchief and tied her hands with a nylon rope. Then for the second time, he inserted his penis to her vagina and satisfied his lust. Before leaving her, he warned her not to tell anyone of the incidents or he would kill her. AAA subsequently, went to the barangay hall to report the incidents but told that she was merely “touched” and not raped by appellant. She was forced to make such statement because appellant’s siblings, namely, Sonia and Roel, thre atened to kill her if she would divulge the truth. Appellant was eventually arrested and detained. She then filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against appellant. Thereafter, AAA confided to BBB that appellant raped her. BBB accompanied AAA to Development (DSWD). Thereupon, AAA disclosed to a social worker that she was


raped by appellant. The social worker and BBB accompanied AAA to Camp Crame where the latter underwent physical and genital examination, which was conducted by Dr. Mariella Castillo and found out that

t AAA had an estrogenized hymen with healed

laceration at the 6:00 o’clock and8:00 o’clock positions caused by penetration injuries or objects inserted therein. In defense, however, appellant argued that he was not in the house when the alleged incidents occurred. He testified that from 8:00 a.m. to midnight of 1 November 1998, he sold ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. He went home in the morning of the following day, 2 November 1998 and same also on the latter part of November. He alleged that AAA had ill motive to fabricate the rape charges, because he caught her several times stealing money from his box inside the house. Gregorio Frias affirmed the statement made by appellant and added that at about 5:00 p.m. of November 2, 1998, he went to appellant’s house and upon arriving therein, he noticed that the people inside were arguing about the loss of money. On 30 November 1998, he and appellant were selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. While Roel Cinco, brother of appellant, stated that on 1 November 1998, he was watching television inside appellant’s house. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant arrived at the house. Later that evening, appellant quarreled with BBB because AAA had several times stolen money from him. RTC rendered a decision against accused of 2 counts of rape and acquitted on the crime of acts of lasciviousness due to failure of the prosecution to establish said charge. On appeal, the decision was affirmed intotu . Issues: WON the trial court gravely erred in not finding the informations under Criminal case nos. q-99-89097 and q-99-89098 as insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for the prosecution’s failure to state with particularity the approximate dates of the commission of the alleged rapes?

Ruling: An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the


offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The purpose of the requirement for the information’s validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his defense, since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. In sustaining the view that the exact date of commission of the rape is immaterial, as ruled in People v. Purazo. Appellant’s allegation of variance between the date of the commission of rape in Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098 and that established by the evidence during the trial is erroneous. AAA categorically testified that she was raped by appellant on 1 November 1998. This is consistent with the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No. Q99-89098 that appellant raped AAA on 1 November 1998. WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 30 January 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01537, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is deleted.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY NAZARENO TOPIC: SECTION 11 (DATE OR TIME OF COMMISSION) G.R. No: G.R. No. 167756 Date: April 8, 2008 Plaintiff: People of the Philippines Respondent: Jerry Nazareno Crime: Multiple Rape (RTC and CA) BUT THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT IT WAS TWO COUNTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT Lower Court Decision: Guilty Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed Lower Court (modified only the penalty)


Supreme Court Decision: Affirmed CA decision (modification of the penalty and the crime charged) “(1) In Criminal Case No. 2650, appellant Jerry Nazareno is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of qualified rape and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each felony, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to

indemnify the victim in the amount of P75,000.00, another P75,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages, for each count. (2) In Criminal Case No. 2638, appellant is found GUILTY of one count of qualified rape and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is likewise ordered to pay the complainant P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.” FACTS: Private complainants AAA and BBB are the legitimate daughters of appellant Jerry Nazareno with CCC. AAA was born on April 30, 1983. BBB, the second child of the union, was born on June 24, 1984. At that time, appellant and CCC were not yet married and it was only in 1987 that the couple formally tied the knot in simple church ceremonies. Three more children sprang from the marriage since then. (They live in San Andres, Catanduanes) Sometime on 1990, the first incident of rape to AAA happened, when she was about seven years old. He then threatened her not to say anything about what happened or else, she, her mother and siblings will be killed by him. This had then became a regular incident between AAA and her father, Jerry Nazareno, as when the two would be the one only left in the house. CCC frequently leaves the house to work to supports the family as the accused was jobless. Last instance of rape happened on March 25, 1996 which AAA distinctly remembers because this was on the day of her graduation from primary school. Sometime in January 1992, BBB suffered the same fate as her older sister, when she was also seven years old, the accused and BBB were left alone in their house when


the first instance of rape to BBB happened. Appellant continued raping BBB, using the girl for his sexual gratification every other day. From BBB's account, appellant would rape her fifteen times in a month. Every time, appellant would threaten her that he would kill all of them should she tell anyone what was happening between them. On October 27, 1998, AAA and BBB had the courage to tell CCC what their father has been doing to them and filed a complaint against the accused. Both AAA and BBB were attended to by DSWD and by Dra. Erlinda H. Arcilla, finding that the two both have healed hymenal lacerations which had been used as evidence against the accused. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the information filed against the accused was insufficient to support a judgement of conviction for its failure to state the precise date of the commission of the offense charged. RULING: In the main, appellant argues that the Informations charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB are defective for failure to state with specificity the approximate date of the commission of the offenses. According to him, the twin convictions have no basis in law because the People violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The argument is specious. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. Further, it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.


However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense.It is already a laid down doctrine that time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. In People v. Gianan ,31 the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed," an information is sufficient. The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v. Salalima and in People v. Lizada. In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired "sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes." In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that "from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes," AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could have moved to quash the informations or at


least for a bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late. Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People contending that the offenses were committed "sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998" for Criminal Case No. 2632 and "sometime in January 1990, up to December 1998" in Criminal Case No. 2650. On the contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his defenses. Simply put, he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the recitals in the informations.

People v Estrada Date: April 2, 2009 GR NO: 164368 Topic: Date or time of commission, Section 11 Facts: 

On April 4, 2001, information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. Separate information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him.



In the information, it was alleged that on or about February 4, 2000, in the city of Manila, then President Estrada without having been duly authorized, judicially,


administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office i.e in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the president of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally represented himself as “Jose Velarde” in several transactions and use and employ the said alias “Jose Velarde” which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank abd/or other corporate entities. Issue/s: W/O/N it is necessary to state in the complaint/information the precise date of the commission of the crime (Does this violate a person’s constitutional right to be informed?) Ruling: No. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the “time” given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of


the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [31] The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense .[32] In short, the allegations in the complaint or information,

as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or information – of the charge/s laid.

CRIM PRO


TOPIC: DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE (SEC. 13)

GR No. 103102 Date: March 6, 1992 CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRIME: FRUSTRATED MURDER to MURDER

RTC: Guilty

CA: Affirmed RTC

SC: Affirmed CA

FACTS:

Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which prevented her death.

After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

attack,

assault

and

shoot with

the

said handgun Maureen

Navarro

Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.


Case digest from http://www.scribd.com/doc/41981268/Teehankee-Jr-vs-Madayag TEEHANKEE JR.vs. MADAYAG March 6, 1992

FACTS: Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to consummated murder. Teehankee Jr. questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary investigation thereon.

There are three (3) questions to be answered here: ISSUE #1: Was there an amendment of the information or substitution when the information was changed from frustrated murder to consummated murder?

HELD: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper. “Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be


placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects: 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.” In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new


information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter

ISSUE #2: What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial? HELD: Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder.´ So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: You shot Hultman who almost died.´ Teehankee Jr.:W ala naman ako dun! I was at home asleep!´ Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now, namatay si Hultman. Ano naman ang depensa mo? Wala naman ako dun!´ The accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still available to him.

ISSUE #3: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge? HELD: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when there is substitution, kailangan ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason


that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary.´ Nota Bene: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

Case Name: People vs. Melquiades Feranandez alias "Moding", and Federico Conrado G.R. No: L-62116 Date: March 22, 1990 Topic: DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE (SEC. 13)

Petitioner: Rebecca Soriano Respondent: Melquiades Feranandez alias "Moding", and Federico Conrado Crime: Rape RTC Decision: Convicted of Rape sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death penalties. Supreme Court Decision: Affirmed RTC's decision

FACTS:


-Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a househelper since September 1981. Residing in Teofilo's house were his wife and daughters Amelita and Ma. Theresa. Rebecca Soriano testified that on 13 January 1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and after she had just finished taking a bath and still naked, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the bathroom. To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly tied around her neck, after which she was forcibly laid down. Conrado held her hands behind her while Fernandez sexually abused her. She declared that, immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in turn went on top of her and likewise succeeded in having sexual congress with her against her will. She added that, thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it on her vagina. Thereupon, she ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita Malong. -During the trial, Amelita Malong testified she saw the approaching Rebecca, naked with smeared mud on her lower private part and a piece of cloth around her neck and Teofilo Malong likewise testified for the prosecution who, together with Rebecca, proceeded to the office of the INP Police Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca physically examined by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio of the San Carlos General Hospital in that same afternoon. -Submitted as evidence for the prosecution was the "Medico-Legal Certificate" issued by Dr. Claudio, indicating his findings of "hymenal lacerations at 6, 10, 3 o'clock positions and one dead sperm cell seen on a slide examined."

THE DEFENSE -The two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense, both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed. -Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui weaving baskets when the incident happened. He admitted having been formerly employed by Teofilo for about two (2) years to spray his mango trees and stated that during the period he was hired as such, he lived alone in a small hut constructed under a mango tree. 7 -Conrado, on the other hand, alleged that when the crime was committed, he was at Malimpuec, Malasiqui as he was hired to spray the mango trees of a certain Mr. Overo Bo. Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted that he used to go to Bo. Taloy, prior to the


incident, as his parents-in-law lived there. 8

THE RTC -As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even corroborated by a single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is the weakest defense that can be resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to concoct or fabricate. the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their positive identification by the prosecution witnesses (especially by complainant victim of rape, Rebecca Soriano) as the perpetrators of the crime charged -Both accused found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law, hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of death, to indemnify the aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano, in the amount of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: W/n the lower Court Erred in Convicting Accused-Appellants for 2 crimes of rape.

HELD: -In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1), Article III thereof, under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua , Fernandez withdrew his appeal. The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the advice of his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the ground that "it has become moot and academic." -This Court nonetheless proceeded to consider accused-appellant's arguments for the sake of verifying the correctness of the sentence imposed. We find no merit in the appeal. -The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them, there is only one (1) crime of rape alleged.


-The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes waiver. -Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can he claim, as he now does, that he was denied the information that he was to be tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts complained of, as constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in ordinary and concise language that any person of common intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend himself against. -In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the accused-appellant Federico Conrado.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL VS MONTENEGRO FACTS: On March 1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from proceeding to hear and decide the case until further orders from the Court. On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for "Roberry" before the Court against respondents. They were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted. Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and jewelries belonging to Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40 Upon arraignment, all of the accused entered a plea of "not guilty". However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to


amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80. Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the private respondent may opposed the admission of the amended information. HELD: Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment. Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essenCe of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not


previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries. DISMISSED.

Case Name: Albert vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No: 164015 Date: February 26, 2009 Plaintiff: Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao Defendant: Ramon A. Albert Crime: Graft and Corruption Sandiganbayan: Issued 2 resolutions granting on one hand the prosecution’s Motion to Admit the Amended Information and on the other hand denying the Motion For Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A. Albert Supreme Court: affirmed the 2 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Facts: On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The information alleges that On May 1990 in the City of Davao, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO,


acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, caused undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declarations that two parcels of real property

are residential lands which Tax

Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property are agricultural land, and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government. However on On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information which was subsequently granted by the Sandiganbayan. In the said amended information the element of gross neglect of duty is changed to gross inexcusable negligence. Petitioner as he comes before this court opposed the granted motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment. He contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended." Issue:

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION Ruling: NO. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or


information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231.


PACOY VS CAJIGAL (AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION) FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word ―Homicide and instead wrote the word ―Murder in the caption and in the

opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that ―disregard of rank

is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder. In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the information from homicide to murder.


HELD: The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. Under Section 14, Rule 110 -Amendment or substitution— A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag is instructive, viz: The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects: 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and


4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.


In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee . While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of theInformation, with the crossing out of word ―Homicide and its replacement by the word ―Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from―Homicide to ―Murder as purely formal.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution’s theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner. While the respondent judge erroneously thought that ―disrespect on account of

rank qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge


61-JARANTILLA VS. CA | Mar. 21, 1989| J. Regalado

TOPIC: same act or omission producing two sources 

FACTS: Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle driven by petitioner Jarantilla and that Sing sustained physical injuries. Jarantilla was accordingly charged for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Sing did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution through a pvt. prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted “on reasonable doubt.”



Sing filed a civil action against the petitioner. Jarantilla alleged as defenses that the Sing had no cause of action and that which is barred by the prior judgment in the criminal case as the civil liability was also deemed instituted therein as plaintiff failed to reserve it. A judgment was rendered sometime in 1977 in favor of Sing and hence this appeal by Jarantilla.



ISSUES: W/N Sing can institute a separate action for civil damages based on the same act without reserving such right to institute such action in the criminal case.



HELD: Sing can file a separate civil action for damages despite failure to reserve such right in the previous criminal case.



RATIO: Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto . Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under ART. 2177 of the NCC that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.



Sing filed a separate civil action after acquittal. This is allowed under ART. 29. In Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al .: “In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de

la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt wasnot proven beyond reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action xxx. The well

settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. ‘The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.’ When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt , a civil action for damages for the same act or


omission may be instituted. This subsequent action requires only a preponderance of evidence. 

The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of ART. 29 is no longer that based on the criminal offense. The acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on ART. 100 of the RPC which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30036 Ponente: YAP, J., **Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.**


Date: April 15, 1988 Plaintiff-appellant: MARCOS BORDAS, Defendants-appellees: SENCENO CANA DALLA and PRIMO TABAR Crime: Serious Physical injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence (culpa aquiliana) Petition: Petition for review on certiorari Decision: The petition was GRANTED; the appealed order of the trial court was set aside; and ordered that the hearing of the civil case resume without regard to the criminal case.

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in toto the Order of the City Court of Cebu, granting defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss Civil Case on the ground that no express reservation was made by the plaintiff-appellant in the criminal action to institute a separate civil action.

Canadalla was charged before the City Court of Cebu, Branch III, with the offense of Serious Physical injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, for having allegedly sideswiped Bordas along M. C. Briones St., Cebu City, on May 2, l968 at about 8:40 a.m.

Canadalla was driving a jeepney owned and registered in the name of Primo Tabar. Candalla’s employer. While Criminal Case was pending, plaintiff-appellant filed a separate civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana against Canadalla and the latter's employer, Primo Tabar.

When defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss said civil case on the ground that the complaint for damages was filed without the proper reservation in the criminal action to institute a separate and independent civil action as provided by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule


III of the Rules of Court, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the same (September 2, 1988), and was later affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (November 2, 1968).

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the plaintiff- appellant to make a reservation of his right to file a separate civil action derived not from the criminal liability of the accused but on culpa aquiliana.

HELD: No. The trial court was in error in considering the conviction of the accused as a "prejudicial question' to the civil liability of Canadalla and his employer Primo Tabar.

The civil liability arising out of criminal negligence governed by the RPC is separate and distinct from the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict.

The plaintiff-appellant's action, being one for culpa aquiliana (Article 2176) may not be classified as a civil action arising from the criminal offense of Canadalla to be suspended "until judgment in the criminal case has been rendered.

Moreover, Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court on independent civil actions has been amended on January 1, 1985 to read as follows:

In the cases provided for in Article 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.


Section 2, Rule III, eliminated not only the requirement that the right to institute such independent civil actions be reserved by the complainant but more significantly eliminated Articles 31 and 2177 of the Civil Code from its purview. This is so because the civil actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 are not civil actions ex delicto. Moreover, said articles by themselves, authorize the institution of a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict which may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.

Castillo vs. CA G.R. NO. 48541, AUGUST 21, 2989 FERNAN, C.J.:


COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA: Dismissed the complaint for damages filed by Petitioners. COURT OF APPEALS: AFFIRMED the decision of CFI SC: PETITION IS DENIED (findings of facts by the CA are conclusive and not reviewable by the SC) FACTS: Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their respective vehicles. The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that fateful day; each party pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate cause of the accident. Petitioners version: On May 2, 1985 at about 2pm, petitioner Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with his wife ( Generosa Castillo), father (Serapion Castillo) seated in front and his minor son (Eulogio Castillo), as passengers, bound and northward for Binmaley, Pangasinan. Just past San Nicolas bridge, Villasis, he noticed a speeding oncoming car (driven by the private respondent, Juanito Rosario) along the same lane he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He switched his headlights to signal the car to return to its own lane as the way was not clear for it to overtake the truck. But the signal was disregarded, in order to evade the impending collision, Castillo swerved his jeep and applied on the brakes. The car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The petitioner, with the patella of his right knee, fractured, suffered serious physical injuries. Serapion whose head crushed through the windshield, was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries. Private respondents version: Private respondents (Juanito and Cresencia Rosario) together with their small daughter, were on their way from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to Olongapo City where they resided. They rode in the family car. Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, and his two passengers, were along McArthur Highway in Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards the south, they saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. The truck was moving very slowly so Juanito decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times. Then as the car was about to overtake, the car’s front left


tire suddenly burst due to the pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally making steering and control difficult. Because of the tendency of the car to veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the direction where he could find a safe place to park and fixed the tire. But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder of the road and just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep which came from the opposite direction. A civil case for the recovery of damages was instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Manila. While the case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information against Juanito Rosario, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in the CFI of Urdaneta. Respondent was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed to the CA, which rendered a decision acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: W/N an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision of the appellate court acquitting the accused? Held: There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the RPC, or create an action for quasidelictos under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. But this rule rule is not without without exception. exception. Thus, Thus, Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In a previous case People v. Rosario, the CA ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. Negligence being the source and foundation of actions of quai-delict, is the basis for the


recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the CA found no negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to petitioners. Since plaintiffs-appellants civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario’s alleged negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom. This court has held time and again that the findings of facts by the CA are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.

GARCIA v FLORIDO G.R. No: L-35095 August 31, 1973 Petitioners: German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco Respondents: The Honorable Mariano M. Florido Of the CFI of Misamis Occidental, Marcelino Inesin, Ricardo Vayson, Mactan Transit Co., INC., INC., and Pedro Tumala Y Digal Crime: action for damages resulting from quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual Lower Court: dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte" denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.


Supreme Court: decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City,for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers and bookkeepers at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at Sindangan,Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car,petitioners, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No.2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.


PU owner Marcelino Inesin and driver Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.

The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et.al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule111 of the Rules of Court, and the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the the negligent act or imprudence of the driver. The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint

ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined only after the termination of the criminal case


2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages

HELD 1. YES An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case.

In the case at bar, petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala. It is evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. As a result of this action, the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. An offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.


Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. The institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

2. YES The action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.

An action shall be deemed to be based on quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,namely: (a) act or omission of the private respondents; (b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; (c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; (d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and (e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. Reasoning The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers


aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others,that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of theRevised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil.607, 620621). It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code,an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted,however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.


Case name: Ruben Maniago vs Court of Appeals GR No.: 104392 Date: February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Ruben Maniago Respondents: CA and Judge Ruben Ayson

Location: Loakan, Baguio City Crime: Reckless Imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries RTC: Denied motion for suspension of proceedings in the civil case CA: Dismissed motion for reconsideration


Facts: Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses that transports employees of Texas instruments to their plant site. One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by the private respondent Boado. A criminal case was filed against the driver of the said bus, Herminio Andaya. When Boado instituted the criminal action, he made no reservation to bring the right to bring a separate civil action. However, another civil case for damages was filed by Boado against petitioner himself. Petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. The RTC and the CA denied such petition on the ground that the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.

Issue: Whether or not despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against the petitioner

Held: No. Private respondent may not bring an action for damages against the petitioner. Petitioner contends that a civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action filed against his employee since he did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. On the other hand, the private respondent alleges that since the right to institute a civil action is a substantive right, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring an action to enforce them separately. Such rule is beyond the rule making power of the Court. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those


which arise "from the offense charged," as originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in another way,

it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission


Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic



Civil Case: Complaint for recovery of sum of money



Criminal Case: violation of BP 22



Mandaluyong City

On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. The complaint alleged that respondent purchased from petitioner various electrical conduits and fittings amounting P1,622,467.14. Respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment. The checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of insufficient funds/account closed. The complaint further alleged that respondent failed to pay despite


demand. It prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the amount of purchase, plus interest and attorney’s fees.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

(1) the civil action was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas PambansaBlg . 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the officers of respondent

corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3) respondent was guilty of forum shopping and unjust enrichment.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order dated December 10, 2001. It ruled that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with insufficient funds, in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal actions. It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the obligation in this case, it being ex-contractu and not exdelicto .

Respondent questioned said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari . The appellate court, in its decision dated October 8, 2003, reversed the order of the trial court. It held that the civil actions deemed instituted with the filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 and Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 are of the same nature, i.e., for sum of money between the same parties for the same transaction. Considering that the courts where the two criminal cases were pending acquired jurisdiction over the civil actions, which were deemed instituted therein, the respondent court could no longer acquire jurisdiction over the same case.


Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, petitioner had already filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent corporation, and were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. These cases involve the same checks which are the subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide: Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions . — (a) x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to such civil action separately

include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file shall be allowed.

The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis pendentia . The elements of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are:


(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other

We reject petitioner’s assertion that there is no identity of parties and causes of action between the civil case, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. No. 0001-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.

First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 represent the same interests as the parties in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 0001-00300 were filed against the officers of respondent corporation who signed the checks as agents thereof. The records indicate that the checks were in fact drawn in the account of respondent corporation. It has not been alleged in the suit that said officers acted beyond their authority in signing the checks, hence, their acts may also be binding on respondent corporation, depending on the outcome of the proceedings. Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 seek to obtain the same relief. With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-0100300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the amount to be paid


by respondent for its purchases. To allow petitioner to proceed with Civil Case No. MC 011493 despite the filing of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double payment of its claim.

CASE NAME: Naguiat vs IAC G.R. No: 73836 Date:August 18, 1988 Plaintiff: ANTOLIN T. NAGUIAT Respondent: HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION RATION AND MANUEL P. LAZATIN CIVIL – complaint for specific performance with damages; CRIMINAL – violation of PD. 957 Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums, Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof

Lower Court Decision: granted the consolidation of the civil action and criminal action Court of Appeals Decision: set aside SC Decision: order of trial court reinstated Facts: The petitioner purchased 4 lots, on installment basis, from Timog Silangan Development Corp. represented by its President Manuel P. Lazatin. The Contract to Sell stipulated that those lots shall be paid within two years. However, Antolin paid the 10%installment in February 1983 and completed payments for Lot No. 16 on August, in which petitioner was given the title to the said lot and alleged that he had completed payments for the three remaining lots on November 1983. Thus, Antolin demanded from TSDC the issuance in his favor of certificates of title for the 3 lots. However, TSDC alleged that the petitioner did not comply with the agreement and as such, he is not entitled to the 10% rebate in price. Therefore, the payments made were not its full purchase price


Thereafter, on 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX docketed as Civil Case No. 4224 with a prayer that TCTs for those 3 lots shall be delivered in his favor. Before the civil action was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically Section 25 thereof, which provides: SEC. 25. Issuance of Title . — The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith. Issue: WON the civil action and criminal action can be consolidated Ruling: Petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3 (a), Rules of Court: Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) "After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shad be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. (Emphasis supplied)" SC= the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots


which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu and not one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is inapplicable. But, as held in Canos v. Peralta,

11

the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil action

arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court , which provides:

Section 1. Consolidation . When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In Canos v. Peralta , where the Court sustained the order of a trial court to consolidate a civil action (an action for the recovery of wage differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages) with a criminal action (for violation of the Minimum Wage Law), it was held that: A Court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. ... The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. 12 “In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise would virtually be the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents.


Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespective of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said special law, constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice”

Corpusvs.Paje


Venue ofCrime:Lubao, Pampanga Crime:Reckless

Imprudence

resultingto

homicide and physicalinjuries Plaintiff:

Laura

Corpus,

widowofoffended partyMarcia Accused:Felardo Paje R T C : G u i l t y CA:Reve rsed, Acquitted Separate CivilActionforDamages:Dismissed by SC. Criminalaction did notexist, henceindependentcivilaction, even ifreserved, shallnotprosper. CrimPro

topic:Rule

111,CivilAspect;RecklessImprudence Facts:Dec. 23, 1956 – apassengerbus ofVictoryLinerdriven byPajecollidedwith ajeepneydriven byClemente Marcia whichcausedthe death of the latterandphysical injuries oftwo otherpersons. Theheirsofthevictimasrepresentedbytheirmotherfiledinformationforhomicideanddoubleser


iousphysical

injuriesand

through

reckless

imprudenceandreservedtheirrighttofile

separatecivilactionfordamages. HewasthenconvictedofthecrimechargedbyCFIPampanga.Pendingappealoftheaccused,th epetitionersinstituted aseparatecivilactionfordamagesbasedonthecriminalactofrecklessimprudenceagainstthea ccusedandVictory

Liner,

prayingthatbothbeorderedto

solidarilypaydamagesclaimed

bythe petitioners. CAreversedthedecisionofthelowercourtandruledfortheacquittaloftheaccusedforfindingthe chargeagainsthim non-existentand thatthecollision wasa caseofpureaccident. Thedefendantthenfiledmotiontodismissthecivilactionoftheplaintiffsonthegroundthattheacti onwasbarredby the acquittalinthecriminalaction.CFIdismissedthemotion nevertheless. Atthepretrialofthecivilaction,defendantaskedthelowercourttoruleontheirspecialdefensethattheactio nhas

already

prescribed.

TheCFIruledon

the

affirmative,stating

that

the

causeofactionforquasidelictwasbrought4years and 11 monthsaftertheaccident;hence itwasbeyondthe4 yearprescriptiveperiod. Issue:WONthelowercourterred dismissingthecivilaction. R u l i n g : N o

in


. Rationale: TheacquittalofthedefendantbytheCourtofAppealsonthegroundthatthecriminalnegligencec harged againsthimdid notexistwasa barto the civilaction fordamageswhichwasbased on thecriminal action. CriminalnegligencewasnotoneofthethreecrimesmentionedinArt33oftheCivilCodewhichaut horizesthe institutionofindependentcivilactionwhichisentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecriminalactth usmayproceed independentlyand maybeproven onlybe preponderanceofevidence. Theoffense

ofcriminalnegligence

underArt365

ofRPCliesin

the

execution

ofan

imprudentornegligentact.Thelaw punishesthe negligentact itselfandnottheresultthereof. AccordingtoRule111,Sec3ofROC,theextinctionofthecriminalactionbyacquittalontheground thatthe chargeagainstthedefendantdidnotexist,necessarilyextinguishesalsothecivilactionarisingfr omthesame criminalact. Assumingthatthecivilactionfordamageswasbasedonquasidelict,theactionwillnotprosperas wellbecauseithas

alreadyprescribed.Thefouryearprescriptiveperiodbegantorunfrom

thedaythequasi-delictwascommitted;andthe

runningof

the

periodwasnotinterruptedbythe institution ofthecriminalactionforrecklessimprudence.

Case Name: Occena v. Icamina G.R. No. 82146 Date: January 22, 1990

said


Petitioner: Eulogio Occena Respondent: Hon. Pedro Icamina Crime charged: Grave Oral Defamation Convicted: Slight Oral Defamation Place: San Remigio – Beliso, Province of Antique Lower court decision: Guilty, to pay fine P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. No damages. Court of Appeals decision: N/A Supreme Court decision: petition is GRANTED. RTC decision is MODIFIED. Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegafria. The latter allegedly uttered: “Gago ikaw nga Bgry. Capt., montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas” or “You are a foolish Brgy. Capt., ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas”. The petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor and so private respondent was convicted of Slight Oral Defamation. There was no damages awarded to petitioner so relief was sought from the RTC but the same was denied. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory. Ruling: YES. The decision of the Mun. Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the RTC cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent. Only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case has become final. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality. The legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: offense against the state and offense against the private person injured. (Art. 100 RPC)


Art.2219 par.7 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Calling petitioner who was a Brgy. Capt. An ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner’s character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner is entitled to moral damages: P5,000 and exemplary damages: P5,000

Case Name: Marcia vs. CA G.R. No: 133872 Date: May 5, 2000 Plaintiff: MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC. Ponente: Relova, J. Crime: homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence Place: Lubao, Pampanga Lower Court Decision: Guilty (Homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence) Court of Appeals Decision: Not Guilty. (because criminal negligence is wanting) Supreme Court Decision: The decision of CA is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Facts: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. An information for homicide and serious


physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the accident was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the driver. While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the criminal offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 3, 1982, for want of criminal negligence on the part of the accused. As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje. The CFI of Rizal dismissed plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA alleging that the acquittal of Paje in the criminal action is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action.

Issue WON THE CA ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT. Ruling:


It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.


CONRADO BUNAG v. CA AND ZENAIDA CIRILO GR No. 101749, 10 July 1992, SECOND DIVISION (Regalado, J.)

*tried in Bacoor, Cavite

The disputed facts involved an alleged abduction of herein appellant-petitioner, Conrado Bunag, of private respondent, Zenaida Cirilo. According to Cirilo, she and Bunag were sweethearts. Because of some past quarrel, Bunag abducted Cirilo together with an unidentified man and brought her to a motel. In order to escape criminal liability, Bunag promised to marry Cirilo and they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. After said period, Bunag left and never returned. Because of this, Cirilo filed complaint for breach of promise to marry against Bunag.

On a finding that Bunag had forcibly abducted and raped Cirilo, the RTC rendered a decision ordering Bunag to pay Cirilo moral and exemplary damages and other costs of suit. The CA dismissed Bunag’s appeal.

Issue: W/N it is proper to award excessive damages to Cirilo taking into consideration that Bunag and Cirilo agreed to marry and there was no forcible abduction with rape

Held: Petition DISMISSED.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, therefore, a breach breach of promise promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff


has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.

10

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.


EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.

FACTS:

Records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a Volkswagen beetle type car owned and driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart St. Iloilo City thereby sustaining physical injuries. Private respondent thus filed a case for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence without reserving the right to institute a separate action for the recovery of civil liability. Upon acquittal of petitioner based on the ground of a reasonable doubt, private respondent instituted another action, this time being civil in character. Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action has already been barred due to the rendition of judgment in the criminal case decided before the institution of the present civil action. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. CA reaffirmed RTC’s decision but reduced moral damages to P18,000.


ISSUE:

WON private respondent (offended party) can still file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission of the petitioner (offender) despite judgment of acquittal, which rendered absence of award for civil liability. HELD:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt , a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Article 29 of the Civil Code allows filing of a separate civil action after such acquittal. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. Same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto . Since the same negligence can give rise either

to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal.


Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

HUN HYUNG PARK vs. EUNG WON CHOI G.R. No.: 165496 February 12, 2007 Topic: Real Parties in Interest in the Civil Aspect of Case

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A Plaintiff : Hun Hyung Park Respondent : Eung Won Choi Crime: B.P. Blg. 22, Bouncing Checks Law Metropolitan Trial Court Decision : Granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case

Regional Trial Court Decision: Granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay P1,875,000 with legal interest; but upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings Court of Appeals Decision: Dismissed his petition Supreme Court Decision: Petition DENIED. The case is REMANDED to MeTC which is

DIRECTED to forthwith for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Ponente: Carpio Morales, J. Place : Makati

FACTS: Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22 for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank a check postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded “not guilty” upon arraignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is a failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party in the petition

Ruling: No, it is not a failure in this case. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The case is


terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any. For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.


TOPIC: EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CIVIL ACTION Case Name: ABS-CBN vs Ombudsman, Benedicto et. al. G.R. No: 133347 Date: October 15, 2008 Ponente: Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura Location: Baguio City Plaintiff: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation Respondent: Ombudsman Crimes: Execution of Deeds by means of Violence or Intimidation, Estafa, Theft, Robbery, Usurpation of Real Rights, and Other Deceits. Ombudsman Resolution: Lack probable cause ~ The SC dropped respondents Benedicto and Tan from the case due to their untimely demise during the pendency of the case; thus, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Supreme Court Decision: Denied.


Facts: Senator Fernandez, representing Benedicto, met with Senator Tañada to discuss on how to arrive at a reasonable rental for the use of ABS-CBN stations and facilities. Thereafter, they entered into a letter-agreement with ABS-CBN. Barely two weeks from their entry into the ABS Broadcast Center, KBS personnel started making unauthorized withdrawals from the ABS Stock Room. All these withdrawals of supplies and equipment were made under the orders of Benedicto, et. al. No payment was ever made by either Benedicto for all the supplies and equipment withdrawn from the ABS Broadcast Center. Issue: Whether or not a criminal prosecution will proceed to prosecute civil liability notwithstanding the death of an accused during the pendency of the case as decided in People vs Bayotas. Ruling: Motion for Reconsideration denied. The motion contained in petitioner’s motion does not involve a question of law as would merit the attention of this Court sitting en banc (Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the case to the Court en banc). Nowhere in People v. Bayotas does it state that a criminal complaint may continue and be prosecuted as an independent civil action. 1.

Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal

liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore .” Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)

Law

b)

Contracts

c)

Quasi-contracts

d)

xxx xxx xxx


e) 3.

Quasi-delicts

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

for recovery thereof may be pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

As regards the offenses, complained of, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. Petitioner has not established the element of intent to defraud and petitioner’s inconsistent claims defeated their complaint.


G.R.No. 183788April5,2010 Case:

De

Zuzuarreguivs.Villarosa Petitioner:

KRIZIAKATRINATY-DE

ZUZUARREGUI Respondents: THEHON.JOSELITO C.VILLAROSA and FANNIETORRES-TY Facts: OnAugust2000,RosemaryTorresTyRasekhi,thesisterofpetitioner’slatefatherfiledapetitionforthe issuanceoflettersofadministrationoftheestateofhermotherBellaTorresbeforetheRTCofPasi gCity. However,petitionerinitiallyopposedthepetitionbuttheywereabletoreachanamicablesettlem entand

enter

intoacompromiseagreementandweresubmittedtotheRTCforapproval.Subsequently,twoof Rosemary’s allegedsiblings(Peter,Catherin,andFannie)filedwiththeCAapetitiontoannuljudgment approvingcompromiseagreement.Theyclaimedthattheyarealsobiologicalchildrenofthelate BellaTorres andthattheyareentitledtoparticipateinthesettlementofthelatter’sestate.However,Rosemary alleged thatPeter,Catherine,andFanniearenotlegitimatechildrenofBellaandAlejandrothattheywere merely raised bythe spouses butwerenotlegally adopted. While the action forannulment ofjudgmentwaspendingbeforetheCourt ofAppeals, Fanniefileda complaintfor falsification and perjury againstpetitionerandRosemarywith regard to the statementmade by Rosemarythatherallegedsiblingsarenotlegitimatechildrenofthespouses.PetitionerandRos emaryfileda jointmotiontosuspendthepreliminaryinvestigationonthegroundofapendingprejudicialquesti


onbefore theCourtofAppeals.Theinvestigatingprosecutordeniedthejointmotionandfoundprobableca useagainst petitionerandRosemaryfor two(2)countseachoffalsificationofpublicdocuments.Theprosecutorheld that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise agreement which is not determinativeofthecriminalcase whichinvolvestheliabilityofpetitionerandRosemaryforfalsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequentcompromiseagreementfiled beforetheRTC ofPasigCity. Thepetitionerfileda

petition

forcertiorari

andprohibitionwith

theRTCofMakati City. RTCdeniedthepetitiononthegroundthattherewasnoprejudicialquestion;hence,theMeTCdid notact with

graveabuseofdiscretion

in

denyingpetitioner’s

motion

to

suspendproceedings. Thepetitionerfileda

petition

forcertiorariandprohibition

beforethe

ofAppealsassailingRTC’s

Court orders.

Theappellatecourtdismissedthepetitiononthegroundthatthecertificationofnonforumshoppingwas signed only bypetitioner’scounsel and notbypetitionerherself. Issu e: Whether ornot thereisa prejudicial question involved in the presentcase Held:Ye s. Foraprejudicialquestioninacivilcasetosuspendacriminalaction,itmustappearnotonlythatsai dcivil caseinvolvesfactsintimatelyrelatedtothoseuponwhichthecriminalprosecutionwouldbebase d,butalso thatin the resolution oftheissue orissues raised inthecivilcase,the guilt


orinnocenceoftheaccused

would

necessarilybe

determined.Therationalebehindtheprincipleofprejudicialquestionistoavoidtwo(2) conflictingdecisions. Thus,foracivilactiontobeconsideredprejudicialtoacriminalcaseastocausethesuspensionoft he criminalproceedingsuntilthefinalresolutionofthecivilcase,thefollowingrequisitesmustbepre sent:(1) thecivilcaseinvolvesfactsintimatelyrelatedtothoseuponwhichthecriminalprosecutionwould bebased;


(2)intheresolutionoftheissueorissuesraisedinthecivilaction,theguiltorinnocenceoftheacc used would necessarily bedetermined;and(3)jurisdiction to try saidquestion mustbe lodged inanother tribunal. Iftheresolutionoftheissueinthecivilactionwillnotdeterminethecriminalresponsibilityofthea ccusedinthecriminalactionbasedonthesamefacts,orthereisnonecessity"thatthecivilcaseb edeterminedfirst beforetakingupthecriminalcase,"thecivilcasedoesnotinvolveaprejudicialquestion.44Neit heristherea prejudicialquestionifthecivilandthecriminalactioncan,accordingtolaw,proceedindepende ntlyofeach other. Asstated,thedeterminationofwhethertheproceedingsmaybesuspendedonthebasisofapr ejudicial questionrestsonwhetherthefactsandissuesraisedinthepleadingsinthecivilcasearesorelat edwiththe issuesraisedinthecriminalcasesuchthattheresolutionoftheissuesinthecivilcasewouldalso determine the judgmentin the criminalcase. AperusaloftheallegationsinthepetitiontoannuljudgmentshowsthatCAG.R.SPNo.87222,pending beforetheCourtofAppealsisprincipallyforthedeterminationofthevalidityofthecompromisea greement whichdid notincludePeter,Catherine, and Fannieasheirs ofBella. Peter, Catherine,and Fanniepresented

evidence

toprovethat

they

arealsobiological

childrenofBella

andAlejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she andRosemary werethe onlylegal heirsofBella.


Itisevidentthattheresultofthecivilcasewilldeterminetheinnocenceorguiltofthepetitionerint he criminalcasesforfalsificationofpublicdocuments.Thecriminalcasesaroseoutoftheclaimof Peter, Catherine,andFanniethattheyarealsothelegalheirsofBella.Ifitisfinallyadjudgedinthecivilc asethat

they

arenotbiologicalchildrenofthelateBellaandconsequentlynotentitledtoashareinherestatea s

heirs,

isnomorebasistoproceedwiththecriminalcasesagainstpetitionerwhocouldnothave committed falsificationinherpleadingsfiledbeforetheRTCofPasigCity,thetruthofherstatements regarding thefiliation ofPeter,Catherineand Fanniehavingbeen judiciallysettled.

FIRST PRODUCERS HOLDINGS CORPORATION v.LUIS CO G.R. No. 139655 , 27 JULY 2000, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J)

there

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A A criminal proceeding, as a rule, may be suspended upon a showing that a prejudicial question determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the very issue to be decided in a civil case pending in another tribunal.

On March 13, 1997, Armand M. Luna filed a criminal complaint for estafa and perjury against Luis L. Co in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. After the filing of Co’s counter affidavit and after consideration of necessary pleadings appended thereto, the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of estafa and perjury against him. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information for estafa against Co in the Regional Trial Court of Makati docketed and another information for perjury was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. On November 16, 1997, during the pendency of the criminal case, Co filed an action for damages against Luna and First Producers Holdings with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In the said complaint, Co claimed ownership over questioned Manila Polo Club Proprietary Share No. 203. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA committed grave and reversible error in finding that a prejudicial question exists with respondent’s filing of the Civil Case 2. Whether or not The CA committed grave and reversible error in directing the suspension of the Criminal Case pending resolution of the Civil Case HELD: Petition GRANTED. Echoing the appellate court’s position, Co maintains that the issue of ownership of the Manila Polo Club share, which was raised in the civil action, constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal case for estafa. Co argues that his guilt or innocence may be determined only after the issue of ownership has been resolved. Co further contends that the prejudicial question was seasonably raised because the Rules provide that it may be made "at any time before the prosecution rests."


Prejudicial questions are regulated by Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. -- The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil

action involves an issue similar or intimately

related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed." "SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. -- A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court

conducting

the

preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition

to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the

prosecution rests." True, the Motion to Suspend the criminal case on the ground that a prejudicial question existed was raised "before the prosecution rested." However, the peculiar circumstances of this case clearly show that it was merely a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal case and vex the already overloaded court system with an unnecessary case. The negligent character of the strategy of Co is apparent from the fact that he could have raised the issue of ownership in the criminal case. Co himself admits that the issue of ownership may be raised in the estafa case. In any event, the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of estafa. Indeed, the rules of procedure, including the rule on prejudicial questions, were conceived to afford parties an expeditious and just disposition of cases. This Court will not countenance their misuse and abuse to frustrate or delay the delivery of justice. In this light, the civil action may in fact give rise to the evils of forum shopping.


G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004 SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE


OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO Location: Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal

Facts:

In September 18, 1967 petitioner Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceño. In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. After earnest efforts, She found her husband cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato in quezon city. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989 Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas.

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he had married Zenaida first in December 24, 1955 in Iloilo and already has 4 children with her. HOWEVER there was no evidence of their marriage in 1955, so he married Zenaida again in 1989 upon the request of his son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military. Trial court convicted Salvador Adunado of bigamy. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modifications.


Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting. 2. Whether or not the petitioner may appeal that his petition for annulment of marriage with Narcisa is a prejudicial question to his criminal case of bigamy. Held: SC AFFIRMED the decision of CA convicting Abunado of bigamy. 1. The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity. All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. 2. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action… The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution


of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Case Name: Ching vs CA GR No. 110844 Date: April 27,2000 Place: Makati City Crime: 4 Counts of Estafa FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Ching executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation in consideration of the receipt by Ching of goods which included the following:


- ‘12 Containers (200 M/T) Magtar Brand Dolomites’ - ‘18 Containers (Zoom M/T) Magtar Brand Dolomites’ - ‘High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks’ -‘High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks ' Under the terms of said agreement, Ching agreed to sell the same for cash with the express obligation to remit to the complainant bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold. However, he failed to remit the proceeds of sale thereof to Allied Banking Corporation. Petitioner was charged before the RTC of Makati with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law". After an omnibus motion (Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Information, or in the Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary Investigation, and to Suspend in the Meantime Further Proceedings in these Cases) was filed by the petitioner, the RTC of Makati required the prosecutor’s office to conduct a preliminary investigation and suspended further proceedings in the criminal cases. Petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., then filed a case before the RTC of Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages . Ching then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action. However, the RTC of Makati denied the said petition which the CA also affirmed. ISSUE: WON a civil case for declaration of nullity of documents constitutes a prejudicial question to the criminal case of estafa filed against Ching RULING: The Court agreed with the findings of the trial court and CA that no prejudicial question exists in the present case. The alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for


declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law, in no uncertain terms, requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit: a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In fine, we reiterate that the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa filed against petitioner Ching.


IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS [Pendency of Civil Case for declaration of nullity of marriage vis-a-vis criminal case for BIGAMY] Ponente: Ynares- Santiago, J. Place: Quezon City Facts: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. On February 25, 1998, information for bigamy was filed against respondent by Imelda Marbella-Bobis. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated


without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari , petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code. Issue: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy? Ruling: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and


(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,

particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent


was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAMON P. JACINTO

Topic: Elements of Prejudicial Question G.R. No: G.R. No. 154622

DOJ’s Findings: Dismissed the appeal; Petitioner however filed for reconsideration and DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution

Date: August 3, 2010 Plaintiff: Landbank of the Philippines Respondent: Ramon P. Jacinto Crime: Violation of B.P. 22 Prosecutor’s Findings: Dismissed the Complaint

dated October 25, 2000 holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability Court of Appeals Decision: reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution of Prosecutor De Joya dismissing the complaint


Supreme Court Decision: Resolution of DOJ affirmed; directing the filing of appropriate information for violation

of B.P. 22 against respondent Ramon Jacinto


FACTS: The First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate amount of P400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement on 1997. As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCC’s account at the Philippine National Bank. Later, before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement on June 1998. Under the new agreement, the loan obligation contracted under the Credit Line Agreement of 1997 was restructured, its terms of payment, among others, having been changed or modified. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason “Payment Stopped” or “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. ” Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.

Hence, Land Bank, through its Assistant Vice President, Udela C. Salvo, filed before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent for violation of B.P. 22. Respondent filed his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges and said that the loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. Prosecutor George V. De Joya dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Prosecutor which was denied; they elevated the matter to DOJ which originally reversed the appeal but upon filing for a Motion for reconsideration, they reversed their former ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed the decision of DOJ and reinstated the decision of Prosector de Joya. ISSUES: Whether or not the element of prejudicial question exists in the instant case


RULING: Respondent’s contention that if it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and restructured then his liability under the dishonored checks would be extinguished, fails to persuade us. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondent’s JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation. In fact, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, out of the nine (9) checks in question, eight (8) checks were dated June 8 to October 30, 1998 or after the execution of the June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement. If indeed respondent’s liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the checks. However, there was no proof that he had been released from his obligation. On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states that “This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements, promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties a nd shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions of this Agreement. ”

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. [18] The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [19] A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.[20] Not every defense raised in a civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial


question.[21] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. [22] In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.[27] Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.

Pimentel v Pimentel


GR No: 172060 Spetember 13, 2010 Ponente: Carpio, J. FACTS: 

Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo Cityfor the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.



Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.



The RTC Quezon City issued an Order holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.



Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC Quezon City denied the motion.



CA: dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

ISSUES: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. RULING: The petition has no merit.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case

Section

7,

Rule

111

of

the

2000

Rules

on

Criminal

Procedure [6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. [8] Respondent's petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action

was

filed

subsequent

to

the

filing

of

the

criminal

action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. [10] A prejudicial question is defined as: one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but


also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11] The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, [12]which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder [14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner's will. [16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioner's reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals [17] that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned

x x x."

First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned."[19]


PEDRO BABALA, petitioner, (accused vs. HON. MAXIMINO ABAÑO, ET AL., respondents.No. L–4600. February 28, 1952

P at ri ci o C a ne la ( co mp la in an t)

V en ue : C am ar in es N or te

C RI MI NA L P RO CE DU RE ; S US PE NS IO N O F C IV IL A CT IO N D U RI N G P E ND E NC Y O F CRIMINAL ACTION; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN CIVIL ACTION.

—“Although a civil action is suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding based on the same facts, the trial court is not thereby deprived of its authority to issue in the civil action preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of re ce ive r, f ixin g am ou nts o f b on ds, an d o th er p ro ce sse s o f sim ila r nature which do not go into the merits of the case.”

PARAS, C. J.:


Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an information for grave coercionw as f il ed o n January 26, 1951, in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, against the herein petitioner Pedro Babala, at the instance of the herein respondent Patricio Canela. On the same date, respondent Canela filed in said court a civil action against petitioner Babala, f or d am ages b ase d on th e sa me f ac ts a lle ge d in the information for grave coercion, in which action

respondent

Canela

prayed

for

the

i s s u a n ce o f a w r i t o f p re li m in a ry m a n d a to ry i n ju n ct i o n . I n t h e c i v i l c a se , t h e petitioner insisted that the criminal case should have precedence.

The Court of First In sta nc e of Ca mar ine s No rte , ho we ve r, iss ue d an or der d ate d F eb rua ry 6 , 1951,providing that the trial of the civil case upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case shall have been decided and terminated,but that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction might be proceeded with.

The present petition for certiorari and prohibition was instituted by the petitioner to set aside this order, it being argued that the criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

SC held: Pe tition er' s c on te ntio n is u nf ou nd ed. In th e ca se of Ram ca r, In c., vs . De L eo n ( 44 Off. Gaz., p. 3795; 78 PhiL, 449) we have already ruled that, although the civil action is suspended until final ju dgm ent in th e cr im in al ca se, th e co urt is not th ereb ydeprived of its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminaryinjunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds, and other p ro ce ss es o f s im il ar n at ur e wh ic h d o n ot g o i nt o t he m er it s of the case. It was reasoned out that "if those ancillary processes cannot be resorted to durin g the suspension, there is no sense in the rule pro viding only for suspension, when its effect is to kill the action." It becomes unnecessary to touch upon the contention of the respondents that the petition for certiorari and prohibition is defective for lack of verification. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,


Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,concur.PABLO, M., dissidente:Disiento por las mismas razones expuestas en mi disidencia en Ramcar, Inc., contraDe Leon, 44 O. G., 3795; 78 Phil., 449.

Petition dismissed

Case Name: People vs. Rivera G.R. No: 177741 Date: August 29, 2009 Topic: Jurisdiction over subject matter determined by allegation in complaint or information

Complainant: People of Phil Accused: WILLIE RIVERA aka"Kirat"


Crime: violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for selling of shabu RTC Decision: Convicted Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed Supreme Court Decision: Affirmed

FACTS -On March 13, 2003, upon the request of the Pasig City Mayor’s Special Action Team which had received information from a civilian agent that a certain "Kirat" was engaged in open selling of prohibited drugs in Villa Reyes St., Barangay Bambang, Pasig City, P/Insp. Rodrigo E. Villaruel of the Pasig Philippine National Police formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area. The team which was composed of SPO4 Manuel Buenconsejo as leader, PO2 Arturo San Andres, PO1 Roland Panis, PO1 Janet Sabo, and PO3 Salisa as poseur buyer, was given control number NOC-1303-03-04 by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). -P/Insp. Villaruel gave PO3 Salisa two one hundred peso (P100) bills on which the latter wrote his initials "AMS" above the serial numbers ZK801664 and JT972090 printed on the top right portion of the bills. To signal consummation of the sale, it was agreed that PO3 Salisa would remove his cap. -Upon arrival at the target area, the buy-bust team parked the van that carried them to the "other side of the street." As the informant approached appellant, he introduced PO3 Salisa as a buyer of shabu worth P200. PO3 Salisa at once handed the marked bills to appellant who in turn handed him two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. At that instant, PO3 Salisa removed his cap. -The members of the buy-bust team thus closed in, and PO3 Salisa held appellant’s arm and introduced himself as a police officer and informed him of his violation and his constitutional rights. -The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical check-up, and later to the Pasig City Police Station. The plastic sachets were delivered to Police Inspector Lourdeliza M. Gural, Forensic Chemist at the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory Office who examined them.

FINDINGS Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.


xxxx CONCLUSION Specimens A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

APPELLANT'S VERSION -Denying the charge against him, appellant claimed that he was framed up. -On March 13, 2003, as he was walking towards his mother’s house in SPS Compound, Barangay Bambang, Pasig City, two police officers accosted him, in the presence of "kibitzers," for allegedly selling shabu. He was dragged and brought inside a parked van wherein the police officers, under threats, tried to elicit from him information on the whereabouts of a certain "Ebot" and "Beng" whom he did not personally know, however. The police officers tried to extort from him P200,000, which was reduced to P20,000, for his release but he did not come across as he could not afford it, hence, they charged him with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

RTC Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of January 23, 2004, convicted appellant for crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for selling of shabu as charged in the information

CA upheld appellant’s conviction.

ISSUE W/N ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED

SC Appellant questions his arrest without warrant, not any of the instances when a warrantless arrest – the person to be arrested must have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense8 –having been allegedly present when he was arrested.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS 2A Buenaventura v. People, 9 citing People v. Bagsit, 10 teaches, however:

x x x It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter,voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently ruled that any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The records do not show that appellant raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned or in his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting evidence in his defense, appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest. In any event, appellant forgets that from the evidence for the prosecution, he was arrested while committing a crime – peddling of illegal drugs, a circumstance where warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

WHEREFORE, the August 14, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Case Name: Miranda vs. Tuliao G.R. No. 158763, Date: March 31, 2006 Petitioners: JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON Respondent: Virgilio Tulio Crime: Murder, Place: Ramon, Isabela


Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J. RTC (Manila): Supreme Court: Granted the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition CA: granted the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent who is now under the witness protection program. 2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitioner Miranda and 4 others as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ. The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution,


Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the information against the petition. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court Held: Petition Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners. petitioners. Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that


an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicial relief. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant war rant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

CASE No. 75 People v. Lagon Crime: Estafa City Court of Roxas Ponente: Feliciano J. FACTS: The accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced. He was charged with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information was dismissed by reason re ason of the court lacks the authority to impose the penalty prescribed by the law for the offense. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. In the case at bar, when the offense was done (April 1975), the jurisdiction was vested by law in the City Court, however when it was filed (July 1976) there there was an amendment in the law stating therein that the the penalty imposable upon a person accused there under had increased, therefore beyond the City Court’s authority to impose. On petitioner’s contention is that would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . ." ISSUE:


W/N the City Court of Roxas had jurisdiction over the case and that it had erred in its order dismissing the case. HELD: Petitioner contention fails. In the case of People v. Purisima the court stressed that it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. Also in the case of People v. Buissan, the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 ( prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period). Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.


77. YUSUKE FUKUZUME V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TOPIC: Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional Petitioner: YUSUKE FUKUZUME

Respondent: People of the Philippines and Javier Ng Yu


RTC- accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa CA- affirmed RTC’s decision. SC- set aside the decisions of the lower courts for RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume. Venue- Paranaque Ponente- MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice

FACTS: Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires. Sometime in July 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Parañaque. Fukuzume is introduced to Yu as coming from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. The initial agreed purchase price was P200,000.00. Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaled P290,000.00. To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawa’s authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel. At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the other for P34,000.00. However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed. Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced and Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR. Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound. When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found. Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa. It also refused to acknowledge


the certifications made by Fukuzume claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR. Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him. Fukuzume promised to return Yu’s money. Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking. Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner which is Estafa. RULING: YES With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque. Q

And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?

A

We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and

oftentimes inaccurate. If the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice.


Topic:Venue inCriminalCases isJur isdictional Case:Cudiavs. CourtofAppeals G.R. No:110315 Date:January16,1998 Petitioner:RenatoCudia Respondent:CourtofAppeals,Hon.CarlosD.Rustia Crime:IllegalPossession ofFirearmsand Ammunition. Place:AngelesCity, Pampanga Ponente: Romero Facts :

RenatoCudia wasarrestedon June 28,1989 in Mabalacat,Pampangaforthecrime ofIllegalPossession of

Firearmsand Ammunition. HewasbroughttoSto.Domingo, AngelesCitywhich a preliminaryinvestigationwas conducted and asa resulttheCityProsecutorfiledaninformationagainsthim. The case againsthimwasraffledtoBranch60 oftheRegional TrialCourtofAngelesCity. Upon hisarraignment, the courtcalled theattentionofthepartiesandcontrarytotheinformation,RenatioCudia had committed theoffensein Mabalacatand not inAngelesCity. Thusthejudge ordered thatthecase should be assigned toa courtinvolving crimes committedoutsideAngelesCityconsequentlyitwasassigned to Branch 56 oftheAngelesCity RTC. However,theProvincial ProsecutorofPampangafiledan informationcharging RenatoCudiowith thesame crime and it waslikewise assigned toBranch 56 oftheAngelesCityRTC which resultedintotwo Informationfiledwoththe same crime. Thisprompted theCityProsecutortofileaMotion toDismiss/ Withdrawthe Informationwhich thetrialcourt granted. Renatofileda Motionto Quash thecriminalcasefiledbytheProvincial Prosecutoron theground thathis continued prosecutionfortheoffenseofillegalpossession of firearms and ammunition—forwhich he had been arraigned in thefirstcriminal case,and which had been dismissed despitehisopposition—wouldviolatehisright not tobe put twiceinjeopardyofpunishmentforthesameoff ense. The trialcourtdeniedthemotiontoquash;hence,petitionerraised theissue to theCourtofAppeals. The appellatecourt, statingthat therewasno double jeopardy,dismissed thesame on theground that thepetitioncould not have been convicted underthefirst informationasthesame wasdefective.Petitioner'smotionforreconsiderationwas denied;hence, this appeal. Issue:Whetherornot theCourtofAppealserred whenit foundthat theCityProsecutorofAngelesCity did nothave the authoritytofilethefirst inf ormation. Ruling:No.

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It isplainlyapparentthat theCityProsecutorofAngelesCityhad no authoritytofile thefirstinformation,the offensehaving been committedintheMunicipalityofMabalacat,whichisbeyond hisjurisdiction. PresidentialDecree No. 1275,in relationtoSection 9 oftheAdministrativeCode of1987,pertinentlyprovidesthat: Sec.11. Theprovincial or the cityfiscalshall: b)Investigateand/orcause tobe investigatedall chargesofcrimes, misdemeanorsand violationsofall penal lawsand ordinanceswithin theirrespective jurisdictions and have

thenecessaryinformationorcomplaintprepared ormade against the personsaccused.In theconductofsuch investigations he orhisassistantsshallreceive thesworn statementsor take oralevidence ofwitnessessummoned bysubpoena forthepurpose. It isthustheProvincial ProsecutorofPampanga,not theCityProsecutor,who should prepare informationsf or offensescommittedwithinPampanga but outsideofAngelesCity.Aninformation,when required tobefiledbya public prosecutingofficer, cannotbefiledbyanother.Itmust be exhibitedorpresentedbytheprosecutingattorneyorsomeone authorizedbylaw.Ifnot, thecourtdoesnotacquirejurisdiction. Infine, theremusthave been avalid andsufficient complaint orinformationintheformerprosecution. Asthe fiscalhad no authoritytofile theinformation, thedismissalofthefirstinformationwould notbe a bartopetitioner's subsequentprosecution.Asthefirst informationwasfatally defectiveforlackofauthorityof theofficerfilingit, theins tant petitionmust fail forfailuretocomplywithall therequisites necessarytoinvoke doublejeopardy. ThusMotionforReconsiderationisDENIED.

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BALA vs MARTINEZ

Topic: venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional

G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990 Venue: manila Crime: falsification of a public document

Petitioner: MANUEL V. BALA Respondent: HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer

Ponente: SARMIENTO, J.:

RTC: petitioner Manuel Bala guilty CA: affirmed

The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated

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April 2, 1984 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch XX.

Facts:

The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Piñas specifically 33 Jingco Street . The probation officer verbally granted the

probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it. By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.

Respondent People of the Philippines : Through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom

of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of

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the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

Petitioner : Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no

longer under probation, his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended.

Respondent Probation Officer: As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion

to revoke the petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired.

Petitioner's contention:

His change of residence automatically transferred the venue of

the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Piñas the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides

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Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...

Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.

As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not his transfer of residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new address

Ruling:

No.

In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. Such being the case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold 197

the petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioneraccused applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas as he is up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Piñas.

It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Piñas is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. 20 Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner.

The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence from his probation officer. This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its requirement of a prior court approval in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees that the probationer must 198

xxx

(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence without its prior written approval;

xxx

Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of August 11, 1982 as one of the conditions of probation, to wit:

(3)

To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor leave the

territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing prior written approval of his Probation Officer.

In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start all over again in needless protracted proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby REVOKED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42847 Date: April 29, 1977

Petitioner THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondents: CECILIA QUE YABUT and HON. JESUS DE VEGA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II Crime: estafa by means of false pretenses for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient funds

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CFI of Bulacan: Judge Jesus de Vega quashed the information, as prayed for by respondent Que Yabut, for the reason "that the proper venue in this case is Caloocan City and not Bulacan." **The People's motioned for reconsideration of this dismissal and was denied.**

G.R. No. L-42902 Date: April 29, 1977

Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: GEMINIANO YABUT, JR. Provincial Fiscal Pascual Kliatchko and Office of the Solicitor General, for petitioner. Crime: estafa by means of false pretenses for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient funds CFI of Bulacan: Judge Paras quashed the information because "(t)he elements of the crime (issuance of the rubber check, attempted encashment, and refusal to honor) alleged in the Information all took place within the territorial jurisdiction, not of Bulacan, but of Caloocan City." **The People's motioned for reconsideration of this dismissal and was denied.**

Ponente: MARTIN, J.:

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This is composed of two consolidated cases where twonovel questions of law were presented to review on certiorari the quashal orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, sitting at Malolos, first, the rule on venue or jurisdiction in a case of estafa for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient funds, and second, whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

FACTS FOR THE CONSOLIDATED CASES:

Private respondent Cecilia Que Yabut in L-42847, treasurer of the Yabut Transit Line, and her husband, Germiniano Yabut, Jr. in L-42902, president of the same Transit Line, were accused of estafa by means of false pretenses presided over by respondent Judge Jesus de Vega (for Que Yabut in CFI of Bulacan) and Judge Edgardo L. Paras (for Germiniano Yabut, also in CFI of Bulacan).

Both the accused, by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company in Caloocan City, prepared and issued several postdated checks in the total sum of P6,568.94 (for Que Yabut) and P37,206.00 (for Germiniano Yabut), payable to Freeway Tires Supply and Free Caltex Station, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan, in payment of articles and merchandise delivered to and received by said accused.

At that time, both Que Yabut and Germiniano Yabut knew there was no or insufficient funds in the said drawee banks, and upon presentation of the said checks, the checks were dishonored. And inspite of repeated demands by Andan to deposit the necessary 202

funds to cover the checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, both of them failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Andan.

Instead of entering a plea, respondents respectively filed a motion to quash contending that the acts charged did not constitute the offense as there was no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing obligation; and the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the complainant in the City of Caloocan, where Que Yabut holds office.

An opposition was interposed by the People, maintaining that the new law on checks (Rep. Act 4885, amending Art. 315, par. 2 (d), Revised Penal Code), penalizes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of pre-existing obligation, and that the Malolos court can exercise jurisdiction over the case, since the damage transpired in Bulacan (residence of complainant).

ISSUE: Whether or not estafa for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient funds is a transitory or continuing offense and whether it may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed.

HELD: Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of 203

deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed.

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." The theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or province, the court of that municipality or province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.

The estafa charged in the two informations appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed.

What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means “(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.”

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Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto. Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2 (d) states: “By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.”

Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.

A prosecution for issuing a worthless check with intent to defraud is in the place where the check was uttered and delivered. The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee. Since in the instant case it was in Malolos, Bulacan where the checks were uttered and delivered to complaint Andan, at which place, her business and residence were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa may be lodged therein. The giving of the checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to Modesto Yambao cannot be treated as valid delivery of the checks, because Yambao is a mere “messenger” or “part-time employee” and not an agent of complaint Alicia P. Andan.

Decision: The appealed orders of the respondent trial courts ordering the quashal of the estafa informations against the two private respondents in the petitions at bar were then reversed and set aside. The information, as they were, substantially conform with the crime charged as defined in the law.

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People vs. Grospe GR L-74053-54, 20 January 1988 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS Manuel Parulan issued a check to the San Miguel Corporation, which was received by the latter’s finance officer in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and which was forwarded and deposited in SMC’s BPI account in San Fernando, Pampanga. Another check was issued by Parulan as direct payment for the spot sale of beer, which was similarly received, forwarded and deposited as above. Both were dishonored for “insufficiency of funds.” Parulan was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and for estafa 206

under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Tried jointly, the court dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE Whether the checks were issued in Bulacan or Pampanga. HELD While the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof, as it is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The issuance and the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, i.e. the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. Both estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, as jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information, i.e. San Fernando, Pampanga, the venue was properly laid. Case is remanded to the trial court for proper disposition. Another Digest: People v Grospe Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized dealer of San Mig Corp in Bulacan. He issued 2checks in connection with beer purchases and which he delivered to the Sales supervisor (Mr. Cornelio) of San Mig. The checks were dishonored by Planters Dev’t Bank (drawee) in Bulacan. From the evidence presented, Parulan made false assurances that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient funds. But Judge Grospe of RTC Pampanga dismissed the case for lack of jusrisdiction. Issue: Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case. 207

Held: No. He had jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Estafa is a transitory crime. There are the elements of deceit and damage. Deceit took place in Pampanga and damage was done in Bulacan where the check was dishonored. While the check was issued in Bulan, it was not completely drawn. It was in Pampanga where the check was uttered and delivered. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation of the obligation. Although the check was received by San Mig in Bulacan, it was not the delivery contemplated by the law to the payee (San Mig). Mr. Cornelio is not the person who could take the check as a holder. Thus, he had to forward the check to the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit took place in Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered.

208

AGBAYANI v SAYO G.R. No: L-47880 April 30, 1979 Petitioners: Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo Bautista, Pablo Pascual and Renato Romeo Dugay Respondent: Honorable Sofronio G. Sayo, Presiding Judge of CFI of Nueva Vizcaya and Conrado B. Mahinan private respondent Crime: Libel

Lower Court: Motion to Quash Denied Supreme Court: Petition granted, trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside NATURE Instant petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS Conrado B. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his subordinates were Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo N. Bautista, Pablo R.Pascual, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay. On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista,Pascual and Dugay. On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that province an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual 209

and Dugay with having maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela,Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual incident report" subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation from the service. According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicted Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office,spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler,chronic falsifier", and an "unreformed ex-convict". The four accused filed a motion to quash contending that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information. It was denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977 on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of theRevised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. After petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied, they filed in this Court the instant petition.

ISSUE WON the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya was the proper venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan

210

HELD NO There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a public officer. Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and which specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation, reads as follows: ART. 360 Persons responsible. . . ."The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. "Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published…"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was

211

published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. -Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courtsThe rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus:1. Whether the offended party is a public official ora private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. -As a corollary, the preliminary investigation of the criminal action for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the cityor capital of the province where such action may be instituted. Applying the foregoing rules, the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was (as he still)in the public service. The preliminary investigation of the complaint should have been conducted by the provincial 212

fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province. The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of the city where the libel was printed and first published. The information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the Court of FirstInstance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction

Petition granted. The trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela within the remainder of the prescriptive period, if warranted according to the result of a proper and duly conducted preliminary investigation. Costs against respondent Mahinan.

213

People v. Rigor

Criminal Case: violation of BP 22 Place: 

Check was drawn, issued and delivered at Rural Bank of San Juan



Check was dishonored at Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch

The Information against petitioner reads:

That on or about the 16th day of November 1989 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously make

or draw and issue to Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. thru its loan officer

Carlos

N.

Garcia, a postdated check to apply on account or for value the check described below: Check No.165476 214

Drawn against: Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch In the Amount of:P500,000.00 Dated:February 16, 1990 Payable to: Rural Bank of San Juan

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue on 16 November 1989, he has already insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check and that as of 2 February 1990 his bank accounts were already closed and that check when presented for payment from and after the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored for the reason “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof during the period of not less than five (5) banking days after receiving notice. When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On July 8, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. ISSUE: W/N the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over the case considering that the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch. RULING: The contention is untenable. 215

As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reflects the old rule, [28] provides: Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted . – (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled: Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no 216

question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Peoplevs. Tomioand Tagahiro G R N o . 7 4 6 3 0 S e p t . 3 217

0 , 1 9 9 1 V e n u e : M a n i l a Case:Kidnappingand SeriousIllegalDetentionforRansom(Art. 267ofRPC) CrimPro:Kidnappinga sacontinuingoffense Appellant:MaidaTomio

aka

SatoToshio;Nakajima

Tagahiroaka YamadaTakao RTC: Guilty, death penalt 218

y SC:Guilty, reducedto reclusionperpetua as death penaltywassuspended

Facts:TatsumiNagao,hereinprivateoffendedparty,wenttothePhilippinesfora5dayvacation.Whilehewashaving hislunchinHolidayInnwherehestayed,theaccusedapproachedhimandofferedhimselfasat ourguide.Thatevening

beforeleaving

atedinner,hiscompanionputacigarette

therestaurantwherethey

onhisshirt’spocketand

toldhimtowait

becausehehadtotalktoa taxidriver. 5 policemenapprehended him, claimingthatthe cigaretteshe had weremarijuana. Atthepolicestation,bothaccusedarrived,servedashisinterpretersandtoldNagaothatthepol icemendemanded $100,000forhisreleaseotherwise;heshallbeinprisonfor612years.Bothoftheaccusedtoldhimthattheyhad

advancedthe

bribe

moneyto

the

transferred

to

police,hence, heshould reimburseittothem. Nagaothen

returned

IntercontinentalHotel

tohis

hotelwith

theaccused

inMakatiCity

and

andsubsequently

transferredagaintoPhilippineVillageHotelwheretheyaskedhimagaintocallhisfatheraboutt hemoney.Hisfather agreed to pay3M yen.Hewas lateragainto anotherhotel inMakati. Nagaowithdrewthemoneyandgaveittotheaccused.Whentheywereabouttoleave,policem en,assoughtbythe Japanese Embassyappre hended them.

219

RTCManilaconvicted

themof

the

crime

charged

andsentenced themto sufferdeathpenalty. By

way

ofan

additionalassignederrorandwhich

firsttime,theaccusedallegedthat

he

claimedto

the

invokefor

the lower

courterredinconvictingtheaccusedbecauseitlackedjurisdictionovertheoffensechargedas itwascommittedatthe HolidayInn in PasayCityand notinManila. Issue: WONthetrialcourterred in convictingthe accused due tolackofjurisdiction overthecase. R u l i n g : N O . Rationale:There

is

nomeritintheclaimoflack

ofevidencepresentedshowed

of

thatduring

jurisdiction.Thetotality the

periodofMay2to12,1986,thecomplainantwasbroughttodifferentplacesbytheaccusedafter Nagaohadgivenhis confidence.The essentialelements ofthecrime werecommitted in various places,hencea continuingcrime. Thecasecanthereforebefiledwiththeappropriatecourtinanyoftheplaceswherethecomplai nantwastakeninthe pursuitorin connection with thecrime. 220

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