UP Law SecC 2014 Constitutional Law 2 Digests
People vs Jalosjos G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago One-Liner : Romeo, who was convicted of rape and acts of las asci civi viou ousn snes ess, s, wa want nts s to di disc scha harg rge e hi his s du duti ties es as a congressman; SC said this can’t be so because it would be a mockery of the penal system. accuse used-ap d-appel pellan lant, t, Rom Romeo eo Jal Jalosj osjos, os, is a ful fulllFacts: The acc fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary penit entiary while his convic conviction tion for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be all allowe owed d to dis discha charge rge his duti duties es as a Con Congre gressma ssman, n, inc nclu ludi ding ng atte at tend ndan ance ce at legi le gisl slat ativ ive e sess se ssio ions ns and an d committee committ ee meetin meetings gs despi despite te his havin having g been convic convicted ted of a non-bailable offense. His main argument is the "mandate of sovereign will", as the electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Cong Co ngre ress ssma man. n. He ad adds ds th that at it ca cann nnot ot be de defe feat ated ed by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. He avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the HR, the latter urge ur ges s a co co-e -equ qual al br bran anch ch of go gove vern rnmen mentt to re resp spec ectt hi his s mand ma ndat ate. e. He al also so cl clai aims ms tha thatt th the e co conc ncep eptt of te temp mpor orary ary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mand ma ndat ate e an and d th that at he ha has s al alw way ays s co comp mpli lied ed wi with th th the e conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. Issues Iss ues:: (1) Should Should he be allowed allowed to discha discharge rge mandat mandate e as member of House of Representatives? (NO) (2)) Do (2 Does es be bein ing g an el elec ecti tive ve of offi fici cial al re resu sult lt in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? (NO)
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. When the voters of his district elected the him, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. (2) The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts thatt the duty to leg tha legisl islate ate ranks highest highest in the hierarchy hierarchy of gove go vern rnme ment. nt. Th The e ac accu cuse sed-a d-app ppel ella lant nt is on only ly on one e of 25 250 0 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 me memb mber ers s of th the e Se Sena nate te,, ch char arge ged d wi with th the du duti ties es of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of Congressman is not a reason rea sonabl able e cla classi ssifica ficatio tion n in cri crimin minal al law enf enforc orcemen ement. t. The func fu ncti tion ons s an and d du duti ties es of th the e of offi fice ce ar are e no nott su subs bsta tant ntia iall dist di stin inct ctio ions ns wh whic ich h li lift ft hi him m fr from om th the e cl clas ass s of pr pris ison oner ers s inter in terru rupt pted ed in the their ir fre freed edom om an and d re rest stri ricte cted d in lilibe berty rty of movement. movemen t. Lawful arrest and confinement confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Impriso Impr isonme nment nt is the res restra traint int of a man man’s ’s per person sonal al liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. As a punishment, it is restra res traint int by jud judgme gment nt of a cou court rt or lawful tribunal tribunal,, and is personal to the accused.
Section 9
Eminent Domain Republic vs Vda De Castellvi G.R. No. L-20620. August 15, 1974
Ratio:
(1) Election Election is the the expression expression of the sovere sovereign ign power power of th the e pe peop ople le.. Ho How wev ever er,, in sp spit ite e of it its s imp mpor orta tanc nce, e, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members memb ers of the House House of rep repres resenta entative tives s arises arises from a provis pro vision ion of the Con Consti stituti tution. on. Thi This s pro provis vision ion gra granti nting ng an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. Constitution. The member members s of Congress cannot compel abse ab sent nt me memb mber ers s to att atten end d se sessi ssion ons s if th the e re reas ason on fo forr the abs bsen ence ce is a leg egit itim imat ate e on one. e. Th The e co con nfi fin nem emen entt of a Con ongr gres essm sman an ch cha arg rged ed wit ith h a cr criime pu pun nis isha habl ble e by imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appella accused-appellant nt to attend congressional congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week willll vi wi virt rtua ualllly y mak make e hi him m a fr free ee ma man n wi with th al alll the pr priv ivilileg eges es
exprop ropria riatio tion n must be act actual ually ly RATIO RA TIO DECIDENDIS: The exp commenced in court ; The “taking” for purposes of determining the jut compensation to be paid must be reckoned from the date the complaint for eminent domain was filed; the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use of which it would bring most in the market; the report of the commissioners of appraisal are not binding but merely advisory in character as far as the court is concerned.
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CoFI on an earlier expropriation proceeding
FACTS:
Carmen Car men Vda. De Cas Castel telvi vi = admi adminis nistrat tratrix rix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castelvi She entered into a contract of lease with the Republic, renewa ren ewable ble on a yea year-t r-to-y o-year ear basis star startin ting g on Jul July y 1, 1947, of a parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Flor Fl orid idab abla lanc nca, a, Pa Pamp mpan anga ga.. On Ju June ne 30 30,, 19 1956 56 th the e Republic, before the expiration of the contract of lease, sought to renew the same but Carmen refused. When the •
UP Law SecC 2014 Constitutional Law 2 Digests
Philip Phil ippi pine ne Ai Airr Fo Forc rce e re refus fused ed to va vaca cate te th the e pr prop oper erty ty,, Carmen wrote the Chief of Staff of the AFP but to no avail. Carmen Car men the then n ins institu tituted ted an eje ejectme ctment nt cas case. e. Whi While le sai said d case cas e is pen pendin ding, g, the Rep Republ ublic ic fil filed ed thi this s exp exprop ropria riatio tion n proceedings for the possession of lands.
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 3 •
The Republic prayed for the pegging of the provisional value val ue of the land at P25 P259,6 9,600, 00, which the low lower er Cou Court rt grante gra nted. d. Car Carmen men and the oth other er int interv erveno enors, rs, such as Tole oledodo-Goz Gozun, un, fil filed ed the their ir sep separa arate te moti motion on to dis dismis miss s alleging that the fair market value is P15.00 per square meter and that the overall price should be approximately P11,389,485. The trial Court appointed 3 commissioners who submitted their recommendation that the lowest price for the lands should be P10.00 per square meter. The Regi Re gio ona nall Tri rial al Co Cou urt he heed eded ed th the e ad advi vice ce of th the e Commiss Com mission ioners ers and dec declar lared ed tha thatt P10 P10.00 .00 per squ square are meter is fair and just; thus this appeal.
3)
ISSUES: 1) 2)
W/n the the trial trial Court Court erred erred in setti setting ng the amoun amountt of just just compensation to P10 per square meter. W/n the the trial trial Court Court erred erred in holdin holding g that the the “takin “taking” g” of the prope properties rties under the expropriation expropriation commenc commenced ed with the filing of the action.
HELD: 1)
2)
4) 5)
Yes, the just just compen compensati sation on should shouldn’t n’t be comput computed ed on the basis of the prices in the year 1947 as the “taking” by th the e Sta State te of the proper property ty usi using ng the power power of eminent domain did not commence in 1947 but only upon the institution of this action. However, the report of the commissioners of appraisal are not binding but merely advisory in character as far as the court is concerned. The Court in this case ruled that P5 per square squ are mete meterr is the jus justt comp compens ensati ation, on, taki taking ng int into o consideration the recommendation of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal. No, th No, ther ere e ar are e 5 es esse sent ntia iall re requ quis isit ites es to co cons nsti titu tute te “taking” under the eminent domain, namely: pres esen entt in th the e (a)) mu (a must st en ente terr pr priv ivat ate e pr prop oper erty ty - pr inst in stan antt ca case se whe hen n by vi virt rtue ue of th the e lea ease se agre ag reeme ement nt th the e Re Repu publ blic ic,, vi via a th the e AF AFP P, too took k possession of the property of Castelvi. (b)) mu (b must st be for more more than a mo mome ment ntar ary y period period wanting in this case as the lease was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year and thus th us th ther eref efor ore e th the e en entr try y on th the e pr prop oper erty ty is temporary tempora ry and considered considered transitory transitory.. The AFP AFP claims that the real intention of the lessee (the Republic) was to occupy the land permanently. The Court held that the “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. If the intention of the lessee in 1947 was to really occupy the land permanently, why was the contract of lease entered into on a year-toyear ye ar ba basi sis? s? Wh Why y al also so di didn dn’t ’t th the e Re Repu publ blic ic expropriate the land in 1949 when it expropriated the other lands it occupied? Even if it really was the intention of the Republic to expropriate the land at some future time, mere or implied notice of an intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate t lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court. (c) Und Under er color color of legal autho authority rity – presen presentt because because the Rep Republ ublic ic ent entere ered d the Cas Castel telvi vi pro proper perty ty as lessee. (d)) Pr (d Prop ope ert rty y mu must st be de devo vote ted d to pu publ blic ic use or otherwise otherwi se informa informally lly appro appropriate priated d or injuri injuriously ously affected. – present because use by air force of the AFP AFP..
(e) Utiliz Utilizatio ation n of property property for publi public c use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all benefic beneficial ial enjoy enjoyment ment of the proper property ty Castelvi was not ousted or deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property because she was still the owner and the State still paid her rent. Therefore, the “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947. The Th e Co Cour urtt di did d no nott ac acce cept pt the Republ Republic ic’s ’s conte contenti ntion on that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time ceases upon the day fixed without a need of a demand (Art 1669, Civil Code) It cannot cannot also also be said, said, as the the Repub Republic lic’s ’s conte contenti ntion, on, that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. The owner owner of of the land land has has the right right to its its value value for the the use of which it would bring most in the market and thus it was appropriate that Castelvi showed that the land was suitable for division into village or town lots (the land was classified as residential and taxes were paid pai d bas based ed on suc such h cla classi ssific ficati ation, on, the loc locati ation on is suitable for a residential subdivision, plans to turn it into subdivision)
People vs Jalosjos G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago One-Liner: Romeo, who was convicted of rape and acts of lasciviousness, wants to discharge his duties as a congressman; SC said this can’t be so because it would be a mockery of the penal system. Facts: Facts: The accuse accused-a d-appe ppella llant, nt, Romeo Romeo Jalosj Jalosjos, os, is a fullfullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowe allowed d to discha discharge rge his duties duties as a Congre Congressm ssman, an, incl includ udin ing g atte attend nda ance nce at legis egisla lati tive ve sess sessio ions ns and and committee committee meetings meetings despite despite his having been convicted convicted of a non-bailable offense. His main argument is the "mandate of sovereign will", as the electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Cong Congre ress ssma man. n. He adds adds that that it cann cannot ot be defe defeat ated ed by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. He avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the HR, the latter urge urges s a co-e co-equ qual al bran branch ch of gove govern rnmen mentt to resp respec ectt his his manda mandate. te. He also also clai claims ms that that the conc concep eptt of tempo tempora rary ry detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mand mandat ate e and and that that he has has alw always ays comp compli lied ed with ith the the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. Issues: (1) Should Should he be allowed allowed to to discharge discharge mandate mandate as as member of House of Representatives? (NO) (2) Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
4 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 persons validly confined under law? (NO) other was used as their residence. In 1979, the government filed an expropriation case for the said land, but was dismissed Ratio: (1) Election is the expression of the sovereign power by the SC on the ground that the choice of area was arbitrary. of the people. However, in spite of its importance, In 1982, the land was auctioned off to the spouses Babiera and the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may spouses Sangalang since the De Knechts failed to pay their be enlarged or restricted by law. real estate taxes. Petitioners failed to pay within one year, so The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and both spouses filed a petition for registration as owners of the members members of the House House of repres representa entative tives s arises arises from a land which the court granted. Then both spouses sold the land provis provision ion of the Consti Constituti tution. on. This This provis provision ion granti granting ng an to Salem Investment Corporation (Salem). exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond On Febr Februa uary ry 17, 17, 1983 1983,, BP Blg Blg 340 340 was was passe passed d the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by authorizing the government to expropriate certain properties in intendment, implication or equitable considerations. Pasay for the EDSA extension, one of which is the assailed The accused-appellant has not given any reason why proper property ty.. The Knecht Knechts s filed filed a civil civil case case for reconv reconveya eyance nce,, he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI annu annulm lmen entt of tax tax sale sale,, and and titl titles es of the the Babi Babier eras as and and of the Constitution. Constitution. The members members of Congress cannot compel Sangalangs. Although the petitioners presented their evidence, abse absent nt memb member ers s to atten attend d sessi session ons s if the the reas reason on for for the they they faile failed d to atte attend nd the fina finall hear hearin ing, g, and and were were alway always s absen bsence ce is a legit egitim imat ate e one. one. The The con confin finemen ementt of a requesting for postponement. The court dismissed the court on Congr ongres essm sman an cha charged rged with ith a cri crime pun punisha ishabl ble e by the ground of “lack of interest”. The petition became final in imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by Febr Februa uary ry 1990 1990.. 3 months months later later,, the the gove govern rnmen mentt file filed d for law, it has constitutional foundations. determination of just compensation of lands in BP 340. The To allow accused-appella accused-appellant nt to attend congressional congressional tria triall cour courtt issu issued ed a writ writ of poss posses essi sion on,, and and 7 of the the De sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week Knechts’s houses were demolished. After, the trial court issued will will virt virtua ualllly y make make him him a free free man man with with all all the priv privilileg eges es an order fixing the compensation of all the lands, but didn’t appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only include the improvements. Because of this, the De Knechts elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it filed a motion for recovery of ownership and possession of the also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction property, and also a motion for intervention and to implead system. additional parties. The trial court dismissed their motion for When the voters of his district elected the him, they intervention after learning that they had no legal interest on the did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of property. action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve Issues: only such legislative results which he could accomplish within 1. WON the Knechts had a right to intervene over the subject the confines of prison. property in the civil case. 2. WON the case was an expropriation proceeding and not just (2) The performance of legitimate and even essential a case to determine just compensation. duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a Holding/Ratio: person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate 1. No. The petitioners are assailed that they didn’t know the tax of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts delinquency and subsequent proceedings until 1983, thus, they that that the duty to legisl legislate ate ranks highest highest in the hierarchy hierarchy of didn’t get to redeem the property after 1 year. But, the claim of gove govern rnmen ment. t. The The accu accuse sed-a d-app ppel ella lant nt is only only one one of 250 250 lack of notice is a factual question which has already been members members of the House of Representati Representatives, ves, not to mention the answere answered d by the trial court court and the CA. Res judica judicata ta has 24 membe members rs of the Sena Senate te,, char charge ged d with with the the dutie duties s of already set in. Since the lower courts dismissed the case for legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical lack of interest, without qualification that it is without prejudice, absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of the dismissal is regarded as an adjudication of merits and is a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification with prejudice. Even if they assail that they are not owners, but from those others who are validly restrained by law. were were stay stayin ing g in the the land land,, they they still still don’ don’tt have have a righ rightt to The election to the position of Congressman is not a intervene. In the absence of procedure in the law, reference is reason reasonabl able e classi classific ficatio ation n in crimina criminall law enforc enforcemen ement. t. The made in the provisions of eminent domain in Rule 67 in the func functi tion ons s and and duti duties es of the the offi office ce are are not not subs substa tant ntia iall Revise Revised d Rules Rules of Court. Court. The power power of eminen eminentt domain domain is dist distin inct ctio ions ns whic which h lift lift him him from from the the clas class s of pris prison oner ers s exercised by every person having an estate or interest at law inte interru rrupte pted d in thei theirr free freedo dom m and and restr restric icte ted d in libe liberty rty of or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the The Knechts lost whatever right or title they have over the land purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the after the Court dismissed the reconveyance case. They had no same class. legal legal intere interest st in the proper property ty by the time the exprop expropria riatio tion n Impriso Imprisonme nment nt is the restrai restraint nt of a man’s man’s person personal al proceedings were instituted. liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. As a punishment, it is 2. Yes. It was in the exercise of the state's power of eminent restra restraint int by judgme judgment nt of a court court or lawful lawful tribunal, tribunal, and is domain under B.P. B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriatio expropriation n proceedings proceedings personal to the accused. were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the proced procedure ure for exprop expropria riatio tion. n. The law merely merely descri described bed the De Knecht vs CA spec specif ific ic prop proper erti ties es expr exprop opri riat ated ed and and decl declar ared ed that that just just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated Ponente: Puno, J . the the then then Mini Ministr stry y of Publ Public ic Work Works s and and High Highwa ways ys as the the Nature: Review on Certiorari administrator in the "prosecution of the project."
Facts:
The case is a sequel to several suits started 20 years ago regarding land, owned by petitioners located in Pasay City. They constructed 8 houses, 7 of which were leased, and the
Note: Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 5 "Section 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint."
RD: In an expropriation case, any person with a legal interest of the land can file a complaint against the government, not only the owners of the land.
Republic vs Tagle December 2, 1998 Overview: The current case involves one of eminent domain. It focuses focu ses on the correct procedure required under Exec Executiv utive e Order No. 1035 specifically on whether an issuance of a writ of possession is proper when the land to be expropriated is already under the control of the government agency seeking to invoke eminent domain.
THE FACTS Executive Order No. 1035 – The EO was enacted to facilitate govern gov ernment ment acq acquis uisiti ition on of pri private vate property property to be use used d for infrastructure or other development projects. According to its Sectio Sec tion n 7, whe when n neg negoti otiati ations ons betw between een the par partie ties s fai fail, l, the gove go vern rnmen mentt ag agen ency cy in invo volv lved ed ha has s au auth thor ority ity to in inst stit itute ute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General. The courts shall give priority to these types of cases. The just compensation will be determined by P.D. 1533 and 10% of it shall be deposited. After which, a writ of possession should be executed within 5 days of the deposit. The cause stems from a dispute over 2 parcels of land in Dasmarinas Cavite which is 483,331 square meters owne ow ned d by He Hele lena na Z. Be Beni nite tez. z. (a (als lso o Ph Phililip ippi pine ne Wo Wome men’s n’s University I think but the case doesn’t explain their connection) In Se Sept ptem embe berr 19 1982 82,, th the e Go Gove vern rnme ment nt th thro roug ugh h Philippine Human Resour Philippine Resources ces Devel Development opment Center (PHRDC henc he ncefo eforth rth), ), un unde derr the Mi Mini nist stry ry of Hu Human man Se Settl ttlem emen ents, ts, coordi coo rdinat nated ed wit with h the Jap Japane anese se Int Intern ernati ationa onall Coo Cooper perati ation on Agency (JICA) to establish the ASEAN Human Resources Develo Dev elopmen pmentt Pro Projec jectt her here e in the country country. One of the main progra pro grams, ms, Prog Program ram III, aim aimed ed to esta establi blish sh a Con Constru structi ction on Manpower Development Center (now under the DTI). From here, it would be better to narrate the facts in bullets *March *Ma rch 30, 198 1983 3 – Memo Memoran randum dum of Agreement Agreement betw between een Benitez and PHRC is made providing for a 20 year lease or for Benitez to sell a portion (not less than 10 hectares) of the land to PHRDC. *September 22, 1983 – Benitez (together with PWU) granted permission to PHRDC to occupy and use the land. CMDF (under PHRDC) then proceeded to possess the property and develop the land.
*December 3, 1983 – PWU (only) entered *December entered into a contract of lease according to the memorandum agreement. The land to be leased is 10 hectares at 200,000 per annum with an option to renew it for a period not to exceed 20 years. *December 1984 – Benitez executed deed of donation in favor of PWU of the land. This means that when PWU entered into the lease agreement, it still had no right to and it was Benitez who owned the land, but this wasn’t a factor in the case. *January 1, 1988 – Lease expires, *January expires, negotiations negotiations begin for the purchase of the land by PHRDC. *Augus *Aug ustt 21 21,, 19 1989 89 – Be Beni nite tez z ad advi vise sed d PH PHRD RDC’s C’s ge gene nera rall manager to pursue the sale of the 7 hectare property for 70php per square meter. *Febru *Feb ruary ary 4, 19 1991 91 – Be Beni nite tez z co conf nfir irmed med th the e po posi siti tion on an and d willingness of the University to sell the land. *February 4 onwards – PHRDC prepared the necessary deed of sa sale le,, Be Beni nite tez z as ve vend ndor or an and d PH PHRD RDC C an and d CM CMDF DF as vendees. As of July 1, 1989, PHRDC stopped the payment of rentals because of the ongoing negotiations for purchase. August 15, 1995 – Benitez did not sign the deed of sale and on this date sent a letter demanding the payment of rentals and asked that CMDF leave the premises within 30 days. Later, Benitez filed a suit for unlawful detainer. Because of the failure of the negotiations, PHRDC and CMDF instituted a complaint for eminent domain under EO 1035. Following Section 2, Rule 67 of the ROC, they deposited the th e wh whol ole e am amou ount nt (n (not ot on only ly 10 10% % as re requ quir ired ed)) in PN PNB B amounting to 708,490. Then they filed for a motion for a writ of possession. The writ was granted and the sheriff was tasked to execute it, but upon motion for reconsideration by Benitez, the same judge overturned the previous issuance of the writ and quashed it. PHRDC and CMDF fi filled a mo mottion for reconsideration which was denied hence the current case.
ISSUE The sole issue is wheth whether er the judge judge,, by quashi quashing ng the writ of pos writ possess session ion that he him himsel selff all allowe owed, d, acte acted d in gra grave ve abuse of discretion.
HELD Yes, it the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
RATIO PHRD PH RDC C an and d CM CMDF DF we were re co corre rrectl ctly y fo follllow owin ing g the procedures for eminent domain and expropriation under EO 1035. 103 5. Whe When n neg negoti otiati ations ons fai failed led,, they filed a com compla plaint int for eminent domain and instituted expropriation proceedings. Then they deposited, not only 10%, but the whole amount. Then the proper writ of possession was issued. The judge in quashing the writ, has his basis only on the fact that writ of possessions are issued for those situations where the government agency still does not have possession of th the e la land nd.. Be Beca caus use e in th this is ca case se,, CM CMDF DF al alre read ady y ha had d possession of the land before the application for the writ, the judge deemed the writ unnecessary and will only be used by
6 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 CMDF as a defense against the ejectment suit. meters 400 php/ sq. meter. CA: affirmed the pricing The judge is wrong because in issuing a writ, the judge has only a ministerial duty and not a discretionary one. ISSUE: He has th the e DU DUTY TY to is issu sue e the writ writ if th the e ag agen ency cy al alre ready ady WON the pricing of the lands sought to be expropriated is just deposited at least 10%. If he were to be followed, the absurd situation would be CMDF would be ejected and then that’s HELD when they will be granted the writ of possession because then, NO. they would not already have possession. This would cause unnecessary suits, plus, the expropriation of property does not RATIO: only mean PHYSICAL occupation but also taking of title and Parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, rights. CMDF wanted to possess the land de facto and de jure. unde un deve velo lope ped, d, ra raw w ag agri ricu cult ltur ural al la land nd,, be bere reft ft of an any y improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other The judge also tried to invoke JM Tuason vs. CA and respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under Cuatico vs CA saying that the issuance of a writ possession operati ope ration on lan land d tra transf nsfer er of the Dep Depart artment ment of Agr Agrari arian an cannot defeat a case of ejectment. However, these cases are Reform. Ref orm. How Howeve everr, the lan land d has bee been n rere-cla classi ssified fied as nott ap no appl plic icab able le be beca caus use e th they ey on only ly do doct ctri rini nize zed d th that at th the e residential. The nature and character of the land at the government gover nment shoul should d provi provide de just compen compensation sation.. They never time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine said that an ejectment suit can defeat the state’s exercise of just compensation compensation to the landowner. landowner. eminent domain. the value of the land at 400 php/sq. meter, which was the sellllin se ing g pr pric ice e of lo lots ts in th the e ad adja jace cent nt ful fully ly de deve velo lope ped d subdivision (the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision). The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, Napocor vs Henson principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. PONENTE: J. Pardo
NATURE: Appeal for certiorari from CA’s decision ordering the Nati Na tion onal al Pow Power er Co Corp rpor orat atio ion n (N (NPC PC)) to pay re resp spon onden dents ts landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five parcels of of land FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) originally instituted with the Regi Re gion onal al Tri rial al Co Cour urt, t, Sa San n Fe Fern rnan ando do,, Pa Pamp mpan anga ga a complaint for eminent domain for the taking for public use us e of fi five ve pa parc rcel els s of la land nd,, ow owne ned d or cl clai aime med d by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. respondents respo ndents filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge petitioners right to condemn their property, but declared that th at the fa fair ir ma marke rkett va valu lue e of th thei eirr pr prop oper erty ty wa was s fro from m P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. TC: petitioner petitioner had a lawful right to take the prope property rty sought to be expropriated. expropriated. fixed the provis provisional ional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 sq. meters to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga (w/c petitioner in fact did). TC: issued issued a wri writt of pos possess session ion in favo favorr of pet petiti itione onerr. the court’s deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land. TC: gra grante nted d the motions motions of res respon ponden dents ts to wit withdra hdraw w the deposit made by petitioner of the provisional value of their property proper ty amount amounting ing to P5,831 P5,831,100.0 ,100.00, 0, with a balan balance ce of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commi co mmiss ssio ione ners rs to ai aid d th the e co cour urtt in th the e re rece cept ptio ion n of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property Commissioners recommended that the fair market value of the entire 63,220 square meters property should be: (a) 350 php/sq.. meter php/sq meter,, accord according ing to Commiss Commissioner ioner Tiglao Tiglao (b) 375 php/ sq. meter, according to Commissioner Atienza. (c ) 170 php/sq. meter, according to Commissioner Orocio. TC: fixed fixed the amount amount of just comp compens ensati ation on to be pai paid d by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square
DISPOSITION: SC pegged the price at 375 php/ sq. meter- w/c is in accord with Commissioner Atienza’s recommendation. ** “Just compensation” in Art III sec. 9 shall be interpreted to mean as the fair market value of the land based on its nature and character at the time of its taking.
Paranaque vs VM Realty Corporation July 20, 1998
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts:
Septe temb mbe er Parañaque
20, 1993- The (P) Municipality of filed a COM CO MPL PLA AIN INT T FOR EXPROPRIATION against (R) VM Realty Corporation over 2 parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,0 10 ,000 00 sq sq.. m. lo loca cated ted at Wa Waka kas, s, San Di Dion onis isio io,, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. a. Th This is comp compla lain intt is purs pursua uant nt to Sangguniang Bayan Bay an Re Reso solu luti tion on No No.. 93 93-9 -95, 5, s. 19 1993 93, authorizing the expropriation “for the purpose of all allevi eviati ating ng the liv living ing con condit dition ions s of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homel ho meles ess s th thro roug ugh h a so soci cial aliz ized ed ho hous usin ing g project.” b. The (P) (P) munici municipal pality ity also also alle alleged ged that that prio priorr to the filing of the complaint, it tried to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with the (R), but the latter did not accept the offer. Janu Ja nuar ary y 10 10,, 19 1994 94-- RT RTC C Ma Maka kati ti issu issued ed an ORDE ORDER R giving the complaint due course. Febr Fe brua uary ry 4, 19 1994 94-- RTC Makat Makatii is issu sued ed ANOT ANOTHE HER R ORDE OR DER R au auth thor oriz izin ing g (P (P)) mu muni nici cipa pali lity ty to ta take ke posses pos sessio sion n of the pro proper pertie ties s upo upon n dep deposi ositt wit with h its clerk of court of an equivalent to 15% of its fair market
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 7
value on its current tax declaration. a. Fe Febr brua uary ry 21, 21, 19 1994 94-- (R (R)) VM Re Real alty ty file filed d it its s ANSWER containing affirmative defenses and counterclaim, alleging: 1. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed on the basis of a resolution and not on an ordina ordinance, nce, as required by RA 7160 or the Local Government Code; 2. The cause of action, if any, was barred by res judicata or prior judgment. Its Answer was then treated as a Motion to Dismiss. b. Ma Marc rch h 24 24,, 19 1994 94-- (P (P)) mu muni nici cipa pali lity ty filed filed an OPPO OP POSI SITI TION ON st stre ress ssin ing g th that at th the e RT RTC C ORDE OR DER R of FE FEBR BRUA UARY RY 4, 19 1994 94 wa was s in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160 LGC, and that res judicata does not apply. apply. August 19, 1994- RTC DECI Nullif lified ied its DECISION SION:: Nul FEBRUA FEB RUARY RY 4, 199 1994 4 ORD ORDER, ER, and dis dismiss missed ed the expropriation case. (P) munic municipa ipalit lity y appeal appealed ed to CA, CA, stating stating the the follow following ing issues: a. WON the Resolution No. 93-95, s. 1993 of Parañaque Municipal Council is a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement of Section 19 of the LGC in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. b. WO WON N th the eir compl complai aint nt state states s no cause cause of action. c. WO WON N th the e st stri rict ct adh dher eren ence ce to th the e lit iter eral al cons co nstr truc ucti tion on of th the e LG LGC C re resu sult lted ed in technicality standing in the way of substantial justice (i.e. as it disallows the LGC from exercising of its power of eminent domain). d. WON the pri princi nciple ple of res res judic judicata ata appl applies ies.. CA DECISION: Affirmed RTC. Dismissed complaint. Also dismissed the MR filed by (P) municipality. Henc He nce e the appea appeall in SC. (P) munici municipa palility ty basic basical ally ly argu ar gues es th that at “o “ord rdin inan ance ce”” an and d “r “res esol olut utio ion” n” ar are e synonymous, such that it may validly expropriate (R) VM Realty’s properties with the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, s. 1993. SC says no, as
benefit of the poor and the landless… REQUISI REQ UISITES TES BEF BEFORE ORE AN LGU MA MAY Y EXER EXERCISE CISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: 1. An or ordi dina nanc nce e is en enac acte ted d by th the e lo loca call le legi gisl slat ativ ive e council authorizing the chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings. 2. The powe powerr of eminen eminentt domain domain is exer exercis cised ed for for public public use, purpose or welfare, of for the benefi benefitt of the poor and the landless. 3. The There re is paym payment ent of of just just compens compensati ation on per per Sec 9, 9, Art Art 3 of the 1987 Constitution. A valid and definite offer has been made previously to th the e ow own ner of th the e property so sou ught to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. b. c.
No com comp pli lian ance ce wit with h the the 1st requisite of an ordinance. (P) muni munici cipa palility ty cited cited the case case of Camar Camarin ines es Sur v. CA which states that a Resolution was enough for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. But this was decided under BP 337, the previous LGC, which provided that a resolution was enough. On the other hand, when this present case was instituted, RA 7160, the present LGC was already in effect and such requires an ordinance and not a resolution.
ORDINANCE
RESOLUTION
A law. law.
Merely a declaration of the sentim sent imen entt or op opin iniion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
Possesses Posses ses a gen genera erall and permanent character.
Temporary in nature.
Requires Requir es maj majori ority ty vot vote e of the members of the Sanngunian members.
A third reading is necessary. necessary.
Issues: 1.
2.
WON WO N a re reso solu luti tion on duly duly approv approved ed by the munic municip ipal al council has the same force and effect as an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. WON the the princ principl iple e of res judi judicata cata appl applies ies when when publi public c interest is primarily involved.
Held/ Ratio: 1.
No, a reso resolut lution ion is is differe different nt from from an ordin ordinanc ance. e. a. Th The e power power of emin eminen entt do doma main in is lodg lodged ed in the leg legisl islati ative ve bra branch nch of the gov govern ernmen ment, t, which may delegate its exercise thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and utilities. Therefore, the LGU may only exercise such power subject to the legislature’s control, as embodied in the statute it enacted for this purpose, that is, the LGC particularly Sec 19, which whi ch spe specif cifica ically lly states the nee need d for an ordinance. Local Government Code Sec 19. Emi Eminen nentt Dom Domain ain.. A loc local al gov govern ernment ment uni unitt may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordi exerci rcise se the pow power er of emin eminent ent ordinance nance exe domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
d. e.
f.
g. h.
If Congr Congress ess int intend ended ed a mer mere e resol resoluti ution on to to be enough enou gh,, it co coul uld d ju just st ha have ve ad adop opted ted th the e language of the previous law. The Th e po powe werr of emine eminent nt do doma main in neces necessa sari rily ly involv inv olves es a del delega egatio tion n of a fund fundame amental ntal or private right of the people. Accordingly, the change in the legislative language from the previous requirement of a “resolution” to an “ordinance” demands strict construction. (P)) reli (P relied on the the IRR wh whic ich h al allo low ws fo forr the use of a resolution to exercise the power, but necessarily, the statute, i.e. the LGC itself, prevails over the IRR. By dec deciding th thiis way ay,, th the e SC does not diminish the power of the LGUs, but it merely upholds the law as worded in the LGC. The pow power er of of eminen eminentt domain domain gra grante nted d to the
8 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 LGUs LG Us is in re real alit ity y “i “inf nfer erio ior” r” as it mu must st 2. Co Compe mpellllin ing g reas reason ons s must must exi exist st conform to the limits imposed by the national 3. Th Ther ere e are are heino heinous us crim crimes es inv invol olve ved d legislature. i. He Henc nce, e, the the co comp mpllai aint nt stat states es no caus cause e of *Heinous crimes (as defined in RA 7659): Act or series of acts, action as it was based on a mere resolution. by the fl flag agra rant ntly ly vi viol olen entt man manne nerr in wh whic ich h the sa same me wa was s The allegation of the (P) municipality that an committed committe d or by the reason of its inher inherent ent viciousness, viciousness, shows ordi or dina nanc nce e wa was s su subs bseq eque uent ntly ly pa pass ssed ed on a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and October 11, 1994 embodying the contents of order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and the resolutio resolution n was not pro proven ven,, and such inhe in here rent nt vi vici ciou ousn snes ess s an and d at atro roci city ty ar are e re repu pugn gnan antt an and d does not cure the defect of the complaint outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shook the moral filed earlier on September 3, 1993. self of a people.
2.
No, the the power power of emine eminent nt domain domain is not not barre barred d by res res judicata. a. Th The e ri righ ghtt to exer exerci cise se the the po pow wer must must be abso ab solu lute te an and d un unfet fetter tered ed ev even en by a pr prio ior r judgment. The scope of eminent domain is plenary plena ry,, and like polic police e power power,, can “reach every form of prope property rty which the state might need for public use. b. Pr Prin inci cipl ple e of res judi judica cata ta howev however er may appl apply y to sp spec ecifi ific c is issu sued ed de deci cide ded d in a pr prev evio ious us case, such as the issue of WON the power may ma y be exercised on the basis of a resolution.
ISSUES: 1.
2.
WON the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment 3. WO WON N th the e de deat ath h pe pena nalt lty y is a cr crue uel, l, inhu inhuma man n or degr de grad adin ing g pu puni nish shme ment nt fo forr th the e cr crim ime e of ra rape pe mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. HELD: 1. No. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the th e in inte tegr grity ity and th the e sa sanc nctit tity y of hi his s or he herr ow own n physical body and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences prefere nces and needs needs.. Howeve However, r, the elemen elements ts of heinou hei nousne sness ss and com compul pulsio sion n are ins insepa eparab rable le and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and con conseq sequen uences ces so des destru tructi ctive, ve, des destab tabili ilizin zing, g, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our sociopolilitic po tical al an and d ec econ onom omic ic ag agen enda da as a de deve velo lopi ping ng nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether altoge ther eradicated. eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.
Judgment: Denied without prejudice to municipality’s right to properly exercise the power over the same property.
Section 19
Cruel and Unusual Punishment People vs Echegaray February 7, 1997 En Banc Motion for Reconsideration
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article III, Section 19, shall be understood as having vested the Congress with the power to re-impose the death de ath pe pena nalty lty su subj bjec ectt to a cl clea earr sh show owin ing g of “compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.” *in bold are those that are related to the topic FACTS: Leo Echegaray was convicted for having raped his ten year old daughter in 1996 and was thereafter sentenced to death under RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law). He appealed and gave the following reasons. I.
II.. II
Mixe Mi xed d fa factu ctual al an and d leg legal al ma matte tters rs a. He was was al alre read ady y pa pard rdon oned ed by the offe offend nded ed party and her mother b. Th The e dates dates of the the commi commissi ssion on of crim crimes es was was unclear , resulted to inadequate defense c. Gui Guilt lt not not prov proved ed bey beyond ond rea reason sonabl able e doubt doubt d. He was was not the the fathe fatherr of the offe offend nded ed party party,, therefore death was not the proper sentence e. Tri rial al cou court rt was was bia biase sed d and and unfai unfair r Inco In comp mpet eten entt cou couns nsel el
III. RA 7659 is uncons unconstituti titutional onal per se: a. Of Offe fens nse e did did not not resu result lt to to deat death h b. Dea Death th pena penalty lty is crue cruell and and unusu unusual al It was stated in this case that the criteria for death penalty are the following: 1. Con Congre gress ss must must prov provide ide for the rei reimpos mpositi ition on
WON WO N the death penalty was imp mpo osed without compelling reasons
2.
No. Article III, Section 19 states, "Excessiv "Exces sive e fin fines es sha shallll not be impo imposed sed,, nor cru cruel, el, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shal sh alll de deat ath h pe pena nalt lty y be im impo pose sed, d, un unle less ss,, fo for r compelling compel ling reasons invol involving ving heinous crimes crimes,, the Congre Con gress ss her hereaft eafter er pro provid vides es for it. Any dea death th pena pe nalt lty y al alre read ady y im impo pose sed d sh shal alll be re redu duce ced d to reclusion perpetua." The SC in explaining its denial cited a string of American jurisprudence to outline similar cases as the one at bar. It said that in Furman, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court nullified nullified all discretionary discretionary death penalty pen alty statutes, statutes, it did so bec becaus ause e the dis discre cretio tion n which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parame par ameters ters,, gui guidel deline ines, s, or sta standa ndards rds int intend ended ed to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries. Furma Fu rman, n, th thus us,, di did d no nott ou outl tlaw aw th the e de deat ath h pe pena nalty lty because it was cruel and unusual per se. Consequently Conseq uently,, in the aftermath of Furman Furman,, when most of the stat states es rere-ena enacted cted their dea death th pen penalt alty y
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 9 statutes statute s now bea bearin ring g the pro proced cedura urall che checks cks tha thatt were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affir af firmed med th the e co cons nsti titut tutio iona nalility ty of the new de deat ath h penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, Jurek v. Texas, Texas, and Profitt v. Florida. 3. No. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, ey e, a to toot oth h fo forr a to toot oth" h".. Th The e de death ath penal penalty ty is imposed impose d in heinous crimes becaus because e the perpetrators perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that th at ha have ve so de deep eply ly de dehu human maniz ized ed a pe pers rson on or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be per permane manently ntly prevente prevented d fro from m doi doing ng so. Sho Short rt of homicide, it is the “ultimate violation of self.”
Echegaray vs Secretary 19 JANUARY 1999
PUNO, J. EN BANC On 4 Jan 1990, Court issued a TRO restraining execution of Echegaray. Echegaray filed TRO on 28 Dec 1998 on these grounds: (1) his execution has been set on 4 Jan 1990, the first working day of 1999 (2) members members of Con Congre gress ss had eit either her sought for exe executi cutive ve clemency and/or review or repeal law on capital punishment. The Court had to resolve whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law were mere speculations or not. The Court granted TRO noting that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading unde un derr oa oath th an and d we were re wi wide dely ly pu publ blic iciz ized ed in the pr prin intt an and d broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Cong Co ngre ress ss is a ne new w Co Cong ngre ress ss an and d ha has s no le less ss th than an on one e hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment punis hment are still unexpressed. unexpressed. The presen presentt Congre Congress ss is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). Public respondents submitted an urgent MR contending that: 1. Exe Executi cution on of final final and and execu executory tory judg judgeme ements nts is unde under r executive authority. TRO trenches on the sphere of executive authority authorit y. 2. TRO creat creates es danger dangerous ous prece preceden dent. t. Endless Endless litig litigatio ation n because there is always a possibility of a repeal of law by Congress. 3. Con Congre gress ss had alre already ady fully fully deba debated ted on on death death penal penalty ty bill. 4. TRO wen wentt beyond beyond pow power er of jud judici icial al revi review ew.. 5. Su Supe perv rven enin ing g ev even ents ts making making death death penal penalty ty repea repeall or modification nil: Pres Pr es.. Estra Estrada da an anno noun unci cing ng he wo woul uld d veto veto an any y law la w im impo posi sing ng de deat ath h pe pena nalty lty for he hein inou ous s crimes Resolution of Cong. Golez (with 113 congressmen) that they are against repeal Sen. Se n. Roc Roco’ o’s s reso resolu luti tion on to to rep repea eall only only has has his his
and Sen. Pimentel’s signature. I. Did Court los lose e jur jurisd isdict iction ion ove overr the cas case e sin since ce fin final al judgments can no longer be altered? altered?
No, the Court is not even changing its final decision. Rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. What the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpos purpose e of enforce enforcement ment of judgme judgment; nt; the latter terminates terminates when the judgment becomes becomes final. The partic par ticula ulars rs of the exe execut cution ion its itself elf,, whi which ch are cer certai tainly nly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while whi le the executi executive ve has no pow power er ove overr the person person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. Supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. II. Has the Court in effect granted a reprieve which Is an exec ex ecut utiv ive e fu func ncti tion on? ? (S (Sec ecti tion on 19 19,, Ar Arti ticl cle e VII VII of th the e Constitution)
The e pr prov ovis isio ion n is si simp mply ly th the e so sour urce ce of pow power er of th the e No. Th President to grant reprieves, President reprieves, commutat commutations, ions, and pardo pardons ns and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction conviction by final judgment. judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted
as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has bee been n con convic victed ted by fin final al jud judgme gment nt stil stilll pos posses sesses ses collllate co atera rall ri righ ghts ts an and d th thes ese e ri righ ghts ts can be cl clai aime med d in th the e appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity insanity.. III. Has III. Hasn’t n’t Con Congre gress ss mad made e cle clear ar its dis dispos positi ition on not to review/repeal/modify review/repeal/mo dify capital punishment?
Yes. The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue iss ue whe whethe therr Con Congre gress ss is dis dispos posed ed to rev review iew cap capita itall punishment. The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999 (House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty penal ty,, notifyi notifying ng the Senate Senate,, the Judiciary and the Executive
10 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Department of the position of the House of Representative on Part III this thi s matt matter er and urging urging the Presiden Presidentt to exh exhaus austt all means under und er the law to imm immedi ediate ately ly imp imple lement ment the dea death th pen penalty alty law.") House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the Relevant Constitutional Provisions prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it Freedom of Speech, Expression, Assembly has served its legal and humanitarian purpose. Article III, Sec. 4 Article XIV, Secs. 6, 7, 9 HELD: COURT GRANTS URGENT MOTION FOR RECON
Freedom of Expression, Association Association and Cognate Rights
AND LIFTS TRO. SEPARATE SEPARA TE OPINIONS: Vitug, J. concurs with the lifting of TRO but urges Congress to revi re view ew th the e la law w un unti till it co comp mpli lies es wi with th th the e st stan anda dard rds s of Constitution : 1. there must be compelling reasons to justify imposition of death penalty 2. capital offense must involve a heinous crime Panganiban, J. cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, to him, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent.
Freedom of Religion Article III, Sec. 5
Culture Article XIV, Secs. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Article XVI, Sec. 12 Article II, Sec. 17
Right to Information Article II, Sec. 28 Article III, Sec. 7 Article XVI, Sec. 10, 11
Participation Article II, Sec. 1 Article V, Sec. 1 Article VI, Sec. 1 Article XIII, Secs. 15, 16 Article XVII, Sec. 1, 2 Article II, Sec. 22
Right to Education Article XIV, Secs. 1, 5 (3)
Right to Privacy Article III, Secs. 2, 3
Due Process and Equality Article III, Sec. 1 Article XIII, Sec. 1 Article II, Sec. 9, 10, 14
Purposes
Arrive at truth and debate on public issues Orfanel vs People Doctrine: Freedom of speech is not absolute. Otherwise it would be an excuse for anyone to implicate individuals, for the attainm atta inment ent of pri privat vate, e, sel selfish fish and vin vindic dictive tive end ends, s, the thereby reby hampering the operation of the Government with administrative investigatio invest igations ns of charge charges s withou withoutt any semblance of truth, and with wit h no other pro probab bable le eff effect ect than the harrassme harrassment nt of the office off icerr or emp employ loyee ee con concer cerned ned,, to the detr detrime iment nt of pub public lic service and public order.
Facts:
Jesus Balles Jesus Ballestero teros s (compla (complaina inant) nt) is is an emplo employee yee of of the Bureau of Printing Godo Go dofre fredo do Orfan Orfanel el (defen (defenda dant nt and secon second d cousin cousin of Jesus) Jes us) wrote a let letter ter to the Director Director of Bur Bureau eau of Printing Godo Go dofr fred edo’ o’s s le lett tter er says says th that at Je Jesu sus s an and d tw two o ot othe her r
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 11
employees employe es of the Bureau has, eve every ry nig night, ht, bee been n printing printi ng Christm Christmas as cards, wedding invitation cards, term te rm pa pape pers rs for co colllleg ege e stu stude dents nts,, et etc. c. us usin ing g the properties and facilities of the Bureau of Printing and appr ap prop opri riat atin ing g th the e mo mone ney y de deri rive ved d fr from om su such ch fo for r personal use; that Jesus has sold wedding cards to one Artemio Holgado; that he (Godofredo) has himself a copy of the cards which will serve as evidence; that with such racket, Jesus was able to bought a lot in Las Piñas and a coconut plantation in Quezon, and he now has a fat bank account in a bank in Manila; that he (Godofredo) can furnish more information to assist in the investigation; and that he (Godofredo) wishes to hold these information strictly confidential and his identity be withheld Godofre God ofredo do has has also also sent sent the the letter letter to to the Sec Secret retary ary of of General Services The office recomm mme ended to th the e Civil Service Commi Co mmiss ssio ion n th that at the ch char arge ges s ag agai ains nstt Je Jesu sus s be dismissed for being groundless Jesu Je sus s th then en comme commenc nced ed a cr crim imin inal al actio action n fo forr li libe bell against Godofredo CFI: CF I: con convi vict cted ed God Godof ofre redo do CA:: af CA affir firmed med th the e co conv nvic icti tion on
3.
Issues: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
WON WO N the letter letter is a pr priv ivilileg eged ed commun communic icati ation on which which whould whou ld ex exemp emptt th the e au auth thor or the there reof of fr from om cr crim imin inal al responsibility WON WO N Go Godo dofr fred edo’ o’s s co conv nvic icti tion on is me mere rely ly ba base sed d on presumption of malice WON the the letter letter merely merely cont contain ained ed an opini opinion on or belie belief f for which Godofredo incurred no criminal liabillity WON WO N the failu failure re of the defen defense se to prese present nt Arte Artemio mio Holg Ho lgad ado o as a wi witn tnes ess s sh shou ould ld be ta taken ken ag agai ains nstt Godofredo WON WO N there there really really has been been publi publica cati tion on of the lette letter r was only addre addressed ssed to no other than than the Director Director of Printing
Held and Ratio: 1.
No Privilileg Priv eged ed commun communic icat atio ion n may eithe eitherr be absolu absolute tely ly privileged or conditionally privileged. A communication is sa said id to be ab abso solu lute tely ly pr priv ivilileg eged ed wh when en it is no nott actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are tho those se whi which, ch, alt althou hough gh con contai tainin ning g def defama amatory tory imputat imp utation ions, s, wou would ld not be acti actiona onable ble unl unless ess mad made e with malice or bad faith. There is malice when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed In this this ca case se,, th the e le lett tter er is a qu qual alif ifie iedl dly y pr priv ivil ileg eged ed communication, pursuant to Article 354 of the Revised Pena Pe nall Co Code de:: “Ev Ever ery y de defa fama mato tory ry im impu puta tati tion on is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown...” 2. No God Godofre ofredo' do's s testimon testimony y about about his alle alleged ged good good fait faith h is untenable: (1) The imputations contained in his letter appear to be absolutely groundless – he did not even try to prove his allegations, he did not present Artemio Holgado, any copy of the alleged cards, and he did not substantiate his claims of Jesus’ buying lot and planta pla ntation tion and hav having ing a fat bank acc accoun ount; t; and (2)
4.
5.
Godofre Godo fredo do ap appe pear ars s to be ac actua tuate ted d by ma malilice ce in send se ndin ing g th the e le lette tterr by way of re reve veng nge e to Je Jesu sus' s' mother's filing of a civil action against Godofredo’s wife for the recovery of a parcel of land Also, Als o, he shou should ld have have name named d the two othe otherr employ employees ees involved in the alleged racket and not just Jesus only No Defe De fend ndan antt co conv nvey eyed ed the im impr pres essi sion on that that he had eviden evi dence ce to sub substa stanti ntiate ate the cha charge rges s mad made e in the letter To escape escape criminal criminal respo responsi nsibil bility ity for libel libel or slande slanderr, it is not enough for the party who writes a defamatory communication to another to say that what he (the writer) expresses is no more than his opinion or belief. The communication must be made in the performance of a "legal, moral, or social duty." Godofredo has no such su ch du duty ty to co conv nvey ey hi his s op opin inio ion n or be belilief ef ab abou outt complainant's moral fiber to the Director of Printing or the Secretary of Gener General al Services. Moreover, Moreover, he has no reasonable ground to have the court believe that Jesu Je sus s is on one e of th thos ose e un unfi fitt me memb mber ers s of th the e government. Godofredo has no legal right, much less less duty, to gossip, or foster the circulation of rumors, or jump at conclusions, and more so if they are gratuitous or groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of spee sp eech ch,, whi hich ch is gu guar aran ante teed ed wit ith h a vi view ew to stren str engt gthe heni ning ng ou ourr de democ mocra rati tic c in insti stitut tutio ions ns an and d promoting the general welfare, would be a convenient excuse exc use for the har harras rassmen smentt of of office ficers rs or peo people ple concer con cerned ned,, to the det detrime riment nt of pub public lic ser servic vice e and public order. Yes He shoul should d ha have ve known known that that Ho Holg lgad ado' o's s te test stim imon ony y would have been the best proof. His failure, not only to introduce said testimony, but also, to explain why he did not do so, necessarily weakened his defense. Yes Defend Def endant ant had, had, likew likewise ise,, sent sent a copy copy to the the Secreta Secretary ry of Gen Genera erall Ser Servic vices. es. Mor Moreov eover er,, con consid sideri ering ng tha thatt Godofredo had explicitly asked an investigation, it is obvious that the reading of the letter by other persons othe ot herr th than an th the e to wh whom om th the e le lett tter er is or orig igin inal ally ly addres add ressed sed was pre precis cisely ely wha whatt the def defend endant ant had envisa env isaged ged and sou sought ght.. Even Even,, how however ever,, if no oth other er person per son than the Director Director of Pri Printi nting, ng, to who whom m the letter was addressed, had read it, still such fact is sufficient publication, for purposes of libel, for he is a third thi rd per person son as reg regard ards s its writer writer and the per person son defamed. defa med. Ind Indeed eed,, "(a "(a)) lib libel el is 'pu 'publi blishe shed' d' not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person" than its author and the offended party.
In Re Emil P. Jurado Telephone Company (PLDT) Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER MATTER in the Supreme Court. Nature: ADMINISTRATIVE Contempt.
PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J. reso solv lve e the is issu sue e ra rais ised ed by th thes ese e fa facts cts,, DOCTRINE: To re application of fairly elementary and self-evident postulates is all that is needed, these being: (1) that the utterance or publication by a person of falsehood or
12 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 half-tr hal f-truth uths, s, or of sla slante nted d or dis distor torted ted ver versio sions ns of fac facts ts or Seve Se ven” n” gro roup up.. “Wh When en la lawy wyer ers s sp spea eak k of th the e accusations which he made no bona fide effort previously to Magnificent Seven one has to make sure which group verify, and which he does not or disdains to prove, cannot be they are referri referring ng to. Makati Makati’s ’s Magnificent Magnificent Seven are justified as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and a bunch of Makati RTC judges who fix drug-related of the press guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be cases. The Magnificent Seven in the SC consists of a dee eeme med d an ac acti tivi vity ty sh shie iellde ded d fr fro om sa sanc ncti tion on by th that at group of justices who vote as one. constitutional guaranty; 3. Oct 21, 21, 1992: 1992: he he dubbed dubbed anoth another er group group as the the “Dirty “Dirty (2) that such utterance or publication is also violative of "The Dozen” “These judges, I am told, are not satisfied Phililip Ph ippi pine ne Jou Journ rnal alis ist' t's s Co Code de of Et Ethi hics cs"" wh whic ich, h, int with accepting bribes; they actually sell their decisions inter er ali alia, a, commands the journalist to "scrupulously report and interpret to the litigant litigants s tha thatt off offer er the larger larger bri bribe. be. Each of the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to these th ese ju judg dges es re repo porte rtedly dly ha has s go go-b -betw etwee eens ns wh who o distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis," and makes approach the litigants and solicit their bids for what is it his duty "to air the other side and to correct substantive clea cl earl rly y an au auct ctio ion n for th the e ju judg dge’ e’s s de deci cisi sion on.” .” errors promptly;" According to him, the Dirty Dozen is the most corrupt. (3) that such an utterance or publication, when it is offensive to MultiMul ti-nat nation ionals als and fin financ ancing ing ins institu titutio tions ns exp explic licitly itly the dignity and reputation of a Court or of the judge presiding stip st ipul ulat ate e in th thei eirr ag agre reem emen ents ts th that at li liti tiga gati tion on in over it or degrades or tends to place the courts in disrepute connection with their contracts may be held anywhere and dis disgra grace ce or oth otherw erwise ise to deb debase ase the adm admini inistra stratio tion n of in Metro Manila except in Makati; and lawyers confirm justice, constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such that Makati judges are the most corrupt. after due proceedings; and 4. Nov 9, 1992 column mn:: he wro rote te about a former (4) tha thatt pre presci scindi nding ng fro from m the obv obviou ious s pro propos positi ition on tha thatt any appellate justice who holds office at a restaurant near aggrieved party may file a complaint to declare the utterer or the CA building and is known as the contact man of writer wri ter in con contemp tempt, t, the ini initia tiatio tion n of app approp ropria riate te con contemp temptt five CA divisions. Jan 29, 1993 column: he referred procee pro ceedin dings gs aga agains instt the latter by the court is not only its to the same CA justice as being “known for fixing prerogative but indeed its duty, imposed by the overmastering cases for 5 CA divisions for a fee. And if the price is need to preserve and protect its authority and the integrity, right, the lawyer of the litigant paying can even write independence and dignity of the nation's judicial system. his own decision using a CA justice as a ponente. This Thi s exex-jus justic tice e hol holds ds cou court rt at the mezzanine mezzanine of a restau res tauran rantt own owned ed by the wi wife fe of a for former mer Marcos FACTS: Em Emil ilia iano no P. P. Ju Jura rado do is a jo jour urna nali list st who who wr writ ites es in a cabinet member, and which has become a meeting news ne wspa pape perr of ge gene nera rall ci circu rcula lati tion on,, th the e “M “Man anilila a place pla ce for jud judges ges,, CA jus justic tices, es, pra practic cticing ing law lawyer yers, s, Standa Sta ndard. rd.”” His col column umn is enti entitle tled d “Op “Opini inion” on” he prosec pro secuto utors rs and even SC jus justice tices. s. The former CA describes descri bes himself as a column columnist ist who “incid “incidental entally ly justice also has his own Chinese contact. hap ha ppe pens ns to be a la lawy wyer er,” ,” ins nsis isti ting ng th that at hi his s 5. Mar March ch 24, 24, 1993 1993 column column:: he claim claimed ed that that one one can get get membership in the law profession does not, in any a TRO from a RTC in Metro Manila by paying the way, affect his occupation as a newspaperman. judge anywhere between 30K and 50K. Ju Jura rado do had been writi writing ng about about al alle lege ged d im impr prop opri riet etie ies s Other columns: and irregularities in the judiciary over several months a) A polic police e report report from from the South South Capita Capitall Command Command that that (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). 8 Makati judges were paid for decisions favoring drug Th The e Chief Chief Just Justic ice e issue issued d AO 1111-93 93 “Creating an Ad traffickers and other big-time criminals b) The Equit Equitabl able e Banking Banking Corpor Corporati ation on (Ermita (Ermita branc branch) h) Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption had hosted a lunch at its penthouse mainly for some in the Judiciary” o Th The e ad ad hoc hoc commi committe ttee e is co comp mpos osed ed of of Chie Chief f justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners Justice Jus tice Andres Andres R. Nar Narvas vasa, a, as cha chairm irman, an, c) Th The e lady lady secre secreta tary ry of an RTC RTC Judge Judge in Maka Makati ti who who and form former er Jus Justic tices es Hon Hon.. Lor Lorenz enzo o Rel Relova ova allegedly makes sure, for a fee of 10K or more, that a and Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as case is raffled off to a Judge who will be “extremely members. sympathetic” and can arrange to have the Court issue o Th The e commi committ ttee ee shal shalll seek seek to ascer ascerta tain in the the attachments or injunctions for a service fee of 1% truth respecting reports and statements as over ov er an and d ab abov ove e th the e re regu gula larr pr pre emi mium um of th the e regards corruption in the judiciary, and shall attachme atta chment nt or inj injunc unctio tion n bon bond; d; a Chi Chines nese-F e-Fili ilipin pino o inte in terv rvie iew w at cl clos osed ed-d -doo oorr se sess ssio ions ns or businessman busine ssman who paid this “miracle worker” worker” 300k on otherwise, such persons as may appear to it top of the regular premium on the to have some knowledge of the matter and attachment/injunction bond. who may be appealed to share th tha at d) Exe Exec c Judge Judge de la la Rosa Rosa violat violated ed the the rule rule that that no case case knowled know ledge ge wit with h the Cou Court, rt, and othe otherwi rwise se may be assigned in multi-sala courts without a raffle. gather such evidence as may be available. e) The secr secreta etary ry of the Judi Judicia ciall and Bar Bar Counc Councilil (JBC), (JBC), o Th The e commi committe ttee e shal shalll subm submit it its its repo report rt to the the had supposedly gotten that body to nominate him to Court within 30 days. the CA; and a son and a nephew of JBC members, who were also nominated to the CA, contrary to ethics JURADO’S PUBLISHED STA STATEMENTS TEMENTS (1992-Feb 1993) and delicadeza 1. October 21, 1992 column: he wrote of the f) Ha Havi ving ng a relat relativ ive e in the JBC JBC or SC, or havi havin ng a “Magnificent Seven” RTC judges who have become powerful politician as sponsor, is a major determinant so no noto tori riou ous s in th thei eirr de deal alin ings gs wi with th liliti tiga gant nts s an and d of pro promoti motion; on; and that nomi nominati nation on of some worthy lawy la wyer ers, s, an and d th that at it ha has s co come me to a po poin intt wh wher ere e individuals was blocked because they incurred the ire lawyers and litigants try their darndest to stay away of the powers that be (Judge Maximiano Asuncion, from these judges. QC RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely identified with 2. Fe Feb b 3, 19 1993 93 co colu lumn mn:: ab abou outt an anot othe herr “M “Mag agni nifi fice cent nt former Senate Pres Salonga
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 13 EVENTS DIRECTLY GIVING RISE TO THE PROCEEDING AT BAR Th The e se seed ed of th the e pr proc ocee eedi ding ng at ba bar: r: the so-c so-cal alle led d contro con trover versia siall cas case e of “Ph “Phili ilippi ppine ne Lon Long g Dis Distan tance ce Tel elep epho hone ne Comp Co mpan any y v. East Ea ster ern n Tel elep epho hone ne Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)” . The vote was 9 to 4 in favor of PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote the opinion of the majority, In conne connect ctio ion n wi with th th the e ca case se,, th the e Ph Phil ilip ippi pine ne Da Dail ily y Inquirer along with 2 other newspapers published a report of the affidavit of a linguistics expert, Mr. Davild Miles Mil es Yerke erkes. s. He has bee been n com commis missio sioned ned by the ETPI to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay to ascertain if the decision had been writ wr itte ten n by th the e la latte tterr. Yer erkes kes co conc nclu lude ded d th that at th the e Gutierrez decision “looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT’s counsel.” The Yerke kes s reve vellati tio ons spaw awn ned mo morre public discussion and comment about the judiciary and the SC.. Th SC Ther ere e wer ere e ca call lls s fo forr imp mpea each chme ment nt an and d resignation. There were derogatory statements about the jud judici iciary ary.. The ter term m “Ho “Hoodl odlums ums in Rob Robes” es” was coined. At about this time and under these
circumstances, circumstan ces, Jurado wrote in his colu column mn on Feb Fe b 8, 19 1993 93,, “W “Who ho wi will ll ju judg dge e th the e Ju Just stic ices es?” ?” referring among other things to a report that six justices, their spouses, children, and grandchildren (36 total) spent a vacation in Hong Kong Ko ng so some me ti time me la last st ye year ar an and d th that at al alll th thei eir r expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm, this gave
rise to the proceeding at bar On Febr Februa uary ry 10, 10, 1993, 1993, Mr. Mr. Vicen Vicente te R. Samso Samson, n, Firs Firstt Vice President of the PLDT, addressed a letter to the Chief Chi ef Just Justice ice,, sub submitt mitting ing his swo sworn rn stat statemen ementt in confuta con futatio tion n of the ite item m in the col column umn of Mr Mr.. Emi Emill Jurado Jur ado of the Manila Manila Stan Standar dard d on a vac vacati ation on trip supposedly taken by six Justices with their families last la st ye year ar,, an and d re requ ques esti ting ng th that at th the e Co Cour urtt ta take ke appropriate actions. o PL PLDT DT dec decla lare res s that that itit is not not the the pub publilic c utili utility ty firm referred to in the Jurado column. It has never paid for the Hong Kong trip, hotel or other accommodations for any justice of the SC or his family during their vacation. It is not even aware that any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred to in the Jurado column. o Ne Neit ithe herr Atty Atty Emi Emill Jura Jurado do nor nor any any one one in in his his behalf has ever spoken to any responsible officer of PLDT about the matter. o PL PLDT DT den denie ies s that that it had had ever ever tal talke ked d to or made arrangements with any travel agency or any person or entity in connection with any such all allege eged d tri trip p of the Justices Justices and their families to HongKong, much less paid anything anythi ng therefore to such agencies, agencies, f ully or in part, in the year 1992. o Th The e trav travel el age agenc ncie ies s whic which h PLDT PLDT pat patro roniz nizes es are Phi Philwa lway y Trav ravel el Cor Corpor porati ation on and Cit CitiiWorld Wor ld Tr Trave avell Mar Martt Cor Corp. p. No rec record ords s from these travel agencies bear out the fact that
arrangement arrange ments s wer were e mad made e by the them m at the instance of the PDLT for the trip referred to in the Jurado column. Atty.. Willia Atty William m Veto, Veto, the in-ho in-house use couns counsel el of Equit Equitabl able e Banking Corporation since 1958, deposed that on Jan 5, 1993 he had hosted a lunch party at the Officers’ Loun Lo unge ge,, 7th Fl Floo oorr of th the e Eq Equi uita tab ble Ba Bank nkin ing g Corp Co rpor orat atio ion n Bu Builildi ding ng,, Er Ermi mita ta Bra Branc nch h up upon on pr prio ior r permission obtained; that the expenses paid for said party were exclusively from his personal funds and the food was prepared in his house by his wife and served by his house help and 4 waiters hired from the near ne arby by Bar Barri rio o Fi Fies esta ta re resta staur uran ant; t; th that at am amon ong g the invited guests were members of the SC and CA who were his friends of 40 years since their law school days; and that the party was held in the lounge of the bank ban k bec becaus ause e his birthday birthday happened happened to fal falll on a working day and his friends from the bank suggested that the party be held there. This was reported in Jurado Jur ado’s ’s col column umn (Manila (Manila Stan Standar dard d Jan 12 and 28, 1993 19 93 is issu sues es)) as ha havi ving ng be been en “h “hos oste ted d (b (by y th the e Equita Equ itable ble Ban Bank) k) at its pen pentho thouse use mai mainly nly for som some e justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners.” The Court also received info fr fro om th the e Ad Hoc Committee o Th The e Chai Chairma rman n of of the the commi committe ttee e exte extend nded ed an an invitation invita tion to Emil to defin definitely itely and accura accurately tely determine the facts as regards the published rumor ru mors s an and d re repo ports rts of cor corru rupt ptio ion n in th the e judiciary Emil failed to appea appear. r. Instead, Jurado stated in his column Feb 4, 1993 that he was told he was being summoned by the Ad hoc committee but “there is really no need to summon me. The committee can go by th the e ma many ny things things I ha have ve written written in my column col umn abo about ut cor corrup ruptio tion n in the jud judici iciary ary.. Many Man y of the these se co colu lumn mn it item ems s ha have ve be been en borne out by subsequent events.” o An Anot othe herr lett letter er was was sent sent by the the Cha Chair irma man n to Jurado Jura do dat dated ed Feb 5, 199 1993, 3, rei reiter terati ating ng the Comm Co mmit itte tee’ e’s s in invi vita tati tion on.. Th The e ad ho hoc c commi com mitte ttee e is a fac fact-f t-fin indi ding ng bo body dy an and d it its s function is to gather evidence. It is not an adjudi adj udicati cative ve body in the sense that it wil willl pronou pro nounce nce per person sons s gui guilty lty or inn innoce ocent, nt, or impos imp ose e sa sanc nctio tions ns,, on the ba basi sis s of su such ch proofs as may be presented to it. At the conclusion of its evidence-gathering mission, the co commi mmitte ttee e wi willll su submi bmitt it its s re repo port rt an and d recommen reco mmendati dations ons to the Cou Court rt whi which ch wil willl then take such action as it deems appropriate. approp riate. The heari hearings ngs were scheduled on Feb 11 and 12, 1993. Jurado still failed to appear. Jura Ju rado do expla explain ined ed that that he had had no nott sn snub ubbe bed d th the e invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee. According to him, the first invitation was routed to his desk at the Manila Standard Standa rd office on the day of the hearing itself, itself, when it wa was s al alre read ady y im impo poss ssib ible le to ca canc ncel el pr prev evio ious us profess pro fession ional al and bus busine iness ss app appoin ointmen tments; ts; and the second invitation was never routed to him. He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and reflect his beliefs and there was no need to elaborate further on what he had written. Jura Ju rado do invo invoke kes s RA 53, 53, as amen amende ded d by RA 147 1477, 7, exempti exe mpting ng the pub publis lisher her,, edi editor tor or rep report orter er of any publication publi cation from reveal revealing ing the source of publi published shed
14 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 news new s or info informa rmatio tion n obt obtain ained ed in con confide fidence nce,, and points out that none of the matters subject of his columns has any bearing on the security of the state. Mr Mr.. Ermin Ermin Garcia Garcia,, Jr Jr.. (P (Pre res s Citi-W Citi-Wor orld ld Tra Trave vell Mart Corpor Cor porati ation) on) and Mrs Mrs.. Mar Mariss issa a de la Paz (Ge (Gener neral al Manager of Philway Travel Corporation) denied ever having made any travel arrangements for any of the Justices of the SC or their families to HongKong. Ju Jura rado do alleg alleged ed that that th the e sw swor orn n st stat atem emen ents ts of Mr Mr.. Garcia, Jr. and Mrs. De la Paz are affirmations of their own personal knowledge; that Jurado had no specific knowledge of the contents of these, let alone their veracity. Jur Jurado ado also also soug sought ht clarif clarifica icatio tion n on two two points points—as —as to to the th e ca capa paci city ty in wh whic ich h he is be bein ing g ci cite ted d in the these se adminis admi nistra trative tive pro procee ceeding dings—w s—wheth hether er as ful fulll tim time e journalist or as a member of the bar and why he is being singled out from the other media who had also written about the wrongdoings in the judiciary. Th The e Court Court inform informed ed Jurad Jurado o that its its Resolu Resoluti tion ons s had been addressed to him in his capacity as a full-time journalist who coincidentally happens to be a member of the bar at the same time. Ju Jura rado do moved moved for the the termin terminat atio ion n of the proce proceed edin ing g on the ff premises: o Th The e cour courtt has no no admi admini nistr strat ativ ive e super supervi visi sion on over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist. o Th The e prese present nt admi admini nist stra rati tive ve matt matter er is not not a citation for (a) direct contempt as there is no pending cases or proceeding out of which a direct dir ect con contemp temptt cha charge rged d aga agains instt him may arise, or (b) indirect contempt as no formal charge for the same has been laid before the court in accordance with Section 3 (Rule 71) of the Rules of Court. o Hi His s comm commen ents ts wou would ld be be more more rel relev evan antt and helpful to the Court if taken together with othe ot herr ev eviide denc nce e an and d re repo port rts s of ot othe her r journalists gathered before the Ad Hoc Committee. He perceives no reason why his comments should be singled out and taken up in a separate administrative proceeding.
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado is liable for published stat st atem emen ents ts de demo mons nstr trab ably ly fa fals lse e or mi misl slea eadi ding ng,, an and d derogatory of the courts and individual judges HELD: YES RATIO:
Court rt und unders erscor cored ed the Zaldivar v. Gonz Zaldivar Gonzales: ales: the Cou importance both of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are fundamental and equally equ ally imp importa ortant nt pub public lic int intere erests sts whi which ch nee need d on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with wi th on one e an and d th the e ot othe herr. Th The e Co Cour urtt st stre resse ssed d th the e importance of the public interest in the maintenance of the int integr egrity ity and the orderly orderly func functio tionin ning g of the administration of justice. o “… “…fr free eedo dom m of spe speec ech h and and of exp expre ress ssio ion n like like all constitutional constitutional freedo freedoms, ms, is not absolute and tha thatt fre freedo edom m of exp expres ressio sion n nee needs ds on occasion to be adjusted to and accommo acc ommodat dated ed wit with h the req requir uireme ements nts of equall equ ally y imp import ortant ant pub public lic int intere erests. sts. One of these public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning functioning of the administration of justice…For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a fu func ncti tion onin ing g an and d or orde derl rly y sy syst stem em of dispen dis pensin sing g jus justic tice, e, wit within hin the con contex text, t, in othe ot herr wor ords ds,, of vi via abl ble e in inde depe pend nden entt institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.” Every Eve ry perso person n ex exer erci cisi sing ng the const constit ituti ution onal al right right of freedom of expression, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged “to act with justice, give everyone his due and observ obs erve e hon honesty esty and goo good d fai faith.” th.”1 It may not be availed availe d of to broadcast lies or half-truths—this half-truths—this would not be “to observe honesty and good faith”; it may not be us used ed to in insu sult lt ot othe hers rs,, de destr stroy oy the their ir na name me or reputation reputa tion or bring them into disrepute—this disrepute—this would not be “to act with justice” or “give everyone his due.” Judges are comm mmo only and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, inte in tegr grity ity,, an and d co comp mpet eten ence ce th than an ar are e co commo mmonly nly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or acc accept ept appointme appointment nt to the Judiciary Judiciary cannot can not rea reason sonably ably be reg regard arded ed as hav having ing ther thereby eby forfeited any right whatsoever to private honor and reputa rep utatio tion. n. The pro protec tection tion of the rig right ht of ind indivi ividua duall person per sons s to pri private vate reputati reputations ons is als also o a matt matter er of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free speech. The Th e point point of ad adju justm stmen entt betwee between n the publi public c intere interest st involv inv olved ed in fre freedo edom m of spe speech ech and the ind indivi ividua duall interest of judges in the maintenance of private honor and reputation is precisely found in the norm which requir req uires es tho those se who who,, inv invoki oking ng fre freedo edom m of spe speech ech,, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona bo na fi fide de ca care re in as asce cert rtai aini ning ng th the e tr trut uth h of th the e statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disr di sreg egar ard d of pr priv ivate ate re repu putat tatio ion n by pu publ blis ishi hing ng or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. This norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norm no rms s an and d th the e Co Code de of Et Ethi hics cs ad adop opte ted d by th the e journalism profession in the Philippines. Fa Faililur ure e to “pres “presen entt the other other si side de”” is repre reprehe hens nsib ible le,, being what in law amounts to a denial of due process. The record does not show that befo forre Jurado published his story, he ever got in touch with Veto or anyo an yone ne in Eq Equi uita tabl ble e Ba Bank nk,, Er Ermi mita ta br bran anch ch,, to determine the accuracy of what he would later report. If he did, he wou would ld qui quickly ckly have learned learned that his sources, whoever or whatever they are, were not to be relied upon. If he did not, he was gravely at fault— at the very least for disregarding the Journalist’s Code of Ethics—in failing to exert bonda fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information. Jur Jurado ado’s ’s publi publicati cation on of the the mislea misleadin ding g and false false repo report rt
1
Art. 19 CC: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 15 is cen censur surabl able. e. His pro proffe ffered red exp explan lanati ation: on: that the justices having confirmed their presence at the luncheon, thus corroborating what he had written in vita vi tall de deta tailils s an and d ma maki king ng fu furth rther er su subs bsta tanti ntiati ation on unnece unn ecessar ssary y, and tha thatt his rep report ort con constit stitute uted d fai fair r comment com ment on the pub public lic conduct conduct of pub public lic of office ficers, rs, obviously does not at all explain why a party given by Atty. Veto was reported by him as one tendered by Equitable Equita ble Bank. Paraphrasing Paraphrasing the Code of Ethics, he failed to scrupulously report and interpret the news; on the contrary, his failure or refusal to verify such essential facts as who really hosted and tendered the luncheon and spent for it, and his playing up of the Bank’s supposed role as such host have resulted in an improper suppression of those facts and a gross distortion of the truth about them. Co Cont ntemp emptt is pu puni nish shab able le,, ev even en if commit committe ted d withou withoutt relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence parall par allels els a res respec pectab table le arr array ay of Eng Englis lish h dec decisi isions ons holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proc pr ocee eedi ding ngs. s. Th The e or orig igin inal al do doct ctri rine ne la laid id dow down n in People vs. Alarcon, --that there is no contempt if there is no pe pend ndin ing g ca case se—h —has as be been en ab aban ando done ned d in subsequent rulings of this Court. Jurado wou oulld also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit sub mit to a sep separa arate te adm admini inistr strati ative ve pro procee ceedin ding, g, treated treate d diffe differently rently than his other colleagues colleagues in media who were onl only y aske asked d to exp explai lain n the their ir rep report orts s and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has so fa farr be been en sa said id,, th the e Co Cour urtt may hold hold any anyon one e to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation, which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the adm admini inistra stratio tion n of jus justic tice, e, or int interf erfere ere wit with h the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. Un Unde derr RA 53, 53, a ne news wsma man n has a righ rightt to keep keep his sources source s confid confidentia ential; l; that he cannot be compel compelled led by the courts to disclose them, unless the security of the State demands such revelation. But it does hold that he ca cann nnot ot in invo voke ke su such ch ri righ ghtt as a sh shie ield ld ag agai ains nstt liliab abilility ity for pr prin inti ting ng st stor orie ies s th that at ar are e un untru true e an and d derogatory of the courts, or others. The ruling, in
other words, is that when called to account for publ pu blic icat atio ions ns de deno noun unce ced d as in inac accu cura rate te an and d misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in the process he discloses his sources, or (b) to refuse, on the ground that to do so would require latter ter eve event, nt, how howeve ever, r, he such disclosure. In the lat
must be re must read ady y to ac acce cept pt th the e co cons nseq eque uenc nces es of publishing false or misleading stories the truth and accuracy of which he is unwilling or made no bona fide fid e eff effort ort to pro prove. ve. RA 53, as amended, amended, is qui quite te uneq un equi uivo voca call tha thatt th the e ri righ ghtt of re refus fusal al to di disc sclo lose se sources is “without prejudice to…liability under civil and criminal laws.” RA 53 confer confers s no immun immunity ity from from pros prosecu ecutio tion n for lib libel el or for other sanction under the law. All it does is give the th e jo jour urna nali list st th the e ri righ ghtt to re refu fuse se (o (orr no nott to be compelled) to reveal the source of any news report
publis publ ishe hed d by hi him m wh whic ich h wa was s re reve veal aled ed to hi him m in confidence. Fals Fa lse e report reports s ab abou outt a publi public c offici official al or other other perso person n are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech in the Constitution. The US SC, while asserting that “under the First Amendment there is no such su ch thi thing ng as a fa fals lse e id idea ea,” ,” an and d th that at “h “how oweve ever r pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas,” ideas,”2 nonetheless made mad e th the e fi firm rm pr pron onou ounc nceme ement nt tha thatt “t “the here re is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,” and the th e er erro rone neou ous s st state atemen mentt of fac factt is no nott wo worth rthy y of constitutional protection.” “Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘unhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . They belong to the category of utterances which are ‘no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outw ou twei eigh ghed ed by th the e so soci cial al in inte tere rest st,, in or orde derr an and d morality.’ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. The kn kno owingly fa fallse sta tate teme men nt and the fa fallse statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. Jurado Jur ado’s ’s actuati actuations ons demonst demonstrat rate e gro gross ss irrespon irresponsib sibili ility ty,, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself bey be yon ond d th the e ci circ rcle le of re repu puta tab ble le,, de dece cent nt an and d responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
JUDGMENT: The Court declares Atty. Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. DISSENTING OPINION MELO, J.
In ma maki king ng a ch choi oice ce be betw twee een n th the e pr pres eser erva vati tion on of liberties and freedom, on one hand, and attainment of a better-ordered society, on the other, men have not stopp sto pped ed de deba bati ting ng.. Th The e ba bala lanc nce, e, th the e po poin intt of the weig we ighi hing ng sc scal ale, e, ha has s mo move ved d hi hith ther er an and d th thit ithe her r depending depend ing on the needs of the times and on the kind of government involved. In democr democrati atic c democr democrati atic c govern government ments, s, there there must must at at alll ti al times mes be du due e re rega gard rd fo forr th the e pr pres eser erva vati tion on of constitutional rights even to the extent of seemingly sacrifi sac rificin cing, g, as in the case at han hand, d, accu accurat rate e and truthful media comment.
PUNO, J.
RA 1477 1477 appro approve ved d on June June 15, 15, 195 956 6 pr proh ohib ibit its s reve re vela lati tion on of “th “the e so sour urce ce of any new news-r s-rep epor ortt on information related in confidence unless the court or a House Hou se or com commit mittee tee of Con Congre gress ss fin finds ds tha thatt such
2
Passage from the f irst Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson
16 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 revelation is demanded by the security of the State. 2007 RA 1477 amended RA 53 by changing the phrase (A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC) “int “i nter eres estt of th the e Sta State te”” to “s “sec ecur urity ity of Sta State te.” .” Th The e change limited the right of the State to share with Date: August 8, 2008 newsmen their confidential sources of information. Ponente: Reyes Th The e protec protecti tion on of RA 53 53,, as amend amended ed by RA 14 1477 77 to Facts: newsmen, provides but one ground which can force a Amado Macasaet writes a daily column in Malaya, a newsman new sman to rev reveal eal the sou source rce of his con confid fidenti ential al newspa new spaper per of gen genera erall cir circul culatio ation. n. In the Sep Septemb tember er 18-2 18-21, 1, information—when demanded by the security of the 2007 issues of the newspaper, newspaper, Macasa Macasaet et publi published shed articles containing statements and innuendos about an alleged bribery State. In re: Angel J. Parazo: the Court adjudged newsman incide inc ident nt in the Sup Supreme reme Court. The bri bribery bery was all allege egedly dly Parazo in contempt of court for refusing to divulge the committ com mitted ed on sep separa arate te occ occasi asions ons in the second week of source of his story regarding leakage of questions in September 2010, wherein 5 boxes were delivered to the Court some so me su subj bjec ects ts in th the e 19 1948 48 Ba Barr Ex Exam am.. Pa Para razo zo and were received by a certain “Cecilia” who as a staff of one cont co nten ends ds th that at un unde derr RA 53 53,, he co coul uld d on only ly be lady Justice for whom the boxed were for. Because the Justice compell comp elled ed to rev reveal eal the source of his informati information on was then absent and believing that the gift might be perishable, when the “revelation is demanded by the interest of Cecilia opened one of the boxes and saw an estimated P10 the State.” The Court rejected his argument as it held million milli on cash. Cecili Cecilia a informed the Justic Justice e about it, after which that the 2 terms are not synonymous, the first being the Justice fired her. The “gift” was allegedly in connection with broa br oade derr th than an the se seco cond nd.. It th then en ru rule led d tha thatt the a dec decisi ision on ren render dered ed by the Jus Justice tice “ac “acqui quitti tting” ng” a Fil Filipi ipinonomaintenance of high standard of the legal profession Chinese businessman from charges of corruption. The articles qualifies as an “interest of the State” the promotion of contained contai ned statements saying that the courts are dirty dirty,, that the which is a good ground to compel newsmen to break reputation of the Court is now soiled and sagging, that the lady the confidentiality of their sources of news. The Court Justice shamed her Court and that she should be impeached. ruling did not sit well with Congress June 15, 1956: Also, on September 20, 2007, Marites Vitug, EIC of RA 1477 was enacted changing the phrase “interest Newsbreak , faxed a letter to SC Associate Justice Ynaresof the State” to “security of State.” Santiago asking her to 1)explain the reversal of her decision in Evi Eviden dence ce on rec record ord fail failed ed to pro prove ve clear clear and and prese present nt the graft case against Go 2)comment on the allegations that danger to the administration of justice, hence, there is she sh e re rece ceiv ived ed a ca cash sh gi gift ft of P1 P10 0 mi millllio ion n af after ter issuin issuing g th the e no need to task respondent to reveal the sources of decision re: Go and 3) confirm the removal of her secretary his information in order to prove that his reports about after opening the box. Ynares-Santiago Ynares-Santiago called for Assista Assistant nt judicial corruption are not patent falsehoods. The Court Administrator Midas Marques to tell Vitug that she had Court should always adopt an approach that is less been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never destructive of freedom of speech and of the press. received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for The san sancti ctity ty of a newsman newsman’s ’s sour source ce of of informa informatio tion n is opening a box of cash. Despite that, however, Newsbreak , not only intended to protect a newsman but also the proceeded to publish an on-line article on September 24 with source of his information. When a person transmits regards to the allegations of bribery against Ynares-Santiago. conf co nfid iden enti tial al in info form rmat atio ion n to a ne new wsm sman an,, he is On Sep Septemb tember er 24, Cec Cecili ilia a Mun Munoz oz Del Delis, is, who was exerci exe rcisin sing g his free freedom dom of spe speech ech on con condit dition ion of previously identified by Macasaet as the “Cecilia” who opened anonymity. the box of cas cash h and got ter termin minate ated d gav gave e Yna Ynares res-San -Santia tiago go Talley v. California: it was held that identification and copies of the letter and the affidavit she executed wherein she fear fe ar of re repr pris isal al mi migh ghtt de dete terr pe perf rfec ectl tly y pe peac acef eful ul described Macasaet’s reports as baseless. She also clarified discussions of public matters of importance. that she was not a secretary but a Juridical Staff Officer; that In the the absenc absence e of clea clearr and con convin vincin cing g eviden evidence ce that that she sh e re resi sign gned ed an and d wa was s no nott fi fire red; d; an and d th that at as a ma matte tterr of respondent knowingly foisted a falsehood to degrade procedure she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, adminis admi nistra tratio tion n of jus justic tice, e, Cou Court rt sho should uld be slo slow w in as such was a duty assigned to their utility personnel. She also citing him for contempt. said that she executed the affidavit to allow Justice Ynares As agent agent of of the peop people, le, the the most most impor importan tantt functi function on of Santiago to defend her honor, and to correct the erroneous the press is to inform and it cannot do so if it is information published by Macasaet. uninfo forrme med d. We should be wary when the On Sep Septemb tember er 25, the Court iss issued ued a Res Resolu olutio tion n independent sources of information of the press dry stating that “it appears that certain statements and innuendos up, for then the press will end up printing “praise” (in the columns) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct releases and that is no way for the people to know the or de degr grad ade e th the e ad admin minis istr trati ation on of ju justi stice ce”, ”, an and d or orde deri ring ng truth. Macasaet to explain why no sanction should be imposed on Th The e ma majo jori rity ty opini opinion on will will weak weaken en the the pr pres ess s as an him for indirect contempt of court. An Investigating Committee informed and informative source of information of the composed of retired Supreme Court Justices was created to sove so vere reig ign n pe peop ople le.. Th The e pr prot otec ectio tion n we gi give ve to th the e “receive the evidence from all parties concerned.” sanctity of the sources of information of the press is The Committee concluded that Macasae Macasaet’s t’s bribery for the benefit of the people. It is designed to benefit story in his September 18-21 columns were unbelievable. They us all, to keep us above the cloud of ignorance. observed that Macasaet’s story is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, contradictions, and that he did not exerci exercise se due dilig diligence ence in checking the veracity of the information before publishing In re Amado Macasaet them. The Committee believed there exist valid grounds for the Court to cite Macasaet for indirect contempt. In re Col Columns umns of Ama Amado do Mac Macasa asaet, et, A.M. No. 0707-0909-1313-SC SC Issue: WON Amado Macasaet was guilty of indirect contempt (August 8, 2008) of court Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, Held: Yes
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 17 Ratio: Justice Reyes started with a long exposition on the nature and history of press freedom, the role of the media, the judiciary and judicial independence and a detailed survey of Philip Phi lippin pine e jur jurisp isprud rudenc ence e on the mat matter ter.. He put so muc much h emphasis on the need for the co-existence of an independent judiciary and a free press in a democratic state, and the balance between these conflicting interests. The Court recognizes that it has no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in their decisions, judicial reasoning, or how they run their public offices, but the Court is of the opinion that the articles of Macasaet crossed this line. The Court opines that Macasaet’s articles do nothing but damage the integrity of the Court undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten judicial independence. The Court relied on the “falsity and negligence” test it used in In Re Jurado in finding finding Macasaet Macasaet guilty guilty of indir indirect ect contemp con temptt of cou court.M rt.Maca acasae saett pub publis lished hed hig highly hly spe specul culati ative ve articles based on specious information, without any regard for the injury it will cause to the reputation of the juidiciary and the effective administration of justice. The terms he used such as “thieves” and “basket of rotten apples” directly undermine the integrity of the justices. Purely resorting to speculations and as admitted by him, by doing a “fishing expedition” in the hope of actu ac tual ally ly cr crea eati ting ng a st story ory,, Ma Macas casae aett co commi mmitt tted ed ac acts ts th that at degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice. The Court also relied on Macasaet’s failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism in holding him guilty of indirect contempt of Court. He failed to confirm the accuracy of his story and in fact admitted that he wrote his articles to “fish out” the Lady Justice involved in an alleged alleged bribery fed to him by his source, disregarding the idea that bribery may or may not have existed at all. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carpio assailed the Commitee Commite e procee proceedings dings which recomme recommended nded that Macasae Macasaett was wa s gu guililty ty of co cont ntemp emptt of Co Cour urtt be beca caus use e the Co Commi mmite tee e monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying Macasaet of his right to due process. He said that Macasa Mac asaet et was red reduce uced d to a pas passiv sive e par partic ticipa ipant, nt, una unable ble to subjec sub jectt the tes testimo timonie nies s of adv advers erse e wit witnes nesses ses to rig rigoro orous us prob pr obin ing g un unde derr cr cros oss-e s-exa xami mina nati tion on.. Th The e ma majo jori rity ty op opin inio ion n disagr dis agrees ees wit with h Car Carpio pio saying that 1) the pro procee ceedin dings gs are presumed to be regular and the burden to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet; 2) that Macasaet was never able to crossexamine his witnesses does not necessarily mean denial of due process of law, in fact Macasaet never asserted said right; and 3) the Court is bereft of power to cross-examine. Finally, the Court believes that “by disproportionately informi inf orming ng the pub public lic abo about ut spe specif cific ic cou court rt pro process cesses, es, or by spreading sprea ding unsub unsubstantia stantiated ted alleg allegations ations about corrup corruption tion and other oth er form forms s of jud judici icial al misc miscond onduct, uct, the pre press ss dra dramati matical cally ly undermines the public’s faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government.” Furthermore, the Court said that they should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes, and that effective administration of ju justi stice ce may only be re real aliz ized ed wi with th th the e str stron ong g fa faith ith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary,, free from political and popular pressure. The cardinal judiciary condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety propriety..
Dissenting Opinion (Carpio): Procedural: The Committee Proceedings were fatally defective, so the testimonies should have been inadmissible. It cannot be said that Macasaer waived his right to conduct cross-examination
for failure to assert such right. From the outset the Committee was a “fact-finding” one, making Macasaet believe that there would be a separate occasion for a cross-examination. The testimonies should have been inadmissible as evidence. Substantive: The majority opinion made use ofthe Jurado test in holding Macasaet in contempt: 1) whether the story was false and 2) whether Macasaet could have prevented the publication of the false story by exercising diligence in verifying its veracity. Carpio believes that instead, the Court should have used two theoretical formulas adopted long before the Jurado test to serve as “judicial scales” upon which the competing interests are weighed: 1) the “clear and present danger” rule and 2) the “dangerous tendency” rule. The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evilil co ev cons nseq eque uenc nce e of th the e co comme mment nt or utt utter eran ance ce mus mustt be extreme ext remely ly ser seriou ious s and the deg degree ree of imm immine inence nce ext extrem remely ely high hi gh.. Un Unde derr th this is ru rule le,, th the e ad advo voca cacy cy of id idea eas s ca cann nnot ot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger dan ger tha thatt such advocacy advocacy wil willl har harm m the admi adminis nistra tratio tion n of justice. The “dangero “dangerous us ten tenden dency” cy” rul rule e mea means ns tha thatt if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. The clear and present danger rule is most protective of free speech and of free press -- basic rights which are necessary for the exercise of almost every other fundamental right. rig ht. The “fa “falsi lsity ty and neg neglig ligenc ence” e” test which the maj majori ority ty opin op inio ion n us used ed in ho hold ldin ing g Ma Maca casa saet et in co cont ntem empt pt do does es no nott consider consid er seriousness or immine imminence nce of the substantive eveil ought to be prevented. In such test, any unflattering publication to a judge or court becomes punishable. If viewed in the light of “clear and present danger” and “dange “da ngerou rous s ten tenden dency” cy” rul rules, es, Mac Macasa asaet et can cannot not be hel held d in contempt. It appears that what the substantive evil caused by Macasaet’s publications are 1)disrespect for the Court and 2) unfair administration of justice. a. On the the questi question on of of disres disrespec pect. t. The The Repo Report rt of of the th e In Inve vest stig igat atin ing g Co Comm mmit itee ee wh whic ich h th the e majority of the Court relied on seemed to have hav e sel selecte ected d wor words ds and sep separa arated ted the them m from context to arrive at its conclusion. Taken Taken in context, the words that the majority found to be contumacious are not. b. On the ques questio tion n of unfair unfair admin adminis istra trati tion on of justice. It was never claimed that the matter of these contempt proceedings will affect the disposition of the court in the case of Go whic wh ich h wa was s sti stillll pe pend ndin ing g (MR wa was s fi file led; d; pending resolution). The Report’s conclusion thatt Mac tha Macas asae aet’ t’s s pu publ blic icat atio ions ns ge gene nera rated ted public distrust in the administration of justice are rooted on assumptions bereft of factual basis, considering that Ynares-Santiago was nott as no asked ked to in inhi hibi bitt fr from om the case. case. Th The e gove go vern rnmen mentt st stililll ha had d co confi nfide denc nce e in he her r impartiality.
Articles: September 18, 2007 –Bribery in the Court A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week. Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans. Believing that the "gift" might be something perishable, she
18 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 open op ened ed the bo box. x. In Inde deed ed,, it wa was s a gi gift ft – es esti tima mated ted at P10 shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice could be restored. fired her instead. September 20, 2007 – She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But Cecilia, please save the court she practically did. I have established the lady justice’s secretary who opened one The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver – what else would we of the five milk boxes containing containing bribe money is a niece of the call him or her – did not check whether the lady justice was in late, respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box full of Palma from Batangas. money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake. know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, with money – a boxful of it. who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls. The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe reputation of the Supreme Court. should be impeached. Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss. dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor rotten that makes the whole basket rotten. the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and The names and reputa reputation tion of highl highly-resp y-respected ected jurists must be staunch defender of the Constitution. saved from suspicions they are thieves. The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them. Here’s the clue The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece September 21, 2007 – of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was Wrong date, same facts inherited by the incumbent lady justice. On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice My problem with this report is that while my source is definite of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last week as at least P10 million, he won’t confide to me the identity of the I mistakenly reported. jurist. It turns out that Cecilia Muñoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss – last five boxes several times in March. and she should as a matter of duty – we will never know who She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court, the from the guardhouse of the Court. Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices. She opened the last and saw the money because the lady The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is justice was absent on that day day.. Forthwith, she was fired. also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four the Court of Tax Appeals. Appeals. boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was and left them with the lady justice. She wouldn’t dare open the an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her duty of firs fi rstt fo four ur be beca caus use e the la lady dy ju justi stice ce wa was s in he herr of offic fice. e. Sh She e telling the truth. opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not report for That way, she would have rendered a great service to the work on that day day.. justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Cecili Cec ilia a tho though ughtt tha thatt the gif gift-w t-wrap rapped ped box con contai tained ned some Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them in perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a was fired. bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia can act swiftly on a clear case of briber y. to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up Otherw Oth erwise ise,, thi this s cas case e bec become omes s one where the pot calls the was one of those errands. kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, Where is Cecilia? that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecili Cec ilia. a. How Howeve everr, if the Sup Suprem reme e Cou Court rt has intention intentions s to September 19, 2007 – investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief Justice The Bribe Giver I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who appear before an investigation group in the Court. has been criminally charged. Better Bet ter sti still, ll, as I sai said, d, yes yesterd terday ay,, Cec Cecili ilia a sho should uld dis disclo close se It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously banc. acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect. Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five whose identity I do not know up to now. trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes. It is my conviction that the Court shoul should d investigate reports reports of Inci In cide denta ntally lly,, th this is se secr creta etary ry is a na names mesake ake of he herr au aunt nt,, a wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way. deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that problem finding out who she is. the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late It is a si simp mple le jo job b of as aski king ng a cl cler erk k to go to pe pers rson onne nell justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know who department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.1 retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity integrity.. Preserve Public Institutions We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 19 US vs Bustos G.R. No. L-12593 March 8, 1918
Ponente: Justice Malcolm Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens petitioned to the Executive Secretary through the Cross field and O’ Brien law office charging charging Roma Roman n Pun Punsal salan, an, Jus Justic tice e of Pea Peace ce of Macabe Mac abebe be and Masa Masanto, nto, Pamp Pampang anga a wit with h Mal Malfea feasan sance ce in Office. First information: Francisca Polintan desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, was told by the judge to give P5 then P3 afterwards and she also served as maid for 4 days in the judge’s house and took from her two chickens and twelve “gandus” Second information: Valentin Sunga was told to give him hi m (j (jud udge ge)) P5 P50 0 if he wa want nt to wi win n hi his s ca case. se. Sunga Sunga ga gave ve nothing, a few days later he was informed that he lost his case. The justice again told him that he could still win on appeal if he would pay P50. Thir Th ird d in infor format matio ion: n: Le Leon onci cio o Qu Quia iamba mbao o fi file led d fo forr a complaint for assault against 4 persons, on the trial date, the justice called him over to his house where he secretly game Quiambao P30; the complaint thereafter was shelved. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of the first fir st ins instan tance ce of the Seve Seventh nth Jud Judici icial al Dis Distri trict ct req reques uestin ting g investigati inves tigation, on, prope proper, r, action, and report report.. The Judge of first instance acquitted Punsalan. Therea The reafter fter,, a Cri Crimin minal al acti action on aga agains instt the pet petiti itione oners, rs, now defen de fenda dant nts s wa was s in inst stit itute uted, d, fo forr th the e re reaso ason n of wr writ itin ing g an and d publishing a statement which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous. The information filed omitted the paragraphs of the petition menti me ntion onin ing g tha thatt the in inve vest stig igat atio ion n wa was s fo forw rwar arde ded d to th the e Executive Secretar y. Hono Ho nora rabl ble e Pe Percy rcy M. Mi Mior or fo foun und d al alll de defen fenda dants nts ex exce cept pt 4 individuals guilty and sentenced each to pay P10 and 1/32 of the cost and to suf suffer fer sub subsid sidiar iary y imp impris risonm onment ent in cas case e of insolvency.
ISSUE: Are the defendants guilty of libel for criticizing Roman Punsalan, a justice of peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. HELD: No. Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic democr atic countries was unknow unknown n in the Philip Philippine pine Island before 1900 (e.g. Rizal, La Solidaridad wanted liberty in press and association). association). When the Americans came, the consti constitution tution of the US guaranteed the right of freedom of speech and the right of assembly and petition. McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission laid the inviolable rule: “That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comme co mment nt up upon on hi his s of offi fici cial al ac acts. ts. Th The e gu guar aran anti ties es of a fre free e speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. If the people cannot criticize a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Qualified Privilege (Communication): a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. In the usual case malice can ca n be pr pres esum umed ed fro from m de defam famat atory ory wo word rds s bu butt pr priv ivilileg ege e communication destroys that presumption. Expres Exp ress s mal malice ice has not bee been n pro proved ved by the pro prosecu secutio tion. n.
Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of peach, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. The defendants are entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public serv se rvic ice, e, we sh shou ould ld ra rathe therr co comme mmend nd th them em fo forr the their ir go good od citizenship. Disposition: Defendants are acquitted. Costs de officio.
Separate Opinion Justice Carson: The doctrine in the former US v. Bustos Case has long since since been abandone abandoned d by this court. That case is identical to the present case.
US vs Perfecto G.R. No. 17493 Johnson, J.: Oct 11 1920 – An Assistant prosecuting attorney of Manila filed a complaint in CFI Manila charging the defendants with the crime of sedition in violation of Section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1692. The defendants demurred, contending that (a) the complaint was illegal and unconstitutional for the reason that it had been presented by a political entity without authority, and that the same had not been formulated in accordance with the essential requisites required by the law; (b) the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a crime and that, even though they came under the provisions of Act No. 292 as reformed by Act No. 1592, said laws were null because they violated certain provisions of the organic law of the Philippine Island; (c) as a result of the first two grounds of the demurrer, CFI Manila was without jurisdiction of the person of the defendants nor over the facts alleged. After a consideration of the demurrer the t he same was over- ruled and the defendants were required to plead not guilty and were duly brought to trial. At the close of the trial the Honorable Imperial, judge, concluded that: a. Maximo Mendoza - insufficient evidence - not guilty b. Gregorio Perfecto - guilty - fine: P500; if insolvent, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. -Perfecto appealed directly to SC ISSUES: Q of law: (a) LC erred in overruling the demurer; (b)) LC er (b erre red d in no nott de decl clar arin ing g the co compl mplai aint nt ilille lega gall an and d uncons unc onstit tituti utiona onal, l, in tha thatt it was ent entitl itled ed "Th "The e Peo People ple of the Philippine Islands" instead of in the name o the "United States of America;" (c) In not declaring illegal, illegal, unconstitutional, unconstitutional, and null, Act Nos. 2667 and 2886 of the Philippine Legislature; (d) In not declaring that Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, is null, illegal, and unconstitutional; and (e) In not declaring that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try and decide the cause presented in the complaint. Q of facts: the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause does not show that he is guilty of the crime charged. HELD HE LD:: SC av avoi oide ded d ru ruliling ng on the co cons nstit titut utio iona nalility ty of the questioned laws by ruling on the insufficiency of evidence. RATIO: +Even granting, without deciding, that the various laws, the constitutionality and legality of which a re questioned by the appellant, are illegal, unconstitutional, and null, the evidence adduced does not show that the defendant willfully, maliciously, maliciously,
20 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 and unlawfully violated neither section 8 of Act No. 292, as found guilty in the Court of First Instance which was affirmed amen am ende ded d by se sect ctio ion n 1 of Ac Actt No No.. 16 1692 92,, no norr an any y ot othe her r by the Court of Appeals. provisions of said Act No. 292. +SC held that his acts was not supposed to incite rebellion, go Law: agai ag ains nstt go gove vern rnmen mentt of offic ficia ials ls,, or to di distu sturb rb pe peac ace e in th the e RP Art. 142 - Inci Inciting ting to sedit sedition. ion. — The penalty of prision community. To hold otherwise, based on the evidence, would correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding be to ab abri ridg dge e th the e fr free eedo dom m of the press press in th the e Phi Phililipp ppin ine e 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without Islands, Island s, which abridgment abridgment would be in direct contra contraventio vention n of taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite the provisions of of the Jones Law, par. 13, sec. 3 othe ot hers rs to th the e acc accom ompl plis ishme hment nt of any of th the e ac acts ts wh whic ich h +U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731. - It is not only a right but a duty consti con stitute tute sed sediti ition, on, by mea means ns of spe speech eches, es, pro procla clamati mations ons,, for a citizen of a state to present their grievances against the writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations gov't. tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who - The free press is the best avenue for that purpose. shallll utte sha utterr sed sediti itious ous wor words ds or spe speech eches, es, wri write, te, pub publis lish, h, or -Commenting on the gov't is essential for a civilized circul cir culate ate scu scurri rrilou lous s lib libels els aga agains instt the Gov Govern ernment ment (of the society and a good government. It is also a necessary United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the consequence of republican and democratic institution, Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or and the complement of the right of free speech. which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing +The freedom of the press consists in the right to publish the the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, although said cabal cab al and mee meett tog togeth ether er for unl unlawf awful ul pur purpos poses, es, or whi which ch publication may be offensive to the Government, to the courts, suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or to individuals. or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to + Ch Chie ieff Ju Justi stice ce Marsh Marshal alll of the US SC SC:: "A "Amo mong ng those those disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the prin pr inci cipl ples es wh whic ich h ar are e he held ld mo most st sac sacre red d by th the e pe peop ople le of Gove Go vern rnmen ment, t, or wh who o sh shal alll kn know owin ingl gly y co conc ncea eall su such ch evi evill America, there is none more deeply rooted in the public mind practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187). than that of the liberty of the press." + Mr Mr.. Dan Daniel iel Webster: Webster: "It is imp import ortant ant to safe safegua guard rd to the Issue: utmost the right to free speech and the free press." It is as Whether or not Espuelas is guilty of inciting to sedition? essential as breathing and life itself." Giving up the right of free speech is like saying "Good-bye" to Held & Ratio: liberties forever. Under such circumstances free government Espuelas is guilty of libel for the following reasons: may still be maintained, [but] their life, their soul, and their 1. It is sc scur urri rilo lous us libel libel becau because se it ca calllls s the gove govern rnme ment nt essentials will be gone. crooks and dictators, pointing out the reference to the Mr.. Ral Mr Ralph ph Wa Waldo ldo Emerson: Emerson: It is also a form of spr spread eading ing Hitler and Mussolini. knowledge and if prohibited, would make the state barbarous. 2. The communication was made to produce DISPO: Complaint Complaint dismis dismissed sed and the defend defendant ant discha discharged rged dissatisfaction or arouses the urge to be disloyal to from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. the government. These kinds of writings are against public peace because not only do they undermine the security of the government or weakens the confidence Espuelas vs People of the citizens in the government, but they may also 17 December 1951 lead to the destruction of the government. 3 . The Th e go gove vern rnme ment nt an and d it its s br bran anch ched ed (l (leg egiisl slat ativ ive, e, Topic: Purposes – Preserve public institutions executive, judicial) must be respected and recognized Ponente: Bengzon, J. thatt they hol tha hold d imp importa ortant nt func functio tions. ns. Any cri critic ticism ism agai ag ains nstt th them em mu must st be ma made de on wi with th a ce cert rtai ain n Facts: standard of decorum. These criticisms must be made This Th is is a pe peti titi tion on fo forr re revi view ew by cer certi tior orar arii of the Co Cour urtt of on some basis of respect and deference. Sedition is Appeals’ decision. another restriction to free speech and writing. Somewhere from June 9 – 24, 1947, in the town of Tagbilaran, The US has punished sedition in the act of July 14, Espuelas had his picture taken which showed him hanging 1978, with analogous provisions in the Espionage Act lifeless from a rope tied to a limb of a tree, when in fact he was and seditious seditious libel amendment. amendment. It can be argue argued d that standing on a barrel and pretending to be lifeless. He then sent these the se statute sta tutes s are vulne vulnerab rable le to being bei ng used use d as a copies of the photograph to newspapers of general publication cons co nstra train int t to free fre e spee sp eech ch, , but bu t the th e safeg sa fegua uard rd of all over the Philippines and abroad, causing its publication in requiring intent on the part of the accused balances the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang, and this out. other local publications. He included a suicide note which said that he was Alberto Reveniera and that the letter was for his Freedom of speech in the Constitution does not mean wife. The letter said that he killed himself because he was very an absolute freedom. Every citizen has the freedom to displeased with the Roxas administration, and that she should criticize the government, but this criticism must be writ wr ite e to Pr Pres es.. Tru ruman man an and d Ch Chur urchi chillll to te tellll th them em th that at th the e specific and constructive. IT must be reasoned and government was full of Hitlers and Mussolinis. He said that she tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of should teach their children to burn pictures of Roxas. He also the government. What Espuelas did clearly does not stated that he killed himself because he had no power to put fall under constructive constructive criticism. His attacks on the the Roxas administration under “Juez de Cuchillo”. Espuelas gove go vern rnmen ment, t, as se seen en in hi his s su suic icid ide e no note te,, we were re admitted to all of these facts. indiscriminate. He did not specify acts or omissions of the adm admini inistra stratio tion n that cau caused sed his dis dissati satisfa sfacti ction. on. Espuelas was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bohol Clea Cl earl rly y, hi his s ac acts ts an and d in infu furi riat atin ing g la lang ngua uage ge we were re with the crime of inciting to sedition (RPC Art. 142). He was
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 21 intended intend ed to cre create ate dis distur turban bance ce and not mer merely ely to persua per suade de the aud audien ience, ce, all the mor more e bec becaus ause e he added the drama of a fake suicide.
o
It is argued that article 142 refers to libelous acts against the government only and what the accused did was specifically against the Roxas administration therefore he cannot be convicted cannot be upheld. Article 142’s language clearly includes “or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof”. Further Furth ermo more re,, th the e su subs bsta tanc nce e of se sedi diti tion on is tha thatt it induces people to resort to illegal methods to express discontent discon tent in the govern government. ment. Clearly, Clearly, Espuel Espuelas as is guilty gui lty of thi this. s. His whole whole let letter ter reflects reflects the ide idea a of violence. He glorifies the situation in Central Luzon, the Huk Hukbal balaha ahaps, ps, Jul Julio io Gui Guille llen n and the ban bandit ditry ry in Leyte, Ley te, whi which ch are instances instances of fla flagra grant nt and armed atta at tacks cks ag agai ains nstt th the e la law w, wh whic ich h sh show ows s tha thatt th thes ese e unlawful acts may be justified in comparison to the “dirty government” run by the Roxas administration. Also, he uses the term Juez de Cuchillo which, in layman’s terms, is the Law of the Knife and refers to “a sum summary mary and arb arbitr itrary ary exe execut cution ion by the kni knife”. fe”. Therefo The refore, re, he sug sugges gests ts tha thatt his rea reason son for kil killin ling g himself is because he could not execute the Roxas administration, and therefore his countrymen should resort to bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to overthrow the administration. Precedent used: Isaac Perez of Sorgogon, in 1922, said in a speech that Filipinos must use bolos to cut off Wood’s head (referring to then Governor-General Leonard Wood). Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition.
Dissenting: Tuason, J. Article 142 refers to the government. What the accused did was wa s ag agai ains nstt the ad admin minis istr trat atio ion n on only ly.. Go Gove vern rnmen mentt an and d administration must be distinguished. He did not use Hitler and Mussolini as comparisons to the government officials, per se. He used them only to say that the system of government is no longer faithful to democracy and is now ruled with tyranny. He also cited the rebel situation in some provinces to be examples of re resu sult lts s fr from om th the e gr graf aftt an and d co corr rrup upti tion on of th the e Ro Roxa xas s admini adm inistr strati ation, on, but he did not mea mean n tha thatt the these se sho should uld be justified or followed. When the intent of the accused is doubtful, he should be given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. Tuason believes that the letter was merely a proclamation of “devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions”.
Planas vs Gil LAUREL ORIGINAL ACTION FOR PROHIBITION Ratio: The constitutional grant to the President of the power to exercise general supervision over all local govts and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila.
Facts:
Planas is Planas is a membe memberr of the the munici municipal pal boar board d of the the City City of Manila
She mad made e a sta state teme ment nt whic which h was was publ publis ishe hed d in La Van angu guar ardi dia a cri critic ticiz izin ing g th the e act acts s of certain cert ain gov govtt off offici icials als in con connec nectio tion n w/ the rece re cen ntl tly y held general electi tio on for Assemblymen o She sai said d that that govt govt offi offici cial als s like like Hon. Hon. Eulog Eulogio io Rodriguez and even the then Pres. Manuel Quezon were campaigning and were using govtt mac gov machin hineri eries es to fla flatten tten the opp opposi ositio tion n and ensure the vic victory tory of the their ir par party ty,, the Nacionalista Party The day day after after the the publi publicati cation, on, Plan Planas as recei received ved a let letter ter from Jose Vargas, Sec to the Pres, who, under the authority of the Pres, directed her to appear before Gil, Gi l, Co Commi mmiss ssio ione nerr of Ci Civi vill Se Servi rvice ce,, to pr prov ove e he her r stat st atem emen ents ts an and d th that at fa fail ilur ure e to do so wo woul uld d be suffici suf ficient ent cau cause se for her sus suspen pensio sion/re n/remova movall fro from m office Plan Pl anas as appea appeare red d before before Gil Gil and raise raised d the issue issue of lack la ck of ju juri risd sdic icti tion on an and d as aske ked d Gi Gill to de desi sist st fr from om investigating her Befor Be fore e the jurisd jurisdic icti tion onal al issue issue was reso resolv lved ed by Gil, Gil, this case was brought to SC During Dur ing the the pende pendency ncy of of this this case, case, Gil Gil resol resolved ved that that he he had jurisdiction jurisdiction and ordere ordered d Plana Planas s to appea appearr before him and adduce evidence to support her charges
Issues: Several issues were raised by both parties, but the following are the ones resolved by the Court:
1. WON WON th the e co cour urtt ha has s ju juri risd sdic icti tion on over over th the e ca case se under the separation of powers doctrine; if yes, can the writ of prohibition issue
YES, YES The Th e SC is en entr trus uste ted d exp xpre ress ssly ly or by ne nece cess ssar ary y implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation (Sec 2 (1), Art VIII of 1935 Consti) o In this this sen sense se and and to this this ext exten ent, t, the the judi judici ciar ary y provid pro vides es the cor coroll ollari aries es of the sys system tem of checks and balances of the govt Th The e Pres Pres is immun immune e from from suit suit but it does does not not follo follow w that his subordinate who is acting under his orders shall also be deemed as granted immunity Ge Gene nera rally lly,, pr proh ohib ibit itio ion n as an extrao extraord rdin inar ary y le lega gall wr writ it will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions o But Sec 516 and 226 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that it may issue to any infe in feri rior or tri tribu buna nal, l, co corp rpor orat atio ion, n, bo boar ard, d, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or in excess of jurisdiction Th The e te term rms s ju judi dici cial al and and mi mini nist ster eria iall are ar e co comp mpre rehe hens nsiv ive e en enou ough gh to include the challenged investigation
2.
WON the Pres has authority to order the investigation
YES Artt VII, Ar VII, Sec 1 of the 1935 1935 Cons Consti ti gran grants ts the the Pres Pres executive power and the duty to see that laws are faithfully executed Art VII, VII, Sec 11 11 (first (first claus clause) e) prov provid ides es that that the Pres Pres shall have control of all the executive depts., bureaus, and offices and (2nd clause) shall exercise general supervision over all local govts as may be provided by
22 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 law Be Besi side des, s, inv nves esti tiga gati tio on wou ould ld st stil illl be un und der th the e Abs Absent ent any any statu statutory tory pro provis vision ion auth authoriz orizing ing the the Pres Pres to authority vested in the Pres to take care that laws be conduct an investigation and in view of the nature and faithfully executed character of the executive authority of the Pres, the constitutional grant to the President of the power 4. WO WON N pet etit itiion oner er ha has s abu buse sed d he herr rig ight ht to fr free ee speech to exe exerci rcise se gen genera erall sup superv ervisi ision on ove overr all loc local al NOT AT ISSUE govts and to take care that the laws be faithfully Pl Plan anas as cont conten ends ds that that if she did did abuse abuse her her right right to executed must be construed to authorize him to speech, then a criminal action should be filed against order an investigation of the act or conduct of the her by the aggrieved party and not by the govt petitioner,, a member of the municipal petitioner municipal board of the Co Cour urtt sa said id that that of offi fici cial al condu conduct ct and th the e po poli lici cies es of City of Manila. o It impli implies es auth author orit ity y to in inqu quir ire e into into facts facts and and public pub lic off offici icials als can be cri critic ticize ized d and such cri critic ticism ism conditions in order to render the power real cannot be suppressed or prevented unless they incite and effective rebellion and civil war As to the conte content ntio ion n that “supe “supervi rvisi sion on”” and “cont “contro rol” l” o And Pl Plan anas as is is not not deni denied ed that that rig right ht nor nor is is she she are different, this is correct but this distinction is not being investigated for exercising such right important as far as the power of the Pres to order an o But she she can canno nott impu impute te vio viola lati tion ons s of law law and and investigation is concerned commission of frauds then refuse to face an o Be Besi side des, s, the the super supervi viso sory ry pow power of the the Pres Pres investigation meant to elicit the truth or falsity was wa s a co comp mpro romi mise se du duri ring ng the Co ConC nCon on of the charges she made resu re sult ltin ing g fro from m the hi hist stor oric ical al vi view ew wh whic ich h recognizes the right of local self-govt and the Santiago vs Far Eastern Broadcasting legal theory which sanctions the possession November 8, 1941 by the state of absolute control over local govts o Th The e resu result lt was was the the reco recogn gnit itio ion n of the the pow power er Ponente: Ozatea, J. of supervision and all its implications and the Topic: Pre Preser serve ve Pub Public lic Inst Institu itutio tions; ns; Ty Type pe of Exp Expres ressio sion n – reje re ject ctio ion n of wh what at ot othe herw rwise ise wo woul uld d be an Forms; Forum – Media/Political Campaigns imperium imperi um in imperi imperio o (The right or powe powerr of a state to enforce the law) to the detriment of a Facts: strong natl govt Peti Pe titio tione nerr Ge Gero roni nimo mo Sa Sant ntia iago go is the ca campa mpaig ign n Asi Aside de from from the the Consti Consti,, Sec 64 64 of Admi Adminis nistrat trative ive Code Code mange man gerr of th the e po poliliti tica call pa party rty Po Popu pula larr Fr Fron ontt Su Sumu mulo long ng.. of 1917 states: Respondent Far Eastern Broadcasting is an owner/operator of o “In additi tio on to his general supervisory radio stations that required Santiago, upon purchasing airtime, author aut hority ity,, the Gov Gov-Ge -Gen n (Pre (Pres) s) sha shallll hav have e to submit a manuscript of the speech to be given. Santiago did such su ch sp spec ecifi ific c po powe wers rs an and d du duti ties es as ar are e not submit a scr script ipt and ins instea tead d pet petiti itione oned d to the Supreme Supreme expressly conferred or imposed on him by Court for mandamus, that he be allowed to broadcast without law and also, in particular, the powers and previous censorship. duties set forth in this chapter. Far East Eastern ern con conten tends ds tha thatt its acti actions ons in req requir uiring ing Among such special powers and duties shall subm su bmis issi sion on of th the e ma manu nusc scri ript pt we were re fo forr th the e be bene nefi fitt of be: safegu saf eguard arding ing pub public lic mor morali ality ty so as not to pre prejud judice ice pub public lic c. To order, when in his opinion the good of interest. Santiago however, however, says that the speech (which was was the th e public servi vic ce so requires, an in fact delivered, albeit not on air) was heard by many at the investigation of any action or the conduct of Opera House and printed in newspapers, without causing any any an y pe pers rson on in th the e Go Govt vt se serv rvic ice, e, an and d in danger. connection therewith to designate the official, comm co mmit itte tee, e, or pe pers rson on by wh whom om su such ch investigation shall be conducted.” Act 8130. Franchise for Far Eastern; radio to be open to the o SC said said this this prov provis isio ion n does does not not viola violate te the the general public but subject to regulations Consti nor was it abrogated by the National Sec.. of Int Interi erior or and and/or /or the Rad Radio io Boa Board rd is Comm. Act 98. Sec Assembly empowe emp owered red to cen censor sor wha whatt is con consid sidere ered d “ne “neith ither er mor moral, al,
3.
Ass ssu uming the Pres has power to order the investigation, petitioner can be proceeded against administratively only on the grounds stated in law —disloyalty,, dishonesty —disloyalty dishonesty,, oppression, misconduct, or mal maladm admini inistr strati ation on in off office ice and that as an elective official, she is responsible for her political acts to her constituents alone
NO Unde Un derr Se Sec c 64 of th the e Admin Admin Code Code,, an inve invest stig igat atio ion n may be or orde dere red d if the in inte tere rest st of pu publ blic ic se servi rvice ce requires such and if Planas’ charges be found true, approp app ropria riate te acti action on may be tak taken en aga agains instt the gui guilty lty partie par ties; s; oth otherw erwise ise,, the peti petitio tion n can be pro procee ceeded ded against under Sec 22140 in connection with Sec 2078 of the Revised Admin Code
educational or entertaining, and prejudicial to public interest.” The Board can forfeit the license of a broadcasting station. Sec. of the Interior, Dept. Order 13. Requires submission of daily dai ly rep report orts s to Sec Sec.. of Int Interi erior/ or/Rad Radio io Boa Board rd re: pro progra grams ms before airing. For speeches, a manuscript manuscript or short gist must be submitted .
Issue/s: Decision:
Whethe Whet herr or not not Fa Farr Ea East ster ern n ha has s th the e ri rig ght to require manuscript Yes, Far Far Easte Eastern rn can can requir require e the the submis submissio sion n of a manuscript. Laws and regulations grant him this
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 23 privilege. Mandamus does not lie. Held
Ratio
1.
SC doe does not not uph uphold claim that Far Eastern had no right to require the subm su bmis issi sion on of th the e manuscript
It is a duty of Far Eastern to requ re quir ire e th the e su subm bmis issi sion on of a manuscript as a requirement in broadcasting speeches.
Santiago has right to contest
He did not even submit a draft of the speech. Would have been a diff di ffer eren entt ca case se if he di did d in fa fact ct submit and was arbitrarily denied of airing it.
2.
no
Besides,, law Besides laws s (se (see e box abo above) ve) provide for such actions.
Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1943) Purposes
Preserve Public Institutions Primicias v. Fugoso 80 Phil. 71 (1943) Nature: Petition for mandamus. Ponente: Feria, J. Doctrine: (1) The delegation of the power to grant or refuse the issuance of a permit to the whim of men in authority, “is arbi ar bitra trary ry,, lilibe berty rty is su subv bver erted ted,, an and d the sp spir irit it of ou ourr fre free e institution violated;” and may only operate as a discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the meeting may be held. And (2) the mere apprehension that trouble may arise duri du ring ng a ra ralllly y wa was s no nott a po pond nder erou ous s re reas ason on to cu curta rtailil th the e fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances. Facts: In November 1947, Valeriano E. Fugoso, the mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The reason cited: "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." The 1119th section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, as writ by the Municipal Board of the City of Ma Mani nila la re requ quir ired ed a ma mayo yor’s r’s pe perm rmit it to ho hold ld a pa para rade de or process pro cession ion,, or or,, by ana analogy logy,, a pub public lic mee meetin ting g or asse assembly mbly.. Cipriano Cipri ano P. Primicias (campaign manager of the Coalesced Mino Mi nori rity ty Pa Part rtie ies) s) fil filed ed a pr pray ayer er to co compe mpell th the e may mayor or to acquiesce to his request for a permit. Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the mayor to grant the permit? Held: (Yes.) The e Co Cour urtt or orde dere red d th the e may mayor or to gr gran antt the pe permi rmit, t, Ratio: Th tempering the ordinance to mean that the Mayor did not have the power to grant or refuse the permit, only the discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the meeting may be held. Such a construction of "'regulate,' as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be
construed constr ued as syn synony onymous mous wit with h "[s "[supp uppres ress]" s]" or "pr "prohi ohibit bit"" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103)." Such abhorred abuse of authority in conferring this prerogative to the whims and an d ca capr pric ice e of a si sing ngle le ma man n wo woul uld d be ta tant ntam amou ount nt to "unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented." The Court said that the constitutional right to free speech and peacefull assembly was a fundamental right of the people and peacefu may not be suppressed unless there was the probability of serious injury to the state, and quoted US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Whitney vs. California: "Fear of serious injury inj ury can cannot not alo alone ne jus justify tify suppress suppression ion of fre free e spe speech ech and assembly.” Disposition: Petition granted.
Notes/Obiter Dictum: (Technical issue given a page's worth of attention) (Technical The Th e Co Cour urtt spe speak aks s of the se sett ttle led d ma maxi xim m th that at the po powe wer r confe co nferr rred ed up upon on the Le Legi gisl slat atur ure e to ma make ke la laws ws ca cann nnot ot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," the only exception to this rule is for some specific powers of local loc al gov govern ernmen mentt and within this amb ambit it of emp empowe owermen rmentt is police regulation which is "conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation." In this light, "the police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into in to ac acco coun untt th that at it its s ex exer erci cise se may be in co conf nflilict ct wi with th th the e exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board." And extending the inference of the unconstitutionality of rele re lega gati ting ng Le Legi gisl slati ative ve po powe werr to an anot othe herr bo body dy or pe pers rson on;; "Besid "Be sides, es, ass assumi uming ng arg arguen uendo do that the Leg Legisl islatu ature re has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter" it will coevally be null and void for the same reasons cited. -Jimenez, 06-12828 03.13.11
Gonzales vs COMELEC L-27833, April 18, 1969
Date: April 18, 1969 Nature: In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of RA 4880 F. Reyes Cabigao Counsel for Petitioners: Atty. F. Counsel for Respondents: Atty. Ramon Barrios Amicus Curiae: Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada (Main), Philippine Bar Associat Association ion,, Civ Civilil Lib Libert erties ies Uni Union, on, UP Law Cen Center ter,, UP Women Lawyers’ Circle Ponente: Fernando
Facts:
RA 4880 4880 (Tañ (Tañad adaa-Si Sing ngso son n La Law) w),, an act amend amendin ing g certain portions of the Revised Election Code, was approved and took effect on June 16, 1967. It (1) prohibited the too early nomination of candidates and (2) limited the period of election campaign or partisan political activity ac tivity.. o SEC. 50-A. Pr Proh ohib ibit itio ion n of to too o ea earl rly y shall be nomination nomin ation of Candi Candidates dates. — It sha unlaw un lawful ful fo forr an any y po polilitic tical al pa party rty,, Po Polilitic tical al
24 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Committ Com mittee, ee, or Pol Politi itical cal gro group up to nom nomina inate te candid can didate ates s for any ele electi ctive ve pub public lic off office ice voted for a large earlier than one hundred and fifty days (150) immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public offi of fice ce ea earl rlie ierr th than an ni nine nety ty da day ys (9 (90) 0) immediately preceding an election. o SEC 50 50-B. Lim Limita itatio tion n upo upon n the per period iod of Electi Ele ction on Cam Campai paign gn or Par Partis tisan an Pol Politi itical cal unla law wfu full fo forr an any y pe pers rson on Activity . — It is un whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to en enga gage ge in an el elec ecti tion on ca camp mpai aign gn or partisan partis an politi political cal activity excep exceptt during the period per iod of one hundred hundred twe twenty nty day days s (12 (120) 0) immediately immedia tely preceding an electi election on for any public office. o "C "Ca and ndid idat ate" e" - any pers person on aspi aspiri ring ng for for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nomin no minate ated d by an any y po poliliti tica call pa party rty as it its s candidate. o "E "Ele lect ctio ion n Ca Camp mpai aign gn"" or "P "Par arti tisa san n Po Poli liti tica call Activity" - acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office which shall include: (a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees Commit tees or other oth er gr grou oups ps of pe pers rson ons s fo forr th the e purpos pur pose e of sol solici icitin ting g vote votes s and and/or /or unde un dert rtak akin ing g an any y ca camp mpai aign gn or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b (b)) Ho Hold ldin ing g po poli liti tica call co conv nven enti tion ons, s, caucuses, caucuse s, confer conferences, ences, meetin meetings, gs, rallie ral lies, s, par parade ades, s, or oth other er sim simila ilar r asse as sembl mblie ies, s, for th the e pu purp rpose ose of soliciting solici ting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (c) Making speeches, announ ann ounceme cements nts or com comment mentari aries es or holding interviews for or against the th e elect ctiion of any party or candidate for public office; (d) Publishing or distribution campaign literature or materials; (e (e)) Di Dire rect ctly ly or in indi dire rect ctly ly solic solicit itin ing g vote vo te and nd/o /orr und nder erta taki king ng an any y campa ca mpaig ign n or pr prop opag agan anda da for or against any candidate or party; (f (f)) Giv ivin ing, g, so soli lici citi ting ng,, or re rece ceiv ivin ing g contributions for election campaign purposes, eith the er directl tly y or indirectly. Provisos: Provided , (1) That simple expr ex pres essi sion ons s or op opiini nion on and an d thoughts thou ghts con concer cernin ning g the ele electi ction on shall not be considered as part of an ele electi ction on cam campai paign. gn. Provided, (2)) Th That at no noth thin ing g he here rein in further , (2 stat st ated ed sh shal alll be un unde ders rsto tood od to prevent any person from expressing his hi s vi view ews s on cu curr rren entt po poli liti tica call
problems or issues, or fr fro om men me nti tion onin ing g th the e na name mes s of th the e candidates candi dates for publi public c offic office e whom he supports. June Jun e 22, 1967 1967 - Petit Petition ioners ers chal challen lenged ged the the validi validity ty of the two new sections abovementioned. They said that the enf enforc orcemen ementt of RA 4880 wou would ld pre prejud judice ice the their ir basic rights such as their freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or soci so ciet etie ies s for pu purp rpos oses es no nott co cont ntra rary ry to la law; w; an and d therefore, therefo re, said act is uncons unconstitutio titutional. nal. They furthe further r assert that there is nothin nothing g in the spirit or inten intention tion of the law tha thatt wou would ld leg legall ally y jus justify tify its pas passag sage e and enforce enfo rcement ment whe whethe therr for rea reason sons s of pub public lic pol policy icy,, public order or morality. Moreover, the nomination of a cand ca ndid idat ate e an and d th the e fi fixi xing ng of pe peri riod od fo forr el elec ecti tion on campaig camp aign n are mat matters ters of pol politi itical cal exp expedi edienc ency y and convenience which only political parties can regulate and curtail among themselves through self-restraint or mutual mutu al und unders erstand tanding ing of agr agreem eement ent.. Fin Finall ally y, the limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the stat state e wou would ld ren render der the con constit stituti utiona onall rig rights hts of petitioners meaningless and without effect. o Pe Peti titi tion oner er Cabi Cabiga gao o was, was, at the the time time of the the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in th the e 4t 4th h Di Dist stri rict ct of Ma Man nil ila a an and d th the e Nacionalista Party official candidate for ViceMayor of Manila to which he was subse sub sequ quen ently tly el elec ecte ted d on No Nove vembe mberr 11, 1967. o Pet Petit itio ione nerr Gonza Gonzale les s is a priva private te indi indivi vidu dual al,, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. c o-petitioner. Respon Res ponden dentt COMELEC COMELEC,, on its its answe answerr filed filed on Aug August ust 1, 1967, denied the allegations as to the validity of the act for being mere conclusions of law and erroneous at th that at.. It se sett for forth th sp spec ecia iall af affi firma rmati tive ve de defen fense ses, s, procedural and substantive in character; and, would have this Court dismiss the petition filed. o He Here re,, the Phil Philip ippi pine ne Gove Govern rnmen mentt argue argued d that that the purpose of the law is to curtail excessive and extrav extravagant agant partis partisan an polit political ical activi activities ties during election year: (1) Prolonged exposure by bo both th ca cand ndid idat ates es an and d th the e pe peop ople le to poliliti po tica call te tens nsio ion n le lead ads s to bi bitte tterr ri riva valr lrie ies s precipitatin precip itating g viole violence nce and even death (i.e. election-related violence); (2) Huge election expen exp endi ditu ture res s mak make e po poor or ye yett de dese serv rvin ing g candid can didate ates’ s’ cha chance nces s of win winnin ning g sli slim m (i.e (i.e.. dominion of rich in political arena); and, (3) Prolonged election campaigns also lead to corruption of the electorate. as a response to a serious substantive (and existing) evil affecting the electoral process Augu Au gust st 3, 1967 1967 – Ca Case se was was se sett fo forr heari hearing ng.. SC passed pas sed a res resolu olutio tion n giv giving ing the pet petiti itione oners rs and the respondent a period of 4 days from this date within which to submit their respective memorandum in lieu of oral argument. Augu Au gust st 9, 196 967 7 – SC passe passed d ano noth the er re reso sollut utiion declaring that they would defer final voting on the issue until after the return of the Justices now on official leave. o There was a divergence of amo mon ng the 8 Justices present as to the constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c), (d) and (e) of the
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 25
Revised Election Code. o Se Sec. c. 10, 10, Art Art VII VII:: "No "No trea treaty ty or or law law may may be decl de clar ared ed unco un cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al with wi thou outt the th e concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court.” Sena Se nato torr Tañ añad ada: a: He ju justi stifi fied ed RA 4880’s 4880’s enact enactmen mentt under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of electi elections, ons, whether for nati na tion onal al or lo loca call of offi fici cial als, s, be bein ing g de deba base sed d an and d degrad deg raded ed by unr unrest estric ricted ted cam campai paigni gning, ng, exce excess ss of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
Procedural Issues: 1.
2.
WON the the peti petitio tion n should should be be dismiss dismissed ed on the grou ground nd that respondent respondent COMELEC is not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act so that the suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion WON the the peti petitio tion n should should be be dismiss dismissed ed on the grou ground nd that the parties do not have legal standing
Substantive Issues: 3.
WON WO N prohibition in RA 4880 of the too early nomination nominat ion of can candid didate ates s and the lim limita itatio tion n foun found d therein on the period of election campaign or partisan political polit ical activities is uncons unconstitutio titutional nal on the groun ground d that it offend against the rights of free speech, free pres pr ess, s, fr free eedo dom m of as asse semb mbly ly an and d fr free eedo dom m of association?
Held/ Ratio: 1.
2.
3.
No.. Un No Unde derr th the e ci circ rcum umsta stanc nces es,, th the e pe peti titi tion on could could sti stillll be rightfully treated as one for prohibition. SC said: It is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; the n; we mus mustt act on the matter. matter. The exceptio exceptional nal char ch arac acte terr of the si situa tuati tion on,, th the e pa para ramou mount nt pu publ blic ic interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away. In the the first first part part of the the deci decisio sion, n, the the SC also also said said:: The The quest stiion confronting this Court is one of transcendental significance. No. In this this juris jurisdic dictio tion, n, the rule rule has has been been suffic sufficien iently tly rela re laxe xed d to al allo low w a tax taxpa paye yerr to br brin ing g an ac acti tion on to restrain the expenditure of public funds through the enfo en forc rcem emen entt of an in inva vali lid d or un unco cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al legislative measure. It is the the judgme judgment nt of the the Court Court that that RA RA 4880 4880 cann cannot ot be declared decla red uncons unconstitutio titutional. nal. The necess necessary ary two-thi two-third rd vote, not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statues to come into play. Petition is dismissed. Writ prayed for denied. Proh Pr ohib ibit itio ion n of too early early nomin nominati ation on of candid candidat ates es is valid. (“We su sust sta ain its validity ty.. We do so unanimously.”) o Po Poliliti tica call parti parties es hav have e less less free freedo dom m as to the the time ti me du duri ring ng wh whic ich h th they ey ma may y no nomi mina nate te cand ca ndid idat ates es;; th the e cu curt rtai ailm lmen entt is no nott su such ch,, however, as to render meaningless such a basi ba sic c ri righ ght. t. Th Thei eirr sc scop ope e of le legi giti tima mate te acti ac tivi viti ties es,, sa save ve th this is on one, e, is no nott un undu duly ly narrow nar rowed. ed. Nei Neithe therr is the there re inf infrin ringeme gement nt of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose.
Limita Limi tati tion on on th the e pe peri riod od of “e “ele lect ctio ion n ca camp mpai aign gn”” or “par “p arti tisa san n po poliliti tica call ac acti tivi vity ty”” su suff ffer ers s fr from om the fa fatal tal consti con stituti tutiona onall inf infirmi irmity ty of vag vaguen ueness ess and may be stricken down. o Whe Where re the the statut statutory ory pro provi visi sion on then then oper operat ates es to inhibit the exercise of individual freedom affirmatively affirma tively protected by the Consti Constitution tution,, the imp imputat utation ion of vag vaguen ueness ess suf suffic ficien ientt to invalidate the statute is inescapable. o Th The e majo majori rity ty of of the the Cour Courtt is thu thus s of the the bel belie ief f that the sol solici icitati tation on or und undert ertaki aking ng of any campaign or propaganda whether directly or indire ind irectly ctly,, by an ind indivi ividua dual, l, the maki making ng of speeches, announcements or commentaries or ho hold ldin ing g in inte terv rvie iew w fo forr or ag agai ains nstt th the e election electi on for any party or candid candidate ate for publi public c office off ice,, or the pub public licati ation on or dis distrib tributi ution on of campaign literature or or materials, suffer from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one on e mo more re af affi firm rmat ativ ive e vo vote te to ca call ll fo forr a declaration of unconstitutionality. o It onl nly y ind ndic icat ates es that that fo forr th the e ma majo jori rity ty,, th the e prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indir indirectly ectly,, or the undert und ertakin aking g of any cam campai paign gn lit litera erature ture or propaganda for or against any candidate or part pa rty y is re repu pugn gnan antt to a co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al command comm and.. To that ext extent, ent, the cha challe llenge nged d statute prohibits what under the Constitution cann ca nnot ot by an any y la law w be ab abri ridg dged ed.. Mo More re specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it is the consideration opinion of the majority, though thou gh lac lackin king g the nec necessa essary ry vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statu sta tute te co coul uld d ha have ve be been en mo more re na narr rrow owly ly drawn draw n and the pra practic ctices es pro prohib hibite ited d mor more e precisely delineate ted d to satisfy the constit con stituti utiona onall req requir uiremen ements ts as to a val valid id limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. o Overbroad: The sta tattutory provisions in question questi on are uncon unconstituti stitutional onal on their face inasmuch as they appear to range too widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental lilibe bert rtie ies s ass assoc ocia iated ted wi with th fre freed edom om of the mind.
Voting: UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Dizon, Zaldivar, Capistrano, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Barredo and Fernando (Ponente). (7 votes) CONSTITUTIONAL (Concurs in the Result): Concepcion C.J., Reyes J.B.L., Makalintal, M akalintal, and Teehankee. Teehankee. (4 votes)
Ratio Decidendi (?): Sec. 4 of Art. III (1987 Constitution), “No law shall be pas passed sed abridgin abridging g the fre freedo edom m of spe speech ech,, of expression, or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to ass assemb emble le and pet petiti ition on the gov govern ernmen mentt for red redres ress s of shou ould ld NO NOT T be in inte terp rpre rete ted d as a ri righ ghtt NO NOT T grievances,” sh susceptible of any limitation. In any case, the law in question would be subjected to certain tests – clear and present danger
26 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 rule and void for vagueness.
Concepts: Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Assembly o
o
At the the very very lea least st,, free free spe speech ech an and d free free pre press ss may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest intere st withou withoutt censor censorship ship or punis punishment. hment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings un unle less ss th ther ere e be a cl clea earr an and d pres pr esen entt da dang nger er of su subs bstan tantiv tive e ev evilil th that at Congress has a right to prevent. o Th The e vita vitall need need in in a consti constitu tuti tion onal al demo democra cracy cy for fre freedo edom m of exp expres ressio sion n is und undeni eniabl able e whether as a means of assuring individual self se lf-fu -fulf lfilillme lment nt,, of at atta tain inin ing g th the e tru truth th,, of assuring participation by the people in social including inclu ding polit political ical decisi decision-maki on-making, ng, and of maintai main tainin ning g the bal balanc ance e betw between een sta stabil bility ity and change. o Fr Free eedo dom m of expr expres essi sion on is is not not an abs absol olut ute. e. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. Criterion for Permissible Restriction ( Cabansag v. Fernandez ): ): o Cl Clea earr an and d Pr Pres esen entt Da Dang nger er Ru Rule le – Evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of immi im mine nenc nce e ex extr trem emel ely y hi high gh be befo fore re th the e utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarde gua rded d aga agains instt is the “su “substa bstanti ntive ve evi evil” l” sought to be prevented. o Dangerous Tendency Rule – If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. . It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is suffici suf ficient ent tha thatt suc such h acts be adv advoca ocated ted in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawf unl awfuln ulness ess.. It is suf suffici ficient ent if the nat natura urall tend te nden ency cy an and d pr prob obab able le ef effe fect ct of th the e utterance be to bring about the substantive evilil wh ev whic ich h th the e le legi gisl slati ative ve bo body dy se seeks eks to prevent. o Th The e test test then then as as a limit limitat atio ion n on free freedo dom m of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substan sub stantive tive characte characterr tha thatt the state has a righ ri ghtt to pr prev even ent. t. Un Unli like ke th the e dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be cle clear ar but also pre presen sent. t. The ter term m cle clear ar seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially substantially evil arisi arising ng from fro m th the e utt utter eran ance ce qu ques esti tion oned ed.. Pre Prese sent nt refe re fers rs to the time elemen element. t. It us used ed to be iden id entif tifie ied d wi with th im immi mine nent nt an and d im immed media iate te dang da nger er.. Th The e da dang nger er mu must st no nott on only ly be probable but very likely inevitable. o Th The e clea clearr and pre prese sent nt dang danger er doctr doctrin ine e rightl rightly y viewed requires that not only should there be an occasion fo forr th the e im impo posi siti tion on of su such ch
restrictions but also that they be limited in scope.
o
Freedom of Association o
o
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. As in in the the case case of of free freedo dom m of exp expre ress ssio ion, n, this this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. With or with With withou outt a consti constitut tutio iona nall provi provisi sion on of of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With this explicit provision, provis ion, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee which are mostly American in or orig igin in,, thi this s pa part rtic icul ular ar fre freed edom om ha has s an indigenous cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. How sho shoul uld d the lim limit itat atio ion n "for "for pur purpo pose ses s not con co ntr trar ary y to la law w" be int nte erp rpre rete ted? d? It is sub su bmi mitt tte ed th tha at it is anoth the er way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown sho wn to cr crea eate te an im immi mine nent nt da dang nger er to public pub lic saf safety ety,, the there re is no jus justifi tificat cation ion for abri ab ridg dgin ing g th the e ri righ ghtt to for form m as asso soci ciat atio ion n societies.
Overbreadth Doctrine o
o
A go gove vern rnme ment ntal al pu purp rpo ose co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal ally ly subject to control or prevent activities state regulation may not be achieved by means which whi ch swe sweep ep unn unnece ecessa ssaril rily y bro broadl adly y and ther th ereb eby y in inva vade de th the e ar area ea of pr prot otec ecte ted d freedoms. It is und unden enia iabl ble, e, ther therefo efore re,, that that even even thoug though h the gov govern ernment mental al pur purpos poses es be leg legiti itimate mate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by mean me ans s th that at br broa oadl dly y st stif ifle le fu fund ndam amen enta tall personal liberties when the end can be more narr na rrow owly ly ac achi hie eve ved. d. Forr pre Fo reci cisi sion on of regulation is the touchstone in an area so clos cl osel ely y re rela late ted d to ou ourr mo most st pr prec eciiou ous s freedoms.
Sanchez (Concurring and Dissenting):
RA 844 8440 0 is a polic police e power power legis legislat lation ion.. It was was enacte enacted d by vi virtu rtue e of the in inhe here rent nt po powe werr of Co Cong ngre ress ss to legisl leg islate ate on matt matters ers aff affecti ecting ng pub public lic int intere erest st and welfare. Section 50-A is valid. We may not tag as unconstitutional 50-B, and its subsections (a), (b) and (f). We fear no serious evil with their enforcement. They The y do not off offend end the con consti stituti tutiona onally lly pro protect tected ed speech and press freedoms, and rights of peaceable assembly and association. association. The latter must yield yield.. The proscription proscr iptions s set forth in all of them are clear-cut, clear-cut, not open to reasonable doubt, nor easily susceptible to unreas unr easona onable ble int interp erpreta retatio tion. n. Pub Public lic int intere erest st and welfare authorize their incorporation into the statute books. Subs Su bsec ecti tio ons (c (c), ), (d) and and (e (e)) of Secti Section on 50-B 50-B ar are e problematic. As we analyze the import of the law, we come co me to th the e co conc nclu lusi sion on th that at sa said id su subs bsec ecti tion ons s of
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 27
Section 50-B inserted into the Revised Election Code by Republic Act 4880 run against the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. o No one one can draw draw an ind indis ispu puta tabl ble e divid dividin ing g line lin e betw between een law lawful ful (See (See:: Pro Provis visos) os) and unlawful discussion. Th The e pecul peculia iari rity ty of disc discus ussi sion on,, be it oral or printed, is that it carries with it varyin varying g degree degrees s of "enthusiasm and an d in incl clin inat atio ion n to pe pers rsua uade de", ", depe de pend ndin ing g up upon on th the e liliste stene nerr or reader. It falls short of a partisan political activity when it is devoid of partisan partisa n intere interest st in the sense that it is no nott ma made de in th the e in inte tere rest st of a candidate or party. This is the only criterion for validity. But who is to deci de cide de thi this? s? An And d ho how? w? Th The e law does not even requi require re that there be an operation or a series of operations in order to measure up to an el elec ectio tion n ca campa mpaig ign n as it is commonly understood. In this way, the th e law ma may y wel elll become an instrument of harassment. Worse, it cou co uld lull th the e pote ten ntial had defen de fenda dant nt in into to a fal false se se sens nse e of security. It then becomes a dragnet that may trap anyone who attempts to ex expr pres ess s a si simp mple le op opin inio ion n on political issues. o Be Beca caus use e of th the e in inde defi fini nite tene ness ss cr crea eate ted d in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B, they th ey re read adil ily y le lend nd th them emse selv lves es to ha hars rsh h application. Vagueness of the law enforcers. Arbitrary enforcement of the letter of the law by an ex expa pans nsiv ive e de defi fini niti tion on of el elec ecti tion on campaign or partisan political activity, should not be branded as improbable. To forego forego the ques questio tion n of constit constituti utiona onalit lity y for now now and take risks may not be the wiser move.
freedo free doms ms of sp spee eech ch,, of th the e pr pres ess, s, of pe peac acef eful ul assembly and of lawful association. o Sec Sec.. 50-A 50-A – The The pro proce cess ss of of nomin nominat atio ion n must must yiel yi eld d to th the e re requ quir irem emen ents ts of re reas ason onab able le regulations imposed by law. While the act of nominat nomi nation ion a can candid didate ate has spe speech ech and assembly asse mbly asp aspect ects, s, the res restric trictiv tive e eff effect ect of this sec sectio tion n wou would ld app appear ear neg neglig ligibl ible. e. The reach of this section is limited: applies only to pol politi itical cal par partie ties, s, pol politi itical cal com committ mittees ees or political groups. The thrust is also limited: it does do es no nott pr proh ohib ibit it po poliliti tical cal pa parti rties es fr from om hold ho ldin ing g no nomin minat atin ing g co conv nven enti tion ons s or fr from om doing doi ng any oth other er law lawful ful thi thing ng dur during ing such con co nve vent ntiion ons; s; wha hatt it co cont ntro rols ls is th the e sched sch edul ulin ing g of no nomin minat atin ing g co conv nven enti tion ons. s. Moreover, periods specified do not appear to be unreasonably short. Finally, the interest of the co commu mmuni nity ty in lilimi miti ting ng th the e pe peri riod od of elec el ecti tion on ca camp mpai aig gns ns,, on ba ballan ance ce,, fa far r outweig outw eighs hs the social social val value ue of the kind of speech and assembly that is involved in the formal nomination nomination of candid candidates ates for publi public c office. o Se Sec. c. 5050-B B – Appl Applie ies s to any any pers person on and and any any group of persons; The effect of the law is to impose impo se a com compre prehen hensiv sive e and pro prolon longed ged prohibition of speech of a particular content except during the 120 or 80 days resp re spect ectiv ively ely,, im imme medi diate ately ly pr prec eced edin ing g an elec el ecti tion on.. The in inte tere rest st of th the e st stat ate e in regulating regula ting partis partisan an polit political ical activi activity ty,, which is sought to be secured by Sec 50-B no less than by Sec 50-A, is a legitimate one and its prote pr otect ctio ion n a pr prop oper er ai aim m fo forr re reaso asona nabl ble e exercise of the public power. However, that that interest does not offset the restrictions which Sec 50-B imposes with indis indiscrimin criminate ate sweep swe ep upo upon n the eve even n mor more e fun fundame damental ntal comm co mmun unit ity y in inte tere rest sts s em embo bodi died ed in th the e cons co nsti titu tuti tion onal al guar gu aran ante tees es of spee sp eech ch,, assembly and association.
Castro (Dissenting):
Sections Sectio ns 50-A 50-A and and 50-B 50-B are not whol wholly ly consi consisten stentt with with each ea ch oth other er an and d tha thatt pr prac acti tica call di diff ffic icul ulti ties es may be expe ex pect cted ed by th thos ose e wh who o wo woul uld d co compl mply y wi with th th the e requirements of both (i.e. with respect to number of days). The very broadness of prohibitions contained in Se Secti ction on 50 50-B -B ha has s th the e ef effec fectt of re redu duci cing ng,, as a practical matter, the time period specified in Section 50-A for nomination of candidates for national offices from 150 to 120 days before an election. requ quir ires es a co cour urtt to Balancing-of-Interests Test – re take tak e con consci scious ous and deta detaile iled d con consid sidera eration tion of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. o Da Dang nger erou ous s Ten Tende denc ncy y and Cle Clear ar and and Prese Present nt Danger Criteria are not appropriate in this case ca se be beca caus use e thi this s ki kind nd of co cons nsti titut tutio iona nall testing would involve both speculation and prophecy of sort which this Court is not in any special competence to do. Appl Ap plyi ying ng th the e ba bala lanc ncin ingg-of of-i -int nter eres ests ts te test sts, s, I am persuaded th tha at Congress did not exceed constitutional limits in enacting Sec. 50-A. However, I reach a different conclusion with respect to Sec. 50-B for it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the
Barredo (Concurring and Dissenting):
This case This case sh shou ould ld ha have ve be been en di dism smis isse sed d ou outr trig ight ht.. Procedural Proced ural grounds: (1) Petitio Petition n f or relief is definitely outside the original jurisdiction of this Court; (2) No actual controversy – No allegations of specific acts of COMELEC or even only threatened to be committed by it; (3) Case is academic – Petitioners have no more interest in the proceeding; (4) Conversion motu into to a tax taxpa paye yer’ r’s s su suit it is no nott pr prop oper er – no proprio in specific expenditure of public funds is involved Re Re:: Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al Pr Prob oble lems ms o In the the ligh lightt of the the rece recent nt poli politi tica call expe experi rien ence ce of the strong of heart and idealists amongst us, this measure appears appears to me as a perfect or, at least, a near-perfect scheme for the perpet per petuati uation on of the sta and d th the e status tus quo an entre en trenc nchme hment nt of the pr pres esen ently tly ex exis istin ting g political politi cal partie parties, s, particu particularly larly,, the two major ones, whether or not we share the cynical refer re feren ence ce to th them em by th the e di disc scer erni ning ng as nothing but twin peas in the same pod. o Par Parag agra raph ph 6, Sec Sectio tion n 1, Arti Articl cle e III of of the Bil Billl of Rights of the Constitution which ordains: The right to form associations or societies for
28 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 purposes not contrary to law shall not be 1. GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and gross abridged. misconduct “F “For or pur purpo pose ses s not not cont contra rary ry to to law” law” The Th e SC used used the the term term “in fac facie ie curi curiae ae”” whic which h liter literal ally ly the ph phra rase se wa was s in inse sert rted ed ju just st to meant direct contempt/”contempt in the face of the show that the right of association cour co urts” ts”.. Bu Butt wh what at the SC mea meant nt wa was, s, th the e ac acts ts of guaranteed in the Constitution was Gonz Go nzal alez ez (i (in n hi his s pl plea eadi ding ngs s an and d in hi his s me medi dia a subjec sub jectt to the domi dominati nating ng pol police ice statemen stat ements) ts) and his mis miscon conduc ductt wer were e ser seriou ious s in power of the state. nature and it was like a “frontal attack” to the integrity o As a matt matter er of of fact, fact, I dare dare say say pol polic ice e powe power r of the Court and to the entire judicial system itself. woul wo uld d be in inex exis iste tent nt un unle less ss th the e po polilitic tical al Anyway, Gonzalez was given a lot of chances to parties that give life to the government which defend himself. Had it been direct contempt, he would exercises police power are allowed to exist. have been punished summarily under ROC Rule 71 That is not to say that political parties are Sec 1. abov ab ove e th the e st stat ate. e. All th that at I me mean an is th that at without political parties, a democratic state 2. RU RULE LE 13 139 9 AP APPL PLIC ICAB ABLE LE cannot exist; what we will have instead is a Rule 139 is on Disbarment or Suspension of police state. Attorneys (SC will act on it). 139-B is on Disbarment o Le Lest st I be mis misun unde ders rstoo tood, d, howe howeve verr, as bein being g and Discipline of Attorneys (IBP will investigate first an ult ultrara-acti activis vist, t, it sho should uld be cle clear ar at the before SC acts). outs ou tset et th that at in ho holldi ding ng th that at th the e abo bove ve The Th e SC only only ment mentiion oned ed 139139-B B be beca caus use e Go Gonz nzal alez ez proh pr ohib ibiti ition ons s co conta ntain ined ed in th the e sta statu tute te in wanted to refer the case to the Solicitor General or to question are violative of the Constitution, my the IBP. IBP. SC said there t here was no need to refer to another stand is limited to my fundamental conviction body because the facts are already presented and that the freedoms of speech, of the press there is no dispute, and that they already found a and of pea peacef ceful ul ass assemb embly ly and redress redress of cause of action there; thus, only issues of law are grievances are absolute when they are being needed to be addressed by the SC already. exercised in relation to our right to choose Cited ca case of of Green vs. US, concurring opinion of the men and women by whom we shall be Justice Frankfurter: the power of the court to punish governed. for contempt without need for jury has never been o In view of the abbreviated period of doubted. campaign fixed in this law, necessarily the candidates have to redouble their efforts, try 3. CLE CLEAR AR AND PRES PRESENT ENT DAN DANGER GER rule rule APPL APPLICAB ICABLE LE to cover more area in less time, see more SC did did not not make make a ne new w “vis “visib ible le tend tenden ency cy doct doctri rine ne”” peop pe ople le ev every ery mo mome ment, nt, di distr strib ibute ute mo more re (NOT defined in the case) but only paraphrased ROC propaganda, etc., etc., and all these mean Rule 71 Sec 3(d) (grounds for indirect contempt: :any money, more money and more money. In this imprope impr operr con conduc ductt ten tendin ding, g, dir direct ectly ly or ind indire irectly ctly,, to set up, so neatly produced by this law, it is impede, impe de, obs obstru truct ct or deg degrad rade e the adm admini inistra stratio tion n of regretably evident that the poor candidates justice”). have no chance. Cited Lagunzad vs. Vda de Gonzales for definitions o Fr Free eedo dom m of exp expre ress ssio ion n has has limi limita tati tion ons: s: Cl Clea earr and and pres presen entt dang danger er rul rule e (thi (this s Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan is NOT THE ONLY TEST) February 1, 1989, 170 SCRA 1 Ba Bala lanci ncing ng of of inte intere rests sts tes testt (cou (court rt to to take ta ke co cons nsci cio ous an and d deta de tail ile ed Ponente: Per Curiam. EN BANC. cons co nsid ider erati ation on of th the e in inte terp rplay lay of Nature: Motion for Reconsideration inter in teres ests ts ob obse serv rvab able le in a gi give ven n situation or type of situation) FACTS: SC said said unde underr ei eith ther er of thes these e 2 te test sts, s, Gon Gonza zallez ez’’ This Th is is an MR fi file led d by by cou couns nsel el of Raul Gonzalez (this statements went beyond the permissible limits of free attorney, “claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayanspeech. Ombuds Omb udsman man und under er the 198 1987 7 Con Consti stituti tution, on,”” is the The SUBST that at the Court Court se seek eks s to SUBSTANTIVE ANTIVE EVIL th subject of this case) in an Oct. 7, 1988 case. prevent (and has authority to do so) is the “obstruction (the (t here re ar are e NO “fa “facts cts”, ”, ju just st a st stat ateme ement nt of is issu sues es of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also raised by petitioner and the SC’s respective ruling) the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of ISSUES: the standards of professional conduct required from 1. Wa Was s Gonzal Gonzalez ez guilty guilty of indire indirect ct or direc directt contemp contempt? t? members of the bar and officers of the courts.” 2. Sh Shou ould ld Gonza Gonzale lez z be ch char arge ged d under under Rule 139( 139(b) b) or o It may may be le less ss pal palpa pabl ble e than than thr threa eatt of pub publilic c Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court (ROC)? disord dis order er,, rio riotin ting, g, or ove overt rt vio violen lence ce but it’ it’s s 3. Whi Which ch is appl applica icable ble,, the “visi “visible ble tend tendency ency rule rule”” or the more far reaching. “clear and present danger rule”? 4. Is intent intent rel releva evant nt in in charge charges s of miscon misconduc duct? t? 4. YES. INT INTENT ENT TO BE DEDU DEDUCED CED FRO FROM M ACT ACTS. S. 5. Can the court court puni punish sh Gonza Gonzalez lez for conte contempt mpt of of court court Gonz Go nzal alez ez dis discl clai aims ms an an inten intentt to atta attack ck the the Cour Court. t. for “out of court” publications? SC sai said you can’ can’tt hid ide e by usi using inte intent nt.. We deriv derive e 6. Is indefi indefini nite te suspe suspens nsio ion n from the the practi practice ce of law a intent by examining acts or statements. Here, it is “cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? clear that Gonzalez’ acts showed intent to attack the Court.
HELD and RATIO
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 29 5. 6. -
YES. Gonzal Gonz alez ez used used UK and and US US tren trends ds on on conte contempt mpt fo forr his his defense SC said said thos those e are not not bind bindin ing g or persu persuas asiv ive e in this this jurisdiction. NOT NO T CRUE CRUEL, L, DEGR DEGRAD ADIN ING G OR INHU INHUMAN MAN!! The indef The indefin init iten enes ess s actua actualllly y is to let let Gonz Gonzal alez ez repe repent nt his acts and prove himself again worthy of the legal profession in his OWN GOOD TIME.
Right as a public political figure Osmena vs Pendatuin G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Ponente: Bengzon J. Congressman ssman Osmena deliv delivered ered a privil privilege ege speech Facts: Congre entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presid President’ ent’s s admini administrati stration on selli selling ng pardon pardons. s. His charges, if made maliciously or recklessly without basis of fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the Office of the President. The House of Representatives (HoR) passed a Ho Hous use e Re Reso solu luti tion on No No.. 59 cr crea eati ting ng a co commi mmitte ttee e of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges. The special committee will submit a report to the House of its finding and recommendations. Osmen Os mena a pe peti titi tion oned ed fo forr de decl clar arato atory ry re relilief, ef, ce certi rtior orar arii an and d prohibition prohi bition with preli preliminary minary injun injunction ction again against st Congre Congressman ssman Pendat Pen datun un and 14 oth other er con congre gressme ssmen n in the their ir cap capaci acity ty as members memb ers of the spe specia ciall com committ mittee. ee. Spe Specifi cifical cally ly,, pet petiti itione oner r asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infrin inf ringeme gement nt of his par parlia liament mentary ary imm immuni unity; ty; and ask asked ed the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech. Court expressed its doubts over its jurisdiction but decided to hear the matter further and required the respondents to answer with wi thou outt is issu suin ing g any pr prel elim imin inary ary in inju junc nctio tion. n. Th The e sp spec ecia iall committee gave Osmena a chance to defend himself but was noneth non ethele eless ss foun found d gui guilty lty for ser seriou ious s dis disord orderly erly beh behavi avior or,, sentenc sen tencing ing him to a 1515-mon month th sus suspen pensio sion. n. Res Respon ponden dents ts chal ch alle leng nged ed th the e ju juri risd sdic icti tion on of the Co Cour urt, t, de defen fende ded d th the e disciplinary power of Congress and invited attention to the fact that the Congress has ended its session – they have ceased to exist!
Issues/Main contentions of Osmena: The Resol Resolution ution violated his consti constitution tutional al absol absolute ute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. 2. His words constituted no actionable conduct. 3. After his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other busi bu sine ness ss ha has s in inte terve rvene ned d af after ter th the e me membe mberr ha had d uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be answ swer er no norr be su subj bjec ectt to ce cens nsur ure e by th the e held to an House. 4. The House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend any of its members
from the legislative body. The members may nevertheless be questioned in Congress itself. 2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interp int erpret retati ation on of the leg legisl islati ative ve bod body y and not the jud judici iciary ary,, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power. 3. Reso Re solu luti tion on was un una ani nimo mous usly ly ap app pro rove ved d by by the the Ho Hou use se.. Such Suc h app approv roval al amo amount unted ed to an ame amendm ndment ent of the House Rules,, which, accord Rules according ing to standa standard rd practice, may be done by unan un anim imou ous s co cons nsen ent. t. Pa Parl rlia iame ment ntar ary y ru rule les s ar are e me mere rely ly procedural. The House has exclusive power over them and the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere (separation of powers). Cong Co ngre ress ss ha has s th the e in inhe here rent nt le legi gisl slat ativ ive e pr prer erog ogat ativ ive e of suspension. 4. For unparl unparliam iament entary ary conduct, conduct, members members of the Congress Congress have been be en,, or co coul uld d be ce cens nsur ured ed,, co comm mmit itted ted to pr pris ison on,, ev even en expelled by the votes of their colleagues. Petition was dismissed.
Dissenting: Reyes, J. B. L. The special committee empowered to investigate and -
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Labrador, J. The House can amends its rules any time but they -
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Held: 1. Parl Pa rliiam amen enta tary ry im immu muni nity ty gu guar aran ante tees es th the e me memb mber ers s the the freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before courts or forum outside of Congress. Congr ess. But this doesn’t protect them from respon responsibil sibility ity
recommend proper action over Osmena’s disorderly cond co nduc uctt wa was s cr crea eate ted d 15 DA DAYS YS af afte terr Os Osme mena na deli de live vere red d hi his s sp spee eech ch.. He wa was s su subj bjec ecte ted d to a punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. This violated the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation. The right of the House to amend its Rules doesn’t carry car ry wit with h it the rig right ht to ret retroa roacti ctively vely deprive deprive the petitioner of the immunity he has already acquired. Whatever liability Osmena has incurred was already extingu exti nguish ished ed whe when n the Hou House se dec decide ided d to con consid sider er other business. This extinction is a SUBSTANTIVE right that can’t be taken away. The Th e pu purp rpos ose e of th this is im immu muni nity ty is to pr prot otec ectt th the e members’ freedom of expression and to relieve them from fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of political convenience. The Th e Co Cour urtt po poss sses esse ses s no po pow wer to di dire rect ct th the e Legislative to act in a specified manner but this should not stop it from recognizing the unconstitutionality of the questioned resolutions.
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may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principles of law, to the extent of punishing an offense after the time to punish it had elapsed. The limitation of the time to which a House may take action against an offending member is a substantive rule, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored when invoked.
Ayer vs Capulong Borjal vs CA G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999
Ponente: Bellosillo, J . Nature: Petition for review on certiorari Facts: Franci Fra ncisco sco Win Winces ceslao lao,, who was ele electe cted d Exe Executi cutive ve
30 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Dir irec ecto torr of th the e Fi Firs rstt Na Nati tion onal al Co Con nfe fere renc nce e on La Lan nd 3. Yes. Winceslao is a public figure, as defined in the case of Trans Tr anspor portat tation ion (FN (FNCL CLT), T), sue sued d Art Arturo uro Bor Borjal jal,, who run runs s the Ayer Production vs. Capulong which states that a public figure column Jaywalker in Philippine Star, and Maximo Soliven its is any anyone one who has arrived arrived at a pos positi ition on whe where re the public public Publisher Publi sher and Chair Chairmane, mane, for Borjal Borjal’s ’s articles in Jaywa Jaywalker lker.. attention is focused upon him as a person. Since FNCLT was Before filing a complaint on Borjal with the National Press Club an undertaking imbibed with public interest, it attracted the (NPC) for using his column as leverage to obtain contracts for media and drew the public’s attention, not only to the event, his public relations firm, Winceslao first wrote to the newspaper butt al bu also so to th the e pe peop ople le be behi hind nd it. Si Sinc nce e Wi Winc ncesl eslao ao is th the e publication publi cation refuting the matters contained contained in the articl articles. es. After Exec Ex ecuti utive ve Di Dire recto ctorr an and d sp spoke okesp sper erso son, n, he co cons nseq eque uentl ntly y filing a complaint, Winceslao also filed a criminal charge for assumed the status of a public figure. Even if he were not a libel against Borjal and Soliven, but were dismissed by the trial public figure, because of the public’s interest in the event, the court, the DOJ, and the Office of the President. So Winceslao publ pu blic ic fo focu cus s is on th the e co cond nduc uctt of th the e pa part rtic icip ipan antt an and d the filed a civil action based on libel against them, wherein the trial content. Since the articles talked about the person’s official cour co urtt de deci cide ded d in fav favou ourr of Wi Winc nces esla lao, o, or orde deri ring ng he here rein in conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director petiti pet itione oners rs to ind indemn emnify ify Win Winces ceslao lao.. The Cou Court rt of App Appeal eals s of the FNCLT, the articles dealt with matters which the public affirm af firmed ed the decision, decision, but red reduce uced d the monetary monetary awa award. rd. It has a right to be informed, especially with the public character found fou nd tha thatt Win Winces ceslao lao was act actual ually ly defa defamed med by Bor Borjal jal by of the conference itself. descri des cribin bing g him as a “se “selflf-pro procla claime imed d her hero,” o,” a “co “confe nferen rence ce 4. No. To be considered malicious, libellous statements must organizer organ izer,” ,” “thick face,” and “a perso person n with dubious ways.” be shown to have been written with the knowledge that they Petitioners filed a MR but was dismissed, thus the present are false or that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to case. the truth of the publication. The Court found that Borjal has reasonable grounds for his remarks in the article evidenced by Issues: 1. WON Wince Wincesla slao o was suffici sufficientl ently y identif identified ied by Borja Borjall in several personal interviews and varied documentary evidence the articles. provided provid ed by his sources. A public public official must not be too thin2. WO WON N th the e ar arti ticl cles es co cons nsti titu tute te qu qual alif ifie iedl dly y pr priv ivil ileg eged ed skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. communication. Ratio Decidendi: 3. WO WON N Winc Winces esla lao o is a pub publilic c figu figure re.. 1. Reiter Reiterated ated Ayer Productions, Inc vs. Capulong on th the e 4. WON there was malice in the part of herein meaning of a public figure. petitioners petiti oners so as to constitute a valid cause of action 2. Privil Privileged eged communications communications are not actionable unless found for libel. to have been done with malice, but when directed to a public figure in his public capacity, it must also be a false allegation of Holding/Ratio: 1. No. Winceslao was not sufficiently identified Borjal in the fact or a comment based on a false supposition. articles. The articles do not identify Winceslao as the organizer of the event. Although to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that Tulfo vs People the victim be identifiable though it is not necessary that he be G.R. No. 161032 (September 16, 2008) named. But the things written to identify the person involved were “a hero of the EDSA revolution” and “organizer of the Date: 16 September 2008 seminar semi nar and con confere ference nces”. s”. The There re wer were e obv obviou iously sly a lot of Ponente: Velasco, Jr. heroes in the EDSA revolution that it would be hard to think Nature: Certiorari who it is. Also, as Winceslao himself admitted, the FNCLT had seve se vera rall or orga gani nize zers rs an and d th that at he wa was s on only ly pa part rt of th the e “The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of organizatio organ ization. n. Identi Identificatio fication n is inade inadequate quate when the offend offended ed our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect party himself is unsure of that he was the subject of the verbal the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with attack. Had Winceslao not revealed that he was the “organizer” resp re spon onsi sibi bili lity ty.. Th Ther ere e is a fi fine ne li line ne be betw twee een n fr free eedo dom m of of the FNCL FNCLT T, the public would still be ignorant of his identity. expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine 2. Yes. A privileged communication may either be absolutely whether or not that line has been crossed.” privileged or quali qualifiedly fiedly privil privileged. eged. Absol Absolutely utely privi privileged leged communications are not actionable even if the author has Facts: acted act ed in bad faith (i.e. Sec 11 Art VI of the Constituti Constitution) on).. - Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the t he Bureau of Customs filed containing Qual Qu alif ifie iedl dly y priv pr ivil ileg eged ed comm co mmun unic icat atio ions ns 4 se sepa para rate te in infor format matio ions ns ag agai ains nstt Erw Erwin in Tul ulfo, fo, as defamatory defama tory amputations amputations are not action actionable able unless found to author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey have hav e bee been n mad made e wit withou houtt goo good d int intent ention ion or moti motive. ve. This is Salao, Sal ao, as nat nation ional al edi editor tor,, Joc Jocely elyn n Bar Barliz lizo, o, as city where “private communications” and “fair and true comments editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo without any comments or remarks” belong. Although Borjal’s Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, remarks do not fall in both, this does not necessarily mean they with wi th th the e cr crim ime e of li libe bell in co conn nnec ecti tion on wi with th th the e are not privileged. The “doctrine of fair comment ” means that publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in in gen genera eral, l, eve every ry dis discre credit ditabl able e imp imputa utatio tion n pub public licly ly made is four issues. deemed false, because because every man is presume presumed d innocent until In this article, it was contended that Tulfo insulted a his gui guilt lt is jud judici iciall ally y pro proved ved,, and eve every ry fal false se imp imputa utatio tion n is certain Atty. Atty. Ding So of the BoC in the South Harbor. deemed dee med mali malicio cious, us, nev neverth erthele eless, ss, whe when n the dis discre credit ditabl able e o o 11 May 1 99 999 – Pinakamayaman sa imputation is directed against a public person in his public Customs: Tulfo referred to Atty Ding So as capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such “gagong attorney ” and as the “ pinakagago pinakagago at discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it [Iglesia ia ni magnanakaw magna nakaw na miye miyembro mbro nito [Igles must, either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based Kristo].” on a fal false se sup suppos positi ition. on. The que questi stione oned d arti article cles s dea dealt lt wit with h o 12 May May 199 1999 9 – Si Si Att Atty y. So ng BoC BoC:: Narr Narrate ated d matters of public interest, thus, it invites close scrutiny by the the corrupt practises of the red tape to avoid media which is obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of paying customs duties and taxes. Highlight: the purpose of the activity and personalities behind it. “Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So bakit hindi na
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 31
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lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng mas mabilis” o 19 May 1999 – alluded to A tttty. So as a standard for corruption o 25 June June 1999 1999 – refer referre red d to Atty Atty.. So So’’s 10million milli on libel suit against Tulfo and edito editors. rs. “Nagalit “Nagal it itong tarant tarantadong adong si si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC. Defense says that there was no proof that Atty. Carlos So wa was s th the e Att Attor orney ney that wa was s th the e su subj bjec ectt of the articles. They also said that the column alludes to an Atty. So at the South Harbour while Atty Att y. So actually works at NAIA. Tulfo also says that he did not write those articles with malice while the officers of the paper say that it is not their duty to monitor Tulfo’s writ wr itin ings gs si sinc nce e he an answ swer ered ed di dire rectl ctly y to on one e Re Rey y Brio Br ione nes, s, VP fo forr Ed Edito itori rial al an and d He Head ad of Ed Edit itor oria iall Division, who was not a party to the case. Prosecution Prosec ution presented four witne witnesses sses which attest that the allegations made were untrue and that he was the only Atty. Ding So in the BoC. Atty. So further claims that the articles of Tulfo caused him dishonour, discredit and contempt among the members of the legal profession, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Iglesia ni Kristo , colleagues at the BoC and among ordinary citizens of the country.
RTC: found petitioners guilty of the crime of libel. CA: dismissed appeal, affirmed RTC SC Decision: Dismissed petition. Lowered fines for Tulfo and the officials of Remate to P6k each + PhP 1,000,000 that they are jointly and severally liable for moral damages. Prison time deleted. Whet ethe herr or no nott th the e ar arti ticl cles es ca can n be co cons nsid ider ered ed Issue: Wh privileged communicatio communication n and therefore the presumption of malice does not apply.
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The defense on privileged communication was only raised in the SC petition, creating an unusual burden on the prosecution because the defense had to be refuted in CA/RTC level.
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions; (b) made in good faith; and (c) That it is without any comments or remarks. In Tu Tulfo lfo the ar arti ticl cle e he wr wrot ote e do does es no nott fal falll un unde der r Privileged Communication because : (a)) Is no (a nott me mett be beca caus use e no de deta tail ils s of th the e ac acts ts committed by Atty. So were described and were plain and baseless accusations (b) There was no good faith since the story was not verified before publication (c) Tulfo assassinated the character of Atty. So by callllin ca ing g hi him m na names mes an and d di disg sgra raci cing ng hi him m fro from m hi his s profession and religion. Test for malice is the “reckless disregard” test which Tul ulfo fo fa fail iled ed.. He ha had d no pr proo ooff no norr ba basi sis s fo forr hi his s allegations and did not desist when Atty. So filed for an action which further shows malice. Officers of the paper are not exempted from liability because direct participation in the publication is not considered an element to be liable for libel under Art. 360 of the RPC. They claim that no one edited Tulfo’s columns, which is exactly the misgiving of the officials.
The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment Daniel Ortiz Summary: This article talks about certain cases demonstrating how the court views how individuals make political choices, specifically decisions in elections. In the civic smarty approach, it is assumed that individuals decide based on the merits of candidates’ views views and policies, and it doesn’t matter how much he or she is exposed to the ideas of that candidate. In the civic slob approach, what matters is perception, and how intensely the idea has been put forward to the individual.
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presump sumptio tion n of mal malice ice hol holds ds tru true e RATIO RA TIO DECIDENDI: The pre when the author did not verify the contents of his published material, therefore, the articles were not considered privileged communication.
Ratio: -
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In Tulfo, the mere fact that that the subject is a publi public c figure does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Since the allegations turned out to be false, and in addition, since Tulfo did not verify it from his “sourc “so urce” e” nor pre presen sentt any evi eviden dence, ce, he bec become omes s liable. The Jo adop opte ted d by th the e Jour urna nali list st's 's Co Code de of Et Ethi hics cs ad National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows thatt the press recognize tha recognizes s that it has standards standards to follow fol low in the exercise exercise of pre press ss free freedom dom;; tha thatt thi this s freedom freedo m carrie carries s duties and respo responsibil nsibilities ities.. Clearl Clearly y, Tulfo did not follow the guidelines.
Condit Con dition ions s of Pri Privil vilege eged d Com Commun munica icatio tion n (Ar (Art. t.
354): (a) fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings whi which ch are not of confid confidential ential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered
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Constitu tuti tio onal law allocates pow owe er eith the er to an individual or government, and it structures the state; therefore, how we make political decisions and how empow emp ower ered ed we ar are e to ca carry rry ou outt th thes ese e de deci cisi sion ons s determi det ermine ne the leg legiti itimacy macy of our gov govern ernment ment.. Tw Two o theories are involved here: o Private Politics – refers to how an individual makes individual political choices o Public Politics – refers to how individuals can or should be able to carry out their individual choices in the political process To ma mak ke demo moc cratic legitima macy cy possi sib ble, it is important that private and public politics be protected. Forr ex Fo exam ampl ple, e, th the e vo vote terr mu must st be ab able le to ma make ke informed judgments and act with others to carry them out through respected collective choice mechanisms, including effective representation. Priv Pr ivat ate e and Publi Public c polit politic ics s is prot protec ecte ted d by the the Fi Firs rstt Amendment of the US Constitution. Several cases show how the firs firstt ame amendm ndment ent is use used d to pro protect tect them, and to show how the court believes individuals make political choices. Basi Ba sica calllly y, there there are are two app appro roac ache hes s in look lookin ing g at how how individuals make political choices: o Civ assu sume mes s th that at Civic ic sm smart arty y app approa roach ch – as individuals indivi duals make highly informed indiv individual idual politi pol itical cal cho choice ices, s, tha thatt peo people ple are eag eager er to acquire and sort through political argument
32 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 and information in order to better evaluate candidates. o Civic slob approach – assumes that people do not both the er to evaluate politi tica call informa inf ormatio tion; n; ins instead tead,, they rely on ima images ges,, feelings and emotions.
presen pres ente ted. d. FN FNB B wo woul uld d on only ly gi give ve th the e vo vote ters rs an informed choice. Justi Ju stice ce Whit White e disse dissent nts s from from the cour court’ t’s s view view, sayin saying g that money will distort choices, since people do not choose completely deliberately
The Academic Debate Buckley v. Valeo -
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In 1974 1974,, Th The e Fe Fede dera rall El Elec ecti tio on Camp mpai aign gn Act Act was amend ame nded ed by se setti tting ng a lilimit mit to co cont ntri ribu buti tion ons s an and d expenditures in election campaigns. Wha Wh at was str triiki kin ng here is th the e limi mittation se sett on “independent” expenditures, where money spent by an individual or entity without the coordination of any political campaign is also being limited. The courts can argue that contributions may pose a threat of political corruption, but expenditures relating to the act of expending money on behalf of the candidate, would not indebt indebt a can candid didate ate to a vote voterr, so reg regula ulatin ting g it would not protect the integrity of the political process. Differe Dif ference nce betw between een exp expend enditu itures res and con contri tribut bution ions s o Co Cont ntri ribu buti tion ons s ha have ve a si sign gnal alin ing g fu func ncti tion on – when one contributes, they indicate that they support the views of the candidate. Called “spe “s peec ech h by pr prox oxy” y”,, th this is as assu sume mes s th that at contributors give money so that the views they also advocate can be promoted by the candid can didate ate,, yie yieldi lding ng a goo good d inv invest estment ment for them. The Th e prob proble lem m howeve howeverr lies lies with with the as assu sumpt mptio ion n that that a person who can spend much more may have greater influence on the outcome of the election. With Wi th all all these these,, the cour courtt offer offered ed thre three e reaso reasons ns why why Congress could not restrict political expenditures: 1. Th The e more more ideas ideas are are expre expresse ssed, d, the bette betterr. The Fir First st ame amendm ndment ent pro prohib hibits its lev leveli eling, ng, becaus bec ause e it imp implie lies s gov govern ernmen mentt con contro troll of political politi cal debate, which may preven preventt voters from making free political choices. 2. Mo Money ney can can influ influen ence ce votes votes,, but each each side side in a political contest has money to spend in proportion to its preexisting popular support, so it does not threaten to distort the overall political process. 3. Vot oter’ er’s s de deci cisi sion ons s ar are e in infl flue uenc nced ed on only ly be ideas ide as and pol polici icies es of the can candid didate ates. s. Thi This s assumes that money only improves choice because with more money, more ideas are communication communi cation,, and the voters have more arguments to base their decisions from.
First National Bank v. Belloti -
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This case deci cid ded the unconstitu tuti tio onality of a Mass Ma ssac achu huse sett tts s criimi cr mina nall stat st atut ute e proh pr ohiibi biti ting ng corp co rpor orat atio ions ns fr from om sp spen endi ding ng mo money ney to in influ fluen ence ce referendums on questions not materially affecting the property, business, or assets of the corporation. Firs Fi rstt Na Nati tion onal al Bank Bank (FNB (FNB)) re rele leas ased ed an ad oppos opposin ing g the graduated state income tax, which is in violation of a Massachusetts criminal statute. However, the First Amendment, which prohibits government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw” runs counter to this; therefore, the Belloti Bello ti court uphel upheld d the validity of FNB’ FNB’s s refere referendum, ndum, sayin say ing g tha thatt FN FNB’ B’s s ad advo voca cacy cy of pe pers rsua uadi ding ng th the e electorate is no reason to suppress it, since voters woul wo uld d st stil illl lo look ok at th the e me meri rits ts of th the e ar argu gume ment nts s
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The Th e ba batt ttlle be betw twee een n int nten ensi siti ties es an and d id idea eas: s: Wh Wha at matters matter s mo more re,, ho how w gr grea eatly tly we ar are e ex expo pose sed d to a certain idea, or how credible the idea is for us from our own consideration? Wright believes that a wellfunded campaign will drown out certain ideas while BeVier believes that the individual chooses how to vote vo te by ev eval alua uati ting ng is issu sues es an and d id idea eas, s, no nott si simpl mply y following feelings and passions. Wrig Wr ight ht’’s fe fear ar of mo mono nopo poli liza zati tion on of id idea eas, s, howev however er,, would not be tenable, because no one may possibly hog all mea means ns of com communi municat cation ion.. For as lon long g all viewpoints are registered even in the slightest way, delilibe de bera rate te vo vote ters rs wi willll tak take e th them em in into to ac acco coun untt in political politi cal decisi decision on making making.. Intensi Intensity ty of presen presentation tation makes no difference. Sust Su stei ein, n, a re regu gullat atiion onal aliist st,, ho how wev ever er po poin ints ts ou outt in financ fin ancial ial con contrib tributi utions ons,, eco economi nomic c pow power er is bei being ng trans tra nsfor formed med to po poliliti tica call po powe werr. Th This is ca cann nnot ot be sustai sus tained ned how however ever sin since ce acco accordi rding ng to the Cou Court’ rt’s s civic smarty assumptions, human political personality prevents this transformation. BeVi Be Vier er forw forwar ards ds this this furt furthe herr by adop adopti ting ng the the polit politic ical al speech spe ech the theory ory of the Fir First st Amendment Amendment say saying ing tha thatt free speech serves to make us have informed choices and to allow us to persuade others to share our views.
The Dark Side of Political Personality: We are in fact Civic Slobs! -
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Money Mone y st stiill matte matters rs,, th ther eref efor ore, e, we ca can’ n’tt re real ally ly be completely civic smarties. Downs Dow ns:: The The publ public ic cho choic ice e theo theory ry wou would ld sho show w that that itit is irrational for us to be civic smarties because people wouldn’t want to expend too much resources on this. The Th e re real alit ity y is that that a si sign gnif ific ican antt am amou ount nt of pe peop ople le knows nothing about politics and many of those who know something only know a few issues. Most base their political decision making on the personality traits of candidates. The Th e court court has has actua actualllly y recog recogni nize zed d this this view view of poli politic tics s in two cases: 1. FE FEC C vs Massa Massach chus uset etts ts Citi Citize zens ns for for Life Life – in this case the cou court rt all allowe owed d an ide ideolo ologic gical al corp co rpor orat atiion who wan ante ted d to end ndor orse se can ca ndidates in an election to ma mak ke independent indepe ndent expenditures, expenditures, becaus because e of the Firs Fi rstt Am Amen endm dmen ent. t. It sa said id th that at re rela lati tive ve availilab ava abilility ity of fu fund nds s is af after ter al alll a ro roug ught ht barometer of public support. 2. Aust Austin in vs vs Michi Michigan gan Cha Chambe mberr of Com Commerc merce e– In this case, an economic corporation was barred from making independent expenditures expend itures.. It says here that the “act does not attempt to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections’; rather, it ensures thatt ex tha expe pend ndit itur ures es re refle flect ct ac actu tual al pu publ blic ic support for the political ideas espouses by corporations. § Th Ther ere e is no su such ch thi thing ng as as too too muc much h speech § A gap gap bet betw wee een n the the reso resour urce ces s of a
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 33
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corporation and publi corporation public c suppor supportt for its ideas is all the more reason to allo al low w th the e co corp rpor orat atio ion n to sp spen end d money on political speech. Lack La ck of ini initi tial al publ public ic supp suppo ort is all all the more reason for civic smarties to hear ideas.
Explaining the Conflict 1.
The court court’s ’s incons inconsiste istency ncy reflec reflects ts the genuin genuine e conflict conflict it sees in human political personality itself. It cannot see a mixed model of human decision making when fashioning legal rules. 2. Th Ther ere e is a te tens nsio ion n be betw twee een n th the e le lega gall ro role le and and th the e symbolic role of the Court. Through its legal role, it take ta kes s a co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al ru rule le (h (her ere e, th the e Fir irst st Amendment), and determines determ ines through t hrough the t he application of le lega gall re reas ason onin ing g wh whate ateve verr a pa parti rticu cula larr se sett of circumstances violates it. Through its symbolic role, it serves to educate the public to lead us to our better selves. Therefore, the conflict lies in that the symbolic role here reaffirms what the legal role denies. The court wouldn’t want to instill false consciousness . 3. We have have seen seen that that the the court court assu assumes mes that that peopl people e are civic smarties when individuals individuals make expend expenditures, itures, and civic slobs when economic corporations do, but the th e en entit tity y do doin ing g th the e ex expe pend ndit itur ure e sh shou ould ld no nott be rele re leva vant. nt. Th The e id iden enti tity ty of th the e sp spea eake kerr sh shou ould ld no nott matter, because the theory describes how listeners behave.
Conclusion -
Thi his s ar arti ticl cle e wan ante ted d to chal challe leng nge e th the e ci civi vic c sm smar arty ty model. Courts should not simply assume that people are civic smarties. Instead, it should ask whether the regu re gula lati tion on wo woul uld d en enco cour urag age e de desi sira rabl ble e po poliliti tica call decisi dec ision on mak making ing – by inc increa reasin sing g the amo amount unt and quality of debate,.
Relationships between private persons
De Leon vs National Labor Union
Ponente: Padilla Facts: SHORT SUMMARY: Eulogio R Lerum and Jose J. Hernandez, the latter two being the president and secretary of National Labor union, had been picketing the Dalisay Theater, owned by Narcisa B. de Leon and ran and operated by her co-plaintiffs, since the time it was reopened on 10 January 1952. he purpose of the picketing being to secure reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Narcisa B. de Leon on which the theater was erected, since 14, April 1949.
WITH DETAILS: Before April 14, 1949, said theater was operated jointly by the motion picture firms known as the plaintiffs LVN Pictures, Inc., Premier Productions and the Sampaguita Picture Inc., as lessees ; that on April 14, 1943, Narcisa B. de Leon leased the aforesaid parcel of land to the Filipino Filipino Theatrical Enterprise, Inc., who on that date had become the owners of the building, known as Dalisay Theater; the lease contract provided that Narcisa B. de Leon, would become the owner of the the buil buildi ding ng,, toge togeth ther er with with all all the the equi equipm pmen entt and and accessories • At the expiration of the lease beginning April 14, 1949, the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., operated the theater, the National Labor Union, Eulogio Lerum and José Hernandez, were all employees employees of the Filipino Theatrical Theatrical Enterprises, Enterprises, Inc. Inc.,, from from Apri Aprill 1949 1949 to Augu August st 14, 14, 1951 1951,, and and said said employees worked at the Dalisay Theater during this period. on July July 12, 12, 1951 1951,, shor shortl tly y befor before e the the expi expira rati tion on of the • aforesa aforesaid id lease, lease, the Filipi Filipino no Theatr Theatrica icall Enterpr Enterprise ises, s, Inc., Inc., notified its employees of the termination of their employment with it, effective August 14, 1951; that 11 August 15, 1951, after after the expira expiratio tion n of said said lease, lease, the full full and complete complete possession of the theater building was delivered and turned over to Narcisa B. de Leon who immediately demolished the building building and on the same site she constructed constructed and finished, finished, after several months of continuous work the new Dalisay Dalisay Theater Building; on Augu August st 31, 31, 1951 1951,, Narc Narcis isa a B. de Leon Leon exec execut uted ed a • contract with her co- plaintiffs for the operation of the new Dalisay Theater as a joint venture among them, whereby the latter would exhibit their pictures in said theater; January 10, 1952, 1952, plaint plaintiffs iffs opened the new Dalisay Dalisay • on January Theater and began exhibiting films there, with a new set of personnel, retaining only the services of four old employees; that on the last-mentioned date when plaintiffs reopened the Dalisay Dalisay Theater for business business about thirty persons among whom were the herein defendants, except the defendants Eulogi Eulogio o Lerum Lerum and Jose Hernan Hernandez dez,, all members members of the Nation National al Labor Labor Union, Union, pickete picketed d the plaint plaintiffs iffs at the said said theater on 617-619 Rizal Avenue, Manila, from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., more or less, by walking to and from on the sidewa sidewalk lk fronti fronting ng the lobby lobby of the theate theaterr and displa displayi ying ng placar placards ds which which bore bore the slogan slogans: s: “Do not patron patronize ize the Dalisay Theater,” “Dalisay Theater is unfair to labor.” “Have mercy mercy on the picketers picketers”” “and “and Sympat Sympathiz hize e with with us,” us,” and others; that defendants during the picketing tried to persuade patrons or customers of the Dalisay Theater to refrain from buyin buying g tick tickets ets or seei seeing ng the the show show beca becaus use e the the cine cine’s ’s management is unfair to its employees, and to sympathize with the picketers; that after the defendants Jose Ramos and Enrique Montoya had left the lobby of the theater, the iron gril grilll door door whic which h sepa separa rates tes the thea theater ter lobb lobby y from from the the sidewalk was closed, thereby confining the picketing in the sidewalk; that the picketing was done by defendants so that they might be re-employed in the Dalisay Theater; that due to the picke picketi ting ng at the Dali Dalisay say Thea Theater ter,, the the box box offic office e receipts of said theater for January 10, 1952, amounted only to about P1,250; and that a premier showing of such a film like “DIMAS” would ordinarily earn a P2,500 gross receipt for the theater. •
HELD: The acts of the defendants which consisted only in walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in
34 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 front of the premises of the Dalisay Theater and displaying were receiving below P6.00 a day, in addition to the PO.16 per plac placar ards ds publ public iciz izin ing g the the disp disput ute e betw betwee een n the the thea theate ter r hour previously awarded by CIR. management and the picketers, were not such as to disturb the April 27, 1965: FTWU asked for wage re-adjustment public peace at the place. There was no clear and present negotiation negoti ations s with the respo respondent ndent company, company, since they think danger of destruction to life or property or of other forms of there should be a proportionate increase with respect to those breach of the peace. employees already receiving P6.00 a day at the effectivity of R.A. 4180 should be subject of negotiations. Defendants were missed or laid off from their work at the old May 6, 1965: FTWU demanded an automatic P0.25 per hour Dalisay Theater by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., the wage increase for all rank-and-file employees receiving above showhouse came under a totally different management when it P0.75 per hour on account of the implementation of the new was reopened on January 10, 1952. There was no existence of statutory minimum wage of P6.00 a day da y. a relationship of employers and employees between plaintiffs May Ma y 17 17,, 19 1965 65:: FT FTWU WU fi file led d a no noti tice ce of st stri rike ke wi with th th the e and defend defendant ants, s, though though defend defendant ants’ s’ purpos purpose e in picketi picketing ng Department of Labor for refusal of respondent company to plaintiffs was for defendants’ reinstatement of their services in negotiate on its demand for wage adjustment under Republic the new Dalisay Theater under the new Management. Act No. 4180, which allegedly constitutes unfair labor practice. June 2, 1965: PLDT filed with CIR a petition for the issuance of Picketing peacefully carried out is not illegal even in absence writ of preliminary injunction as an incident of pending Case of employer-employee relationship for peaceful picketing is a No. 51-IPA and was thus docketed as Case No. 51-IPA (2). part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. PLDT prayed that CIR enjoin the union from striking as the parties had previously agreed on March 3, 1965 to submit all further disputes to the CIR and that a strike under the situation Free Telephone Workers Union vs PLDT and CIR would violate respondent CIR's November 9, 1964 order. G.R. No. L-24827 April 27, 1982 Justice Makaisar June 3, 1965: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition of June Ju ne 2, 19 1965 65 on th the e gr grou ound nd th that at re resp spon onde dent nt CI CIR R ha has s no Facts: jurisdiction to consider it. November 1, 1964: FTWU declared a strike against PLDT to July 6, 1965: CIR issued a temporary restraining order break an impasse over negotiations on a 20-point economic enjoining petitioner from declaring a strike or any specie demand , including a demand for wage increase covering a thereof during the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction. period of three years-1964 to 1967. July 7, 1965: Petitioner filed with the respondent CIR a motion for reconsideration of the June 6 order, alleging substantially Novembe Nov emberr 3, 196 1964: 4: Phi Philip lippin pine e Pre Presid sident, ent, upo upon n aut author hority ity of the same grounds contained in its June 3, 1965 motion to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), dismiss. On the sam same e day day,, pet petiti itione onerr, dec declar lared ed a str strike ike.. certified the labor dispute as one clearly affecting an industry According to petitioner, the strike was precipitated by the (1) indispensable to the national interests, to the Court of Industrial summary sum mary dismissa dismissall of two of its members members with without out a pri prior or Rela Re lati tion ons s (C (CIR) IR).. Th The e ca case se wa was s en entit title led d "Free Telepho elephone ne inves in vesti tiga gati tion on at which wh ich it shou sh ould ld be repr re pres esen ente ted, d, and an d (2) (2 ) Worker Wor kers s Uni Union, on, pet petiti itione oner, r, vs vs.. Phi Philip lippin pine e Lon Long g Dis Distan tance ce respondent respon dent company's continue continued d refusal refusa l to negotiate on its Telephone Company, respondent " (CIR 51-IPA) demand for wage re-adjustment. July 8, 1965: PLDT filed with CIR an urgent motion to declare Nove No vembe mberr 9, 19 1964 64:: CI CIR, R, aft after er he hear arin ing, g, is issu sued ed a pa part rtia iall the July 7, 1965 strike of petitioner illegal, the same being decision, ordering PLDT to pay each of his 1,345 rank and file violative of the no-strike order of July 6, 1965 and the court's employees, a P0.16 wage increase per hour from Nov. 9 until 1 partial decision of November 9, 1964, and praying that the yearr the yea therea reafter fter.. Pur Pursua suant nt to the pro provis vision ions s of Sec Sectio tion n 19, strikers be ordered to return to work or else forfeit their jobs. Commonwealth Commonw ealth Act 103, the members of the Free Telepho elephone ne July Ju ly 9, 19 1965 65:: FT FTWU WU mo move ved d to di dism smis iss s th the e af afor ores esai aid d Workers Union are ordered to return to work immediately, and respondent company's urgent motion. PLDT is ordered to accept them in addition to the award herein July 16, 1965: After due hearing, the trial judge of CIR above indicated while the other unresolved demands of the issued an order denying petitioner's June 3, 1965 motion Union -are under consideration. consideration. It sha shall ll be und unders erstoo tood d tha that t to dismiss respondent company's June 2, 1965 petition for during dur ing the pendency pendency of the case, the Uni Union on its members members Pursuant nt to the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Pursua and/or agents shall not strike or walk out of their employment; the Partial Decision in relation to Section 19 of C.A. 103, as and PLDT shall not lockout its employees as public interest amended amen ded,, the pet petiti itione onerr uni union, on, its off office icers, rs, age agents nts and and/or /or demands, considering that the Court, in its opinion can not assigns and sympathizers are hereby directed to call off the promptly settle or decide the dispute dispute. strike declared on July 7, 1965, and to lift the picket lines esta es tabl blis ishe hed d in an and d ar arou ound nd th the e pr prem emis ises es of re resp spon onde dent nt (FTW (F TWU U ap appe peal aled ed to the Su Supr prem eme e Co Cour urtt ma main inly ly on th the e compan com pany's y's var variou ious s off office ices s and ins instal tallat lation ions. s. The per person sons s sufficiency of the amount granted as increase. The Supreme manning manni ng the picket lines in these places are hereby enjoi enjoined ned Cour Co urtt af affi firme rmed d on Ju July ly 31 31,, 19 1970 70,, th the e No Nove vembe mberr 9, 19 1964 64 from impeding and interfering with the implementation of this decision of the respondent CIR.) Order Ord er as well as fro from m int interf erferi ering ng in any man manner ner with the operations of respondent. The striking employees are hereby March 3, 1965: Both parties agreed that while the case was directed to return to work within three (3) days from receipt of a pending, disputes or misunderstandings that may arise by and copy of Order by petitioner, otherwise, if they or any of them between them shall be referred to the President of the UNION faill to do so, conside fai considerin ring g tha thatt as has bee been n fou found nd by the and the Controller of the COMPANY for possible settlement. If President Pres ident of the Philippines Philippines the busin business ess of respo respondent ndent is the dispute or misunderstanding is not settled amicably, the coupled with national interest, the management of respondent dispute or misunderstanding shall be submitted to the courts is hereby authorized to replace any and all of them in virtue of for final disposition as incidents of CIR Case No. 51-IPA. Section 19 of CA 103, as amended, provided however, that the April 21, 1965: Republic Act No. 4180 (Minimum Wage Law) employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated was enacted, enacted, raising raising the minimum minimum wag wage e to P6. P6.00 00 a day day.. by the Court after due hearing and after establishing good and Accordingly,, PLDT increased the wages of its workers who Accordingly
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 35 valid gro valid ground unds s for their failure failure to ret return urn to wor work k as her herein ein directed . July 17, 1965: FTWU, without first returning to work as above dire di rect cted ed,, fi file led d wi with th th the e re resp spon onde dent nt CI CIR R it its s mo moti tion on fo for r reconsideration of the aforesaid July 16, 1965 order. July 19, 1965: FTWU filed with this Court its urgent petition for certiorari and prohibitory and mandatory injunction docketed as G.R. No. L-24755, questioning the power and jurisdiction of respondent respo ndent CIR. The Supreme Court dismis dismissed sed the aforesa aforesaid id petition for "being premature and for lack of merit".
July 31, 1965: CIR denied petitioner's July 17, 1965 motion for reconsideration of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the trial judge, Ansberto Parades. The court says that after looking at the records as well as the arguments of both parties, they fail to find sufficient justification for altering or modifying the aforesaid orders. The petitioner now questions the validity of the aforesaid July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the CIR and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution of respondent CIR. Issue: (1) WON the orders of July 6 and July 16, 1965, Page 671 which were both affirmed by the respondent court en banc, were validly issued (jurisdiction). (2) WON striking employees of an industry certified to be indispensable to national interest could be validly ordered to return to work and lift picket lines under paiin of be pa beiing re rep pla lace ced d wi with thou outt vi vio ola lati ting ng th the e constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Held: (1) Yes, they were validly issued. (2) Yes, they can be validl val idly y ord ordere ered d to ret return urn to wor work k and lif liftt ill illega egall pic picket ket lin lines es under pain of being replaced. Rationale: (1)) UN (1 UNIO ION: N: Re Repu publ blic ic Act No No.. 41 4180 80 co coul uld d no nott ha have ve be been en envi en visi sion oned ed by th the e Pr Pres esid iden entt of the Ph Phililip ippi pine nes s wh when en he certified the labor dispute, subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA, to the CIR on November 3, 1964. So, their demand was different from and outside the scope of certified Case No. 51-IPA, since the strike of July 7, 1965, happened long after the certification of the President of the Philippines of November 3, 1964. SC: One of the principal issues in the labor dispute that was certified by the President of the Philippines on November 3, 1964 is the issue of wage increases. During the conciliation stage of this case it was made clear that the wage increase demanded by petitioner are on a staggered 3-year basis and covered November 9, 1964 until November 8, 1967. The partial decision of November 9, 1964, which resolved petitioner's first strike declared on November 1, 1964, had settled the matter of wage increase for the first year of the 3- year period. This is precisely why on March 3, 1965, petitioner and respondent company comp any ent entere ered d int into o an agr agreem eement ent to ins insure ure har harmon moniou ious s labor management relations while the case/s are pending. Therefore, There fore, the second union deman demand d for wage incre increase ase in May,, 1965, which is the basis of this SC case was made within May the same period covered by respondent court's partial decision of November 9, 1964 granting petitioner a wage increase of P0.16 per hour. The same demand is likewise covered by the provision of the March 3, 1965 agreement. Also, CIR Case No. 51-IPA (2) is but an incidental case or an ancillary proceeding to CIR Case No. 51-IPA, the main case. When the main case was thrown to the CIR's lap by Presidential directive, the CIR assumed jurisdiction over it, together with all its incidents. If Republic Act No. 4180 has any bearing at all on the issue of wage increases, it is only that it may be used as a justification of the increase. This was what FTWU did when it mentioned
the Act in its Memorandum of May 3,1965, filed in support of its stand on the wage increase for the second and third years. The effect of a Presidential certification of a labor dispute to the Cour Co urtt un unde derr Se Secti ction on 10 of R. R.A. A. 87 875 5 is th the e re revi viva vall of th the e compulsory powers of the CIR under C.A. 103. Section 17 of C.A. 103 provides a clear remedy to petitioner in order that it could avail itself of the effect of the passage of R.A. 4180. Pursuant to this legal provision, it could seek the modification, altera alt eratio tion n or set settin ting g asi aside de or the reo reopen pening ing of the Par Partia tiall Decision. On Nov Novemb ember er 26, 196 1965, 5, the Cou Court rt of Ind Industr ustrial ial Relation Relations s rendered rende red a 'Thir 'Third d Partia Partiall Decisi Decision', on', wherein the employ employees ees repr re pres esen ente ted d by FT FTWU WU we were re gr gran anted ted a wa wage ge in incre creas ase e of P0.16/hr for the 2nd year, effective November 9, 1965, and increase of P0.18/hr for the 3rd year, effective November 9, 1966. The total gained at the start of the third year as a result of the initial demands was P0.50 per hour. The Th e CI CIR R mad made e us use e of a de deta taililed ed an anal alys ysis is of th the e PL PLDT’ DT’s s financial situation. These underscore the fact that the increase now challenged by the union as insufficient is supported by substantial evidence. As it has been pointed out in its brief by PLDT, without any denial on the part of the FTWU, that the latter appears to consider the additional wage increases as reasonable and did not even move for their reconsideration. Thus, FTWU seems to have impliedly accepted the jurisdiction of the CIR. (2) UNION: respondent CIR's order of July 16, 1965 violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech because it called for the lifting of peaceful picket lines. SC: Peac Peaceful eful pick picketing eting cannot be rest restrained rained because the same is part of the freedom of speech but petitioner fails to realize that the questioned July 16, 1965 order of the Court of Industrial Relations did not refer to peaceful picketing but to illegal picketing which interfered with the order or interfered in any manner with the operations of respondent. In the case of Mortera, this Court ruled that the "order of the Court Cou rt of Ind Indust ustria riall Rel Relati ations ons pro prohib hibiti iting ng pic picket keting ing mus mustt be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means" UNION: PLDT could not validly authorize respondent company to replace those striking employees who failed to return to work within the 3 days from receipt of a copy of the July 16, 1965 order since no hearing on the issue of termination of employee status had yet been conducted by the CIR. SC: Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended, provides that an implied condition to every contract of employment is that when any dispute between the employer and the employee has been submitted submitt ed to the Court of Industr Industrial ial Relations Relations for settlem settlement ent or arbitration and pending award of decision by it, the employee, shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by th the e Co Cour urt, t, af afte terr he hear arin ing g an and d wh when en pu publ blic ic in inter teres estt so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only afterr hea afte hearin ring g whe when n pub public lic interest interest so req requir uires es or whe when n the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the employees fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer to accept other employees. This provision vests CIR with full authority to direct the striking employees to forthwith return to their work and to allow the respon res ponden dentt com compan pany y to rep replac lace e tho those se wor worker kers s who wou would ld
36 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Sept Se pt 29 29,, 19 1982 82.. Th The e pet etiiti tio one ners rs al alle lege ge th that at th the e sa saiid choose to defy the court's directive. It is a sanction to enforce demonstration is just a continuation of their General Assembly, petitioner's obedience obedience to the court's order. While termination termination by which the school administration authorized. The alleged rally reason of an illegal strike requires hearing, replacement by demonstrated the students’ opposition to the abolition of the reason of violation of a return-to- work order does not. The scho sc hool ol’s ’s Ins Insti titu tute te of Ani Animal mal Sc Scie ienc nce. e. Ac Acco cord rdin ing g to the sanction is merely provisional and an expedient to enable the petitioners, the students taking courses would not be able to respondent company to comply with its duties and functions graduate. The university refused to let them enroll after a sham which are very closely related to the interests of the public, it invest inv estiga igatio tion n of the their ir all allege eged d vio violat lation ion of scho school ol rul rules es and being bei ng inv involv olved ed in an ind indust ustry ry aff affect ecting ing nat nation ional al int intere erest st.. regulations. Moreover, such provisional remedy is calculated to minimize the injurious effects of the strike on the respondent company The university denied denied the granting of the authorization authorization to hold and its clients as well as on the public. the asse assembly mbly and all allege eged d tha thatt the stu studen dents ts lam lambas basted ted the The questioned order states that the replaced employees may school sch ool adm admini inistr strati ation’ on’s s dec decisi ision on to mer merge ge the Inst Institu itute te of be reinstated. In fact, the employees replaced by PLDT were Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The merger subs su bseq eque uent ntly ly or orde dere red d re rein insta state ted d by CI CIR R in it its s or orde derr of was a cost-saving measure for the university and it was said November 4, 1965. that it would not deprive the students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Sciences from earning their degrees. UNION: UNI ON: CIR err erred ed in giv giving ing the comp company any inj injunc unctiv tive e rel relief ief without the company exhausting all remedies to negotiate with ISSUES: WON penalty was highly disproportionate the petitioner (4th assigned error) and in issuing the July 6 and WON the rally was non-peaceable in character 16, 1965 orders without regard to the procedural requirements of due process (5th assigned error). t o rule on that. HELD: Yes, no need to
SC: Both assigned errors are without merit. The subsequent demand for wage increase which precipitated the second strike by petitioner was merely an incident of the main case, CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore the conceded jurisdiction of the respondent court over the main case (CIR Case No. 51-IPA) carried with it authority to take cognizance of the aforesaid incident incid ent subje subject ct of CIR Case No. 51-IP 51-IPA(2). A(2). Consequently Consequently, since the second wage increase is part of the main case which was then already subject to compulsory arbitration, negotiation was no longer necessary necessary..
RATIO: SC said that student leaders are hardly timid diffident
With respect to the claim that proced procedural ural requirements requirements of due process were disregarded in the issuance of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders, it must be stressed that the said orders were issued on the premise that the incident subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA(2) was part of CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore, the jurisdiction of CIR over CIR Case No. 51-IPA necessarily includes its authority over CIR Case No. 51-IPA(2). When CIR issued the questioned July 6 and 16, 1965 orders it was merely enforci enf orcing ng the sai said d Nov Novembe emberr 9, 196 1964 4 Par Partia tiall Dec Decisi ision on by requiring the striking -workers to return to work under pain of being replaced. As a provisional sanction, it did not require a separate hearing.
SC cited Art 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where it says that everyone has the right to education and that technical and professional education shall be made generally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Using the said provision, there is justifi justification cation for excluding 3 of the petitioners petitioners because of their academic deficiency. Educational institutions may drop a student with failing grades under standards set by it and made to apply to all similarly situated.
Dispositive: The July 6 and 16, 1965 orders and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution of the respondent court of industrial relations are hereby affirmed.
Arreza vs Gregorio Araneta University Foundation G.R. No. L- 62297, June 19, 1985. EN BANC – June 19, 1985 Nature: Mandamus proceeding Ponente: Fernando, C.J. ONE-LINER: Students who rallied were denied enrollment in their fi fin nal year, SC said that penalty was highly disproportionate.
FACTS: Carmelo Arreza and some other officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University filed fil ed a man mandam damus us pro procee ceedin ding g bec becaus ause e the sai said d uni univers versity ity refused to let them enroll in their final year. This was because they held a rally/demonstration (according to the university) on
types. Their activities did not present clear and present danger of pu publ blic ic or orde derr be beca caus use e it wa was s co cond nduc ucte ted d in the sch schoo ooll premises premise s and during during the daytime. daytime. Infract Infractions ions of universi university ty rules or regulations by petitioners-students justify the filing of appropriate charges. However, the infliction of the penalty of denial den ial of enr enrolm olment ent and the con conseq sequen uentt fai failur lure e of sen senior ior studen stu dents ts to gra gradua duate te was hig highly hly dis dispro propor portio tionat nate e if in the exercise of their cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them
Non vs Dames II G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990.
Cortés, J. Petition for cert Petition certiorari iorari with praye prayerr for preliminary preliminary manda mandatory tory injunction.
Cont ntra ract ct be betw twee een n th the e sc scho hool ol an and d it its s stu stude dent nt is Doctrine: Co imbued with publi public c intere interest st consid considering ering the high priority given by our Con Consti stituti tution on to edu educati cation. on. In imp imposi osing ng dis discip ciplin linary ary sanction/action against students, the procedural process laid down in Guzman must be satisfied and the penalty must be commensurate to the offense.
Facts: •
Petitioners are seeking the reversal of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., that ‘a college student once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school .” (termination of contract doctrine) is deemed terminated .”
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 37 •
•
Petitioners are students of Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Camari nes Norte, who participated participated in student mass actions against the school. On that basis, they were not allowed to reenroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989. The petitioners filed a petition in the trial court seeking for readmission/r readmi ssion/reenro eenrollment llment,, but the trial court denie denied d their petition, upholding the ruling in Alcuaz 3. The trial court also denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON Mabini Colleges, Inc. accorded the students due process when it prevented them from reenrolling in the said college.
Held: NO. “Termination of contract theory” does not hold. Contract between school and students is not ordinary. It is imbued with public interest. Students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. Our Constitution recognizes and protects the rights of free speech and assembly. The same guarantee is found in the 1973 Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Con Consti stituti tution, on, as amen amended ded [Art. III, sec sec.. 8], the Philippine Phili ppine Autonomy Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, par. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, par. 13]. Said cognate rights are also available to students as settled in the case of Mala Ma laba bana nan n v. Ra Rame ment nto o4, and upheld in Vil illa larr v. Techno echnologic logical al Inst Institute itute of the Phili Philippines ppines, and Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. •
•
•
•
Contract between a school and its student is imbued with public interest . This is in consideration of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State Sta te of su supe perv rvis isory ory an and d re regu gula lato tory ry po powe wers rs ov over er al alll educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)]. Paragr Par agraph aph 137 of the Manual of Reg Regula ulatio tions ns for Pri Privat vate e Schools merely serves to protect schools for non-payment of tuition. In fact, the Manual recognizes that the student is expected to complete the entire course once enrolled [Par. 107]. The same presumption has been translated into a right in B.P. B.P. Blg. 232, the “Education Act of 1982.” Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights. The Court held in Villar that “the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to di disc scri rimi mina nate te ag agai ains nstt st stud uden ents ts wh who o ex exer erci cise se th thei eir r constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.” Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school must satisfy procedural due process . Cardinal rights of students for there to be procedural due process in imposing disciplinary sanctions in schools, as stated in Guzman, are as follows:
1) students must be informed in writing of the nature 3 In this case the court ruled that once a student is admitted by the school, that student is considered enrolled for one semester. Thus after the close of the semester, PSBA-QC PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract with the students and the teachers. PSBA-QC cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with them.
4
This is a case involving students who were granted permit to assemble but held their assembly in a place different from that written in the permit and proceeded with the demonstration beyond the permitt permitted ed time. time. During During the assembl assembly y they manife manifeste sted d their their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. CJ Fernando declared that students do not, “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
and cause of any accusation against them; 2) students shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; 3) students shall be informed of the evidence against them; 4) students shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and 5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigat inves tigating ing comm committee ittee or offic official ial designated designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The five students who did not incur failing marks were refused reenrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to reenroll. As for the other students, it appears that they were not accorded procedural due process. The reason provided by the school for preventing reenrollment, that the students had failing marks, is a mere afterthought given the undeniable fact that what caused the ire of the school was the participation of the students in the demonstration. Clearly then, this is not only a denial of due process but also a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. This however, does not mean that the students cann ca nnot ot be su subj bjec ecte ted d to di disc scip ipli lina nary ry ac acti tion on as he held ld in Malabanan. However, the penalty must be commensurate and must subscrib subscribe e to pro proced cedura urall due process process as lai laid d dow down n in Guzman. PETITI PET ITION ON GRA GRANTE NTED. D. RESP RESPOND ONDENT ENT MAB MABINI INI COL COLLEG LEGE E ORDERED TO READMIT AND TO ALLOW REENROLLMENT OF PETITIONERS.
Ayer vs Capulong FACTS: Hal (Aus ustr tral alia ian n fi film lmma make ker) r) an and d hi his s Hal Mc McEl Elro roy y (A production company com pany,, Ayer Productions, wanted to spearhead a film project on the EDSA Revolution. The project was discussed with a local movie producer, Lope Juban, who suggested that McElroy consult with key government agencies, as well as Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the event. The Fourwas s en endo dors rsed ed by th the e Four-Day Day Revol Revolutio ution n wa MTRCB and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also gave his approval. Th The e pr prop opos osed ed pr proj ojec ectt was a 66-ho hour ur mi mini ni-s -se eri ries es rendered in a docu-drama style, focused primarily on fictional fiction al charac characters, ters, interwoven with real events, and using usi ng actu actual al doc docume umentar ntary y foot footage age as bac backgro kground und.. (Tony (T ony O’ O’Ne Neilil,, a U.S U.S.. jo jour urna nalilist; st; An Angi gie e Fo Fox, x, an Australian journalist; Ben Balano, a newspaper editor and supporter of Aquino; and his daughter Eva who’s in love with Tony.) Mc McEl Elro roy y se sent nt En Enri rile le a sy syno nops psis is of th the e pr prop opos osed ed project, but Enrile expressed his disapproval of the proj pr ojec ect’ t’s s us use, e, ap appr prop opri riati ation on,, re repr prod oduc ucti tion on an and d exhi ex hibi bitio tion n of hi his s na name me or pi pictu cture re or th that at of an any y memb me mber er of hi his s fa fami mily ly.. En Enri rile le al also so ba barr rred ed an any y references made to him or any member of his family. Mc McEl Elro roy y os oste tens nsib ibly ly ac acce cede ded d to En Enri rile le’’s de dema mand nd:: Enrile’s name was deleted from the screenplay, and they proceeded with filming. Enr Enrile ile file filed d a compla complaint int with with appl applica icatio tion n for tempo temporary rary restraining order and writ of prohibition with the RTCMakati Mak ati – he contended contended that the film constitut constituted ed a viol vi olat atio ion n of hi his s ri righ ghtt to pr priv ivac acy y. A he hear arin ing g fo for r preliminary injunction was set. McE McElr lroy oy move moved d for the the dismi dismiss ssal al of the the compl complai aint nt –
38 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 the mini-series would not involve the private life of to the extent of keeping the film a truthful historical Enrile or that of his family; prelim injunction would account amou am ount nt to pr prio iorr re rest stra rain intt on th thei eirr ri righ ghtt to fr free ee expression; Enrile had no cause of action as the miniEnrile was a public figure! series had not yet been completed. Prosser & Keeton’s concept of a “public figure”: a The RTC (Judge Capulong) issued the prelim person who, by his accomplishments, fame or mode injunc inj unctio tion n and ord ordere ered d tha thatt pro produc duction tion be cea ceased sed.. of living or by adopting a profession which gives to the Ayer Productions and McElroy then elevated the case public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs or to the SC (via certiorari). character charac ter,, has become a public figure figure.. Publi Public c figure figures s En Enri rile le insis insiste ted d th that at th the e fi film lm pr proj ojec ectt co cons nsti titu tute ted d a have ha ve lilimit mited ed ri righ ghts ts to pr priv ivac acy y – the press press ha has s a violation of his right to privacy. privilege under the Constitution to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of The SC framed the issue of this case as a conflict between the public interest. right to free expression (McElroy’s and Ayers’) and the right to Enr Enrile ile beca became me a publi public c figure figure prec precise isely ly becau because se of his his privacy (Enrile’s). role ro le in th the e ev even ents ts tha thatt cu culm lmin inate ated d in the ED EDSA SA Revolution – the absence of reference to him would HELD/RATIO: render ren der the fil film m gro grossly ssly unhistori unhistorical cal.. Enr Enrile ile,, in fact fact,, continues to be a public figure as he is currently a Senator, after waging a successful campaign that took Freedom of expression includes the freedom to produce adva ad vant ntag age e of th the e st stat atus us he ga gain ined ed fr from om hi his s and film motion pictures and to exhibit such; film is a participation in the EDSA Revolution. principal medium of mass communication Gonzales v. Katigbak : film as an important medium and an d or orga gan n of pu publ blic ic op opin inio ion, n, re rega gard rdle less ss of it its s To not be violative of Enrile’s conditional right to privacy informative or entertaining nature (no clear distinction as a pu publ blic ic fi figu gure re:: fi film lm mu must st be a fa fair irly ly tr trut uthf hful ul an and d between entertainment and education) historical account of past events Th This is freed freedom om is avail availab able le to both both local local and forei foreign gn No delib deliber erat ate e or reckle reckless ss disre disrega gard rd of the truth truth;; no production companies, commercial or non-profit repres rep resent entati ation on of the private private lif life e of Enr Enrile ile,, and no revela rev elatio tion n of int intima imate te or emba embarra rrassi ssing ng fac facts ts of a personal nature The right to privacy is not absolute; the production and filming of The Four-Day Revolution does not constitute an
unlawful infringement of Enrile’s right to privacy
Limited Limite d intrusi intrusion on into into a person person’s ’s priva privacy cy is permi permissi ssible ble whe hen n th tha at pe pers rson on is a pu publ blic ic fi figu gure re an and d th the e informa inf ormatio tion n sou sought ght to be pub publis lished hed is of a pub public lic character Wha Wh at is prote tec cted is the right to be fr fre ee from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs of an individual which are outside the realm of public concern Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales : dealt with a similar confli con flict ct betw between een cla claims ims of free freedom dom of spe speech ech and expression and claims of privacy. Freedom of speech and expression is validly constrained by the clearandan d-pr pres esen ent-d t-dan ange gerr ru rule le an and d th the e ba bala lanc ncin ingg-of of-interests test.
Judge Capulong’s issued judgment constituted prior and dire di rect ct re rest stra rain intt on th the e ex exer erci cise se of fr free ee sp spee eech ch an and d expression of McElroy and Ayer
Premature Prematu re as fil film m was not not yet yet comple completed ted or or exhibi exhibited ted to the public; no clear and present danger of any violation of any right to privacy could be asserted In Lagunzad : no prior and direct restraint, film was completed and screened to the public
The subject matter of the film was one of public interest and concern
Film relat Film related ed to a hi high ghly ly criti critica call st stag age e in Phili Philipp ppin ine e history – part of public domain, appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media Film Fil m doesn’ doesn’tt relate relate to the the indivi individua duall and priva private te life life of Enrile (as opposed to the Moises Padilla biopic in Lagunzad ) Film Fil m only only refers refers to to the role role Enri Enrile le playe played d in the the EDSA EDSA Revolution Film Fil m constitu constituted ted limite limited d intrusio intrusion n into Enrile Enrile’s ’s life: life: only only
Enrile vs Capulong J. Sarmiento Brief Background: Whe When n the RTC RTC issu issued ed the the writ writ of preli prelim m injunc injunctio tion n (at Enrile’s petition), it required Enrile to file a Php2M bond to answer for whatever damages McElroy and Ayer may suffer by reason of said injunction Aft After er the SC rul ruled ed in thei theirr favor favor, McElro McElroy y and Aye Ayer r filed a motion to hold Enrile and the First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company solidarily liable on the bond, as they had been forced to move the filming of the movie to Sri Lanka after an extensive locational survey, which entailed additional costs and additional days of shooting and schedule delays. As a direct result, they suffered about Aus$ 438K. The RTC RTC held held that that McElr McElroy oy and and Ayer Ayer were were enti entitle tled d to an award of damages given the SC ruling that Enrile was not entitled to the writ of prelim injunction. En Enri rile le filed filed the pres presen entt petiti petition on to stop stop the RTC RTC from acti ac ting ng on the ap appl plic icati ation on fo forr da damag mages es fr from om th the e wrongful issuance of a writ of prelim injunction of Ayer Productions and McElroy Held: McElroy and Ayer’s claim for damages brought about abo ut by a wro wrongfu ngfull inj injunc unctio tion n sho should uld hav have e bee been n commenced prior to the date the Ayer judgment was entered. Because Ayer had achieved finality, it follows that all proceedings after such are void and of no effect. A claim for damages arising from a wrongful injunction should be filed in the main case. If the lower cour co urt' t's s de deci cisi sion on,, de deny nyin ing g in inju junc ncti tion on,, is ho howe wever ver appealed appeal ed to the CA, and the latter affirms affirms the denia denial, l, the application may be commenced in the CA, which may either direct a remand of the case for reception of evidence or otherwise hear the claim itself So also, it mus mustt be co comme mmenc nced ed be befor fore e ju judg dgme ment nt att attai ains ns
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 39 finality. Otherwise, it is barred.
J. NARVASA, DISSENTING:
The ru The rule le is clear clear in a si situ tuat atio ion n where where judg judgme ment nt is rendered by the CA or the SC on an appeal from a decision of a trial court. But, the case at bar concerns the special civil action of certiorari instituted in the SC by defendant parties aggrieved by a prelim injunction issued by a trial court. The SC’ SC’s s pronou pronounce ncement ment as as to Enril Enrile’s e’s lac lack k of cause cause of action should not be construed as absolving Enrile from liability for such damages as might have been caused to Ayer and McElroy by his unfounded action and the prelim injunction wrongly obtained by him. The Th e posti posting ng of a bo bond nd in conn connec ecti tion on with with a pr prel elim im inju in junc ncti tion on do does es no nott op oper erate ate to re reliliev eve e th the e pa party rty obtain obt aining ing an inj injunc unctio tion n fro from m res respon ponsib sibili ility ty for the damages that the writ may have caused. It merely gives additional additional protection to the party again against st whom the th e in inju junc nctio tion n is di dire recte cted. d. It gi give ves s hi him m a ri righ ghtt of recourse against the applicant. The spec special ial civi civill action action of of certior certiorari ari was was separa separate te and inde in depe pend nden entt of the ca case se in init itia ially lly fi file led d by En Enri rile le (against (agai nst McElroy and Ayer). Ayer). The issue of liabi liabilitie lities s of the parties on the merits of that case was peculiarly within the RTC’s competence; it was not an issue in the certiorari action in the SC. Dama Da mage ges s re resu sullti ting ng fr from om th the e in injjun unct ctiion ma may y be recovered by McElroy and Ayer in the action before the RTC (Enrile’s case), rather than in the certiorari suit in the SC.
Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs Ago Medical and Educational Center – Bicol Christian College of Medicine G.R. No. 141994 (January 17, 2005)
Carpio, J. Facts: In th the e mo morn rnin ing g of De Dece cemb mber er 14 an and d 15 of 19 1989 89,, ra radi dio o comment com mentato ators rs of FBN FBNI, I, nam namely ely Car Carmelo melo “Mel” Rim Rima a and Hermoge Her mogenes nes “Ju “Jun” n” Ale Alegre gre,, in the their ir rad radio io pro progra gram m “Exp “Expose ose”” allegedly uttered libellous and defamatory statements against AMEC, stating that : 1. AMEC offe offered red a Physi Physical cal Ther Therapy apy cour course se despi despite te not being accredited by DECS to offer such 2. Ma Maki king ng their their Med stude students nts reta retake ke all their their subje subject cts s (even the ones they passed) if they happen to fail any subject. 3. Stu Studen dents ts are made made to enr enrol ol requir required ed subje subjects cts even even if the subject does not have an instructor. 4. That AMEC is a recipient of donati tio ons fr fro om a McDona McD onald ld Fou Founda ndatio tion n bas based ed fro from m the fact tha thatt its buildings is called McDonald hall. 5. Th That at AMEC AMEC is tr tryi ying ng to mi mini nimi mize ze its expen expense ses s by hiring hir ing tea teache chers rs who wer were e rem remove oved d fro from m Aqu Aquina inas s University Unive rsity for immora immorality lity and contin continuing uing to employ Dean Justita Lola in spite of her being too old already as evidenced by her inability to see already. AMEC filed a complaint for damages alleging that the above broadcasts are defamatory and destroyed their reputation as reputable learning institution. FBNI, FBN I, in the their ir answ answer er all allege eged d tha thatt the bro broadc adcast asts s aga agains instt AMEC were fair and true. Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report what was going on in AMEC, which is an institution imbued with public interest.
Trial court found in favour of AMEC, but absolved Rima. Both parties appealed the decision to the CA. The CA affirmed the deci de cisi sion on bu butt mo modi difi fied ed it so th that at Ri Rima ma is ad adju judg dged ed to be solidarily solid arily liable with FBNI and Alegre. Alegre. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed for an MOR which the CA denied, thus this petition. Issues: 1. Whe Whethe therr the the bro broadc adcasts asts are lib libell ellous ous 2. Whe Whethe therr AMEC AMEC is entitl entitled ed to to Moral Moral Dama Damages ges 3. Whe Whethe therr the awa award rd of of attorn attorney ey fees fees is is prope proper r 4. Wh Whet ethe herr FB FBNI NI shoul should d be so solilida dari rily ly liabl liable e with Rima Rima and Alegre for payment of Moral Damages, Attorney’s Fees and Costs of Suit Held: 1. Yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Yes Ratio: 1. The peti petitio tioner ners s cite Borj Borjal al v. v. CA, conte contendi nding ng that that the broadc bro adcast asts s fal falll wit within hin the cov covera erage ge of qua qualif lified iedly ly privileged communications for being commentaries on matters of public public interest. interest. The Court Court said the Borjal Borjal case does not apply since the commentaries of the peti pe titi tion oner ers s ma may y no nott re reas ason onab ably ly in infe ferr rred ed fr from om estab es tablilish shed ed fa facts cts.. Th The e br broa oadc dcas asts ts ar are e pa pate tent ntly ly libell lib ellous ous bec becaus ause e they wer were e pat patent ently ly def defamat amatory ory withou wit houtt any support support or evi eviden dence ce as to the their ir tru truth. th. Much of the defamatory statements by the petitioners were patently false. Had the petitioners exerted a little effort to verify these claims, they would have easily known this, like the allegation that AMEC is offering a course not accredited by DECS. Had they gone to DECS, they would have known that such accreditation exists, and have existed since 2 years prior to the broadcasts. And Dean Lola, is old, but when she testified in court, it was proven that she is not incompetent at all as the broadcast suggested. Also, the petitioners failed to provide any of the students studen ts who claime claimed d to have been victimized by the schools policies. 2. Alth Althoug ough h a juridic juridical al person person is gene general rally ly not entit entitled led to morall dama mora damages ges bec becaus ause e they can cannot not exp experi erienc ence e suffering suffer ing or such sentiments as wounde wounded d feelin feelings, gs, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 under Article 2219 of the Civil Code which expressly authorizes the claim for moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation, and notably not ably,, doe does s not dis distin tingui guish sh betw between een actu actual al and juridical persons. Although, 300k is too much, so the Court reduced it to 150k. 3. AM AMEC EC fa fail iled ed to ju just stif ify y sa sati tisf sfac acto tori rily ly it its s cl clai aim m fo for r attorney’s fees. Also, the RTC and the CA failed to justify its award of attorney’s fees, which was elucidated in the case of Inter-Asia Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Although, in that case it was said that the award of attorney’s fees is up to discretion of the court, it nevertheless requires such an award to be justified or at least explained why it was given. 4. FBN FBNII failed failed to show show that that it exerci exercised sed the the dilige diligence nce of a father of a family in it supervision of its employees namely Alegre and Rima. And, the circumstances of the case validly adjudge him as a tort feasor. AMEC was correct in anchoring their claim against FBNI on Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Individual Enhancement
40 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 1. Re: Freedom of expression and Right to Property Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs The demonstration demonstration was in valid exercise of their freedom Philippine Blooming Mills of expression in general and of their right of assembly and G.R. L-31195, June 5, 1973. petition for redress of grievances. It was in fact the duty of the Company Comp any to pro protect tect the Uni Union on and its memb members ers from the Facts harassment of local police officers as it is in their best interest The petitioner organization is a legitimate labor union thatt the tha their ir emp employ loyees ees arr arrive ive to wor work k free from har harass assment ment,, comprised compri sed of the employees of the respondent respondent corpor corporation, ation, vexation and peril. while the private petitioners are officers and members of said The assumption of the Company that it would incur losses unio un ion. n. On Ma March rch 1, 19 1969 69,, th they ey de deci cide ded d to st stag age e a mas mass s as a result of the absence of its employees is simply for the demons dem onstrat tration ion at Malacan Malacanang ang on March March 4 to protest protest the protection of their property rights. However, the Court has held alleged abuses of the Pasig police, and they informed the the primacy of human rights over property rights. Furthermore, respondent Company of their intention. This strike was to be the th e ri righ ghts ts of fre free e ex expr pres essi sion on an and d of as asse sembl mbly y oc occu cupy py a participated by workers from the first shift (6AM – 2PM) as well preferred position since they are essential to the preservation as the workers of the regular shifts (7AM – 4PM and 8AM – and vitality of our civil and political institutions. 5PM) Furthermore, the court argues that the CBA that fixes the The company then called a meeting on March 3 and working workin g shifts of the employees “constitutes “constitutes virtua virtuall tyranny advi ad vise sed d th the e Un Unio ion n tha thatt al alth thou ough gh th thei eirr st stag agin ing g of a ma mass ss over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe demonstration is a right given be the Constitution, this right condemnation.” should sho uld not und unduly uly pre prejud judice ice the nor normal mal ope operat ration ions s of the As such, the mass demonstration could not have been Company. Therefore, they asked that those who work the first legally legal ly enjoined by any court since this would entrench on the and regular shifts, who had not previously filed a leave of freedom of expression of the members of the Union. absence, should still report to work on March 4 or they would The Company’s argument that not all of the employees be dismissed for violating the existing CBA as their actions were necessary for the mass demonstration fails because it woul wo uld d be ta tanta ntamou mount nt to an ilille lega gall st stri rike. ke. In Inste stead ad,, the they y comp co mple lete tely ly di disr sreg egar ards ds th the e wh whol ole e pu purp rpos ose e of a ma mass ss suggested that the Union should organize those from the send demonstration. The absence of one third of the members of the and 3rd shifts. union will display disunity among its members and will render However, the Union said that it was too late to change the demonst demonstration ration ineffective. ineffective. Furthe Furthermore, rmore, the Union notified their plans since the demonstration would happen the following the Company two days ahead, which was enough time for morning. As such, they proceeded with their demonstration so them to have made counter measures or to prevent any losses the Company filed a charge against the employees of violating it may have sustained. Sections 4a-6, 13, 14 and 15 of RA 875 and the CBA that In any case, the Court of Industrial Relations did not report provided for “No Strike and No Lockout.” any findings regarding any lose or damages that the Company The Union countered that they did not violate the CBA may have incurred and the Court therefore assumed that it did becaus bec ause e they gave the Comp Company any prior notice notice of the mass not sustain any. In fact, the company may have actually saved demonstration, it was in valid exercise of their constitutional money from not having to pay wages and other fees in relation free fr eedo dom m of sp spee eech ch ag agai ains nstt th the e ab abus uses es of so some me Pa Pasi sig g to the workers workers and this sho should uld have off offset set the unr unreal ealize ized d policemen, and, in any case, the mass demonstration was not profits. targeted against the Company and therefore was not a strike. On September 15, the Court of Industrial Relations Re: Unfair Labor Practices found in favor of the Company, stating that the Union had The Company is also guilty of unfair labor practices for bargained barga ined in bad faith, perpet perpetrating rating unfair labor practices and violating Section 3 of RA 875 (The Industrial Peace Act) which were considered to have lost their status as employees of the guarantees employees the right to engage in concert activities Company. for mutual aid or protection and Section 4(a-1) which prohibits Union then claimed that they received the order on employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees Sept 23, but only filed their motion for reconsideration on Sept in their exercise of their rights. 29 because Sept 28 had fallen on a Sunday. They allege that To stress, the purpose of the mass demonstration was for the th e or orde derr ma made de by th the e Co Cour urtt of In Indu dustr stria iall Re Rela lati tion ons s wa was s the mutual aid and protection of the Union members against contrary to law and evidence, and asked for 10 days to file the police abuse. Therefore, the insistence of the Company their arguments pursuant to the Rules of the CIR. that the employees of the first and regular shifts report for work The Company argued that the Union, having received or be dismissed is a potent means for inhibiting speech. the order on Sept 22 had only 5 days by which to file their motion for reconsideration and that because it was two days 2. The period of fi fiv ve day ays s to fi fille a motion fo for r late, it should have been dismissed. Union countered that their reconsideration is too short because aggrieved workers do not failure to do so was of excusable negligence and an honest have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses. mistake. They then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court has previously ruled that the procedural rules of Issues Cong Co ngre ress ss or of th the e Su Supr pre eme Co Cour urtt giv ives es way to a 1. WO WON N Pe Peti titi tion oner ers s we were re in lawfu lawfull ex exer erci cise se of th thei eir r constitutional right, therefore the procedural rule of the Court of freedom of expression Industrial Relations must also give way. 2. WO WON N the Motion Motion of Re Reco cons nsid ider erat atio ion n wa was s ri righ ghtfu tfulllly y It is also accepted accepted that the Supreme Court has the power dismis dis missed sed by the Cou Court rt of Ind Industr ustrial ial Rel Relati ations ons for to suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice being two days late require it do so. To stick to the application of a five-day time limit for the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration would deny Held justice to the Union members and is unconstitutional because it 1. Yes subverts the human rights of the Union and the workers. 2. No
Rationalization
Finally, the court rules that the penalty against the workers
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 41 should have been to charge the absence on sick or vacation leave rather than having them fired.
To equalize opportunities Badoy vs COMELEC G.R. No. L- 32546, October 17, 1970 Ponente: Makasiar Overview: This case is about Anacleto Badoy, Overview: Badoy, a candid candidate ate for the Con Constit stituti utiona onall Com Commis missio sion n sea seatt rep repres resent enting ing the lon lone e distric dis trictt of Nor North th Cot Cotaba abato to con contes testin ting g the pro provis vision ion F on being ng Sectio Sec tion n 12 of the Revised Revised El Elect ection ion Act 613 6132 2 for bei unco un cons nstit titut utio iona nall be beca caus use e th the e la law w im impo pose sed d lilimit mits s on the freedom of speech of candidates when it provided guidelines relating to the publishing of their campaign materials. The court deni de nied ed hi his s or orig igin inal al pe peti titi tion on to th the e Su Supr preme eme Co Cour urtt as th the e provision – a. Pr Prev even ents ts a clear clear and pres presen entt dange dangerr of having having the the electoral system being perverted b. Enf Enforce orces s Equal Equal Pro Protec tectio tion n of of the the Law Laws s Facts: Anacleto Badoy filed two cases: 1. In G.R. G.R. No No.. LL-32 3255 551 1 he pray prayed that that pr prin inti ting ng of publications about a candidate which are not paid to be allowed even if they do not contain any mention of other candidates candidates;; and that Comelec Resolu Resolution tion No. RR -724 be declared unconstitutional for prohibiting articles that are not paid from being published. 2. In G.R G.R.. No. L-3 L-3254 2546 6 he cha challe llenge nges s that that Sec Sec.. 12 (F) of RA No. 61 6132 32 is un unco cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al as it un undu duly ly abridges the freedom of expression of an individual whether candidate or not. Held: 1. In G.R. G.R. No. L-325 L-32551 51 the issu issues es were were render rendered ed moot moot and academic as the relevant portions of the RR-724 were amended by RR-739 and no longer prohibits the printing and publication of unpaid articles that do not mention the other candidates, or mentions but not in the same prominence other candidates. 2. In G.R. G.R. No. No. LL-32 3254 546, 6, fre freed edom om of of expr expres essi sion on can can be be subj su bject ected ed to po polilice ce po powe werr wh when en th the e re restr stric icti tion on imposed is narrow enough to allow the basic liberty to remai re main n (I (Imbo mbong ng vs vs.. Co Comel melec ec an and d Go Gonz nzal ales es vs COMELEC). The candidates are still able to publish such advertisements provided, that they include other candidates in the spiel. a. Th The e purp purpos ose e of Sec. Sec. 12 (F) (F) of of RA No. No. 6132 6132 is to give poor candidates a fighting chance in the elections – “While it is true that the mere mention if the poor opponent in the same advertisement advertisement or paid article does not by itself alone engender perfect equality of chance cha nces; s; at lea lease se the cha chance nce of the poor candid can didate ate for vic victory tory is imp improv roved ed bec becaus ause e ther th ereby eby his na name me wi willll be ex expo posed sed to th the e reading the public in the same article as that of the wealthy candidate” b. Th The e restr restric ictio tion n is only only one of of the meas measur ures es devised devise d to promot promote e equal chances chances among the candidates c. The oth other er secti sections ons of RA RA 314 3142 2 provi provide de othe other r avenues where the candidate can exercise his hi s fre freed edom om of ex expr pres essi sion on in incl clud udin ing g hi his s freedom of assembly – i. The electio election n cam campai paign gn period period lilimit mit
doesn’t apply to con-con delegates ii. The candidate candidate can utiliz utilize e relations up to the 4th ci civi vill de degr gree ee of consanguinity affinity iii.Employ a campaign staff for one of every ten precincts iv.Members iv .Members of a politi political cal party, party, acting indivi ind ividua dually lly,, can camp campaig aign n for or against the candidate v. Ut Utililiz ize e th the e al allo lotte tted d sp spac ace e in th the e COMELEC billboard. vi. Utilize the allotted COMEL CO MELEC EC ti time me for radio radio an and d tv broadcasting vii. Appear on o n ra radio an and tv tv provided other candidates are also invited viii. Be included in news coverage of mass media of significant or newsworthy events d. The limit limitati ations ons in in Sec. Sec. 12 (F) (F) of of RA No. 6132 6132 are less restrictive than RA 4880 which the SC has already held to be constitutional. e. The limi limitati tations ons in Sec. Sec. 8 (A ) of RA RA No. No. 6132 6132 are more restrictive than the Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 613 6132 2 bec becaus ause e it pro prohib hibits its pol politi itical cal part pa rtie ies s or gr grou oups ps fr from om gi givi ving ng ai aid d fo forr a candidate, and even then it was still held to be constitutional by an SC vote of 6. f. Su Sub bst stan anti tive vely ly,, in th the e balancing of interests Sec. c. 12 (F (F)) of RA No. No. 61 613 32 fa far r tests, Se outw ou twei eigh ghs s th the e in inte tere rest sts s of th the e st stat ate e in preserving the purity of the ballot and equal protection of law than liberty of expression. MAKALINTAL, J. (concurring): 1. Th The e as assa saililed ed provi provisi sion on is ac actu tual ally ly an em empi piri rica call an and d pragmatic approach to the problems of our electoral process FERNANDO, J. (dissenting): 1. It is an abrid abridge geme ment nt of the free freedo dom m of the the press press,, contrary to the mandate of the constitution. Due to the editorial policy of a publication and other items in it, a candidate’s chance of being featured is very limited and may only obtain publicity through advertisement. His right to press freedom entitles him to dictate what is included in his ad; matters are made worse when he is not only restrained on what he could place, but also forced to include others on the pain of not being able to advertise at all. 2. Fre Freedo edom m of expressi expression on is signif significa icant nt as a politic political al right right for this freedom – “for without the free press and free speech guarantees, one may not effectively make use of prerogative in the choice of the public officials in who the power to govern is vested.” 3. Th The e evils evils being being preven prevente ted d here canno cannott stand stand under under the scrutiny of the clear and present danger rule – whether the circumstances are of such evil that the Cong Co ngre ress ss sh shal alll ha have ve a ri righ ghtt to in inter terve vene ne.. It is a question of proximity and degree 4. Wh Whilile e the evil evil feared feared of is substa substanti ntial al and shou should ld be met, the legislation made should not be at war with the constitutional command of press freedom 5. It fails fails th the e co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al test where where the permis permissi sibl ble e scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it should have ha ve be been en na narr rrow owly ly dr draw awn n an and d th the e pr prec ecis isel ely y delineated.
42 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 6. Fre Freedo edom m of expre expressi ssion on ranks ranks high high in in the hier hierarc archy hy of some som e ot othe herr le less ss re rest stri ricti ctive ve mea measu sure re fo for r legal values, a preferred position which should not be freedom evaded by accident or by design. It should not allow 8. The provi provisio sion n limitin limiting g the candid candidate’ ate’s s expendi expenditure ture to dubi du biou ous s in intru trusi sion on.. Th Ther ere e sh shou ould ld be a cl clea earr an and d P32,00 P32 ,00 if pro proper perly ly imp implem lement ented ed wou would ld ade adequa quately tely present danger of substantive evil. cover the evils the act seeks to avert without having to Barredo, J. (dissenting): go through the limitation on freedom. The provisions give more reason for people to shy away from 9. The prov provisi ision on fails fails in the the Due Due Proces Process s clause clause for for the the coming election because it has increased the difficulties of means employed defeat the purpose of the act in the means of commun communicatio ication n between the candi candidates dates and the maximizing maximiz ing equality for candi candidates. dates. Those with the electo ele ctorate rates. s. The There re sho should uld be mor more e inf inform ormati ation on giv given en to all same names as to the nuisance candidates have no instead of curtailment. recourse to clarify themselves. Teehankee, J. (dissenting): 1. The statu statute te affect affects s the politi political cal discu discussi ssion on and curtai curtails ls National Press Club vs COMELEC the th e su supp ppor ortt th that at is gi give ven n to on one e ca cand ndid idat ate, e, an aberration in republican governments. Date: March 5, 1992 2. It not only only viola violate tes s freedo freedom m of ex expr pres essi sion on,, but also also Ponente:Feliciano, J. freedom of the press and freedom of association, also denying due process and equal protection of laws. Facts: 3. The CO COME MELE LEC C sp spac ace e gi give ven n to ca cand ndid ida ate tes s on only ly Three petitions were consolidated assailing the constitutionality consists of the name of the candidates as their total of Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). numb nu mber er co come me in th the e cl clos ose e of 3, 3,00 000. 0. In Inste stead ad of Petitioners consist of representatives of the mass media which enabli ena bling ng a rel relati atively vely mode modest st can candid didate ate to pro procur cure e are prevented from selling or donating space and time for adsp ad spac ace e fo forr hi hims msel elf, f, th the e re regu gula lati tion on be beco come mes s political advertisements, candidates for office, taxpayers, and prohibitive prohi bitive as the cost of the advertisement advertisement becomes voters. bigger. 4. Co Cons nsid ider erin ing g th the e pr proh ohib ibit itio ion n of ju juri ridi dica call en enti titi ties es Petitioners argue that Section 11 (b) violates the constitutional publis pub lishin hing g art articl icles es in sup suppor portt of can candid didate ates, s, onl only y guarantee of freedom of expression: single proprietory publishers would be allowed to do 1. It am amou ount nts s to censo censors rshi hip, p, becau because se it se sele lect cts s an and d so howeve however, r, publishers publishers are normally compan companies ies now sing si ngle les s ou outt fo forr su supp ppre ress ssio ion n an and d re repr pres essi sion on wi with th as to avoid personal liability that may be incurred from crimin cri minal al san sancti ctions ons,, onl only y med mediaia-bas based ed ele electi ction on or libel suits. politi pol itical cal pro propag pagand anda a dur during ing the ele electi ction on per period iod of 5. Th The e premis premises es under under the Imbo Imbong ng – Gonza Gonzale les s cases cases 1992 are not applicable here – 2. De Dero roga gati tion on of me medi dia’ a’s s ro role le,, fu func ncti tion on and du duty ty to a. Wo Woul uld d th the e ba bann nnin ing g of the po poli liti tica call pa part rtie ies s provide provid e adequ adequate ate channels of publi public c inform information ation and purify the electoral process? public opinion relevant to election issues b. Wi With thou outt polit politic ical al parti parties es there there woul would d be no 3. Abr Abridg idges es free freedom dom of spee speech ch of of candi candidat dates es one on e to di disc scip ipli line ne cr croo ooke ked d po poli liti tici cian ans, s, 4. Su Subs bsta tant ntia iall re redu duct ctio ion n in th the e qu quan anti tity ty or vo volu lume me of whereas if they were present the latter could information concerning candidates and issues in the be disciplined electi ele ction on the thereby reby cur curtai tailin ling g and lim limiti iting ng the rig right ht of c. Re Remov moval al of politi politica call partie parties s would would fa faci cililitat tate e voters to information and opinion the preponderance of King Pins, creating a politi pol itical cal vac vacuum, uum, per perpetu petuati ating ng per person sonal al Sec 11 (b) of RA 6646: political machineries and followers. Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. 6. The clear and present danger test is a n In ad addi diti tion on to th the e for forms ms of el elec ecti tion on pr prop opag agan anda da oversimplified judgment unless it takes into account prohibited prohib ited under Section 85 of Batas Pamban Pambansa sa Blg. the following: 881, it shall be unlawful ; a. Relati tiv ve seriousness of th the e danger in xxx comparison with the value of the occasion b) fo forr an any y newsp newspapers apers,, radio broa broadcast dcasting ing or for speech or political activity television station, other mass media , or any person b. Th The e av avai aila labi bili lity ty of mo more re mo mode dera rate te co cont ntro roll making use of the mass media to sell or to give free than those the state imposed of charge print space or air time for campaign or c. The spe specif cific ic inte intent nt for for which which the acti activity vity was other political purposes except to the launched. Commission as provided under Sections 90 and The main opinion conveys a delusion of certitude. 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 . Any mass media 7. Fac Factors tors to to be consid considere ered d in the Bala Balanci ncing ng of Intere Interests sts columnist, columni st, commen commentator tator,, annou announcer ncer or person personality ality Criterion: who is a candidate for any elective public office shall a. So Soci cial al valu value e and impo importa rtanc nce e of the spec specif ific ic take a leave of absence from his work as such during aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the campaign period. the legislation b. The spe specifi cific c thrust thrust of the the res restri tricti ction on Secti Se ction on 11 (b (b)) of RA 6646 sh shou ould ld be re read ad tog toget ethe herr wi with th c. Th The e va valu lue e an and d imp mpor orta tanc nce e of the publi public c Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code: interest sought to be secured by legislation Sec. 90. Comel Comelec ec spac space e. - The Commission shall d. Wh Whet ethe herr the specifi specific c restri restricti ction on decre decreed ed by procure space in at least one newspaper of general cong co ngre ress ss is re reas ason onab ably ly ap appr prop opri riat ate e an and d circ ci rcul ulat atio ion n in ev every ery pr prov ovin ince ce or ci city: ty: Pr Prov ovid ided ed,, necessary for the protection of public interst howeve how everr, Tha Thatt in the abs absenc ence e of sai said d new newspap spaper er,, e. Wh Whet ethe herr the neces necessa sary ry safeg safegua uard rdin ing g of the publication shall be done in any other magazine or public interest involved may be achieved by period per iodica icall in sai said d pro provin vince ce or city city,, whi which ch sha shallll be
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 43 known as 'Comelec Space' wherein candidates can anno an noun unce ce th thei eirr ca cand ndid idacy acy.. Sa Said id sp spac ace e sh shal alll be
allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. Sec. 92. Com The e Co Comm mmis issi sion on shall Comele elec c tim time e. - Th procure radio and television time to be known as 'Comelec Time' which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the are of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and televi tel evisio sion n sta statio tions ns are hereby amended amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Issue: WON Sec 11 (b) of RA 6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of speech, expression and of the press
Held: No. The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable
clearly an important value (Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution Consti tution is the egalitarian egalitarian demand that "the State shallll gua sha guaran rantee tee equ equal al acc access ess to opp opport ortuni unitie ties s for public publi c servic service e and prohibit political political dynasti dynasties es as may be defined by law.”) No presu presump mpti tion on of in inva vali lidi dity ty ar aris ises es in respe respect ct of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opport opp ortuni unity ty amo among ng can candid didate ates s for pol politi itical cal off office ice,, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press (t (top opic ic)) Se Sect ctio ion n 11 (b (b)) do does es limit limit the righ rightt of free free spee sp eech ch an and d of ac acce cess ss to ma mass ss me medi dia a of th the e candid can didate ates s the themsel mselves ves.. The lim limita itatio tion, n, how howeve ever, r, bears bea rs a cle clear ar and reasonabl reasonable e con connec nectio tion n wit with h the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution: -equalization of the situations of the candidates with the deep pocket pockets s and the candidates candidates with shallow or empty pockets; or to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves
Ratio: 1.
(topic (top ic)) Th The e ob obje ject ctiv ive e ai aim m of Se Sec c 11 (b (b)) is th the e equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjo en joyi ying ng th the e un undu due e ad adva vant ntag age e of offe fere red d by hu huge ge campaign “war chests” No one one dispu dispute tes s the legit legitima imacy cy or the impo import rtan ance ce of the objective sought to be secured by the provision in relation to sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code The obj object ective ive is is of speci special al impo importan rtance ce and and urgency urgency in a country like ours which is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between elite and rest of society The Th e ob obje ject ctiv ive e al also so ha has s be been en gi give ven n co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al status under Article IX(C) (4): The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise
3.
or reg regula ulate te the enj enjoym oyment ent or uti utiliz lizati ation on of all fran fr anch chis ises es or pe perm rmit its s fo forr th the e op oper erat atio ion n of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information , all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, incl in clud udin ing g an any y go gove vern rnmen ment-o t-own wned ed or co contr ntrol olle led d corporation corpor ation or its subsidiary. subsidiary. Such super supervisi vision on or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply , including reas re ason onab able le,, eq equa uall ra rate tes s th ther erefo efore re,, fo forr pu publ blic ic info in form rmat atio ion n ca camp mpai aign gns s an and d fo foru rums ms am amon ong g candidates in connection with the objective of holding
Davide, J (Concurring)
free,, or free orde derl rly y, ho hone nest st,, pe peac acef eful ul,, an and d cr cred edib ible le elections.” The Th e Comele Comelec c has thus thus been been expres expressly sly auth author oriz ized ed by the Constitution
2.
The provisio provision n on free freedom dom of spe speech ech,, free freedom dom of expression and freedom of the press (Art III (4)) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C)(4) They Th ey are are no nott un unli limi mite ted d ri righ ghts ts,, an and d ar are e not the only only impor imp ortan tantt an and d re rele leva vant nt va valu lues es ev even en in the mo most st democratic polities Equa Eq ualility ty of op oppo port rtun unity ity to proff proffer er onese oneself lf for publi public c offi of fice ce,, wi with thou outt re rega gard rd to th the e le leve vell of fi fina nanc ncia iall resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is
The restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and fre fr eedom of th the e press of Se Sec ction 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations a. Se Sect ctio ion n 11 (b (b)) is limi limite ted d in the the durat duratio ion n of its applicability and enforceability to election periods b. Sec Sectio tion n 11 11 (b) is is limited limited in scop scope e of applic applicati ation: on: i. Ap Apply ply only only to pu purch rchas ase e and sale, sale, inclu includi ding ng purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print pri nt spa space ce and air tim time e for “Campaign “Campaign or other political purposes” ii. Does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columni col umnists sts in res respec pectt of can candid didate ates, s, thei their r qualifications, and programs and so forth - Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media med ia re repo porti rting ng,, op opin inio ion n or co comme mmenta ntary ry ab abou outt candid can didate ates, s, the their ir qua qualilifica ficatio tions ns and pla platfor tforms ms and promises. iii.. Cov iii Cover er onl only y pai paid d pol politi itical cal advertis advertisemen ements ts of particular candidates c. Se Secti ction on 11 11 (b) exempt exempts s from from its prohi prohibi bitio tion n the purcha pur chase se by or don donati ation on to Come Comelec lec of pri print nt space or air time
The fr fre eedom of speech and of th the e press, or of expr ex pres essi sion on is no nott an ab abso solu lute te ri righ ght. t. It do does es no nott comprehend the right to speak whenever, however, and whe wherev rever er one pleases, pleases, and the man manner ner,, and place, or time of public discussion can be constitutiona consti tutionally lly contro controlled. lled. Freedom is not freedo freedom m from responsibility but freedom with responsibility Ther Th ere e can be be no high higher er form form of limi limita tati tion on to a righ rightt than what the constitution itself allows. The present constitution consti tution lays downs certain princ principles iples authorizing allowa all owable ble res restra traint ints s (sa (same me as main opi opinio nion). n). The They y contemp con templat late e meas measure ures s that wou would ld bri bridge dge the gap between the rich and the poor in society. Framers of the present Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. “social justi tice ce””-h huma man nizati tio on of law aws s and th the e equali equ alizat zation ion of soc social ial and economic economic for forces ces by the
44 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 State Sta te so that justice justice in its rational rational and objective objectively ly secular conception may at least be approximated Th The e ai airi ring ng and pr prin inti ting ng of a ca cand ndid idat ate’ e’s s po poli liti tica call advert adv ertise isement ments s can sti stillll be don done e dur during ing “Co “Comel melec ec Time” and within “Comelec space”
Padilla, J (Concurring)
These Thes e freedo freedoms ms are not not immun immune e to regul regulati ation on by the the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power Secti Se ction on 11 11 (b) aims aims to upho uphold ld the the State’ State’s s policy policy of of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service; and acts as an equalizer between the rich and poor candidates. Sect Se ctio ion n 11 (b (b)) is a po posi siti tive ve and effec effecti tive ve measu measure re against corruption in public office: To tolerate even indirectly overspending in print space or air time for campaign purposes will open floodgates to corruption in pub public lic off office ice bec becaus ause e a win winnin ning g can candid didate ate who over ov ersp spen ends ds du duri ring ng th the e el elec ecti tion on pe peri riod od mu must st necessarily recover his campaign expenses by “hook or crook” Elec El ecto tora rate te ar are e gi give ven n op opp por ortu tuni niti tie es to kn know ow th the e candidates and be informed of their qualifications and platforms. Sec 9 of RA 6646 states that Comelec shall encourage non-political, non-partisan private and civic organi org anizat zation ions s to ini initia tiate te and hold in eve every ry city and munic mun icip ipal ality ity,, pu publ blic ic fo fora ra at wh whic ich h al alll re regi giste stere red d candidates candi dates for the same office may simul simultaneou taneously sly and person personally ally participate participate to prese present, nt, explai explain, n, and/or debate deb ate on the their ir cam campai paign gn pla platfor tforms ms and pro progra grams ms and other like issues
electorate electo rate of the cre creden dentia tials ls and pla platfor tforms ms of the candidates that they are allowed to campaign during the electi election on period period.. All chann channels els of commun communicatio ication n should be kept open to insure the widest diss di ssem emin inat atio ion n of in info form rmat atio ion n be bear arin ing g on th the e forthcoming elections Ends End s and Means Means Test: Test: lawf lawful ul objec objectiv tive e may be read readily ily conceded. Lawful method here applied falls short of the consti constitutiona tutionall criter criterion. ion. Finan Financial cial dispar disparity ity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by leg legisl islati ation on exc except ept onl only y by the limitatio limitation n of the their ir respective expenses to a common maximum. The rich candidate violates no law as long as he does not exce ex ceed ed th the e ma maxi ximu mum m am amou ount nt pr pres escr crib ibed ed by the Election Code The prop propose osed d distri distributi bution on of Comel Comelec ec time time and and space space is ha hard rdly ly wo worka rkabl ble e co cons nsid ider erin ing g th the e tre tremen mendo dous us number of candidates running all over the country Sect Se ctio ion n 11 (b (b)) co cons nsti titu tute tes s pr prio iorr re rest stra rain intt on th the e dissemination of ideas—illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion, and on the candidates who want and have the right to address the greatest number of voters through the modern facilities of the press, radio and television
Paras, J. (Dissenting)
Serious Seriou s attack attack on our our freed freedom om of expr express ession ion.. Should Should the campaign for votes be carried out in other for a, the rich candidate can always be at a great advantage over his less fortunate opponent
Gutierrez, Jr., J (Dissenting)
Section Secti on 11 11 (b) is cens censor orsh ship ip pure pure and simpl simple: e: it will will cert ce rtai ainl nly y ke keep ep th the e vo vote ters rs ig igno nora rant nt of wh who o th the e candidates are and what they stand for and will result in gross inequality. We owe it to the masses to open all forms of communication to them during this limited campaign period Comelec Come lec is is alread already y overbu overburde rdened ned with with the the conduc conductt of elections and cannot supervise publicity campaigns of almost 100,000 candidates Exis Ex isti ting ng re rest stri rict ctio ions ns (c (cam ampa paig igns ns ar are e al allo lowe wed d on only ly within a limited period and amount they may spend is restricted) are more than sufficient
Cruz, J. (Dissenting)
“Freed “Fre edom om of Speech Speech”” ac acco cord rdin ing g to Mi Milt lton on:: th the e liberty liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties “Fre “F reed edom om of Ex Expr pres essi sion on”” ac acco cord rdin ing g to Ph Phil illi lips ps:: at once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate of all liberty; the sharpest and handiest weapon to blunt the edge of oppression Ever Ev ery y citiz citizen en has has a ri righ ghtt to offe offerr hi his s op opin inio ion n and sugg su gges esti tion ons s in th the e di disc scus ussi sion on of the pr prob oble lems ms confro con fronti nting ng the com commun munity ity or the nation. nation. He can arti ar ticu cula late te hi his s vi view ews s thr throu ough gh man many y me metho thods ds bu butt what wh atev ever er for form m he em empl ploy oys, s, he is en enti titl tled ed to the protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his thoughts. One especially significant way by which the citizen can express his views, and that is thro th roug ugh h th the e ba ball llot ot.. By th that at vo vote te,, he is ab able le to participate in the selection of the persons who shall serve as his representatives in the various elective offices in the government It is fo forr th the e purpose of properly info forrmi min ng the
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995. Facts: ·
COME COMELE LEC C issu issued ed Res Resol olut utio ion n No. No. 2272 2272:: Sec. 2. — The Come Comele lec c Spac Space e. Commission shall shall procur procure e free prin printt spac space e of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general general circulati circulation on in every province or city for use as "Comelec from Marc March h 6, 1995 1995 in the the case case of Space" from candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until until May 12, 12, 1995 1995.. In the absen absence ce of said said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec the Space" shall be allocated by Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. "Comelec Comelec Space Space" shal shalll also also be used used by the Commissi Commission on for dissemin dissemination ation of vital vital election election information. Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication shall allow to be prin printed ted or publ publis ishe hed d in the the news news,, opin opinio ion, n, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publ public icat atio ion n acco accoun unts ts or comm commen ents ts whic which h manife manifestly stly favor or oppose oppose any candid candidate ate or
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 45
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political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including including therein said candidate candidate or political political party. ty. Howe owever, unless the fac facts and circums circumstan tances ces clearl clearly y indica indicate te otherw otherwise ise,, the Commission Commission will respect respect the determination determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publ public icat atio ions ns that that the the acco accoun unts ts or view views s publis published hed are signif significa icant, nt, newswo newsworthy rthy and of public interest. Purs Pursua uant nt to this this,, COMEL COMELEC EC sent sent lett letter ers s to sever several al periodicals (ie., Phil Star, Malaya, etc) directing them to provide half a page of free print space for use as
“COMELEC space” PPI PPI assai assails ls the the const constit ituti ution onal ality ity of of the Reso Resolu luti tion on on the grounds that: o Sec Sec 2 viol violat ates es the the proh prohib ibit itio ion n on gov gover ernm nmen entt and and its its agen agenci cies es agai agains nstt takin taking g priv private ate prop proper erty ty for for publ public ic use use with withou outt just just compensation. o Letter requiring them to give free “COMELEC space” and at the same time process raw data from candidates to make it camera camera ready ready consti constitute tutes s imposi impositio tions ns of involuntary servitude. o Sec 8 violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. · OSG and and COME COMELE LEC C defe defens nse: e: o COME COMELE LEC C Resol Resolut utio ion n does does not imp impos ose e an obligation upon the publishers to give free space as it does not criminalize or sanction the refusal to do so. It is designed merely to solicit free space from publishers. o Even Even if the the Reso Resolu luti tion on and and let lette terr direc directi tive ve are are mandatory in nature, they are nonetheless valid as an exercise of Police Power. o Sec Sec 8 is is a per permi missi ssibl ble e exer exerci cise se of of the the powe power r of supervision supervision/regula /regulation tion of the COMELEC COMELEC over over comm commun unic icat atio ion n and and info inform rmat atio ion n operations of print media enterprises during the election to ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Is Resolution No. 2272 constitutional? Held: Sec 2 suffers suffers from from a constitution constitutional al vice vice and and should should therefore be nullified Appeal as to Sec 8 is dismissed for not being a justiciable issue. Ratio:
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did not even allege tha that the the publishers were unwilling to sell the print spaces at the prevailing price. § It has has not not eve even bee been show shown n tha that COMELEC COMELEC has been been grante granted d the power of eminent domain either by the constitution or legislature. § Sec 2 is n ot ot a v al alid e xe xercise o f emin eminen entt doma domain in,, Sec Sec 2 has has no constitution constitutional al basis for compelling compelling publishers publishers to donate against their will. Deci Decisi sion on is in line ine with ith the the theo theory ry of demo democr crat atiic representative government: o The The bene benefi fits ts which hich flow flow fro from heig height hten ened ed level level of inform informati ation on and awaren awareness ess of the elec electo tora rall proc proces ess s is comm commun unit ity y wide wide,, therefor therefore e the result resulting ing economi economic c burden burden should be distributed as widely as possible through throughout out the society society by utiliz utilizing ing public public funds. It has has not not been been sho shown wn tha thatt Poli Police ce Pow Power er has has been been constitutionally delegated to COMELEC. In any case, they also failed to show that they complied with the requisites for lawful taking under the police power. o Sec Sec 2 does not not show show th the exi existence of a national emergency or an urgent public need that that need need to be addr addres esse sed d and and that that the the measure taken is the only reasonable and calibr calibrate ated d respons response e availa available ble.. Instead Instead,, it indiscriminately takes the private property of publishers.
II. ·
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PPI fai faile led d to alle allege ge any any speci specific fic aff affir irmat mativ ive e actio action n on the part of COMELEC to enforce Sec 8. It also failed to allege that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of the provision. Sec Sec 8, is a poo poorl rly y phra phrase sed d prov provis isio ion n impl implem emen enti ting ng the the doctrine in the case of NPC v COMELEC, where the court ruled that: The Electoral Reforms Law which prohibits the sale of print space or airtime for campaign and other political purposes, except to the COMELEC does not include in its scope the reporting of news, commentaries and expressio expressions ns of opinion opinion by reporters, reporters, broadcasters, broadcasters, columnists, etc not intended for advertising as such are protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
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PPI PPI canno cannott be fault faulted ed for for inter interpr pret etin ing g the Res Resol olut utio ion n and letter directive as a taking of private property without without due process, process, despite the claim of COMELEC COMELEC that refusal to follow the directive is not criminalized or sanctioned. The Resolution and letter directive are in fact susceptible to the same interpretation as PPI’s. o The The wor wordi ding ng of of Sec Sec 2 doe does s not not demon demonstr strat ate e that the intention of COMELEC is to merely solicit. Direct Directing ing print print media media compani companies es to donate donate print print space space amounts to taking a private property for public use, within the concept of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. o Requ Requis isit ites es for for lawful lawful tak takin ing: g: (1) (1) neces necessi sity ty for for the taking; (2) legal authority to effect the taking. § COMELEC failed to prove the existence of the first element. They
No limitation based on content or on the characteristics of the speaker BAYAN vs Ermita FACTS: Petitioners come in three groups. - Bayan, et al., alleged alleged that their rights as organizations organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP 880. - Jess del Prado and 26 others allege that they were injured, arrested arrested and detained detained when a peaceful mass action they held was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. - Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al allege that their rights as organizations and individuals, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that a rally they co-sponsored was to be
46 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them and Further Furthermore more,, nothing nothing in BP 880 authoriz authorizes es the denial denial of a forcib forcibly ly disper dispersed sed them. them. They They furthe furtherr allege allege that that a multimultipermi permitt on the the basi basis s of a rall rally’ y’s s prog progra ram m cont conten entt or the the sectoral rally was scheduled to proceed along España Ave in stat statem emen ents ts of the the spea speake kers rs ther therei ein, n, exce except pt unde underr the the front front of UST and going going to Mendio Mendiola la bridge bridge.. Police Police office officers rs constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test." blocked blocked them and prevented prevented them from proceeding proceeding further. further. - Meanwhile, the SolGen agreed with the observation of the CJ Three rallyists were arrested. that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term because it - They all assail BP 880 Secs 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought well as the policy of "Calibrated "Calibrated Preemptive Preemptive Response". They to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, forth in BP 880 and that it does not the maximum tolerance no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. policy embodied in that law. la w.
Pet contentions : - Bayan: BP 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that: 1) it requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger; danger; 2) it curtails the choice choice of venue and is thus repugnant as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the freedom expression is exercised; 3) it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions actions in suppor supportt of the governmen government; t; 4) the words words "lawful "lawful cause," cause," "opinion," "opinion," "protesting or influencing influencing"" suggest suggest the the expo exposi siti tion on of some some caus cause e not not espo espous used ed by the the government; - Jess del Prado: it is unconstitutiona unconstitutionall as it is a curtailment curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in BP No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. - KMU: BP 880 cannot put the prior requirement requirement of securing securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certai certain n events events requir require e instant instant public public assemb assembly ly,, otherw otherwise ise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, policy, they argue that it is preemptive, t hat the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. Furthermore, Furthermore, it contravenes contravenes the maximum maximum tolerance tolerance poli policy cy of BP 880 880 and and viol violate ates s the const constit itut utio iona nall righ rightt to peaceably assemble.
Respondents’ (Ermita, Atienza, PNP, et al) contentions: 1. Peti Petiti tion oner ers s have have no stan standi ding ng beca becaus use e they they have have not not presented evidence that they had been injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR and BP 880. 2. Neither BP 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cann cannot ot hone honestl stly y clai claim m that that the the time, time, plac place e and and manne manner r regulation embodied in BP 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) it is content-neutral; (b) it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; (c) it leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information. 3. BP 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly’s time, place place and manner manner of conduc conduct. t. It entails entails traffic traffic re-rou re-routin ting g to preven preventt grave grave public public inconv inconveni enienc ence e and seriou serious s or undue undue inte interf rfer eren ence ce in the the free free flow flow of comm commer erce ce and and trad trade. e.
ISSUES : W/N pet have standing (YES) W/N BP 880 is constitutional (YES) W/N CPR is valid/constitutional (NO)
RATIO: 1. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition is directly affected by BP 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. 2. Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to organize or form associations, as well well as to enga engage ge in peac peacef eful ul conc concer erte ted d activ activit itie ies, s, are are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution (Sections 4 and 8 of BOR) BOR).. Thes These e righ rights ts enjo enjoy y prim primac acy y in the the real realm m of constitutional protection: without this, all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. - However, it must be remembered that these rights, while sacrosanct, are not absolute. They may be regulated that they shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" - There There can be no previo previous us restra restraint int or limita limitation tion on free free speech, free press, or freedom of assembly unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v Bagatsing , to wit: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the the cons consen entt of the the owne ownerr or the one entit entitle led d to its legal legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahea ahead d in time time to enab enable le the the publ public ic offic officia iall conc concer erne ned d to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the “clear and present danger” test be the standard for the decision reached. reached. His decision, whether favorable favorable or adverse, must be transmi transmitted tted to them them at the earlie earliest st opportu opportunity nity.. Thus, Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. - It is very clear that BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. - BP 880 refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 47 causes; causes; otherwise otherwise they would not be "peaceable" "peaceable" and entitled entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground ground of clear clear and presen presentt danger danger to public public order, order, public public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under under the Univer Universal sal Declar Declarati ation on of Human Human Rights Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. - As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precis precise e and sufficie sufficient nt standar standard d (which (which is the clear clear and present danger rule). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. - Finally, the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. 3. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. It merely confuses the people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. NB: In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s mayor’s office office to allow allow proper proper coordi coordinat nation ion and orderly orderly activities.
Reyes vs Bagatsing RATIO DECIDENDI: The only exception to the right of the people to free speech and peaceably assemble is the presence of clear and present danger which is of a character both grave and imminent, and a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
NATURE: Suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
FACTS: Petitioner, retire Justice JB L. Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the Cit y of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Em bassy. A short program was to be held and after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States S tates Ambassador. Mayor Raymond Bagatsing denied said permit based on intelligence reports on the plans of subversive elements to disrupt s aid assembly. Mayor Bagatsing, however remained amenable as long as the Anti-Bases Coalition chose to hold the rally in Rizal Stadium or in any other closed space.
ISSUE: Is Mayor Bagatsing ‘s denial of the rally permit applied for by JB L. Reyes tantamount to a violation of Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution?
HELD: Yes. RATIO: Free speech and peaceable assembl y, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. 2) There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the venue for the start of the peace rally. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy. Embassy. The Court cites Justice Roberts in Hague v CIO: Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 3) It being the case that the Philippines is a signatory to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the State is under a special duty based on the second paragraph of the Article 22 of said treaty which reads: The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. However, only if there was a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Embassy. According to the Court, this clear and present danger was absent in this case since General Narciso Cabrera, Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, assured Mayor Bagatsing that the police force is in a position to cope with such emergency should it arise. Also from him came the commendable admission that there were the least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where no untoward event occurred. It was also made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would take place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, that all the necessary steps would be taken by it to ensure a peaceful march and rally. 1)
48 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 without basis. The Board affirmed the resolution of its sub4) Mayor Bagatsing sought support from the Ordinance committee and further ordered the Chairman to withhold the No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding gran grante ted d permi permitt unti untill the the peti petiti tion oner ers s comp comply ly with with certa certain in or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius deficiencies. Gonzalez, et. al filed this motion for certiorari to of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or the Supreme Court. chancery and for other purposes. purposes. However, there was
no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Because of this, the Court held that the need to pass on the issue was obviated. 5)
Procedure for securing permits for peaceable assemblies: a)
b)
c)
d)
The appl applic icant ants s for a perm permit it to hold hold an an assemb assembly ly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such Such applic applicati ation on shoul should d be filed filed well well ahead ahead in in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is is an an indispe indispensable nsable condition condition to such refusal refusal or or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If the licensing authority is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Therea Thereaft fter er,, the decisio decision, n, whether whether favora favorable ble or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Gonzales vs Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985 JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO INO BROC BROCKA KA,, JOSE JOSE F. LACA LACABA BA,, and and DULCE ULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. CHAIR HAIRMA MAN N MARI MARIA A KALA KALAW W KATI KATIGB GBAK AK,, GENER ENERAL AL WILF WILFRE REDO DO C. ESTRAD ESTRADA A (Ret (Ret.), .), and and THE THE BOAR BOARD D OF REVI REVIEW EW FOR FOR MOTI MOTION ON PICT PICTUR URES ES AND AND TELE TELEVI VISIO SION N (BRMPT), respondents. Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.
Overview: This is a certiorari proceeding over the controversy revolving around the motion picture entitled, Kapit sa Patalim , over which, the respondent Board is being questioned about its scope of power. This case also discusses the question of what constitutes obscenity. This is a balancing between the right to freedo freedom m of expres expressio sion n of the petiti petitione oners rs and the scope scope of power of the respondent Board relevant to the said right.
The Board, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the case, as it has already revoked its prior decision and has granted the petitioners the permit to exhibit the film without deletions. In an affirmative action, the Board contends that the petition does not questio question n the validi validity ty of the classi classifica ficatio tion, n, therefo therefore re is already moot and academic. The petiti petitione oners’ rs’ amended amended petiti petition on raises raises object objection ions s on the classificati classification on of the film as without without legal and factual basis and is exer exerci cise sed d as imper mpermi miss ssib iblle rest restra rain intt of artis rtisti tic c expression. The Board however asserted that the issues have been all rendered moot. It was also submitted that the standard of the the law law for for clas classi sify fyin ing g film films s affo afford rd a prac practi tica call and and determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment. For the Board, the only question left to be answered is the sufficiency of the standards of classification.
Issue: Is obscenity a valid basis of invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution? (a) What What constit constitute utes s obsceni obscenity? ty? (b) (b) What What is the scope scope of the exer exerci cise se of power power of the Board?
Discussion: Motion Pictures · In Burstyn v. Wilson , it is said that notwithstanding the pronouncement of the importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion, that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform, there is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. · However, in i n Reyes v. Bagatsing , press freedom, is said to be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censor censorshi ship p or punish punishment ment.. The Court Court emphas emphasize izes s here that despite this, the freedom is not absolute, and can be limited if there is a clear and present fander of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Censorship or Previous Restraint · The The Cour Courtt says says that that the the emp empha hasi sis s shou should ld be be put put on the freedom from censorship or restraint than on the restraint itself, because the power to exercise prior rest restra raiint is not not to be presu resume med, d, rath rather er the the presumption is against its validity. validity. · In this case, the Court sees that the scope of
power of the Board is limited to the classification of films, in determining what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only.
Makasiar, Ponente: Fernando, C.J. (concurring: Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcio Concepcion, n, Jr., Jr., Melencio-He Melencio-Herrera, rrera, Plana, Plana, Escolin, Escolin, Relova, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., in the result, Aquino, J.)
Facts: The film, Kapit sa Patalim, was granted a permit but was classified as “For Adults Only” by a sub-committee of the Board Board of Review Review for Motion Motion Pictur Pictures es (Board (Board), ), with with certain certain change changes s and deleti deletions ons effect effected ed on it. Upon Upon this this resolu resolutio tion, n, Antonio Gonzalez, the President of Malaya Films filed a motion for reconsideration reconsideration alleging that the said classificatio classification n was
Clear and Present Danger Test
· · ·
Dang Danger er must must not not onl only y be clea clearr but als also o pres presen entt and and imminent, and the causal connection must be evident. Danger must must not not only be probable, it should be inevitable Dang Danger er of of evil evil is to publ public ic mora morals ls,, publi public c healt health h or any any
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 49 other legitimate public interest. “Obscene” · Uno Unortho rthodo dox, x, cont contro rove vers rsia ial, l, hate hatefu full idea ideas s are are stil stilll protected unless they infringe upon other rights. · In Unit (1918) 8),, the the cour courtt United ed Stat States es v. Bust Bustos os (191 recognized the principle that libel, though beyond the pale pale of cons consti titu tutio tiona nall prot protec ecti tion on,, still still pass passes es a determination as to whether there is no violation of the right to freedom of expression. · Justice Brennan (in the case of Roth): sex sex and and
following cases: (a) Justice Conrado vs. Sanchez, (b )Surigao Minera Minerall Reserv Reservati ation on Board Board vs. vs. Clorib Cloribel el and Zaldiv Zaldivar ar vs Gonzales.
THE FACTS ·
obscen obscenity ity are not synon synonym ymous ous,, and obscen obscene e materi material al is materi material al which which deals deals with with sex in a mann manner er appe appeal alin ing g to prur prurie ient nt inte intere rest st.. The The port portra ray yal of sex, sex, e.g. e.g.,, in art, art, lite litera ratu ture re and and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny deny materi material al the consti constitut tution ional al protec protectio tion n of freedom of speech and press. State’s Patronage of Arts and Letters · On one one hand hand,, the the Boar Board d cont conte ends nds that that it appl applie ies s contemporary Filipino cultural values as its standard, as supported by EO 878. · The The Cour Courtt howev however er remi remind nds s that that the the arts arts and and let letter ters s shall be under the patronage of the State, stating that this is a constitutional mandate, i.e. it is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation, and what is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. · On the the quest questio ion n of obsc obscen enity ity,, such such stand standar ard d set for forth th in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconst itutionality. itutionality. No Grave Abuse of Discretion · The The abus abuse e is evid eviden entt in the the ligh lightt of the the diff diffic icul ulty ty and and travai travaill underg undergone one by petitio petitioner ners s before before Kapi Kapitt sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. The Board’s perception of what cons consti titu tutes tes obsce obsceni nity ty also also appe appear ars s to be undu unduly ly restrictive. But there are not enough votes to maintain that that such such an abus abuse e can can be cons consid ider ered ed grav grave, e, therefore certiorari does not lie. · The The respo respond nden entt Boar Board, d, in its its Answ Answer er enum enumer erat ated ed a number of scenes which it believes will not be suitable for non-mature viewers and the classification is thus a warning to theatre operators and viewers alike that some contents of the picture are not fit for the young.
Note: Petition is dismissed on the ground that there are not enough votes to rule that there was grave abuse of discretion.
In re Letter of Atty. Atty. Noel Sorreda A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC (July 22, 2005) Overview: The current case is about the disciplining of Atty. Noel Noel Sorr Sorred eda a due due to his his lett letter ers s to the the cour courtt wher wherei ein n he complained, lectured, and generally disrespected the Court for not getting his desired results in several of his cases. He also imputed that the court is “corrupt” and is specifically out to get him and not let him win any of his cases. In this case, a person’s right to freedom of expression, more specifically Atty. Atty. Sorreda’s Sorreda’s right to criticiz criticize e the court is weighed weighed against against his lawyerly duty to maintain respect to the Courts at all times acco accord rdin ing g to Cano Canon n 11 of the the Code Code of Prof Profes essi sion onal al Responsibility, Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the ROC, and the
·
·
Febr Februa uary ry 25, 25, 200 2005 5 – Atty Atty.. Noel Noel Sor Sorre reda da as as a memb member er of the Phili Philipp ppin ine e Bar Bar wrote wrote to the the Chie Chieff Justi Justice ce furnish furnishing ing all associ associate ate justic justices, es, RTC RTC justic justices es and counse counsels ls in the involved involved cases. cases. In the loetter loetter, he expr expres esse sed d his his frust frustra rati tion ons s over over the the unfav unfavor orab able le outcomes and the manner by which the court arrived to its decisions. The following cases were cited by Sorreda. o UDKUDK-12 1284 845, 5, Ramo Ramon n Soll Solleg egue ue vs. vs. Court Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs Commision on Elections o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1484 148440 40,, Lili Lilia a Sanc Sanchez hez vs. Cour Courtt of Appeals o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1527 152766 66,, Lili Lilia a Sanc Sanchez hez vs. Cour Courtt of Appeals et al. o G.R. G.R. No. No. 154 15431 310 0 Noel Noel Sor Sorre reda da vs. vs. Cour Courtt of Appeals et al. o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1554 155446 46 Alla Allan n Reyn Reynol old d Cu vs. vs. Cour Courtt of Appeals et al. o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1566 156630 30 Ron Ronililo o Sorr Sorred eda a vs Cou Court rt of of Appeals et al. o G.R. G.R. No. 157 15704 046 6 Roni Ronilo lo Sor Sorre reda da vs. vs. Nati Nation onal al Labor Relations Commission et al. o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1641 164163 63 Gle Glenn nn Cab Cabal alle les s vs. vs. Peop People le et al. o G.R. G.R. No. No. 1646 164677 77 Mar Maris isa a Maca Macari rilay lay vs. vs. Hon. Hon. Alba-Estoesta et al. In his his firs firstt letter letter,, Sorre Sorreda da state stated d that that the the way way the the court court acted is EXECRABLE and ATROCIOUS. He stated that these were not the actions of men of reason and men who follow the rule of law, but of BULLIES AND TYRANTS. Lastly he stated that the court should be ashamed. Naturally, the court asked for Sorreda to show cause why he shouldn’t be held in contempt. In resp respon onse se to the sho show w caus cause e orde orderr, Sorre Sorreda da wro wrote te another two letters, one dated December 2, 2001 and the other June 16, 2002. He basically argued for the propriety of his actions and lectured the court on his proper concepts of ethics and constitutional law. The following are important passages in his letters: o Something is terribly wrong with the country’s country’s justice system. What is happening happening to the justice system in our country Mr. Chief Justice? o I depl deplor ore e and and cond condemn emn in str stron onge gest st ter term m the stron strong-h g-han ande ded d actu actuati ation ons s of the Cour Court. t. These actions can be found in dictatorship and authoritarian regimes o The 10 cases are one of the most meritorious meritorious cases ever. A reasonable reasonable and impartial mind cannot ignore their merit. The
High High Cour Courtt has has take taken n it pers person onal ally ly agai agains nstt me, me, to the the detr detrim imen entt of my innocent clients and justice. If the court o
had anything against me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck. If I had had ind indee eed d wron wronge ged d the the Cour Courtt in the way they say, no punishment save DISBARMENT will do. Given that, the Court has resolved to deny the opportunity for self-defense that I
50 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 don’t have any way to defend myself. o Am I pun punis ishe hed d beca becaus use e I said said tha thatt the the cour courtt ISSUE can’t give a fully reasoned judgment as in Re Almacen? But rather than t han admit that it made The sole issue in this case is whether or not Sorreda a mistake, the Court resolved to get back at is liable for his writing to the Court. me. o Mr. Justice, this is craven cowardice to HELD
deal with an adversary like that. o
o
That nine of the ten cases were only assigned the First and Second Division. The First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice and the Second chaired by Justice Bellosillo. That after Justice Bellosillo retired and was replaced by Justice Vinita V. Chico-Nazario, only then did a case of this counsel did not fall fall under under the First First and Second Division Division.. Could it be because the chair of the Third Division, Division, Justice Vitug and Justice Justice Nazario Nazario had reputations for independent mindedness that the powers that be prevented them from being at the bench? I am sad a s a counsel to come to t he he realiz realizati ation on that the the high high inst instit itut utio ion n of
which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. low. Indign Indignati ation on as a citize citizen, n, that that the public officers that should help instead give judgments that insult the intelligence. § How can the court pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days? § How can the court suffer a widow and her children to live in their toil toilet et and and sanc sancti tion on the the ille illega gall demolition of their home? § Did Did the the cour courtt even even try try to put put themselves in the shoes of the innocent man kept locked up for 3 years? § Wher Where e did did the the Cour Courtt get get such such shameless boldness to dismiss a case on lack of docket fees when evidence shows that it has been paid? § How can they invoke invoke that they they are like Frodo fighting the evils in society society when when they they themse themselve lves s are committing the evils. § Didn’t the Court already bought into the What-are-we What-are-we-in-p -in-powerowerfor mentality? ·
·
On Mar March ch 15, 15, 200 2005, 5, the the Cou Court rt en en band band req requi uire red d agai again n Atty. Sorreda to show cause. But Atty. Sorreda’s reply was to say tat he does not need to say any more because because the cause has already been shown as clear as day. He dared the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge. The The Cour Courtt stan stands ds by by the the ruli ruling ngs s it mad made e that that Sor Sorre reda da allege alleges s to be unfair unfair.. The Sollegue Sollegue case was not dism dismis isse sed d only only beca becaus use e I was was file filed d afte afterr the the regl regleme ement ntary ary peri period od in Sec.4 Sec.4 Rule Rule 65, 65, but but also also because the duplicate original or certified true copy was not submitted. In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. vs. CA, CA, the the case case wasn wasn’t ’t only only dismi dismisse ssed d due due to insufficient verification but because the petition was bein being g used used as a subs substit titut ute e for a lost lost remed remedy y of appeal. The other cases weren’t discussed but they are equally valid and well supported.
Yes.
RATIO Unfo Unfoun unde ded d accu accusa sati tion ons s or alle allega gati tion ons s tend tendin ing g to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. They constitute direct contempt of court and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Responsibility. Ang vs. Castro states that any offensive and malicious stateme statements nts submitted submitted to the same court court or judge judge in which which proceedings are pending is direct contempt. Sorr Sorred eda a also lso viol violat ated ed Can Canon 11 of the the Cod Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer should always maintain the respect due to the courts. Under the same Canon, Rule 11.03 states that a lawyer should abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language. Rule 11.04 also states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by record. Both rules were also violated. Although Sorreda o wes fidelity to his client, he must do so only within the bounds of all. A lawyer is entitled to criticism according to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, but as all freedoms, this is not absolute. A lawyer’s fidelity to his client should not be at the expense of orderly administration of justice. In Justice Conrado vs. Sanchez, it was establishes that there can be no excuse to violate Section 20(b) Rule 138 of the ROC, because it spells out such duty. A lawyer should protect the court from unjust criticism and clamor. In Suriga Surigao o Minder Minderal al Reserv Reservati ation on Board Board vs Clorib Cloribel, el, a lawyer has the duty not to promote distrust in th administration of justice. To undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity continuity of government government and to the attainment attainment of the liberties liberties of the people. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, it was recognized recognized that a person is indeed entitled to free speech, but it is not absolute and should be weighed against equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of the administration of justice. The Supreme Court especially should be accorded respect because it serves as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Sorreda should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and his client’s success is always subordinate.
JUDGMENT Atty. Sorreda has transcended the bounds of permissible permissible comment and constructive constructive criticism. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer puts his moral character in serious doubt. Sorreda has shown that he is unfit as a member of the bar and his rehabilitation should be outside the brotherhood he had dishonored. Therefore, he is found guilty of contempt and violat violation ion of the Code Code of Profes Professio sional nal Respon Responsib sibili ility ty and is
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 51 indefinitely suspended. Chemeri Cheme rins nsky ky,, Erw Erwin in,, “T “The he Fi Firs rstt Am Amen endme dment nt:: Wh When en th the e Government Must Make Content Based Choices,” 42 Clevland State L. Rev. 199 (1994). I. Introduction Senator Helms succeeded in adopting a bill that prohibited the use of federal funds for obscene material. Also, artists receiving such federal funds must certify in advance that no such material shall be disseminated by them. Is this unconstitutional? Can the government make contentbased choices? II. The Prohibition Against Content-Based Discrimination The US SC, in a long line of cases, declared that contentbased based choice choices s of the govern governmen mentt shall shall be consid considere ered d violative of the First Amendment. In Simon Simon and Schus Schuster ter,, Inc. Inc. vs. vs. New York Crime Crime Victi Victims ms New York ork adop adopte ted d the the Son of Sam Sam law law that that Board: New prohib prohibited ited crime crime perpet perpetrat rators ors from from profiti profiting ng from from their their crimes by selling film, book and television rights of their stories. SC struck down the measure as violative of the First Amendment. Justice O’Connor’s opinion mentioned that the First Amendment prohibits content- based choices that regulate free speech unless the government can show that such regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: St. Paul, Minnesota adopted a measure measure prohib prohibiti iting ng the burnin burning g of crosse crosses s or placin placing g swastikas or other expressions of hate in a manner likely to elicit alarm, anger or resentment. Justice Scalia also opined that this is a content- based choice, thus, violative of the First Amendment. In Turner Broadcast Broadcasting ing System System v. Federal Federal Communica Communications tions The US SC, SC, thro throug ugh h Just Justic ice e Kenn Kenned edy y, Commission: The endo endors rsed ed a two-t two-tie ierr syste system m of revi review ew:: (1) (1) view viewpo poin intt neutrality- the government can’t regulate speech based on the ideology of the message (2) subject subject matter neutralityneutralitythe government can’t regulate speech based on the topic of the speech. Why is there so much concern about content neutrality? - The fear is that government will target particular messages and attem attempt pt to contr control ol thoug thoughts hts on a topic topic by regu regula lati ting ng speech. The SC also says that “ Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate manipulate the public public debate through coercion and not persuasion”. III. Content- Based Choices are Sometimes Inevitable When can a city deny the use of its theatre or auditorium based on the content of the speech? It is not helpful to say that the government cannot make content-based choices because it must. Another example: choice of books found in the library . Which books books should should be bought bought,, consid consideri ering ng the scarci scarcity ty of funds? Another example: disbursement of funds for artists. In what type of material should be published to warrant the award of funding? Obse Observ rvati ation ons: s: (1) (1) the prob proble lem m of makin making g cont conten ent-b t-bas ased ed choice choices s is pervas pervasive ive,, not isolate isolated d (2) outcome outcomes s of the case cases s are are compl complet etel ely y inco incons nsis iste tent nt (somet (sometim imes es the the government wins, other times it loses), with no principle to account for the inconsistent results and (3) there are many similarities in all cases (the government more of a provider of speech, not merely a regulator; allocation of scarce
resources) How How are are such such choic choices es to be appr apprai aise sed d unde underr the Firs Firstt Amendment? When do government decisions violate the Constitution? IV. The Failure of Traditional Responses First approach- “ The Government cannot make content-based choices”- as shown, this is clearly inevitable. Second approach- “Unconstituti “Unconstitutional onal Condition Condition Doctrine” Doctrine” (the government cannot condition the receipt of a benefit on a person giving up a right” - Criticisms (1) its current viability is in doubt, since in Rust v. Sullivan , the gag rule was held constit constituti utiona onal, l, and the govern government ment had the choice choice of expending federal revenues (2) it is not analytically useful to solve the problem, since it begs the question of when con content tent-- base based d choi choice ces s by the the gove govern rnme ment nt are are constitutional. Third approach- “doctrine of Prior Restraint” (attempt of the government to censor speech before it occurs) - Criticisms (1) the government is facilitating speech by subsidy and the restraint seems secondary to the enhancement of First Amendment values (2) if choices by the government as to what to fund are prior restraints, the government cannot avoid prior restraints in this area (what prior restraints are allowed and w/c are not?) This This brings brings us to two conclu conclusio sions: ns: Either Either we say that the govern government ment has the free rein rein in making making conten content-ba t-based sed choice choices, s, or it should should never never consider consider making making contentcontentbased choices at all. IV. Towards a Solution The solution will not be found in the First Amendment. It is largel largely y focused focused in limitin limiting g the govern government ment’s ’s abilit ability y to regulate regulate speech. speech. Here, the government government inherently inherently must must regulate. Ultimately, the issue is about how to control the government in a situation where it must act- this is what due process is about. Due process process is based on the notion notion that personal personal freedoms freedoms can be secured only when there is an institutional check on arbitrary government actions. The best solution when the government must make content -based choices is to assure the fairest possible process in acco accord rd w/ the the Due Due Proce Process ss clau clause ses s of the the Fift Fifth h and and Fourteenth Amendment. Subs Substa tant ntiv ivel ely y, the the gove govern rnme ment nt must must make make choi choice ces; s; procedurally, the courts should insist that they are done in the fairest possible way. What a fair process process should include: include: (1) the government government must have have clearl clearly y stated stated the criteria criteria for how choice choices s will will be made (this limits discretion among government officials) (2) criteria must be specific as possible and should be invalidated if they are unduly vague. A reasonable person should should be able able to unders understan tand d the basis upon w/c the government will be making its funding decisions (3) the criteria must not discriminate among speech and speakers based based on the ideas ideas expres expressed sed.. Thus, Thus, subjec subjectt matter matter restrictions would be permissible, but viewpoint ones will not be allowed. Problems: (1) Funding authorities can purport to be making quality-based determinations, but in reality make decisions based on viewpoint (2) Subject matter restrictions can hide viewpoint discrimination (3) Even viewpoint discrimination will be allowed if there is a sufficiently compelling state intere interest. st. (4) courts courts should should be able able to assure assure that the criteria have been reasonably applied.
52 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems
b.
properly left to individual freedom. Mino Mi nori rity ty tyranny tyranny occur occurs s if th the e maj major ority ity is preve prevente nted d from ruling where its power is legitimate.
Robert H. Bork Argument of the essay: A problem of constitutional law is the LACK OF THEORY which therefore results to courts having no withou wit houtt ef effect fective ive cri criter teria ia and and,, the theref refore ore we hav have e come to expect that the nature of the Constitution will change, often quite qui te dra dramati matical cally ly,, as the per person sonnel nel of the Sup Supreme reme Cou Court rt changes. The essay therefore provides for ranging shots, which attempt to establish the necessity for theory and to take the argument of how constitutional doctrine should be evolved by courts a step or two farther The first section centers upon the implications of Professor Wechsler's Wech sler's concept of "neutr "neutral al princi principles," ples," and the second attempts to apply those implications to some important and much mu ch-d -deb ebat ated ed pr prob oble lems ms in th the e in inter terpr pret etat atio ion n of th the e fi firs rstt amendment.
The Supreme Court and the Demand for f or Principle Debate has been on regarding the proper role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution, posing the question of when is authority legitimate. This question arises when any court either exercises or declines to exercise the power to invalidate any act of another branch of government. Take the example of the
Warren Court. Professor Herbert Wechsler argues that the Court must not be mer merely ely a "n "nak aked ed po powe werr or orga gan," n," wh whic ich h me mean ans s tha thatt it its s decisi dec isions ons mus mustt be con control trolled led by pri princi nciple ple.' .' "A principled acco cord rdin ing g to We Wech chsl sler er,, "i "is s on one e th that at re rest sts s on decision," ac reasons with respect to all the issues in a case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.” Wechsler chose the term "neutral principles" to capsulate his argument, though he recognizes that the legal principle to be applied is itself never neutral because it embodies a choice of one value rather than another. Wechsler asked for the neutral application of principles, such that: a. Th The e ju judg dge e "s "sin ince cere rely ly belie believe ves s in the princi principl ple e up upon on which he purports to rest his decision." b. He "must "must beli believ eve e in the valid validity ity of the the reaso reasons ns give given n forr th fo the e de deci cisi sion on at le leas astt in the se sens nse e th that at he is prep pr epar ared ed to ap appl ply y th them em to a la later ter case which which he cannot honestly distinguish." The requirement that the Court be principled arises from the resolution of the seeming anomaly of judicial judicial supremacy in a democratic society. If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society is not democratic. The an The anom omal aly y is di diss ssip ipat ated ed,, ho howe weve verr, by th the e mo mode dell of government embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model upon which popular consent to limited government by the Supreme Court also rests, which we may call "Madisonian.” A Madisonian system: a. No Nott co comp mple lete tely ly de demo mocr crat atic ic,, if by "d "dem emoc ocra rati tic" c" we mean completely majoritarian. b. Also has a counter-majoritarian premise, which are areas properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of life is tyranny.
Dilemma of the Madisonian system : a.
Majori Maj ority ty tyranny tyranny occur occurs s if legisla legislatio tion n invades invades the the areas areas
The res resolu olutio tion, n, how howeve ever, r, of the dil dilemma emma imp impose oses s sev severe ere requirements upon the Court. For it follows that the Court's power pow er is legitimate legitimate only if it has has,, and can dem demons onstrat trate e in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority free fr eedo dom. m. On th the e ot othe herr ha hand nd,, th the e Cou Court rt vio violat lates es the postulates postu lates of the Madi Madisonia sonian n mode modell that alone justifies its power if: a. It does does not have have such such a theory theory but merel merely y impose imposes s its own value choices, or b. It preten pretends ds to have a th theo eory ry but actua actually lly foll follow ows s it its s own predilections howeve everr, sup suppor ports ts the valueJudge Ske Judge Skell lley ey J. Wr Wrigh ightt , how choosing role of the Warren Court , adopting the technique of confession and avoidance. He seems to be arguing that a Court Cou rt eng engaged aged in cho choosi osing ng fun fundam dament ental al val values ues for soc society iety cannot can not be exp expect ected ed to pro produc duce e pri princi nciple pled d dec decisi isions ons at the same time: Decisi Decisions ons first, princi principles ples later. later. His argument then rests on a syllogism: a. The Supre Supreme me Court Court should should "pro "protec tectt our consti constituti tutiona onall rights and liberties." b. Th The e Suprem Supreme e Court Court mu must st "make "make funda fundamen menta tall value value choices" in order to "protect our constitutional rights and liberties.” c. There refo fore re,, the Supreme Court should "make fundamental value choices."' that at a le legi gitim timat ate e Co Cour urtt mu must st be Authorr then concl Autho concludes udes th controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices. Logic has a life of its own, and devotion to principle requires that we follow where logic leads. Judges must be neutral in the: a. Definition b. Derivation c. Ap Appl plic icat atio ion n of pr prin inci cipl ples es Example: Griswold v. Connecticut , a Warren Court decision, which raises the questions of: Why does the principle extend only onl y to mar marrie ried d cou couple ples? s? Why Why,, out of all forms of sex sexual ual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives? Why, out of all forms fo rms of be beha havi vior or,, on only ly to sex sex? ? Th The e qu ques esti tion on of ne neutr utral al deriva der ivation tion als also o ari arises ses:: Wha Whatt jus justifi tifies es any lilimita mitatio tion n upo upon n legislatures in this area? What is the origin of any principle one may state? This is to illustrate the author’s point against the Warre Wa rren n Cou Court, rt, as he pus pushes hes the ide idea a of neu neutral trality ity--th --that at a decisi dec ision on is neu neutra trall if its interpreta interpretation tion may be app applie lied d to different cases consistently. His other points: a. All opin opinion ions s of the case case faile failed d to justify justify the the deriv derivati ation on of any principle used to strike down the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute or to define the scope of the principle. b. Justi tic ce Douglas created here the mi mirracle of transubstantiation. He did not disclose how a series of spec sp ecif ifie ied d ri righ ghts ts co combi mbine ned d to cr crea eate te a new an and d unspecified right—the right to privacy. c. It fails fails ever every y test of of neutra neutralility ty as it give gives s no idea idea of wha hatt th the e pr priinc ncip iple le re real ally ly fo forb rbid ids. s. Wh Wher ere e th the e Consti Con stituti tution on doe does s not emb embody ody the mora morall or ethi ethical cal choice, the judge has no basis other than his own valu va lues es up upon on wh whic ich h to se sett as asid ide e th the e co commu mmuni nity ty judgment embodied in the statute. But this is NOT an
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 53 adeq ad equa uate te ba basi sis s fo forr ju judi dici cial al su supr prem emacy acy. The judiciary has no role to play other than that of applying the statutes in a fair and impartial manner. – Equal
Gratification Clause From this, the author concludes: a. Th That at the choi choice ce of "fun "funda damen menta tall value values" s" by the Court cannot be justified. b. Whe Where re consti constituti tutiona onall materia materials ls do not clea clearly rly speci specify fy the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. c. The judg judge e must must stick stick close close to the text text and and the histo history ry,, and the their ir fai fairr imp implic licati ations ons,, and not con constru struct ct new rights. From the discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause , then, the author says that it is always a mistake for the Court to try to construct substantive individual rights under the due process or the equal protection clause. Such rights cannot be constructed without comparing the wor worth th of ind indivi ividua duall gra gratifi tificati cations ons,, and tha thatt com compar pariso ison n cannot be principled.
TWO PROPER METHODS OF DERIVING RIGHTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION 1. Take from from the document document rather rather specific specific values values that textt or his tex history tory show the fra framers mers actually actually to hav have e intended and which are capable of being translated into principled rules. We may call these specified rights. 2. Derive rights fro rom m governme men ntal processes esta es tabl blis ishe hed d by th the e Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion on.. Th Thes ese e ar are e secondary or derived individual rights. a. Ess Essen entia tiall to the in inter terpr pret etat atio ion n of the fi first rst amendme amen dment, nt, to vot voting ing rig rights, hts, to cri crimin minal al procedure and to much else. b. Not posse possesse ssed d by the indivi individua duall because because the the Constitution Consti tution has made a value choice about indi in divi vidu dual als. s. Ne Neit ithe herr ar are e the they y po poss sses esse sed d becaus bec ause e the Sup Suprem reme e Cou Court rt thi thinks nks the them m fundamental to all humans. c. Ra Rath ther er,, th thes ese e ri righ ghts ts ar are e lo loca cate ted d in th the e indivi ind ividua duall for the sak sake e of a gov govern ernment mental al process proces s that the Consti Constitution tution outlines outlines and thatt the Court sho tha should uld preserve. preserve. They are give gi ven n to th the e ind ndiv ivid idua uall be beca caus use e hi his s enjoyment of them will lead him to defend them th em in co cour urtt an and d the there reby by pr pres eser erve ve th the e govern gov ernment mental al pro proces cess s fro from m leg legisl islati ative ve or executive deformation. *The dis deri rive ved d fro from m th the e distin tincti ction on bet between ween the two is de economic market place. A right is a form of property, and our thinking thinki ng about the catego category ry of constit constitutiona utionall prope property rty might usefu us efully lly fo follllow ow the pr prog ogre ress ss of th thou ough ghtt ab abou outt ec econ onomi omic c property.
SOME FIR SOME FIRST ST AME AMENDM NDMENT ENT PRO PROBLE BLEMS: MS: THE SEA SEARCH RCH FOR THEORY Points: 1. 2. 3.
The la law w ha has s se sett ttle led d up upon on no te tena nabl ble, e, in inte tern rnal ally ly consistent theory of the scope of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. Some peo people ple ask why why the the need need for the theory ory in in the are area a of free speech when we tolerate inconsistencies in other areas of the t he law so calmly. Auth Au thor or be beli liev eves es th that at th the e co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al pr prot otec ecti tion on should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to
protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic. 4. Whe When n decisi decision on makin making g is princ principl ipled ed it has has nothin nothing g to say about the speech we like or the speech we hate; it has a great deal to say about how far democratic discretion can govern without endangering the basis of democratic government. 5. Th Ther ere’ e’s s al also so a pr prob oble lem m in peopl people’ e’s s in inte terp rpre retat tatio ion n of the gua guaran ranty ty of free speech as abs absolu olute. te. Author’s Author’s take: absolute. "Freedom of speech" may very well be a term referring to a defined or assumed scope of liberty, and it may be this area of liberty that is not to be "abridged." 6. Go Gove vern rnme men nt ca cann nnot ot fu fun nct ctio ion n if an any yon one e ca can n sa say y anything anywhere at any time. And so we quickly come to the conclusi conclusion on tha thatt lin lines es mus mustt be draw drawn, n, differentiations made. 7. The Firs Firstt Amend Amendment ment seem seems s to be hastil hastily y drafted drafted that that we are forc forced ed to con constru struct ct our own theory theory of the constitutional protection of speech. 8. 4 BENEF BENEFITS ITS TO BE DERIV DERIVED ED FROM FROM SPEE SPEECH: CH: a. Th The e de deve velo lopm pmen entt of th the e fa facu cullti tie es of th the e individual; b. Th The e happi happine ness ss to be deriv derived ed from from engag engagin ing g in the activity; c. Th The e provi provisi sion on of a safet safety y value value for for socie society ty;; and, d. The dis discov covery ery and and sprea spread d of poli politic tical al truth truth.. 9. The dif differe ference nce exis exists ts only only with with respec respectt to one one kind kind of speech: explicitly and predominantly political speech. This seems to me the only form of speech that a principled judge can prefer to other claimed freedoms. All 10. 2 pro proble blems ms arising arising from the res resolu olutio tion n of applying applying it only political speeches: a. Th The e di diff ffic icul ulty ty of dr draw awin ing g a li lin ne be betw twee een n political and non-political speech. b. Su Such ch a li line ne wil illl le leav ave e un unpr prot otec ecte ted d mu much ch speec spe ech h th that at is es esse sent ntia iall to th the e lilife fe of a civilized community communit y. 11. Explic Explicitly itly political political speech speech is speech speech about how we are are governed, and the category therefore includes a wide range ran ge of eva evalua luatio tion, n, cri critic ticism ism,, ele electio ctionee neering ring and propaganda. 12. The core core of the First First Amendm Amendment ent is politica political. l. 13. POL POLITI ITICAL CAL TRU TRUTH TH a. An absolute set of truths that exist independently of Constitution or statute. b. A set of values that are protected by constit con stituti utiona onall pro provis vision ion from the rea reach ch of legislative majorities. c. Wit Withi hin n that that area area of life life whic which h the majo majori rity ty is permitted to govern in accordance with the Mad Ma dis ison onia ian n mode mo dell of repr re pres esen enta tati tive ve govern gov ernment ment,, wha whatev tever er res result ult the maj majori ority ty reaches and maintains at the moment. 14. Valu alues es protected protected by the Constituti Constitution on are one type of political truth. They are primarily truths about the way government must operate, that is, procedural truths. 15. The use of of the IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE DANGER DANGER or CLEAR CLEAR AND AND PRESE PR ESENT NT DA DANG NGER ER re requ quir irem emen entt to de dete termi rmine ne whether or not the guaranty of free speech applies. 16.. Fi 16 Fina nall lly y, th the e au auth thor or we went nt ba back ck to th the e us use e of th the e NEUTRA NEU TRALIT LITY Y in def defini ining, ng, der derivi iving, ng, and app applyi lying ng principles.
54 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 righ ri ghtt of th thos ose e wh who o cho choos ose e to pa parti rtici cipa pate te in th the e so sole lemn mn Not to be used as condition for exercise or proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, enjoyment of another constitutional right. there is no warrant for their expulsion. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where Ebranilag v. v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, G.R. Nos. L-95770, 95887, March 1, 1993. under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all Consolidated special civil actions for c ertiorari , Mandamus and citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education Prohibition: March 1, 1993 accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)
SYLLABUS TOPICS: 1. Not to be used as condition for exercise or enjoyment 2. 3. 4.
of another constitutional right. Exercise of freedom and conscience. Restraint on Exercise of another right. Freedom of religion
RATIO DECIDENDI: The fla The flag, g, an em embl blem em of na nati tion onal al so sove vere reig ignty nty,, of nation nat ional al uni unity ty and cohesion cohesion and of fre freedo edom m and liberty liberty is protect pro tected ed by the Con Constit stituti ution, on, how howeve everr, thi this s pro protec tectio tion n is subject to exemptions, such as when such decree violates another constitutional right (in this case, the right to freedom of religion and the right to free education) and when violation of such does not produce imminent danger to the public. petiti itione oners rs in bot both h (co (conso nsolid lidate ated) d) cas cases es wer were e FACTS: The pet expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 12 65 (A (An n Ac Actt ma maki king ng fl flag ag ce cere remo mony ny co comp mpul ulso sory ry in al alll educational educa tional institutions) institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Depart Department ment Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making mak ing the fla flag g cere ceremony mony com compul pulsory sory in all edu educati cationa onall institutions insti tutions.. Jehova Jehovah's h's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities authorities in compell compelling ing the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for disob disobedien edience ce of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
HELD: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the hig highes hestt pri priori ority ty and the amp amples lestt pro protec tection tion among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exe exerci rcise se of rel religio igious us fr free eedo dom m is the the exi existen stence ce of of a grav grave e and and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified (Teehankee). The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the com compul pulsory sory flag cer ceremon emony y, they do not eng engage age in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the obse ob serva rvanc nce e of th the e fl flag ag ce cere remon mony y. Th They ey qu quie ietly tly st stan and d at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the
Type of Expression
Thought, Speech, Act and Advocacy Distinction People vs Ferrer G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
CASTRO, J. EN BANC Two cases were being tried under the ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT (Act 1700) Feliciano Co was charged guilty of Anti-Subversion Feliciano Anti-Subversion Act being found an officer of the Communist Party of the Phils. and being an instructor of Mao Tse Tung University. Co moved to quash on the ground that the Act is a bill of attainder. In another case, Tayag and 5 others were accused as members and leaders of Kabataang Makabayan; Benjamin Bie and Commander Melody as off office icers rs and leaders leaders of CPP and NP NPA. A. Taya ayag g move moved d to quash, impugning validity of statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder (2) it is vague (3) it embraces more than one subj su bjec ectt no nott ex expr pres esse sed d in ti titl tle e (4 (4)) it de deni nied ed hi him m of eq equa uall protec pro tectio tion n of law laws. s. Jud Judge ge Fer Ferrer rer (tri (trial al cou court) rt) dec declar lared ed the statute void because it is a bill of attainder and that it is Trial ial Cou Court rt sai said d Con Congre gress ss usu usurpe rped d vague and overb overboard oard. Tr judicial power by pronouncing guilt of CCP without trial, creating a presumption of organizational guilt (one is guilty by virtue of joining the org). Gov’t appealed.
Is the Act a Bill of Attainder? Bill of Attainder – a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. It’s the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban on it serves to implem imp lement ent pri princi nciple ples s of sep separa aratio tion n of pow powers ers and impo imposed sed against the evil of suppressing unpopular causes and political minorities (singling out of definite class). a. CCP is issued solely for definitional purposes focusing on conduct not on individuals. Viewed in actual operation, it does not specify CPP for the purpose of punishment but only to dec declar lare e it as an org organi anized zed conspira conspiracy cy for purposes purposes of prohibition against membership in the outlawed org. b. It is on only ly wh when en a st stat atut ute e ap appl plie ies s ei eith ther er to na name med d
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature legis lature may apply its own rules, and judic judicial ial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. c. It is not enough that the statute (A) specify persons or forr it to be a bi billll of att attai aind nder er.. It mus mustt (B (B)) apply groups fo retroactively; must have (C) ex post facto features (they are united in the clause “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed…). The (D) penalties prescribed have to be
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 55 inescapable. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liab li abil ilit ity y by re reno noun unci cing ng in wr writ itin ing g an and d un unde derr oa oath th th thei eir r membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable. Does it violate due process? No. There is a legislative finding of an evil sought to be prevented and the act only punishes knowi win ng membership. Declaring CCP as an organized conspiracy is intended not as a legislative finding of guilt but to justify proscription. There must be substantive evil to justify the limitation on the freedom of expression and freedom of association. (Recital of legislative findin fin dings gs has determi determined ned a clear and presen presentt danger danger to national security. Purpose of CCP is to establish totalitarian regime and alien domination). domination). The gov’t has a right to protect itself. This legisla legislative tive finding finding passes passes test of distinctio distinction n between legislative fact and adjudicative fact : 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied , and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio ." The requirement requirement of knowing membership (with knowledge of org’s unlawful purpose),as distinguished from nominal membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive organization.
Is it constitutionally overboard? No, the word “overthrow” “overthrow” clearly imported an overth overthrow row of the Gov’t by violence (not by peaceful means), and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was intend int ended ed to be und unders erstood tood.. The wor word d 'ov 'overt erthrow hrow'' cou could ld not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise.
Does it violate the guaranty of freedom of expression? The Act is ai The aimed med ag agai ains nstt co cons nspi pira raci cies es to ov over erthr throw ow the Gove Go vern rnmen mentt by fo force rce,, vi viol olen ence ce or ot othe herr ilille lega gall mea means ns.. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so
indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national preservation vation of democr democratic atic institutions institutions in his security and the preser country.
Does it embrace more than one subject beyond the scope of the title? Main Title of the Act: “An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the th e Phil Ph ilip ippi pine nes s and an d Simi Si mila larA rAss ssoc ocia iati tion ons, s, Pena Pe nali lizi zing ng Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes" It also has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion A nti-Subversion Act." Toge ogether ther with the main tit title, le, the short tit title le of the sta statute tute unequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversion
in gen genera erall whi which ch has for its fun fundam dament ental al pur purpos pose e the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the exis ex isti ting ng Go Gove vern rnme ment nt an and d no nott me mere rely ly su subv bver ersi sion on by Communist conspiracies. The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clea cl earr te terms rms the na natu ture re,, sco scope pe,, an and d co cons nseq eque uenc nces es of th the e proposed law and its operation.
HELD: Resolution of 15 Sept 1970 is set aside and the two cases are REMANDED for trial on merits. Court establishes the ff guidelines:
Subversive Orgs other than CCP: 1. pu purp rpos ose e is to ov over erth thro row w th the e go gov’ v’tt an and d es esta tabl blis ish h a totalitarian regime under foreign power 2. ac accu cuse sed d join joined ed su such ch or org g 3. he did did so knowi knowingly ngly,, willfu willfully lly and and by over overtt acts acts CCP: 1. CC CCP P co cont ntin inue ues s to pu purs rsue ue th the e sa same me su sub bve vers rsiv ive e objectives declared by Congress in 1957 2. ac accu cuse sed d jo join ined ed CC CCP P 3. he did did so knowi knowingly ngly,, willful willfully ly,, and by over overtt acts
Forms Political and Public Interest
Ayer Productions vs Capulong David vs Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988.
Doctrine: It is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power,, and political responsibility power responsibility of the gover government nment to the governed.
Facts:
Seven Seve n pe peti titi tion ons s ch chal alle leng nge e th the e co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal alit ity y of Presidential Presid ential Proclamation Proclamation 1017 and Gener General al Order No. 5 Respondents’ version: On the the 20th 20th Ann Annive iversa rsary ry of the Edsa Peo People ple Powe Powerr I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, by virtue of the powers vested by Sectio Sec tion n 18, Article Article 7 of the Phi Philip lippin pine e Con Consti stituti tution on which states that Ba Base ses s fo forr th the e declar declarat atio ion: n: elemen elements ts in the polit politic ical al opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the th e ex extr tre eme Ri Righ ght, t, re repr pres esen ente ted d by mi mili lita tary ry adve ad vent ntur uris ists ts to br brin ing g dow down n th the e du duly ly co cons nstit titut uted ed Government; such hinders the growth of the economy and sabotages the people’s confidence in government and an d th thei eirr fai faith th in th the e fut futur ure e of th this is co coun untry try;; al also so incl in clud uded ed ar are e th the e bo bombi mbing ng of te tele leco commu mmuni nica catio tion n towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan and the raid of an army outpost in Benguet Th The e Presi Preside dent nt then then issue issued d G. O. No. 5 implem implemen entin ting g PP 1017 Pre Presid sident ent annou announce nced d the canc cancell ellati ation on of all all progra programs ms and an d ac acti tivi viti ties es re rela late ted d to th the e 20 20th th an anni nive vers rsar ary y celebration celebr ation of Edsa People Power I; and revoke revoked d the permits per mits to hol hold d ral rallie lies s iss issued ued earlier earlier by the loc local al governments Pro Protes teste ters rs stil stilll march marched ed unde undete terr rred ed Hu Hund ndre reds ds of ri riot ot poli police ceme men n br brok oke e up an ED EDSA SA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City Pol Police ice arre arrested sted (wi (withou thoutt warrant warrant)) petitio petitioner ner Rando Randolf lf S. Davi Da vid, d, Ro Rona nald ld Ll Llam amas as,, pr pres esid iden entt of pa part rtyy-li list st Akbayan, Crispin Beltran, B eltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno CI CIDG DG of the PNP raide raided d th the e Da Dail ily y Tri ribu bune ne offi office ces, s, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante, in Manila and confiscated news stories by reporters
56 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Bay Bayan an Muna Muna Repres Represen enta tati tive ve Satur Satur Ocampo Ocampo elud eluded ed limi li mita tati tion on or ch chec eck k up upon on th the e ot othe herr. In ti time mes s of arrest when the police went after him during a public emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that forum. we re repo pose se a ce cert rtai ain n am amou ount nt of fai faith th in th the e ba basi sic c Ret Retire ired d Major Major Gene General ral Ram Ramon on Mont Montaño año,, former former head head integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the of the Phili Philippine ppine Constabulary Constabulary,, was arrest arrested ed while same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully with his wife and golfmates. prescribed procedural limitations. Exa Exactly ctly one week week after after the the decla declarat ration ion,, the Presi Presiden dentt a. Fa Faci cial al Ch Cha all llen enge ge lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 Pe Peti titio tione ners rs cont conten end d that that PP 1017 1017 is void void on its face face declaring decla ring that the state of nation national al emergency has becaus bec ause e of its "ov "overb erbrea readth dth." ." The They y cla claim im that its ceased to exist enforce enfo rcement ment enc encroa roached ched on bot both h unp unprot rotecte ected d and Issues: protec pro tected ted rig rights hts und under er Sec Sectio tion n 4, Article Article III of the Procedural Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens. 1. WO WON N the issu issuan ance ce of PP 1021 1021 rende renders rs the peti petiti tion ons s Ov Over erbr brea eadt dth h do doctr ctrin ine e is an an analy alyti tica call too tooll de deve velo lope ped d moot and academic for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech 2. WON peti petitio tioner ners s have have leg legal al stan standin ding. g. cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not Substantive primarily directed to speech or even speech-related 1. WO WON N th the e Su Supr prem eme e Co Cour urtt ca can n re revi view ew th the e fa fact ctua uall cond co nduc uct. t. Fi Firs rst, t, th the e ov over erbr brea eadt dth h do doctr ctrin ine e is no nott bases of PP 1017 intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects 2. WON PP 1017 1017 and and G.O. G.O. No. No. 5 are are unco unconsti nstituti tutiona onall legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive a. Fa Faci cial al Ch Chal alle leng nge e contro con troll ove overr har harmful mful,, con consti stituti tutiona onally lly unp unprote rotected cted b. Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al Ba Basi sis s cond co nduc uct" t".. Sec Secon ond, d, fa faci cial al in inva valilida datio tion n of la laws ws is c. As Ap Appl plie ied d Cha Chall llen enge ge consid con sidere ered d as "ma "manif nifestl estly y stro strong ng medi medicin cine," e," to be Held and Ratio: used use d "sp "spari aringl ngly y and only as a las lastt res resort ort," ," and is Procedural "generally disfavored”. Lastly, a facial challenge on 1. Yes the th e gr grou ound nd of ov over erbr brea eadt dth h is the mo most st di diff ffic icul ultt A moot moot and and acade academi mic c case case is one that that ceas ceases es to challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger pres pr esen entt a ju just stic icia iabl ble e co cont ntro rove vers rsy y by vi virt rtue ue of must establish that there can be no instance when the superv sup erveni ening ng eve events nts so that a dec declar larati ation on ther thereon eon assailed law may be valid.. would be of no practical use or value "V "Voi oid d fo forr va vagu guen enes ess s do doct ctri rine ne"" ho hold lds s th that at "a la law w is Bu Butt co cour urts ts will will de deci cide de cases cases,, ot othe herw rwis ise e mo moot ot and facially invalid if men of common intelligence must academ aca demic, ic, if: (1) there is a gra grave ve violation violation of the necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its Constit Con stituti ution; on; (2) the exc except eption ional al cha charac racter ter of the application. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to situ si tuat atio ion n an and d the pa para ramou mount nt pu publ blic ic in inter teres estt is show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires also al so fa fail iled ed to es esta tabl blis ish h th that at me men n of co comm mmo on formula for mulatio tion n of con control trollin ling g pri princi nciple ples s to gui guide de the intell int ellige igence nce can cannot not und unders erstan tand d the mea meanin ning g and bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is application of PP 1017. capable of repetition yet evading review b. Co Cons nsti titut tutio iona nall Basi Basis s of PP PP 1017 1017 Th Ther ere e is no quest questio ion n th that at the issu issues es being being raise raised d Fir First st provi provisio sion n is consit consituti utiona onall – the calli calling ng out powe power: r: affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, people’ peo ple’s s bas basic ic rig rights hts to free freedom dom of exp expres ressio sion, n, of Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has of th the e Ph Phil ilip ippi pine nes, s, to ma main inta tain in la law w an and d or orde der r the th e du duty ty to fo form rmul ulat ate e gu guid idin ing g an and d co cont ntro roll llin ing g throughout throug hout the Philip Philippines, pines, prevent or suppre suppress ss all constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the form fo rms s of law awle less ss vi viol olen ence ce as wel elll an any y ac actt of symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, insurrection or rebellion" and in the present present pet petiti itions ons,, the military military and the o Se Sect ctio ion n 18 18,, Ar Arti ticl cle e VI VIII of th the e Co Con nst stit itut utio ion n polilice po ce,, on th the e ex exte tent nt of th the e pr prot otec ecti tion on gi give ven n by grants gra nts the Pre Presid sident, ent, as Com Command manderer-ininconstitution consti tutional al guaran guarantees. tees. And lastly lastly,, respon respondents’ dents’ Chief, Chi ef, a "se "seque quence nce"" of gra gradua duated ted pow powers ers.. contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, From the most to the least benign, these are: the petitions are subject to judicial review. the calling-out calling-out power power,, the power to suspend 2. Yes, consid consideri ering ng the transce transcende ndenta ntall importan importance ce of the the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue involved, the Court relaxed the standing rules. and the power to declare Martial Law. Substantive o Un Unde derr th the e ca call llin ingg-ou outt po powe werr, th the e Pr Pres esid iden entt 1. No may summon the armed forces to aid him in The Pres Preside ident’ nt’s s "callin "calling-o g-out" ut" powe powerr as a discret discretion ionary ary suppressing lawless violence, invasion and power is solely vested in his wisdom, but "this does rebe re bellllio ion. n. Th This is in invo volv lves es or ordi dina nary ry po polilice ce not prevent an examination of whether such power action. But every act that goes beyond the was exerci exercised sed withi within n permis permissible sible constitutional constitutional limits President’s calling-out power is considered or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting illegal or ultra vires. grave gra ve abu abuse se of dis discre cretio tion." n."Thi This s rul ruling ing is mai mainly nly a o It is cl clea earr that that PP 10 1017 17 is is not not a decl declar arati ation on of of result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII Marti Mar tial al La Law w. It is me mere rely ly an ex exer erci cise se of of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the cour co urts ts to de dete term rmin ine e in an ap appr prop opri riat ate e ac acti tion on th the e armed forces to assist her in preventing or validity of the acts of the political departments. suppressing lawless violence 2. No Se Seco cond nd provi provisi sion on is uncons unconsti titu tuti tion onal al – the take take care care Al Alth thou ough gh each each depar departm tmen entt is suprem supreme e within within its own own power: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and sphere, none has the monopoly of power in times of to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as me personally or upon my direction;
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 57 o
Presid Pres iden entt is gran grante ted d an Ordin Ordinan ance ce Powe Power r under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may is issu sue e an any y of the fo follllow owin ing: g: EO EO,, AO AO,, Proc Pr oc., ., Me Memo. mo. Or Ord. d.,, Mem Mem.. Ci Circ rc., ., Ge Gen. n. Or Special Powers o Pre Presid sident ent Arro Arroyo’ yo’s s ordi ordinan nance ce pow power er is is limi limited ted to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Presid ent Marcos under PP 1081 durin during g the peri pe riod od of Ma Mart rtia iall La Law w un unde derr th the e 19 1973 73 Constitution. Third Thi rd provi provisio sion n is uncon unconsit situti utiona onall – the powe powerr to take take over: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constit Con stituti ution on do her hereby eby dec declar lare e a Stat State e of Nat Nation ional al Emergency." o A dist distin inct ctio ion n mu must st be draw drawn be betw twee een n th the e President’s authority to declare "a state of nati na tion onal al em emer erge genc ncy" y" an and d to ex exer erci cise se eme merrgency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legiti legitimate mate constitutional constitutional objection can be rais ra ised ed.. Bu Butt to th the e se seco cond nd,, ma mani nifo fold ld constitutional issues arise. o Ge Gen ner eral ally ly,, Co Cong ngre ress ss is th the e re repo posi sito tory ry of emergen emer gency cy pow powers. ers. This is evi eviden dentt in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. How Ho wev ever er,, kn know owiing th that at du duri ring ng gr grav ave e emerg eme rgen enci cies es,, it may no nott be po poss ssib ible le or prac pr acti tica cabl ble e fo forr Co Cong ngre ress ss to me meet et an and d exer ex erci cise se it its s po powe wers, rs, th the e Fr Fram amer ers s of ou our r Cons Co nsti titu tuti tio on de deem emed ed it wis ise e to al alllow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency, (2)) Th (2 The e de dele lega gati tion on mu must st be fo forr a lilimit mited ed peri pe riod od on only ly,, (3 (3)) Th The e de dele lega gatio tion n mu must st be subjectt to such restri subjec restrictions ctions as the Congress may pr pres escri cribe be,, an and d (4 (4)) Th The e em emer erge genc ncy y powers pow ers must be exe exerci rcised sed to car carry ry out a national policy declared by Congress o Th The e taki taking ng over over of of priva private te busi busine ness ss affe affecte cted d with wi th pu publ blic ic in inte tere rest st can canno nott pr prop oper erly ly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. o Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, Court cannot hold that the th e Co Comma mmand nder er-in -in-C -Chi hief ef of th the e Ar Armed med Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to ke keep ep la labo borr di disp sput utes es fr from om st stop oppi ping ng produc pro ductio tion. n. Thi This s is a job for the nation’s nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities. o Fu Furt rthe herm rmor ore, e, the Pres Presid iden ent’ t’s s po powe werr to see see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. o Hence, while the President alone can decl de clar are e a st stat ate e of na nati tion onal al eme emerg rgen ency cy,, howev how ever er,, wi with thou outt le legi gisl slati ation on,, he ha has s no power to take over priva privately-ow tely-owned ned public utilility ut ity or bu busi sine ness ss af affe fecte cted d wi with th pu publ blic ic interest. c. As Ap Appl plie ied d Cha Chall llen enge ge PP 1017 1017 is mere merely ly an invo invoca cati tion on of the Pre Presi side dent nt’s ’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion invasi on or rebel rebellion. lion. But there is nothing in PP 1017 nor in G.O. No. 5 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights. David’ Dav id’s s arrest arrest without without warran warrantt is illegal illegal.. That petiti petitione oner r David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising thei th eirr ri righ ghtt to pe peac acefu efull as asse sembl mbly y. Th They ey we were re no nott committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a cl clea earr an and d pr pres esen entt da dang nger er th that at wa warra rrant nted ed th the e lilimi mita tati tion on of th that at ri righ ght. t. As ca can n be gl glea eane ned d fr from om circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Cour Co urtt lilikew kewis ise e co cons nsid ider ers s the disper dispersa sall an and d ar arre rest st of the th e me memb mber ers s of KM KMU U et al al.. (G (G.R .R.. No No.. 17 1714 1483 83)) unwarranted. the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such perm pe rmit its s aft fter er du due e no noti tice ce an and d he hear ariing on th the e determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. G.R. G. R. No. 17140 171409, 9, (Cach (Cachoo-Ol Oliv ivar ares es,, et al.) al.) pr pres esen ents ts another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Here, the search is illegal. There was no search warrant issued, the search was done without the presence of legal occupant, and warrant was not served in a daytime. Also, the search violated the freedom of the press. The Th e search search and seiz seizur ure e of ma mater teria ials ls for publi publica cati tion on,, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Dai ly Tr Tribu ibune ne off office ices, s, and the arr arroga ogant nt war warnin ning g of government officials to media, are plain censorship. The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments.
Political Freedom as an Outlaw: Republican Theory and Political Protest Simon Bronitt and George Williams
Publications and Freedom of the Press
Planas vs Gil Santiago vs Fart Eastern Broadcasting Babst vs National Intelligence Board Counsel for petitioner: Atty. Joker P. Arroyo Facts: Journalists (who some of them are now famous ie. Jo Ann Maglipon, Yes! Magazine and PEP Editor-in-Chief and Sheila Corona Coronal, l, Philip Philippin pine e Center Center for Investi Investigat gative ive Journa Journalis lism) m) of PANOR ANORAM AMA A maga magazi zine ne were were invi invite ted d by membe members rs of the the National Intelligence Board for questioning through letters like: “Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee Committee at Philippine Philippine Army Officer's Officer's Clubhouse, Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, Manila, (sketch attached), attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on conf confid iden enti tial al matt matter ers s bein being g look looked ed into into by this this
58 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Comm Commit itte tee e will will be cons constr trai aine ned d to proc procee eed d in accordance with la w.”
officers or tribunals and if the questions involved are likely to arise frequently in the future unless they they are are sett settle led d by a cour courtt of last last reso resort rt..
(Teehankee, J.) 2) The court should set aside procedural niceties
They were asked questions like why they write bad stuff about the military and told they were on the borderline of legitimate journalism and writing things that arouse the people. General Ver terminated NIB’s questioning while Brig. Gen. Tadiar filed libel suits with a P10M claim against the writers specifically over the article “Forty Years After the Fall Bataan is Under Siege Siege Again” Again” (which (which report reported ed milita military ry operat operation ions s in Bataan Bataan amounting to raids, tortures, arrests, and killings). Remedy prayed for: Prohibition with preliminary injunction 1) stop stop NIB from from issu issuin ing g subp subpoe oena nas s or lette letters rs of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them 2) decl declar are e the the inte interro rroga gati tion ons s unco uncons nstit titut utio iona nall and and unlawful 3) stop stop NIB NIB from from fili filing ng lib libel el sui suits ts
Legal provisions: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” Art. IV Sec. 9, 1973 Consti Issue: 1) 2)
Whether Whether or or not peti petitio tion n is still still just justici iciabl able? e? Whether Whether or or not remed remedy y of prohi prohibit bition ion will will issu issue e in respect to the libel charges?
Held: (Planas, J., ponente) 1) No. Petition has become moot and academic. Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invita invitatio tion n to attend attend a hearin hearing g and answer answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constit constituti utiona onally lly object objection ionabl able. e. Under Under certai certain n circumstances, however, such an invitation can easi easily ly assu assume me a diff differ eren entt appe appear aran ance ce.. Fort Fortun unat atel ely y, the the NIB NIB dire direct ctor or gene genera rall and and chairma chairman n saw the wisdom wisdom of termina terminatin ting g the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. 2)
No. Firs First, t, a writ writ of prohib prohibiti ition on is direc directed ted agai against nst a tribunal acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The libel cases are not pending before respondent NIB or any other. Second, the issue of validity of libel charge and and admi admissi ssibi bilility ty of evide evidenc nce e elic elicit ited ed in the the course of NIB’s inquiry should be settled in the proper forum ie. the court where it is filed. Third, Brig. Gen. Tadiar filed the suit in his personal capacity.
Dissent:
1) Even though the inquiry has been terminated, the Court should still rule squarely on the questioned acts of harassing and intimidating journalists if it will be useful as a guide for the conduct of public
and consider the RTC and the People as formally impleaded. impleaded. Brig. Gen. Tadiar Tadiar filing libel “in his personal capacity” is not borne out of record. The info inform rmat atio ion n file filed d reci recite tes s that that the the libe libell was was committed against "the character... of Brigadier Genera Generall Artemi Artemio o A. Tadiar adiar,, Jr., Jr., Comman Commandin ding g General of the 3rd Philippine Marine Brigades... both as a man and as an officer in the Armed There e is no legal legal Forces Forces of the Philippines. Philippines." Ther alchemy by which a State may create a cause of acti action on for libe libell "by "by trans transmit mitti ting ng crit critic icis ism m of government, however impersonal it may seem on its its face face,, into into pers person onal al criti critici cism. sm..." .." Artic Article le on Bataan is protected right to fair comment and not an actionable libel. (Teehankee, J.)
The procee proceedin dings gs are odious odious and had chilli chilling ng effects because they were cloaked by a mantle of pseudo legality. The letter of respondent Estrada to Ms. Babst uses the word "law" twice — a law whic which h vests vests auth author ority ity in him him and and whic which h also also authorizes his committee to proceed if Ms. Babst should fail to appear. I have asked and searched but I have yet to discover the law respondent Estrada had in mind. It is now well-sett well-settled led that prohib prohibiti ition on can be issued issued in the sound discreti discretion on of the court in order to prevent oppressive enforcement of the criminal law. Upon the other hand, the reasons adva advanc nced ed by Justi Justice ce Plan Plana a why proh prohib ibit itio ion n should not be issued are based on technical and igno ignore re equi equita tabl ble e grou ground nds. s. He forg forget ets s that that prohibition is a prerogative and an equitable writ. The interrogations were violative of the freedoms of speech speech,, press press and privacy privacy.. They They were were the prop proper er obje object cts s of proh prohib ibit itio ion n or inju injunc ncti tion on.. Similarly, any libel suit, whether civil or criminal, on matters inquired into in the interrogation can also be prohibited. (Abad Santos, J.)
People vs Godoy Date: March 29, 1995 Ponente: Regalado Facts: Judge Eustaquio Gacott of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City filed a complaint to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso Jr., a columnist, and Eva Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board of Palawan Times. The complaint was based on an article written by Reynoso in his column published in July 20, 1994. According to the article, Godoy had sentenced to serve the penalty of double death and that Judge Gacott has been receiving threats to his life because of this. It is alleged that Gacott has been bringing with him an army of men in full battle gear for security. There were also averments of statements allegedly said by the Judge, something to t he effect of “Tagilid na raw ang mundo.” (yung totoo, di ko gets yung article. Ahehe)
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 59 The complaint avers that the article: 1. Tends ends to impede impede,, obstru obstruct, ct, belitt belittle, le, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice 2. Contai Contains ns averm averment ents s which which are are disr disresp espectf ectful, ul, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory 3. Does Does not not only only cas castt aspe aspers rsio ions ns on on the the integrity of and honesty of the judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him 4. Is sub sub judi judice ce beca because use it is is still still pend pending ing automatic review. Reynoso contended that his article does not impede justice because it was published after the case had been decided upon; that such publication will not affect the Supreme Court’s eventual decision on the case because the paper circulated in Palawan only; that the comments made were in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom and expression and of the press; and that it was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court. Ponce de Leon, on the other hand, contended that the article was merely in reaction to the TV interview given by Judge Gacott in the show Magandang Gabi Bayan; that the article is no longer sub judice; that it cannot be considered contemptuous in the absence of a clear and present danger; that it is a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that it does not constitute contempt and instead is a fair criticism at most; and that she did not gave either actual knowledge or personal connection with the authorship of such article.
Issues: 1. 2. 3.
WON the spec specifie ified d stateme statements nts compl complain ained ed of of are contumacious in nature WON there there can can be conte contempt mpt of of court court in case case of post post-litigation statements or publications WON the Supr Supreme eme Cour Courtt has jurisd jurisdict iction ion over over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal
Held: 1. 2. 3.
No Yes Yes
Ratio: 1.
The allege alleged d dispar disparagi aging ng state statement ments s had been been taken out of context. There were three particular statements that Judge Gacott complained about. With regards to the death threats – Such statements do not even deal with the merits of the case, they only make mention of the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that his life is being threatened by Godoy. Godoy. With regards to rumors about Godoy’s affairs – They are rumors only and not presented as facts, Reynoso even acknowledged that he doesn’t know if the statements are true or not. With regards to the possible effect of the Supreme Court’s decision – The statements constituted a fair analysis of possible developments in the case. •
•
•
With regards to the statements of Atty Paredes – The article merely reported what Atty Paredes said in reaction to Judge Gacott’s public statements in Magandang Gabi Bayan Snide or sarcastic remarks do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The article could not have intended on influencing the Supreme Court because it wasn’t capable of doing so. It had not transcended the legal limits of editorial comment and criticism and it has not been shown that there is a substantive evil which is extremely serious and imminent as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. It is in the nature of the duty of the judge that in every case, he decides in favour of one party and therefore the disappointment on the part of the losing party is inherent. A judge ought to be patient and tolerate everything which appears to be a momentary outbreak of disappointment 2. It has has been been held held that that crit critici icism sm of courts courts after after a case has been finally disposed of does not constitute contempt. But criticism should be distinguished from insult, and an insult hurled to the cirt. Even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. The rule is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be contempt of court when: i. Where Where it ten tends ds to to bri bring ng the the court into disrespect or, in other words, scandalize the court ii. ii. Ther There e is a cle clear ar and and pre prese sent nt danger that the administration of justice would be impeded Moreover, the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. But the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libellous, depending on the purposes and effects thereof. One may still be cited for contempt where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavour and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court. Allowing such situation to go unpunished would have mischievous consequences. The administration of justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear. 3. Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged. The rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will •
60 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 punish a given contempt, for the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a Notes: court to compel due decorum and respect in its Balancing of Interests presence and due obedience to its judgments, On one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts orders, and processes. However, there are must be maintained, while, on the other hand, free speech, a exceptions: free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. a. Indire Indirect ct contemp contemptt commit committed ted agains againstt Both are equally valuable rights. Although the Constitution itself inferior court may also be tried by the guarantees free speech and liberty of the press, it never proper regional trial court. intended that the power of the court should be trenched upon b. Indire Indirect ct contemp contemptt agai against nst the Suprem Supreme e under the guise of these constitutional guaranties. Court may be caused to be investigated The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with by a prosecuting officer and the charge impunity the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, may be filed in and tried by the regional whether it respects governments and individuals; the right trial court. freely to publish whatever the citizen may please and to be c. An appeal appeal transf transfers ers the procee proceedin dings gs to protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so the appellate court, and this last court far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or becomes charged with the authority to scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by their deal with contempts committed after the falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, perfection of the appeal. It presupposes reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals. The liberty of however that there must be a complete the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. liberty. court, and where contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the Gacott vs Reynoso & Ponce de Leon appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in (G.R. Nos 115908-09) the trial court. d. A cour courtt may may pun punis ish h con conte tempt mpts s Date: March 29, 1995 committed against a court or judge Ponente: Regalado constituting one of its parts or agencies Facts: (e.g. courts with branches or divisions) Judg Judge e Eust Eustaq aqui uio o Gaco Gacott tt of the the RTC of Puer Puerto to e. Where Where the singul singular ar jurisd jurisdict iction ion of a Princesa City filed a complaint to cite for indirect contempt given matter has been transferred from Mauricio Reynoso Jr., a columnist, and Eva Ponce de Leon, the contemned court to another court publis publisher her and chairma chairman n of the editori editorial al board board of Palawan (e.g. improper venue) The compl complai aint nt was was base based d on an arti articl cle e writ writte ten n by Times. The f. A new new cou court rt rep repla laci cing ng a pri prior or cour court, t, Reynoso in his column published in July 20, 1994. According to although an affirmative transfer of the article, article, Godoy Godoy had sentence sentenced d to serve serve the penalty penalty of jurisdiction before the contempt court is double death and that Judge Gacott has been receiving threats necessary to empower the successor to his life because of this. It is alleged that Gacott has been court where the successor court is bringing with him an army of men in full battle gear for security. created by statute which does not There were also averments of statements allegedly said by the extinguish jurisdiction in the Judge, something to the effect of “Tagilid na raw ang mundo.” predecessor. (yung totoo, di ko gets yung article. Ahehe) g. Contem Contempt pt com commi mitte tted d after after an appe appeal al The complaint avers that the article: is taken is contemptuous of the 1. Tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, appellate court because of the downgrade and degrade the administration tendency of such contempts to upset of justice the status quo or otherwise interfere 2. Contai Contains ns averme averments nts which which are disres disrespec pectful tful,, with the jurisdiction of such court; disc discou ourt rteo eous us,, insu insult ltin ing, g, offe offens nsiv ive e and and hence, jurisdiction is given to the derogatory appellate court 3. Does not only cast aspersions on the the h. Where Where a judge judge is is disqu disquali alifie fied d only only in in the the integrity of and honesty of the judge and on main case, because of matters which do his ability ability to admini administe sterr justic justice e objecti objectivel vely y not disqualify him in a contempt and impartially, but is an imputation that he is proceeding, the regular judge should sit biased biased and he prejud prejudges ges the cases cases filed filed in the contempt proceeding. before him i. When When the cont contem empt pt is agai agains nstt two two or 4. Is sub judi judice ce becau because se it is stil stilll pendi ending ng more courts, it is no bar to contempt automatic revie w. proceedings in one of them that there is Reynoso contended that his article does not impede also a contempt against the other. justice because it was published after the case had been j. To the substantial extent that disciplinary decided upon; that such publication will not affect the Supreme action remains a punishment, Court’ Court’s s eventu eventual al decisi decision on on the case case becaus because e the paper disciplinary measures imposed by circulated circulated in Palawan Palawan only; that the comments comments made were in another court than the one contemned good faith and in the exercise of the freedom and expression furnish an exception to the rule against and of the press; and that it was erroneously filed with the punishing for contempt of another court. Supreme Court. k. Some Some conte contemp mptuo tuous us acts acts whic which h are als also o Ponce de Leon, on the other hand, contended that the crime, usually misdemeanours, are article was merely in reaction to the TV interview given by often punishable in other courts. Judge Gacott in the show Magandang Gabi Bayan; that the
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 61 article is no longer sub judice; that it cannot be considered contemptuous in the absence of a clear and present danger; that that it is a valid valid exerci exercise se of the consti constituti tutiona onally lly guaran guaranteed teed freedom of the press; that it does not constitute contempt and instead is a fair criticism at most; and that she did not gave either either actual actual knowledg knowledge e or person personal al connec connectio tion n with with the authorship of such article.
Issues: 1. 2. 3.
WON WO N the the spec specif ifie ied d stat statem emen ents ts comp compla lain ined ed of are are contumacious in nature WON there there can can be contemp contemptt of cour courtt in case case of postpostlitigation statements or publications WON WO N the the Supr Suprem eme e Cour Courtt has has juri jurisd sdic icti tion on over over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal
Held: 1. 2. 3.
No Yes Yes
Ratio: 1.
2.
The The alle allege ged d disp dispar arag agin ing g state statemen ments ts had been been taken out of context. There were three particular particular statements that Judge Gacott complained about. · With With rega regard rds s to to the the death death thre threat ats s – Such Such statements do not even deal with the meri merits ts of the the case case,, they they only only make make mention of the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that his life is being threatened by Godoy. Godoy. · With With reg regar ards ds to rum rumor ors s abou aboutt Godo Godoy’ y’s s affairs affairs – They are rumors only and not pres presen ente ted d as fact facts, s, Reyn Reynos oso o even even acknowledged that he doesn’t know if the statements are true or not. · With With rega regard rds s to the the pos possi sibl ble e eff effec ectt of of the the Supr Suprem eme e Cou Court’s rt’s deci decisi sion on – The The statements statements constituted a fair analysis of possible developments in the case. · With With reg regar ards ds to the the sta state teme men nts of of Atty Atty Paredes Paredes – The article article merely reported reported what what Atty Paredes Paredes said said in reacti reaction on to Judge Judge Gacott’ Gacott’s s public public stateme statements nts in Magandang Gabi Bayan Snide Snide or sarcast sarcastic ic remarks remarks do not necessa necessaril rily y assu assume me that that leve levell of cont contum ume ely which hich is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The The arti articl cle e cou could not not have have inte intend nded ed on influencing the Supreme Court because it wasn’t capable of doing so. It had not transcended the legal limits of editorial comment and criticism and it has not been shown that there is a substantive evil which is extremely serious and imminent as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. It is in the nature of the duty of the judge that in every case, he decides in favour of one party and therefore the disappointment on the part of the losi losing ng party party is inhe inhere rent nt.. A judg judge e ough oughtt to be patient patient and tolerate everything which appears to be a momentary outbreak of disappointment It has has been been held held that that criti critici cism sm of cour courts ts after after a case case has has been been final finally ly disp dispos osed ed of does does not not constit constitute ute contemp contempt. t. But critic criticism ism should should be distinguished from insult, and an insult hurled to
the cirt. Even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. The rule is that in case of a post-litigati post-litigation on newspaper newspaper publication publication,, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be contempt of court when: i. Wher Where e it tend tends s to brin bring g the the court into disrespect or, in other words, scandalize the court ii. ii. Ther There e is a clea clearr and and pres presen entt danger that the administration of justice would be impeded Moreover, the general rule that there can be no contemp contemptt in post-l post-liti itigat gation ion public publicati ations ons is not nece necess ssar aril ily y allall-em embr brac acin ing g unde underr cert certai ain n situations. But the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libell libellous ous,, depend depending ing on the purpos purposes es and effe effect cts s ther thereo eof. f. One One may may stil stilll be cite cited d for for cont contem empt pt where here such such puni puniti tive ve acti action on is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavour and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court. Allowing such situation to go unpunished would have mis mischievous consequences. The admi admini nist stra rati tio on of just justiice, ce, no matt matter er how how righte righteous ous,, may be identi identifie fied d with with all sorts of fanc fancie ied d scan scanda dall and and corr corrup upti tion on.. Litig Litigan ants, ts, discontented for having lost their cases, will have every every way way to give give vent vent to thei theirr rese resent ntmen ment. t. Respect and obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear. 3. Cont Contem empt pt proc procee eedi ding ngs s are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged. The rule has been that no other other cour courtt than than the the one one cont contem emne ned d will will punish a given contempt, for the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose purpose of enabling enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orde orders rs,, and and proc proces esse ses. s. Howe Howeve verr, ther there e are are exceptions: a. Indi Indire rect ct cont contem empt pt comm commit itte ted d agai agains nstt inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court. b. Indi Indire rect ct conte contempt mpt agai agains nstt the Supre Supreme me Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional regional trial court. c. An appe appeal al tran transf sfer ers s the pro proce ceed edin ings gs to the appellate court, and this last court becomes charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. It presupposes however that there must be a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, court, and where contemp contemptt does does not rela relate te to the the subj subjec ectt matt matter er of the the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. d. A court may punish contempts commi committe tted d agai agains nstt a cour courtt or judg judge e
62 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 constituting one of its parts or agencies (e.g. courts with branches or divisions) De Leon vs National Labor Union e. Wher Where e the the sin singula gularr juri jurisd sdic icti tion on of a given matter has been transferred from Philipine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs the contem contemned ned court court to anothe anotherr court court Philippine Blooming Mills (e.g. improper venue) f. A new court replacing a prior court, Biflex Phils Inc Labor Union vs Filflex Industrial and altho althoug ugh h an affir affirmat mativ ive e tran transfe sferr of Manufacturing Corporation jurisdiction before the contempt court is necess necessary ary to empowe empowerr the success successor or G.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006 cour courtt where where the the succe successo ssorr cour courtt is crea create ted d by stat statut ute e whic which h does does not not Biflex lex Phils. Phils. Inc. Labor Union Et Al. and Fi Fiflex flex Petitioner: Bif extinguish jurisdiction in the Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union Et Al. predecessor. Respondents: Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation and Biflex (Phils.), Inc. g. Cont Contem empt pt comm commit itte ted d after after an appea appeall is take taken n is cont contem empt ptuo uous us of the the Ponente: Carpio Morales, J. appe appelllate ate cour courtt beca becaus use e of the the Nature: Review on Certiorari of CA Decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and Reinstating Labor Arbiter’s Decision. tendency of such contempts to upset
the status quo or otherwise interfere with with the jurisd jurisdict iction ion of such such court; court; hence, hence, jurisd jurisdict iction ion is given given to the appellate court h.
i.
j.
k.
Where Where a judge judge is is disqu disquali alified fied only only in the main case, because of matters which do not not disq disqua uali lify fy him him in a cont conte empt mpt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. When When the the co conte ntempt mpt is agai agains nstt two two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disc discip ipli lina nary ry meas measur ures es impo impose sed d by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. Some Some conte contempt mptuo uous us acts acts whic which h are als also o crime crime,, usua usualllly y misd misdem emea eano nour urs, s, are are often punishable in other courts.
Notes: Balancing of Interests On one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained, while, on the other hand, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. Although the Constitution itself guaran guarantee tees s free speech speech and liberty liberty of the press, it never never intended intended that the power of the court should be trenched trenched upon under the guise of these constitutional guaranties. The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects respects governments governments and individual individuals; s; the right freely to publish whatever the citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility responsibility for so doing, doing, except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals. The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty.
In re: Emil Jurado
Labor Picketing and other actions
Octobe oberr 24, 199 1990, 0, the lab labor or sec sector tor(in (in gen genera eral) l) FACTS: On Oct staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. Then the petitioner unions Fiflex and Biflex Unions staged a work wo rk sto stopp ppag age e wh whic ich h la laste sted d fo forr se seve vera rall da days ys pr promp ompti ting ng respondent corporations to file a petition to declare the work stop st oppa page ge il ille lega gall fo forr fa fail ilur ure e to co comp mply ly wi with th pr proc oced edur ural al requirement. Petitioners on the other hand claimed that they were locked out by respondents and that they were prevented from reporting to work (but this was not believed by the court because if the petitioners were indeed locked out, they should have filed a protest with the management). Labor Arbiter Rendered a Decision and held that the strike was illegal and declared the officers of the Unions to have lost their emplo emp loym ymen entt st stat atus us.. NL NLRC RC re reve vers rsed ed the La Labo borr Ar Arbi bite ter’s r’s Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. The Cour Co urtt of Ap Appe peal als s ag agai ain n re reve vers rsed ed NL NLRC RC’s ’s de deci cisi sion on an and d reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
ISSUE: Was the Union officers’ dismissal valid? HELD: YES RATIO: Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were consid cons ider ered ed me mere rely ly as an ex exer erci cise se of th thei eirr fr free eedo dom m of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant state interests such as the “right of enterprises to reasonable retu re turn rns s on in inve vest stmen ments, ts, an and d to ex expa pans nsio ion n an and d gr grow owth th”” enshrined in the 1987 constitution must also be considered. There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention or that they were allowed to join the welga ng bayan, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection. Article 264(e) of Labor Code provides: “no person engaged in picketing shall… obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.” Assuming that in staging the strike, the petitioners had complie comp lied d wit with h the leg legal al for formal maliti ities, es, the stri strike ke wou would ld sti stillll be illegal for blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Article 264(a) of Labor Code provides that, “Any union officer who knowingly participated participated in an illeg illegal al strike and any worker or union offic officer er who knowingly participates participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employme empl oyment nt stat status: us: Pro Provid vided, ed, that mer mere e par partici ticipati pation on of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement has been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.” The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 63 employment employ ment.. Rei Reinsta nstateme tement nt of a stri striker ker or rete retenti ntion on of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which the court may not supplant. DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED
GSIS and Garcia vs Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS G.R. No. 170132 (December 6, 2006) GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & Genera Gen erall Man Manage ager, r, petitio petitioner ners, s, vs. KAPISANAN KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents. GARCIA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari by Garcia to challenge the ruling of CA. Oct/4-7/2004 – Demonstration of GSIS employees - 4 day walkout and rally was concerted by GSIS employees including the herein respondent union and contingents from contingents from fro m oth other er gov govern ernment ment age agenci ncies. es. The mass act action ion's 's tar target get appear app eared ed to hav have e bee been n her herein ein petitione petitionerr Gar Garcia cia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave by the GSIS management Oct/1 Oc t/10/ 0/20 2004 04 - In Inve vesti stiga gatio tion n by GS GSIS IS ma mana nage gemen mentt - the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should should not be cha charge rged d adm admini inistra strativ tively ely for thei their r participation in said rally. KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Nov/2/2004 - KMG filed for Prohibition at CA - KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, filed a suit with the filing of the Peti Pe titi tion on fo forr Pr Proh ohib ibit itio ion n at be benc nch. h. On th the e gr grou ound nd th that at its members should not be made to explain why they supported their union's cause and faulted Garcia with blatant disregard of Sec. 10, Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, a.k.a Guidelines for Prohib Prohibited ited Mass Action Action,, requir requiring ing government agencies to "har "h arne ness ss al alll me mean ans s to he hear ar emp emplo loye yees es'' gr grie ieva vanc nces es an and d facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or other modes of settlement allowed by law and civil service rules." KMG filed two supplements to that petition: 1. Tha Thatt its Spe Speake aker, r, Atty. Atty. Mol Molina ina,, had bee been n pla placed ced und under er preventive suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not only deprive its members of the privileges and benefits due them but will also disqualify them from promotion and other employee privelege. 2. That Garcia served a spate of additional formal charges against 230 of KMG's members for their participation in the demonstrations. GSIS management: 1. Albert Velasco had already been dropped by GSIS and thus ceased to be President or a member of KMG. 2. Invoked the rules on forum shopping because two pending petitions petiti ons for certio certiorari rari and prohi prohibition bition were already filed by Velasco, and thus prayed for dismissal. The mana managem gement ent con contin tinued ued wit with h the inv invest estiga igatio tion n of the admini adm inistr strati ative ve case cases s and 207 of the 278 cas cases es fil filed ed was resolv res olved, ed, res result ulting ing in the exo exoner nerati ation on of 20 res respon ponden denttemployees, the reprimand of 182 and the suspension of 5 for 1
month + CA held that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361 of [KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of discre dis cretio tion n whi which ch may be the pro proper per subject subject of the writ of prohibition." Dispositively, CA GRANTED KMG's petition and held hel d Win Winsto ston n F. Gar Garcia cia PER PERPET PETUAL UALL LY ENJO ENJOINED INED fro from m implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events. Motion for Reconsideration was filed and denied. There is no question of facts about the participation of the employees in the demonstration. Thus the question is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If yes, then the filing of the administrative charges would be prima facie tenable, had the right to file such in the interest of the civil service. If no, then CA would be correct. Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the employee's acts. On the other hand, CA and union contend that it was nothing more than an air airing ing of gri grieva evance nces s in the exe exerci rcise se of the their ir "broad "br oader er rig rights hts of free exp expres ressio sion." n." They als also o ass assert ert tha thatt although althou gh the filin filing g of admini administrati strative ve charges again against st KMG's members is well within Garcia's powers under Sec. 45, RA 8291, 829 1, it was tai tainte nted d wit with h arb arbitr itrari arines ness s and vin vindic dictiv tivene eness ss becaus bec ause e the mas mass s dem demons onstra tratio tions ns wer were e dir direct ected ed aga agains instt Garcia. They also argued that the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons charged is antithetical to the best interest of the service. They also argued that alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form, join or assist employees organization, is the broader rights of free expression which is an anathema to Garcia's filing. CA impliedly equated the right to form associations with the right rig ht to eng engage age in str strike ike and similar similar acti activit vities ies available available to workers in the private sector. Citing what Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr., CA concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges agai ag ains nstt GS GSIS IS em empl ploy oyees ees wa wagi ging ng or jo join inin ing g ra rallllie ies s an and d demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. ISSUE: WON GSIS and Garcia committed grave abuse of authority. HELD: No, it was within his authority to file and the GSIS employees does not have a right to demonstrate. RATIO: + Ci Civi vill se serv rvic ice e go gove vern rns s al alll ag agen enci cies es of th the e Go Gove vern rnmen ment, t, including inclu ding govern government-ow ment-owned ned or control controlled led corpor corporation ations s with original charters, like the GSIS. Thus, they are also subject to circul cir culars ars,, rul rules es and reg regula ulatio tions ns iss issued ued by the Civ Civilil Ser Servic vice e Commi Co mmiss ssio ion n (C (CSC SC), ), in incl clus usiv ive e of ma matte tters rs in invo volv lvin ing g se self lf-organi org anizat zation ion,, stri strikes kes,, dem demons onstra tratio tions ns and lik like e con concer certed ted actions. Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector. ON GS GSIS IS EM EMPLO PLOYE YEE' E'S S RI RIGH GHT T TO EN ENGA GAGE GE IN MA MASS SS ACTIONS: - SC held that CA's position is contrary to what Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02131617 provides. - Invocation of Justice Cruz's opinion in MPSTA is clearly offtangent - the Justice's opinion is a dissent. - It is true that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances
64 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 stand sta nd on a lev level el hig higher her tha than n eco econom nomic ic and other lib liberti erties. es. 306 employees participated. Government personnel's situation is different however. To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of + 1973 Constitution services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS - All Allian iance ce of Gov Govern ernment ment Workers Workers v. Min Minist ister er of Lab Labor or and main mai n off office ice during during tho those se 4 day days s of mas massiv sive e wal walkout kouts s and Emplo Emp loym ymen entt - it wo woul uld d be un unfai fairr to al allo low w em empl ploy oyee ees s of wholes who lesale ale abs absenc ences es wou would ld be to und unders erstate tate thi things ngs.. And to government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative ever ev er pr pres esen entt th thre reat at of a st stri rike ke to wr wrin ing g be bene nefi fits ts fr from om accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to Government. mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil + 1987 Constitution - expressly guaranteed, for the first time, servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the rig right ht of gov govern ernment ment per person sonnel nel to sel self-o f-orga rganiz nizati ation on to Public Officials and Employees. complem comp lement ent the pro provis vision ion acc accord ording ing wor workers kers the rig right ht to ASSEMBLY OR STRIKE?: engage engag e in "peac "peaceful eful concerted activities, activities, inclu including ding the right to - According to the demonstration is only a "parliament of the strike in accordance with law." stre st reet ets, s,"" or on only ly an "a "ass ssem embl bly y of ci citi tize zens ns"" to on only ly ai air r - Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.21 In it, we held, citing MPSTA grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, v. Lag Laguio uio,, Jr Jr., ., - emp employ loyees ees in the public public ser servic vice e may not a strike presupposes a mass action undertaken to press for engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of some so me eco econo nomic mic de dema mand nds s or se secu cure re ad addi diti tion onal al ma mate teri rial al work; that the right of government employees to organize is employment employ ment benefits. SC said however that it does not matter limite lim ited d to the for formati mation on of uni unions ons or ass associ ociati ations ons,, wit withou houtt whatever name CA desires to call the demonstation because including the right to strike. the th e fac factt re remai mains ns th that at th the e er erri ring ng em empl ploy oyee ees s co coul uld d ha have ve - Ja Jaci cint nto o v. CA - the right right of ci civi vill se serv rvan ants ts to or orga gani nize ze employed non-crippling activities during their free time instead. themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court Thus Th us,, GS GSIS IS’’ em empl ploy oyee ees s ac acts ts ca can n on only ly be de defin fined ed as a of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But for the exercise of "prohibited concerted activit y." the th e ri righ ghts ts of fr free ee ex expr pres essi sion on an and d of as asse semb mbly ly,, th ther ere e ar are e The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the gathering in question did not involve some specific material purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations demand. But then such, even if true, did not make such mass of na nati tion onal al se secu curi rity ty.. As re rega gard rds s th the e ri righ ghtt to st stri rike ke,, th the e action less of a prohibited concerted activity. It is allowed only if Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in in accordance with that law and "[i]n the absence of statute, accordance with law." public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted E.O 180 - provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of work stoppages for any purpose." govern gov ernment ment wor worker kers s to org organi anize, ze, for ins instan tance, ce, imp implic licitly itly ON GARCIA'S GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY: endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of In Garcia rests authority and responsibility, under Sec. 45 of admin ad minis istr trati ative ve sa sanc ncti tion ons, s, al alll go gover vernm nmen entt of offic ficer ers s an and d RA 8291, 8291, the GSIS Act of 19 1997 97,, to re remov move, e, su suspe spend nd or employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, otherw oth erwise ise dis discip ciplin line e GSI GSIS S per person sonnel nel for cau cause. se. It doe does s not walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in matter matt er whatever whatever mood he is in when he filed the cha charge rges s temporary tempora ry stoppage or disrup disruption tion of publi public c servic service" e" by statin stating g because his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and thatt the Civ tha Civilil Ser Servic vice e law and rul rules es gov govern erning ing con concer certed ted doubtless within his jurisdiction. activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. Arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or grave abuse - Gesite v. Court of Appeals - the Court defined the limits of the of discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot also be right of govern government ment employees to organ organize ize in the following simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those charged wise: It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in as well as the gravity or the dire consequences of the charge this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The mass ma ss ac acti tion on th that at wi willll le lead ad in th the e tem tempo pora rary ry sto stopp ppag age e or prin pr inci cipl ple e of ac acco coun unta tabi bili lity ty de dema mand nds s th that at ev ever ery y er erri ring ng disr di srup upti tion on of pu publ blic ic se serv rvic ice. e. Th The e ri righ ghtt of go gove vern rnme ment nt gove go vern rnme ment nt em empl ploy oyee ee be ma made de an answ swer erab able le fo forr an any y employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or malfea mal feasa sanc nce e or mi misf sfea easa sanc nce e co commi mmitt tted ed.. An And d le lest st it be associations only, without including the right to strike, adding overlo ove rlooked oked,, the mere fil filing ing of for formal mal adm admini inistra strativ tive e cas case, e, thatt pub tha public lic emp employ loyees ees goi going ng on dis disrup ruptiv tive e una unauth uthoriz orized ed regard reg ardles less s of the gra gravity vity of the offense offense cha charge rged, d, doe does s not absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for over ov erco come me th the e pr pres esum umpt ptiv ive e in inno noce cenc nce e of th the e pe pers rson ons s conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. complained of nor does it shift the burden of evidence to prove - 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum guilt of an administrative offense from the complainant. When Wh en we pr prop opos osed ed thi this s ame amend ndmen mentt pr prov ovid idin ing g fo forr se self lf-organizatio organ ization n of government employees, employees, it does not mean that - MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving over 800 public school because they have the right to organize, they have also the teachers who took part in mass actions for which the then right to strike. Secreta Sec retary ry of Edu Educat cation ion fil filed ed adm admini inistr strati ative ve comp complai laints nts on Proh Pr ohib ibit ited ed co conc ncer erte ted d ac acti tivi vity ty - an any y co coll llec ecti tive ve ac acti tivi vity ty asso as sort rted ed ch char arge ges, s, su such ch as gr gros oss s mi misco scond nduc uct. t. Of tho those se underta und ertaken ken by gov govern ernment ment empl employe oyees, es, by the themsel mselves ves or charged, 650 were dismissed and 195 suspended for at least 6 throug thr ough h the their ir emp employ loyees ees'' org organi anizat zation ion,, wit with h the int intent ent of months. The Court, however, did not consider the element of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize number of respon respondents dents thereat and/or the dire conseq consequences uences their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it of the charges as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar of the Secretary of Education's challenged action. nature. CA also faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing During the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or 48% of grievance machinery and other modes of settlement agreed the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took upon upo n in the GSI GSIS-KM S-KMG G Col Collec lectiv tive e Neg Negoti otiati ations ons Agr Agreem eement ent to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,28 (CNA) before filing the charges. Art. VI of CNA states however leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office that: where a host of transactions take place every business day. "the parties (GSIS and KMG) mutually agree 2nd day - 707 participated. 3rd day - 538 participated. 4th day that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 65 concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules.” None Non e of the employees employees bothered bothered to ava availil of the grievanc grievance e procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. The Union should thus be blamed and at best, be st, bo both th GS GSIS IS man manag agem emen entt an and d th the e Un Unio ion n sh shou ould ld be considered as in pari delicto. VELASCO'S LEGAL STANDING - Th The e le lega gall st stan andi ding ng of Al Albe bert rto o Vel elas asco co wa was s no lo long nger er disc di scus ussed sed be beca caus use e a KMG re reso solu luti tion on st state ated d th the e he ha had d ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG, having previously been dropped from the rolls of GSIS employees. While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty. Velasco had in fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO had already expired. DISPO: 1. Judge Issagani Cruz's opinion in MPSTA is is a dissent and the majority opinion should be the controlling jurisprudence. 2. The right to strike given to unions in private corp co rpor orati ation ons/e s/ent ntit ities ies is no nott ap appl plic icab able le to ci civi vill se servi rvice ce employees. 3. CA's decision, in effect, would allow prohibited mass actions by civil servants that is unlawful and an aberration that would be intolerable. CA is thus REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED.
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and forr fo Oth the er Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner says it is not valid as it contains unconstitutional provisions and it goes beyond the law it is supposed to implement. The said RIRR contains, among others, an absolute prohibition on advertisements of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products. Note: This is a long case under the COMMERCIAL SPEECH heading. However, the main opinion does not say anything at all about commercial speech. What is more at point is the separate and concurring opinion. So, maybe you could skip the th e wh whol ole e ma main in op opin inio ion n an and d ju just st re read ad th the e se sepa para rate te an and d concurring opinion digest.
FACTS:
Executiv Execu tive e Order Order No. No. 51 (Milk (Milk Code Code)) was issu issued ed by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative legisl ative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Consti o On One e of the the prea preamb mbul ular ar clau clause ses s of this this law see se eks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intternational In Code of Marketing of Breas Bre astmi tmilk lk Su Subs bsti titut tutes es (IC (ICMBS MBS), ), a co code de adop ad opte ted d by the Wo Worl rld d He Heal alth th As Asse sembl mbly y (WHA) in 1981 o WH WHA A adapt adapted ed sever several al reso resolu luti tion ons s to the effe ef fect ct th that at br brea east stfe feed ediing sh shou ould ld be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health clai cl aims ms ar are e no nott pe permi rmitte tted d fo forr br brea east stmil milk k substitutes. In 1990, 1990, Phil Phil rati ratifie fied d the Inter Internat nation ional al Conve Conventi ntion on on the Rights of the Child Art 24 of which states that State Parties should take approp appropriate riate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. In 200 2006, 6, DOH DOH iss issue ued d the the assa assaililed ed RIRR RIRR Petitio Peti tioner ner cont contend ends s that that DOH vio violat lated ed the the Consti Consti and and exceeded its authority when it issued said RIRR
Exercise of Freedom of Conscience
Ebranilag v. v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu Campaign paraphernalia
Adiong vs COMELEC G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992
Art
ISSUES: 1.
Standing
HELD: YES
Gonzales vs Katigbak What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography and the Problem for Artistic Expresion Amy Adler
Adiong vs COMELEC Commercial Speech
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs Duque AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CERTIORARI This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify Admin Order (AO) No. 2006-0012 2006-0 012 entitl entitled, ed, Rev Revise ised d Im Imple plemen mentin ting g Rul Rules es and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Code, Relev Relevant ant Internatio International nal Agreeme Agreements, nts,
2.
Jurisprud Jurisp rudenc ence e states states that that an asso associa ciatio tion n has stan standin ding g to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct intere int erest st if its members members are affected affected by the action action (Exec. Sec. v. CA); that it has the legal personality to repres rep resent ent its mem member bers s bec becaus ause e the results results of the case will affect their vital interests Also, the petitioner ’s ’s Amended Articles of Incorporation states that the association is formed to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the general public WON the RIRR pro provis vision ions s are con consti stituti tutiona onall A. WON the int intern ernati ationa onall ins instrum trument ents s (IC (ICMBS, MBS, WHA, etc.) invoked invoked by respond respondents ents are part of of the law of the land o Pe Pettitioner say ays s RIR IRR R went bey eyon ond d th the e prov pr ovis isio ions ns of th the e Mi Millk Co Code de,, th ther ereb eby y amendin amen ding g and exp expand anding ing the cove coverag rage e of said law
66 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 o Th The e defe defens nse e of the the DOH DOH is that that the the RIR RIRR R implements not only the Milk Code but also various variou s intern internation ational al instru instruments ments regard regarding ing infant and young child nutrition o Un Unde derr th the e 19 1987 87 Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion on,, in inte tern rnat atio iona nall law la w ca can n be beco come me pa part rt of th the e sp sphe here re of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. Th The e trans transfor format matio ion n metho method d requi require res s tha th at an inte tern rna ati tio onal law be trans tra nsfor formed med in into to a do dome mesti stic c law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. Th The e in inco corp rpor orat atio ion n me meth thod od appli applies es when wh en,, by me mere re co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al decl de clar arat atio ion, n, in inte tern rnat atio iona nall la law w is deeme med d to have the fo forrce of domestic law. o Tre reat atie ies s becom become e part part of of the law law of of the lan land d through transformation pur pursua suant nt to Arti Article cle VII, Section Section 21 of the Constitut Constitution ion which provides provid es that “[n]o treaty or intern internationa ationall agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate Th The e ICMB ICMBS S and and WHA WHA Res Resol olut utio ions ns are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least twothirds of all members of the Senate as re requ quir ired ed un unde derr Se Sect ctio ion n 21 21,, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. How owe ever, th the e ICMB MBS S which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through thro ugh loc local al leg legisl islati ation, on, the Mil Milk k Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. Th The e Milk Milk Co Code de is is almos almostt a ver verba batim tim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of produc pro ducts ts wit within hin the scop scope e of the ICMBS. ICMB S. Inst Instead ead,, th the e Mi Milk lk Co Code de
latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it
statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor , that is, how states behave beh ave,, and the psy psycho cholog logica icall or subjective factor , that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for determining the existe exi stence nce of cus custom tom is the actual behavi beh avior or of stat states. es. Thi This s inc includ ludes es several eleme men nts: duration, consistency consis tency,, and generality of the practice of states. The required duration can be either short or long. Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice. Once the existence of state practice has been establ established ished,, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it beha have ve th thus us or do obligatory to be they do it on only ly as a mat atte terr of Opinio nio jur juris is, or the courtesy? Opi
belief beli ef th that at a ce cert rtai ain n fo form rm of behavi beh avior or is obl obliga igator tory, y, is wha whatt makes make s pract practice ice an inter internatio national nal rule. Without it, practice is not law. o
Have WHA Have WHA Res Resol oluti ution ons s attai attaine ned d the stat status us of of customary law and should be deemed as part of the law of the land? Un Unde derr the the 1946 1946 WHO WHO Con Const sti, i, WHA WHA determines the policies of WHO Several provisions (Art 19-22) states that regulations adopte adopted d by WHA bind member states But Art 23 states that recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members. They are not binding but they carry moral and political weight Th The e ICMB ICMBS S itse itself lf was was ado adopt pted ed as as a mere recommendation
o
Unlike Unli ke wh what at ha has s be been en do done ne wi with th th the e ICMBS whereby the legi legislatu slature re enact enacted ed most of the provisions into law which is the th e Mi Milk lk Co Code de,, th the e su subs bseq eque uent nt WHA Resolutions, spe specif cifica ically lly pro provid viding ing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other mark ma rket etin ing g ma mate teri rial als s ma may y be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). o
Section Secti on 2, 2, Arti Articl cle e II of the the 198 1987 7 Cons Consti titu tuti tion on embodies the incorporation method The cl clas assi sica call form fo rmul ulat atio ion n in
international law sees those custo customary mary rule rules s accep accepted ted as binding result from the combination [of] two established, elements: the widespread, and consistent practice on the part of a psychological States; and elem el emen entt kn kno own as th the eopinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
Bernas defines customary international law to mean a general and con consis sisten tentt pra practi ctice ce of sta states tes followed by them from a sense of legal oblig obligation ation [opi opinio nio jur juris is]. This
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 67
o
B.
advert adve rtis isem emen ents ts an and d pr prom omot otio ions ns of breast bre astmil milk k sub substi stitut tutes, es, hav have e not bee been n adopted as a domestic law the provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
o
WON the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law o Se Secti ction on 3, 3, Chap Chapter ter 1, Tit Title le IX IX of the the Rev Revis ised ed Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within wit hin the fra framew mework ork of the gov govern ernment ment's 's gene ge nera rall po polilici cies es an and d pl plan ans, s, an and d issue
orders and regu orders regulatio lations ns conc concernin erning g the implem imp lement entati ation on of est establ ablish ished ed hea health lth policies. o
o
AO No. No. 20 2005 05-0 -001 014 4 de decl clar ared ed the the ff po poli licy cy guidelines: id idea eall breas breastfe tfeed edin ing g practi practice ces, s, such such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive exclus ive breastfeeding breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; mi micro cronu nutri trien entt suppl supplem emen entat tatio ion; n; un univ iver ersa sall sa salt lt io iodi diza zati tion on;; the exercise of other feeding options; and fee feedin ding g in in exce excepti ptiona onally lly dif difficu ficult lt circumstances The Th e prim primacy acy of of breas breastfe tfeed edin ing g for chi child ldre ren n is emphasized as a national health policy; however, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-
0014 is it declared that as part of such heal he alth th po poli licy cy,, th the e ad adve vert rtis isem emen entt or prom pr omot otio ion n of br brea east stmi milk lk su subs bsti titu tute tes s should be absolutely prohibited o
In view view of of the ena enact ctme ment nt of of the Mil Milk k Code Code which does not contain a total ban on the advert adv ertisi ising ng and pro promot motion ion of bre breast astmilk milk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotio promotion, n, it fol follow lows s tha thatt a tota totall ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the con constit stituti utiona onally lly aut author horize ized d bra branch nch of government, the legislature C. WO WON N the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance w/ those of the Milk Code Petitioner alleges the ff: o Th The e Milk Milk Cod Code e limi limits ts its its cover coverag age e to chil childr dren en 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to young children or those from ages two years old and beyond SC say says the the cove covera rage ge of of the the Milk Milk Code is not dependent on the age of th the e ch chil ild d bu butt on th the e ki kind nd of bein ing g ma mark rket ete ed to th the e product be public As lon long g as wha whatt is bei being ng mar marke kete ted d
falls within the scop falls scope e of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it ca can n be su subj bjec ectt to re regu gula lati tion on pursua pur suant nt to sai said d law law,, eve even n if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months The Th e Milk Milk Cod Code e recog recogni nize zes s that that infa infant nt form formul ula a may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months and declares that there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk SC say says s the the RIR RIRR shou shoulld be rea read d in its entirety and that Section 7 of the th e RI RIRR RR pr prov ovid ides es th that at whe hen n medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of bre breast astmil milk k substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated information. Section 8 of the RIRR also states thatt info tha informa rmatio tion n and edu educat cation ional al materials should include information on the proper use of infant formula when the use thereof is needed.Hence, the RIRR, just like
the Mil Milk k Cod Code, e, als also o rec recogn ognize izes s that in certain cases, the use of breast bre astmi milk lk sub substi stitut tutes es may be proper. o
o
The Milk The Milk Code Code only only regul regulat ates es and and does does not not impos imp ose e un unre reas ason onab able le re requ quir ireme ement nts s fo for r advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substit sub stitute utes s int intend ended ed for inf infant ants s fro from m 0-2 0-24 4 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a “total effect” in the promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague The RIRR imp mpo ose ses s additi tio onal labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code The two issues above were resolved by SC together SC say says s heal health th is is a leg legit it sub subjj matte matter r forr re fo regu gula lati tion on by th the e DO DOH H in exer ex erci cise se of th the e po poli lice ce po pow wer ers s delegated to it Se Sec c 938 938 of of the1 the191 917 7 Rev Revis ised ed Ad Admi min n Code charged DOH with the duty to protec pro tectt the health of the people, people, and vested it with such powers as (g) the dis dissem semina inatio tion n of hyg hygien ienic ic info in form rmat atio ion n am amon ong g th the e pe peop ople le and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care and d th the e me meth tho ods of of in infa fant nts s an preventing and combating dangerous communicable diseases Th The e 1987 1987 Ad Admi min n Code Code tas taske ked d DOH DOH to carry out the sta tate te policy pron pr onou ounc nced ed un unde derr Se Sect ctio ion n 15 15,, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right to health of th the e people and instill health amon ong g them. th em. To consciousness am that th at en end, d, it wa was s gr gran ante ted d un unde der r
68 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Secti Sec tion on 3 of th the e Ad Admin minis istra trati tive ve Code Cod e the power to (6) propagate propagate health information and educate the impo port rtan antt he heal alth th,, population on im medical and envir environmenta onmentall matters which have health implications The Milk Code specifically delegated to the DOH the power to ensu en sure re th that at th ther ere e is ad adeq equa uate te,, consistent and objective information on br brea east stfe fee edi ding ng an and d use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and an d re rela late ted d pr prod oduc ucts ts;; an and d th the e power to control such information. Al Also so,, the Milk Code auth tho ori riz zed DOH to control the content of any info in forma rmati tion on on br brea east stmi milk lk vi viss-aavis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products DOH DO H is also also autho authori rize zed d to contr control ol the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be diss di ssemi emina nate ted d un unde derr Se Sect ctio ions ns 6 thro th roug ugh h 9 of th the e Mi Millk Co Cod de to ensu en sure re th that at th the e in infor format matio ion n th that at woul wo uld d re reac ach h pr preg egna nant nt wo wome men, n, moth mo ther ers s of in infa fant nts, s, an and d he heal alth th profess pro fession ionals als and wor workers kers in the health care system is restricted to scienti sci entific fic and fact factual ual mat matter ters s and shall not im imply ply or cre create ate a be belilief ef that bottlefeeding bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. Ho Howe weve verr, the DOH' DOH's s power power unde under r the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and an d pro romo moti tion on of br brea east stmi milk lk substitutes. Se Sect ctio ions ns 13 on “tota “totall ef effe fect ct”” an and d 26 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some so me labe la bellin ing g requ re quir irem emen ents ts,, spec sp ecif ific ical ally ly:: a) th that at th ther ere e be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a state sta temen mentt th that at pow powder dered ed in infan fantt formula form ula may con contai tain n path pathoge ogenic nic micr mi croo oorg rgan anis isms ms and mu must st be prepared prepar ed and used appro appropriate priately ly.. Section 16 of the RIRR prohibits all heal he alth th an and d nu nutr trit itio ion n cl clai aims ms fo for r produc pro ducts ts wit within hin the scop scope e of the Milk Mi lk Co Code de,, su such ch as cl clai aims ms of increased emotional and intellectual abililit ab itie ies s of th the e in infa fant nt an and d yo youn ung g child These requireme men nts and limitations limita tions are consis consistent tent wit ith h th the e pr prov ovis isio ions ns of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to wit: SECTION 8. Health workers -
xxxx (b) In (b) Infor forma matio tion n pr prov ovid ided ed by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regard reg arding ing pro produc ducts ts wit within hin the sco sc ope of th thiis Code shall berestricted to scientific and factua fac tuall mat matter ters s, and such informationsha imply ply or shall ll not im create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior superior to brea br eastf stfee eedi ding ng.. It sh shal alll al also so include the information specified in Section 5.
o
and Secti tio on 10(d) which bars the use on containers and an d la labe bels ls of th the e te term rms s humanized, humani zed, materna maternalized, lized, or similar terms. Thes Th ese e provi provisi sion ons s of the the Milk Milk Code Code expres exp ressly sly for forbid bid in inform formati ation on tha thatt would imply or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such information informa tion would be incons inconsistent istent with the superiority of breastfeeding How Ho wev ever er,, Secs Secs 11 11 and and 4(f) 4(f) of the the RIRR violates the Milk Code since the Milk Code only provides for the regulation of advertising, promo pr omotio tiona nal, l, or ot othe herr mar market ketin ing g materials for breastmilk substitutes thro th roug ugh h th the e IAC IACwh whilile e the RIR RIRR R absolutely bans the same
The Milk Code allow ows s dissemi min nation of info in forma rmati tion on on in infa fant nt fo formu rmula la to he heal alth th professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity The Court finds th tha at there is no inco con nsiste ten ncy betw twe een the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR RI RR.. Se Sect ctio ion n 7( 7(b) b) of th the e Mi Milk lk Code, in relation to Section 8(b) of the same Code, allows disse di ssemi mina nati tion on of in info forma rmati tion on to heal he alth th prof pr ofes essi sion onal als s bu butt such su ch
inform info rmat atio ion n is re rest stri rict cted ed to scientific and factual matters. Contra Cont rary ry to peti petiti tion oner er's 's cl clai aim, m, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of
information to health professio profe ssionals nals on scien scientific tific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and an d di dist stri ribu buto torr of th the e pr prod oduc ucts ts covered by the Code in activities for the th e pr prom omot otio ion, n, ed educ ucat atio ion n an and d production of Inf or ormation, Educ Ed ucat atio ion n an and d Co Commu mmuni nica cati tion on (IEC) materials regarding
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 69 are ar e intended forr wo fo wome men n an and d ch chil ildr dren en.. Said provis pro vision ion can cannot not be con constru strued ed to encompass even the dissemination of brea br eastf stfee eedi ding ng
that th at
information to health profes pro fessio sional nals, s, as res restri tricte cted d by the Milk Code. The Milk The Milk Code Code permi permits ts milk milk manu manufa fact ctur urer ers s and an d di dist stri ribu buto tors rs to ex exte tend nd as assi sist stan ance ce in research and continuing education of health professional profess ionals; s; RIRR absol absolutely utely forbids the same SC say says s the the proh prohib ibit itio ion n in th the e RIRR RIRR pertains to breastfeeding promotion and an d ed educ ucat atio ion n fo forr wo wome men n an and d children and not to health professionals o The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it SC say says s the the Milk Milk Cod Code e giv gives es DOH DOH the discretion to request or accept donations and is not mandated to accept donations Th The e assa assaililed ed pro provi visi sion on in in the the RIRR RIRR is,, th is ther erefo efore re,, an ex exer erci cise se of th this is discretion o The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code. SC say says s DOH DOH has has no auth author orit ity y to fix or impose administrative administrative fines; so, Sec 46 is null and void But th the e DOH DOH is is not not left left w/o w/o rec recou ours rse e sinc si nce e Se Sec c 13 of th the e Mi Milk lk Co Code de provides for penalties for violators of the Milk Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it o Th The e RI RIRR RR prov provid ide es fo forr re repe peal al of exist existin ing g laws to the contrary SC say says s this this is is a friv frivol olou ous s argu argumen mentt RIRR does not provide f or or the repe re peal al of la laws ws bu butt on only ly or orde ders rs,, issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the DOH's rulemaking power po wer.. WON the RIRR RIRR is is unnec unnecessa essary ry and and oppres oppressiv sive e and is offensive to the due process clause in so far as it is in restraint of trade o SC say says s the the fram framer ers s of the the con consti stitut tutio ion n were were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests. o Despite the fact that our present o
3.
o
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the gove go vern rnme ment nt th the e po powe werr to in inte terv rven ene e when wh enev ever er ne nece cess ssar ary y to pr prom omot ote e th the e general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of pro protec tectiv tive e reg regula ulatio tions. ns. It must be clearly explained and proven by compet com petent ent evi eviden dence ce jus justt exa exactl ctly y how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
o
Peti Pe titio tione nerr faile failed d to show show that that the pros proscr crip ipti tion on
o
o
of mil milk k man manufa ufactur cturers ers par partic ticipa ipatio tion n in any policy pol icymaki making ng bod body y (Se (Secti ction on 4(i 4(i)), )), cla classe sses s and an d se semi mina nars rs fo forr wo wome men n an and d ch chil ildr dren en (Sect (Se ctio ion n 22 22); ); th the e gi givi ving ng of as assi sist stan ance ce,, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giv giving ing of don donati ations ons (Section (Section 52) would wou ld unr unreas easona onably bly ham hamper per the tra trade de of breastmilk substitutes Peti Pe titi tion oner er fa fail iled ed to dem emon onst stra rate te th that at th the e aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreas unr easona onable ble and opp oppress ressive ive for bei being ng in restraint of trade. Peti Pe titi tion oner er also also fail failed ed to convi convinc nce e th the e court court that the provision in RIRR w/c defined the term mil milk k com compan pany y is unr unreas easona onable ble and oppressive The term milk company only merg me rge ed to toge geth ther er th the e en enti titi tie es defined separately in the Milk Code as distributor and manufacturer
So, the RIRR was held constitutional except for Secs 4(f), 11, and 46 for being ultra vires. Puno’s Separate and Concurring Opinion: Another reason why the abs absolu olute te ban on the
advertising and promot advertising promotion ion of breast breastmilk milk substi substitutes tutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 20060012 (RIRR) should be struck down: Adve Ad verti rtisi sing ng an and d pr prom omoti otion on of br brea east stmi milk lk su subs bsti titut tutes es properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic transaction o Th This is is is a sepa separa rate te cate catego gory ry of of spee speech ch whi which ch is not accorded the same level of protection as th that at gi give ven n to ot othe herr co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal ally ly guar gu aran ante teed ed fo form rms s of ex expr pres essi sion on bu butt is
nonetheless entitled to protection
Centra Cent rall Hu Huds dson on Gas & El Elec ectr tric ic v. Publi Public c Se Serv rvic ice e Commission Commiss ion is the waters watershed hed case that establ established ished the primary test for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations o 44-pa part rt analy analysi sis s for eval evalua uati ting ng the the valid validity ity of of regulations of commercial speech: 1. The commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading if it is to be protected under the 1st Amendment It is not contended that the adve ad vert rtis isem emen entt at is issu sue e is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate In fact, both the Milk Code and Internationa Intern ationall Code recognize and conced con cede e tha thatt the there re are ins instan tances ces when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary 2. The asserted governmental interest for regulating commercial speech must be substantial The governmental interest in prov pr oviidi ding ng sa safe fe an and d ad ade equ quat ate e nutr nu trit itio ion n to in infa fant nts s an and d yo youn ung g children is substantial; this interest is expressed as a national policy in the Consti and is also embodied in various intl agreements If the two requirements are met, 3. Whe Whethe therr the stat state e reg regula ulatio tion n dir directl ectly y
70 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 advanc adv ances es and gov govern ernment mental al int intere erest st petitioned to the SC under certiorari. asserted There is an undeniable causal She invoked her right to freedom of expression, while ETSI relationship bet the interest of govt posited that Punzal acted in bad faith in sending the second eand the advertising ban mail, mail, whic which h was was tant tantamo amoun untt to a grav grave e viol violat atio ion n of the the Br Bre east stfe fee eding is th the e tested and company’s Code of Discipline. proven method of providing opitmal nutr nu trit itio ion n to in infa fant nts s an and d yo youn ung g ISSUE: chil ch ildr dren en.. Th The e ra rati tion onal ale e of th the e Whether or not Punzal was legally dismissed absolute ban is to prevent mothers from succumbing to suggestive and HELD: misleading marketing and Punzal was legally legally dismissed. dismissed. SC affirms affirms CA decision decision with propaganda which may be modification, granting her nominal damages. conta co ntain ined ed in ad adve vert rtis isem emen ents ts of breastmilk substitutes. RATIO: 4. And whether it is not more extensive An employee must show deference to his superiors. If than is necessary to serve that interest. aggrieved, the employee should approach the superior directly The abs advertising ising or ask for mediation (Philippines Today, Inc. v. NLRC). absolu olute te ban on advert prescribed under Sections 4(f) and 11 of the RIRR is unduly The second e-mail was not just an opinion by a direct attack on is more Geisert. Geisert. It even encouraged encouraged other other employees employees to ignore ignore his restrictive and than furth ther er th the e av avow owed ed authority authority.. As SVP, SVP, Geisert had the authority authority to cancel the necessary to fur governmental interest of promoting Halloween party. party. the he heal alth th of in infan fants ts an and d yo youn ung g children. It ought to be self-evident, Samson v. NLRC, which Punzal invoked is misplaced. In that for instan instance, ce, that the advertisement advertisement case, the challenged challenged actions of the employee in speaking out of such products which are strictly against a superior were excusable because they were under informative cuts too deep on free different circumstances. In Samson the “speech” in question speech spe ech.. The lau laudab dable le con concer cern n of was done at a Christmas party (where they had been drinking the respondent for the promotion of liquor) liquor) and not directed directed against the superior superior directly directly.. In the the he heal alth th of in infan fants ts an and d yo youn ung g case at bar, Punzal knew her superior would find out about the children cannot justify the absolute, e-mail, given her supervisor’s earlier warning. overarching ban. Punzal was correctly dismissed, but denied due process. ETSI failed to inform her of her right to be represented by counsel Punzal vs Etsi Technologies during her conference with with Remudaro and Geisert. Geisert. This goes against the Labor Code so she is entitled to nominal damages Freedo dom m of expr expres essi sion on in the work work plac place e is DOCTRINE: Free for such violation. subject to deference and respect due to superiors
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9211
Lorna Dising Punzal was a Department Secretary who had been working at ETSI Technologies for 12 years. On October 30, 2001, she sent an e-mail to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party at the office the following day and inviti inviting ng their childr children en to come and dress dress in costume costume.. Her supervisor, Carmelo Remudaro, received the e-mail and told Punzal that the event did not meet the approval of SVP Werner Geisert. Punzal then sent a second e-mail saying Geisert was “unfair” and “parang iniisahan” and invited her co-workers to skip work the following day and go to Megamall which was doing a trick or treat event.
AN ACT REGULATING REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE, SALE DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Punzal was later informed by HR that Geisert got wind of her e-mail and required required her to explain explain her side. Her employment employment was later terminated because she was found in violation of ETSI’s Code of Discipline (acts of discourtesy and disrespect).
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis
Punzal filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The LA found in favor of ETSI: that Punzal was legally dismissed. dismissed. She then appealed appealed to the NLRC where they ruled ruled that her dismissal dismissal was not proportional proportional to her actions. actions. They ordere ordered d reinsta reinstateme tement nt (which (which was no longer longer to possib possible le beca becaus use e of ill ill rela relati tion ons s betw betwee een n Punza Punzall and and her her forme former r employer) employer) or separation separation pay. pay. No back wages were given given to Punzal, Punzal, so she then appealed to the CA. ETSI also appealed appealed to the CA to set aside the NLRC decision. decision. The CA reinstated the LA decision, decision, which upheld upheld Punzal’s Punzal’s dismissal. dismissal. She then
Tobacco To bacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements Advertisements of Lawful Products Howard K. Jeruchimowitz
“Symbolic” Speech
John Hart Ely
Overview: Professor Ely describes a doctrinal framework for first amendment analysis originally developed by the Supreme Court of the late Warren era. This framework, he argues, not only onl y pro provid vides es a sta stable ble bas basis is for jud judici icial al reso resoluti lution on of free expression expres sion questions generally, generally, but also sugges suggests ts both the immedia imme diate te dif difficu ficulty lty and the ult ultima imate te res resolu olution tion of the fla flag g desecration problem. The “crux of the Court’s Court’s opinion” opinion” iin n United States v O'
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 71 Brien, a decision upholding a conviction for draft card burn bu rnin ing, g, re refe fers rs to go gove vern rnme ment ntal al re regu gula lati tion on.. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it furthe fur thers rs an imp import ortant ant or sub substan stantia tiall gov govern ernment mental al interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and, (3) if the incide inc identa ntall res restri trictio ction n on all allege eged d Fir First st Ame Amendme ndment nt free fr eedo doms ms is no gr grea eater ter tha than n is es esse sent ntia iall to the furtherance of that interest. According to Ely, however, the test in O’ Brien is limited in the sense that it is incomplete.
On Cr Crit iter erio ion n No No.. 1 – Im Impo port rtan antt or su subs bsta tant ntia iall
governmental interest o
Additi Addi tion on of the the word word “subs “substa tant ntia ial” l” seem seems s to be no protection at all since legislatures do not enact wholly useless provisions. On Criterion No. 2 – shifts from ontology to teleology; an inquiry into whether the governmental interest or interests that support the regulation are related to the suppression of expression o Ob Obvi viou ously sly this this appr approa oach ch is not not self-d self-defi efini ning ng:: it can, for one thing, be interpreted in a way that th at wi willll gu guar aran antee tee tha thatt it its s de deman mand d ca can n always be satisfied. o Th The e criti critica call ques questi tion on woul would d there therefor fore e seem seem to be whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more partic par ticula ularly rly out of the way peo people ple can be expected to react to his message, or rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had ha d no comm co mmun unic icat atiive sign si gnif ific ican ance ce whatever. On Criterion No. 3 - Incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest “Less Restrictive Analysis” - Weakly construed, constru ed, it could require require only that there be no les less s res restri trictiv ctive e alt altern ernati ative ve cap capabl able e of serving the state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under attack. In effect, therefore, this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition of expression, requiring only that a proh pr ohib ibit itio ion n no nott ou outr trun un th the e in inte tere rest st it is designed to serve. o Ten ende denc ncy y to invol involve ve tradi traditi tion onal al notio notions ns of freedom Two Reviews: (1) No gratuitous prohibition (upheld the draft card burning law) and (2) balancing approach. Emerson’s Expression-Action Distinction - To some extent ext ent exp express ression ion and act action ion are alw always ays ming mingled led:: most con conduc ductt inc includ ludes es ele element ments s of both both.. Eve Even n the clearest cleare st manife manifestatio stations ns of express expression ion invol involve ve some action, as in the case of holding a meeting, publishing a newspaper, or merely talking. At the other extreme, a po poliliti tica call as assa sass ssin inat atio ion n in incl clud udes es a su subs bsta tanti ntial al measure of expres expression. sion. He noneth nonetheless eless maintains that the "predominant element" in a course of conduct can be ide identi ntified fied,, and fir first st ame amendme ndment nt pro protec tectio tion n thereby determined. o Attempts to determine which element "pre "p redo domin minat ates es"" wi willll th ther erefo efore re in inev evit itab ably ly degenerate into question-begging judgments abou ab outt whe heth ther er th the e ac acti tivi vity ty sh shou ould ld be protected (ex. burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated
whole, Ioo% action and Ioo% expression) First Amendment Analysis: The debate on the first amend ame ndmen mentt ha has s tra tradi ditio tiona nalllly y pr proc ocee eede ded d on th the e assumption that categorization and balancing (used as a gen generi eric c term term,, to enc encomp ompass ass all approach approaches es including includ ing "clea "clearr and present danger danger") ") that consider the likely effect of the communication are mutually exclusive exclus ive approaches to the various probl problems ems that arise under the first amendment. The categorizers, or "absol "ab soluti utists, sts,"" wer were e sur surely ely rig right ht that the theirs irs was the approach more likely to protect expression in crisis times. But what the decisions of the late Warren era bega be gan n to re reco cogn gniz ize e is th that at ca cate tego gori riza zati tion on an and d balancing need not be regarded as competing general theories of the first amendment, but are more helpfully employed in tandem, each with its own legitimate and indispensable role in protecting expression. State laws typically typically extend American American flags two separate sorts sor ts of pro protect tection ion:: (1) Des Desecr ecrati ation on Pro Provis vision ion ("N ("No o person shall publi publicly cly mutila mutilate, te, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any su such ch fl flag ag.” .”)) an and d (2 (2)) Imp Impro rope perr Us Use e Pr Provi ovisi sion on (outlaws affixing to the flag any "word, figure, mark, pictur pic ture, e, des design ign,, dra drawin wing g or adv adverti ertiseme sement nt of any natu na ture re," ," or pu publ bliicl cly y di disp spla lay yin ing g any fl flag ag so embellished”). o Th The e stat state e does does not not car care e what what mess messag age e the defendant is conveying by altering the flag: all that matters is that he is interrupting the message conveyed by the flag. o Wh What at has has not yet yet been been suffi suffici cien entl tly y noted noted is that although improper use statutes do not single out certain messages for proscription, they the y do si sing ngle le ou outt on one e se sett of me mess ssag ages es,, namely the set of messages conveyed by the American flag, for protection
o
Judicial actions
Concerned Trial Lawyers vs Veneracion A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920 (April 26, 2006) Ponente: Corona Nature: Nature: Administrativ Administrative e Matter. Matter. Misconduct, Misconduct, Tardiness, ardiness, Gross Inefficiency.
Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from the Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila (members (members are not named in the letter) alleging misconduct and tardiness of Judge Lorenzo Veneracion of Manila RTC Br. 47. The letter alleged these things against the Judge: 1) that he is reluctant to try petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages, despite their alleged merit, by dwelling on technicalities, 2) that he would force complainants to read and interpret Bible verses, and and casti castiga gatin ting g them them when when they they fail fail to give give the the prop proper er interpretation, 3) that the judge is habitually tardy resulting in delay in disposition of cases. The OCA designated an investigator and here is what they found. Judge was really famous for having litigants read from the the Bibl Bible. e. Also Also,, yes, yes, ther there e were were with withdr draw awn n peti petiti tion ons s for declaration of nullity of marriages but all of these withdrawn cases were handled by one Atty. Rizalino Simbillo . In the Judge’s sala, there was also a considerable number of cases that were pending or unacted upon (ex. cases not decided with within in 90-d 90-day ay-p -per erio iod, d, case cases s with with pend pendin ing g moti motion ons s or
72 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 resolutions, cases not reset for trial).
Judge defended himself. On the delayed cases, he said that his branch was just designated to try family, tax, and heinous crime cases but was changed to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Hence, there was a lot of work and many cases were misfiled due to lack of personnel and space. Plus, he suffered a mild stroke, his handwriting was affected and therefore could not take notes while hearing cases, and so he had to wait for TSN before he could decide. In many of the alleged unresolved cases, Judge said he had already dictated his decisions but the stenographer hasn’t transcribed them yet. On the Bibl Biblee-re read adin ing g issu issue, e, Judge Judge did did not not deny deny it. it. He prese resent nted ed than thank k you you lette etters rs from from liti litiga gant nts s who got got “enlightened.” Judge prayed for optional retirement if he was found guilty of violations.
2)
-
DISPOSITIVE: DISMISS charges of misconduct and tardiness LIABLE for Gross Inefficiency. Fined P11,000, to be deducted from retirement benefits as Judge is already retired.
What is outside
Issues: 1)
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manner to preserve the image of the judiciary. The The judge judge’’s pract practic ice e of readi reading ng Bibl Bible e verse verses s in hearings is an exercise of his religious freedom. SC said: “we hesitate to castigate him lest we trample on this right.” Ther There e were were indee indeed d lette letters rs show showin ing g that that peopl people e appreciated the Judge’s efforts in helping them find their way in life Judg Judge’ e’s s practi practice ce does doesn’ n’tt impai impairr his judi judici cial al dutie duties s anyway
Was Was Judge Judge guilty guilty of Gross Ineffi Inefficie ciency ncy? ? Tard Tardine iness? ss? Delay? Was Was Judg Judge e guilty guilty of of misco miscond nduc uct? t? (consti issue) Was Judge excessive in his display of freedom of religion?
Pornography/Obscenity
People vs Kottinger People vs Padan
Held and Ratio: 1)
OCA and SC: SC: there there is NO Conce Concerne rned d Trial Trial Lawy Lawyers. ers. The The lette letterr was was trace traced d to Atty Atty.. Simb Simbilillo lo who who was was embarrassed once by the Judge in the latter’s sala. Atty was made to read a Bible verse, he was displeased, and from then on Atty withdrew all his annulment cases whenever they get raffled to Judge’s sala. ON TARDINESS: NOT GUILTY No evidence presented here. ON DELAYED CASES: NOT GUILTY SC accepted the Judge’s explanations above. But… ON GROSS INEFFICIENCY: GUILTY Judge Judge fai faile led d to deci decide de some some case cases s withi within n the the 9090day period (required in Consti Sec 15(1) Art. VIII). He also violated New Code of Judicial Conduct Sec 5 Canon 6 (on efficiently, reasonably, fairly doing judicial duties) and Rule 3.09 (supervisio (supervision n of personnel) Even Even tho thoug ugh h he had had no no new new pers person onne nell upon upon the the re-designation of his branch, it is up to the judge to devise an efficient recording and filing system for his branch. Regarding the cases, SC could have allowed/excused the failure to decide within 90 days, BUT the judge should have first requested for an extension of time. This he failed to do, and this is inexcusable. Viola iolate ted d Rule ule 140 140 of Revi Revise sed d Rule Rules s of Cour Court: t: undue delay in rendering a decision order, or in trans transmit mitti ting ng the the reco record rds s of a case case – a less less ser serious cha charge punishable by 1-3 mo. mo. suspension or P10-20,000 fine.
2)
EXPR EXPRES ESSI SION ON OF RELI RELIGI GION ON NOT NOT EXCE EXCESS SSIV IVE. E. NOT amounting to MISCONDUCT. MISCONDUCT. New New Code Code of of Judic Judiciial Con Condu duct ct Can Cano on 4 Sec Sec 6 states that judges are also entitled entitled to freedom freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly but they must still conduct themselves in a dignified
J. Montemayor FACTS: A “live “live show” was exhibi exhibited ted in a building building in Tondo. Tondo. The building (nothing more than a shed) was principally used for table tennis matches – with floor space for the table and surrounding bleachers. The live show (an exhibition of “human fighting fish”) was advertised by word of mouth, with tickets being sold at Php 3 each. The show had been scheduled for 8pm, but did nott st no star artt un unti till 9: 9:15 15pm pm.. Th Ther ere e we were re ab abou outt 10 106 6 attendees. The Man Manila ila Poli Police ce Depar Departmen tmentt got win wind d of the the even event, t, and sen sentt pla plainin-clo clothe thes s pol police icemen men (wi (with th a sea search rch warrant) who conducted a raid and made arrests after the show. Mar Marina ina Pad Padan, an, Cos Cosme me Espin Espinosa osa,, Ernest Ernesto o Reyes Reyes and Jose Fajardo were charged with a violation of RPC Art. 201 (immoral doctrines, obscene publications & exhibi exh ibitio tions, ns, & ind indece ecent nt sho shows) ws).. Fajardo wa was s th the e manager, Reyes the ticket collector, and Padan and Espinosa were the performers. Tw Two o civil civilian ians s at the the even eventt gave gave testimo testimony ny.. Reyes was seen se en at th the e do door or se sellllin ing g an and d co collllec ecti ting ng ti tick cket ets. s. was s se seen en at th the e do door or ov over erse seei eing ng ti tick cket et Fajardo wa selling and collection. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor. Once all the attendees were inside, he riled up the audience by asking them to choose between 2 girls. Padan was the th e fa favo vore red d ch choi oice ce.. Sh She e an and d Espinosa then approached the bed, disrobed, and began to indulge in la lasc sciv ivio ious us ac acts, ts, wh whic ich h cu culm lmin inat ated ed in se sexu xual al intercourse (3 different positions!). Oth Other er witnes witnesses ses for for the the prosecu prosecutio tion n testifi testified ed that that they they were “excited beyond description.” Al Alll plead pleaded ed not not guilty guilty upo upon n arrai arraign gnmen ment, t, but but Padan eventu eve ntuall ally y wit withdr hdrew ew her ple plea a and ple pleade aded d gui guilty lty instead. All 4 were convicted as charged. On Only ly Pada Padan n and Faja Fajard rdo o appea appeale led. d. Padan doesn’t question her conviction, but prays for a lesser penalty (no (n o mo more re pr pris ison on se sent nten ence ce,, prisión correcional ). ). insi sists sts th that at he wa wasn sn’t ’t the ma mana nage gerr, bu butt Fajardo in
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 73 merely an innocent bystander. Because of his “sigasiga” reputation, he had been urged by the audience to select the performers for the show. He insists that he had left before the show started, and only returned when he heard the commotion of the police raid. HELD/RATIO: ·
The actual exhibition of sexual intercourse, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can’t possibly be considered “art”
No re rede deem emin ing g fea featu ture res! s! Clea Cl earr an and d un unmit mitig igat ated ed obscen obscenit ity y, in inde dece cency ncy,, an and d an offense to public morals Such Su ch an exhib exhibit itio ion n inspi inspire res s lust lust and lewdn lewdnes ess, s, and exerts a corrup corrupting ting influence on socie society ty (espec (especially ially the youth!)
The SC won’t disturb the lower court’s judgment as to Padan’s sentence
Lowerr court Lowe court al alre ready ady took took into into consid consider erat atio ion n her plea for leniency when it reduced her fine to Php 200 from Php 600. The Th e impo impose sed d pena penalty lty is rea reaso sona nabl ble! e!
There Ther e is co conc nclu lusi sive ve ev evid iden ence ce of Fa Faja jard rdo’ o’s s participation
acti ac tive ve
Witnes Witn esse ses s te test stif ifie ied d! His name was stamped on the tickets (“Pepe Fajardo” – which he admitted was his name) Fajard Faj ardo o is the the most most guil guilty ty of the 4, 4, as he he was was the one who conducted the show, and presumably derived the most profit or gain
·
said defendants and their agents from confiscating confiscating plaintiffs plaintiffs magazines magazines or from preventing preventing the sale or circ circul ulat atio ion n of thes these e mate materi rial als s clai claimin ming g that that the the magaz magazin ine e is a dece decent nt,, artis artisti tic c and and educ educat atio iona nall magazine which is not per se obscene, (b) and that the public publicati ation on is protec protected ted by the Consti Constituti tutiona onall guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Later fil filed an Urgent Motio tion for for issuance of a tempora temporary ry restra restraini ining ng order order agains againstt indisc indiscrim rimina inate te seizure, confiscation and burning of "Pinoy Playboy" Magaz Magazin ines es,, pend pendin ing g hear hearin ing g on the the peti petiti tion on for for prel prelim imin inar ary y inju injunc ncti tion on in view view of the the Mayo Mayor’ r’s s pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. Court granted this. Upon Upon laps lapse e of this this TRO TRO,, again again file filed d for ano anoth ther er,, whic which h was countered by Bagatsing, claiming that the second appl applic icat atio ion n for for TRO TRO will will be cont contra rary ry to an SC Resolution.
Mayor Bagatsing · Admi Admitt tted ed the the conf confis isca cati tion on and and burn burnin ing g of obsc obscen ene e read readin ing g mate materi rial als, s, but but clai claimed med that that thos those e were were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police author authoriti ities, es, and that that the actions actions were were underta undertaken ken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. · The The act actio ions ns do do not not con const stit itut ute e a rai raid. d. Cabrera · No answer. RTC : Dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Gonzales vs Katigbak Pita vs CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989 LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs. THE THE COUR COURT T OF APPE APPEALS ALS,, RAMO RAMON N BAGA BAGATS TSIN ING, G, and and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents. William C. Arceno for petitioner. Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent.
Overview: This is a case which aims to determine the balance
CA: Dismissed the appeal upon the following grounds:
(1) that that despit despite e the petitione petitioner’s r’s consti constituti tutiona onall guaran guarantee tee protecting its right to express oneself in print, and the prot protec ectio tion n affo afford rded ed by the the cons consti titu tutio tion n agai agains nstt unreasonable searches and seizure, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect protect society from pornographi pornographic c literature literature that is offensive offensive to public public morals as supported supported by the pertinent laws (2) The case case falls within within the exception exception to the rule rule against against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable
between the State’s police power and people’s right against unreas unreasona onable ble search search and seizur seizure e and right right to freedom freedom of expression over the seizure of materials allegedly containing indecent, pornographic and obscene contents.
Issue: Can police officers, without any court warrant or order
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
seiz seize e and and conf confis isca cate te mate materi rial als s on the the basi basis s of thei their r determination that the same are obscene?
Facts: In furtherance of the Anti-Smut Campaign of the City of
Discussion:
Manila Manila,, Mayor Mayor Ramon Ramon Bagats Bagatsing ing initia initiated ted a seizur seizure e and confiscation confiscation operation along Manila sidewalks, sidewalks, magazines, magazines, publ public icat atio ions ns and and othe otherr read readin ing g mater materia ials ls beli believ eved ed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent, and later burned these materials in public at the University Belt along C.M. Recto Avenue. Among the materials was the magazine, Pinoy Playboy , published, and co-edited by Leo Pita. Leo Pita · file filed d a case case for inj injun unct ctio ion n with with pray prayer er for for issua issuanc nce e of the the writ writ of prel prelim imin inary ary inju injunc ncti tion on agai agains nstt Mayor Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera (WPD superintendent) (a) seeking to enjoin and/or restrain
Standards in Jurisprudence · concep eptt of comm commun unit ity y stan standa dard rd in Kottinger - conc determining decency/obscenity · Go Pin - no protection if picture is not used for art but for commercial purposes · concep eptt of rede redeem emin ing g elem elemen entt of art art Padan - conc inspiration · Gonzalez v. Katigbak - obscene if, to the average pers person on,, appl applyi ying ng cont contemp empor orar ary y stan standa dard rds, s, the the dominan dominantt theme theme of the material material taken as a whole whole appeals to prurient interest
74 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 · 5. Th The e prope properr suit suit is then then broug brought ht in the the court court Memoirs v. Massachusettes - obscenity is one "utterly without any redeeming social value under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; · 6. An Any y co conv nvic icti tion on is su subj bjec ectt to appea appeal. l. The The Miller v. California - abandoned Massachusettes, and established basic guidelines: appellate court may assess whether or not (a) (a) whet whethe herr 'the 'the aver averag age e pers person on,, appl applyi ying ng the properties seized are indeed "obscene." contemp contempora orary ry standar standards' ds' would would find find the work, work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; Petition is grante granted. d. But since since the magazi magazines nes Disposition: Petition (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a subject of the search and seizure have been destroyed, the pate paten ntly tly offen ffensi sive ve way, ay, sexu sexual al cond conduc uctt Court declined to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the specifically defined by the applicable state law; case was rendered moot and academic and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks UP vs Catungal serious serious litera literary ry,, artist artistic, ic, politi political cal,, or scient scientifi ific c G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997 value. Court’s Say
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Cour Courtt begin begins s in asce ascert rtai aini ning ng the the powe powerr to exer exerci cise se censorship in this wise: that there must be objective
and convincin convincing, g, not subjective subjective or conjectur conjectural, al, proof proof of the existe existence nce of a clear clear and present present danger, and that it is essential for the validity of prev previo ious us rest restra rain intt or cens censor orsh ship ip that that the the auth author orit ity y does does not not rely rely sole solely ly on his his own own apprai appraisal sal of what what the public public welfare, welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. -
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Here, Here, the Court is not convinc convinced ed that that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant conf confis isca cati tion on of the the lite litera ratu ture re for for whic which h mand mandat ator ory y inju injunc ncti tion on had had been been soug sought ht beca becaus use e they they were were not not poss posses esse sed d of a lawf lawful ul cour courtt orde order: r: (1) (1) find findin ing g the the said said mate materi rial als s to be porn pornog ogra raph phy y, and and (2) (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant "Police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process.
Pres Presid iden enti tial al Decr Decree ees s Nos. Nos. 960 and and 969 are are polic police e power measures, but these decrees do not exempt law enforcers, in carrying from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the the righ rightt agai agains nstt unre unreas ason onab able le sear search ches es and and seizures, because these may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. Cou Court outl utlines ines the the fol follow lowing ing rule rules s in dete determ rmin iniing seizure of materials similar to the objects of this case: 1. Th The e autho authori riti ties es must must apply apply for for the issu issuan ance ce of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; 2. Th The e author authoriti ities es must must convin convince ce the cour courtt that the th e ma mate teri rial als s so soug ught ht to be se seiz ized ed ar are e "obscen "ob scene", e", and pose a cle clear ar and present present dang da nger er of an ev evilil su subs bsta tant ntiv ive e en enou ough gh to warrant State interference and action; 3. The jud judge ge must must det determi ermine ne whet whether her or not not the the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. 4. If, in in the the opini opinion on of of the cou court, rt, prob probabl able e cause cause exis ex ists, ts, it may is issue sue th the e se sear arch ch wa warra rrant nt prayed for;
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHANCELLO CHANC ELLOR R ROGER POSADAS, POSADAS, VICE CHANC CHANCELLO ELLOR R ROLA RO LAND NDO O P. DA DAYC YCO, O, VI VICE CE CH CHAN ANCE CELL LLOR OR MA MART RTIN IN GREG GR EGOR ORIO IO,, PR PROF OF.. AR ARTU TURO RO BA BALBA LBAST STRO RO,, PR PROF OF.. CECILIA CECI LIA FLOR FLORENCIO ENCIO,, and PROF PROF.. LETI LETICIA CIA PENA PENAÑO-HO ÑO-HO vs. HON. ELPIDIO M. CATUNGAL, JR. (deceased); HON. OSCAR OSC AR C. C. HER HERRER RERA, A, JR. JR.,, in his cap capaci acity ty as for former mer acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. PEDRO M. AREOLA, in his capacity as Present Presiding Judge Judge of Branch 85 of the Region Reg ional al Tria riall Cou Court rt of Que Quezon zon Cit City; y; and SA SAL LVADO ADOR R CARLOS [G.R. No. 121863]
Date: 05 May 1997 Ponente: Davide, Jr. Nature: Certiorari and prohibition Facts: -
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Peti Pe titi tio one nerr Un Uniive vers rsiity of th the e Ph Phil ilip ippi pin nes is a st stat ate e university created by virtue of Act No. 1870. 187 0. Petitione Petitionerr Pos Posada adas s is the Cha Chance ncello llorr of UP Dilima Dil iman. n. Petitione Petitioners rs Day Dayco co and Gre Gregor gorio io are Vi Vice ce Chancellors for Administration and Community Affairs, respectively respec tively,, of UP Dilima Diliman. n. Petitio Petitioners ners Balba Balbastro, stro, Floren Flo rencio cio,, and Pen Penaño año-Ho -Ho are UP Dil Diliman iman fac faculty ulty members memb ers and memb members ers of the UP Administra Administrativ tive e Disciplinary Discip linary Tri Tribunal bunal (Tr (Tribuna ibunal), l), the admini administrativ strative e body created to try the administrative case filed by UP against again st the priva private te respon respondent. dent. Private respon respondent dent Carlos is a UP Diliman f aculty member. On 5 Oct ctob ober er 199 1994, 4, RT RTC Quez Quezon on Cit City y issu issued ed an an Order Ord er gra granti nting ng the app applic licati ation on fil filed ed by the Que Quezon zon City Central Police District Command for the issuance of a search warrant against Carlos based on three witnesses. They alleged that on different occasions they were brought by a certain Rea to the residence of Ca Carl rlos os to ha have ve th them emse selv lves es ph photo otogr grap aphe hed d fo for r publication in a magazine. Instead, Carlos threatened the th em with a gun and ordered them to str triip naked. Nude photos of them were taken, and they were forced to have sex with him. With Wi th the the coop cooper erat atio ion n of the the UP Dili Diliman man pol polic ice, e, sear search ch warrant was served upon Carlos at his residence. The following following were confiscated: (1) One 38 cal calibe iberr rev revolv olver er,, Smit Smith h & We Wesso sson n W/S W/ Sn 88659 with six live amm mmu unition (unlicensed); (2) One Ansco 1090 AFS camera; (3)) Twe (3 wenty nty-ni -nine ne lilive ve bu bullllets ets for 38 ca calilibe ber r revolver; (4) Six spent shells for 38 caliber caliber revolver; (5) Two pictures of nude women;
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 75
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(6) One artificial rubberized penis penis about 8 inches in length; (7) One art artific ificial ial rub rubber berriz rized ed pen penis is abo about ut 2.5 inches in length; and (8) One rubber rubber suction pump Carl Ca rlos os was was arre arreste sted d and and deta detain ined ed at at the Que Quezo zon n City City jail for f or illegal possession poss ession of firearm. Petitioner Dayco ordered ordere d a preli preliminary minary investigation investigation and design designated ated Atty. Marichu C. Lambino of the UP Diliman Legal Office Of fice to con conduc ductt the inv investi estigat gation ion.. On 7 Oct Octobe ober r 1994 19 94,, Att Atty y. La Lambi mbino no su subm bmit itted ted he herr Pr Prel elim imin inar ary y Investi Inv estigat gation ion Rep Report ort whe wherei rein n she con confir firmed med tha thatt a pr case se ex exis iste ted d ag agai ains nstt Ca Carl rlos os an and d prim ima a fa faci cie e ca recomme rec ommende nded d that Carlos be cha charge rged d wit with h gra grave ve misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for ninety days. On 7 Oct Octob ober er 199 1994, 4, the the Offi Office ce of of the the Chan Chance cellllor or,, UP Diliman, through petitioner Dayco as officer-in-charge, filed a Formal Charge for grave misconduct against Carlos. Duri Du ring ng the the he hear arin ings gs,, th ther ere e wer ere e a lot of pr prob obllems regard reg arding ing pre presen sentati tation on of evi eviden dence ce due to Car Carlos los’’ missing counsel. Carlos, on his own behalf, filed a moti mo tion on fo forr po post stpo pone neme ment nt an and d a co comp mpla lain intt fo for r oppression oppre ssion and grave miscon misconduct duct again against st petiti petitioner oner Balbastro as Chairman of the Tribunal. In a lette letterr-mo motio tion n ad addr dres esse sed d to petit petitio ione nerr Posad Posadas as,, Carlos sought the dissolution of the Tribunal for lack of ju juri risd sdic icti tion on.. He lilikew kewis ise e re requ ques este ted d th that at hi his s preven pre ventiv tive e sus suspen pensio sion n be lif lifted ted and his Chr Christm istmas as bonus and cash gift be released. Petitioner Posadas denied the requests. Carl Ca rlos os file filed d a compla complain intt for inj injun unct ctio ion n befo before re the the RTC RTC Quez Qu ezon on Ci City ty pr pray ayin ing g fo forr (1 (1)) th the e is issu suan ance ce of a temporary restraining order against the petitioners, (2) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the Tribunal to cease and desist from proceeding with the administrativ admini strative e case during the pendency of the case, and (3) his reinstatement and payment of his withheld salary sal ary and Chr Christ istmas mas bon bonus. us. In sup suppor portt ther thereof eof Carl Ca rlos os al alle lege ged d tha thatt he wa was s co compe mpelllled ed to su subm bmit it himself to the Tribunal when there never was a proper complai comp lainan nant; t; tha thatt the pro procee ceedin dings gs wer were e use used d as a fishing fishin g exped expedition ition and were conducted in viola violation tion of the Constitution and the Rules. On 1 Feb Febru ruar ary y 1995, 1995, the the trial trial cou court rt issue issued d orde orderr whic which h granted a writ of preliminary injunction which is what is being assailed in this case. The petitioners petitioners were dire di rect cted ed to re refr frai ain n fr fro om pro roce ceed edin ing g wi with th th the e administrative case against Carlos. The Th e tr tria iall co cour urtt is issu sued ed a te temp mpor orar ary y re rest stra rain inin ing g or orde der r agains aga instt the pet petiti itione oners rs and the foll followi owing ng day day,, the Tribu Tr ibunal nal iss issued ued an ord order er gra granti nting ng the req reques uestt of Carlos Car los for the resetting resetting of the presentati presentation on of his evidence, subject to the outcome of the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Afte Af terr the laps lapse e of th the e effec effecti tivi vity ty of the the restr restrai aini ning ng order, the Tribunal issued another order setting the adminis admi nistra trative tive cas case e for the pre presen sentati tation on of Car Carlos los'' evidence. evide nce. Calos was warned that failure failure on his part to present his evidence would constitute a waiver and the case would be submitted for resolution. In the the repor reportt submi submitt tted ed to peti petiti tion oner er Posa Posada das, s, the the Tribu Tr ibunal nal foun found d pri private vate res respon ponden dentt gui guilty lty of gra grave ve misc mi scon ondu duct ct an and d re reco comm mmen ende ded d th the e pe pena nalt lty y of dismissal
SC Decision: Petition granted, Writ of preliminary injunction order for pre-trial is nullified and TRO made permanent. Whethe therr or not gra grant nt of pre prelim limina inary ry inj injunc unctio tion n was Issue: Whe proper
RATIO RA TIO DECIDENDI: Those who ask for preliminary injunction from the courts must come with clean hands after exhausting all administrative reliefs possible.
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Section Secti on 3 of of Rule Rule 58 58 of the the Rul Rules es of of Cour Courtt prov provid ides es for for the following as grounds for the grant of a preliminary injunction: (a)) That (a That th the e pl plai ainti ntiff ff is en enti titl tled ed to the re relilief ef demanded and the whole or part of such relief cons co nsis ists ts in re rest stra rain inin ing g th the e co comm mmis issi sion on or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the nonperfo pe rform rman ance ce th ther ereo eoff wo woul uld d pr prob obab ably ly wo work rk injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) That the defendant defendant is doing, threatens, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done do ne,, so some me ac actt pr prob obab ably ly in vi viol olat atio ion n of th the e plaint pla intif iff's f's rig rights hts res respec pectin ting g the sub subjec jectt of the acti ac tion on,, an and d te tend ndin ing g to re rend nder er th the e ju judg dgmen mentt ineffectual. The Th e cour courtt must must state state its its own own find findin ings gs of of fact fact and and cite cite the particular law to justify the grant of preliminary injunc inj unctio tion. n. Sinc Since e inj injunc unctio tion n is the stro strong ng arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean clean hands. hands. We are convinc convinced ed that Carlos Carlos did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. Having in fact participated at the preliminary conference, agreed to the matters therein taken up, attended the hearings and cross-examined a witness, Carlos had waived any legal issue which he initially raised.. If the Tribunal raised Tribunal acted in the manner it did in proceeding with the hearings, Carlos and his counsel had thems mse elves to blame fo forr their unfa faiir maneuvers. maneuve rs. In no way can the Tri Tribunal bunal's 's action be characterized as illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. That Carlos was under preventive suspension and that his salary and Christmas bonus were withheld could not cause "irre "irreparab parable" le" injury injury.. He himsel himselff delay delayed ed the lifting of the suspension because of the postponements of the case at his request, and his unpa un paid id sa sala lary ry an and d Ch Chri rist stmas mas bo bonu nus s ar are e of fix fixed ed amounts which would be paid him depending on the outcome of the case. Indi In disp sput utab ably ly then then,, Carlo Carlos' s' immed immedia iate te reco recour urse se to the the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The administrative process is in inten tende ded d to pr prov ovid ide e le less ss ex expe pens nsiv ive e an and d mor more e speedy solutions to disputes.
Fernando vs CA December 6, 2006 | Ponencia: Quisumbing Doctrine: The state has a right to regulate obscenity (as an unprotected speech) in line with its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials. Determination of what is obscene is an issue proper for judicial
76 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 In this this cas case, e, the the mate materia rials ls conf confisc iscate ated d wher where e offe offensi nsive ve determination, as it will be treated on a case to case basis. to mora morals ls - they depicted depicted sexual sexual acts which were Facts: The PNP PNP con conducte ted d a search of the the Gaudencio E. offensive to public morals inspiring lust and lewdness, and will corrupt the minds of the youth. Fernando Music Fair where copies of magazines with nude nud e obs obscen cene e pic pictur tures es and VHS tap tapes es con contai tainin ning g Forr the Fo the vide videos os dep depic icti ting ng a nake naked d body body of of a woman woman,, it pornographic shows were seized. may be argued that the motive may be innocent, but Gauden Gau dencio cio Fer Fernan nando, do, a certa certain in Warr Warren en Ti Tingc ngchuy huy,, and and the th e pe perfo rform rman ance ce wa was s no none neth thel eles ess s re revo volt ltin ing g an and d the storekeeper Rudy Estorninos were charged with shocking to good morals. violation of Article 201 of the RPC. Mere Me re pos posse sessi ssion on is is not not a viola violati tion on sinc since e the the purp purpos ose e The Th e trial trial cou court rt gave gave the the peti petitio tione ners rs an opp oppor ortu tuni nity ty to of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene present evidence, but they opted to just submit the materials to the public, and the law does not require case for decision. that the person be caught in the act of selling the Tin ingc gchu huy y wa was s fo foun und d in inno noce cent nt for for la lack ck of suffi suffici cien entt materials. However in this case, the petitioners were evidence, but Fernando and Estorninos were found involved in selling these materials, and it has been guilty by the RTC with the affirmation of CA; thus, they proven that they were involved in it, so there is a are appealing to the SC. violation: o Fe Fern rnan ando do was was ind indee eed d the the owne ownerr of the the Mus Music ic err in affirmi affirming ng the guilt guilt of Fernand Fernando o and Fair, as the business permit of the store was Issue: Did the CA err Estorninos? unde un derr hi his s na name me ev even en if it wa was s al alre read ady y expired. Also, the address in his bail bond had the same address as the store’s. Held: No. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. o Es Esttorninos was identifi fie ed by Barangay Chairperson Lipana and Inspector Tababan Rationale: as the store attendant, attendant, and with that there is The Th e st stat ate, e, by parens patriae, has a right to a presumption of regularity of performance regulate obscenity as an unprotected speech in on their part especially since the petitioners line with its mandate to protect the public, from waived their right to present evidence when obscene, immoral and indecent materials. o Ob Obsc scen enit ity y has been been previ previou ousl sly y defin defined ed in they opted to submit the case for decision. People vs Kottinger as something offensive agains aga instt cha chasti stity ty,, dec decency ency or del delica icacy cy.. In Of Course, More than Words dete de termi rmini ning ng if so somet methi hing ng is in inde dece cent nt,, it C. Edwin Baker shou sh ould ld (1 (1)) ha have ve th the e te tend nden ency cy to co corru rrupt pt those tho se who whose se min minds ds are open to imm immora orall Hate Speech infl in flue uenc nces es,, an and d th that at (2 (2)) it ca can n sh shoc ock k th the e ordinary and common sense of men as an R.A.V. vs City of St. Paul Minnesota indecency o People vs Go Pin - claiming that indecent pictures are for art's sake is just secondary US. Supreme Court No. 90-7675. June 22, 1992 Justice Scalia to the real purpose considering that those Facts: who went to their galleries were not exactly On June June 21, 1990, 1990, RAV RAV (a juveni juvenile) le) and other other teenag teenagers ers artists. allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together o Peo People ple vs Pad Padan an - there is no art in an broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside exhibition of a sexual act the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street o Gon involv olves es from the house where petitioner was staying. Gonzal zales es vs Kal Kalaw aw Kat Katigb igbak ak - inv motion pictures, looks at the dominant theme Even if they could have been charged under different other of th the e ma mate teri rial al and no nott ju just st is isol olat ated ed laws, R. A. V. was charged under the St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias passages. which h puni punish shes es "whoever Motiva Motivated ted Crime Crime Ordina Ordinance nce, whic o Pi state ated d th that at fro from m pr prev evio ious us Pita ta vs CA – st places on public or private property a symbol, object, jurisprudence, it can be inferred that what is appell appellati ation, on, charac character teriza izatio tion n or graffi graffiti, ti, includ including ing,, but not obscene depends on what the judges think it limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows is or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or o Miller vs California – laid down a guideline to resent resentmen mentt in others others on the basis of race, color, color, creed, creed, determind what is obscene: religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be Wh Whe ether to the average pers rso on, guilty of a misdemeanor." misdemeanor." applying applyi ng contemp contemporary orary standa standards rds The trial court dismissed this charge on the ground that the woul wo uld d fin find d th the e wo work, rk, taken taken as a ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly whol wh ole, e, ap appe peal als s to th the e pr prur urie ient nt therefore invalid invalid because because of the First content content based, and therefore interest Amendment. The Minnesota reversed. It Minnesota Supreme Supreme Court Court reversed. Work depicts or descr criibes, in a rejected the overbreadth claim because the phrase "arouses pate pa tentl ntly y of offe fens nsiv ive e wa way y, se sexu xual al anger, alarm or resentment in others" had been construed in conduct specifically defined by the earlier state cases to limit the ordinance's reach to "fighting applicable state law la w. within the meaning of this Court's decision decision – words words" within Wo Work rk lacks lacks seri seriou ous s liter literary ary,, artisti artistic, c, "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an political or scientific value immedia immediate te breach breach of the peace. peace.", ", a catego category ry of expres expressio sion n From Fro m all all the the juri jurispr sprude udence nce pro provid vided, ed, cle clearly arly,, obsce obscenity nity unprotected by the First Amendment. The court also concluded is an iss issue ue pro proper per for jud judici icial al det determi erminat nation ion,, and that that the ordina ordinance nce was not impermi impermissi ssibly bly content content based based treated on a case to case basis. becaus because e it was narrowly narrowly tailored to serve a compelli compelling ng
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 77 governmental interest in protecting the community against bias motivated threats to public safety and order. WON: The ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the First Amendment. (Freedom of Speech -- WON a municipality may constitutionally constitutionally enact an ordinance ordinance that makes it a crime to place a symbol on public or private property that arouses anger in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.) The ordi ordina nanc nce e is faci facial ally ly inva invali lid d unde underr the the Firs Firstt Held: The Amendment since the ordinance unconstitutionally prohibits speech on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. (a) (a) Thi This Court ourt is bound ound by the the stat state e cour court' t's s cons constr truc uctio tion n of the the ordi ordina nanc nce e as reach reachin ing g only only expressions expressions constituting constituting "fighting "fighting words." R. A. V.'s request that the scope of the Chaplinsky formulation be modifi modified, ed, thereb thereby y invali invalidati dating ng the ordina ordinance nce as substantially overbroad, need not be reached. (b) The First First Amendm Amendment ent genera generally lly preven prevents ts
governmen governmentt from prohibiti prohibiting ng speech speech or even even expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content based regulations are presumptively invalid. A few limited categories of speech speech,, such such as obscen obscenity ity,, defama defamatio tion, n, and fighting words, may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism, towards a nonproscribable When the the basi basis s for for the the message message they contain contain. When content content discriminati discrimination on consists consists entirely entirely of the very reas reason on the the enti entire re clas class s of spee speech ch at issu issue e is pros proscr crib ibab able le,, no sign signif ific ican antt dang danger er of idea idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction distinction within the class. Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content content defined defined subclass subclass of proscribabl proscribable e speech is that that the subcla subclass ss happen happens s to be associ associate ated d with with particular "secondary effects" of the speech, so that the regula regulatio tion n is justified withou withoutt referen reference ce to the content of the . . . speech." (c) The ordinance, even as narrowly construed by the State State Suprem Supreme e Court, Court, is facial facially ly uncons unconstitu titutio tional nal becaus because e it impose imposes s specia speciall prohib prohibiti itions ons on those those spea speake kers rs who who expr expres ess s view views s on the the disfa disfavo vore red d subjec subjects ts of "race, "race, color color,, creed, creed, religi religion on or gender gender"" although the phrase in the ordinance, "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others," has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction to reach only only those those symb symbol ols s or disp display lays s that that amou amount nt to "fight "fighting ing words. words."" Those Those who wish wish to use "fight "fighting ing words" words" in connec connectio tion n with with other other ideasideas--to -to expres express s host hostilility ity,, for for exam exampl ple, e, on the the basi basis s of poli politi tica call affiliation affiliation,, union membership, membership, or homosexuality homosexuality--are --are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit
St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those spea speake kers rs who who expr expres ess s view views s on disf disfav avor ored ed the same same time, time, it perm permit its s disp displa lays ys subjects. At the containing abusive invective if they are not addressed to those topics. Moreover, in its practical operation the ordi ordina nanc nce e goes goes beyon beyond d mere mere cont conten ent, t, to actual Display lays s cont contai aini ning ng viewpoint viewpoint,, discrimi discriminatio nation n . Disp "fight "fighting ing words" words" that that do not invoke invoke the disfav disfavore ored d subjects subjects would seemingly be useable useable ad libitum libitum by those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but not by their opponents. St. Paul has
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight fight freesty freestyle, le, while while requir requiring ing the other other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules. The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content. (d) The content based discrimination reflected in the ordinance does not rest upon the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue is proscribable, it is not aimed aimed only only at the "seconda "secondary ry effects effects"" of spee speech ch with within in the meani meaning ng of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., and it is not for any other reason the sort that does not threaten censorship of ideas. The ordinance's content discrimination is not justified on the ground that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in ensuring the basic human human rights rights of groups groups histori historical cally ly discri discrimin minated ated against, since an ordinance not limited to the favored topics topics would would have have precis precisely ely the same same benefi beneficia ciall effect. The majority held that "fighting words" were not truly without any protection and that even a prohibition against "fighting words" could not be content-based, that is, restrict only certain types of fighting words. The Court concluded by writing "Let there be no mistake about our belief belief that that burnin burning g a cross cross in someon someone's e's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment Amendment to the fire."
Reversed and remanded. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. -
I agre agree e with with petiti petitione onerr that that the ordina ordinance nce is invali invalid d on its face. Although Although the ordinance ordinance as construed construed reaches categ tegories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also criminalizes a substantial substantial amount of expression expression that--howeve that--however r repugnant--is shielded by the First Amendment. Our Our fighti fighting ng word words s cases cases have have made made clea clearr, however, that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional prot protec ecti tion on.. In the the First First Amend Amendmen mentt conte context, xt, "Cri "Crimi mina nall stat statute utes s must must be scru scruti tini nize zed d with with part partic icul ular ar care care;; those those that that make make unla unlawf wful ul a substantial substantial amount of constitution constitutionally ally protected protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate legitimate application." application." The St. Paul antibias ordinance is such a law. Although the ordinance reaches conduct that is unprotected, it also also makes makes crimin criminal al expres expressiv sive e conduc conductt that that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and is protected by the First Amendment. The ordina ordinance nce is theref therefore ore fatally fatally overbr overbroad oad and invalid on its face. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. The The St. Pau Paull ordin ordinan ance ce regu regula late tes s speec speech h not on on the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the basis of the harm the the spee speech ch caus causes es.. Cont Contra rary ry to the suggestion of the majority, the St. Paul ordinance does not regulate expression based on viewpoint. The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it does
78 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 bar both sides sides from hurling hurling such such words words on the basis of the target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender." It does not, therefore, favor one side of any debate. It only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words. Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial, reli religi giou ous, s, and and gend gender er equa equalility ty.. The The St. Paul Paul ordinance (as construed by the Court) regulates expressive activity that is wholly proscribable and does so not on the basis of viewpoint, but rather in recognition of the different harms caused by such activi activity ty.. Taken aken togeth together er,, these these severa severall consid considera eratio tions ns persua persuade de me that the St. Paul Paul ordina ordinance nce is not an uncons unconstit tituti utiona onall conten contentt base based d regu regula lati tion on of spee speech ch.. Thus Thus,, were were the the ordinance not overbroad, I would vote to uphold it. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving driving minori minoritie ties s out of their their homes homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifi specifical cally ly punish punishing ing the race race based based fightin fighting g words that so prejudice their community. I concur in the judgment, however, because I agree with Justi Justice ce Whit White e that that this this part partic icul ular ar ordi ordina nanc nce e reac reache hes s beyo beyond nd figh fighti ting ng word words s to spee speech ch protected by the First Amendment.
Free Speech by the Light of a Burning Cross Jerome O’Callaghan This article is evaluates and criticizes the decision RAV v. City of St. Paul. See digest to know more about this case. I.
Introduction The case of RAV v. City of St. Paul decided that a hate speech ordinance is against the first amendment. Case illustrates that no one theory of • application of the free speech guarantee but commands widespread support because of the majority of opinion and numerous concurrences Court was united in judgment but • divided in understanding Conc Concur urri ring ng Cri Criti tiqu ques es Important to look at concurrences because Justice Scalia’s analysis o became the majority opinion at 5-4 The concurrences leave open o the possibility that a hate speech law could pass First Amendment analysis Justice White’s concurrence attacks Justice Scalia’s opinion on three grounds 1. Proc Proced edur ural al iss issue ue – uni unimpo mport rtan antt 2. Justi Justice ce Sca Scalilia’ a’s s argu argumen mentt has has the effect of undermining the categorical approach that has •
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measured the reach of the free speech guarantee. Certain classes of speech are simply not covered by free speech. These include defamation, obscenity and fighting words. The decision is an ironic result that says that fighting words are protected by the First Amendment when the govt is too selective in the prohibition. 3. Justi Justice ce Scali Scalia’ a’s s opi opini nion on removes the essential effect of the strict scrutiny review. The irony is that Scalia agreed that St. Paul had a compelling interest in preventing the cross burning and that the ordinance issued promoted that interest. However, the ordinance was still declared unconstitutional. The majority suggests that while fighting words are proscribable, there is a danger in isolating one subset of fighting words for prohibition. Scalia finds in the ordinance government interference with the marketplace of ideas. The first amendment does not allow St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects Dilemma: if the government is forbidden from proscribing subsets of categorically unprotected speech, won’t laws against threatening govt officials unconstitutional? Scalia’s solution: special force argument – reasons why threats are outside the first amendment have special force when applied to the person of the president. Another difficulty: this special force • argument can be used to justify the ordinance fighting words are bad. When they are directed to people who have been discriminated for a long time, it brings more harm. Justice Scalia does not see the special force as a double edged sword Justice White’s critique – by deciding that a state cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not, the court seems to abandon the categorical approach and relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws. Justice Steven’s concurrence – Justice Scalia’s disdain for content based restrictions. III. Justice Justice Scal Scalia’ ia’s s Majority Majority Opin Opinion ion a. The Beauha Beauharna rnais/ is/Cha Chapli plinsky nsky Dilemma Dilemma Ironies of main opinion: reliance on Beauharnais v. Illinois as precedent. First is to support the contention that defamation is a traditional limitation on free speech. Second, •
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Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 79 some categories of speech are not constitutionally protected. The government may proscribe libel but it may not make further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the govt. Chaplinsky reasoning – dichotomized all speech for first amendment purposes – categories that are protected and not. Beauharnais and Chaplinsky survived doctrinal shifts because it is a categorical approach to standardized tests and dilemma in free speech cases is captured in this case. b. The The Pos Posad adas as Argu Argume ment nt This case upheld the power of govt to restrict advertision for some forms of gambling in Puerto Rico. It gave Puerto Ricans less access to information and put advertisements for casino gambling beneath advertisements for other forms of gambling. Reference to this case is ironic since in this case, it strengthens the hand of govt while in the case at bar, it does not. To determine the appropriate place of a particular instance of expressive conduct in a hierarchy of first amendment speech – examine topic and content. In the case, topic was race relations. It is difficult to interpret burning cross without using the word intimidation The argument that no comparison can be made between expressive conduct and commercial speech is flawed. IV. IV. Fund Fundame ament ntal al Fla Flaws ws Prominent theme in RAV is the accusation that the govt has chosen to display favoritism in the realm of speech. Ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination. Raises 2 questions 1) WON ordinance punishes one side of a debate, 2) WON punishing one side is at odds with first amendment doctrine There is no debate here unless you count non-verbal expression of hate as debate. If we do this, then you’re categorizing debate as a form of public discussion Ordinance involves not viewpoint favoritism but content favoritism A social interest in order and morality is furthered by minimizing incidents where debates degenerate into hate fests. V. Justic Justice e Scali Scalia’s a’s Errati Erratic c Stand Standard ards s Three ironies Justice Scalia’s faith in o marketplace is ironic as his position in other First •
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Amendment cases indicates skepticism about free trade for speech. Several values that outweigh free speech rights Willingness to see expression o of some value, expression worth protection. Equality arguments that are o frequently used by proponents of govt restriction of hate speech RAV raises the question whether punishing one side of a debate violates First Amendment principles. Justice Scalia is blind to the unique • relevance of other Constitutional guarantees like 13th and 14th amendments (involuntary servitude, due process and equal protection) VI. Conclu Conclusio sion: n: Schiz Schizophr ophreni enia a Essence of the problem – two track first amendment doctrine. First approach – antio majoritarian nature of the free speech guarantee, minimal role of govt in any public debate and courts’ duty to ensure that govt meets highest standard before a restriction – anti chilling effect Second approach – o emphasizes the purposes of the text, limited reach of the term “speech” and countervailing interests in order, morality and securit y. Justice Scalia attempts in RAV o to intergrate these two which explains why the reasoning is convoluted. However, his effort to integrate is unconvincing. •
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Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups Kenneth Karst
Type of Limitations
No content based limitations Reyes vs Bagatsing Osmena vs COMELEC Chavez vs Gonzales February 15, 2008 Ponente: Puno, CJ
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Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Certiorari and Prohibition Overview: This case discusses whether or not the Hello Garci tapes can be reported by the media. While this was written by Puno, accounting for its long discussion, it’s imperative that the case be read in its entirety as its quite a textbook for the freedom of speech.
80 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014
Facts: 1.
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maintain the balance od stability and change. Cont Contro rove vers rsy y aros arose e afte afterr the the June June 2004 2004 nati nation onal al elections were there is a supposed fixing perpetrated, evidenced by the conversation between PGMA and a COMELEC COMELEC official official procured procured via wiretapping. wiretapping. Press Secr Secreta etary ry Buny Bunye e prod produc uced ed two vers versio ions ns of the recording, one as the complete, while the other is a doctored one. He later retracted his statement that the voice is of PGMA. June June 7, 2005 2005,, Form Former er couns counsel el of Erap Erap,, Atty. Atty. Alan Alan Paguia came forward and with an alleged authentic reco record rdin ing g whic which h also also incl includ udes es Comm Commis issi sion oner er Garciliano, First Gentleman, and Senator Barbers. June June 8, 2005 2005,, Secr Secret etar ary y of DOJ DOJ Rau Raul Gonza onzale les s warned the media that broadcasting and publishing its contents could be held liable under Anti-Wiretapping Act. June June 9, 2005, 2005, Secret Secretary ary Gonz Gonzal ales es issue issued d anothe another r pres press s stat state ement ment urgi urging ng the the NBI NBI to issu issue e an investigation to media outfits that are distributing the tape’s contents, starting with Inq7.net (PDI and GMA News) June June 11, 11, 2005 2005,, NTC NTC issu issues es a pres press s rele releas ase e to the the effect that “continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations … is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law” and the may lead to the cancellation of their licenses to operation. a. NTC NTC Memo Memora ran ndum dum Circ Circul ular ar 111-12 1-12-8 -85 5 reiter reiterate ated d by 111-1 111-12-8 2-89: 9: pertai pertains ns to all medi media a that that shal shalll have have the the tend tenden ency cy to disseminate false or misleading information that shall incite or propose treason, rebellion or sedition June June 14, 14, 2005 2005 NTC had had a dial dialog ogue ue with with Kapisanan released ed a ng mga Broadc Broadcast aster er sa Pilipi Pilipinas nas and releas statement that a. The NTC did not issue a memorandum restraining press freedom b. That That it asks asks for for resp respons onsibl ible e repor reportin ting g c. That That the the stand standar ards ds be uphe upheld ld in new news and publ public ic affa affair irs s prog progra rams ms,, and and ther there e be sensitivity in discussing these affairs. Petiti Petitione onerr Chavez Chavez filed filed a peti petitio tion n based based on Rule Rule 65 of of the Rules of Court against Secretary Raul Gonzales and the NTC-certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to prevent prevent unconstitutio unconstitutional nal and oppressive oppressive exercise of authority by said offices; praying for the nullification of orders issued from June 6, 2005 to present. Resp Respon onde dent nts s aver aver that that this this is mere merely ly a fair warning, and under the scope of the NTC.
Issues: 1. 2.
WON Petitio Petitioner ner has Legal Legal Standi Standing? ng? No WON there there has has been been an an abridg abridgemen ementt to the the freed freedom om of speech? Yes
Held: 1.
Chav Chavez ez faile failed d to illus illustr trate ate a pers person onal al inter interes estt in the the outcome of the controversy. Nonetheless, the courts proceed due to transcendental importance.
2.
Discus Discussio sion n of the Right Right to to Free Free Speech Speech Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections – free speech and free press entails the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfu truthfully lly any matter matter of public public intere interest st withou withoutt censorship or punishment… unless there is a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent; such freedom is needed in a democracy to assure participation of the people and
Justice Holmes- it is the freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. us. This This free freedo dom m exte extend nds s to near nearly ly all all form forms s of communication. Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans- all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to the the broa broad d prot protec ecti tion on of free freedo dom m of spee speech ch and and expression. Three Three Tests Tests on the Restra Restraint ints s to Freedo Freedom m of Speech and Expression: Expression: a. Dang Danger erou ous s tende tendenc ncy y Doctr Doctrin ine: e: permits limitation on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech contained and the danger contemplated b. Bala Balanc ncin ing g of Inter Interes ests ts Tes Tests ts:: standard to weigh conflicting conflicting social values and individual individual interests, and requires a conscious and detai tailed cons consid ider erat atio ion n of the the inte interp rpla lay y of inte intere rest st observable c. Clea Clearr and Pres Presen entt Dange Dangerr Rule: Rule: premised that speech may be restrained because there is a substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent; this rule requires that the evil consequences be: i. Substa Substanti ntive ve ii. Extremely Extremely serious serious iii.A iii.And nd the the degr degree ee of immi immine nenc nce e must must be extremely high Four Aspects on the Freedom of the Press: Press: official 1. Free Freedo dom m from from prior prior restr restrai aint nt:: Refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or others form forms s of expr expres essi sion on in adva advanc nce e of actu actual al publication publication or disseminati dissemination on censorship censorship of public publicati ation: on: permits permits to publis publish, h, licens license e taxes, taxes, clos closur ure e of prin printi ting ng offi office ces. s. Certa Certain in prev previo ious us restraints may be permitted by the Constitution: merely a. Cont Conten entt Neut Neutra rall Regu Regula lati tion on:: concerned with the incidents of speech, or merely cont contro rols ls the the time, time, and and plac place e or mann manner er;; not not designed to suppress any particular message but an intermediate approach somewhere somewhere between between the mere rationality that is required of any other law based d on the the b. Content Content Based Based Restraint: Restraint: base subjec subjectt matter matter of the utterance utterance or speech speech,, is subjected to the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact; is viewed critically under the clear and present danger rule with the govern governmen mentt having having the burden burden of overco overcoming ming unconstitutionality. The government has to show the gravity and imminence of the harm based on proximity and degree.
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Freedom from punishmen ment subsequent to publication 3. Free Freedo dom m to acc acces ess s info inform rmati ation on 4. Free Freedo dom m of cir circu cula lati tion on Dichot Dichotom omy y of Free Free Press: Press: Print Print vs. Broadc Broadcast ast Media Broadcast Media – has limited protection under the First Amendment of the US Constitution for three reasons: · The scarcity of the medium the frequencies
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 81 by which the medium operates The pervasiveness as a medium Unique accessibility to children the US inte interp rpre reta tati tion on is not not adopt dopted ed in the the –the Phil Philip ippi pine nes s whol wholly ly;; our our cour courts ts have have made made no distinction between print and broadcast media. DYRE vs. vs. Dans Dans:: all all form forms s of medi media a whet whethe herr prin printt or broadcasts are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitation is the clear and present danger rule 3. Conclu clusion: The danger that the government wishes to prevent is the airing of the recording that supposedly violates the Anti wiretapping Law. Not every ever y violation of a law will justify impeding on the freedom of speech; while the viol violati ation on is a facto factorr, the the effe effects cts woul would d be more more injurious. The need to prevent the violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. There There is no showing showing that the violation violation endang endangers ers national securit y. The mere statements of the Secretary of the Press and the DOJ and the statement of the NTC, which were uttered while they were in their official capacity, can be considered as prior restraint to freedom of speech even without the follow-up memorandum that shall detail how the their state tateme men nts will be operati operationa onalis lised. ed. These These utteran utterances ces gave gave a chilli chilling ng effect on the media.
9 J. Tinga
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10 J. Velasco, Jr.
11 J. Reyes
Comments Dissenting Justices 1 J. Corona 2 J. Chico-Nazario 3 J. Nachura 4 J. De Castro 5 J. Tinga
Summary of Voting 6 J. Velasco, Jr. Title
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzalez, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
Docket No. G.R. No. 168338
Date of Promulgation
February 15, 2008
Ponente
C.J. Puno
No. of Participating Justices Unanimous Decision (Yes/No)
15
No
Comments Concurring Justices 1 C.J. Puno 2 J. Quisumbing 3 J. Ynares-Santiago 4 J. Sandoval-Gutierrez 5 J. Carpio 6 J. Austria-Martinez 7 J. Carpio Morales 8 J. Azcuna
e.g. separate opinion (SO), joined SO, reservations In the result and I join the separate concurring opinion of J. Carpio Please see my separate concurring opinion See separate concurring I also join in the separate opinion of J.Carpio I join in the separate concurring opinion of J. Carpio I concur in a separate opinion
Pls. see separate opinion (Dissenting & Concurring); Grant the petition insofar as DOJ Sec. Gonzales’ Press Statement is concerned Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion; Grant the petition insofar as the NTC’s Press Statement is concerned -
e.g. dissenting opinion (DO), joined DO I join the dissent of Mr. Justice Nachura Please see my separate dissenting opinion Please see my dissent I join the dissent of Justice Nazario and Justice Nachura Pls. see separate opinion (Dissenting & Concurring); Deny the petition insofar as the NTC’s Press Statement is concerned Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion; Deny the petition insofar as DOJ Sec. Gonzales’ Press Statement is concerned
Sandoval – Gutierrez (Concurring): · “Whe Where they they have have burn burned ed book books, s, they they will will end end in burning human beings” · Univ Univer ersa sall Decl Declar arat atio ion n of Human Human Right Rights s guar guaran ante tees es freedom of speech regardless of frontiers. · The The Cana Canadi dian an SC SC prom promote otes s it as as it faci facililita tates tes the the flow flow of ideas ideas need need to sustai sustain n democr democraci acies, es, helps helps the sear search ch for for truth truth,, valu valuab able le in the the proc proces ess s of self self actualization, and check on governments. · The issuance of the press release by the NTC consti constitute tutes s censor censorshi ship p as it was releas released ed with with the threat threat of suspen suspensio sion, n, revoca revocatio tion n or cancel cancellat lation ion of licenses of media outfits. o Licensing Act of 1643: licenses did not permit anything against the Church or State be disseminated. o Near vs. Minnesota: where there is a permanent enjoining for contents considered obsce obscene ne,, lewd lewd,, lasc lasciv ivio ious us or mali malici ciou ous, s, scandalous and defamatory. defam atory. o Justi Justice ce Will Willia iam m Brenna Brennan: n: the the consti constitut tutio iona nall prote protect ctio ion n does does not not turn turn upon upon the truth, truth, popularity or social utility of the ideas and the belief which are offered. § The fact that the tapes were obtained in violation of wiretapping laws does not make the media privy to the crime. · The The bala balanc ncin ing g test test sho shoul uld d be used used in in this this cas case e–
82 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 o Amer Americ ican an Comm Commun unic icat atio ion n Asso Associ ciat atio ion n vs. vs. communication structures and respect for the freedom Doud Douds: s: when when a part partic icul ular ar condu conduct ct is of speech speech and the press. press. The regulatory regulatory warnings warnings regulated in the interest of public order, and work against the flow of communication. the the regu regullati ation resu resullts in a indi indire rect ct,, Tinga (Separate Opinion – Dissenting and Concurring): Writ be conditional conditional and partial partial abridgement abridgement of the granted against DOJ but not against NTC – speech, the duty of the courts is to determine · The NTC is a regulatory tory bod body whic hich has some which of there interests demand the greater capacity to impose sanction or otherwise perform acts protection that that coul could d impi imping nge e on the the righ rightt of its its subj subjec ects ts of o The right of the people to kno know mat matter ters regu regula latio tions ns whil while e the DOJ DOJ secre secretar tary y head heads s the pertaining to the elections is of paramount depart department ment of govern government ment which which can initia initiate te and importance as its exercise is the instrument litigate prosecution of just about anybody. of democracy dem ocracy.. · For as long as the the expression is not libelous or o Just Justic ice e Doug Dougla las: s: The The domi domina nant nt use use of the the slanderous , not obscene, or otherwise not dangerous first amendment was to suppress to the immediate well being of the State, it should be embarrassing information. protected by the constitution. Carpio , J.(Separate Concurring Opinion): · The The “chi “chillllin ing g effe effect” ct” has has not not been been pro prove ven n and and ther there e is · In Car Carpi pio’ o’s s state stateme ment nt of of facts facts he he adde added d the Fran Franci cisco sco no guideline set to adjudge it. Chavez, as a citizen filed this suit on two grounds – 1. Velasco (Separate Opinion – Dissenting and Concurring): The respon responden dents ts conduc conductt violat violated ed the freedo freedom m of · Ther There e was was chil chilliling ng eff effec ectt prov proved ed whe when n the NTC, NTC, five five expression and the right of the people to information days after making the statement enjoined the KBP to on matters of public concern concern under Sec 7 Art 3 of the clarify its statement that it is not a condemnation of Constitution and 2. The NTC acted ultra vires when it media outfits. In comparison, there was no proof of warned the media from the Garci Tapes. Tapes. impact towards the said media outfits when the DOJ · He names the issue as WON NTC posed an secretary made his utterances. impermissible prior restraintyes. Chico-Nazario (Dissenting): o Sec Sec 4 Art Art 3 prohi prohibi bits ts the the ena enact ctme ment nt of of any · Ther There e was was no abr abrid idge gemen mentt of the the rig rights hts.. Read Read in in the the law curtailing the freedom of expression prop proper er cont contex extt and and in its its enti entire rety ty,, the assa assaililed ed o The The cour course se carv carved ed unpro unprote tect cted ed expr expres essi sion on statements of the NTC were nothing but a warning. that may be subjected to prior restraint restraint (four Nachura (Dissenting): categories): · It was was not not imp impro rope perr for for NTC NTC to war warn n the the medi media a as itit § Pornography was part of its regulatory authority. § Fake Fake or misl mislea eadi ding ng adve advert rtis iseme ement nt · Also Also the the pres press s stat statem emen entt was was not not of the the natu nature re of of a § Advocacy of imminent lawless prio priorr restr restrai aint nt for for the the has has been been no forb forbid iddi ding ng of action spee speech ch,, expr expres essi sion on or impo imposi siti tion on of oner onerou ous s § Dang Danger er to nati nation onal al secu securi rity ty requirement for the publication and dissemination of o Only Only unp unpro rote tecte cted d expre express ssio ion n may be be subje subject ct idea. to prior restraint and even then it must hurdle · There There is is no no tran transgr sgress ession ion of the the people people right right when when the two things – prior restraint being presumed matter is of public concern. unconstituti tutio onal, and proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint. Adiong vs COMELEC o If the subject does not fall in the above
categories, then the restraint is unconstitutional without exception(protected expression). o
Prior restrain is more severe than a subsequent punishment because it prevent the dissemination of ideas altogether. · NTC NTC in issu issuin ing g the pri prior or rest restra rain intt faile failed d to prov prove e that that the Garci Tapes were under unprotected expression and hurdle the two requirementso The The NTC NTC had had no fact factua uall or lega legall basi basis s in claimi claiming ng that that there there was a violat violation ion of the wiretapping laws as even the office of the president played the conversation, and since it was a mobile conversation the technicality of WON wiretapping law can be applied is not settled o The The NTC NTC did did not not give give the the medi media a outf outfit its s the the opportunity to be heard; they were denied of basic due process stated in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations Azcuna (Separate Concurring Opinion): · The The NTC NTC and and DOJ DOJ warn warnin ings gs viol violate ated d Sec1 Sec10, 0, Art 16 16 of the Constitution which was the provision designed for new technologies applied to media. The state shall be responsible for the development of an environment fost foster eriing Filip ilipin ino o capa capabi bili lity ty,, emer emerge genc nce e of
Prior Restraint/Consequent Punishment
Prior restraint Chavez vs Francisco/Gonzales MTRCB vs ABS-CBN and Loren Legarda Date: January 17, 2005 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: ABS CBN aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV progra program m “The “The Inside Inside Story produc produced ed and hosted hosted by Loren Loren Legarda. It named the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) as the the scho school ol wher where e fema female le stud studen ents ts moon moonli ligh ghte ted d as prostitutes to be able to pay for their tuition. The façade of the PWU PWU buil buildi ding ng was was also also used used as the the backg backgro roun und d of the the episode. Complaints from the Chancellor, parents and teachers associations were filed with MTRCB alleging that the episode besmirched the name of PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of it female students. ABSCBN argued that “The Inside Story” is a “public affai affairs rs prog progra ram, m, news news docum documen entar tary y and and soci socioo-po polilitic tical al
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 83 editorial”, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. The The MTRC MTRCB B Inve Investi stiga gatin ting g Commi Committe ttee e rend render ered ed a decision ordering ABSCBN to pay for the non-submission of the program for review and approval of the MTRCB, and that all other programs of ABSCBN of the same category shall be subm submitt itted ed to the the Boar Board d of Revi Review ew and and Appro Approva vall befo before re showing. MTRCB Chairman Mendez affirmed the ruling. ABSCBN filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC seeking to declare Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28(a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations unconstitutional as they constitute prior restraint restraint on ABSCBN’s ABSCBN’s exercise exercise of freedom freedom of expression expression and of the press. RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN. MTRCB filed a petition petition for certiorari certiorari contending contending that: television programs, including “public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials” are subject to their power of review under Sec 3(b) of PD 1986; their power to review does not amount to prior restraint and in violation of ABSCBN’s freedom of expression and of the press.
Law: Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: xxx b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs , including including publicity materials such such as adverti advertiseme sements, nts, traile trailers rs and stills, stills, whethe whetherr such such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or nontheatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export; c) To To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions f rom and/or and/or prohib prohibit it the importa importatio tion, n, export exportati ation, on, produc productio tion, n, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadc broadcast ast of the motion motion pictur pictures, es, televi televisio sion n progra programs ms and publicity publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cult cultur ural al valu values es as stand standar ard, d, are are obje objecti ction onab able le for for bein being g immora immoral, l, indece indecent, nt, contrar contrary y to law and/or and/or good good customs customs,, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its peop people le,, or with with a dang danger erou ous s tend tenden ency cy to enco encour urage age the commission of violence or of wrong or crime, such as but not limited to: xxx To supervise, supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that that no such such pict pictur ures es,, prog progra rams ms and and mate materi rial als s as are are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with with para paragr grap aph h (c) (c) here hereof of shal shalll be impo import rted ed,, expo exporte rted, d, produc produced, ed, copied copied,, reprod reproduce uced, d, distri distribut buted, ed, sold, sold, leased leased,, exhibited and/or broadcast by television; xxx
that the term “television programs” did not include “religious programs”. The Court held that the law gives the Board the powe powerr to scre screen en,, revi review ew and and exam examin ine e ALL ALL “tel “telev evis isio ion n programs” whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. (Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos -when the law does not make any exceptio exception, n, courts courts may not except except somethi something ng theref therefrom rom,, unless unless there there is compel compellin ling g reason reason apparent in the law to justify it). Also, the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still the Court did not exempt Iglesia Iglesia ni cristo’s program from MTRCB’s MTRCB’s power to review. review. Freedom of expression and of the press has not been declared of preferred status. 2. “The “The Ins Insid ide e Story Story”” is not not a new newsre sreel el ABSCBN contends that “The Inside Story” is a newsreel; therefore, included in the exceptions from MTRCB’s powe powerr of revi review ew under under Sec Sec 7 of PD 1986 which which are are (1) (1) television television programs imprinted or exhibited exhibited by the Philippine Philippine Govern Government ment and/or and/or its depart department ments s and agenci agencies es and (2) newsreels. MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing PD 1986 defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels. “The Inside Story” is a public affairs program which is a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. decision on on the consti constituti tutiona onality lity of the assail assailed ed Note: The decisi provisions of PD 1986 is not necessary for the determination of the case itself; therefore, the Court did not rule if the Rules and Regulations Regulations specified contravened contravened the Constitution Constitution.. MTRCB only only penali penalized zed ABSCBN ABSCBN for non-su non-submis bmissio sion n before before their their broadcast of the episode but did not ban or disapprove the showing of the latter’s program or cancel their permit.
David vs Macapagal-Arroyo ABS-CBN vs COMELEC G.R. No. 133486 28 Jan 2000 Doct Doctri rine ne:: The The powe powerr to exer exerci cise se prio priorr rest restra rain intt is not not presumed; rather, rather, the presumption is is against its validity. validity.
Facts: ·
Issue: WON MTRCB has the power to review “The Inside Story” prior to its exhibition?
Held: Yes. It is within the power given to MTRCB by the law to review all television programs including “The Inside Story”.
Ratio: 1.
“The “The Insid Inside e Story” Story” is a telev televis isio ion n progr program am and is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB to review. Ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo v CA is applicable. In that case, Iglesia ni Cristo sought to be exempted from contending
·
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution resolution restraining restraining ABS-CBN or any other group from conducting exit poll surveys. Laws invoked: o Sec Sec 2 Art 5 1987 1987 Cons Consti titu tuti tion on and and relev relevan antt provis provision ions s of the Omnibu Omnibus s electi election on code code relati relating ng to its constit constituti utiona onall and statuto statutory ry duty to ensure clean, honest, and credible electi elections ons and to maintai maintain n the secrecy secrecy of ballots. § Exit Exit pol polls ls will will crea create te confus confusio ion n as as to who won the election, it will compr comprom omis ise e the the COME COMELEC LEC and and NAMFREL counts which will in turn sow violence and anarchy. anarchy. § It also also lure lures s vote voters rs into into reve reveal alin ing g the contents of their ballots. ABSABS-CB CBN N assai ssails ls the the reso resolu luti tion on argu arguin ing g that that the the holding of exit polls and its nationwide broadcast is a
84 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression and the press. SWS vs COMELEC COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496 Issue: May the COMELEC, in the exercise of its powers, ban MENDOZA exit polls? Held: No. private e non-st non-stock ock,, non-pr non-profi ofitt social social FACTS: - SWS is a privat Ratio: research research institution institution conducting surveys surveys economics, economics, politics, politics, · Gonzales v COMELEC: Free press and free speech demo demogr grap aphy hy,, and and soci social al deve develo lopme pment nt,, and and ther therea eafte fter r consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully proces processin sing, g, analyz analyzing ing,, and public publicly ly report reporting ing the result results s any matter of public interest without prior restraint. thereof. o J. Holm Holmes es:: the free freedo dom m encom encompa pass sses es the the - Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila thoughts we hate no less than the thoughts Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features we agree with. election surveys. · Limi Limita tati tio on: Poli Police ce Pow Power - Petitioners filed an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec · Test/s est/sta tand ndar ard d for for vali validi dity ty of of rest restra rain int: t: from enforcing §5.4 Fair Election Act , which provides: o Clear and present danger rule: requires that Surveys affecting national candidates shall the evil conseq consequen uence ce of the comment comment or not be published fifteen (15) days before an utter utteran ance ce is extr extreme emely ly seri seriou ous s and and the the elec electi tion on and and surv survey eys s affe affect ctin ing g loca locall degr degree ee of immi immine nenc nce e is high high.. “Pre “Prese sent nt”” candidates shall not be published seven (7) refers to the time element. The evil must not days before an election. only be probable but also inevitable. - “Election surveys” as defined in §5.1 of the law, refer to the o Dangerous that the natura naturall Dangerous tendency tendency rule: that meas measur urem emen entt of opin opinio ions ns of the the vote voters rs as rega regard rds s a tend tenden ency cy and and the prob probab able le effe effect ct of the the candidate’s popularity, popularity, qualifications, platform s in relation to the utterance is to bring about the substantive election, including voters’ preference for candidates. evil that the legislature seeks to prevent. · The The power power to exe exerci rcise se prio priorr restra restrain intt is not not presu presumed med.. Petitioners’ contentions: To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial 1. The restriction on the publication of election survey results government interest must be clearly shown. The total consti constitute tutes s a prior prior restra restraint int on the exerci exercise se of freedom freedom of ban on exit poll is not justified because: speech without any clear and present danger to justify such o COME COMELE LEC’ C’s s claim claims s are pur purel ely y spec specul ulat ativ ive. e. restraint. § The poll is to be conducted 2. They claim that SWS conducted and published the results of randomly therefore, the result would surveys surveys prior to the previous elections elections up to as close as two be repres representa entative tive of the genera generall days before the election day without causing confusion among opinion of the voting population. the voters. § The The resu resullt is not not mean meantt to repl replac ace e 3. There is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the the COME COMELE LEC C and and NAMF NAMFRE REL L the the conc conclu lusi sion on that that there there is an immed immedia iate te and and inev inevit itab able le counts, counts, but merely merely reflects reflects public public danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. opinion. It also does not create a 4. No simi simila larr rest restri ricti ction on is impo impose sed d on poli politi tici cian ans s from from bandwagon bandwagon or unduly influence influence the explaining their opinion or on media from writing and publishing vote voterrs as the resul sult is to be articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. broadcasted ted a day afte fter the 5. There is no reason reason for voters voters to be denied denied access access to the election. results of election surveys. § No evid eviden ence ce that that the the cond conduc uctt of of exit exit polls will create chaos or disorder. Respondents’ contentions: o COME COMELE LEC’ C’s s duty duty may be be fulf fulfil ille led d in a less less 1. the prohibition bears a rational connection to the objective of invasive manner, ie, regulating the conduct the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral of exit poll to minimize if not entirely avoid proces process s result resulting ing from from manipu manipulat lated ed survey surveys, s, bandwa bandwagon gon disorder or confusion. effect, and absence of reply o The The prov provis isio ion n on bal ballo lott secr secrecy ecy is mea meant nt as as 2. it is narr narrow owly ly tail tailor ored ed to meet meet the the “evi “evils ls”” soug sought ht to be a safeguard safeguard against vote buying. buying. Voters Voters are prevented prohib prohibite ited d to exhibi exhibitt the conten contents ts of their their 3. the impairment of freedom is minimal, the restriction being ballot for the purpose of assuring that their limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days and the last 7 votes have been cast in accordance with the days days before before a local local election, election, and in scope as it does not order of a third person. prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. § This purpose is not achieved through the conduct of exit polls. In Fair Electio Election n Act is uncons unconstitu titutio tional nal (YEAH, (YEAH, ISSUE: w/n Fair any case, the poll is only voluntary, consti constitute tutes s an uncons unconstitu titutio tional nal abridg abridgment ment of freedo freedom m of the vote voters rs may even choo choose se to speech, expression, and the press) conceal their identities. § RATIO: Kapunan dissenting: - §5.4 lays a prior restraint on said freedoms by prohibiting the The The pres presump umpti tion on of inva invalilidi dity ty for rest restri ricti ction ons s to public publicati ation on of electio election n survey survey result results s affecti affecting ng candid candidates ates freedom of speech and of the press is not applicable where as within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days and seven (7) in this case Constitutional functions are being exercised. And days. Because of the preferred status of the said rights, such a where the presumption of invalidity does not apply, there is no measure is presumed invalid. The Government thus carries a occasion for the application of the clear and present danger heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of rule. such restraint.
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 85 - Even if it is argued that Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or util utiliz izat atio ion n of fran franch chis ise e for for the the oper operat atio ion n of medi media a of communi communicati cation, on, such such power power is limite limited d to ensuri ensuring ng “equal “equal opportu opportunity nity,, time, time, space, space, and the right right to reply” reply” as well well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for “public information campaigns and forums among candidates.” The effect of this is that no presumption of invali invalidit dity y arises arises in respec respectt of exerci exercises ses of superv superviso isory ry or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although it may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. - But KAPUNAN KAPUNAN dissents. dissents. He rejects rejects the test of clear clear and present danger for determining the validity of §5.4. This test was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriate appropriated d for free speech. Hence, while while it may be useful with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be adequa adequate te for this this case. case. For such a test test is concerne concerned d with with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of §5.4. - Instead, KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing balancing the circumstances circumstances to determine determine whethe whetherr public public intere interest st is served served by such such regula regulatio tion. n. After After canv canvas assi sing ng the reas reason ons, s, ( band b andwa wago gon n effe effect ct to favo favor r candidates, the “junking” of “losing” candidates), the dissenting opinion concludes that its limiting impact on free speech and press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere restriction on the publication of election surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period when the voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect. - The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these cons consid ider erat atio ions ns shou should ld outw outwei eigh gh the the valu value e of free freedo dom m of expression. This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves such freedoms with little protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible justification forward can easily show a rational connection between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, the balancing of interest was a strong one. - The test that should be employed is laid down in United States v. O’Brien, which provides that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if : 1. it is with within in the the cons consti titu tuti tion onal al powe powerr of the the Government; 2. it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3. the gove govern rnmen menta tall inte intere rest st is unre unrela late ted d to the suppression of free expression; 4. if the incidental incidental restriction restriction on alleged alleged freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. - First. S 5.4 fails to meet criterion 3 of the O’Brien test because the the caus causal al conn connec ecti tion on of expr expres essi sion on to the the asse assert rted ed governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the the supp suppre ress ssio ion n of free free expr expres essi sion on.” .” By proh prohib ibit itin ing g the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that that such such public publicati ation on might might undermi undermine ne the integr integrity ity of the election, it actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by other media. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for
a partic particula ularr subjec subjectt matter matter,, if not viewpoi viewpoint, nt, by preferr preferring ing personal opinion to statistical results. - The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of 15 days and 7 days. - Second . §5.4 fails to meet criterion 4 of the O’Brien test. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of the creation of bandwagon bandwagon effect, “junking” “junking” of weak or “losing” “losing” candidates, candidates, etc. Praiseworthy Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. - As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this naturalenough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with the “winners.” Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. - To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the government governmental al intere interest st sought sought to be promote promoted d can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Burden of unconstitutionality Iglesia ni Kristo vs CA RATIO DECIDENDI: The only exception to the right of the people to free speech and peaceably assemble is the presence of clear and present danger which is of a character both grave and imminent, and a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. NATURE: Petition for review decision of Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." FACTS: On September, October, and November 1992 Iglesia Ni Cristo submitted VTR tapes of its TV program Series to the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited b y law." INC took two courses of action against the Board: n peal t the Office of the President regarding the classification of its TV Series and a civil case. Both succeeded. The respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC regarding the civil case. Thus, this present case.
ISSUES: 1) 2)
Is the respon responden dentt Board Board vested vested with with the the power power to review Iglesia ni Cristo’s TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"? Assumin Assuming g it was was vested vested with with author authority ity,, did the the respondent board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program for the reason they constitute an attack against other
86 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a and good customs? judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits HELD: 1) Yes, 2) Yes that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly RATIO: administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. 1) Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 vests the Board the power to " screen, review and examine all "television programs." The Court held that while the thesis has a lot to commend By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the itself, the Court is not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply subject to review by our courts "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being Standards "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous Clear and Present Danger tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime." Gonzales vs COMELEC According to J. Isagani Cruz, the right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz ., ., Ruiz vs Gordon freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983 beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is EN BANC subject to regulation where the belief is translated into HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's external acts that affect the public welfare . INC’s Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, vs. broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayo ayor of Olongapo of the bosom of internal belief. Television Television is a medium City, respondent. that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Teddy C. Macapagal and Engelberto de Castro for petitioners. Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar for respondent. freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to Standards; Clear and Present Danger prevent, i .e., serious detriment to the more overriding Forum; Rallies interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. Fernan ando do,, C.J. C.J.,, with by, Ponente: Fern with Separa Separate te Opinio Opinions ns by, 2) The respon responden dentt Board Board may may disag disagree ree with with the the Teehankee, Concepcion, JJ. criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, Overview: This is a case for mandamus filed by Hector Ruiz, unclean they may be. the coordi coordinat nator or of Olonga Olongapo po Citize Citizen's n's Allian Alliance ce for Nation National al a. The respon responden dents ts canno cannott rely rely on on the the groun ground d Reconc Rec oncili iliati ation, on, which whi ch consis con sists ts of severa sev eral l intere int erest st groups gro ups "attacks against another religion" in x-rating against Mayor Richard Gordon, to compel the latter to issue a the religious program of petitioner for it is not permit to hold a prayer-rally prayer-rally and a parade/march in Olongapo among the grounds to justify an order City on December 4, 1983, invoking their rights to free speech prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's and free fre e assemb ass embly ly. . The case case ruled ruled that that withou withoutt preclu precludin ding g television program. The ground "attack direct filing to the Supreme Court, future mandamus petitions against another religion" was merely added of this this kind kind coul could d be file filed d at the the tria triall cour courts ts,, for for earl early y by the respondent Board in its Rules. disposition, in the interest of justice and public convenience. b. The respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show Facts: (Note the dates as the Court poses arguments on filing that the decision of the respondent Board, and receipt of notices, litigation etc.) affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to · November 19 – Letter/Request sent to Gordon justify the conclusion that the subject video · received ed by Office Office of the November 22 – Letter receiv tapes constitute impermissible attacks Mayor of Olongapo against another religion. There is no showing · November 23 – Mandamus Petition filed by Ruiz, et. whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will al bring about especially the gravity and · November 23 – Request granted by Gordon, with imminence of the threatened harm. Prior certain conditions as to the peaceful conduct of the restraint on speech, including religious rally, as to liabilities in case of loss or damage to speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical government property and to cleanliness, and as to the fears but only by the showing of a itinerary of the parade and the requisite coordination substantive and imminent evil which has of the group with the police force for traffic assistance. taken the life of a reality already on ground . · November 29 – Court issued a resolution requiring
OBITER:
Justice Kapunan and Justice Mendoza suggested that ". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies
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Gordon to file an Answer to the Petition, not a Motion to Dismiss, within two days from notice (after erno noon on of the the same same day) day) – Novemb November er 29 (aft Respondent Gordon filed a Manifestation with Prayer
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 87 for Dismissal alleging that the request for prayer-rally was received by his office on November 22, and was approve approved d on Novemb Further, r, respon responden dentt November er 23. Furthe Mayor Mayor manife manifested sted that verbal verbal approv approval al of the said said request has already been communicated in several inst instan ance ces: s: on a flag flag cere ceremo mony ny;; over over his his radi radio o program; and on the newspaper “Guardian” wherein the said pronouncement was published on November 22-28. · · ·
Court granted plea for dismissal. Ruiz file filed d a Moti Motion on to With Withdr draw aw Dece Decemb mber er 1 – Ruiz Peti Petiti tion on,, as the permi permitt soug sought ht has has alre already ady been been granted December 2 – Respondent answered reiterating what was set forth forth in his Manifestat Manifestation ion,, the delay delay being being accoun accounted ted to the distanc distance e between between Olonga Olongapo po and Manila. Also, the notice of resolution was served only on November 30.
Discussion J.B.L. Reyes Decision This case set forth guidelines regarding the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles. It lays down down the follo followi wing ng poin points ts rega regard rdin ing g perm permit its s to hold hold an assembly: · Applicant ants s should should inform inform the licens licensing ing Requisites. Applic authority of the date, public place (where), and the time (when) it will take place. If to be held in private plac place, e, only only the consen consentt of the the owne ownerr or the the one one entitled to its legal possession is required. · Timeliness . Application should be filed well ahead in time time to enab enable le the publ public ic offic officia iall conc concer erne ned d to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. · Clea Clearr and and Pres Presen entt Dang Danger er Test est. This is the indisp indispens ensabl able e standar standard d to arrive arrive at a decisi decision on for refusal of granting a permit. o If the the aut autho hori rity ty is is of the the vie view w that that the there re is is an imminent imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, evil, the applican applicants ts must must be heard heard on the matter. o The The decis decisio ion, n, whet whethe herr favor favorab able le or adv adver erse se,, must be transmitted to the applicants at the earl earliiest est oppo opport rtun unit ity y to prov provid ide e the them opportunity for recourse to judicial action. o Burd Burden en of proof proof is on the issu issuin ing g auth author orit ity y, and it is essential for the validity of a denial of a permi permitt whic which h amou amount nts s to a prev previo ious us restrai restraint nt or censor censorshi ship p that the licens licensing ing author authority ity does not rely solely on his own appraisal appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safe safety ty may may requ requir ire. e. To just justif ify y such such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and and suff suffic icie ienc ncy y to sati satisfy sfy the clea clearr and and presen presentt danger danger test. test. The possib possibili ility ty that that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough. Petition unnecessary · ·
The The petiti petition oner ers s could could have have veri verifie fied d with with the the Offic Office e of the Mayor first whether the permit was granted before taking recourse to judicial action. Cour Courtt said said that that after after a reas reason onab able le time, time, the the petit petitio ione ner r
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could have checked with the issuing office the status of his application, and if he fails to do so, notice of the decision regarding the application should be sent to the petitioner. This way, there will not be a waste of time in litigation. Litiga Litigants nts should should be awa aware re of of the the guide guidelin lines es set set forth forth in in the J.B.L. J.B.L. Reyes Reyes decisi decision on and conven convenien ience ce to the parties would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level. Cour Courtt say says that that the the clea clearr and and pres presen entt dang danger er test test should be adhered with first for the earliest disposition of cases like this. The proper remedy for the losing party after the decision has been made by the said authority/issuing officer, is certiorari.
Case is DISMISSED. DISMISSED. Teehankee, J. Concurring . · The The J.B.L J.B.L.. Reyes Reyes deci decisi sion on stre stress sses es that that the the right right to peacefully assemble, speak out freely and petition the govern government ment for redres redress s of grieva grievance nces s should should be accorded the utmost deference and respect and is not to be limited much less denied, except under the clear and present danger standard, i.e. there must be a clear showing of the " danger, danger, of a character character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest - a substantive evil that the State has .” a right to prevent .” · This is in support of the Court’ rt’s sway sway tha that the the presumption "must must be to incline incline the weight weight of the scales of justice on the side of such right of free speech and peaceful assemble, enjoying as they do ." precedence and primacy ." · Burd Burden en of of proo prooff of immi immine nent nt dan dange gerr is on on the the issu issuin ing g authority. · The basic right of peaceable assembly could well
be abridged, if not denied, if its exercise were to be sadd saddle led d with with oner onerou ous s cond condit itio ions ns.. The accountability as to damages which will be incurred during during the rally rally should should be on an indivi individua duall level. level. ·
In U.S U.S.. v. v. Apur Apurad ado, o, the the Cou Court rt say says that, that, “disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd (be not seized) as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a sedi sediti tiou ous s and and tumu tumult ltou ous s risi rising ng agai agains nstt the the this will will render render illusory illusory the right of authorities" as this peaceable assembly
Concepcion, J. Concurring . · The The righ rights ts prov provid ided ed for for in the the fre free e spee speech ch clau clause se giv give e life life and meaning meaning to a democr democrati atic c society society and are sacred and inviolate. However, they are not absolute and not licentious. The exercise of these rights must take into account the exercise of the rights of others and of the State. The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute but relative. · While While a pers person on has has a constit constituti utiona onall right right to free freedom dom of speech, the exercise of such right does not give him any license to libel or slander another. Nor to incite the people to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or insurr insurrect ection ion,, sediti sedition on or assaul assaultt upon upon a person person in authority or his agents. (citing RPC provisions) · Publ Public ic offi offici cial als s auth author oriz izin ing/ g/is issu suin ing g perm permit its s to hold hold rallies, demonstrations, etc., do right by basing their decisi decisions ons on the existen existence ce or non-ex non-existe istence nce of a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent,” which application
88 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 and interpretation should be measured and weighed 12, 1954, no further step was taken by the court or the parties. in the light of circumstances as to persons, time, and place. December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed · office and issued E.O. #1 creating the Presidential Complaints In order that public officials may not be charged, and Action Commission (PCAC). E.O. #1 was superseded by rightl rightly y or wrongl wrongly y, with with dereli derelicti ction on of duty duty or E.O. #19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. Cabansag wrote the abuse of powers in the granting or denying of PCAC and furnished a copy to the Secretary of Justice and the such such perm permit its, s, the the foll follow owin ing g guid guidel elin ines es are are Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. deemed necessary: 1. When When a peac peacefu efull asse assembl mbly y is to be be held held in a priv privat ate e lot, lot, hous house, e, or edif edific ice, e, only only the the The The lette letter’s r’s conte contents nts incl includ uded ed grat gratit itud ude e for for the the cons consen entt of the the owne ownerr of the the plac place e is President’s creation of the PCAC because now poor people necessary. No permit from the government have have somew somewhe here re to turn turn to. He state stated d that that he had had been been or any public officer is required. depr depriv ived ed for for a long long time time of his his land land due due to the the care carefu full 2. When When an appl applic icati ation on to hold hold a rally rally,, parade parade,, maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. He stated further that the case or peaceful assembly has to make use of could could not progress progress due to the fact that the stenog stenograph raphers ers public places like parks, plazas, and streets, haven’t transcribed the notes yet and that they are already the public authority charged charged with the duty of assigned in other courts. Cabansag also wrote that he feared granting or denying the permit should also that he will be deprived indefinitely of the land he owns. consider the convenience and the right of the rest rest of the public public to use and enjoy these The Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of same facilities. Cour Courtt of Pang Pangas asin inan an with with the the instr instruc ucti tion ons s to requ requir ire e the 3. Condit Condition ions s of peac peace e and and order order in in the the local locality ity stenographer stenographers s to transcribe their notes. The Clerk of Court shou should ld be care carefu full lly y cons consiidere dered d and and referred the matter to Judge P. Morfe. Judge Morfe informed prec precau auti tion onar ary y step steps s take taken n to prev preven entt the the Secr Secret etar ary y of Just Justic ice e that that unde underr Act Act No. No. 2383 2383,, the the vandals, vandals, hooligans, hooligans, provocateurs, provocateurs, and other stenographers are not obliged to transcribe their notes except criminals from turning into a violent one what in cases of appeal and that since the litigants are not poor, they otherwise should be a peaceful are not entitled to free transcription. Judge Morfe also told he demonstration. Secreatary that both stenographers were already not under his jurisdiction.
Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan Dangerous Tendency
Cabansag vs Fernandez OCTOBER 18, 1957 G.R. No. L-8974 Over Overvi view ew:: The The curr curren entt case case is an appe appeal al of Apol Apolon onio io Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto and Rufino Merrera of the decision finding them guilty of contempt of court. Cabansag wrote a letter to the newly created Presidential Complaints and Actions Commission (PCAC) due to the fact that his case which involved land, has been dragged on for so long and the court stenographers of the case haven’t transcribed the notes and were already under a different jurisdiction that’s why the case can’t further progress. Opposing Opposing counsel counsel filed a motion motion before Judge Morfe, the new presiding judge, for Cabansag to be declared in contempt for his “scurrilous” remarks in his letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people.
On September 1, 1954, counsel for the defendants filed a motion to hold Cabansag in contempt for the words “through the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer” in his letter to the PCAC. Cabansag filed his answer and Judge Morfe dismissed the case but asked Cabansag to show cause within 10 days. Cabansag answered that he did not mean to belittle the respect due to the court or that he acted with malice. The lawyer lawyers s of Cabans Cabansag ag submitt submitted ed a manife manifestat station ion that they consented consented to Cabansag’s Cabansag’s letter because they found no wrong in it. They were also asked to show cause. Cabansag and his lawyers were found guilty and thus this case of appeal.
ISSUE Was Was the the deci decisi sion on conv convic icti ting ng Caba Cabans nsag ag and and his his lawyers correct?
HELD No.
THE FACTS The first ever case was filed by Cabansag on January 13, 1974. It was a complaint for ejectment of Fernandez et al. from a parcel of land. The hearing was set for July 30, 1947. It was postponed to August 8, 1947. Because on that day, only one witness testified, the case was again postponed to August 25, 1947. From there, three incidents developed, (1) claim for damages, (2) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, (3) alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties. The case was postponed and continued until October 4, 1949. The Court, then then presid presided ed by Judge Judge Villa Villamor mor,, ordere ordered d the stenographers to transcribe within 15 days of the payment of their fees. Again the case was postponed until December 9, 1952 largely due to having only partial hearings. On December 9, 1952 1952 Judg Judge e Pasi Pasico cola lan n issu issued ed an orde orderr rega regard rdin ing g the the transcription of the stenographers. From December 9 – August
RATIO It has already already been establish established ed by a long long line line of jurisprudence t hat the courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity through the power to punish for contemp contempt. t. The question question arises arises,, did the court court proper properly ly exercise this power in this case? At the heart of this case is the balancing again of two rights rights.. The right to petiti petition on the govern government ment for redres redress s or grievance and the right of the judiciary to protect itself. Two theo theore reti tica call formu formula las s had had been been devi devise sed d to
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 89 determine the correct judgment when there exists conflicting rights. First is the “clear and present danger” rule and the second is “the dangerous tendency rule.”
President, and since the DOJ is also under the Office of the President, it can be inferred that the letter was meant for the DOJ through the PCAC. His sending it to the president also fails the 2 tests.
Clear and Present Danger Rule
This This rule rule means means that that the evil consequen consequence ce of the comment comment or utteran utterance ce must must be “extre “extremely mely serious serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the utterance can be puni punish shed ed.. The The dang danger er to be guar guarde ded d agai agains nstt is the the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented. This “evil” is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This rule originated from Schenck vs US. The case stated that this rule “is an appropriate appropriate guide in determining determining the constitution constitutionality ality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy.” The Supreme Court of the US states that “the clear and and pres presen entt dang danger er of subst substan anti tive ve evil evils s as a resu result lt of indisc indiscrimi riminat nate e public publicati ations ons regard regarding ing judici judicial al procee proceedin dings gs justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publication publications s concerning concerning a judge’s judge’s decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute and imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. Dangerous Tendency Rule
This This rule rule appl applie ies s in case cases s wher wherei ein n there there exis exists ts extr extreme eme diff diffic icul ulty ty in confr confron ontin ting g wher where e the free freedo dom m of expr expres essi sion on ends ends and and the righ rightt of cour courts ts to prote protect ct thei their r indepe independe ndence nce begins. begins. There There must must be a remedy remedy to these these borderline cases. The basic principle of this rule is that the free freedo dom m of spee speech ch and and the press, press, as well well as the right right to petition for redress of grievance are not absolute. This rule can be epitomized as follows: if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. It us sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect is to bring about the substantive evil which is sought to be prevented. The The immed immedia iate te dang danger er is none none the less less real real and and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot be expected to wait until actu actual al dist distur urba banc nces es happ happen en befor before e it can can act act upon upon the imminent danger. If this is the case, the right to protect itself will will only only aris arise e when when the gove govern rnmen mentt has has alre alread ady y been been overthrown. Judgment
Cabansag’s letter fails both tests. It is evident from the letter that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and mush less to belittle or degrade it. He only gave vent to his feelings that he has been long been deprived of his land and will continue to be deprived unless the notes are transcribed. If there ever exists criticism, it is not against the court but against the opposing counsel. About the only thing disturbing about the lett letter er was was the the fact fact that that it was was sent sent to the the Offi Office ce of the the President. But since the PCAC is part of the office of the
Although Cabansag is completely without fault, his lawyers are another matter. Since they are knowledgeable in the law, they should have acted with more care (not said how) to avoi avoid d the the cour courts ts emba embarr rras assm smen entt and and unne unnece cess ssar ary y interference with the normal course of its proceedings. But since they weren’t in bad faith, they were just warned.
“Balancing of Interest” Test
Badoy vs Ferrer Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan German vs Barangan PONENTE: J. Escolin NATU NATURE RE:: Peti Petitio tione ners rs seek seek the the issu issuan ance ce of [1] a writ writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray pray inside inside St. Jude Jude Chapel Chapel located located at J.P. J.P. Laurel Laurel Street, Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church FACTS: Octo Octobe berr 2, 1984 1984-- peti petiti tion oner ers, s, comp compos osed ed of abou aboutt 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march march down down said said street street with with raised raised clenched clenched fists fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. They were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Jude Chapel Chapel was locate located d within within the Malaca Malacañan ñang g security area. At the t he hearing of this t his petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religi religious ous worshi worship, p, but to conduc conductt an anti-go anti-gover vernme nment nt demonstration at a place close to the very residence and office offices s of the Presid President ent of the Republ Republic. ic. Respon Responden dents ts further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly Undoubtedly,, the yellow T-shirts T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. ISSUE: WON WO N petit petitio ione ners’ rs’ freed freedom om of reli religi giou ous s worsh worship ip and and of locomotion had been violated HELD NO RATIO While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable
90 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 and inviol inviolabl able e right right to religi religious ous freedom freedom,, the exerci exercise se the the futur future. e. That That is to invo invoke ke free freedo dom m of reli religi gion on as a thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must preferred preferred right of undoubted undoubted primacy. primacy. Specifically Specifically prior be done in good faith. restraint is ruled out except under a clear showing that its Art. 19 of CC: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights exercise would be attended by a clear and present danger and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty of substantive evil. and good faith." Why a concurrence concurrence in the result then? => Clear manifestation manifestation Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the by the the Soli Solici citor tor Gene Genera rall that that such such a righ rightt woul would d be Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use acco accord rded ed the full fulles estt resp respec ectt with with due due rega regard rd to the the by the the publ public ic of J.P J.P. Laur Laurel el Stree Streett and and the the stre streets ets countervailing consideration of avoiding danger to the lives approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and of the President and his family. from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely It may be observed that the non-establishment clause in the prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, Philippines which in the United States is the basis for the unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this concept of separation of church and state is made much restric restrictio tion n is readil readily y percei perceived ved and apprec appreciat iated ed if it is more more expl explic icit it by this this cons consti titut tutio iona nall comma command nd:: "The "The considered that the same is designed to protect the lives separation of church and state shall be inviolable." Had of the the Pres Presid iden entt and and his his fami family ly,, as well well as othe other r there been no clear manifestation by both petitioners and gove govern rnmen mentt offi offici cial als, s, dipl diplom omats ats and and fore foreig ign n gues guests ts respondents that the right to attend mass at St. Jude's trans transac acti ting ng busi busine ness ss with with Mala Malaca caña ñang ng.. The The need need to Church Church would be respec respected ted,, even even if it is located located in a secure the safety of heads of state and other government government security area but with due precautionary measures taken officials officials cannot be overemphasiz overemphasized. ed. The threat to their to avoid avoid infilt infiltrat ration ion by subver subversiv sive e element elements, s, this this Court Court lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the would have been called upon to rule and, if possible, to world. delineate with some degree of precision the scope of such Restr Restric icti tion on is more moreov over er inte intend nded ed to secu secure re the the seve severa rall a righ rightt to free free exer exerci cise se and and enjo enjoym ymen entt of reli religi giou ous s executi executive ve office offices s within within the Malaca Malacañan ñang g ground grounds s from from profession and worship. possible external attacks and disturbances. From From the the very very word wordin ing g of the the clea clearr and and pres presen entt dang danger er Sec. Sec. 6 Art Art III III of 87 Cons Consti ti (fre (freed edom om of loco locomo moti tion on)) is principle, the question, to follow Holmes, who was the superseded by the wisdom and the reasonableness of the author of this concept, is "one of proximity and degree." national security measure imposed by State. Nece Necessa ssari rily ly in each each and and ever every y insta instanc nce e wher where e it is Sec Sec 5 Art III of 87 Cons Consti ti (fre (freed edom om of reli religi giou ous s wors worshi hip) p),, invoked, there must be the most careful scrutiny of the according to US SC in Cantwell v. Connecticut : environmental facts and conditions. In times of stress-and much more so in times of crisis-it is that “..On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of everyone at least for the majority of mankind. worship.. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of It bears repeating that the promise made by the respondents of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces not restricting petitioners from entering and worshipping at two concepts-freedo concepts-freedom m to believe and freedom freedom to act. The first St. Jude Church is a guarantee that no such impermissible is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” restr restrai aint nt of reli religi giou ous s free freedo dom m woul would d there thereaft after er be attempted. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of That the Court is united in the view that the free exercise of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by religious profession and worship is to be accorded the which which they had attempt attempted ed to transla translate te the same into into amplest protection. The dismissal of the petition is not a action. In Gerona v. Secretary of Education: bar to the application hereafter of the clear and present danger principle. If no mention was made in the opinion of “.. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the Court of such controlling doctrine it is my perception that it is due to the assurances made by the parties to the the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government controversy that the right to the free exercise of religious steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes profe professi ssion on and and worsh worship ip will will be acco accord rded ed the the full fulles estt the one exercising it.” respect.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION: C.J. Fernando, Concurring: Concurring in the result and dissenting insofar as the opinion fails to declare that the freedom of exercise of religious profe profess ssio ion n and and worsh worship ip can can only only be limit limited ed by the the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. The plea to enter and pray at such church on Friday, October 12, 1984 is moot moot and academic. academic. There There is in additi addition, on, howev however er,, a plea plea for the inju injunc ncti tive ve reli relief ef to prev preven entt respondents respondents from interfering interfering with petitioners petitioners exercising their constitutional right to attend mass at such church in
J. Teehankee, Dissenting: Right of free worship and movement is a preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in this case As can be understood in J. B. L Reyes vs. Bagatsing (w/c was also referred in part in C.J. Fernando’s opinion): - Freedo Freedom m of worship worship,, alongs alongside ide with with freedo freedom m of expression and speech and peaceable assembly "along with the other other intell intellectu ectual al freedo freedoms, ms, are highly highly ranked ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. - In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 91 limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and immine imminent, nt, of a seriou serious s evil evil to public public safety safety,, public public morals morals,, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. - The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons from entering the church of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the military or police officials who would so physically restrain them. (Remember: Art 132 of RPC penali penalizes zes public public office officers rs and employ employees ees who "preve "prevent nt or disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion" and Art. 32 of CC grants an independent cause of action for f or moral and exemplary damages and "for other relief" against such officials or employees or private individuals "who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair (the) freedom of religion (and) freedom of speech"). - Good faith on both sides is and must be presumed. Respondents were in full control and there is no question as to the capability of the security forces to ward off and stop any untow untowar ard d move move.. They They had had plac placed ed an adva advanc nce e checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and could stop the flow of people in the church if they deemed it unman unmanag agea eabl ble. e. Ther There e defin definite itely ly was was no clea clearr and and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacañang. Peti Petiti tion oner ers s have have give given n full full assu assura ranc nce e of thei theirr peac peacef eful ul intentions. They were walking and would walk along the sidewa ewalks. They did not and will not hold any demonstrations. They were and are unarmed, and were and are willing to be searched and have pledged peaceful and orderly behavior. J. Makasiar, Dissenting: Petitioners gave the assurance that they are marching towards St. Jude Jude's 's Chur Church ch only only for for the the purp purpos ose e of pray prayin ing g or attending mass therein; that they were and are going to march in an orderly manner without blocking the traffic and with the marshals policing and Identifying the marchers; that they are not armed and are not going to be armed with any kind of weapon; and that they are willing to be frisked. Respondents likewise assured that they are not going to block or stop petitioners as long as they march peacefully and their real purpose is just to hear mass inside St. Jude's Church. Respondents or their agents can frisk petitioners for any concealed weapon. Their wearing yellow T-shirts and clothing and bearing yellow emblems or banners, are forms of expression which are also protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expr expres essi sion on in gene genera ral, l, and and reli religi giou ous s freed freedom om in particular. With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respon responden dents, ts, there there is no clear clear and presen presentt danger danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the the resp respon onde dent nts s have have adop adopte ted d meas measur ures es and and are are prepar prepared ed to insure insure agains againstt any public public disturb disturbanc ance e or violence. J. Abad Santos, Dissenting: It is highly presumptuous for both the respondents and this Court to attribute attribute unstated and unadmitted motives motives to the petitioners. The petitioners said that they wanted to pray
and hear mass. Why can't good faith be accorded to them in the light light of the constitut constitution ional al provis provision ion that the free free exer exerci cise se and and enjo enjoym ymen entt of reli religi giou ous s profe profess ssio ion n and and worship shall forever be allowed? I fail fail to perceive perceive the presence presence of any clear clear danger danger to the security of Malacañang due to the action of the petitioners. J. Melencio-Herrera, Dissenting: The act of petiti petitione oners rs in conver convergin ging g at J.P. J.P. Laurel Laurel Street, Street, majority majority of whom were wearing wearing yellow T-shirts, T-shirts, marching towards St. Jude Chapel, there to hear Mass, shouting anti-Governme anti-Government nt invectives invectives with clenched clenched fists as they marched, did not in my opinion pose any clear and present danger. danger. Petitioners Petitioners were unarmed, unarmed, marching marching peacefully peacefully,, albeit noisily. noisily. But neither can respondents be taken to task for impeding petitioners from proceeding along J.P. Laurel Street, which is within the perimeter of the Malacañang security area, since it was not by chance that petitioners were marching as a group, evidently also to hold a public demonstration. In other words, their objective cannot conclusively be said to have had a purely religious flavor. The location of the St. Jude Chapel within the perimeter of the Malacañang security area is not, to my mind, sufficient reason for a prior restraint on petitioners' right to freedom of religious worship. Proper security measures can always be taken. It is only when petitioners, in the exercise of their religious beliefs, exceed those bounds and translate their freedoms into acts detrimental or inimical to the superior rights of public peace and order, that the test of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil is met and the acts having a religious significance may be infringed upon in the exercise of the police power of the State. J. Relova, Separate vote and statement: October 2, 1984 was a Tuesday and was not a particular day of devo devoti tion on to St. St. Jude Jude,, know known n as the the Sain Saintt of the the impo imposs ssib ible le.. Thus Thus,, it cann cannot ot be said said that that peti petiti tion oner ers' s' inte intent ntio ion n that that afte aftern rnoo oon n was was to cond conduc uctt an anti anti-government demonstration because if the purpose was to stage one they would have gone to St. Jude Chapel on a Thursd Thursday ay and be favored favored with a crowd crowd to hear hear them. them. Stated Stated differe differentl ntly y, Thursda Thursdays ys would would be the best best day to stage stage a march march at the place and, after praying praying and/or and/or hearing mass, deliver speeches outside the chapel before the many devotees. Petitioners claim that they were on their way to hear mass and/o and/orr pray pray.. For For resp respon onde dent nts s to say, say, even even befor before e petitioners have reached the place, that they would be delivering delivering speeches is pure speculation. speculation. Respondents should have allowed petitioners to hear mass and/or pray and, thereafter, thereafter, see what they would do. Only then would We know what were really in their minds. J. Gutierrez Jr., Concurring: Noted the unique phraseology in Sec 5 Art. III (freedom of religious worship): “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religi religion on or prohib prohibiti iting ng the free exerci exercise se thereo thereof. f. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” The clause "shall forever be allowed" is simply an expression
92 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 of the the fram framer ers' s' fait faith h that that the Fili Filipi pino no peop people le cher cheris ish h 3364, be declared unconstitutional and illegal religious freedom so much that they would never remove b. Th That at the the City City be order ordered ed to refu refund nd to the the (P) the the this this freed freedom om from from the the Cons Consti titu tuti tion on or wate waterr it down down amount it paid under protest. through a modification. c. Ot Othe herr relie relieff and remed remedy y as the cour courtt may deem deem just just The free exercise of religious freedom is not only intended to and equitable. last "forever" but the clause clause guaranteeing guaranteeing it is interpreted interpreted within within limits limits of "utmos "utmostt amplit amplitude ude". ". If the presid presidenti ential al (R) City of Manila answered: securi security ty forces forces or any other other public public functiona functionarie ries s try to a. Th The e said ordi ordina nanc nces es were were enacte enacted d by th the e Munici Municipa pall impede any genuine and legitimate exercise of a person's Board of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by religious profession or worship, there can be no doubt that Secti Se ction on 24 2444 44,, su subs bsec ecti tion on (m(m-2) 2) of the Re Revi vise sed d this Court would rule against such an attempt. Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949 At the same time, any claim to the free exercise of religion by Section 18, subsection (1) of RA No. 409 or the must be a genuine or valid one Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The facts as stated stated by contend contending ing counsel counsel show that the b. It pray prayed ed that that the the comp complai laint nt be be dismi dismisse ssed. d. problem is one of a failure of communications and not a denial of freedom of worship. If the respondents do not In the hearing, (P) proved that: deny completely free access to church goers while the a. It has been been in in existen existence ce in the the Philipp Philippine ines s since since 1899. 1899. petitioners had absolutely no intention to hold a political b. Its real real prope propert rtie ies s lo loca cate ted d at Is Isaa aac c Peral Peral are exempt exempt demonstration, the petition belabors a non-existent issue. from real estate taxes. c. It was neve neverr requir required ed to pay pay any any munici municipal pal lice license nse fee fee or tax before the war, nor was the American Bible Forms of restraint Society in the US required to pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of Bible there. Fees and Taxes d. It also also tried tried to esta establi blish sh that that it neve neverr profite profited d from from the sale of the bible. However, the difference between the American Bible Society vs City of Manila dollar prices and the peso purchase price of the bibles show otherwise. Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila. CFI DECISION: Case dismissed. The meanings of repealed Ponente: Felix, J. sec (m-2) of the RAC and the repealing portions (o) of Sec 18 of RA No. 409 are practically the same for the purpose of Facts: taxing the merchandise mentioned in the said legal provisions. CFI also stated that the taxes to be levied by the ordinances is (P) American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec 3 Ordinance religious, relig ious, missionary corporation corporation duly registered and doing No. 3000), as amended, and Sec 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. busine bus iness ss in the Phi Philip lippin pines es thro through ugh its Phi Philip lippin pine e age agency ncy 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364. established in Manila in November 1898 with its principal office Manila. (P) appealed to the CA, but the CA certified the case to the SC as it involves purely questions of law. The (R) City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of RA (P) argues that the subject ordinances are unconstitutional and No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. illega ill egall in so far as its society society is con concer cerned ned,, bec becaus ause e they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise In the course of its ministry, (P) distributes and sells bibles and and enjoyment of its religious profession: the distribution and gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines, translating sale of bibles to residents of the Philippines. the same in several dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila: Sect Se ctio ion n 1, su subs bsec ecti tion on (7 (7)) of Ar Arti ticl cle e II IIII of th the e 19 1935 35 a. Info Informed rmed the the (P) that that itit was condu conducti cting ng the busi busines ness s Constitution provides: of ge gene nera rall me merc rcha hand ndis ise e si sinc nce e No Nove vembe mberr 19 1945 45 (7) No law shall be made respecti respecting ng an esta establi blishm shment ent of without the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free lilice cens nse, e, in vi viol olat atio ion n of Or Ordi dina nanc nce e No No.. 30 3000 00,, as exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, amended amen ded,, and Ord Ordina inance nces s Nos Nos.. 252 2529, 9, 302 3028, 8, and withoutt discri withou discriminatio mination n or prefer preference, ence, shall foreve foreverr be allow allowed. ed. 3364. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or b. Re Requ quir ired ed (P) to se secu cure re the permi permitt an and d licens license e fees political rights. within 3 days/ c. Als Also o requir required ed (P) to to give give a comprom compromise ise cove coverin ring g the Section 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79 , which th nd period from the 4 quarter of 1945 to 2 quarter of reads as follows: 1953, in the total sum of P5, 821.45. 79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the City is not (P) protested against the requirement, yet the City Treasurer empowered to license or to tax .... P5.00. required and demanded such payment, hence, the (P) paid the said amount in protest. At the same time, (P) sent a letter to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, the City Treasurer, informing it that a suit shall be filed to 2821 and 3028 prescribes the following: question the legality of the ordinances. SEC. 1. FEES.-Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the In its complaint, (P) American Bible Society prays: Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended, there a. Th That at the sa said id Munic Municip ipal al Ordin Ordinan ance ce No. 30 3000 00,, as shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the amended amen ded,, and Ord Ordina inance nces s Nos Nos.. 252 2529, 9, 302 3028, 8, and busine bus inesse sses s or occ occupa upatio tions ns bel below ow enu enumera merated ted,, qua quarte rterly rly,,
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 93 license fees based on gross sales or receipts realized during the pre preced ceding ing qua quarter rter in acc accord ordanc ance e wit with h the rate rates s her herein ein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any business or occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the th e bu busi sine ness ss as in indi dicat cated ed he here rein in fo forr th the e co corre rresp spon ondi ding ng business or occupation Issues: 1. WO WON N Ordinance No. 3000, as ame men nded, and Ordi Or dina nanc nces es No Nos. s. 25 2529 29,, 30 3028 28,, an and d 33 3364 64,, ar are e consti con stituti tutiona onall and valid (As to the topic For Forms ms of Restraint—taxes and fees). 2. WON the the provi provisio sions ns of said said ordin ordinanc ances es are appl applica icable ble to th the e cas case e at ba barr. (A (As s to th the e to topi pic c Fr Free eedo dom m of Religion).
Held/ Ratio: 1.
The ord ordina inance nces s are are con constit stituti utiona onal. l. a. Ord Ordina inance nce No. No. 3000 3000 is of gener general al appl applica icatio tion n and an d no nott pa part rtic icul ular arly ly di dire rect cted ed ag agai ains nstt inst in stit ituti ution ons s lilike ke th the e (P (P), ), an and d it do does es no nott cont co ntai ain n any an y prov pr ovis isio ions ns wha hats tsoe oeve ver r pres pr escr crib ibin ing g reli re ligi giou ous s cens ce nsor orsh ship ip nor no r restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. b. The necessity of the permi mitt is ma mad de to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax sai said d bus busine iness, ss, tra trade, de, or occ occupa upatio tion n (Item (It em No No.. 79 79,, Se Secti ction on 3, Or Ordi dina nanc nce e No No.. 3000). c. As to the lic licens ense e fees fees that that the the City City Trea Treasur surer er required the (P) society to pay, Section 1 of Ordi Or dina nanc nce e 25 2529 29,, as ame amend nded ed,, do does es no nott impos imp ose e di dire rectl ctly y th the e sa said id fe fees es up upon on an any y religious institution, but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enume en umera rate ted, d, su such ch as re reta tailil “d “dea eale lers rs in generall mercha genera merchandise” ndise”,, which, it is alleg alleged, ed, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc. d. (P) further argues that the subject ordinances are no longer in force and effect as they were enacted enacted und under er sec 244 2444, 4, subsection (m-2) of the RAC , as amended by Act No. 3659, which was already repealed by sec 102 of RA No. 409 or the Revised Manila Charter. However, the SC says that the only substantial distinction between the two provisio provisions ns is tha thatt the latter does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, “all rights and liabilities whic wh ich h ha have ve ac accru crued ed un unde derr th the e or orig igin inal al statute are preserved and may be enforced, sinc si nce e th the e re reen enac actm tmen entt ne neut utra rali lize zes s th the e appeal, appea l, therefo therefore re continuing the law in force without interruption.” The SC therefore holds that the ordinances are still in effect. e. Mo More reov over er,, the busin busines ess s of “r “ret etai aill deale dealers rs in gene ge nera rall merc me rcha hand ndis ise” e” is expr ex pres essl sly y enumerated in subsection (o), sec 18, of RA No. 409.
2. Ord rdiina nan nce No. No. 300 3000 0, which prescribes that the (P) must get Mayor’s permit, APPLIES. Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which prescribes payment of fees
and taxes, does NOT apply. a. Th The e co cons nsti titu tuti tio ona nall gu guar aran anty ty of th the e fr free ee exe ex erc rciise an and d en enjo joy yme ment nt of re reli ligi giou ous s profess pro fession ion and wor worship ship carries carries wit with h it the right rig ht to dis dissem semina inate te rel religi igious ous info informa rmatio tion. n. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. b. Sec 27 27 of Commo Commonw nwea ealt lth h Act Act No. No. 466 or or the National Nation al Intern Internal al Reven Revenue ue Code, exempts the (P) as a rel religi igious ous instituti institution on fro from m tax, excep exc eptt on only ly wh when en su such ch ac activ tivit itie ies s ar are e fo for r profit. SC held that although the bibles and pamphlets are sold in prices a little bit higher, this cannot mean that the (P) was already engage eng aged d in the bus busine iness ss or occ occupa upatio tion n of selling said merchandise. c. SC ther therefo efore re held held that that Ordi Ordina nanc nce e No. 2529 2529 cannot be applied to (P), for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its rel religi igious ous pro profes fessio sion n and wor worship ship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. d. As to Ordi Ordina nanc nce e No. 3000 3000,, SC fi find nds s that that it does not impose any charge upon the right granted by the Constitution. Judgment: CFI decision reversed. (R) City ordered to return to (P) society the amount of P5, 891.45.
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance En Banc: October 30, 1995
RATIO DECIDENDI: Regulations imposed by the state such as that of taxation, as a form is restraint, shall be interpreted as binding bindi ng even to consti constitutiona tutionally lly guaran guaranteed teed rights rights/insti /institution tutions s exer ex erci cisi sing ng su such ch (i (i.e. .e. Fr Free eedo dom m of re reliligi gion on/ex /expr pres essi sion on-Church/media) provided no differential treatment or censorial motivation is behind the enactment -In bold are those related to the topic.
FACTS: Republic Act 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existi exis ting ng VAT sy syste stem m an and d en enha hanc nce e it its s ad admin minis istr trati ation on by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. However, the consti con stituti tutiona onality lity of RA 7716 was bei being ng cha challe llenge nged d on the grounds of its procedural and substantial aspects. TIMELINE: Severa erall bil bills ls wer were e int introd roduce uced d in the July Jul y 22, ‘92-Aug ‘92-Aug 31: Sev house of repres representati entatives ves seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Nat ional Internal Revenue Code relative to VA VAT T. The bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended the substitute measure, H.No. 11197, 11197, entitled: AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VA (VAT) T) SYSTEM SYST EM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BAS BASE E AND ENH ENHANC ANCE E ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NAT NATIONAL IONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED Nov. 6, ‘93: H.No. 11197 was considered on second reading Nov No v. 17 17,, ’9 ’93: 3: H.No H. No.. 11 1119 197 7 was was appr approv oved ed by by the the Hous House e of Representatives after third and final reading.
94 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Nov No v. 23, 23, ’9 ’93: 3: H.No H. No.. 11 1119 197 7 was was se sent nt to th the e Sen Senat ate e of Representatives. Because a bill originating in the House Feb 7, ’94: Senate Committee submitted its report may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the recommending approval of S.No. 1630, entitled: result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result of the AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VA (VAT) T) Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a SYSTEM SYS TEM TO WID WIDEN EN ITS TAX TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ENHANCE ITS revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES Bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 with amendments” but also to “propose amendments”. It would OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two TITLE IX, AND REPEALI NG SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 116 OF houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to TITLE TIT LE V, ALL OF THE NA NATIO TIONAL NAL INT INTERN ERNAL AL REV REVENU ENUE E the th e Se Sena nate te.. Gi Give ven n th the e po powe werr of the Se Sena nate te to pr prop opos ose e CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even Feb 8, ’94 94:: Sena Se nate te be bega gan n con consi side dera rati tion on of S.N S.No. o. 16 1630 30.. with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to Marc Ma rch h 24 24,, ’94 94:: Sena Se nate te fi fini nish shed ed de deb bat ates es on th the e bi bill ll an and d originate in the House. approved it on 2nd reading What Wh at th the e Co Cons nsti titut tutio ion n si simpl mply y mea means ns is tha thatt th the e Sena Se nate te ap appr prov oved ed bi billll on 3rd rea readin ding g by initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an mean me ans s of af affir firma mati tive ve vo votes tes of 13 of th the e me memb mber ers s an and d 1 increa inc rease se of the public public deb debt, t, pri privat vate e bil bills ls and bills of loc local al abstention application must come from the House of Representatives on April 13, 19, 21, and 25, ’94:H.No. 11197 and S.No.1630 were the theory theory that elected elected as the they y are from the dis distri tricts, cts, the referr ref erred ed to a con confere ference nce committee committee who met 4 time times s and members of the House of Representatives can be expected to recommended that H.No. 11 11197 197 and S.No 1630 be approved in be mor more e se sens nsiti itive ve to th the e lo loca call ne need eds s an and d pr prob oble lems. ms. Th The e accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and Senators, on the other hand, are expected to approach the approved by the conferees problem on national perspective. Both views are thereby made April 27, ’94:Conference Committee Bill entitled AN ACT to bear on the enactment of such laws. RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) (VAT) SYSTEM, S YSTEM, WID WI DENING IT ITS S TAX BA BAS SE AN AND D ENHANCING IT ITS S B. Does it violate Art VI Sec 26 (2) violate the constitution? ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES NO. The president had certified S.No. 1630 as urgent. AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement OF TH THE E NA NATI TION ONAL AL IN INTE TERN RNAL AL REV REVEN ENUE UE CO CODE DE,, AS not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was approved by days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the the House of the Representatives requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing May 2, ’94: Senate likew ewiise approved th the e Confe ferrence and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the Committee Bill weight of the legislative practice. May 5, ’94: Bill presented to the President of the C. Wh What at is th the e ex exte tent nt of th the e po powe werr of th the e Bi Bica came mera rall Philippines who signed it at the same day; hence, it became Conference Committee? RA 7716 The conference committee shall settle the differences May Ma y 12 12,, ’94 ’94:: RA 77 771 16 was was publ publiish she ed in 2 new newsp spap aper ers s in of Senate and House of Congress. It shall make a detailed and gen circulation sufficient report with explicit statement of the changes in or May 28 28, ’9 ’94: RA 7716 to took ef effect amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees. May 28-J -Ju une 30, ’94: RA 7716’s imp mplleme men ntation was II. Substantive Issues suspended to allow time for business registration. A. Does the law violate the provisions in the Bill of Rights
(Art 3)? ISSUE: I. Procedural Issues A. Does RA 7716 violate Art V I Sec 24 of the Constitution? B. Does it violate Art VI Sec 26 (2) violate the constitution? C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues A. Does the law violate the ff provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art 3)? Sec 1 Sec 4 Sec 5 Sec 10 B. Does the law violate the ff other provisions of the Consti? Art VI Sec 28 (1) Art VI Sec 28 (3)
HELD: I. Procedural issues A. Does RA 7716 violate Art VI Sec 24 of the Constitution? NO. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House
NO. Since the law granted the press a privilege, the la law w cou could ld tak take e bac back k the pri privil vilege ege any anytim time e wit withou houtt offens off ense e to the Con Consti stitut tution ion.. The rea reason son is sim simple ple:: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. With regard to Freedom of Expression, even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, the press is not immune from general regulation regul ation by the state. Ther There e is no differential differential treatment of th the e pr pres ess s by th the e la law, w, mu much ch le less ss an any y ce cens nsor oria iall motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a VAT, it is not because it is singled out but only becaus bec ause e of the rem remova ovall of the exe exemp mptio tion n pre previo viousl usly y gran gr ante ted d to it by la law. w. Ot Othe herr tr tran ansa sact ctio ions ns,, li like kewi wise se previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and scope of the VAT system. Hence, no discriminatory treatment was given to the press since it is not the only one affected by such change in VAT VAT system. This is even highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and an d la larg rge e th this is is no nott so an and d th that at th the e ex exem empt ptio ions ns ar are e granted for a purpose. The VAT is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 95 constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or ex exch chan ange ge of go good ods s or pr prop oper erti ties es or th the e sa sale le or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regu re gula lati tion on is no nott to vi viol olat ate e it its s fr free eedo dom m un unde derr th the e Constitution In terms of reli religiou gious s freedo freedom, m, PBC’ PBC’s s alleg allegation ation that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication, or importa importatio tion n of books or rel religi igious ous article articles s vio violat lates es freedom of thought and conscience. The free exercise of religion does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. Moreov Mor eover er,, the VAT reg regist istrat ration ion fee is a mer mere e administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privil pri vilege ege,, mu much ch les less s a con consti stitut tution ional al rig right. ht. The fix fixed ed amount of P1,000 is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege BUT only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. registration. The registration is a central feature of the VAT system. For Art III Sec 10, it is enough to say that the part pa rtie ies s to co cont ntra ract ct ca cann nnot ot,, th thro roug ugh h th the e ex exer erci cise se of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the state. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reserv reservation ation of essen essential tial attributes attributes of sover sovereign eign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of legall orde lega order. r. The poli policy cy of prote protecting cting contracts against impai airm rme ent pre resu supp ppos oses es th the e mai aint nten enan ance ce of a government which retains adequate authority to secure peace pea ce and goo good d ord order er of soc society iety.. Mor Moreov eover er,, con contra tract ct clause is not a limitation on the power of taxation save only on ly wh wher ere e a ta tax x ex exem empt ptio ion n wa was s gr gran ante ted d fo forr a va vali lid d consideration. B. Does the law violate the ff other provisions ( Art VI Sec 28 (1) and Art VI Sec 28 (3)) of the Consti? NO. There is no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to due process and equal protection clause. The absence of threat or immediate harm makes mak es the nee need d for jud judici icial al int interve erventi ntion on les less s evi eviden dentt and underscores the essential nature of petitioners’ attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equa eq uall pr prot otec ecti tion on an and d im impa pair irme ment nt of co contr ntrac acts ts as a mer mere e academi aca demic c dis discus cussio sion n of the meri merits ts of law law.. Fur Furthe thermor rmore, e, in absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, regre ssive, oppressive, oppressive, and confisca confiscatory tory and that it viola violates tes vest ve sted ed ri righ ghts ts pr prote otecte cted d un unde derr th the e co cont ntra ract ct cl clau ause se ar are e prematu pre maturel rely y rai raised sed and likewise likewise,, do not jus justify tify the gra grant nt of prospective relief.
Moral compulsion
Miranda. Respon Miranda. Respondent dent Mayor stated his willi willingness ngness to grant permits per mits for pea peacefu cefull ass assemb emblie lies s at Plaz Plaza a Mir Mirand anda a dur during ing Saturdays, Sundays and holidays whn they would not cause great disruption of normal activities of community and offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue for demonstration. Every time assemblies are announced, they cause fear and tension in the community such as offices and classes being dismissed, dismiss ed, store storefronts fronts being boarde boarded d up and transp transportatio ortation n being disrupted to the general detriment of the public. Petiti Pet itione onerr has even man manifes ifested ted that it has no mean means s of preventing preven ting disorders. disorders. Petitio Petitioner ner has failed failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor Villegas to grant their application for permit unconditionally unconditionally.. As in Primicias v. Fugoso , the mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
Petition is dismissed. SEPARATE OPINIONS: Villamor, J. concurs. Right to freedom of assembly is neither unlimited nor absolute. The mayor did not arbitrarily refuse the permit and even offered an alternative. Cast Ca stro ro an and d Fe Fern rnan ando do,, JJ di diss ssen ent. t. Ri Righ ghtt to fr free eedo dom m of assembly, although not unlimited, is entitled to utmost respect. There is no clear showing that Mayor’s refusal met criteria in Prim Pr imic icia ias s v. Fu Fugo goso so . Th The e ef effec fectt is of pr prio iorr re rest stra rain intt of a constitutional right. Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) Ignacio vs Ela (Time and place) Doctri Doct rine ne:: Th The e ri righ ghtt to fre freed edom om of sp spee eech ch,, to pe peac acefu efulllly y assemble, etc. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, they are not absolute. They may be regulated by the state through “police power” so that they shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. Facts:
Babst vs National Intelligence Board
Time and Place
Reyes vs Bagatsing
Fernando Fernan do Ignaci Ignacio o and Simeo Simeon n dela dela Cruz Cruz (petiti (petitione oners) rs) are memb members ers of the Watch Towe Towerr Bib Bible le and Tract Tract Society,, common Society commonly ly known as Jehova Jehovah’s h’s Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic religion They The y asked asked Mayor Mayor Norb Norberto erto Ela (res (respon ponden dent) t) to give give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kios kiosk, k, but but,, ins instea tead d of gra granti nting ng the per permiss mission ion,, Respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy that the Kiosk should only be used “for legal purposes.” When Wh en their their reque request st for recon reconsi side dera rati tion on was denie denied, d, Peti Pe titi tio one ners rs ins nsti titu tute ted d th the e pre rese sent nt ac acti tion on fo for r mandamus.
Issues: WON the action taken by Respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution
Navarro vs Villegas 26 FEB 1970
RESOLUTION, EN BANC
Petitioners sought unconditional permit to assemble at Plaza
Held and Ratio: No Th The e ri righ ghtt to freed freedom om of sp spee eech ch,, an and d to peace peacefu full lly y
96 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, grieva nces, are fundame fundamental ntal personal rights of the “Institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom” people recognized and guaranteed by the Art. XIV Sec. 8(3), 1973 Consti constitutions of democratic countries. But the exercise of those rights is not absolute. The They y may be regu regulat lated ed that that it sha shallll not not be inj injuri urious ous to to Issue: the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor 3) Whethe Whetherr or not not exerci exercise se of of freedom freedom of of assemb assembly ly injurious to the rights of the community or society. The could be a basis for barring enrolment? power pow er to reg regula ulate te the exercise exercise of suc such h and other constitution consti tutional al rights is termed the sovere sovereign ign ‘police power’. Held: (Fernando, C.J., ponente) The po pow wer exe xerc rciise sed d by Re Resp spon onde dent nt ca cann nno ot be considered consid ered as capric capricious ious or arbitra arbitrary ry consi considering dering the 1) Barr Barret eto, o, de Leon Leon Jr. Jr. and and Laxa Laxama mana na coul could d be peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that denied enrolment in view of their failing grades. the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a Villar and others are entitled to the remedies. short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some The invo invoca cati tion on of the the righ rightt to free freedo dom m of 2) The concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid peaceable assembly carries with it the implication disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of that the right to free speech has likewise been untowa unt oward rd inc incide idents nts,, they dee deemed med it nec necess essary ary to disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of proh pr ohib ibit it th the e us use e of th that at ki kios osk k by an any y re reli ligi giou ous s freedom freedom of expression, which is Identified Identified with denomination as a place of meeting of its members. the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any Re Resp spon onde dent nt never never denie denied d such requ reques estt but merel merely y matter matter of public public intere interest st withou withoutt censor censorshi ship p or tried tri ed to enf enforc orce e his policy policy by ass assign igning ing them the punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much nort no rthw hwes este tern rn pa part rt of th the e pu publ blic ic pl plaz aza. a. It ca cann nnot ot less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their and present danger of a substantive substantive evil that the constitutional right to assemble, considering that the state has a right to prevent." tenets of Petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their "Petition ioners ers invoke invoke their their rights rights to peacea peaceable ble 3) "Petit request. Suc Such h conclu conclusio sion n is predic predicate ated d on facts. facts. The The presi presidin ding g assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do judge, through information, personal experience and so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the through throug h the papers papers,, has known of unfort unfortunate unate events freedom to express their views and communicate which caused the disturbance of peace and order in thei theirr thou though ghts ts to thos those e disp dispos osed ed to liste listen n in the community. If the Petitioners should be allowed to gatherings such as was held in this case. They use the kiosk which is within the hearing distance of do not, to borrow from the opinio opinion n of Justic Justice e the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance Forta Fortas s in Tink Tinker er v. Des Des Moin Moines es Comm Commun unit ity y of other religious ceremonies performed in the church. constitutional rights to School District, 'shed their constitutional free freedo dom m of spe speech ech or expre xpress ssiion at the the 12 Primicias vs Fugoso schoolhouse gate.'" Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the cons consti titu tuti tio onal nal righ rights ts to free free spee speech ch and and Arbitrary actions due due to national security security peac peacea eabl ble e asse assemb mbly ly was was visi visite ted d by thei their r expulsion from respondent College Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs Dans Restraint on exercise of another right
Ebranilag vs Superintendent of Schools of Cebu Villar vs Technological Institute of the Philippines Facts: Seven Seven studen students ts of TIP filed filed the petition petition with four of them them passing most of their subjects and only having a few (1-2) failing grades while three of them had multiple failing grades. (the only explicit facts, but I assume that these students rallied and such) Remedy prayed for: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
Legal provisions:
4) It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultur cultural al rights rights,, it is equall equally y manifes manifestt that that the obligation impo mposed sed on the the State is not catego categoric rical, al, the phrase phrase used used being being "gener "generall ally y availa available ble"" and higher higher educati education, on, while while being being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit merit." ." To that that exte extent nt,, ther therefo efore re,, ther there e is justification for excluding three of the aforeme aforementi ntione oned d petitio petitioner ners s becaus because e of their their marked academic deficienc y.
5) The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of high higher er lear learni ning ng"" incl includ udes es the the righ rightt to set set academ academic ic standa standards rds to determ determine ine under under what what circ circums umsta tanc nces es fail failin ing g grad grades es suffi suffice ce for for the the expu expuls lsio ion n of stude student nts. s. Once Once it has has done done so, so, howe howeve verr, that that stand standar ard d shou should ld be follow followed ed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 97 agai agains nstt those those stud studen ents ts who who exer exerci cise se thei their r constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free free spee speech ch.. If it does does so, so, then then ther there e is a legi legiti tima mate te grie grieva vanc nce e by the the stud studen ents ts thus thus prejud prejudice iced, d, their their right right to the equal equal protect protection ion clause being disregarded.
Non vs Dames
investigate the killing in the Vizconde home. Webb’s Alibi: He was in the US during the said occurrence of the crime. He bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car during the said dates. He was issued Driver’s License in California of June 14, 1991. Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy confirmed Webb’s arrival in San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991. Gatchalian, Alejano Alibi: 11 on the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o’clock, they watch video tapes.
ISSUE
Censorship
Gonzales vs Katigbak Pita vs CA Fernando vs CA Regulation of the Forum
See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Television Television Violence and the First Amendment Ian Matheson Ballard To accord due process
Webb vs De Leon G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
Petitioners: Hubert J. P. Webb, Michael A. Gatchalian, and Antonio L. Lejano Respondents: Honorable Raul E. De Leon, Presiding Judge of RTC Paranaque, et al. Nature: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for TRO and Preliminary Injunction Ponente: Justice Puno Overview This This is the case of Hubert Webb question questioning ing the validity validity of arrest and preliminary preliminary court proceedings. proceedings. The court said that in the preliminary preliminary investigatio investigation, n, only probable cause is to be dete determ rmin ined ed and and not not the the guil guiltt of the the accu accuse sed. d. Otherwise, there will be no use for the actual trial.
Were the accused denied of their constitutional right to due process during the preliminary investigation? (NO)
Held/Ratio No. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence evidence attached attached to the records records of the case. The various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provid provide e substa substanti ntial al basis basis for a findin finding g of probab probable le cause cause against the petitioners. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions. Sect Sectio ion n 1 of Rule Rule 112 prov provid ides es that that a prel prelim imin inar ary y investigatio investigation n should should determine determine whether there is a sufficient sufficient grou ground nd to enge engend nder er a well well-g -gro roun unded ded beli belief ef that that a crime crime cogniz cognizabl able e by the RTC has been committ committed ed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Consid Consideri ering ng the low quantu quantum m and quality quality of eviden evidence ce needed needed to support support a finding of probable probable cause the DOJ panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses witnesses for clarificatory clarificatory questions. Preliminary Preliminary investigatio investigation n is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confro confront nt and cross-e cross-exami xamine ne his accuse accusers rs to establ establish ish his innocence.
Consequent Punishment Laws Sedition/ Inciting to Sedition
Facts NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, and six others with the crime crime of Rape Rape with with Homici Homicide. de. Carmel Carmela a Vizcon Vizconde de was raped and killed her mother Estrellita Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer were also killed. Duri During ng the the Prel Prelim imin inary ary inve investi stiga gati tion on,, NBI NBI pres presen ente ted d the following sworn statements: (1) (1) Mari Maria a Jessic Jessica a M. Alfar Alfaro o – saw saw the actual actual rape rape and and killin killing; g; there there are incons inconsiste istenci ncies es with with the first first and second affidavits. (the inconsistencies was sufficiently explained; Jessica said that at first, she was hesitant to divulge the information) (2) Two Two Former Former Housemaid Housemaid of the Webb Webb family family – Nerissa Nerissa saw Hubert Hubert in the Webb’ Webb’s s reside residence nce on June June 29, 1991; Mila, laundry woman, washed clothes on June 30, 1991 and found fresh stains. (3) Carlos Carlos J. Cristoba Cristobal, l, passenge passengerr of United United Airli Airlines nes on March 9, 1991. – Was not sure if the person we saw was Hubert. (4) Lolita Lolita Birrer Birrer,, former former live-in live-in partner partner of Gerard Gerardo o Biong, investigator. – She said that on the dawn of June 30, 1991, 1991, Biong Biong has a phone phone call call and returned returned home around 7am. Then moments later, Biong was called to
Espuelas vs People US vs Perfecto Libel
US vs Bustos Orfanel vs People GMA Network vs Bustos GMA NE GMA NETW TWOR ORK, K, INC INC.. (f (for orme merly rly kno known wn as "R "REP EPUB UBLI LIC C BROA BR OADC DCAS ASTI TING NG SY SYST STEM EM,, IN INC. C.") ") an and d RE REY Y VI VIDA DAL, L, petiti pet itione oners, rs, vs. JES JESUS US G. BUST BUSTOS, OS, M.D. M.D.,, TEO TEODOR DORA A R. OCAMPO, M.D., VICTOR V. BUENCAMINO, M.D., CESAR F. VILLAFUERT VILLAF UERTE, E, M.D., ARTEMIO T. T. ORDINA ORDINARIO, RIO, M.D., and VIRGILIO C. BASILIO, M.D., respondents. GARCIA, J.: FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision dated January 25, 2001 of CA.
98 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 On Fe Febr brua uary ry 10 10,, 19 1988 88,, a ce cert rtai ain n Ab Abel ello lo an and d 22 226 6 ot othe her r RATIO: examinees exami nees who faile failed d the physi physician's cian's licensure examination examination It bears to stress, at the outset, that the trial court found the filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to disputed news report not actionable under the law on libel, compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to rehence no damages may be recovered. The Trial Court found check and reevaluate the test papers. that th at the di disp sput uted ed news news re repo port rt is bu butt a na narr rrat atio ion n of the As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. allegations contained in and circumstances attending the filing assigned to gather news from courts, co-petitioner Rey Vidal of the said Petition for Mandamus and merely of a summary of covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a the allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus, filed by the copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news medical examinees, thus the same falls within the protected coverage for the ten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s ambit of privileged communication. Channel 7 Headline News. The text of the news report stated CA found the same but said that the news failed to be a fair, that, tha t, afte afterr bei being ng allowed allowed to exa examine mine the test papers, papers, the accurate and true report of the proceedings. CA said that the petitioners found errors in the checking and these errors "were PGH PG H de demon monstr strat atio ion n foo footag tage e ten tend d to sh show ow th that at the PG PGH H so material that they actually lowered the scores that formed demonstrators supported the failed examinees. They further the individual ratings of the examinees in the various subjects." stated that the words "file video" should have been inserted The Th e re repo port rt al also so sta state ted d tha thatt "t "the he pe peti titio tione ners rs sa said id tha thatt th the e and the network knows this - and thus, in wanton and reckless haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now disregard of their duty to the public to render a fair, accurate be stopped once and for all" while the failed examinees cited and true report of the same. their 9 years of hardship to obtain a degree in medicine. SC is of th the e vi view ew th that, at, gi give ven n th the e pa para rallllel el un unch chal alle leng nged ed The Respondents, then chairman and members of the Board determination of the two courts below that what petitioner Vidal of Medicine, claimed that it was a false, malicious and onereported was privileged, the award of damages is untenable as sided report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter. They it is paradoxical. filed an action against against GMA for recklessly disregarding disregarding the An award of damages presupposes libel, which, in turn, truth, defaming them by word of mouth and simultaneously presupposes malice. presenting it in Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to Libel Lib el - the public public and maliciou malicious s imp imputat utation ion to ano anothe therr of a make a forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, use of an unr unrela elated ted and old foot footage age (sh (showi owing ng phy physic sician ians s discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. wearing weari ng black armbands) to make it appea appearr that other doctors Liability for libel requisities: were wer e sup suppor portin ting g and symp sympath athizi izing ng wit with h the com compla plaini ining ng (a)) an al (a alle lega gati tion on or im impu puta tati tion on of a di disc scre redi dita tabl ble e ac actt or unsuccessful unsuc cessful examinees. examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video condition concerning another; footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration (b) publication of the imputation; staged by doctor doctors s and personnel of the Philippine Philippine General (c) identity of the person defamed; and Hospital Hospi tal (PGH) regard regarding ing wage and economic dispute with (d) existence of malice. hospital hospi tal management. They argued that the Vidal report have Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or expose exp osed d the them, m, as pro profess fession ionals als,, to hat hatred red,, con contemp temptt and may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the ridicule. And in a bid to establish malice and bad faith on the imputation (malice in law). part of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending - Br Brililla lante nte v. Co Cour urtt of Appeal Appeals s - ma malilice ce is a te term rm us used ed to to show that the former exerted no effort toward presenting indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal illtheir side in subsequent telecasts. will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to GMA and Vidal claimed that it was contextually a concise and injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an objective narration of a matter of public concern. They also intent int ention ion to do ult ulteri erior or and unj unjusti ustifiab fiable le har harm. m. It is pre presen sentt invoked invoke d that press freedom guarantee guarantee covere covered d the teleca telecast st in when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or viewing public on the conduct of public officials. They also with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. asserted that they were "neutral." They also asserted that the In the instant case, the newscast was basically a narration of PGH PG H foo footag tages es we were re ac acco compa mpani nied ed,, wh when en sh show own, n, by an the contents of the aforementioned aforementioned petition for mandamu mandamus. s. appropriate appro priate voiceover, voiceover, thus negati negating ng the idea conju conjured red by the This is borne by the records of the case and was likewise the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report. finding of the trial court. And the narration had for its subject The trial court dismissed the complaint and also the counternothing more than the purported mistakes in paper checking claim. Reconsideration was filed and denied. and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the CA reversed reversed and ordered ordered GMA to pay for moral dam damage ages; s; August 1987 physicians’ licensure examinations attributable to exemplary damages; attorney’s fee; and cost of suit. the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. ISSUE: There may be hypothetically some failing by network but it (1) WON the televised news report in question on the filing of bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable the petition for mandamus against the respondents is libelous; act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus (2) WON the insertion of the old film footage depicting the supplying supply ing grounds for actionable libel. For, althou although gh every doctors and personnel of PGH in their 1982 demonstrations defa de famat matory ory imp imput utat atio ion n is pr pres esum umed ed to be mal malic icio ious us,, th the e constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In respondents. fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. HELD: Privileged matters - may be absolute or qualified. No. The subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, Absolute - not actionable regardless of the existence of malice a si simpl mple e na narr rrati ation on of th the e al alle lega gati tion ons s co cont ntai aine ned d in an and d in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or circums cir cumstan tances ces sur surrou roundi nding ng the fil filing ing by the uns unsucc uccess essful ful bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and provides an absolute bar to the action. made without malice and the petitioners are thus entitled to the Qualif Qua lified ied or Con Condit dition ional al - the freedom freedom fro from m lia liabil bility ity for an protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence A354 (2) RPC. of express malice or malice in fact. This kind of privilege, in
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 99 fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or mali malice ce in fac fact. t. To thi this s gen genre re bel belong ongs s "pr "priva ivate te commu co mmuni nica cati tion ons" s" an and d "f "fai airr an and d tru true e re repo port rt wi witho thout ut an any y comme co mment nts s or re remar marks ks"" fal falliling ng un unde derr an and d de desc scri ribe bed d as exce ex cept ptio ions ns in A3 A354 54 RP RPC. C. Th The e en enum umer erat atio ion n un unde derr th the e aforec afo recite ited d A35 A354 4 RPC is not an excl exclusi usive ve lis listt of con condit dition ional al privilege privi lege commun communicatio ications ns as the constit constitutiona utionall guaran guarantee tee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privil pri vilege ege to inc includ lude e fai fairr comm comment entari aries es on mat matter ters s of pub public lic interest. The report falls under the second kind of privileged matter, being a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandam man damus us pet petiti ition on by the fai failed led examinees examinees devoid devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. It was thus simply an act to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments ther th erei ein. n. It mu must st be re reit iter erat ated ed tha thatt the courts courts a qu quo o ha had d determi det ermined ned the new news s rep report ort in que questi stion on to be qua qualif lified iedly ly priv pr ivil ileg eged ed co comm mmun unic icat atio ion n pr prot otec ecte ted d un unde derr th the e 19 1987 87 Constitution. ON THE PROOF OF ILL WILL AND MALICE: The CA the respondents’ thinks that ill will and malice was establ est ablish ished. ed. As the CA not noted, ed, the ins inserti ertion on of an old film foot fo otag age e sh show owin ing g do docto ctors rs we wear arin ing g bl blac ack k ar armba mband nds s an and d demon de monstr strat atin ing g at th the e PG PGH, H, wi witho thout ut th the e ac acco compa mpany nyin ing g character-generated words "file video," created the impression that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees. SC ho wever, disagrees. The OLD PGH footage - the words "file video" it may indeed remove doubts and misrepresentation of a footage and RTC stat st ated ed "t "the he us use e of fi file le fo foota otage ge in TV new news s re repo porti rting ng is a standard practice." SC said however that the absence of the accompanying accomp anying character-generate character-generated d words "fil "file e video video"" would not change the legal situation situation insofa insofarr as the privileged privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. The footage was thus not a libel in disguise; without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. Personal Person al hurt or embarrassment embarrassment or offense, offense, even if real - not automa aut omatica tically lly equ equiva ivalen lentt to defa defamati mation. on. The law aga agains instt defamation protects one’s interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as one’s character and conduct warrant" warra nt" in the community. community. It is the community, community, not personal standards, that matters in allegations of libel and any attached claims for damages. + Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel - "Community" - may be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may require. For libel, the reason for adopting the more general meaning of community in the ascertainment of relevant standards is rooted deep in our constitutional law. Our cons co nsti titu tuti tion on pr prot otec ects ts an and d pr prom omot otes es fr free ee sp spee eech ch an and d expression, an interest shared by all Filipinos. A newspaper … should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being charged with criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the genera gen erall com communi munity ty.. A con contra trary ry rul rule e is lik likely ely to pro produc duce e an unwh un whol oles esome ome "c "chi hillllin ing g ef effec fect" t" up upon on the co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal ally ly protect pro tected ed ope operat ration ions s of the pre press ss and oth other er ins instrum trument ents s of information and education. SC also took note of the voice over used in the old footage and
there was nothing in the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond what was reported. Actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausi pla usibly bly be ded deduce uced d fro from m the fac factt of pet petiti itione oners rs hav having ing dubbed in their telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in isolation or in rela re latio tion n to th the e na narr rrate ated d Vi Vida dall re repo port, rt, ca can n be vi view ewed ed as reputation impeaching. It did not contain an attack or defamed the honesty, honesty, charac character ter or integ integrity rity or like personal qualities qualities of any an y of th the e re resp spon onde dent nts, s, wh who o we were re no nott ev even en na name med d or specifically identified in the report. If the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of publication.22 And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. There is thus no pereivable reason nor motive on the part of either petiti pet itione onerr for mal malice ice.. The They y als also o fai failed led to sub substan stantia tiate te by preponderant evidence that petitioners were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a discomforting light. Petitioners’ failure to obtain and telecast the respondents’ side is not an indicia of malice. - US 5th Circuit CA in NY Times Co. v. Connor - "a reporter … may rely on statements made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official." What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence that he or all of them collectively was or were among amon g the demonstra demonstratin ting g PGH doctors doctors in the 1982 vid video eo footage. They could thus not claim to have been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news telecast. Thus, the awards for damages may not be recovered. DISPO: DIS PO: Pet Petiti ition on is GRA GRANTE NTED. D. CA REVERSED REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial court is REINSTA REINSTATED TED and AFFIRMED in toto.
Flor vs Poeple 31 March 2005 Topic: Consequent punishment - Libel Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. Facts: This is a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Regional Trial court of Pili, Camarines Sur in a criminal case convicting Salvador Salvador Flor and Nick Ramos of libel and in a civil case awarding damages in favor of the private complainant, former Governor of Camarines Sur and Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization Luis R. Villafuerte .
Flor and Ramos were the managing editor and correspondent of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper. On or about August 18-24, 1986, in the Bicol Region (Albay, (Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, Iriga City and Naga City), the accused published in the front page an article with with the banner banner “ Villaf Villafuer uerte’ te’s s Denial Denial Convin Convinces ces No One” One” claiming that government funds by way of cash advances to public officials were used for Villafuerte’s trips to Israel and Japan. He was accompanied by mayors who supposedly did not have any public function to exercise in those trips, and that the the trips trips,, amou amount ntin ing g to P700,0 P700,000 00.00 .00,, were were for for plea pleasu sure re,, spec specif ific ical ally ly when when they they went went to Japa Japan n to watch watch the the 1986 1986 baseball games. The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos, Jr.,
100 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum, but he became a fugitive or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise and was never never arrest arrested. ed. Prior Prior to the crimin criminal al complai complaint, nt, of their functions. Villafuerte had filed a civil action for damages. Thus, the cases are consolidated pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC. Originally, There are two categories of privileged communications. The the Information was filed in Naga City, but pursuant to RA 4363 first class is those that are absolutely privileged, which include which outlines the venues for libel cases where the offended those those made made in offici official al legisl legislati ative ve procee proceedin dings gs and Court Court party is a public official, it was transferred to Pili, Camarines proc procee eedi ding ngs s for for as long long as it is conn connec ecte ted d to the the issu issues es Sur. Flor and Ramos pleaded not guilty. involved. The second class is the qualifiedly or conditionally privil privilege eged d which which is suscep susceptib tible le to libel libel when when found found to have have In the witness stand, Villafuerte refuted the claims. He said that been done with malice. This class includes the exceptions in he never went on a Japan trip and he had clarified that on the Article 354 of the RPC. radi radio. o. The The issu issue e was was neve neverr brou brough ghtt up agai again n unti untill the the questioned news article. Also, he said the Provincial Auditor According to Borjal v. CA , libel is not merely confined in the and Budget Officer denied the issue of the cash advances. He word wordin ings gs of Articl Article e 354 354 of the the RPC. RPC. Libe Libell is made made more more claims that his trip to Israel was made in his capacity as a expansive in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing Cabinet member of Corazon C. Aquino and that his personal freedom freedom of the press. press. Thus, in US v. Bustos , it is said that for funds were used for the trip. He said that the Bicol Forum did every case of libel concerning a public official as an injured not not even even bothe botherr to get get his his side side of the the story story or veri verify fy the part party y, it shou shoulld be anal analyz yzed ed in conn connec ecti tion on with ith the the contents of the news article. Furthermore, he thinks that the Consti Constituti tutiona onall guaran guarantee tee of freedo freedom m of the press. press. This This is title of the article mocks his previous explanation on the issue because public opinion will always be the check-and-balance and thus subjects him to public humiliation and ridicule. of the Government Government and the constant constant source source of liberty liberty and democrac democracy y. This This does does not mean, though though,, that there is no On the the othe otherr hand hand,, Ramo Ramos s test testif ifie ied d say saying ing he got got the the recourse for injured public official. In New York Times Co. v. information in the news article from a note given to him by a Sullivan, it is said that public officials may recover damages for sour source ce he refu refuse sed d to name name who who was was conn connec ecte ted d to the the libel but only after close scrutiny of the act and proving that it Provincial Treasurer’s Office. He talked to the source and he has been performed with actual malice, which is “knowledge was was give given n a copy copy of the Schedu Schedule le of Cash Cash Advanc Advances es of that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was Disbursing Officers and Other Officers. Among the provincial false or not.” government officials listed therein were Villafuerte who had a 1986 balance of P25,000.00 incurred for cultural activities; Atty. The OSG claims that the article article was meant meant to malign malign the Jose Maceda who also had a 1986 balance of P130,084.00 for integr integrity ity and reputatio reputation n of the Govern Governor or,, and that it was sports development, Operation Smile, NAMCYA Festival, and publ publis ishe hed d with with mali malice ce beca becaus use e it was was base based d on mere mere prisoners’ subsistence; and Eulogio Panes, J r., who had beside speculation speculation and conjecture. conjecture. This, along with their failure to his name a 1986 balance of P250,000 for the purpose of sports produce their source in Court, proves malice under the New development. development. Ramos also claimed claimed that when he went to the York Times Co. v. Sullivan test. Provincial Treasurer’s Office to conduct his investigation, he was shown some vouchers and was told that many of the The SC disagrees. For the test of New York Times to hold, members of the baseball delegation to Japan were not elected there must be clear showing of a reckless disregard of the provin provincia ciall offici officials als and, and, in fact, fact, some some mayors mayors and privat private e truth. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show this. At individuals were sent as part of the Philippine group. the time of publication, publication, the topic of the article article was legitimately legitimately an issue to be discussed since it was a hot topic in Camarines On the witness stand, Flor admitted to writing the headline and Sur at that time, as evidenced by Villafuerte going so far as to sub-headline which he claimed was suitable and fitting to the explain himself on the radio. Furthermore, the accused relied contents of the news article written by Ramos. on information from a source connected to the government. Their conclusion from the information given to them, along with Trial Court and CA found both guilty and liable for damages on public documents, may have been false but it does not amount the grounds that the sweeping conclusion of the article about to a conviction. As discussed by Newell, slight unintentional Gov. Villafuerte without verification was published with malice, errors shall be excused. thus destroying the privilege of a free media. The fact that the accused did not verify the information and did Issue: Whether or not the article is libelous? not hear out the side of Villafuerte does not amount to malice or reckless disregard. While substantiation of facts is important Held & Ratio: No, it is not libelous. in responsible news reporting, it is acceptable that a journalist relies on a lone source for information. Libel is penalized under Article 354 of the RPC. It is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or Also, failure f ailure of the accused to produce their source in Court is defect, defect, real real or imagin imaginary ary,, or any act, omissio omission, n, condit condition ion,, acceptable, acceptable, as in the case of Rodolfo Rodolfo Vasquez v. CA, wherein stat status us,, or circ circum umsta stanc nce e tend tendin ing g to caus cause e the dish dishon onor or,, the Court stated that the burden of proof is not on the accused discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or but on the prosecu prosecution tion,, especi especiall ally y in libel libel cases cases wherei wherein n to blac blacken ken the memor memory y of one one who who is dead dead.” .” There There is a journalists are constrained to give out information on presumption of malice in defamatory imputations under libel, confid confident ential ial source sources. s. The fact fact that that the informa informant nt worked worked in except except for: A private private communication communication made by any person to Government is enough to explain why he did not want to be another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; exposed in the trial concerning a superior public official. and a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comment comments s or remark remarks, s, of any judici judicial, al, legisl legislati ative, ve, or other other Finally, the argument regarding the headline of the article does official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of not hold. The Court explains that the headline must be taken any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, with ith the the whol hole arti articl cle, e, such such that that even even if ther there e is an
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 101 exagge exaggerat ration ion in the headli headline, ne, the same same may neverth neverthele eless ss present a fair index in the content of the article.
Guingguing vs CA TINGA CERTIORARI This case assails the decision of RTC which was affirmed by the CA finding Ciriaco “Boy” Guinguing and Segundo Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.
RATIO: The constitutional guarantee of free speech should be construed constru ed as not only pro protect tecting ing pol polite ite spe speech ech but even expression in its most unsophisticated form.
FACTS:
Cirse “Choy” Cirse “Choy” Torr Torralb alba a filed filed against against petiti petitione onerr and Lim a complaint for libel Tor orra ralb lba a wa was s a broadc broadcas astt jo jour urna nalilist st who handl handled ed to programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX which were based in Cebu City but broadcasted over a large portions of Visayas and Mindanao Lim Li m ca caus used ed the pu publ blic icat atio ion n of recor records ds of cr crim imin inal al cases filed against Torralba as well as photos of him being arrested o Th Thes ese e were were pub publi lish shed ed by by mean means s of a oneonepage ad paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner o The Sunday Po Post st was was ci cirrculated in th the e province of Bohol as well as in the Visayas and Mindanao Torr orralb alba a asserte asserted d that he had had alread already y been acqu acquitt itted ed and an d the ca case ses s re refer ferre red d to in th the e pu publ blic icati ation on ha had d already been settled o He all alleg eged ed tha thatt the the publ public icati ation on pla place ced d him him in public contempt and ridicule and that it was designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist Lim Li m al alle lege ged d th that at Tor orra ralb lba a wa was s ma maki king ng sc scur urri rilo lous us attack against him and his family and since he had no access to radio time, he opted for paid ads to answer the attacks as a measure of self-defense o Al Also so argu argues es that that Tor Torra ralb lba, a, as a medi media a man and member of the 4th estate, occupied a position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public scrutiny The lo low wer co cour urtt co conc nclu lude ded d th that at th the e pu publ bliica cati tio on complai comp lained ned of was ind indeed eed lib libelo elous. us. Dec Declar laring ing tha thatt malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was present in the case because every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the th e pa part rt of the au auth thor or an and d pu publ blis ishe herr tow towar ards ds th the e person subject thereof. o lo lowe werr court court gave gave no no crede credenc nce e to Lim Lim and petiti pet itioner’ oner’s s arg argumen umentt tha thatt the pub public licatio ation n was resorted to in self-defense. o Al Also so disr disreg egar arde ded d th the e in insu sula lati tive ve effe effect cts s of Tor orra ralb lba’ a’s s sta statu tus s as a me medi diam aman an to th the e prosecution prosec ution of the criminal libel charge. The publication of a calumny even against public offic of ficer ers s or ca cand ndid idat ates es fo forr pu publ blic ic of offic fice, e, accord acc ording ing to the trial cou court, rt, is an off offens ense e most dangerous to the people. It deserves puni pu nishm shmen entt be beca caus use e th the e la latte tterr may be deceiv dec eived ed the thereby reby and rej reject ect the best and
deserving deservi ng cit citize izens ns to the their ir gre great at inj injury ury.. It further held that a private reputation is as constitutionally protected as the enjoyment of life, liberty and property such that anybody who wh o at atta tack cks s a pe pers rson on’’s re repu puta tati tion on by slanderous words or libelous publications is oblige obl iged d to make full comp compens ensati ation on for the damage done CA af affir firmed med the fi find ndin ing g of gui guilt lt o Sa Saiid selff-d defe fen nse was unavailing as a justification since the defendant should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him. o Al Also so ass asserted that th the e purpose of selfdefen de fense se in lilibe bell is to re repa pair ir,, mi mini nimiz mize e or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the defendant to utterr blo utte blow-fo w-for-b r-blow low scu scurri rrilou lous s lan langua guage ge in retu re turn rn fo forr wh what at he re rece ceiv ived ed.. On Once ce th the e defen de fenda dant nt hi hits ts ba back ck wi with th eq equa uall or mo more re scurr scu rrililou ous s re remar marks ks un unne nece cess ssary ary fo forr hi his s defe de fens nse, e, th the e re reta tallia iati tion on be beco come mes s an independent act for which he may be liable. Peti Pe titi tion oner er co cont nten ends ds th that at as ed edit itor or-p -pub ubli lish sher er of th the e Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the th e lo lowe werr co cour urts ts’’ fi find ndin ing g of gu guil iltt ag agai ains nstt hi him m constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press o Also fau faults lts the LC’ LC’s s failu failure re to appr appreci eciate ate sel selffdefense
ISSUE: WON the publication is indeed libelous HELD: NO
Underr the crim Unde crimin inal al law law, libel libel is def defin ined ed as a publi public c and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defec de fect, t, re real al or ima imagi gina nary ry,, or an any y ac act, t, omi omiss ssio ion, n, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the t he memory of one who is dead. Th Thus us,, the the eleme elements nts of lib libel el ar are: e: o (a (a)) imp mpu uta tattion of a discreditable act or condition to another; o (b (b)) pub publilica cati tion on of th the e imp imputa utati tion on;; o (c) id iden enti tity ty of of the the pers person on def defame amed; d; and and,, o (d (d)) exi exist sten ence ce of mal malic ice e Th The e Cour Courtt then then histo histori rici cized zed lilibe bel: l: o 16 1603 03 – libe libell agai agains nstt a publi public c offi office cerr is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man and that truth of a defamatory imputation is not a defense o 17 1735 35 – trut truth h was was unoff unoffic icia ially lly ackn acknow owle ledge dged d as defense in libel o Th Then en,, in New Yor York k Time Times s v. Sull Sulliv ivan an,, from from where whe re the mod modern ern libel law eme emerge rged, d, the actual malice doctrine was established’ Sa Said id tha thatt a publi public c offi offici cial al may may not not successfully sue for libel unless the offici off icial al can pro prove ve actu actual al mal malice ice,, whi hic ch was defi fin ned as “w “wiith knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true Leeway was was allow owe ed even if th the e chal ch alle leng nged ed stat st atem eme ent nts s wer ere e fact fa ctua uall lly y er erro rone neou ous s if ho hone nest stly ly made.
102 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 o The Court cited more American cases but reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true 2 deter determin minant ants s of of the the peti petitio tioner’ ner’s s guil guilt: t: I’m no lon longer ger includin including g the them m her here e sin since ce I o WO WON N Tor Torra ralb lba a is is a pu publ blic ic fi figu gure re don’t think they’re impt. The Th e promin prominen entt Ameri America can n legal legal comme comment ntato atorr, Cass Cass YES, he is Sunstein, has summarized the current American trend He is is a br broa oadc dcas astt journ journal alis istt for 2 in libel law as follows: radio stations He even even asse assert rted ed befo before re the the tr tria iall [C]onsider the law of libel. Here we have cour co urtt th that at hi his s br broa oad dca cast st wa was s an explicit system of free speech tiers. To list li sten ened ed to wi wide dely ly,, he henc nce, e, hi his s simp si mpli lify fy a co comp mple lex x bo body dy of la law w: In th the e notoriety is unquestionable. o If yes, yes, WON WON the pub publi lica cati tio on was made made w/ w/ highes hig hest, t, mo mostst-spe speech ech pro protec tectiv tive e tie tierr is actual malice libelous speech directed against a “public Government ment can allow libel plain plaintiffs tiffs SC said said any any stat statem eme ent that that does does figure”. Govern to re reco cove verr da dama mage ges s as a re resu sult lt of su such ch not contain a provably false factual speech if and only if the speaker had “actual conn co nno ota tati tion on will wi ll rece re ceiive fulll fu that at is is,, th the e spe constitutional protection malice”–th speake akerr mus mustt hav have e Ho Howe weve verr, during during the the trial trial,, Tor Torra ralb lba a known that the speech was false, or he himse hi mself lf ad admi mitt tted ed th the e tru truth th of the must have been recklessly indifferent to content of the ad its truth or falsity. This standard means that the spe speaker aker is pro protec tected ted aga agains instt lib libel el sui suits ts The in info form rmat atio ion, n, mo more reov over er,, wen entt unless he knew that he was lying or he was into the very character and integrity truly foolish to think that he was telling the of complainant to which his listening truth. A person counts as a public figure (1) if public has a very legitimate interest. he is a “public official” in the sense that he Complainant hosts a public affairs works wor ks for the gov govern ernment ment,, (2) if, whi while le not prog pr ogra ram, m, on one e wh whic ich h he hi himse mself lf employed by government, he otherwise has clai cl aimed med wa was s im imbu bued ed wi with th pu publ blic ic pervasive fame or notoriety in the community, char ch arac acte terr si sinc nce e it de deal als s wit ith h or (3 (3)) if he ha has s th thru rust st hi himse mself lf in into to so some me “cor “c orru rupt ptio ions ns in gov over ern nme ment nt,, particular controversy in order to influence its corr co rrup upti tion ons s by pu publ blic ic of offic ficia ials ls,, resolution. irre ir regu gula lari riti ties es in go gove vern rnmen mentt in In Adi Adion ong g v. v. COMELE COMELEC, C, the the Cour Courtt accep accepte ted d comrades.” By entering into this line the actual malice stadard regarding criminal of work, complainant in effect gave libel cases concerning public figures the public a legitimate interest in his Pub Public lic figu figure re defini definitio tion n in Aye Ayerr v. v. Capulo Capulong ng w/c w/c life. He likewise gave them a stake the Court got from an American textbook on in finding out if he himself had the torts: integrity and character to have the o A pub publi lic c figu figure re has has bee been n defi define ned d as righ ri ghtt to cr crit itic iciz ize e oth other ers s fo forr the their ir a person who, by his conduct. accomplishments, fame, or mode of SC hel held tha that Ar Art 354 354 of RPC RPC, as living, or by adopting a profession or applied to public figures callllin ca ing g wh whic ich h gi give ves s the pu publ blic ic a complaining of criminal libel, must legitimate interest in his doings, his be construed in light of th the e affa af fair irs, s, an and d hi his s ch char arac acte terr, ha has s cons co nsti titu tuti tion onal al gu guar aran ante tee e of fre free e become a 'public personage.' He is, expr ex pres essi sion on,, and an d this th is Co Cour urt’ t’s s in other words, a celebrity. Obviously precedents upholding the standard to be included in this category are of actual malice with the necessary thos th ose e wh who o ha have ve ac achi hiev eved ed so some me imp mpli lica cati tion on th that at a sta st ate teme ment nt degree deg ree of rep reputat utation ion by app appear earing ing regarding a public figure if true is before the public, as in the case of not libelous. an act actor or,, a pro profess fession ional al bas baseba eballll Art 354 provision itself play pl ayer er,, a pu pugi gili list st,, or an any y ot othe her r allo al lows ws fo forr su such ch le leew eway ay,, ente en terta rtain iner er.. Th The e lilist st is is,, ho howe weve verr, acce ac cept ptin ing g as a de defen fense se broader than this. It includes public “good intention and offi of fice cers rs,, fa famo mous us in inve vent ntor ors s an and d justifiable motive.” expl ex plor orer ers, s, wa warr he hero roes es an and d ev even en The exercise of free ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, expression, and its and no less a personage than the concor con cordan dantt ass assura urance nce of Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It comm co mmen enta tary ry on pu publ blic ic includes, in short, anyone who has affairs affair s and public figure figures, s, arrive arr ived d at a pos positi ition on whe where re pub public lic certainly qualif y as attention is focused upon him as a “justi “ju stifia fiable ble moti motive,” ve,” if not person. “good intention.” In order order to justi justify fy a convict conviction ion for for crimina criminall libel libel again against st The guar guarant antee ee of of free spe speech ech was was enact enacted ed to prote protect ct a pu publ blic ic fi figu gure re,, it mu must st be es esta tabl blis ishe hed d be beyo yond nd not only polite speech, but even expression in its most reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were unso un soph phis isti tica cate ted d fo form rm.. Cr Crim imin inal al lilibe bell st stan ands ds as a made mad e or pu publ blis ishe hed d wi with th ac actu tual al ma malilice ce,, me mean anin ing g necessary qualification to any absolutist interpretation know kn owle ledg dge e th that at th the e sta state teme ment nt wa was s fa fals lse e or wi with th of th the e fr free ee sp spee eech ch cl clau ause se,, if on only ly be beca caus use e it
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 103
preven prev ents ts th the e pr prol olife ifera rati tion on of un untr truth uths s wh whic ich h if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to safeguard against fears that the public debate might be muted due to the reckless enforcement of libel laws, truth has been sanctioned as a de defen fense se,, mu much ch mo more re in th the e ca case se when the state st ateme ments nts in qu ques esti tion on ad addr dres ess s pu publ blic ic is issu sues es or involve public figures. Thus, the publicati tio on of th the e advertiseme men nt by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the int intent ention ion to let the pub public lic know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with goo go od mo moti tive ves s an and d fo forr ju just stif ifiiab able le en ends ds.. The advertisement advert isement in questi question on falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal is mandated. In as asce cert rtai aini ning ng th the e de degr gree ee of fa fals lsiity th that at wo woul uld d constitute consti tute actual malic malice, e, the Court, citing New York Times, has even gone so far as acknowledging:
Even assuming that the contents of th the e ar arti ticl cles es ar are e fa fals lse, e, me mere re er erro rorr, inaccuracy inacc uracy or even falsity alone does not Errors or prove actual malice. misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of tr tru uly fr free ee ex expr pres essi sion on an and d de deba bate te..
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care ca re,, th the e pr pres ess s sh shou ould ld no nott be he held ld to accoun acc ount, t, to a poi point nt of sup suppre pressi ssion, on, for honest hone st mista mistakes kes or impe imperfect rfections ions in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgmen misjudgmentt. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held — A newspaper especially one national in reach and covera cov erage, ge, sho should uld be free to re repo port rt on ev even ents ts an and d developments in which the publ pu blic ic ha has s a le legi giti tima mate te interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or ano another ther on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspa new spaper per resp respects ects and keeps within the standards of mo mora rali lity ty an and d ci civi vili lity ty prevailing with thiin the th e general community communit y. To avo avoid id the sel self-ce f-censo nsorsh rship ip tha thatt would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Ti Times mes doc doctrin trine e req requir uires es that liability for defamation of a public official or publ pu blic ic fi figu gure re may not be im impo pose sed d in th the e
absence absenc e of pro proof of of "ac "actua tuall mal malice ice"" on the part pa rt of th the e pe pers rson on ma maki king ng th the e li libe belo lous us statement.
Philippine Journalists vs Theonen Qualifiedly privileged communication communication ceases to DOCTRINE: Qualifiedly be privileged when published
FACTS: Christina Lee, as a reporter for People’s Journal, acquired a copy of a letter sent by a certain Atty. Efren Angara to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation. The letter asked for information regarding Francis Thoenen, a Swiss living in BF Homes. The letter letter alleged that that Thoenen Thoenen had been known known to shoot stray pets in the neighborhood. Prompted by this letter, Lee published an article in the People’s Journal Journal on the same subject. subject. She deviated deviated from the original original cont conten ents ts of the the Anga Angara ra lett letter er,, sayi saying ng that that Thoe Thoene nen’ n’s s deport deportati ation on was being sought. sought. She include included d not only the identity identity of Thoenen but but also his home address. address. She added certain certain details details absent from the Angara letter about complaints from neighbors and a confrontation that took place with a pet owner. Thoene Thoenen, n, a retire retired d engine engineer er permane permanentl ntly y residi residing ng in the country with his Filipina wife, filed for damages claiming that the report was defamatory. defamatory. He also says that there was never any shooting shooting of pets that took place. place. In addition addition to the other discr discrep epan anci cies es in the repo report rt (ment (mentio ione ned d abov above) e),, he also also contests the identity of Atty. Angara who could not be found in the rolls of lawyers. The RTC decided in favor of People’s Journal and Lee, saying that there was no malice malice in publishing publishing the report. report. The court said said that that the report report fell fell under under the purview purview of a qualif qualified iedly ly privileged matter and therefore cannot be presumed malicious. The CA reversed this decision and ruled that a violation of Civil Code, Art. 195 was committed. committed. MR of People’s People’s Journal Journal and and Lee was denied so they petitioned to the SC under certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Lee’s report was qualifiedly privileged 2. Whether or not damages may be awarded to Thoenen
HELD: SC affirms CA decision 1. No. The letter of Atty. Atty. Angara Angara may have been qualifiedly qualifiedly privileged (SC did not say if in fact it was), but it ceased to be so when published 2. Yes. Yes. Thoenen Thoenen is awarded moral and and exemplary damages damages and is granted legal fees. RATIO: People’s Journal and Lee argued that the issue is not under NCC 19 (as the CA held) but one under Libel (RPC 353). Libel has the following requisites: 1. Alle Allega gatio tion n of a disc discre redi dita tabl ble e act act 2. Publ Public icat atio ion n of of a cha charg rge e 3. Iden Identi tity ty of of the the def defam amed ed 4. Exis Existe tenc nce e of mali malice ce Generally, malice is presumed in defamatory remarks, but this
5 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
104 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 is not not the the case case in qual qualifi ified edly ly priv privilileg eged ed matte matters rs (pri (priva vate te duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to communication or report regarding public officials). Petitioners directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion say that that becaus because e the report report was qualifi qualifiedl edly y privil privilege eged, d, no demands...amon demands...among g other reasons reasons which which there is hardly time to malice can be presumed and therefore the 4th requisite for libel state state herein herein,, the prayer prayer in the instant instant petiti petition on cannot cannot be is not met. granted.” 1981,, the the BP (Bata (Batasa sang ng Pamba Pambans nsa) a) prop propos osed ed Facts: In 1981 SC finds finds this of of no merit. merit. In US v. Bustos, the Court held that amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were in order for a report regarding a public official to be qualifiedly to be placed to a plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES privileged, it must be addressed solely to an official with proper vote was being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party while the jurisdiction over the matter. NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. Earlier, to ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 Thoenen is not a public public officer. Even if it is held that the letter w/c, to wit, provided that there be equal opportunity (1467), of spurious Atty. Angara was privileged when he inquired to the equal time (1468) and equal space (1469) on media used for CID, CID, this this ceas ceased ed to be the the case case when when Lee Lee publ publis ishe hed d its its campaigns for both sides. contents in her People’s Journal report. Further, article is not a On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV fair and true account account so it cannot be privileged. privileged. Because Because it is and and radi radio o fro from 9:30 9:30p pm to 11:3 11:30p 0pm. m. The same same was not privileged, malice is presumed and the 4 th requisite of libel broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations is met! nationwide. Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO to COMELEC dated 10 March A publication that knowingly publishes false matters cannot 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same prime time enjoy the protection under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. and number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., it “requested” that the public meeting on Saturday, Contempt March 21, at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, be covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. In re: Emil Jurado In spite spite of its suppli supplicat cation ion,, COMELE COMELEC C denied denied the demand demand,, stating that: “The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have Forum the the same same cons consti titu tuti tion ona al prer prerog ogat atiives ves vest vested ed in the the President/Prime Minister ... As such, it has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos.” The Rallies UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with with the TV or radio radio station stations s concer concerned ned.. This This Commis Commissio sion, n, Primicias vs Fugoso however, cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities. First of all, the COMELEC cannot assume dictatorial Reyes vs Bagatsing powers and secondly, the rule of equal time for campaigning as to dura durati tion on and and qual qualit ity y is not not appl applic icab able le unde underr the the circumstances of this case.. Ruiz vs Gordon In its motion for reconsideration, UNIDO justified acquiescence to its prayer since contrary to what the decretal section of German vs Barangan COMELEC the assailed resolution concluded “the radio and televi televisio sion n covera coverage ge on March March 12th, 12th, did not deal deal with with any Media ‘program ‘program of government’ government’ [or] any ‘guideline ‘guideline of national national policy” but the core of the progra program m (“Pulo (“Pulongng-pul pulong ong sa Pangul Pangulo”) o”) Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting [was] [was] a campa campaig ign n for for the appr approva ovall of the the cons consti titut tutio iona nall amendments; and that the President had utilized this avenue of campaign campaign without without charge. charge. Notwithstand Notwithstanding ing these defences defences Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs Dans brought forth by UNIDO, COMELEC did not find any cogent reas reason on to reve revers rse e its its earl earlie ierr reso resolu luti tion on and and gran grantt the the Gonzales vs Katigbak supplicant’s prayer. UNID UNIDO O assa assaililed ed this this deni denial al as a viol violati ative ve of the the “basi “basic c principles of equality, good faith and fair play, and they are not Ayer vs Capulong conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections,” hence, this appeal for review. UNIDO vs COMELEC Issue: WON the COMELEC erred in denying the petition of UNIDO. Ponente: Barredo, J. Held: (No.) The deno denoume ument nt of the the pone ponenc ncia ia writ writes es of an One-Liner : The Supreme Court Court was of the considere considered d view, view, in Ratio: The Supreme unsu unsucc cces essf sful ulll fini finis s of UNID UNIDO’ O’s s pray prayer er to comp compel el the the consonance with the COMELEZ resolution, that when Pres. COMELEC to bequeath upon them the same free air time Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the Pres. Marcos had enjoyed in advocating his vote of confidence peop people le on Marc March h 12, 12, 1981 1981,, he did did so in his capa capaci city ty as in the amendments to the 1973 Constitution in the coming President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head plebiscite as thus: “(1) being beyond what the charter, the laws of any politi political cal party. party. Under Under the Constit Constituti ution, on, the “Prime “Prime and pertinent Comelecr egulations contemplate [ralated to the Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible... for the program plea’s ‘being impractical under prevailing circumstances, and of government and shall determine the guidelines of national for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, policy’ ( Art. IX, Sec. 2 ).” thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act’], for (2.) being It also also saw saw the the “Pul “Pulon ongg-Pu Pulo long ng sa Pang Pangul ulo” o” as merel merely y a more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the verita veritable ble channe channell whereb whereby y the Preside President nt imbued imbued with with the
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 105 power and duty to inform the voting populace of indispensable info nforma rmatio tion rela relate ted d to the the ple plebisc biscit ite e—an —an even eventt of transcendental importance to the government and the people constituting it. In the the pres presen entt scen scenar ario io the the Cour Courtt also also note noted d that that the the COMELEC indeed has the power to supervise and regulate but absent any showing that “any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled” this remedy is not forthcoming. Disposition: Appeal unmeritorious. The Supr Suprem eme e Cour Courtt coul could d not not compe compell TV Obiter Obiter Dicta: The stations and radio stations, being indispensable parties, to give UNIDO free air time as they were not impleaded in this case. UNIDO must seek a contract with these TV stations and radio stat statio ions ns at its its own own expe expens nse. e. The The logi logic c of this this edic edictt is highlighte highlighted d if all the other oppositors of the amendment amendment came for judicial recourse; an absurb situation would thus materialize — the court being constrained from granting them less aid than justice would heed.
Political Campaigns
Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting UNIDO vs COMELEC National Press Club vs COMELEC Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC
Other Interests Freedom of Information Adiong vs COMELEC Senate vs Ermita (G.R. No. 169777)
Constitutional Law II Topic: Freedom of Information Date: April 20, 2006 Ponente: Carpio Morales Facts:
Septemb Sept ember er 21 – 23, 23, 2005 2005 – Commi Committe ttee e of the the Senate Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Exec Ex ecut utiv ive e De Depa part rtme ment nt fo forr th them em to ap appe pear ar on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearin hea ring g on the railway railway pro projec jectt of the North Luz Luzon on Raililwa Ra ways ys Co Corp rpor orat atio ion n wi with th th the e Ch Chin ina a Na Nati tion onal al Machinery and Equipment Group (North Rail Project). Likewise, the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued invitations to some AFP officials (i.e. Senga, Esperon, Mayuga, Danga, Gudani, and Balutan) for them to attend as resource persons in a public publi c heari hearing ng on Septemb September er 28, 2005 regarding: regarding: (1) Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005 200 5 (ba (based sed on Pim Piment entel’ el’s s pri privil vilege ege spe speech ech); ); (2) Wire-Tapping in the Philippines (based on Jinggoy’s privil pri vilege ege spe speech ech); ); (3) “Cl “Clear ear and Pre Presen sentt Dan Danger ger”” (based (ba sed on Bia Biazon zon’s ’s pri privil vilege ege spe speech ech); ); (4) Rol Role e of Military in Gloriagate Scandal (based on Senate Res.
No. 285 filed by Madrigal); and (5) Wire-Tapping of the Pre Presid sident ent of the Phi Philip lippin pines es (ba (based sed on Sen Senate ate Res. No. 295 filed by Biazon). o Ge Gene nera rall Seng Senga a requ reques este ted d for pos postpo tpone neme ment nt due to a pressing operational situation that demands his perso personal nal attention. Also, some of th the e in invi vite ted d AF AFP P of offic ficer ers s ar are e cu curre rrentl ntly y atte at tend ndin ing g to ot othe herr ur urge gent nt op oper erat atio iona nall matters. o Ex Exec ecut utiv ive e Se Secr cret etar ary y Er Ermi mita ta also also re requ ques este ted d for po post stpo pone nemen mentt so th that at th the e re requ ques ested ted offici off icials als of the Exe Executi cutive ve Dep Departm artment ent can have ample time and opportunity to study and an d pr prep epar are e fo forr th the e va vari riou ous s is issu sues es to be disc di scus usse sed. d. Sena Se nate te Pres Pr esid iden entt Dril Dr ilon on resp re spon onde ded d to th this is say sayin ing g tha thatt he ca cann nnot ot grant his request since all preparations and arrangements to all resource persons were completed the previous week. o Jo Jose se Cort Cortes es,, Jr Jr., ., Pres Presid iden entt of th the e No Nort rth h Luzon Railways Corporation, requested that the he hear arin ing g on the No North rthra railil pr proj ojec ectt be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. Se Septe ptembe mberr 28, 2005 2005 – the Pres Presid iden entt issue issued d EO 464, 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Pow Power ers, s, Ad Adhe here renc nce e to the Ru Rule le on Exe Execu cuti tive ve Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under Und er the Con Consti stituti tution on and For Oth Other er Pur Purpos poses, es,”” whic wh ich h pu purs rsua uant nt to Se Sec. c. 6 th ther ereo eoff to took ok ef effe fect ct immediately. o Sec. 1 – Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress – All heads of depart dep artmen ments ts of the Ex Execu ecutiv tive e Bra Branch nch of Government shall secure the consent of the President Presi dent prior to appea appearing ring before eithe either r accord ordanc ance e wit with h House Hou se of Con Congre gress ss (in acc Article VI, Section 22 of 1987 Constitut ion) o Sec. 2 A – Na Nature a nd nd S co cope – Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive orde or derr, in incl clud udin ing: g: (1 (1)) co conv nver ersa sati tion ons s an and d correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this EO; (2) mili mi lita tary ry,, di dipl plom omat atic ic an and d ot othe herr na nati tion onal al securi sec urity ty mat matter ters s whi which ch in the int intere erest st of national security should not be divulged; (3) inform inf ormati ation on bet betwee ween n int inter er-gov -govern ernmen mental tal agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements; (4) discussion in clos cl osee-do door or Ca Cabi bine nett me meet etin ings gs;; an and d (5 (5)) matters affecting national security and public order. o Sec. 2 B – Wh Who ar are C ov overed – (1) Senior Officials of executive departments who in the judgment of department heads are covered by the executive privilege; (2) Generals and flag fl ag of offi fice cers rs of th the e AF AFP P an and d su such ch ot othe her r officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; (3)) PNP officers with rank of chief (3 superi sup erinte ntenden ndentt or hig higher her and suc such h oth other er officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
106 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 executive and legislative branches of the government. PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Fe Feb bru ruar ary y 20 2006 06 – Se Sena nato torr Bi Biaz azon on re reit iter erat ate ed hi his s (4) Senior national security officials who in invitation to Gen. Senga for him to attend the wirethe th e ju judg dgme ment nt of th the e Na Nati tion onal al Se Secu curi rity ty tapping hearing. Again, he refused pursuant to EO Adviser are covered by the executive 464 since their request to attend such was not yet privilege; (5) Such other officers as may be approved by the President. As none of those invited determined by the President. o Se Sec. c. 3 – App Appea eara ranc nce e of Othe Otherr Publ Public ic Off Offic icia ials ls appear app eared, ed, the hea hearin ring g on Feb Februa ruary ry 10, 200 2006 6 was Before Congress – Officials enumerated in cancelled. In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food Sec.. 2B sha Sec shall ll sec secure ure prior con consen sentt of the and the Blue Ribbon Committee (re: mismanagement President Pres ident prior to appearing before eithe either r of fer fertil tilize izerr fund fund), ), the inv invite ited d cab cabine inett off offici icials als als also o House of Congress to ensure the invoked EO 464. In the budget hearing set by the observance of the principle of separation of Sena Se nate te,, Pre Pr ess Secr Se cret etar ary y and an d Pres Pr esid iden enti tial al powers, adherence to the rule on executive Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye, DOJ Secretary Raul privilege and respect for the rights of public M. Gonzalez and Department of Interior and Local offi of fici cial als s ap appe pear aring ing in in inqu quir irie ies s in ai aid d of Gove Go vern rnmen mentt Un Unde ders rsec ecre retar tary y Ma Mari rius us P. Co Corp rpus us legislation. Se Sept ptemb ember er 28, 2005 2005 – Dr Drililon on recei receive ved d anothe anotherr le lette tter r communicated their inability to attend due to lack of from fr om Er Ermi mita ta in info form rmin ing g hi him m th that at th the e re requ ques este ted d appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to execut exe cutive ive of offici ficials als hav have e not sec secure ured d the req requir uired ed EO 46 464. 4. Du Duri ring ng th the e Fe Febr brua uary ry 13 13,, 20 2005 05 bu budg dget et consent from the President so they would not be able hearing, hearin g, howe however, ver, Secretary Bunye was allowed to to attend the above abovementio mentioned ned hearings. Gen. Senga attend by Executive Secretary Ermita. also sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him that Fe Febr brua uary ry 13, 13, 2006 2006 - Jose Jose Anse Anselmo lmo I. I. Cadiz Cadiz and and the no approval has been granted by the President to any incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official Despite Despi te these, the invest investigatio igation n pushed through with organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudan attending. constitutional right to be informed on matters of public These two were later relieved from their military posts inte in tere rest st,, fi file led d th thei eirr pe peti titi tion on fo forr ce cert rtio iora rari ri an and d and were made to face court martial proceedings. prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray Oct Octobe oberr 3, 2005 2005 – three three peti petitio tions ns were were filed filed befo before re the the that E.O. 464 be declared null and void. SC challenging the constitutionality of EO 464 Peti Petitio tioner ners s submit submit that that EO 464 464 violat violates es the fol follow lowing ing o Ba Bay yan Mu Muna na,, Oca camp mpo o, Be Belt ltra ran, n, Ma Mari rian ano, o, constitutional provisions: (1) Art. VI, Sec. 21 (Inquiries Maza, Maz a, Vi Virado rador, r, Cas Casino ino,, Cou Courag rage, e, COD CODAL AL in aid of Legislation), (2) Art. VI, Sec. 22 (Question claim that EO 464 infringes on their rights Hour), (3) Art. VI, Sec. 1 (Legislative Power), (4) Art. and an d im impe pede des s th them em fr from om fu fulf lfil illi ling ng th thei eir r XI, Sec. 1 (Public office is a public trust.), (5) Art. III, respective obligations (i.e. right as a political Sec. Se c. 7 (R (Rig ight ht to In Infor forma matio tion) n),, (6 (6)) Ar Art. t. III III,, Se Sec. c. 4 party to participate in governance, rights and (Freedom (Freed om of Speech Speech,, Expres Expression, sion, Press, Assembly Assembly,, duties dut ies as mem member bers s of Con Congre gress, ss, rig right ht to etc.), (7) Art. XIII, Sec. 16 (Right of people and their tenure of members in public office, duty to organizations to effective and reasonable participation uphold the rule of law, right to information at all levels of social, political, and economic decisionand to a transparent government). For this, making shall not be abridged), (5) Art. II, Sec. 28 (Full they prayed that EO 464 be declared null Public Disclosure of Transactions). and void for being unconstitutional; and, that Respondents ts,, on th the e other hand, pray for the Ermi Er mita ta be pr proh ohib ibit ited ed fro from m im impo posi sing ng an and d dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit. threatening to impose sanctions on officials who ap appe pear ar be befo fore re Co Con ngr gres ess s du due e to Exce cept pt wi with th re resp spec ectt to re requ quis isit ites es of Procedura Proc edurall Issue Issues: s: Ex congressional summons. standing and existence of actual case or controversy, where o Cha Chavez vez (ci (citiz tizen, en, taxp taxpaye ayerr, law law pra practio ctioner ner)) the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the o Al Alte tern rnati ative ve Law Law Gro Group ups, s, Inc. Inc. cla claim ims s that that EO EO rest of the requisites for judicial review shall be omitted. 464 46 4 de deni nied ed to th the e pu publ blic ic th thei eirr ri righ ghtt to 1. WO WON N peti petiti tion oner ers s have have stan standi ding ng information on public concerns. As such, the 2. WON the there re is is an act actual ual cas case e or con contro trover versy sy group prayed that said order be declared null and an d vo void id an and d tha thatt Er Ermi mita ta be or orde dere red d to Substantive Issues: cease from implementing it. 3. WO WON N EO 46 464 4 co cont ntra rave vene nes s th the e pow owe er of in inqu quir iry y Oc Octo tobe berr 11, 11, 2005 – Senat Senate e of the Phili Philipp ppin ines es filed filed a vested ves ted in Con Congre gress ss (in the lig light ht of the validity validity of petition for certiorari and prohibition. It argued that EO certain sections of EO 464) 464 dir directl ectly y int interf erfere eres s wit with h and imp impede edes s the val valid id 4. WO WON N EO 464 464 vi viol ola ate tes s th the e ri righ ghtt of the the pe peop oplle to exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and information on matters of public concern concea con ceals ls inf inform ormati ation on of gre great at pub public lic int intere erest st and 5. WO WON N respon responde dent nts s have commi committe tted d a gr grav ave e abuse abuse of concern. discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its Oct Octobe oberr 14, 2005 2005 – PDPPDP-Lab Laban an (poli (politic tical al party party)) filed filed a publication in a newspaper of general circulation similar petition. it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be Held/ Ratio: imple imp lemen mente ted d thr throu ough gh its me membe mbers rs in Co Cong ngre ress ss,, 1. Peti Petitio tioner ners s have lega legall standin standing g standin standing g except except PDPPDPpart pa rtic icul ular arly ly in the co cond nduc uctt of in inqu quir irie ies s in ai aid d of Laban because its allegation that EO 464 hampers its legisl leg islati ation on and tra transce nscende ndenta ntall iss issues ues nee need d to be legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the is only a genera generalized lized interest interest which it shares with the
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2.
3.
rest of political parties. The Th e Senate, Senate, incl includ udin ing g its indiv individ idua uall member members, s, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the contro con trover versy sy and is the proper proper par party ty to ass assail ail the constitution consti tutionality ality of E.O. 464. Indeed Indeed,, legisl legislators ators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any offic of ficia iall ac actio tion n wh whic ich h the they y cl clai aim m in infri fring nges es th thei eir r prerogatives as legislators. It is wellwell-se sett ttle led d th that at when when suin suing g as a ci citi tize zen, n, the inte terrest of the petiti tio oner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. Yes es.. As the imple impleme ment ntat atio ion n of the challe challeng nged ed order order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event befo be fore re co cons nsid ider erin ing g th the e pr pres esen entt ca case se ri ripe pe fo for r adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464. The Co Cour urtt fi find nds s re resp spon onde dent nts’ s’ as asse sert rtio ion n th that at th the e President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in det determi erminin ning g the existence existence of an act actual ual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. E. O. 46 464 4 do does es no nott re requ quir ire e ei eith ther er a de deli libe bera rate te withho wit hholdi lding ng of con consen sentt or an exp expres ress s pro prohib hibiti ition on issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. Sec. Se c. 1, in view view of its its speci specifi fic c refer referen ence ce to Sec. Sec. 22 of Art. VI, is valid. Likewise, Sec. 2A is also valid as it merely provides guidelines. On the other hand, Secs. 3 and 2B must be invalidated. Val alid idit ity y of of Sec Secti tion on 1 o Se Secti ction on 1 spec specif ific ical ally ly app applilies es to dep depar artme tment nt heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herselff has, throug hersel through h the chall challenged enged order, made ma de th the e de dete term rmin inat atio ion n th that at th they ey ar are. e. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by execut executive ive privilege. privilege. In fact, in mark ma rked ed co cont ntra rast st to Se Sect ctio ion n 3 vi viss-àà-vi vis s Section 2, there is no reference to executive privil pri vilege ege at all all.. Rat Rather her,, the req requir uired ed pri prior or consen con sentt und under er Sect Section ion 1 is gro ground unded ed on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation legisl ation and the questi question on hour hour.. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sec Secti tion ons s 21 and and 22, 22, the there refor fore, e, whil while e closely related and complementary
to ea each ch ot othe herr, sh shou ould ld no nott be cons co nsid ider ered ed as pe perta rtain inin ing g to the same sa me po powe werr of Co Cong ngre ress ss.. On One e specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used forr le fo legi gisl slat atio ion, n, wh whil ile e th the e ot othe her r pertains to the power to conduct a ques qu esti tion on ho hour ur,, the ob obje jecti ctive ve of which whi ch is to obt obtain ain informati information on in purs pu rsui uitt of Co Cong ngre ress ss’’ ov over ersi sigh ghtt function. o Sec Secti tion on 1, 1, in view view of of its spe speci cific fic refe refere renc nce e to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and an d th the e abs bsen ence ce of an any y re refe fere renc nce e to inqu in quir irie ies s in ai aid d of le legi gisl slat atio ion, n, mu must st be constru con strued ed as lilimite mited d in its app applic licati ation on to appear app earanc ances es of dep departm artment ent hea heads ds in the question questi on hour contemplated contemplated in the provis provision ion of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as po possi ssibl ble, e, in a wa way y tha thatt wi willll re rend nder er it constitutional. o Th The e requi require reme ment nt then then to sec secur ure e presi preside dent ntia iall consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of th the e Co Cons nsti titu tuti tion on,, th the e ap appe pear aran ance ce of depart dep artment ment heads in the que questi stion on hou hourr is discretionary on their part. o Se Sect ctio ion n 1 ca cann nnot ot,, ho how wev ever er,, be ap app pli lied ed to appe ap pear aran ance ces s of de depa part rtme ment nt he head ads s in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not boun bo und d in su such ch in insta stanc nces es to re resp spec ectt th the e refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is su sub bse sequ quen entl tly y ma mad de, ei eith ther er by th the e Pres Pr esid iden entt he hers rsel elff or by th the e Ex Exec ecut utiv ive e Secretary. Val alid idity ity of Se Sect ctio ions ns 2 and and 3 o Th The e cl clai aim m of pr priv ivil ileg ege e un unde derr Se Sect ctio ion n 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied impl ied.. Inst Instead ead of pro provid viding ing pre precis cise e and certa cer tain in re reaso asons ns for the cl clai aim, m, it mer merel ely y invoke kes s E.O. 464, coupled with an announ ann ounceme cement nt tha thatt the Pre Presid sident ent has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Co Cong ngre ress ss to de deter termi mine ne wh whet ethe herr the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. o No infi infirm rmit ity y, how owev ever er,, ca can n be impu impute ted d to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on th the e heads of offi fice ce ment me ntio ione ned d in Se Sect ctio ion n 2( 2(b) b),, on wh what at is covered by executive privilege. It does not purp pu rpor ortt to be co conc nclu lusi sive ve on th the e ot othe her r bran br anch ches es of go gove vern rnmen ment. t. It may thu thus s be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. o The President may not authorize her
108 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 subord sub ordina inates tes to exe exerci rcise se pow power er to inv invoke oke Dispositive: The petitions are partly granted. Sections 2B and such privielege. There is even less reason to 3 of EO 464 are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2A are VALID. uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization authorization is not explicit but by Ratio Decidendi: Sec. 1 of EO 464 must be construed as mere me re si sile lenc nce. e. Se Sect ctio ion n 3, in re rela lati tion on to limited in its application to appearances of department heads in Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score. the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section It foll follow ows, s, ther theref efor ore, e, that that when when an 22 of Article Article VI. Sec. 2A must be interpret interpreted ed as pro provid viding ing offi of fici cial al is be bein ing g su summ mmon oned ed by guidelines on what is covered by the executive privilege. Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by Concepts: exec ex ecuti utive ve pr priv ivilileg ege, e, he mu must st be Judicial Review - Like almost all powers conferred afforded reasonable time to inform by the Con Consti stituti tution, on, the pow power er of jud judici icial al rev review iew is the th e Pr Pres esid iden entt or th the e Ex Exec ecut utiv ive e subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an Secretary of the possible need for actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of invo in voki king ng th the e pr priv ivil ileg ege. e. Th This is is judicial power; (2) the person c hallenging the act must necessa nec essary ry in ord order er to pro provid vide e the have standing to challenge the validity of the subject President or the Executive act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a Secreta Secr etary ry wit with h fai fairr opp opport ortuni unity ty to personal and substantial interest in the case such that consider whether the matter indeed he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a call ca lls s fo forr a cl clai aim m of ex exec ecut utiv ive e resu re sult lt of it its s en enfo forc rcem emen ent; t; (3 (3)) th the e qu ques esti tion on of privilege. If, after the lapse of that cons co nsti titut tutio iona nalility ty mus mustt be ra rais ised ed at th the e ea earl rlie iest st reas re ason onab able le ti time me,, ne neiith ther er th the e opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must Pres Pr esiide dent nt no norr the th e Exec Ex ecut utiv ive e be the very lis mota of the case. Secre Sec reta tary ry in invo voke kes s the pr priv ivilileg ege, e, St Stan andi ding ng on th the e Gr Grou ound nd of Tra rans nsce cend nden enta tall Cong Co ngre ress ss is no lo long nger er bo boun und d to Importance - For it to be accorded standing on the respect the failure of the official to ground gro und of tran transcen scenden dental tal imp importa ortance nce,, how howeve ever, r, it appear before Congress and may must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is then opt to avail of the necessary public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the legal means to compel his presence of a clear case of disr sre egard of a appearance. consti con stituti tutiona onall or sta statuto tutory ry pro prohib hibiti ition on by the pub public lic 4. Yes es.. The impai impairm rmen entt of the righ rightt of the peop people le to resp re spon onde dent nt ag agen ency cy or in inst stru rume ment ntal alit ity y of th the e information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is just as government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct dir ect as its violatio violation n of the legislat legislature ure’s ’s pow power er of direct and specific interest in raisin raising g the questi questions ons inquiry. being raised. To th the e extent extent that inves investi tiga gati tion ons s in aid of legisl legislat atio ion n Po The e po powe werr of in inqu quiry iry is co co-Power wer of Inq Inquiry uiry - Th are gen genera erally lly con conduc ducted ted in pub public lic,, how howeve everr, any extensive with the power to legislate. Since Congress executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures has authority authority to inq inquir uire e int into o the ope operati rations ons of the of inf inform ormati ation on in suc such h inv invest estiga igatio tions ns nec necessa essarily rily executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that depr de priv ives es th the e pe peop ople le of in infor format matio ion n wh which ich,, be bein ing g the power of inquiry does not extend to executive presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be officials who are the most familiar with and informed a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby on executive operations. operations. Even where the inqui inquiry ry is in denied access to information which they can use in aid ai d of le legi gisl slat atio ion, n, th ther ere e ar are e st stil illl re reco cogn gniz ized ed formulating their own opinions on the matter before exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions Con Co ngr gres ess s — opi pini nion ons s whi hich ch th they ey ca can n th the en fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." commu co mmuni nica cate te to th thei eirr re repr prese esenta ntati tive ves s an and d ot othe her r Executive Privilege - the power of the Government government officials through the various legal means to withhold information information from the publi public, c, the courts, allowed by their freedom of expression. and the Congress; the right of the President and high It is in the the inter interest est of of the Stat State e that that the chan channe nels ls for for level executive branch officers to withhold information free political discussion be maintained to the end that from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public the government may perceive and be responsive to o Tribe’s Varieties of Executive Privilege – the people’s people’s wil will. l. Yet, thi this s ope open n dia dialog logue ue can be (1) State Secrets Privilege invoked by U.S. effec ef fecti tive ve on only ly to the ex exte tent nt tha thatt th the e ci citi tize zenry nry is Presidents, Presid ents, begin beginning ning with Wash Washington ington,, on info in form rmed ed an and d th thu us ab able le to fo forrmu mula late te its wi will ll the ground that the information is of such intel in tellilige gent ntly ly.. On Only ly wh when en th the e pa part rtic icip ipan ants ts in the natur na ture e th that at it its s di disc sclo losu sure re wo woul uld d su subv bver ertt discussion are aware of the issues and have access crucial military or diplomatic objectives. (2) to information relating thereto can such bear fruit Another variety is the t he informer ’s privilege, or 5. Yes es.. While While E.O. 464 464 applie applies s only to offic officia ials ls of the the pr priv ivilileg ege e of th the e Go Gove vern rnmen mentt no nott to executive branch, it does not follow that the same is disclose the identity of persons who furnish exempt from the need for publication. informat info rmation ion of vio violat lation ions s of law to of office ficers rs As expl explai aine ned d above above,, E.O. E.O. 464 has has a direct direct effec effectt on charge cha rged d wit with h the enforceme enforcement nt of tha thatt law law.. the right of the people to information on matters of (3) Fin Finall ally y, a gen generi eric c pri privil vilege ege for int intern ernal al public pub lic con concern cern.. It is, the theref refore ore,, a matt matter er of pub public lic delilibe de bera ratio tions ns ha has s be been en sa said id to at attac tach h to inter in teres estt wh whic ich h me memb mber ers s of th the e bo body dy po poliliti tic c may intrago intr agover vernmen nmental tal doc docume uments nts refl reflecti ecting ng question before this Court. Due process thus requires adviso adv isory ry opi opinio nions, ns, rec recomme ommenda ndation tions s and thatt the people tha people sho should uld have bee been n app appris rised ed of thi this s deliberations comprising part of a process by issuance before it was implemented. which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 109 Neri vs Senate Romulo Neri vs.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Invest Investiga igatio tions, ns, Senate Senate Commi Committe ttee e on Trade rade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security September 4, 2008. GR No. 180643. 564 SCRA 152 EN BANC. Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro FACTS: · Neri Neri app appea eare red d befor before e all all 3 respo respond ndent ent com commi mitte ttees es (or (or respondents) on Sep. 26, 2007 for the hearing on the Nati Nation onal al Broad Broadba band nd (NBN (NBN)) Proje Project ct betw betwee een n the DOTC and ZTE. Neri said that COMELEC COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M for his approval of the project. Neri also said that he reported this brib bribery ery attemp attemptt to PGMA PGMA and he told told him him not not to accept the bribe. · Howe Howeve verr, Neri Neri refus refused ed to to answe answerr these these 3 ques questi tion ons, s, invoking “executive privilege” (EP): a. WO WON N PGMA PGMA fo follow llowed ed up on the the NBN Project b. WON she directe directed d him him to priori prioritize tize it c. WO WON N she she dire directe cted d him him to app appro rove ve it. it. · Of cour course se the the respo respond nden entt commi committ ttee ees s tried tried to forc force e him him to answ answer er.. Exec. Exec. Secr Secreta etary ry Eduar Eduardo do Ermit Ermita a intervened and requested respondents to stop asking these questions because of EP, invoking Senate vs. Ermita. · Neri Neri did did not not appe appea ar on the the next next hea hearing ring beca becaus use e PGMA PGMA orde ordere red d him not not to go, go, invo invoki king ng EP. EP. Respon Responden dents ts issued issued a show cause cause letter letter requir requiring ing Neri Neri to expl explai ain n why why he shou should ld not not be cite cited d for for contempt. Neri said he did not mean to ignore the hearing. hearing. He thought thought that the remaini remaining ng questions questions were were cove covere red d by the the EP anyw anyway ay,, but but shou should ld respondents have other questions, he’d be willing to appear again provided he’s given the questions to be asked in advance. · Resp Respon onde dent nts, s, inst instea ead d of reply replyin ing, g, issu issued ed a cont contem empt pt order order agains againstt Neri Neri and ordere ordered d his detention detention and arrest. Neri filed for certiorari (the March 25, 2008 decision) and it was granted by SC on 2 grounds: 1) that that the commu communi nica cati tion ons s elici elicited ted by the the 3 questions were covered by the EP because a. they they rela relate te to a quin quinte tess ssen enti tial al and non-de non-deleg legabl able e power power of the President b. they they wer were e rece receiv ived ed by by a clos close e advisor of the President c. resp respon onde den nts fail faile ed to show show a compe compellllin ing g need need that that woul would d justify the limitation of the privilege privilege and the unavailabil unavailability ity of the info elsewher elsewhere e by the appropriate investigating body 2) that respo spondent ents comm commiitted grave abu abuse of disc discre reti tion on in issu issuin ing g a contempt order because a. ther there e was was a val valid id clai claim m of of EP EP b. thei theirr invit invitati ation ons s to petit petitio ione nerr did
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not not cont contai ain n the the ques questi tion ons s relevant to the inquiry c. ther there e was was a clou cloud d of of doub doubtt as to the regularit y of the proc procee eedi ding ng that that led led to their their issuance of the contempt order d. they they viol violat ated ed Con Consti sti Art VI Sec Sec 21beca 21because use their their inquiry inquiry was not not in acco accord rdan ance ce with with the ”du ”duly published rules of procedure” e. they they issu issued ed the the con conte temp mptt orde order r arbitrarily and precipitately So the the res respo pond nden ents ts file filed d thi this s MR. MR.
ISSUES 1. WON there there is is a recogniz recognized ed presump presumptiv tive e preside presidenti ntial al communications privilege in our legal system 2. WON ther there e is a factu factual al or lega legall basis basis to hold hold that that the the commu communi nica cati tion ons s elic elicit ited ed by the 3 ques questio tions ns are are covered by the executive privilege 3. WON respondents have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are critical to the exercise of their functions 4. WO WON N respondents commi mmitted grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. HELD and RATIO 1. YES, YES, THER THERE E IS A RECO RECOG GNIZE NIZED D PRESUMPTIVE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE o Senate vs. Ermita, Almonte vs. Vasquez: the presid president ential ial commun communica icatio tions ns privil privilege ege is fundamental fundamental to the operation of government government and is rooted in the separation of powers. Also, the right to information does not extend to matt matter ers s reco recogn gniz ized ed as “pri “privi vile lege ged d information” o In this this case case,, it’s it’s the pre presi side dent nt hers hersel elff throu through gh Exec. Sec. Ermita who invoked the EP. In the case, only only executi executive ve Senate Senate vs. vs. Ermita Ermita case, officials invoked it. o Sena “when n Cong Congre ress ss Senate te vs. vs. Ermi Ermita ta:: “whe exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege… only one executive official may be exempted from this this power— power—the the Preside President nt on whom whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach reach of Congre Congress ss except except through through the power of impeachment.” 2.
YES. THER THERE E ARE ARE FACT FACTUAL UAL AND LEGA LEGAL L BASES BASES TO TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE 3 QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a “qu “quinte intess ssen enti tia al and and non-d on-del eleg ega able ble presidential po wer. wer. Yes, es, the the Pres Presiident dent has has to to have have the the concurrence of the Monetary Board to enter into foreign loans, but the power power is still still execut executive ive in nature nature.. The President still makes the final decision. · Even the legislature a hs hs duties which are essentially legislative even
110 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 thou though gh they they requ requir ire e the participation of the pres presid iden entt (ex. (ex. pass passin ing g laws)
B.
The The “doc “doctri trine ne of oper operat atio iona nall prox proxim imity ity”” was was laid laid dow down prec precis isel ely y to limi limitt the the scop scope e of the the presidential communications privilege, but, in any case, it is not conclusive. Doct Doctri rine ne of of oper operat atio iona nall prox proxim imit ity y · In Re: Sealed Case: this is used to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege · The priv privil ileg ege e sho shoul uld d app apply ly only only to commu communi nica cati tion ons s authored, solicited, received by staff members who have the duty of investi investigat gating ing and giving giving advi advice ce to the the pres presid iden entt rega regard rdin ing g the the subj subjec ecttmatter at hand. Here Here,, in in this this case case,, Ner Nerii is is a Memb Member er of the Cabinet. He is advisor to the president, in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Ther There e is als also o the the orga organi niza zati tion onal al tes testt (Judici Judicial al Watch Watch,, Inc. Inc. vs. vs. Dept. Dept. of Justice) (NOT defined in the case) The The main main con consi side dera rati tion on is is to limi limitt the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President because of their function and their position in the Exec Executi utive ve’s ’s orga organi niza zatio tiona nall structure
C. Presi Preside dent’ nt’s s claim claim of the the EP is not not merely merely base based d on a generalized interest on confidentiality Our diplomatic and economic relations with China will be prej prejud udic iced ed if Neri Neri answ answer ers s the the questions - Akbayan vs. Aquino: diplo diplomati matic c nego negoti tiat atio ions ns have have a priv privil ileg eged ed character Pre President can’t do her fun functions well if she and her advisors would be investi investigat gated ed by the Congre Congress ss everytime o Resp Respon onde dents nts arg argue ue that that the the SC disre disrega gard rded ed,, in the March 2008 decision, constitutional constitutional provis provision ions s on govern government ment transpa transparen rency cy,, accoun accountab tabili ility ty,, disclo disclosure sure of inform informati ation, on, namely : Art III Sec 7, Art II Sec 24 and 28, Art XI Sec 1, Art XVI Sec 10, Art VII Sec 20, Art XII Sec 9, 21, 22) o SC: SC: We did didn’t n’t say tha thatt the Sen Senat ate e has has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legi legisl slat atio ion. n. We only only say say that that the the 3 questions are covered by the EP and that they must respect the EP. EP. o “The “The righ rightt to info inform rmat atio ion n is not an abso absolu lute te right.” o The The cons consti titu tuti tion onal al provi provisi sion ons s cite cited d do not espouse an absolute right to information. In
o
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fact, they are about limitations on that right. See Art III Sec7 and Art II Sec28 Chavez vs PCGG: it was said that the right is limi limite ted d on 1) nati nation onal al secu securi rity ty matte matters rs (including (including military military and diplomatic diplomatic matters, matters, and government exchanges prior to signing of treati treaties es and executi executive ve agreeme agreements nts), ), 2) trade secrets and banking transactions, 3) crim crimin inal al matt matter ers, s, 4) othe otherr conf confid iden enti tial al information NOTE NOTE that that in this this case case,, what what respo respond nden ents ts seek seek is the the righ rightt to obta obtain in info inform rmat atio ion n alle allege gedly dly in aid aid of legi legisl slat atio ion, n, NOT NOT the the people’s right to information (which the cited provisions of respondents protect)
NO. RESPO RESPONDE NDENTS NTS FAILE FAILED D TO PROV PROVE E THAT THAT THE THE ANSWER TO THE 3 QUESTIONS IS CRITICAL IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS Respondents can’t just simply mention statutes or pending bills as a justif justifica icatio tion n for their their legisl legislati ative ve inquiry The test: “The presumption of privilege privilege can only be overturned overturned by a showing showing of compell compelling ing need for disc discllosur osure e of the the info inforrmati mation on covered by t he EP.” EP.” The bur burde den n is on on the the resp respon ond dents ents to show how critical the information sought is in the discharge of their functions and THEY FAILED The nee need d for for hard hard fa facts cts in cra craft ftin ing g legislation cannot be equated to the courts courts’’ need need of facts facts in decidi deciding ng cases In this case, there is only a gene genera rali lize zed d asse assert rtio ion n that that the the info inform rmat atio ion n is impo import rtan antt to the the exerci exercise se of power power to legisl legislate ate.. It wasn asn’t clearly rly expl xplained by respondents which matters or which pend pendin ing g bill bills s they they won’ won’tt make make prog progre ress ss on if the the 3 ques questi tion ons s weren’t answered. Even counsel for respondents duri during ng oral oral argu argumen ments ts impli implied edly ly admitted that the legislature can still make make laws laws with withou outt the the need need to answer the 3. So, the presumption in favor of confidentiality still stands. Resp Respo onden ndents ts say say the they y als also o hav have e a duty to “curb graft and corruption.” SC said this is only an “oversight func functi tion on”” of the Cong Congre ress ss.. You shouldn’t be too aggressive to find facts in the exercise of this function. Be more aggressive when you do this to make laws. Bengzon Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Congre ress ss is not not the the Committee: Cong proper branch to find out whether a public official did something wrong. It’s supposed to be the courts. SC: t he he 3 q ue uestions s ee eem t o be be geared geared more more toward towards s tracing tracing the
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bribery to the President. Yes, your goals might be noble, but that is not your your func functi tion on.. Leav Leave e it to the the OMBUDSMAN. “no “no inq inqui uiry ry is is an end end in in its itsel elf; f; itit must must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress.” (if, for for exam exampl ple, e, Neri Neri answ answer ers s the the questions, what will the respondents do with it? They failed already to establish the connection of the 3 questions to their legislative duties) Plu Plus, eve even tho though you you try try to se seek the truth, you don’t have standards of evidence like the Judiciary has. The The Omb Ombud udsm sman an has has bee been n wor worki king ng on this “bribery “bribery issue” issue” already already.. And it has the duty to do so, not the respondents.
YES, THERE THERE IS GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE ABUSE OF DISCRET DISCRETION ION IN IN ISSUING THE CONTEMPT ORDER 4 grounds here: 1. Ther There’ e’s s a legi legiti tima mate te clai claim m of of EP EP Alre Alread ady y disc discus usse sed d abov above e 2. Senate vs vs. Er Ermita requirements are not met “An “An unco uncons nstr trai aine ned d cong congre ress ssio iona nall investig tigativ tive power ower,, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses… abuses… Constant Constant exposure exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively.” effectively.” Witn Witnes esse ses s also also ha have the their ir ri right ght to due process! And part of that is to be informed of the matters to be taken up by the inquiry, so they will be able to prepare the information and the documents needed. Neri’s advance request for the ques questi tion ons s is a reas reason onab able le one. one. Respondents should have granted it. The The sub subpo poen ena a ord order er did did not not incl includ ude e the name or number of any Senate pend pendin ing g bill bill where where the the answ answer ers s would be used—this is required in the Senate vs. Ermita case 3. Cour Courtt can can chec check k if the the rul rules es of of proc proced edur ure e of the the resp respon onde dent nts s are are viol violat ativ ive e or not not of the the Constitution—in this case, it was violated The The delib deliber erat atio ions ns on the the issu issuan ance ce of the the cont contem empt pt orde orderr was was not not attended by a majority of members of the respondents. The Rules of Procedure Procedure Governing Governing Inquiries Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (or “The Rules”) , Sec 18, say that there must be a vote of majority of all the members of a Comm Commit itte tee e befo before re issu issuin ing g cont contem empt pt orde orders rs!! Only Only 7 were were present in the contempt delibe deliberati rations ons!! The CAPOI CAPOI has 17 senator senator members, members, the CNDS CNDS has 18, and CTC has 9 members but only only 3 of thos those e 9 atten attende ded. d. So, So,
4.
since attendance attendance was lacking, it’s impossible to get a majority vote. What respondents did was craft a contemp contemptt order order and present present it to other members for signing. This is wrong! Con Consti sti Sec Sec 21 Art Art VI. VI. Ner Nerii has has the the right to expect that all the proceedings would follow the rules, but it was not what happened. Rul Rules were ere NO NOT pub publi lish shed ed!! Respondents say Senate is a continuing body. SC said Yes, the Senate as an institution is a continuing body, BUT, the members, the business, the matters of each Congress is not continuing. · Ex. The Rules of the Sena Senate te (Rul (Rule e XLIV XLIV Sec Sec 123) (NOT the one earlier) say that all matters pend pendin ing g shal shalll term termin inat ate e upon upon the the expi expira rati tion on of 1 Congress but may may be taken up by the next as if for the first time · Senate Rules say that thei theirr rule rules s would ould take take effect 7 days after publication in 2 newsp newspap aper ers s of gene genera rall circulation. This DOESN’T mean mean that that the prev previo ious us rules rules will will carry carry over over into into the next. Rather, it emphasi emphasizes zes the need need for publication! Here in this case, the present Senate mer merely adopted the publ publis ishe hed d Rule Rules s of the the prev previo ious us Senate. What the SC is saying is that that even even if you you deci decide de to adop adoptt previous Rules, you need to publish them still!
Judicial Integrity/Contempt Cabansag vs Fernandez Zaldivar vs Fernandez People vs Godoy In re: Emil Jurado Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting
Private Property Adiong vs COMELEC Philippine Press Institute Punzals vs ITCSI
112 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 hours a day or 40 hours a week (Res. No. 00-0227). Court Admi min nistr tra ator Pre Pr esbite terro Velasco, Jr.., Jr Privacy recommended that the Muslim judiciary employees be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30am to Due Process 3:30pm without break during Ramadan, and that they be excused from work from 10:00am to 2:00pm every Webb vs de Leon Friday. To compensate for the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working hours from 7:00am to 10:00am and from 2:00pm to 7:00pm every Freedom of Religion Friday.
American Bible Society vs City of Manila Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union German vs Barangan Ebranilag vs Superintendent In Re: Request of Muslim Employees Employees in Different Courts
HELD/RATIO:
Recommendation of Court Administrator with respect to the Ramadan measure is well taken
Muslim prayer day measure must be denied for lack of statutory basis
In Re: Request of Muslim Employees Employees in Different Courts in Iligan City (2005) J. Callejo, Sr. FACTS: Severa Severall Muslim Muslim emplo employee yees s in diffe differen rentt courts courts in in Iligan Iligan City sent a letter (19 November 2001) to Executive Judg Ju dge e Val aler erio io Sa Sala laza zarr of th the e RT RTC C – Ili Iliga gan n Ci City ty,, requ re ques esti ting ng tha thatt the be al allow lowed ed to en enjo joy y ce certa rtain in privileges: o To hold hold off offic ice e hour hours s from from 7:30a 7:30am m to 3:30 3:30pm pm without lunch break or coffee breaks during Ramadan o To be excu excuse sed d from from work work from from 10: 10:00 00am am to 2:00pm 2:0 0pm eve every ry Fri Friday day (Mu (Musli slim m pray prayer er day day)) during the entire calendar year Sal Salaza azarr forward forwarded ed the the letter letter to to the Offi Office ce of the the Court Court Administrator averring that he agreed to the first proposal, but had misgivings about the second The Musl Musliim emp mplo loy yee ees s in invo voke ke P.D. No. 291 (as amended by P.D. No. 322) enacted by Marcos, which rein re infor force ced d na nati tion onal al un unity ity by re reco cogn gniz izin ing g Mu Musl slim im holidays and making them part of Philippine national holidays. Sec. 2, P.D. No. 291 contains a list of recognized Muslim holidays, holidays, durin during g which Muslim govern government ment employees are excused from reporting to work. Se furthe therr pro provid vides es tha thatt Musl Muslim im gov govern ernment ment Sec. c. 3 fur emplo emp loye yees es sh shal alll on only ly ob obse serv rve e of offi fice ce ho hour urs s fro from m 7:30am to 3:30pm, without lunch or coffee breaks, without diminution of salary or wages, provided that nonno n-fas fasti ting ng em empl ploy oyee ees s ar are e no nott en enti titl tled ed to su such ch benefits Pur Pursua suant nt theret thereto, o, the Civi Civill Servic Service e Commis Commissio sion n (CSC) (CSC) enacted Res Novemb ember er 198 1981), 1), Res.. No. 8181-127 1277 7 (13 Nov which adopted the Ramadan measure, as well as that for the Muslim prayer day (no work from 10:00am to 2:00 2: 00pm pm), ), fo forr al alll Fr Frid iday ays s of th the e ca cale lend ndar ar ye year ar.. However, the CSC also prescribed the adoption of a flex fl exib ible le wo worki rking ng sc sche hedu dule le to ac acco commo mmoda date te th the e Musl Mu slim im’’s Fr Frid iday ay pr pray ayer er da day y su subj bjec ectt to ce cert rtai ain n conditions, so as not to contravene Sec. 5, Rule 17 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires all civil servants (regardless of religion) to render public service or no less than 8
The measur The measure e has statu statuto tory ry basis basis in Sec. Sec. 3(a), 3(a), P.D. P.D. No. 291 (as amended)
Office Offic e of the Court Court Atto Attorn rney ey (Edna (Edna Diño Diño)) repor report: t: the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in its resolutions resolu tions that Musli Muslim m employ employees ees are excuse excused d from work from 10:00am to 2:00pm every Friday subject to certain conditions. Neither P.D. No. 291 nor P.D. No. 322 mentions the Muslim prayer day as one of the recognized Muslim holidays.
Sec. 5, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution
Contains Contai ns 2 aspec aspects: ts: (1) (1) the nonnon-est establ ablish ishmen mentt clause clause,, (2) the free-exercise clause (upon which the subject requests are based) The righ rightt to relig religiou ious s profess profession ion and and worsh worship ip has has a 2fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. Accor Acc ordi ding ng to J. Isa Isaga gani ni Cr Cruz uz:: o Freedom to believe: absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. o Freedom to act on one’s beliefs: subject to state regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Religious freedom can only be enjoyed with a proper pro per regard for the rights rights of oth others ers.. Pol Police ice power pow er can be exe exerci rcised sed to pre preven ventt rel religi igious ous practices inimical to society society.. o The con constit stituti utiona onall provi provisio sion n on rel religi igious ous free freedom dom termina ter minated ted dis disabi abilit lities ies;; it did not crea create te new privil pri vilege eges. s. It gav gave e rel religi igious ous lib liberty erty,, not civ civilil immu im muni nity ty.. It Its s es esse senc nce e is fr fre eed edo om fr from om conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
The nee need d of the Sta State te to pre prescr scribe ibe gov govern ernmen mentt off office ice hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants (regardless of religion) cannot be disregarded!
Sec. 5, Rule Sec. Rule 17 of the the Omnib Omnibus us Rule Rules s Imple Implemen menti ting ng Book V of E.O. No. 292: interest of the general public to be assu assured red of con contin tinuou uous s gov govern ernment ment ser service vice during officer hours, Monday-Friday Monday-Friday.. To allow allow Mulsi Mulsim m employ employee ees s the Muslim Muslim praye prayerr day measure would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours (12 hours short of required monthly mont hly hou hours) rs).. Thi This s wou would ld onl only y enc encour ourage age oth other er religious relig ious denominations denominations to reque request st for simila similarr specia speciall treatment. The Th e perfor performan mance ce of religi religiou ous s pr prac acti tice ces s sh shou ould ld not prejudice the courts and the public. The exercise of
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 113 religi reli giou ous s fr free eedo dom m do does es no nott ex exemp emptt an anyo yone ne for form m compliance with reasonable requirements of the law. Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, 259 SCRA 529 (July 26, 1996). Estrada v Escritor, A.M. No. A.M. No. P-02-1651 (June 22, 2006)
Freedom to Associate Gonzales vs COMELEC
Academic Freedom Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting
Other Considerations Overbreath/ “Void for Vagueness” doctrine
Gonzales vs COMELEC Chilling Effect Doctrine
David vs Macapagal-Arroyo
