COMPILED POLIREV DIGEST_COMPLETE.docx

Midterms 2017-2018 Political Law Review Dean Albano

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) vs. SPOUSES VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA G.R. No. 206484

June 29, 2016

BRION, J.: FACTS:

Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina are the registered owners of five parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program. The DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into several Facilities Management Agreements (FMA) for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain, and develop facilities comprising local telephone exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs were later converted into Financial Lease Agreements (FLA). The municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated 1200sq.m. parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents’ property in the donation. Pursuant to the lease agreements, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses. Respondent spouses Abecina discovered Digitel ’ s occupation over portions of their properties. They required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages, but the latter refused, insisting that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA. They sent a final demand letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of 1.2M. Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the demand. Respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership over the subject properties but it admitted during the pre-trial conference that the Abecinas were the rightful owners of the properties. Sps Abecina and Digitel executed a Compromise Agreement and entered into a Contract of Lease which was approved by the RTC. RTC decision

It brushed aside the defense of state immunity. Government immunity from suit could not be used as an instrument to perpetuate an injustice on a

citizen. It held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them. RTC ordered the DOTC (as a builder in bad faith) to forfeit the improvements and vacate the properties and to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages. CA decision

CA upheld RTC decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages. It denied the DOTC’ s claim of state immunity from suit, reasoning that the DOTC removed its cloak of immunity after entering into a proprietary contract – the Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel. It adopted the RTC’ s position that state immunity cannot be used to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an unlawful taking without the proper expropriation proceedings. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. DOTC s contention ’

Its Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel was entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions to promote and develop networks of communication systems. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of state immunity. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its mandate, took private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. Instead of allowing recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for determination of just compensation. Respondent Spouses’ contention contention State immunity cannot be invoked to perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They also maintain that because the subject properties are titled, the DOTC is a builder in bad faith who is deemed to have lost the improvements it introduced.

ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity

HELD: NO

The fundamental doctrine that “the State may not be sued without its consent ” stems from the principle that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication. It is necessary to distinguish between the State ’ s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively

Camalig, Robert | De Belen, Donna | Hornilla, AK | Manaligod, Jam | Narsoles, Tin | San Diego, Elmo | Silva, Pat 1 of 22


extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity.

for the DOTC to actually take the property at this point.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’ s contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity. However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

DOTC as a builder in bad faith

Our laws require that the State ’ s power of eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on the respondents ’ property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from suit. The petitioners would not have had to resort to filing its complaint for reconveyance. When the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.

DOTC was not a builder in bad faith when the improvements were constructed. The encroachment over the properties was a result of a mistaken implementation of the donation from the municipality. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and [of] his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. While the DOTC later realized its error and admitted its encroachment over the respondents' property, there is no evidence that it acted maliciously or in bad faith when the construction was done. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith. Without proof that DOTC’ s mistake was made in bad faith, its construction is presumed to have been made in good faith. Therefore, the forfeiture of the improvements in favor of the respondent spouses is unwarranted.

Therefore, DOTC’ s entry into and taking of possession of the respondents ’ property property amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.

Other issues:

Propriety of reconveyance (Sabi ni DOTC expropriation proceedings na daw kasi dapat kasi ginagamit na yung property for governmental functions) The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take the property for public use and the consequent payment of just compensation. The property is evidently being used for a public purpose. However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject properties. If in the future the factual circumstances should change and the respondents refuse to continue the lease, then the DOTC may initiate expropriation proceedings. But as matters now stand, the respondents are clearly willing to lease the property. Therefore, we find no genuine necessity Camalig, Robert | De Belen, Donna | Hornilla, AK | Manaligod, Jam | Narsoles, Tin | San Diego, Elmo | Silva, Pat 2 of 22


Republic of the Philippines v Gonzalo Roque G. R. No. 203610

October 10, 2016

Brion, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents owned several parcels of land with a total area of about 9,811 square meters,4 located in Constitution Hills, Quezon City.5 Gonzalo represented the respondents in the court proceedings. In 1978, the Republic, through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), approached the respondents and asked them to sell a portion of the land at government-dictated prices lower than the market value.6 The Republic was supposed to use the land for President Marcos' National Government Center (NGC) Project — his plan to bring together the various national government offices in one venue for greater efficiency and to create additional areas for the expanding needs of the central government and the people. The respondents allege that several public hearings regarding the sale took place between the Republic and the respondents;8 and that during these meetings, the Republic made the following representations. First, the Republic guaranteed that although the respondents would get paid a price much lower than the market value of the land, the construction of the NGC Project would eventually enhance the value of the surrounding portions of the land that they still own. Second, the Republic assured the respondents that, in the remote possibility that it abandons the project, they will have the right to buy back the land. The respondents further allege that they were reluctant to sell the land, but felt compelled to do so because martial law was in force, and they dared not resist a project of President Marcos.11 Thus, relying on the Republic's representations, the respondents signed the deeds of absolute sale. The Republic did not immediately take possession of all of the land it had bought from the respondents;14 thus, the respondents continued to occupy portions of the sold properties. After several years, informal settlers began to occupy parts of the land, and the respondents felt that the Republic was reneging on its undertaking to develop the land into the NGC Project.16 Hence, Gonzalo sent letters dated March 25, 1987, and September 23, 1988, to then DPWH Secretary

Vicente R. Jayme (Jayme) offering to buy back the properties.17 Gonzalo received no response. The respondents' suspicion was confirmed in December 2003. Armando A. De Castro (De Castro), then undersecretary of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), wrote a letter to the respondents, requesting them to vacate all portions of the sold land that they were still occupying, because the government would use the properties for socialized housing pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9207.1 Realizing that the Republic had completely abandoned its initial plan to use the land for the NGC Project, in 2005, the respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the properties on the grounds of fraud, force, intimidation, or undue influence.24 They also asserted their right to buy back the properties at the same price at which they sold them since the Republic failed to develop the l and according to the original purpose for which it was "expropriated."25cralawred Alternatively, they asked for the payment of additional compensation in the amount of not less than Five Million Pesos. n their answer,27 the Republic and the HUDCC (defendants) argue that: (1) they are immune from suit as government instrumentalities; (2) they agreed to neither the respondents' right to repurchase the properties in case the government abandons the NGC Project nor a right to additional compensation in case the respondents' remaining properties suffer a decrease in market value; (3) the respondents were not forced, intimidated, or unduly influenced to sell their properties to the government; and (4) even assuming that any vice of consent attended the sale, the respondents' action for the annulment of sale is barred by prescription28 and laches.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether the Republic is immune from suit; (b) Whether the action is barred by prescription or laches; and (c) Whether an exception to the parol evidence rule applies.

HELD:

a.

NO The Constitution provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent."49 One instance when a suit is against the State is when the Republic is sued by name,50 as in this case.

A suit against the State is allowed when the State gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given through a statute51 while implied consent is given when the State enters into a



contract or commences litigation.52 Although not all contracts entered into by the government operates as a waiver of its non-suability, the Court held in the two cases below that the State effectively gave its consent when it entered into contracts and committed breach. In Santiago v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,53 Ildefonso Santiago and his wife donated a parcel of land to the Republic on the alleged condition that the latter would install lighting facilities and a water system and would build an office building and parking lot on the property on or before December 7, 1974. Santiago filed a complaint for the revocation of the donation due to the government's breach of the condition. The trial court dismissed the case based on the State's non-suability. The Court set aside the dismissal on certiorari, reasoning that the State's consent to be sued is presumed when the State fails to comply with the alleged terms of a deed of donation. It essentially held that the Republic impliedly waived its immunity. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that when the Republic entered into a compromise agreement with a private person, it stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself on the same level as its adversary. When the State enters into a contract which creates mutual or reciprocal rights and obligations, the State may be sued even without express consent.55 Its consent to be sued is implied from its entry into the contract and the Republic's breach grants the other party the right to enforce or repudiate the contract. In the present case, the Republic entered into deeds of sale with the respondents to construct the NGC Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale, the Republic created a negotiating team to discuss the terms of the sale with the respondents. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale on these alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the properties if the NGC Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project will increase the market value of their remaining properties. Following Santiago and Republic, the State's failure to abide by these conditions constitutes the State's implied waiver of its immunity. We reiterate that the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve to perpetrate an injustice on a citizen.56 If we rule otherwise, we will be tolerating unfair dealing in contract negotiation.

b.

NO. Resolving the issues of prescription and laches in the present case requires a factual review, specifically whether the presidential proclamations that reduced the land allotted for the NGC Project covered the subject properties and when the

prescription period should start to run under the circumstances. These are questions of fact that this Court need not delve into.

Nevertheless, the RTC found and concluded, with the CA affirming, that the respondents' action to annul the sale is not barred either by prescription or laches. Both court ruled that the enactment of RA 9207 was the earliest time that the respondents could have known about the government's plans to officially use the land for socialized housing. Thus, the respondents were not barred by prescription when they filed their complaint in 2005, within four (4) years from the enactment of RA 9207. As to laches, both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents' letters to the DPWH showed that they were vigilant in asserting their alleged right to repurchase the properties from the Republic. This vigilance negates the Republic's claim of laches. We are bound and accordingly adopt these findings and conclusions by the lower courts.

c.

NO. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a written contract is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon by the parties and no evidence of these terms is admissible other than the contents of the contract.

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of a written agreement by testimony showing that the parties orally agreed on other terms before the signing of the document.61 However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement if he puts in i ssue in his pleadings either: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the parties' true intent and agreement; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The issue must be squarely presented. We note the basic rule that he who alleges must prove his case. In this case, the respondents have the burden to prove that the sale was subject to two conditions: (a) their remaining properties will benefit from the increase in land value after the construction of the NGC Project and (b) the government will return the sold properties to them should the NGC Project not materialize. However, they failed to discharge this burden. Notably, they failed to present copies of the deeds of sale to show that the sale was attended by the alleged conditions. Pursuant to the parol evidence rule, no



evidence of contractual terms is admissible other than the contract itself. On this level alone, the respondents failed to discharge their burden. Furthermore, the respondents failed to put in issue in their pleadings the sale contract's failure to express the parties' agreement. On a final note, we point out that the parties entered into a negotiated sale transaction; thus, the Republic did not acquire the property through expropriation. In expropriation, the Republic's acquisition of the expropriated property is subject to the condition that the Republic will return the property should the public purpose for which the expropriation was done did not materialize.68 On the other hand, a sale contract between the Republic and private persons is not subject to this same condition unless the parties stipulate it. The respondents in this case failed to prove that the sale was attended by a similar condition. Hence, the parties are bound by their sale contract transferring the property without the condition applicable in expropriation cases.



Republic of the Philippines v. Davonn Harp G.R. No. 188829; June 13, 2016 Sereno, C.J.

FACTS:

Respondent Harp was born and raised in the USA, and while on a visit to the Philippines, he was discovered by basketball talent scouts. He was invited to play in the PBL and was drafted to the PBA. Respondent was invited to participate in a Senate investigation jointly conducted by the Committee on Games, Amusement, and Sports; and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws. The Senate inquiry sought to review the processes and requirements involved in the acquisition and determination of Philippine citizenship in connection with the “influx of bogus Fil-Am or Fil-foreign basketball players into the PBA and other basketball associations in the Philippines.” In the course of the inquiry, it was established that respondent had previously obtained recognition as a citizen of the Philippines from the BI and the DOJ upon submission of several documents. The Senate committees, however, found reason to doubt the Philippine citizenship of respondent. After a scrutiny of the documents he had submitted, they concluded that he had used spurious documents in support of his Petition for Recognition (such as a simulated or highly suspicious birth certificate with several erasure marks and discrepancies as to its entries). In the report, the Senate committees also directed the BI and the DOJ to examine thoroughly the authenticity of the documents submitted by certain PBA players, including respondent, and to determine if they were indeed citizens of the Philippines. The DOJ issued a department order creating a special committee to investigate the citizenship of the PBA players identified in the report. As part of the investigation, the players were required to submit position papers. The DOJ special committee concluded that there was substantial evidence to conduct summary deportation proceedings against respondent for misrepresentation as a Filipino citizen in applying for recognition before the Bureau of Immigration and DOJ, relying on the findings of the Senate committees and NBI on the apparent alterations made in the Certificate of Li ve Birth of respondent’ s father. Acting on the special committee’ s findings, the DOJ secretary issued a resolution revoking the recognition accorded to respondent and 5 other

PBA players, and also directed the BI to undertake summary deportation proceedings against them. Upon receipt of the Summary Deportation Order, respondent filed a Petition for Review with an application for injunction before the CA to seek the reversal of the DOJ Resolution and the BI Summary Deportation Order. This was granted by the CA, holding that respondent, who was a recognized citizen of the Philippines, could not be summarily deported and that his citizenship may only be attacked through a direct action in a proceeding that would respect his rights as a citizen. The CA however refused to settle the issue of citizenship, by reason of his incorrect resort to Rule 43.

ISSUES/HELD:

Whether or not respondent ’ s appeal was rendered moot and academic by his voluntary departure from the Philippines. No, respondent’ s appeal was not rendered moot and academic by his voluntary departure from the Philippines. Petitioners’ allegation that appeal is no longer necessary to resolve the appeal of respondent because he has voluntarily departed from the Philippines and is now beyond the legal processes of the country is not proper based on the case of Lewin v. Deportation Board, involving an alien who entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor and eventually left without any assurance that he would be allowed to return to the country. However, the SC ruled that it does not apply to the present case since it involves those whose Philippine citizenship has been previously recognized and whose intention to return to the country has likewise been manifested. In the case of Gonzalez v. Pennisi , wherein the respondent prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino citizen, it was stated that : “he manifested his intent to return to the country because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the CA and before this court showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He was precisely questioning the DOJ's revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary deportation by the BI.” Like the respondent in Gonzalez, respondent herein is also a recognized citizen of the Philippines. He has fought for his citizenship and clearly demonstrated his intent to return to the country. Consequently, the SC holds that his departure has not rendered this case moot and academic. Whether or not the DOJ erroneously revoked the recognition accorded to the respondent.



Yes, DOJ erroneously revoked the recognition accorded to the respondent. The SC decided to resolve the following issues brought by the DOJ Resolution and Summary Deportation Order: a) Finality of the Recognition Accorded to Respondent The recognition granted to respondent has not attained finality. The SC has consistently ruled that the issue of citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion demands. Res Judicata only appli es once a finding of citizenship is affirmed by the Court in a proceeding which: (a) the person whose citizenship is questioned is a party; (b) the person's citizenship is raised as a material issue; and (c) the Solicitor General or an authorized representative is able to take an active part. Since respondent's citizenship has not been the subject of such a proceeding, there is no obstacle to revisiting the matter in this case.

b)

Validity of the DOJ Resolution

The DOJ Resolution was invalid. The evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is not enough to negate the probative value of the documentary evidence submitted by respondent to prove his Philippine citizenship. The SC finds no reason to set aside the rule that public documents, particularly those related to the Civil Register, are “prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.” As in any administrative proceeding, the exercise of the power to revoke a certificate of recognition already issued requires the observance of the basic tenets of due process. At the very least, it is imperative that the ruling be supported by substantial evidence in view of the gravity of the consequences that would arise from a revocation. In this case, the DOJ relied on certain pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence to support its conclusion that respondent is not a true citizen of the Philippines: (a) the findings of the Senate committees and the NBI that alterations were made in the Certificate of Live Birth of Manuel; (b) the discrepancy between the middle initial found in Manuel's birth certificate and that which appears in respondent's affidavit of citizenship; (c) the results of the Senate's field investigations of respondent's relatives; and (d) a Certification from the Secretary of Barangay stating that "Manuel Arce Gonzalez" was not included in the 2002 list of voters in that barangay.

the Philippines on the strength of the documentary evidence he presented, such as his birth certificate, certificate of live birth, naturalization certificate, and certification issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco. In its Resolution, however, the DOJ decided to attach more importance to the "clear and convincing" rebuttal evidence from the Senate committees and the NBI, which supposedly outweighed the probative value of these authenticated documents. It must be emphasized, however, that Manuel's birth certificate, a public document and an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar, enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity. To defeat these presumptions, the party making the allegation must present clear, positive and convincing evidence of alteration. For obvious reasons, this burden cannot be discharged by the mere submission of an inconclusive report from the Senate Committee and the presentation of an excerpt of an NBI report on the purported alterations.

c)

Validity of the Summary Deportation Order

The Summary Deportation Order was invalid. It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens of the Philippines. In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, the Court reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding. In that case, the SC stated: “When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.” Since respondent has already been declared and recognized as a Philippine citizen by the BI and the DOJ, he must be protected from summary deportation proceedings.

The Court finds these pieces of evidence inadequate to warrant a revocation of the recognition accorded to respondent. Respondent was earlier recognized as a natural-born citizen of



REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017 EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.) DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their suppl y lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless. FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups. After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate

declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’ s specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis. ISSUES:

1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution? 2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,: a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts; b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or

c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported? 3. IsthepoweroftheCourttoreviewthesufficiencyof thefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately? 4. Weretheresufficientfactualbasisfortheproclam ationofmartiallaworthesuspensionofthe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has the burden of proof? c. What is the threshold of evidence? 5. Istheexerciseofthepowerofjudicialreviewbythe Courtinvolvesthecalibrationofgraduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief? 6. considered,

May Proclamation No. 216 be vague, and thus null and void:



a. with its inclusion of

“other

rebel groups” ; or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region? 7. ArethearmedhostilitiesmentionedinProclamationNo .216andintheReportofthePresidentto Congress sufficient bases; a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region? 8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? 9.

Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or b. alsonullifytheactsofthePresidentincallingoutthearm edforcestoquelllawlessviolencein Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region? RULING: 1. YES.TheuniquefeaturesofthethirdparagraphofSecti on18,ArticleVIIclearlyindicatethatitshould be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which the Court has to promulgate its decision. In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2. a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciati on of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. b. NO.Eventherecommendationof,orconsultation with,theSecretaryofNationalDefense,or other highranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. c. YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of the Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President. Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or



reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself. 3. YES.TheCourtmaystrikedownthepresidentialprocla mationinanappropriateproceedingfiledby any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress. 4. YES.ThePresidentdeducedfromthefactsavail abletohimthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the

factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. b. Afterall,whatthePresidentneedstosatisfyisonly thestandardofprobablecauseforavalid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 5. NO.Thepowerofjudicialreviewdoesnotextendto calibratingthePresident'sdecisionpertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. 6. a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the



Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of i ts power to revoke. 7. YES.AreviewofthefactsavailabletothePresid entthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising,the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives leading to President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President ’ s conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 8. YES.Foradeclarationofmartiallaworsuspensi onoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusto be valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued, road blockades and checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were targeted, young male Muslims were forced to join their group, medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered, reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the security of the entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 9. a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court ’ s declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through

Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines. The President’ s calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be precluded to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case. b. NO. Under the “operative fact doctrine” , the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination of constitutionality is an operative fact that may have consequence which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidy may have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate and particular conduct, private and official.

Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of Mindanao

We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution. Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law



beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their suppl y lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless. x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao. Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end. x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.



ALBERT WILSON v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA G.R. No. 189220 December 07, 2016 PROCEEDINGS in GR NO. 135915

On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged with the crime of consummated rape by a 12-yearold girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner. The girl was assisted by her biological father in filing the criminal complaint. Immediately thereafter, Wilson was taken into custody. RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and

was imposed death penalty. Indemnify the victim an amount of P50, 000.00. *Pending appeal, Wilson filed with the committee, pursuant to the Optional Protocol, a case against the RP for violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CA: the Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. It found that there

were serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements particularly in the testimony given by the victim. It concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by Wilson. THE PRESENT CASE FACTS:

Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal. He immediately left the Philippines for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon his return in the UK, Wilson sought compensation

UK

at

the

request

of

the

former.

On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued the View. It found that the allegations falling under Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the ICCPR were inadmissible. The Committee stated: 9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the [ICCPR], the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. In respect of the violations of article 9 the State party should compensate the author. As to the violations of articles 7 and 10 suffered while in detention, including subsequent observes that to sentence of death, the Committee the compensation provided by the State party under its domestic law was not directed at these violations, and that compensation due to the author should take due account both of the seriousness of the violations and the damage to the author caused . In this context, the Committee recalls the duty upon the State party to undertake a comprehensive and impartial investigation of the issues raised in the course of the author's detention, and to draw the appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences for the individuals found responsible. As to the imposition of immigration fees and visa exclusion, the Committee takes the view that in order to remedy the violations of the Covenant the State party should refund to the author the moneys claimed from him. All monetary compensation thus due to the author by the State party should be made available for payment to the author at the venue of his choice, be it within the State party's territory or abroad. The State party is also under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future.

In his letter dated October 20, 2008, Wilson reiterated his June 19, 2008 letter and asked that the payment of compensation be effected, a comprehensive and impartial investigation be conducted, and the monies paid by Wilson with respect to immigration fees and visa exclusion be refunded.

from the Board of Claims (BOC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to R.A. No. 730916 through counsel as one who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal.The BoC-DOJ awarded to Wilson P14,000.00 as compensation. Wilson was informed of the BoCDOJ award and that he had to claim the compensation in person in the Philippines. Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that under R.A. No. 7309, he was entitled to P40,000.00 and

On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus. He insists his entitlement to the writ of mandamus owing to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol. He argues that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach of an international obligation since any View issued by the Committee constitutes part of international law and that the RP is obligated to enforce the same. He prays that: 1.

Respondents take steps to ensure that Albert Wilson is paid and given reparation in the amount sufficient to compensate him for the torture and abuse he suffered under the penal system of the Philippines, in compliance with Philippine treaty obligations in the ICCPR as embodied in the Communication of the Human Rights Committee in Case no. 868/1999 in keeping with international law on reparations.

2.

Respondents undertake continual efforts and steps to ensure that no torture and inhuman and degrading treatment are suffered by prisoners in the National Penitentiary and other places of detention and imprisonment in the Philippines, in the manner laid down in the Manila Bay case.

that a memorandum was issued directing the BOC to raise the award to the maximum amount that may be paid to those unjustly imprisoned or detained subject to the availability of funds. Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa to travel to the Philippines due to his presence in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watch list. According to the BI, Wilson's presence in the watch list could be attributed to his overstaying and his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The BoC-DOJ, thereafter, issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated August 24, 2001 granting Wilson an additional award of P26,000.00 in addition to the initial amount of P14,000.00 bringing the total award to P40,000.00. The DOJ issued a check

3. ISSUE: Whether Mandamus lie to compel the view?

amounting to P26,000.00 representing the additional award. The check was made out to Wilson, care of the Ambassador of HELD:

NO.

The

petition

is


without

merit.


Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a writ issued to compel a tribunal to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, to wit: Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station , or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

persons who were: (1) unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly detained and released without being charged; (3) a victim of arbitrary or illegal detention and released without being charged; and (4) victim of a violent crime.42 Under R.A. No. 7309, compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention will be based on the number of months of imprisonment. Compensation for each month of imprisonment shall not exceed P1,000.00.43 It is clear, however, that Wilson has been granted compensation under R.A. No. 7309. In fact, the BoC-DOJ granted to Wilson the maximum allowed compensation under that law. It was Wilson's decision not to collect the money granted to him. Other than the R.A. No. 7309, under which Wilson had already been granted compensation, there is no other law or regulation that forms the basis of such ministerial right that the government is impelled to grant. Wilson does not present any law by which his ministerial right arises from with respect to additional compensation. It is not within this Court's discretion to adjust any monetary grant arbitrarily.

In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al.,37 and several times reiterated thereafter, the Court held that a purely ministerial duty must exist and a clear legal right must be established by the petitioner for mandamus to lie, to wit: Two pertinent principles arc well settled in this jurisdiction: (a) one is that mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal, board or officer to comply with a purely ministerial duty, or to allow a party to exercise a right or to occupy and enjoy the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; (b) the others is that for the writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought, and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in relation thereto. It behooves the Court to examine whether the View dated November 11, 2003 relied upon by Wilson confers upon him any legal right which the respondents are ministerially required to perform but have unlawfully neglected. No

Ministerial

Duty

It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.39 As stated in Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes:40 A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his o wn judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992 creating a BoCDOJ to evaluate and investigate claims for compensation for



RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States on July 12, 2011.

Leonen, J.:

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections and eventually won.

FACTS:

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was later adopted and raised by spouses FPJ and Susan Roces. She took her college degree in the USA. She returns to the Philippines frequently. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided to settle in the US with her husband and children and lived there for some time. She was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport. When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned to support her father's candidacy. After the Elections, she returned to the United States on J uly 8, 2004. On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate. In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States and decided to return home in 2005. She came back on May 24, 2005. On July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship and derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children were granted. Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006. Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport. She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the Constitution. On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a Senator

HELD: Voting 9-3, the high court ruled in favor of Poe.

From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on citizenship, it was never the intention of the framers to exclude foundlings from naturalborn citizenship status. “Children

or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens of this nation” and the only reason that there was no specific reference to foundlings in the 1935 provision was that these cases “are few and far in between. ” Evident intent was to adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code “wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. ” Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is proved. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to said convention, its provisions are binding as they form part of the law of the land pursuant to the incorporation clause. Senator Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Convention remarked “By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized…” By referring to this rule in international law (which was no other than Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930), what was effectively created in the Constitution itself, was an exception to the general rule of natural-born citizenship based on blood descent.



Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines with unknown parentage) were, by birth, accorded natural-born citizenship by the Constitution. “natural-born citizens by legal fiction” The framers of the Constitution were sufficiently empowered to create a class of natural-born citizens by legal fiction, as an exception to the jus sanguinis rule. This is evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on nationality to be determined by the law of that State) of the 1930 Hague Convention. Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, as required under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225. Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman, Poe executed an affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship. This was sufficient to qualify her for her appointive position, and later, her elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not require that her Certificate of Loss of Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first approved in order that she may qualify for office. Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Poe still used her U.S. passport after having taken her Oath of Allegiance but not after she has renounced her U.S. Citizenship.

Yung SC may jurisdiction sya na ireview yung decisions ng SET – JUDICIAL REVIEW

Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still possible.

Ang paulit ulit sinasabi ni Dean Albano about sa case na ito ay yung circumstantial evidence lang daw yung ginamit para ma prove yung citizenship ni Grace Poe.

V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens. Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive. However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish her parentage. In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185 Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence: Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and



(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190chanrobleslaw

following table inference:196

is

support

of

his

statistical

NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 20102014 Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen. Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution. Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. SO ORDERED.

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population.192 Private respondent is described as having "brown almondshaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it. In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the



Rep. Baguilat vs Speaker Alvarez GR. No. 227757

July 25, 2017

separation of powers and political question applies to the instant question.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be compelled via mandamus to recognize Rep. Baguilat as the Minority leader.

FACTS:

1. Prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 2017, news surfaced that Rep. Suarez sought endorsement from President Duterte for his appointment as Minority Leader in the House. That to this effect, some members of the House Majority coalition feigned membership in the Minority to ensure appointment of Rep. Suarez.

2. Prior to the election of the House Speaker, thenacting floor Leader Rep. Fariñas and Rep. Atienza agreed that all who voted for the winning speaker shall be members of Majority and all who will abstain or vote in favor of other candidates will be members of the minority, no one objected.

3. Rep. Alvarez won the election of House Speaker with 252 votes. Rep. Baguilat got eight votes, Rep. Suarez got 7 and 21 abstained.

4. Herein petitioners hoped that the long-standing tradition where the second candidate who garnered the second highest vote automatically becomes Minority Leader, in this case, Rep. Baguilat. Despite numerous follow-ups from House Speaker Alvarez, Baguilat was never recognized as such.

5. One of the abstentionists, Rep. Abayon, manifested that all those who did not vote for Alvarez have voted for Suarez as minority leader. Fariñas moved for the recognition of Suarez but Rep. Lagman opposed on the ground that Suarez is a majority member, hence cannot be voted in the minority and that those who voted for him are independent members.

6. Petitioners filed herein Petition for Mandamus to the Supreme Court for the recognition of Baguilat as minority leader on the ground of the aforementioned long-standing tradition and irregularities in the election of Suarez.

HELD:

No, Mandamus is an extraordinary relief to one who has a CLEAR legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled which is not attendant in this case. The election proceeded without anyone objecting to the agreement between Fariñas and Atienza stating that all who voted for the winning speaker shall be members of Majority and all who will abstain or vote in favor of other candidates will be members of the minority. This unobjected procession was reflected in the Journal of the house, which according to jurisprudence is conclusive. Moreover, Section 16, (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that: 1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other offi cers as it may deem necessary. Under this provision, the house may decide to have officers other than the Speaker and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, the court observed that the Constitution is dead silent on how the election of all leaders except the House Speaker must be done. Corollary, paragraph 3 of the same section in Article 16 vests in the HoR the sole Authority to determine the rules of proceedings, as they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the House. As a general rule, the court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude i nto that exclusive realm. As an exception, it may strike down such determination in case of grave abuse of discretion, which is not present herein. As may be gleaned from the circumstances of the case as to how the house conducted the questioned proceedings, such grave abuse of discretion is absent. To rule otherwise will not only embroil this court to the real of Politics but will will breach the separation of powers doctrine. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

7. Suarez maintains that the court has no jurisdiction as the election of Minority is an internal matter to the HoR. The OSG, in behalf of the respondents insisted that the principle of



Alexander Padilla vs. Congress G.R. No. 231671 25 July 2017 Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

Within forty-eight ( 48) hours after the proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session, President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of Representatives, through House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (House Speaker Alvarez).

On May 30, 2017, the Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 388, which expressed support for President Duterte’ s Proclamation No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No. 390, which called for the convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives to deliberate on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.

P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao. " P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its approval and adoption.

After the closed-door briefing, the House of Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of

Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao. '" The House of Representatives proceeded to divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured the majority vote. The House of Representatives also purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was rejected.

These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.

ISSUES:

1.

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated petitions; YES

2.

Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court’ s exercise of its power of judicial review; YES

3.

Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’ s proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus under Art. 7, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution(MAIN ISSUE); NO and

4.

Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present cases. NO

HELD:

1. YES. Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is.

2. YES.

3. NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote to revoke the President’ s Declaration or suspension.



Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-in Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces, in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-inChief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power through the two other co-equal and independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of

martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.

There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz. : a.

Within forty-eight ( 48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;

b.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President;

c.

Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in the same manner. extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and

d.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty four hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.

There is no question herein that the first provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017. The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual circumstances which arc not availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the initial proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and not their extension; and the Congress was still in session 68 when President Duterte issued Proclamation No .. 216 on May 23, 2017.

It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein: “The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regul ar or special session, may revoke such proclamation or



suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.”

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. According to the plain meaning rule or verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or "speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure. ”

President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.

4. NO. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.

Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of legislative duty, we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous cases. In thi s particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.

It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session. ” While it may be conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase “voting jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement that “[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.

As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It bears to mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very same act - which, in the Tafiada Petition, the nonconvening by the two Houses of the Congress in joint session - is contradictory, as the former involves a mandatory duty which the government branch or

Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the

In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.



instrumentality must perform without discretion, while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of the government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. Nevertheless, if the Court is to adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it still finds the same to be without merit. To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after deliberations among their Members and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure. Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse it s discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence thereto.


COMPILED POLIREV DIGEST_COMPLETE.docx

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