Compiled case digest in persons and family relation civil code , family code

Persons and Family Relation Compliled Case Digest Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli, Bolide, Rouelli Gift, Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz, Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan, Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes, Jareed, Rosario, Keouh, Savellano, Michael Niño Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries

Case Title EFFECTIVITY Lara v. Del Rosario DATE OF EFFECTIVITY Tanada v. Tuvera Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga Basa v. Mercado Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission COMPUTATION OF TIME Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown People v. Del Rosario

G.R./SCRA No. 94 Phil 778 136 SCRA 27 G.R. 108461 No. G.R. 158761 No. G.R. LNo. 42226 G.R. 192717 No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

162155 L-7234

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals People v. Gasacao

G.R. No. G.R. No.

137873 168445

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales Laureno v. Court of Appeals Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals Bernabe v. Alejo Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. Montanez v. Cipriano Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice WAIVER OF RIGHTS Guy v. Court of Appeals

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R.

L55960 114776 140047 112193 140500 181556 181089 188056 163707 1

F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. People v. Morial

No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

187521 129295

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Magkalas v. National Housing Authority

G.R. No. G.R. No.

162215 5 138823

EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW Garcia v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No.

165835

STARE DECISIS Ting v. Velez-Ting Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. G.R. No.

166562 110398

LAW OF THE CASE Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations

G.R. No.

141600

OBITER DICTUM Villanueva v. Court of Appeals Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation DURA LEX SED LEX People v. Veneracion CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

142947 146486 134284

249 SCRA 251 G.R. No.

L55960

G.R. No. G.R. No.

L30642

G.R. No.

L24170

G.R. No.

124371

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. Ursua v. Court of Appeals

112170

APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY Llorente v. Court of Appeals


2

INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION Miciano v. Brimo

G.R. No.

L22595


L16749 L23768 L27860

G.R. No. G.R. No.

L68470

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

132344 17

RENVOI Aznar v. Garcia Bellis v. Bellis Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS Van Dorn v. Romillo Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co.

133876

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS University of the East v. Jader G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona Go. V. Cordero Villanueva v. Rosqueta Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp.

156841 164703 180764 184315

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA Custodio v. Court of Appeals Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon

G.R. No. G.R. No.

116100 156168

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA Hotel Nikko v. Reyes

G.R. No.

154259

LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO Manuel v. People of the Philippines Romero v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. G.R. No.

165842 167546

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES Pe v. Pe

G.R. No.

L17396

G.R. No.

L14628

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals


3

Galang v. Court of Appeals Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals Wassmer v. Velez Natividad v. Tunac

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

L17248 97336 L20089 143130

UNJUST ENRICHMENT Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation Elegir v. Philippine Airlines


172525 138088 181995

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.

L56168

RIGHT TO PRIVACY Concepcion v. Court of Appeals Padalhin v. Lavina

G.R. No. G.R. No.

120706 183026

NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No.

125704

ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME Manantan v. Court of Appeals Nuguid v. Nicdao People v. Agacer


107152 150758 177751

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS) People v. Bayotas Cancio, Jr. v. Isip Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals


102007 133978 108395

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES) Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.


G.R. No.

150256

4

International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos Ruiz v. Ucol

G.R. No. G.R. No.

130362 L45404

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase


141309 119398 182976

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASIDELICTS/TORTS) Barredo v. Garcia Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco

G.R. No. G.R. No.

48006 165732

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION City of Pasig v. COMELEC Beltran v. People Merced v. Diez Donato v. Luna Tenebro v. Court of Appeals PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY Geluz v. Court of Appeals RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT Catalan v. Basa Domingo v. Court of Appeals Mendezona v. Ozamis Oposa v. Factoran Jr.


165732 125646 L15315 L53642 150758

2 SCRA 801 G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

159657 127540 143370 101083

KINDS OF DOMICILE Marcos v. COMELEC

G.R. No.

119976

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION


5

Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals Bernabe v. Alejo

G.R. No. G.R. No.

112193 140500

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE G.R. No. Adm. No.

Ancheta v. Ancheta Abadilla v. Tabiliran

145370 MTJ92-716

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian' Eugenio v. Velez Balogbog v. Court of Appeals


155733 85140 83598

LEGAL CAPACITY Silverio v. Republic Republic v. Cagandahan

G.R. No. G.R. No.

174689 166676

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER Beso v. Judge Daguman

A.M. No.

Aranes v. Occiano

A.M. No.

MTJ991211 MTJ021390

MARRIAGE LICENSE Alcantara v. Alcantara Republic v. Court of Appeals Carino v. Carino Sy v. Court of Appeals Sevilla v. Cardenas Abbas v. Abbas

G.R. 167746 No. 477 SCRA 277 G.R. 132529 No. 330 SCRA 550 G.R. 167684 No. G.R. 183896 No.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT Manzano v. Sanchez


A.M. No.

MTJ001329 6

Ninal v. Badayog Cosca v.Palaypayon

G.R. No. A.M. No.

133778 MTJ92-721

MARRIAGE CEREMONY Morigo v. People

G.R. No.

145226

A.M. No. A.M. No.

MTJ94-963 MTJ96-963

G.R. No.

135216

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY Moreno v. Bernabe Navarro v. Domagtoy MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals FOREIGN DIVORCE Republic v. Iyoy Republic v. Obrecido III Van Dorn v. Romillo San Luis v. San Luis Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas Garcia-Recio v. Recio

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

152577 154380 L68470 133743 186571 138322

NO MARRIAGE LICENSE Atienza v. Brillantes

A.M. No.

MTJ92706

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee Quita v. Court of Appeals Tenebro v. Court of Appeals Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines Macarrubo v. Macarrubo Weigel v. Sempio Dy Montanez v. Cipriano


G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. A.C. No. G.R. No. G.R.

183622 124862 150758 164435 6148 L53703 181089 7

No. VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES Republic v. Nolasco Republic v. Court of Appeals Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals Manuel v. People of the Philippines Republic v. Bermudes Calisterio v. Calisterio Republic v. Granada

G.R. 94053 No. 477 SCRA 277 G.R. 111717 No. G.R. 165842 No. G.R. 160258 No. G.R. 136467 No. G.R. 187512 No.

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC Domingo v. Court of Appeals Atienza v. Brillantes

G.R. No. A.M. No.

108481 8 MTJ92706

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao Santos v. Court of Appeals Hernandez v. Court of Appeals Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines


119190 112019 126010 184063

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina Barcelona v. Court of Appeals Tongol v. Tongol Marcos v. Marcos Te v. Te Agraviador v. Agraviador Marable v. Marable


G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

108763 130087 157610 136490 161793 170729 178741

8

Aurelio v. Aurelio Republic v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. G.R. No.

175367 159594

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Republic v. Encelan Mendoza v. Republic Republic v. Galang Ochosa v. Alano Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes Toring v. Toring Ligeralde v. Patilunghug Suazo v. Suazo Aspillaga v. Aspillaga Alcazar v. Alcazar Najera v. Najera Halili v. Santos-Halili Paras v. Paras Zamora v. Court of Appeals Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris Antonio v. Reyes Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco Villalon v. Villalon Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals Republic v. Quintero-Hamano


G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

170022 157649 168796 167459 185286 165321 168796 164493 170925 174451 164817 165424 147824 141917 162368 155800 158896 167206 127358 149498 9

Dedel v. Court of Appeals Republic v. Dagdag Pesca v. Pesca


151867 109975 136921

ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, GROUNDS Mallion v. Alcantara

G.R. No.

141528

G.R. No.

112597

PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE Leonor v. Court of Appeals PARTIES Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli Catalan v. Court of Appeals Ninal v. Badayog Carlos v. Sandoval Ablaza v. Republic


169766 173614 167109 133778 179922 158298

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE Maquilan v. Maquilan Republic v. Cuison-Melgar Malcampo-Sin v. Sin Tuason v. Court of Appeals Corpus v. Ochotorena

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. A.M. No.

155409 139676 137590 116607 RTJ-041861

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Pacete v. Carriaga

G.R. No.

L53880

FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis Ty v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. G.R.

138509 127406 10

No. EFFECTS Valdes v. RTC and Valdes Dino v. Dino

G.R. No. G.R. No.

122749 178044

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT Villaneva v. Court of Appeals Anaya v. Palaroan Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon


132955 L27930 47101

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE Villaneva v. Court of Appeals Macarrubo v. Macarrubo Reyes v. Zaballero

G.R. No. A.C. No. G.R. No.

132955 6148 L-3561

DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION Alcazar v. Alcazar Villanueva v. Court of Appeals Jimenez v. Canizares


174451 132955 L12790

LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong Gaudioncio v. Penaranda Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals


15320 79284 82606

DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON Arroyo v. Court of Appeals Ginez v. Bugayong People v. Zapata De Ocampo v. Florenciano DEFENSES, CONSENT Matubis v. Praxedes


G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R.

96602 L10033 L-3047 L13553 L11

People v. Schneckenburger People v. Sensano

No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

11766 48183 37720

DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT Benedicto v. De La Rama

G.R. No.

1056

G.R. No.

L13553


L10699 L13553 L29138

DEFENSES, COLLUSION De Ocampo v. Florenciano DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION Brown v. Yambao De Ocampo v. Florenciano Contreras v. Macaraig ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE Banez v. Banez Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio

G.R. No. G.R. No.

132592 L30977

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD Araneta c. Concepcion Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr. Pacete v. Carriaga


L-9667 L34132 L53880

NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE Pacete v. Carriaga

G.R. No.

L53880

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE Sabalones v. Court of Appeals Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio


106169 115640 L30977

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION Laperal v. Republic Siochi v. Gozon


G.R. No. G.R. No.

L18008 169900 12

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES Pelayo v. Lauron Go v. Court of Appeals Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio Goitia v. Campos Rueda Cuenca v. Cuenca


129295 114791 17014 139789 11263 L-7231

PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael Matabuena v. Cervantes Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company


146683 L28771 12707

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS Navarro v. Escobido Villanueva v. Court of Appeals Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.


153788 143286 187023

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED PROPERTY Ching v. Court of Appeals Tan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. G.R. No.

124642 120594

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION In Re Muller v. Muller

G.R. No.

149615

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS Dela Pena v. Avila Titan Construction Co. v. David

G.R. No. G.R. No.

187490 169584

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.

188305

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION


13

Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio Ros v. Philippine National Bank Siochi v. Gozon Aggabao v. Parulan Fuentes v. Roca


157537 170166 169900 165803 178902

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual

G.R. No.

163744

G.R. No.

176556

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION Quiao v. Quiao VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS Dino v. Dino Maxey v. Court of Appeals Carino v. Carino Valdes v. RTC and Valdes Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals Maquilan vs. Maquilan Gonzales vs. Gonzales Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr


G.R. No.

178044 L45870 132529 122749 127358 155409 159521

152716

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS Carino v. Carino Tumlos v. Fernandez Francisco v. Master Iron Works Joaquino v. Reyes Saguid vs. Court of Appeals

Juaniza v. Jose



132529 137650 151967 154645 150611 L5012714

28 Adriano v. Court of Appeals COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY Hiyas v. Acuna Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals Santos v. Court of Appeals PROHIBITED COMPROMISE Mendoza v. Court of Appeals FAMILY HOME Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan Modequillo v. Breva Josef v. Santos Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc. Gomez v. Sta. Ines Manacop v. Court of Appeals Taneo v. Court of Appeals Fortaleza v. Lapitan

G.R. No.

124118

229 SCRA 274 500 SCRA 514 309 SCRA 340 G.R. 129242 No. 475 SCRA 1 19 SCRA 756 G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

185920 86355 165060 172263 132537 97898 108532 178288

KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN De Asis v. Court of Appeals Fernandez v. Fernandez

G.R. No. G.R. No.

108532 143256

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS Concepcion v. Court of Appeals Angeles v. Maglaya Jao v. Court of Appeals Babiera v. Catotal



123450 153798 L49162 138493

15

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon

G.R. No. G.R. No.

138961 142877

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY Tijing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.

125901

VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION Cabatania v. Court of Appeals Eceta v. Eceta Alberto v. Court of Appeals


124814 157037 86639

COMPULSORY RECOGNITION Rivero v. Court of Appeals People v. Bayani People vs. Manahan


141273 120894 128157

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY Nepomuceno v. Lopez Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva Cruz v. Cristobal Perla v. Baring

G.R. 181258 No. 496 SCRA 135 G.R. 140422 No. G.R. 172471 No.

PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES Tijing v. Court of Appeals Agustin v. Court of Appeals Herrera v. Alba People v. Vallejo Estate of Ong v. Diaz

G.R. 125901 No. 460 SCRA 315 460 SCRA 197 G.R. 144656 No. G.R. 171713 No.

COMPULSORY RECOGNITION Guy v. Court of Appeals Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court


G.R. No. G.R. No.

163707 72078 16

Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor

G.R. No.

174680

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN Briones v. Miguel Republic v. Abadilla Verceles v. Posada People v. Glabo Tonog v. Court of Appeals Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals Silva v. Court of Appeals David v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

156343 133054 159785 129248 122906 111455 114742 111180

RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN De Santos v. Angeles Abadilla v. Tabiliran WHO MAY ADOPT Republic v. Court of Appeals Republic v. Toledano Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara

G.R. 105619 No. 249 SCRA 448 G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No.

100835 94147 95551

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim Landingin v. Republic Cang v. Court of Appeals Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen

G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. A.M. No.

168992 164948 105308 RTJ-961362

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION Republic v. Hernandez Republic v. Court of Appeals In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia


G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R.

117209 103695 148311 17

No. G.R. No.

Teotico v. Del Val

L18753

RESCISSION OF ADOPTION Lahom v. Sibulo

G.R. No.

143989

G.R. No.

131286

SUPPORT Lam v. Chua WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT Briones v. Miguel Quimiging v. Icao Francisco v. Zandueta Santero v. Court of Appeals Gotardo v. Buling


156343 L26795 43794 L61700 165166

WHEN DEMANDABLE Lacson v Lacson

G.R. No.

150644

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT Lim v. Lim Verceles v. Posada Mangonon v. Court of Appeals De Guzman v. Perez


163209 159785 125041 156013

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY Lacson v. Lacson

G.R. No.

150644

SUPPORT PENDENT LITE Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.

118671

G.R. No.

L48219

G.R. No.

114742

SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS Reyes v. Ines-Luciano CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY Silva v. Court of Appeals


18

WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY Tonog v. Court of Appeals Vancil v. Belmes Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals Sombong v. Court of Appeals


122906 133323 140817 116773 111876

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto Santos v. Court of Appeals Golangco v. Court of Appeals David v. Court of Appeals Espiritu v. Court of Appeals Perez v. Court of Appeals


174485 154994 113054 124724 111180 115640 118870

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court Tamargo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. G.R. No.

70890 85044

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY Aquinas School v. Inton St. Joseph's College v. Miranda St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos Amadora v. Court of Appeals Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals



184202 182353 143363 L47745 L70458 84698 19

USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court

G.R. No. G.R. No.

169202 94986

USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia In re Julian Lim Wang In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte USE OF DIFFERENT NAME


People v. Estrada Ursua v. Court of Appeals

148311 159966 L51201 164368 112170

AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo Lee v. Court of Appeals In re change of name of Julian Wang Silverio v. Republic Republic v. Cagandahan Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City


189476 118387 159966 174689 166676 181174

EFFECTIVITY LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO G.R. No. L-6339

April 20, 1954

Facts: In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of “Waval Taxi.” He


20

employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notices. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. Issue: Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of “salary corresponding to said month.” commonly known as “mesada.” If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month, then computation of the month’s salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.


21

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 Facts: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. Issue: Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette. Ruling: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.


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DATE OF EFFECTIVITY PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES G.R. No. 108641 October 21, 1996 Facts: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision. Issue: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.


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DATE OF EFFECTIVITY NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007 Facts: On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do not provide for such ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. NEA, on the other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. Issue:


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Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying with the publication requirement. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO G.R. No. L-42226 26, 1935

July

Facts: Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the


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Ing Katipunan where the notice was published was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law. Issues: a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation Ruling: The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing. The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012


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Facts: Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of overrecoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application. Issue: Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws shall take effect after fifteen


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days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of publication such as an interpretative regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it’s IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR. Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.


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COMPUTATION OF TIME COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007 Facts: On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the twoyear reglementary period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.


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COMPUTATION OF TIME PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955 Facts: On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court. Issue: Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed. Ruling: The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the new provisions should apply.


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PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010 Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.


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Ruling: No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an exception because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005 Facts: Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he can’t be held liable for illegal recruitment because he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the law against prohibition on bonds and deposits


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under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. 8042. Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. Ruling: There is no merit in appellant’s contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning agency because he was the company’s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agency’s requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES G.R. No. L-55960 24, 1988

November

Facts:


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Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through evidences like Yao Kee’s and Gan Ching’s testimony, Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registration stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the certificate by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China affirming the fact of the marriage. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid. Ruling: Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In such absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as ours. In the Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a solemnizing officer; therefore the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.


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PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114776 2, 2000

February

Facts: Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979. However because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company initiated cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd. Issue: a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case. b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ them. The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case. Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioner’s action for damages due to illegal dismissal has already prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years after the effective date has prescribed.


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PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC. G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004 Facts: On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce. On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint management. To comply with the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement.


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On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full payment of its performance bond counterguarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project. VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made on its counterguarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq’s laws should be applied in determining VPECI's failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract. Ruling: Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the doctrine of processual presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner guarantor should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.


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PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996 Facts: In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate children of their defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to


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one-half portion of share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively. Ruling: Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when the parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with the New Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription. Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not impair the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested right of the respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS BERNABE vs. ALEJO G.R. No. 140500

January 21, 2002


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Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the action. Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation. The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right. Issue: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son. Ruling: The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.


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PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009 Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that “After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank”. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings Issue: Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. “This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation”.


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PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012 Facts: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes re-married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the Regional Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004, Silverio’s daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the Family Code, Article 40 cannot be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed. Issue: Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of


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bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art. 40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of anyone. The petition is thereby granted.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 188056 2013

January 8,

Facts: Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that


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DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 Facts: On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million more or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On June 13, 1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of


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Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private respondent’s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational support received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities. The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was made. Issue: Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming successional rights. Ruling: The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional rights because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary rights, hence it can’t be construed as a waiver of successional rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents may repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been judicially approved, the release and waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION


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G.R. No. 187521

March 14, 2012

Facts: Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof. The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was completed, HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter’s progress billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC’s progress billings. Issue: Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC’s valuation of the completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on account of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works, had effectively waived its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC’s submission of its monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the parties’ respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its


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valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed works conducted by it and the DPWH. On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of FFCCI’s failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its contractual right to require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs”. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this case.


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WAIVER OF RIGHTS PEOPLE vs. MORIAL G.R. No. 129295

August 15, 2001

Facts: Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him by the police was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when Morial signed the admission. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused. Ruling: The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.” Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or


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under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted”. Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN G. R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007 Facts: On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming refund based on its final adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting 365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA found that the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period equivalent to 730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the petition was filed 731 days after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA reversed the CTA and ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA. Ruling:


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The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is EO 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Section 31 provides that a “year” shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. Both article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month from the day the taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008 Facts: Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of


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109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.

On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control (sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff’s structure is located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development. Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.

On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.

The Order denying plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decision and order of the RTC.


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Issue: Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioner’s structure will violate the vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the constitution.

Ruling: Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution.

Petitioner’s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA’s authority to order the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315. Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioner’s property. The NHA, as the decree’s designated administrator for the national government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements.

P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.


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Inasmuch as petitioner’s property was located in the area identified as an open space by the NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order. Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the subject property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-0063).

EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 165835

June 22, 2005


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Facts: This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family. The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both Forfeiture I and II. Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan to R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379. Ruling: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379. Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without compensation in consequence of an offense.


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STARE DECISIS TING vs. VELEZ-TING G.R. No. 166562 2009

March 31,

Facts: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been realized Ruling: No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.


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But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. The petition for review on certiorari is granted.

STARE DECISIS NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997 Facts: In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found. Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the


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passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City. On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the agreement. Issues: a) Whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the Don Juan; b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case; c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and unwarranted. Ruling: First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear. Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally


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negligent as it found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship. Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner. Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under petitioner’s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.

LAW OF THE CASE FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION


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G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003 Facts: Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they received notice of the NLRC’s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to; hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA. Issue: Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the Rules of Court impede the cause of justice. Ruling: Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.


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OBITER DICTUM VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 142947 2002

March 19,

Facts: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her. Issue: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

Ruling: The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.


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OBITER DICTUM OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005 Facts: The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the


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expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal. Issues: a) Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are impeachable. b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively liable. Ruling: Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that “The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment”. Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented. Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative


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investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.

OBITER DICTUM AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000 Facts:


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Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval b) the construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling: Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, for the payment of damages.


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DURA LEX SED LEX PEOPLE vs. VENERACION G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12, 1995 Facts: On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused to act. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law. Ruling: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.


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CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES G.R. No. L-55960 24, 1988

November

Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws. Ruling: Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee


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and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP. G.R. No. L-30642 1985

April

30,

Facts: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA. Issue:


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Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue. Ruling: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170 10, 1996

April

Facts: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request


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to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar Perez” when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged under the wrong law. Ruling: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS


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G.R. No. L-24170 16, 1968

December

Facts: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. Issue: Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters. Ruling: The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on Philippine ship.


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NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124371 23, 2000

November

Facts: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank. On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate. Issue: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente. Ruling: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi


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doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION MICIANO vs. BRIMO G.R. No. L-22595 1, 1927

November

Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Ruling: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in


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any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

RENVOI AZNAR vs. GARCIA G.R. No. L-16749 31, 1963

January

Facts: Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.


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Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs. Ruling: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

RENVOI BELLIS vs. BELLIS G.R. No. L-23678 1967

June

6,

Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing


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of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.


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RENVOI PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN G.R. No. L-27860 March 29, 1974 Facts: Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible). Issue: Whether or not Texas Law should apply. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time).


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FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. G.R. No. L-68470

October 8, 1985

Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding. Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse. Ruling: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,


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which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 133876 December 1999

29,

Facts: Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.


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The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted. On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure. Ruling: Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment


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or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000 Facts:


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Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations due to UE’s negligence. Issue: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages? Ruling: Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what Court of Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with


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legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted. PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA G.R. No. 156841

June 30, 2005

Facts: GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of employment. He was tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event conducted, play-off games, etc. He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team and players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation in good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of the corporation. He also agreed to endorse the corporation’s products in commercial advertising, promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph 3) Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to


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the terms of the contract as he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity. Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking their right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six (6) years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona’s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal. GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating Valenzona’s employment, finding Valenzona’s claim for damages as valid. The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of applicable laws and established jurisprudence. Ruling:


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GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years. In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor. Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for breach of contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action. Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages, exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney’s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to pay the balance of Valenzona’s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS GO vs. CORDERO G.R. No. 164703

May 4, 2010

Facts: Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).


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After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the


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Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998. On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747). Issue: a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of contract; and b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA. Ruling: While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson.


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In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.


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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA G.R. No. 180764 19, 2010

January

Facts: Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria MacapagalArroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it. But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the


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preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer. Ruling: Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty. But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION G.R. No. 184315 November 25, 2009 Facts: In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "MarcosRomualdez crony," which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities.


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The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife. In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel. Ruling: In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a "corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable. There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged


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communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to a defamatory imputation. Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications. In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.


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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116100 1996

February 9,

Facts: Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper? Ruling: No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a


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legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.” At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.


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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON GR. No. 156168 December 14, 2004 Facts: Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by


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his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought. Issue: Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages. Ruling: Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.


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VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES GR. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus,


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making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees. Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse. Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff. Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.


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LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE GR. No. 165842

November 29, 2005

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issues: a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.


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b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law. Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.


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LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009 Facts: On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries. As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.


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Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which on July 17, 2001, affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s acquittal freed him of civil liability? Ruling: In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE G.R. No.L-17396 1962

May 30,

Facts: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a


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Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man." Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages.


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Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.


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BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960 Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through


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plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively. Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.


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BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. No.L-17248 January 29, 1962 Facts: Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the


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bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory. The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.

Issues: Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach of promise to marry? Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Facts:


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Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses. Issue: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages. Ruling: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood. Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.


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BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY WASSMER vs. VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Issue: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry? Ruling: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."


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BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC G.R. No. 143130 10, 2000

July

Facts: Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her. Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house. It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town. Issue: Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction. Ruling: In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers before they engaged in any


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sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in this case. In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. UNJUST ENRICHMENT SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC. G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5, 275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract documents. On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner


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demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement. Issue: Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to unjust enrichment. Ruling: No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC award for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to claim because Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the materials came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually installed the said materials as part of remaining works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn. The claim for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because in the computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price and the cost of variations which included the inventoried materials. Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by respondent.


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UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation G.R. NO. 138088 January 23, 2006 Facts: On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation filed an ejectment case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the possession of a parcel of land at Quezon Avenue. USHIO Realty contends that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the former owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO Realty, CAR COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995 USHIO Realty sent the final demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable


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15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR COOL refused to vacate the property, hence the ejectment case. The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty. CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision affirming the decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, granting rentals to USHIO Realty. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and attorney’s fees in favor of USHIO Realty Ruling: USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to CAR COOL’s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the property does not constitute unjust enrichment.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012


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Facts: Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir was one of those awarded with the opportunity. Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for an optional retirement authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in that the company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL will deduct the unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave thereafter. Elegir’s counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training should not be deducted from his retirement pay. Issue: Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir’s retirement pay the amount unrecovered from his training. Ruling: PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code, they had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL. Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one’s self on something which does not meritoriously belong to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, “Nemo cum alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest”. Elgir has the right to retire since he has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered a long stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not even recovered the cost of training.


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PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

G.R. No. L-56168 22, 1988

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS December

Facts: Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated a loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian’s shareholders. It was found out in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its creditors. Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn its non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the bank only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa’s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back to them because they have already paid the loan of Php 300.00. Issue: Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa’s land. Ruling:


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The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time the rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa’s by making a document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a preponderance of proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the power of the state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000 Facts: Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an apartment being leased to them by Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resides in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor. Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the deceased husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accusing him of having adulterous relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigo’s sick mother, in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence


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also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of fidelity and frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology. Issue: Whether or not Nestor’s right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor entitled to damages. Ruling: The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that there was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the privacy of another’s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that manner. The Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every county, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus, under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous, and insulting language. Nestor, therefore is entitled to damages.


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RIGHT TO PRIVACY

G.R. No. 183026 14, 2012

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA November

Facts: Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice. Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in


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the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina’s house with the aid of Lavina’shouse helpers. The second raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures were taken. Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent to Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The investigating team comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence without any search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina subsequently filed before the RTC for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation team. Issue: Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavina’s right to privacy. Ruling: The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a person’s right are disturbed. There is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina’s privacy rights. The act was defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestor’s surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.


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NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998 Facts: On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52. In a letter dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it has pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly. Issue: Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the nonpayment of the taxes due by Philex. Ruling: The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-payment of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake cannot be a reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the taxes. The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation because taxes cannot be offset against claims of taxes by the government; the relationship of the government and its taxpayers is not a debtor-creditor relationship.


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CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001 Facts: In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they should borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get Nicolas at the Manantan Technical School. When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others to go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather decided to go to a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities. Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision but was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio suffered minor injuries to his head and legs. The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled in favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond


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reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas now seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he can be held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime. Issue: Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused. Ruling: The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first is acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second is the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is extinguished while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil liability merely requires preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code. EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL NUGUID vs. NICDAO G.R. No. 150785

September 15, 2006

Facts: The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid lent the Nicdao spouses money. Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the loan. The checks are to be deposited in Nuguid’s account upon non-payment of the amount within one year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account


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in Ching’s account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability. Issue: a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the violation of B.P. 22. b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract. Ruling: The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao has already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the crime was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited upon non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are applied first to interest. The interest was unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per Article 1956 of the Civil Code.


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CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT PEOPLE vs. AGACER G.R. No. 177751

January 7, 2013

Facts: The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his brother Andy, Rafael,


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and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that Cesario had raised. Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started fire on Cesario’s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops. While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused. Issue: Whether or not the civil liability of the brother’s arose upon the final judgment of the Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling: The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by Article 1161 of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order, and second as an offense against the private person injured by the crime.

DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY


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PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS G.R. No. 102007

September 2, 1994

Facts: The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992. The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability arising from the crime. In the Solicitor General’s comment the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil liability shall be extinguished. Issue: Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal liability. The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability arising from delict only.


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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION CANCIO vs. ISIP G.R. No. 133978

November 12, 2002

Facts: The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime. Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata. Issue: Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of the criminal case of estafa. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was made by the prosecution on time. According


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to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997 Facts: On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.


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Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION) ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. G.R. No. 150256 March 25, 2004 Facts: Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his complaint for damages against respondent’s publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor Max Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared on People’s Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-


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ASA, lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NAIS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape and the supposed details of the rape. About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item”, his reputation as a director of NAIS was injured, that he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion. Issue: Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the editors liable for defamation. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs, in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith


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and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)


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INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001 Facts: Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H. Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his personal announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court. Issue: Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action. Ruling: IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.


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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION) RUIZ vs. UCOL G.R. No.L-454404 August 7, 1987 Facts: AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendantappelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action for damages. Ruling: Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest


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that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol’s answer in the administrative case after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007 Facts: On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 3793 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also


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contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper against the petitioner. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law, the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.


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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119398 1999

July 2,

Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to


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September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz. The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights to due process. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of


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petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.


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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS) MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO G.R. No. 182976 14, 2013

January

Facts: Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has been tampered with. Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional rights of the respondent.


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Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS) BARREDO vs. GARCIA G.R. No. 48006

July 8, 1942

Facts: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that negligence of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him. Issue: Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.


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Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article 1903.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS) SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006 Facts: On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to


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deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasidelicts. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999 Facts: On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. Issue: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well


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suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 137567

June 20, 2000

Facts: Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question. Issue: Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage. Ruling: The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.


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Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION MERCED vs. DIEZ G.R. No. L-15315

August 26, 1960

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeth’s relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question. Issue: Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question. Ruling: In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a


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marriage would be illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DONATO vs. LUNA G.R. No. L-53642

April 15, 1988

Facts: An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his second marriage is a prejudicial question. Issue:


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Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of bigamy. Ruling: The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second marriage.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

Facts:


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Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Less than a year after, petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously married and that he is leaving to live with his first wife, Hilda Villareyes. On January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner is truly married to Hilda, to which it was affirmative. She then filed a criminal complaint of bigamy against herein petitioner. His marriage to Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on ground of psychological incapacity while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the defense that the bigamy is not committed in lieu of the nullity of the marriage. Issue: Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy. Ruling: A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void; the nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. The declaration of nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on ground of psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of marriage retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is the liability of incurring criminal liability for bigamy.


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PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No . L-16439

July 20, 1961

Facts: Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to which she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita’s marriage with plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child. Issue: Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child. Ruling: No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights can take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear that the husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT CATALAN vs. BASA G.R. No. 159567

July 31, 2007

Facts: Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951 he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed an action or declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio. Issue: Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity. Ruling: In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his rights.

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127540

October 17, 2001

Facts: Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. Issue: Whether or not the sale was void. Ruling: At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ G.R. No. 143370

February 6, 2002

Facts: Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale. Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller. Ruling: The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she considered incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT OPOSA vs. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083

July 10, 1993

Facts: Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The minors further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek to cancel all existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR from issuing anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and nature in general. Issue: Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to sue. Ruling: Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for other of their generations and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational

responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

KINDS OF DOMICILE ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 Facts: Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the cancellation and disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Issue: Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not. Ruling:

Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in political law to be used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly only had numerous residences, but maintained her domicile to be in Leyte.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112193

March 13, 1996

Facts: Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration of acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation has already prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive. Issue: Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case. Ruling: Respondents are establishing their filiation by “open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child” under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the attainment of age of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing filiation can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or prejudiced in the process. The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested by the filing of complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the Family Code.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION BERNABE vs. ALEJO G.R. No. 140500

January 21, 2002

Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on grounds that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application and hence, the manner of proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a status of a legitimate child” must have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent. Issue: Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case. Ruling: The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive effect of the family code finds no application in this case.

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA G.R. No. 145370

March 4, 2004

Facts: Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not there is basis for a new trial. Ruling: Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her, hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 1995

October 25,

Facts: Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges. Ruling: Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006 Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half and fullblood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces, illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa’s estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon. Ruling: Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE EUGENIO vs. VELEZ G.R. No. 85140

May 17, 1990

Facts: Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister, Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein petitioner in his residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims custody over Vitaliana’s body. Issue: Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana’s body instead of the immediate relatives. Ruling: Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a community of property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 83598

March, 7, 1997

Facts: Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate. They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate. Issue: Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was successfully overcome. Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a matter of constitutional concern.

LEGAL CAPACITY SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts: Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to have his name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate. Ruling: Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. However a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not sanction such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. A person’s sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.

LEGAL CAPACITY REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN G.R. No. 166676 2008

September

12,

Facts: Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff. Issue: Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected. Ruling: Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER BESO vs. DAGUMAN A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 2000

January 28,

Facts: Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage. Ruling: Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 Facts: On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner’s marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with lack of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction? Ruling: Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

MARRIAGE LICENSE RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 167746 August 28, 2007 Facts: On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person “fixer” who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number “7054133” is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void. Ruling: The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license

is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties herein. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.

The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

MARRIAGE LICENSE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO GR No. 103047 September 2, 1994

Facts: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage? Rulings: The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

MARRIAGE LICENSE SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001 Facts: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children. And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969. Issue: Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits? Ruling: Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The

records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not being the legal wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present case; both parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children.

MARRIAGE LICENSE FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 127263 April 12, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered

dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Issues: a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony? b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity? Ruling: A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

MARRIAGE LICENSE JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006 Facts: On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005. This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime. Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question? Ruling: Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence

of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. Therefore, the instant petition is denied.

MARRIAGE LICENSE SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 Facts: Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated

November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage? Ruling: The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. The petition is therefore granted.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 Facts: Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross

ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law? Ruling: Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00. . MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG G.R. No. 133778 2000

March 14,

Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Issues: a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a Marriage license? b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s marriage void after his death? Ruling: The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested

party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment is legitimate. MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994 Facts: In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.

Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the complaints charged? Ruling: The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

MARRIAGE CEREMONY LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On

October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CAG.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the criminal case. Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the

beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995

Facts: On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete. In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him. Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law." Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of

the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996 Facts: On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte. Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law? Ruling: The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary

laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 Facts: Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison. Such decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issues: a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid? b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

FOREIGN DIVORCE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005 Facts:

Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. Issues: a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely? b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to the case at bar? Ruling:

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

FOREIGN DIVORCE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Facts: On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Issue: Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce

as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 Facts: The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998 Issues: a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration? Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 Facts: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.

Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree? Ruling: The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required

certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together

as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual. Issues: a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven? b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its

admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing

his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

NO MARRIAGE LICENSE LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR. A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko

abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Issue: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Ruling: Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater

demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALANLEE G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 Facts:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated. On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition. Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998 Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27, 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Issues: a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties? Ruling: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and

Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is denied.

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004 Facts: Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage,

petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by Villareyes. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Issues: a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting petitioner of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and insufficiency of evidence. b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void. Ruling: The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar

as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37and 38may contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009 Facts: On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their decision. Ruling: Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The

moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail. Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004 Facts: Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing

them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. After hearing during which both complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is suspended for three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct. Ruling: Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third marriage. Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts: In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. Issue: Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Ruling: The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. The petition is dismissed.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO. G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012 Facts: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case. Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal. Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent. Ruling:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The petition is granted.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 Facts: Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose. Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that

all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died. Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. Ruling: The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159614

December 9, 2005

Facts: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by the court. At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the

absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead. VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994 Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985. Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan

and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services. Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to settle their dispute failed. On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute. Issue: Whether or not Aurelio’s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news

of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void. Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 Facts: On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo

went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single." The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article 41 of the Family Code. Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community. In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005 Facts: Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987. Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Issues: a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case. Ruling: The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered

thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground. The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000 Facts: On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Ruling: Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in

1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions — one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 Facts: In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Issues: a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal. b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented. Ruling: The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and

executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40 ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 Facts: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she

further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-infact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. Issues: a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties." The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995 Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,

Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De Castro. Ruling: Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that respondent

failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Facts: Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent. Ruling: The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and

protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Facts: Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,

shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court). Issue: Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid. Ruling: It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties. Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. The petition is denied.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite. On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity. Ruling:

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more

appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011 Facts: Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood, petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the

respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to change children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Ruling: No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b)juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as: (a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b)this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.

All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they have gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 Facts: On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the sole breadwinner. On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends eve after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision. Issue: Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they are

incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity: (1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a. Medically or clinically identified, b. Alleged in the complaint, c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and d. Clearly explained in the decision. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. (4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003 Facts: Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from each other. On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second

Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status. On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s claim that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping. Issues: a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action. b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status. Ruling: Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need not be alleged, to wit: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages – x x x.

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TONGOL vs. TONGOL G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007 Facts: On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were married. From their marriage they begot four children. On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s family. The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union and their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of Filipinas’ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to interfere with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also resented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their children. Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however, this was the fault of Orlando’s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court. Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only consisted of her testimony.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision in toto. Issue: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect”. Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MARCOS vs. MARCOS G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. They were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a trading and construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner’s urges on respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the breadwinner, is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s failure to provide for his family, he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her mother. The following day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she was diagnosed with contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.

Issues: a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the declaration of psychological incapacity. b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or clinically identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary. No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity. The evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity. The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period of more than six years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage. Equally important, the condition was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver. GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TE vs. TE G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009 Facts: In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for

only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity. On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given the petitioner’s totality of evidence. Ruling: Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder, he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers

to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010 Facts: In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent. Issue:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects but failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity: (1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a. Medically or clinically identified, b. Alleged in the complaint, c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and d. Clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. (4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or “straightjacket”.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MARABLE vs. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011 Facts: In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they happened to sit beside each other in

a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the conjugal home; gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Issues: Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void. Ruling: No. The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine. Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological

disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AURELIO vs. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011 Facts: On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her quick changes in temperament, selfindulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issues: Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid. Ruling: Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such

illness, and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for dismissal is denied.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR. G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012 Facts: Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not blessed with children due to Catalina’s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalina’s psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent; engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issues: Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void. Ruling: No. First, Catalina’s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was not established. Eduardo’s testimony was selfserving. Second, Dr. Reyes’ neuro-psychiatric evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalina’s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo’s statements but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to dispute psychological incapacity.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2009 Facts: On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."

In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling. OSG filed the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling: No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with coworkers does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 Facts: Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support. Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs). In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominic’s co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship. In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and later asked her to issue two blank checks for the car’s insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks were not paid for the

car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-inlaw to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening her, her mother and her sister.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity – gravity, antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity. Ruling:

No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her findings concerning Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-feelings toward him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require the root cause to be “medically or clinically identified” by a physician or a psychologist. What is important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC vs. GALANG G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011 Facts: On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived in Nestor’s father’s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home as a housewife. Christopher is their only child. On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations. Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond. On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. On November 25, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of responsibility coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy’s condition as permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of psychological tests to determine the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The psychologist’s testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OCHOSA vs. ALANO G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011 Facts: Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young lieutenant in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties’ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” (sexual disloyalty with Jose, sexual promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence.” Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas

in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and respondent got marriedon December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter, they lived with the Ramon’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses

were shouldered by Ramon’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00 from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned from his family’s business. Because of this, Ramon engaged into (1) a fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton trading business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her inlaws. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorro’s mother where petitioner continued to carry the financial burdens Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene, Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children. Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed and set aside RTC’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void. Ruling:

Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations. It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TORING vs. TORING G.R. No. 165321

August 3, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt’s house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt’s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies.

Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. However, not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Issue: Whether or not Teresita should be deemed incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations.

psychologically

Ruling: No. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have been expected to

know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations during the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG G.R. No. 168796

April 15, 2012

Facts:

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Issues: (a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess jurisdiction. (b)Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Ruling: No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records. No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity

must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY SUAZO vs. SUAZO G.R. No. 164493

March 10, 2010

Facts: Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children. Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint that from the start of their marriage until their separation in July 1987, their relationship has been marred with bitter quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted upon by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelito’s refusal to work, his indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelito’s psychological incapacity started at the time of their marriage and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable.

In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by Angelito but told the Court that she was not treated violently before the marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyn’s aunt, corroborated Jocelyn’s testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic Antisocial Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the marriage on the grounds provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Ruling: No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The psychologist derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence does not constitute psychological incapacity.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA G.R. No. 170925

October 26, 2009

Facts: Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication. In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He

left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children. Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision. Issue: Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity is not mere “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect”. Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects

of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. Incurability was not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable differences could not be equated with psychological incapacity.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR G.R. No. 174451 13, 2009

October

Facts: Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival. Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Issue: Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Ruling: No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did not describe the “pattern of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NAJERA vs. NAJERA G.R. No. 164817

July 3, 2009

Facts: On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage. On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter. Issue:

Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI G.R. No. 165424

June 9, 2009

Facts: Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained their relationship nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that they never lived together as husband and wife and they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is null and void. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological incapacity. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the petitioner suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively prevented him to comply from his essential marital obligations. Ruling: Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that already existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY PARAS vs. PARAS G.R. No 147824

August 2, 2007

Facts: On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When

confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter. After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993 Issues: a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case; b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary; and c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo. Ruling: A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true,such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while hisacts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA G.R. No. 141917

February 7, 2007

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant’s trip to theUnited States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a big house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child, and the court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed tocomply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant. Issues: a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the result of the present case; b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;

c) Whether or not private respondent’s refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ruling: The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368

July 17, 2006

Facts: Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family. Issue: How shall psychological incapacity be proven? Ruling: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the rootcause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and

incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. Infact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not understandpetitioner’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" She stated that there was a history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent’sparents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disablingfactor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ANTONIO vs. REYES G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

Facts: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void. Ruling:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged. Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO G.R. No. 158896

October 27, 2004

Facts: Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctor’s findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. Issue: Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage. Ruling: The court ruled in the negative. Manuel’s relationship with another was caused merely by his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY VILLALON vs. VILLALON G.R. No. 167206 2005

November 18,

Facts: On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answerdenying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been “fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship” and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova Complex”. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as “a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning” with main symptoms of “grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality.” A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with “Casanova Complex” exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity of the husband. Ruling: No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital

obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history. The petition has no merit.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005 Facts: July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The Court of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage. Ruling: The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Facts: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. Issue: Whether or not abandonment psychological incapacity.

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Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to

meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 151867

January 29, 2004

Facts: David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage

like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Ruling: No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition is denied.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

Facts: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.” Issue: Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling: Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY PESCA vs. PESCA G. R. No. 136921 17, 2001

April

Facts: The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists. Issues: a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court. b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

Ruling: The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” The petition was denied.

GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MALLION vs. ALCANTARA GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006 Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds ogf lack of marriage license? Ruling: Res judicataapplies. Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of acti on which is the nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the absence of a marriage license.

PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R No. 112597

April 2, 1996

Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void? Ruling: Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all”.

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 169766 30, 2011

March

Facts: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. Issue: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. Ruling: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is

a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI G.R. No. 173614 28, 2007

September

Facts: Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962. They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004, Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: 1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and 2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness. Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog. Issue: a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage license. b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of Eulogio. Ruling: Petition is dismissed.

Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio. While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the family code. Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 167109 2007

February 6,

Facts: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Ruling: A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG G.R. No. 133778 14, 2000

March

Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008 Facts: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. Issue: a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules of Court

b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages Ruling: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. PARTIES ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

Facts: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. Issue: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother Ruling: Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 Facts: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002. Issue: Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid. Ruling: A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where

the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006 Facts: On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985. Issue: Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature contemplated by Article 36. Ruling: The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an

adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001 Facts: On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Ruling: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that

evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996 Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of

Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was denied. Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing. Ruling: Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004 Facts: Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him. The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution. The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial. Issue: Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. Ruling: Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PACETE vs. CARRIAGA G.R. No. L-53880

March 17, 1994

Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980. Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision. Ruling: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000 Facts: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint a n information for bigamy was files against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case as a prejudicial question. Issue: Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent Ruling: The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case. A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 Facts: In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991, Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only when his

civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision Issue: Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly Ruling: The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid. Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights. Petition subsisting.

granted,

judgment

and

resolution

declared

valid

and

EFFECTS VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 Facts: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following the

joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father Antonio Valdes. Issue: Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract. Ruling: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 137 or Article 148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-law spouses.

EFFECTS ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011 Facts: Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Issue: Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties. Ruling: Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006 Facts: Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal Falsification of Public Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties and among them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13 appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a surety bond but this document was found to be falsified. The two complaints for falsification of document was brought before Manila prosecutor’s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the latter affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in the two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to include the respondent among those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by the petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial court. The respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently, respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the appellate court pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for the crime committed by the respondent and the same has redounded to his benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since it is a mere obiter dictum. Issue: Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party is a mere obiter dictum. Ruling: The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party is not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issue presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter

dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC ANAYA vs. PALAROAN G.R. No. L-27930

November 26, 1970

Facts: Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that “the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced…Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted ‘FRAUD’’ in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages. Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage Ruling: Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of

the Article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT G.R. NO. 47101 25, 1941

April

Facts: On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they came engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida. Issue: Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married. SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006 Facts: Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal Cases entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties among them IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office. The charges against

Respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in fact an aggrieved party. Ruling: Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO A.C. No. 6148

February 27, 2004

Facts:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage since it was contracted with vitiated consent. Issue: Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the court’s declaration of nullity of the marriage. Ruling: While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred for gross misconduct.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE REYES VS. ZABALLERO G.R. No. L-3561

May 23, 1951

Facts: This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land. The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated, and that he had an option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without defendants’ knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors. Issue: What constitutes Duress or Intimidation? Ruling: According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when

he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR G.R. No. 174451

October 13, 2009

Facts: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. Issue: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother Ruling: `Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006 Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia CanalitaVillanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:

Issue: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent Ruling: The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES G.R. No. L-12790 31, 1960

August

Facts: Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required period. Thereafter, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not followed by the defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the scheduled hearings. Because of this, the judge ordered a judgment annulling the marriage of the parties. The city attorney then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical examination. Issue: Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband-plaintiff. Ruling: Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

Facts: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13, 1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to the repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand maintains that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his sole efforts also, William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal dwelling. Issue: Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid. Ruling: William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his

reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place. Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987 Facts: Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private respondent. In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil action arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. Issue: Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal separation should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the said civil action. Ruling: A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the

dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992 Facts: Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further ordered the payment of support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite disposition for the judicial separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals seeking for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties. The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code since the separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the spouses.When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief.

Issue: Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not allowed. Ruling: A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

CONDONATION/PARDON EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991 Facts: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982

in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery. According to the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went to Baguio City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the evening, co-accused Eduardo Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and her friend was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room. After 45 minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the room and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living room. Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance made by Dr. Neri. Issue: Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon. Ruling: The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the

preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149: "The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

CONDONATION/PARDON BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ G.R. No. L-10033 28, 1956

December

Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her. Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by her husband. Issue: Whether or not there was condonation in this case. Ruling: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the

latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation. CONDONATION/PARDON PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA G.R. No. L-3047 16, 1951

May

Facts: A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. Issue: Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy. Ruling: A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the

adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts. The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.

CONDONATION/PARDON JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff

signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her after having discovered her adulterous acts. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant. Ruling: We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband. Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

CONSENT AND FORMS SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES G.R. No. L-11766 25, 1960

October

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained

unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreementwhich provides among others that “neither of them can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime arising from their separation.” In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community. Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the defendant. The trial court however dismissed the action on the ground that under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband as proven by their “agreement.” Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant. Ruling: An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief. The very wording of the “agreement” gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article 100 Civil Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

CONSENT AND FORMS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941 Facts: On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part recites “en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.” On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband and wife. Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for concubinage. The accused posed as defense the act of condonation made by the complainant. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case. RULING: The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as

the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our authority. CONSENT AND FORMS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933 Facts: Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they

have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce. Issue: Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief Ruling: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years. RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA G.R. NO. L-1056

December 8, 1903

Facts: Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living together until August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents and left her there. It was found out that in plaintiff’s complaint for separation, she charges defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such adulterous acts committed by the defendant. On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what

had occurred, and left her there. The mother testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter. Issue: Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case Ruling: It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: “For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.”The Court’s conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts: The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo. The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard. As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.

COLLUSION JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff

discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. Issue: Whether or not collusion existed in this case. Ruling: Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it

PRESCRIPTION WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957 Facts: On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially with another woman and had begotten children by her. The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action had already prescribed. Issue: Whether or not the action had already prescribed. Ruling: The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion. The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

PRESCRIPTION JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. Both lower and appellate courts denied the petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment. Issue: Whether or not there was confession of judgment. Ruling: Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted,

since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

PRESCRIPTION ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG G.R. No. L-29138 29, 1970

May

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three days. During these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to anger defendant. Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby. Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met with Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give defendant but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her. In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place of work where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.

Issue: Whether or not prescription has already set in Ruling: The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala. From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive period is thus followed in this case. PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ G.R. No. 132592 23, 2002

January

Facts: On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children. Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She concludes that

respondent’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period. Issue: Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases. Ruling: In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 Facts: On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married

civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31, 1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation. Issue: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself “... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).” The action is absolutely dead Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of

right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956 Facts: The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation on the ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport. The husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition granting custody of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her children. The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband’s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: “ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” Issue: Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed Ruling: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused. Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by the husband in the face of express allegations under

oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode? Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised. Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody. MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR. G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972 Facts: On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Ruling: After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to

the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."There would appear to be then recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994 Facts: In Concepcion Alanis’ complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.

The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which was granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the declaration of default is proper Ruling: Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves. It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the

matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE

ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994 Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita. Ruling: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be

tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.” LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994 Facts: As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering

any of the conjugal properties. The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. Ruling: The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal. The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. Ruling: The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO G.R. No. L-30977 31, 1972

January

Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934

and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights. Ruling: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962 Facts: On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. Ruling: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SIOCHI vs. GOZON G.R. No. 169900

March 18, 2010

Facts: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens. Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to InterDimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Issue:

Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Ruling: The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, “Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as regards this point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES PELAYO vs. LAURON G.R. No. 129295

August 15, 2001

Facts: On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After the consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. Issue: Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation? Ruling: No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The

party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114791 29, 1997

May

Facts: In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit. Issue: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages. Ruling: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO G.R. No. 17014

August 29, 1921

Facts: Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. Issues: a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction Ruling: The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile. “When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans) On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as

England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER G.R. No. 139789

May 12, 2000

Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

Facts: The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiffappellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE CUENCA vs. CUENCA G.R. No. L-72321 1988

December

8,

Facts: Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar. On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by the property records of Agusan. That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North

by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of 1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest is further reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October 19, 1950. These two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the properties in question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses, More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro. Issue: Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia

Ruling: The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is no longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome Sanchez moot and academic. Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before Notary Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that: Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062, Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land belongs exclusively to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the

conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld. In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change the result. The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the respondent court.

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL G.R. No. 146683 22, 2001

November

Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES G.R. No. L-28771

March 31, 1971

Facts: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. Issue: Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. Ruling: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to p revent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918 Facts: In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell and Co). In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim. Ruling: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife. The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large

extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS) NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO G.R. No 153788

November 27, 2009

Facts: Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement. Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed. Issue: Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. Ruling: No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states: Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond. The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief; (c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and (d) The actual market value of the property. The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.

The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS) VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 143286 April 2000

12,

Facts: Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon’s death in 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective proindiviso shares. Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The RTC declared that private respondents’ action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners are the “legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them. Issue: Whether or not laches apply against the minor’s property that was held in trust. Ruling: No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle’s actions, they filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioner’s assertion. Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law between Felipe’s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon’s fraudulent titling of Felipe’s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS) IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010 Facts: On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under the First and Second Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation. Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners’ conjugal partnership. Ruling: Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was

error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim. We agree with petitioner. The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A thirdparty claimant may also resort to an independent “separate action,” the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a “separate action” is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a “separate action.” It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of “terceria” authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a party to the case against petitioner. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed. It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s] motion was already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.

ABSOLUTE COMMUINTY PARTY (EXCLUDED PROPERTY) CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124642

February 23, 2004

Facts: On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other persons executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos. PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges.)Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo Ching.Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common shares.According to her, the shares were purchased out of the conjugal funds.She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family). Issue: Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable. Ruling: Yes.. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Ching’s name appeared as the sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesn’t mean that it is his exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership. As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the court said that “signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business.” For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would be benefited. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching’s common shares must not be levied because he is not the sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership.

Under Article 121 of the Family Code.

EXCLUDED PROPERTY TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 120594 10, 1997

June

Facts: Petitioner ChiaoLiong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly described as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him. Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under Certificate of Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said motor vehicle was purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro payment was placed in his name because it was his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to return the van to him and appropriated the same for himself. On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business that was placed in petitioner’s name because at that time he was then leaving for the United Stated and petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the deliver of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for the van, which would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless, respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioner’s name. It was also their understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to time to use the van for deliveries of machinery. After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in the appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner-appellant ownership over the subject motor vehicle.

established

proof

of

Ruling: No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of private respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one’s name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof. The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated therein. Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

DISSOLUTION IN RE ELENA BUEANAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER GR. No. 149615 August 29, 2006 Facts: Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German national, on Hamburg dated Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a house owned by Helmut’ s parents but later on sometime 1992 they permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo as well as for the construction of a house. That property was registered in the name of Elena Muller. During their marriage they had some incompatibilities and Helmut was alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that, the spouses eventually got separated. On September 26, 1994, Helmut, respondent, filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It ruled that the separation of properties shall be applied between the petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by gratuitous title during their marriage. In relation to the property, respondent cannot recover his funds expensed since it was a violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits aliens from procuring private lands.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the Constitution which specifically prevents Helmut from procuring private land. With that decision it also ordered Elena to reimburse him accordingly. Issue: Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be reimbursed by Elena Muller, petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the property in Antipolo and to construct the house. Ruling: No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property using the proceeds of his sold inherited property in Germany despite the constitutional prohibition. It is provided in the Constitution that alien can’t own lands here in the Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here in the Philippines inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way in the case. Also, reimburse is considered a fruit of the property, with that Helmut can’t claim the fruits as well.

COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012 Facts: A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in Marikina City was previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono). On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property. On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it resulted to naming Gemma as the owner of the subject realty on the Registry of Deeds. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now

Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility evidenced by the Promissory Notes On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma. Gemma failed to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name. On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property. Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to Gemma is null and void Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith. Ruling: No, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage debt,FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby.

COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL DAVID SR. G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010

Facts: Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in their names. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she was declared in default. Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void. Ruling: Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership”. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that “the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law”. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.

LIABILITIES/ CHARGES AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching, Exec. Vice President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally liable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan with that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching. In the RTC’s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner alleging that petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Issue: Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Ruling: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate ownership.

The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the benefit of PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

DISPOSITION THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011 Facts: Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners, they contend that with the Protacio Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null and void. RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta- that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively. Issue: Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it was made without prior liquidation. Ruling: No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. With Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property

being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share and as a coowner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.

DISPOSITION JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011 Facts: Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978. Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13, 1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners’ own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon PNB’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner’s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

Ruling: Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and paragraph (1) one of the said provision states “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”. The loan was used for additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.

DISPOSITION MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON G.R. No. 169900 2010

March 18,

Facts: A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredo’s wife, filed a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-10508. October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI). Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Issues: a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to Buy and Sell he entered with Alfredo. b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with Alfredo. Ruling: No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. Still, Alfredo can’t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void. No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the property hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation

of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.

DISPOSITION SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR. G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010 Facts: Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners. Issue: Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio? Ruling: The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

“The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.” Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

DISPOSITION MANUEL FUENTES vs. CONRADO ROCA G.R. No. 178902 21, 2010

April

Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could

invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. Issues: a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged. b) Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed? c) Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale? Ruling: Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent. No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs.

DISSOLUTION METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008 Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage on

the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren’t able to liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation. Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally include the lot in question (bought from Sering). When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM’s. Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses. b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid. Ruling: No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not authomatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where:“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.

But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interests in the disputed party even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

LIQUIDATION BRIGIDO QUIOA vs. RITA QUIAO G.R. No. 176556

July 4, 2012

Facts: Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the petitioner Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated October 10, 2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the conjugal properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within the required period for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and was later on granted. Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the “net profit earned”. The Court defined it asthe remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of the “net profit earned”. With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the “net profit earned” be based on the Article 102 of the family Code. November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed a Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common properties, meaning of the “net profit earned”, and the law governing the property relation between him and Rita. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005. Ruling: No. Brigido wasn’t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005, thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his right to question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system

of relative community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS ALAIN DIÑO vs. MA CARIDAD DIÑO G.R. No. 178044 19, 2011

January

Facts: Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchi ldhood friends and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years thensepar ated. After two years, they reunited and later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. Healleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout theirmarriage and was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she already filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion between the two parties. A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Ruling: Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because Section

19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE MARGARET MAXEY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984 Facts: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide “When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Thus, the property in question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone was invalid. The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land. Issues: a) Whether or not the “military fashion” marriage of Maxey and Morales was recognized as valid. b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying Article 144 of the Civil Code. Ruling: No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could not have

applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement. Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001 Facts: SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. Issues: a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void. b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. Ruling: No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an

absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE ANTONIO VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT G.R. No. 122749 31, 1996

July

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005 Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage. Ruling: Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.

VOID MARRIAGES VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 Facts: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. Issue: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? Ruling: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital

authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

VOID MARRIAGES BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933 Facts: The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. Onthat same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Renodivorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courtsof Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died intestate

on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred ineducating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case. After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, butreduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision. Issue: Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce. Ruling: No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorcedone in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on thequestion of divorce. It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted prayingthe ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquiredby the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon thecourt of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919. Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to bedone, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel thecourts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.

VOID MARRIAGES MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR G.R. No. 152716

October 23, 2003

Facts: In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment basis

using Brunos exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their properties were also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children). Issue: Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno’s exclusive property Ruling: No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were capacitated tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was acquired during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite 204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001 Facts: SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4

Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. Issues: a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage. Ruling: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain

exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 137650

April 12, 2000

Facts: On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez. Ruling: In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that “In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by

them in common in proportion to absence of proof to the contrary, shares are presumed to be equal. apply to joint deposits of money and

their respective contributions. In the their contributions and corresponding The same rule and presumption shall evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.” Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is unsubstantiated.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS G.R. No. 151967

February 16, 2005

Facts: On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco”. On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC. On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous. Issue: Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations. Ruling: No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to answer the liabilities of Eduardo. Even though Eduardo and Josefina’s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of

age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. G.R. No. 154645

July 13, 2004

Facts: In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros. On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased. The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioner’s possession and that the real and personal properties in petitioner’s possession are conjugal partnership properties of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in respondents’ favor; that the two cars in petitioner’s possession be delivered to respondents and that petitioner be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as attorney’s fees. Issue: Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the deceases validates her claim of ownership. Ruling: No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:

"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse." Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros likewise failed to prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961 when the property was purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative values, they were not cross-examined by the respondents.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150611

June 10, 2003

Facts: Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married but separated de facto from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief courtship they decided to cohabit as husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up their nine-year cohabitation. On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner in the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of the personal properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and the amount of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of their house be reimbursed to her. Issue: Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house. Ruling: Yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions..."Proof of actual contribution is required. The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE G.R. No. L-50127-28

March 3, 1979

Facts: In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney, involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At that time the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen years. The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney, which figured in the collision.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124118

March 27, 2000

Facts: On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriage as devisees and legatees. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of the will. On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the complaint plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and administration. Issue: Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage. Ruling: Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that

it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his first marriage. Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the property in question.

COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE G.R. No. 109068

January 10, 1994

Facts: Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Issue: Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family. Ruling: Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word “No”, the requirement is mandatory for that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that “If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law”

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA G.R. No. 154132

August 31, 2006

Facts: On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad. On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Issue: Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed. Ruling: No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: “No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit: “No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.” In the case of Martinez v. Martinez ruled that Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that

earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON G.R. No. 125465

June 29,1999

Facts: Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151. Issue: Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151. Ruling: No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 129242

January 16, 2001

Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. His wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age, survived him. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. Issue: Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition. Ruling: It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a

remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced.

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO G.R. No. 134787

November 15, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. Issue: Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no application Ruling: A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

PROHIBITED COMPROMISE CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA G.R. No. L-23102

April 24, 1967

Facts: In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States. Issue: Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal. While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222, future support.

FAMILY HOME JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN G.R. No. 185920

July 20, 2010

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. Ruling: Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable

must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

FAMILY HOME JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS G.R. No. 86355

May 31, 1990

Facts: The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home. Ruling: The petitioner’s contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

FAMILY HOME ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS G.R. No. 165060

November 27, 2008

Facts: In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002. A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit. On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution. Issue: Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is legal. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe

the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified. The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.

FAMILY HOME SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA G.R. No. 172263

July 9, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners. Ruling: Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

FAMILY HOME MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZSALCEDO vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES G.R. No. 132537

October 14, 2005

Facts: Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property. Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972 Issue: Whether or not the property can be sold. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta

falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

FAMILY HOME FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC. G.R. No. 97898

August 11, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected. Issue: Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest

before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

FAMILY HOME PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG G.R. No. 108532

March 9, 1999

Facts: As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property. Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution. Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

FAMILY HOME SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN G.R. No. 178288

August 15, 2012

Facts: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Salethat was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal demandto vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their children. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.

KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999 Facts: Vircel D. Andres, as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis. She alleged that Manuel is the father of Glen but as a father, he failed to provide support to his child. Manuel countered that he is not the father of the child and so he has no obligation to support mentioned child. Thereafter, Vircel moved for the dismissal of the case because of the father's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child. Six years later, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the putative father. Manuel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata. Issue: a.) Whether or not the civil status of a son or his filiation and paternity could be left to the will or agreement of his parents. b.) Whether or not the child is barred from filing an action to ask for support from his alleged father due to the dismissal of the first case filed. Ruling: No, a child’s civil status or his filiation and paternity cannot be left to the will of his parents. Such issue must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. In the case at bar, the civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived being in issue, no conclusion could be given to such a denial until an authoritative declaration has been given.

No, the child is not barred from filing an action to ask for support. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al. G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001 Facts: The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to Rodolfo’s son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that

Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Ruling: No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation. The only public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents. However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. His baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also constitute proof of filiation. ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005 Facts:

Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma. Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision but on appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. Issues: a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. Ruling: Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the socalled “marriage” with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa

was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005 Facts: Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of Francisco’s estate. Petitioner Belen opposed respondent’s claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Issue: Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco Angeles. Ruling: No, respondent’s legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption of her legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis- that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage certificate or marriage contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent could not be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above

explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect. Respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate was not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. L-49162 28, 1987

July

Facts: In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlene’s pregnancy but when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Issue: Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice. Ruling: Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type

of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000 Facts: TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera then 65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes that Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion testified that Teofista was born through the help of a “hilot” and that her mother Flora forged the Teofista’s birth certificate, making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging Hermogena’s signature. Presentacion further claims that Teofista’s real surname is Guinto, her mother being single; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the

birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code which states that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. Issue: Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofista’s claim that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the issuance of her birth certificate be upheld. Ruling: Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel Teofista’s birth certificate for the void and simulated birth certificate of the latter would affect the former’s hereditary rights. Also, Teofista’s birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for there were already irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth to Teofista, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al. G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Facts:

Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to William’s death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but living separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for the subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children from her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an heir by the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceased’s legitimate children on their part, alleges that the deceased could not have fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been separated. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother’s subsisting marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Ruling: Holding that Corazon’s marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. This presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: “Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.” No evidence other than that of physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child can be admitted. Such physical impossibility may be caused by: (a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; (c) by the serious illness of the husband. Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by petitioner

himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001 Facts: Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged petitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon. Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon. Ruling: No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Since the petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents’ access to each other during the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail their presumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001 Facts: Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted. Issue: Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child. Ruling: Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to establish the child’s filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficient clinical records, presenting the

proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 Facts: Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as petitioner’s household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a month, petitioner’s wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner’s wife dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and claimed that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial, Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondent’s claim. Issue:

Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner. Ruling: No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child. With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION ROSALINA P. ECETA vs.MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA G.R. NO. 157037 May 20, 2004 Facts: Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente. When Isaac died, he left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente also died but he had an illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made

co-owner of a property which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma. Theresa’s contention was that she should be made as co-owner by virtue of her father’s death. During pre-trial, Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On appeal though, she questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could be established by mere birth certificate and by her admission during the trial. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s filiation to her alleged father could be established by the birth certificate and by the admission made. Ruling: Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente through the duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed respondent’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639

June 2, 1994

Facts: Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in the person of the petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun, died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate. The petition was granted but was reopened as petitioner filed a motion that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The court favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child. Ruling: Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gang mates, and openly visiting his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the MOPC, manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove. Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of the Civil Code allows her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the time she reaches majority age. Such motion was filed seasonably before the expiration of the 4-yr period.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVEROvs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005 Facts: Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They begot a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that he be given his share in the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but later on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of her father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the agreement was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a mental hospital. Such compromise agreement was approved by the court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter, the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise agreement. Issue: Whether or not the recognition of Benedick’s illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the compromise agreement made. Ruling: No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SGT. MORENO BAYANI G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996 Facts: Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal grandmother together with her siblings as their parents were abroad. Appellant frequented their house as he was a neighbor and a “kumpadre” of her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victim’s grandmother for her consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victim’s grandmother consented. After visiting his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant invited her to have lunch in a hotel restaurant but victim declined and suggested they go home. Appellant however said they would still visit another friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where appellant deceived the friend they were going to visit was in the 2 nd floor. When appellant opened a room, he forcibly let victim in and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her, intimidating and threatening her with a gun pointed at her. After his lust was sated, he threatened to kill her and her family if ever she’ll divulge the incident. Victim did not divulge the incident because of fear, until it became apparent that she was pregnant. She was then sent to another place for her safety and as the trial ensued, appellant’s contention was that victim consented to the act, she being the appellant’s mistress. The trial court found him guilty of rape. Issue: Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his crime. Ruling: No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the

offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married, as in the case at bar, can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL MANAHAN G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999 Facts: Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen. He and his wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as victim was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. When she opened her eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top of her. Victim tried to shout but accused covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In her weakened state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the month, victim left the canteen and returned to her parents. The incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus, she was forced to divulge the rape incident to her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint against accused. The accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and that the sexual congress between them were consensual. The court favored the testimony of the victim and convicted accused of rape. Issue:

Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his crime. Ruling: No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010 Facts: Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do so. Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month. Issue:

Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy. Ruling: No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such is to be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the adduced evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent evidence of illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note cannot be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not even notarized. Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY ELINO RIVERA, et al. vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, et al. G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

Facts: Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Petitioners who are Gonzales’ half-brothers contested such extrajudicial settlement and questioned Angelina’s illegitimacy.Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation. Issue: Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelina’s filiation. Ruling: No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, and does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence. Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et al. G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006 Facts: Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventura’s children from his second marriage. Long after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such to their names. Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their alleged shares in the property. To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention was also confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial. Issue: Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently proven. Ruling: Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. "Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission. In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by

the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice to prove that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING, et al. G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012 Facts: Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a result, Randy was born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to give support to their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that he had a one night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s birth and baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied the information indicated in the certificates, as the ‘hilot’ who assisted her went to Antonio’s house to solicit the said information. Randy also testified, saying that he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonio’s sister for a week with which he 1st met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged him, he promised to support Randy. Issue: Whether or not Randy’s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven. Ruling: No. Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of the Family Code. Whereas, in the case at bar, the birth and baptismal certificates presented have no probative value to establish the alleged filiation since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned hilot to prove her claim that it was Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates.

Besides, they do not contain Antonio’s signature and that there were also inconsistencies such as Antonio’s middle name, signifying that he had no hand in their preparation. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single instance of Antonio’s hug and promise to support Randy cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned single instance, there were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later.

PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001 Facts: Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida

now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted. Issue: Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child. Ruling: Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005 Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents alleged that the petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He admitted that their affair started in 1993 but theirs was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature and the community tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that there was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court. Issues: a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD. b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search. Ruling: No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE HERRERA V. ALBA G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005 Facts: On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that “under the present circumstances, the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.”In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination

because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. Issue: Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Ruling: Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact. In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having sexual

relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002 Facts: On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death. In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But

prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing. The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG V. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007 Facts: A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs that is recognizing the child as his. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong. Ruling: As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four

significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. COMPULSARY RECOGNITION MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 Facts: The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.

Ruling: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have. The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION MARQUINO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT GR. No. 72078 June 27, 1994 Facts: Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such

action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent. Issues: a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is dismissed.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR GR. No. 174680

March 24, 2008

Facts: On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles. On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a

motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The motion was denied. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. Ruling: The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father. In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation. RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343

October 18, 2004

Facts: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him. Issue: Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away. Ruling: Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA GR. No. 133054

January 28, 1999

Facts: Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte. On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children, Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was granted. The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the “date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors’ surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.” Issue: Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case. Ruling: Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN VERCELES vs. POSADA GR. No. 159785

April 27, 2007

Facts: On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects. On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. Issue: Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven.

Ruling: The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN PEOPLE vs. GLABO GR. No. 129248

December 7, 2001

Facts: One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accusedappellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accusedappellant’s brute strength. She shouted for help, but there were no neighbors nearby. Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went

to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant’s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs. The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila’s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court. Issue: Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate. Ruling: Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accusedappellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122906 7, 2002

February

Facts: Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and

the trial court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Issue: Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin. Ruling: No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998 Facts: Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child’s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge at the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration. Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s off ice, rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General’s Circular No. 4, which provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the petition to substitute the child’s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which aff irmed the RTC’s decision Issue: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register thecertifi cate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity. Ruling: No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code, which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, be under

her parental authority, and be entitled to support in conformity with the provisions of the Family Code.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 114742

July17, 1997

Facts: Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways. The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. Issue: Whether or not the Father can visit his children. Ruling: The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 111180

November 16, 1995

Facts: Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this, Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal family. Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had enrolled him at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie Ruling:

Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married to another woman other than his mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

GR. No. 105619

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES December 12, 1995

Facts: On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio

died intestate leaving properties 000,000.00.

with an estimated value of P15,

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967. The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. Issue: Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized. Ruling: Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child." In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children:

legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN AM No. MTJ-92-716

October 25, 1995

Facts: Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children. Issue: Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate. Ruling: The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

ADOPTED CHILDREN REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 100835 1993

October 26,

Facts: James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition. Issue: Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors. Ruling: While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

ADOPTED CHILDREN REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO GR.No. 94147

June 8, 1994

Facts: Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon. Ruling: Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her

spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

ADOPTED CHILDREN REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA GR. No. 95551

March 20, 1997

Facts: On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt

Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Issue: Whether or not the adoption is valid. Ruling: Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other." None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009 Facts:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. Issue: Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. Ruling: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC GR No. 164948

June 27, 2006

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother Ruling: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-

establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were “too meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.”

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Ruling: This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.” In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997 Facts: Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the

"findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption. Issue: May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court? Ruling: No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

(1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed; (2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . . The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law. By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the

Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

Lingayen,

Pangasinan,

is

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ GR No. 117209

February 9, 1996

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption. Ruling: No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A

petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996 Facts: The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL." The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth. On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the Government and the Courts." Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA G.R. No. 148311 2005

March 31,

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname. The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Ruling: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

Facts: Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. Issue: Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.

Ruling: Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

RESCISSION OF ADOPTION LAHOM vs. SIBULO G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

Facts: A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation," Issue: Can the adoption be rescinded? Ruling: While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

SUPPORT LAM vs. CHUA G.R. No. 131286

March 18, 2004

Facts: A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January

13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul. Issue: Should Jose give the corresponding support Ruling: The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL G.R. No. 156343

October 18, 2004

Facts: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines Issue: Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away. Ruling: Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody. According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor. At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the

Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT QUIMIGING vs. ICAO G.R. No. L-26795

July 31, 2970

Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”. Issue: Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a

clear violation of Carmen’s rights. compensation for the damage caused.

Thus, she is entitled to claim

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA G.R. No. 43794

August 9, 1935

Facts: Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s birth. Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case. Issue: Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as petitioner’s son Ruling: No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really agreed to have him pay the pension during the case’s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the

fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of support can be given because the very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question. It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.” Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-61700 1987

September 14,

Facts: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFICavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that

private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners. Issue: a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance? b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing? Ruling: Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code. Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds. WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT GOTARDO vs. BULING G.R. No. 165166

August 15, 2012

Facts:

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties’ failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995. Issue: Whether or not petitioner should provide support. Ruling: One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the

Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE LACSON vs. LACSON G.R. No. 150644

August 28, 2006

Facts: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support. Ruling: Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT LIM vs. LIM G.R. No. 163209

October 30, 2009

Facts: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite. Issue: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents. Ruling:

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT VERCELES vs. POSADA G.R. No. 159785

April 27, 2007

Facts: Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel. On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.

Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects. Issue: Whether or not there is proof of filiation. Ruling: Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be

given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125041 2006

June 30,

Facts: On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following: i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year, broken down as follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00 Books 1,000.00 Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina Issue: Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support Ruling: In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one

another’s well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ G.R. No. 156013

July 25, 2006

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987. Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman with whom he begot two children. Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son. In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued education thus became uncertain. Issue: May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect Ruling:

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.

Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides: SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. – (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum period. The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY LACSON vs. LACSON G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006 Facts: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward’s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul’s College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00. In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint. As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the court’s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court. Issue: Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads: When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioner’s daughters.

SUPPORT PENDENT LITE

ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996 Facts: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: (a.) Edmond Ruiz – only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the deceased’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3 granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to Edmond’s lack of opposition. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained probate court’s order. Issues: Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling: No. Grandchildren are not entitled funds of the decedent's estate. The law "widow and children" and does not grandchildren, regardless of their minority

to provisional support from the clearly limits the allowance to extend it to the deceased's or incapacity.

Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated

i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration

SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979 Facts: Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action. Ruling: Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997 Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children, namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal

conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that as alleged by Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children. Issues: a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights. b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children. Ruling: The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon City RTC’s decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne’s written permission. The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. The Court clarified: “Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.” The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to

Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002 Facts: In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents. Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution. Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old. Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding? Ruling:

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child. For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her

preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY VANCIL vs. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001 Facts: Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are

permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen. On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent. Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian? Ruling: Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally

unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001 Facts: Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City . On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to

the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion. The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor children. Issue: Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children? Ruling: The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997 Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision. Issue: Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?

Ruling: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996 Facts: Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give

Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan. Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella. On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody. The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

Ruling: Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from

voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.” In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent. Petition is dismissed.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone. Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay. Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Issue: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below. Ruling: The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005 Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother. Ruling: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,

unless the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October

8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents. Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. Ruling: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE GOLANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124724 December 22, 1997 Facts: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The couple had two children, Justin Rene

and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this Court. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court. On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged incident on July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against Rene by his son Justin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati on the basis of Justin’s complaint-affidavit. On August 16, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against him and set the hearing of the motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order. Issue: Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law. Ruling: The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence and witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial court deemed it proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case. This Supreme Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of the trial court’s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. The petition was partially granted.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. Issue: Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child. Ruling: Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third

person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto." In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he

should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE G.R. March 15, 1995

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS No.

115640

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly

pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. Ruling: Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996 Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations

and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare. Issue: Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child? Ruling: Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to

take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother. Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R.No. 70890 September 18, 1992 Facts: On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents. Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. Ruling: Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No. 85044 June 3, 1992 Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Issues: a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition. b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011 Facts: This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. Jose Luis left

his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis. Ruling: No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records, certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010 Facts: While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident. Ruling: Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and

teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers. SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS G.R. No. 143363 6, 2002

February

Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.

Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-47745 1988

April 15,

Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. Issue:

Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora. Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-70458 October 5, 1988 Facts: Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon. Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school’s ROTC Unit. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio

with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. Issue: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon. Ruling: Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180— 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school , including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84698

February 4, 1992

Facts: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the school’s academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student. Ruling: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students

while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his death. Petition denied. USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change her surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name “Remo” in her passport. Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport

issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT G.R. No. 94986 23, 1995

February

Facts: Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. The petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname. Issue: Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name. Ruling: The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. Wherefore the petition is granted.

USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ARTICLES 364-369, CIVIL CODE IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 Facts: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname. The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court did not allow the use of her mother’s surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. Issue:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father. Ruling: As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the mother’s surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mother’s surname Garcia as her middle name.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG GR.No.159966 30, 2005

March

Facts: Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue: Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed. Ruling: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are: a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b.) When the change results as a legal consequence c.) When the change will avoid confusion. d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was not aware of the alien parentage. e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 Facts: This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C1, C-2 and C-3). At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court. From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

Issue: Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname. Ruling: Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition. The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name. WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA G.R. No. 164368 2009

April

2,

Facts: December 27, 1994, at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw this. He requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. Accused-appellant, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” where he claims that: prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accusedappellant, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for accusedappellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the “Demurrer to Evidence.” Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and diagnosed with “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.” The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, Issue: Whether or not he was indeed insane Ruling:

When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone. Accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought to the courts. To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accusedappellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused’s mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind of accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the counsel’s filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant’s state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death! At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant’s mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant’s

competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996 Facts: Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as ”An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence. Issue: Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142. Ruling: No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2012 Facts: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic)

filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. Issue: a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings. b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate. Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118387

October 11, 2001

Facts: On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas Gonzales who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C. Lee (ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17 March 1986. On 17 September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to

dismiss the third party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on 12 July 1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence. On 4 August 1988, the trial court issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16 August 1988, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988. On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that the Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring ALFA to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19 January 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared that service upon Lee and Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated 14 August 1989 denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration. On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the

pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were required to take positive steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25 October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action. On 19 March 1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision, setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April 1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court which resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an entry of judgment on 16 July 1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated 3 January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Supreme Court's. Issue: a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of their positions as directors of the corporation. b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code. c) Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind ALFA. Ruling: Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and Lacdao ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject

voting trust agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter because the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records that DBP has taken over full control and management of the firm. The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled s account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP. It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise will

contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN RE CHARGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 Facts: Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/ or correction/ cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. Issue: Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause mentioned. Ruling:

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable r extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b.) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; c.) When the change will avoid confusion; d.) When the one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from “Rommel” to “Mely.” Issue: Should the court allow the change of name?

Ruling: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that “while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.” The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008 Facts: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Issue: Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted. Ruling: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 Facts: Petitioner, Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himalayan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille andPablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) thecorrection of the entriesin Patrick's birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, tosubmit Patrick to DNA testingto determine his paternity and filiations; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, thedeclaration of the marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is notacting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied. Issue: Whether or not the courtmay pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in anaction to correct entries in the civil registrar.

Ruling: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacyand filiations. Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtvis a visArticle 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded anddue process is properly observed. The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void forbeing bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attacksuch as the petition filed before the courta quo.

Compiled case digest in persons and family relation civil code , family code

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