Civil Procedure Digest
A2010
Prof. Victoria A.
1
Avena JUDICIAL POWER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION PRESCRIBED JURISDICTION i.e. OVER SUBJECT MATTER, BY LAW SINDICO V DIAZ 440 SCRA 50 CARPIO-MORALES; October 1, 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of Iloilo
FACTS -Virgilio Sindico, is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which he let the spouses Eulalio and Concordia Sombrea cultivate, without him sharing in the produce, as his "assistance in the education of his cousins" including defendant Felipe Sombrea -After the death of the Eulalio Sombrea, Felipe continued to cultivate the lot -On June 20, 1993, Sindico requested Felipe’s wife for the return of the possession of the lot but the latter requested time to advise her h usband -Repeated demands for the return of the possession of the lot remained unheeded, forcing Sindico to file a civil case before the RTC against the spouses Sombrea for Accion Reivindicatoria with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging - The that the RTC has no jurisdiction over their person and that as the subject matter of the case is an agricultural land which is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB in accordance with Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 (THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988) The plaintiff filed an Opposition alleging that the - The case does not involve an agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship or leasehold agreement with the defendants. The RTC of Iloilo granted the Motion to Dismiss - The -As their Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners, lodged the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE W ON ON t he he D ep ep ar art me me nt nt o f A gr gr ar ari an an R ef ef or or m Adju Adjudi dica cati tion on Boar Board d (DAR (DARAB AB)) has has orig origin inal al and and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar
HELD No. Ratio. Juris Jurisdic dictio tion n over over the subjec subjectt matter matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer answer or in a motion motion to dismis dismiss, s, otherw otherwise ise,, jurisdiction would be dependent on his whims. The allegations in petitioner’s complaint Reasoning. The show show that that the the acti action on is one one for for reco recove very ry of posses possessio sion, n, not one which which involv involves es an agrari agrarian an dispute. -Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines "agr "agrar aria ian n disp disput ute" e" over over whic which h the the DARA DARAB B has has exclusive original jurisdiction as: ( d) d) a ny ny c on on tr tr ov ov er er sy sy r el ela ti tin g to t en enu ri ri al al arra arrang ngem emen ents ts,, whet whethe herr leas leaseh ehol old, d, tena tenanc ncy, y, stewardship stewardship or otherwise, otherwise, over lands devoted devoted to agri agricul cultu ture re,, incl includ udin ing g disp disput utes es conc concer erni ning ng farmwo farmworke rkers rs associ associati ations ons or repres represent entati ation on of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange arrange terms or conditions conditions of such tenurial tenurial arrangement arrangements s including including any controversy controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants disputants stand in the proximate relation relation of farm operator operator and beneficiary, beneficiary, landowner and tenant, tenant, or lessor and lessee. -Since petitioners’ action is one for recovery of
possess possession ion and does not involve involve an agrarian agrarian dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.
ground ground that the court had no jurisd jurisdict iction ion of the subject matter
FACTS - On Dec 1907, Mla Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This is for construction of a railroad railroad line "from Paniqui Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac," as authorized by law. - Before Before beginn beginning ing the action action,, Mla Railro Railroad ad had caused to be made a thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to w ho ho m t he he y b el el on on ge ge d. d. A s a r es es ul ult o f s uc uc h investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located in Tarlac. - After filing filing and duly serving serving the complaint, complaint, the plai plaint ntif iff, f, purs pursua uant nt to law law and and pend pendin ing g fina finall determinati determination on of the action, took possessio possession n of and occupi occupied ed the lands lands descri described bed in the compla complaint int,, building its line and putting the same in operation. - On Oct Oct 4, Mla Mla Rail Railro road ad gave gave noti notice ce to the the defendants defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that that the court had no jurisd jurisdict iction ion of the subject subject matter matter,, it having having just just been been ascert ascertain ained ed by the plaintiff plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due considerat consideration, ion, the trial court dismissed dismissed the action action upon the ground ground presented by the plaintiff.
ISSUE/S 1. WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another province 2. WON Sec. 377 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Disposition Petition is granted. SEC. 377. Venue of actions. Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts doubts from the title to real estate, estate, or to obtain obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated; actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in which the will was admitted to probate, probate, or letters letters of administr administration ation were granted, or the guardian guardian was appointed. appointed. And all actions actions not herein otherwise otherwise provid provided ed for may be broug brought ht in any province province where the 1
JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. GENERAL 20 PHIL 523 MORELAND; December 11, 1911 NATURE Appeal from CFI Tarlac’s Tarlac’s judgment dismissing dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the
Civil Procedure Digest
A2010
Act. No. 1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
- Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly justly exercised. To be sure, in certai certain n cases, cases, if that that power power is not exercise exercised d in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, purely, the court attempting attempting to exercise exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the pers person on or that that the the judg judgme ment nt may may ther thereb eby y be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sust sustai ain n it. it. Ther There e is, is, of cour course se,, an impo import rtan antt distinctio distinction n between between person person and subject matter matter are both both confer conferred red by law. law. As to the subject subject matter matter,, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall shall be remove removed. d. That That is a matter matter of legisl legislati ative ve enactm enactment ent which which none none but the legisl legislatu ature re may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction over over the person person,, howeve however, r, may be confer conferred red by consent, consent, expressly expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an obje object ctio ion, n, be prev preven ente ted d from from atta attachi ching ng or removed after it has attached.
Prof. Victoria A.
2
Avena HELD 1.YES Sections 55 and 56 2 of Act No. 136 of the Ratio Sections Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real real esta estate te in the the Phil Philip ippi pine ne Isla Island nds. s. Such Such jurisdict jurisdiction ion is not made to depend upon locality. locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. universal. It is nowhere suggested, suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take take cogniz cognizanc ance e of an action action arising arising in anothe anotherr provin province ce or of an action action relating relating to real real estate estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, found, or in any province province where the plaintiff, plaintiff, except in cases cases were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant defendant resides resides within the Philippine Philippine Islands Islands and the action is brought to seize seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action action is brought brought to seize or obtain obtain title to property property of the defendant defendant within the Philippine Philippine Islands, Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks seeks to seize seize or to obtain obtain title title to is situat situated ed or is found: found: Provided , that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law, the action must be brought brought in the province province where the land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering entering his appearanc appearance e in the action action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal tribunal in which the action is brought, brought, except in the actions actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, estate, and actions actions against against executors executors,, administr administrators ators,, and guardians, guardians, and for the distribut distribution ion of estates estates and payment payment of legacies. 2 SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate. SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction . Courts of First Instance Instance shall have original jurisdiction: 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
2. NO Ratio Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed directed against the one who begins the action action and lays lays the venue. venue. The court, court, before before the action action is commenced, commenced, has nothing to do with it either. either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section section begin to operate operate effectively effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. plaintiff. It establishes establishes a relation relation not between between the court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. defendant. It relates relates not to jurisdiction jurisdiction but to trial. trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualifie unqualified d right, right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnes witnesses ses live. Its object object is to secure secure to him a convenient trial.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF - That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course course of practice practice - that is, by the the proc proces ess s of the the cour courtt - but but also also by cons consen entt expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted
itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. The defend defendant ants s are now in this this court court asking asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff plaintiff in any position position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts.
*DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE - The fact that such a provis provision ion appears appears in the procedural procedural law at once raises raises a strong strong presumption presumption that it has nothing nothing to do with the jurisdicti jurisdiction on of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter matter of method method,, of conven convenien ience ce to the partie parties s litiga litigant. nt. If their their intere interests sts are best best subser subserved ved by bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controllin controlling g reason reason why such a course course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, entire entirely ly within within the contro controll of either either party. party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely timely objectio objection n and, and, as a result result,, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law. - Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable applicable to actions actions by railroad corporations corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, their, or, if one defendant defendant,, his, his, lands lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not object objecting ing would would contin continue ue in the provin province ce where where origin originall ally y begun. begun. It would would be severe severed d as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect affect the decisi decision on in the case case before before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to
the venue venue and are not asking asking for a change change expressly submitted submitted thereof . They have not only expressly themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here here asking asking that that that that jurisd jurisdict iction ion be mainta maintaine ined d against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
Civil Procedure Digest
A2010
Act. No. 1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
- Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly justly exercised. To be sure, in certai certain n cases, cases, if that that power power is not exercise exercised d in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, purely, the court attempting attempting to exercise exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the pers person on or that that the the judg judgme ment nt may may ther thereb eby y be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sust sustai ain n it. it. Ther There e is, is, of cour course se,, an impo import rtan antt distinctio distinction n between between person person and subject matter matter are both both confer conferred red by law. law. As to the subject subject matter matter,, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall shall be remove removed. d. That That is a matter matter of legisl legislati ative ve enactm enactment ent which which none none but the legisl legislatu ature re may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction over over the person person,, howeve however, r, may be confer conferred red by consent, consent, expressly expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an obje object ctio ion, n, be prev preven ente ted d from from atta attachi ching ng or removed after it has attached.
Prof. Victoria A.
2
Avena HELD 1.YES Sections 55 and 56 2 of Act No. 136 of the Ratio Sections Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real real esta estate te in the the Phil Philip ippi pine ne Isla Island nds. s. Such Such jurisdict jurisdiction ion is not made to depend upon locality. locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. universal. It is nowhere suggested, suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take take cogniz cognizanc ance e of an action action arising arising in anothe anotherr provin province ce or of an action action relating relating to real real estate estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, found, or in any province province where the plaintiff, plaintiff, except in cases cases were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant defendant resides resides within the Philippine Philippine Islands Islands and the action is brought to seize seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action action is brought brought to seize or obtain obtain title to property property of the defendant defendant within the Philippine Philippine Islands, Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks seeks to seize seize or to obtain obtain title title to is situat situated ed or is found: found: Provided , that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law, the action must be brought brought in the province province where the land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering entering his appearanc appearance e in the action action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal tribunal in which the action is brought, brought, except in the actions actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, estate, and actions actions against against executors executors,, administr administrators ators,, and guardians, guardians, and for the distribut distribution ion of estates estates and payment payment of legacies. 2 SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate. SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction . Courts of First Instance Instance shall have original jurisdiction: 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
2. NO Ratio Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed directed against the one who begins the action action and lays lays the venue. venue. The court, court, before before the action action is commenced, commenced, has nothing to do with it either. either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section section begin to operate operate effectively effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. plaintiff. It establishes establishes a relation relation not between between the court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. defendant. It relates relates not to jurisdiction jurisdiction but to trial. trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualifie unqualified d right, right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnes witnesses ses live. Its object object is to secure secure to him a convenient trial.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF - That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course course of practice practice - that is, by the the proc proces ess s of the the cour courtt - but but also also by cons consen entt expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted
itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. The defend defendant ants s are now in this this court court asking asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff plaintiff in any position position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts.
*DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE - The fact that such a provis provision ion appears appears in the procedural procedural law at once raises raises a strong strong presumption presumption that it has nothing nothing to do with the jurisdicti jurisdiction on of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter matter of method method,, of conven convenien ience ce to the partie parties s litiga litigant. nt. If their their intere interests sts are best best subser subserved ved by bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controllin controlling g reason reason why such a course course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, entire entirely ly within within the contro controll of either either party. party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely timely objectio objection n and, and, as a result result,, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law. - Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable applicable to actions actions by railroad corporations corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, their, or, if one defendant defendant,, his, his, lands lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not object objecting ing would would contin continue ue in the provin province ce where where origin originall ally y begun. begun. It would would be severe severed d as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect affect the decisi decision on in the case case before before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to
the venue venue and are not asking asking for a change change expressly submitted submitted thereof . They have not only expressly themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here here asking asking that that that that jurisd jurisdict iction ion be mainta maintaine ined d against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
Civil Procedure Digest
A2010
Disposition The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.
jurisdiction over the civil case and that said case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CFI of Sulu: petition dismissed without cause -“petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlo landlord rd and tenant tenant relati relations onship hip betwee between n the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the the CAR, CAR, and and that that upon upon the the alle allega gati tion ons s of the the complaint, complaint, the case is "clearly "clearly one of ejectment." ejectment."
Prof. Victoria A.
3
Avena
JURISDITION VOID ABBAIN V. CHUA 22 SCRA 748 Sanchez; February 26, 1968 NATURE Direct appeal to the SC
FACTS March March 12, 1958: 1958: Tongham Tongham Chua commen commenced ced suit for forcible forcible entry and illegal illegal detainer detainer against against Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace (JOP) Court of Bongao, Sulu. Chua's averred that he is the owner of a 4-hectare land together with the improvements thereon thereon mostly mostly coconut coconut trees located in Maraning, Maraning, Bongao, Sulu; that this land was donated to him by his father, Subing Chua, in 1952 and from that date he has assumed ownership thereof, taken possession of the land and paid the corresponding taxes yearly; that from 1952-1958, Abbain has been his tenant and the two divided the fruits or copra harvested harvested therefrom therefrom on 50-50basis; 50-50basis; that in 1957, Abbain by means means of force, force, strate strategy gy and stealt stealth h unlawf unlawfull ully y entered and still occupies the land in question after Chua have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his failure to give chua’s share of the several harvests. LC: JOP Managula Managula rendere rendered d judgme judgment nt directin directing g Abbain Abbain to vacate vacate the premises premises and place Chua in posses possessio sion n of the planta plantatio tion, n, with with costs. costs. This This judgment judgment was predicated predicated upon the findings that sometime before WWII, Abbain, because of financial hardship, hardship, sold for P225 to Subing Subing Chua the coconut plantation plantation;; that after the sale, Abbain became the tenant of Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, Subing Chua donated the planta plantatio tion n to his son, Tongha Tongham m Chua, Chua, and Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the tenant on the land. - Abbain Abbain filed a petition petition in the CFI of Sulu against Tongham Chua and Judge Managula, seeking relief from from the the judg judgme ment nt of the the JOTP JOTP Cour Courtt anr/ anr/or or annulment of its decision with preliminary injunction. He averre averred d that that the JOTP JOTP Court Court did not not have have
ISSUE WON the JOTP Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by Chua
HELD NO Ratio. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. And in Gomez Gomez vs. Concepcion, Concepcion, this Court Court quoted quoted with with appr approv oval al the the foll follow owin ing g from from Free Freema man n on Judgments: Judgments: "A void judgment is in legal effect effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights rights can be obtained. obtained. Being worthless in itself, itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress." Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken." Reasoning. The provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 1199 (app (appro rove ved d Augu August st 30, 30, 1954 1954), ), know known n as the the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, read: "SEC. 21. Ejectmen Ejectment; t; violation violation;; jurisdict jurisdiction. ion. — All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and and disp dispos osit itio ion n of disp disput utes es aris arisin ing g from from the the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to t ak ake co gn gn iz iz an an ce ce of t en en an an cy cy r el el at at io io ns ns anddisputes."
Sec. 7, RA 1267, creating the First Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on September 9, 1955,provides: "SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. — The Court shall have original and exclusiv exclusive e jurisdict jurisdiction ion over over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle settle all questions questions,, matters, matters, controversie controversies s or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." - Chua's Chua's complaint complaint was filed on March March 12, 1958 — long long afte afterr RA’s RA’s 1199 1199,, 1267 1267 and and 1409 1409 were were incorporated in our statute books. Chua's complaint positively averred that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his noncompliance of our agreement of his giving my share of the several several harvests he made." made." The JOTP Court itself found that Abbain continued to be the tenant of Chua after the latter became owner of the plantation which which he acquir acquired ed from from his father father by virtue virtue of a donation; and that Abbain refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest." - If both both the complain complaintt and the inferi inferior or court' court's s judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the JOTP Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it became all the more evident evident that a landlord-te landlord-tenant nant relationship relationship existed. The judge had no power to determine the case case.. Becau Because se Chua Chua's 's suit suit come comes s with within in the coverage of Sec. 21, R.A. 1199 - that "cases involving the dispossession dispossession of a tenant tenant by the landholder landholder," ," shall be under the "original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disput disputes" es",, and the broad broad sweep sweep of Sectio Section n 7, RA 1267, 1267, which which lodged lodged with the CAR "origi "original nal and exclusive exclusive jurisdiction jurisdiction . . . to consider, consider, investigate, investigate, deci decide de,, and and sett settle le all all ques questi tion ons, s, matt matter ers, s, cont contro rove vers rsie ies s or disp disput utes es invo involv lvin ing g all all thos those e relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the CAR over cases of this nature. Such exclusive exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the
Civil Procedure Digest
A2010
Prof. Victoria A.
4
Avena land, "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the CAR, "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for cultivation by the landlord." The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void. The judgment of the JOTP Court is not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on its face. It may be attacked directly or collaterally . Here, the attack is direct. Abbain sought to annul the judgment. Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed, appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement of that judgment. In varying language, the Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped of' or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require. Disposition The decision of the JOTP Court of Sulu is annulled.
JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL General rule: SEAFDEC V NLRC (LAZAGA) 206 SCRA 283 NOCON, February 14, 1994 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC
FACTS -SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. Private Respondent Lazaga was hired as a Research Associate and eventually became the Head of External Affairs Office of SEAFDEC-AQD. However, he was terminated allegedly due to financial constraints being experienced by SEAFEC-AQD. He was supposed to receive separation benefits but SEAFDEC-AQD failed to pay private respondent his separation pay so Lazaga filed a complaint for non-payment of
separation benefits, plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. -In their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM, SEAFDEC alleged that NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case because: (1) It is an international organization; (2) Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid (and clearances has not been paid) COUNTERCLAIM: Lazaga had property accountability and outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD amounting to P27, 532.11 and that Lazaga was not entitled to the accrued sick leave benefits due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment -LA: for Lazaga -NLRC: affirmed LA, deleted attorney’s fees and actual damages -SEAFDEC-AQD filed MFR, denied
ISSUES 1. WON SEAFEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character 2. WON SEAFDEC-AQD is estopped from claiming that the court had no jurisdiction
HELD 1. YES Ratio. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its departments enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Reasoning. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction (immune from legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found) that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization. Such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. 2. NO Ratio. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the p arties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the d ecision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.
-The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. -The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel
Exception: SOLIVEN vs FASTFORMS PHILS. 440 SCRA 389 Sandoval-Gutierrez, October 18, 2004 NATURE -petition for review on certiorari
FACTS -Petitioner Marie Antoinette Soliven filed a complaint for P195,155 as actual damages with P200k as moral damages, P100k as exemplary damages and P100k as attorney’s fees against respondent Fastform Phils., with the Makati RTC. It alleged that respondent, through its president Dr. Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner (P170k) payable within 21 days with 3% interest. On the same day, respondent issued a postdated check for P170k + P5k int. 3 weeks later, Escobar advised petitioner not to deposit the check as the account from where it was drawn had insufficient funds and instead proposed that the P175k be rolled-over with 5% monthly interest, to which the latter agreed. Respondent issued several checks as payment for interests for 5 months but thereafter refused to pay its principal obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands. -In its counterclaim, respondent denied obtaining the loan and that it did not authorize Escobar to secure said loan or issue checks as payment for interests. After a trial on the merits, the court ordered respondent to pay the amount of the loan plus interest and attorneys fees, but moral and exemplary damages as well as the counterclaim were dismissed. -Respondent filed a MFR questioning the court’s jurisdiction alleging that since the principal demand (P195,155) did not exceed P200k, the complaint should have been filed with the MTC, pursuant to RA 7691. The TC denied the MFR since the totality of the claim exceeded 200k and since respondent was estopped from questioning jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA reversed the TC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and that respondent may assail
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Avena jurisdiction of the TC anytime even for the first time on appeal. Petitioner filed an MFR which was denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUE (Members of religious group) WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD NO. Ratio. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. Since respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the TC and even sought affirmative relief, it is estopped from challenging the TC’s jurisdiction, especially since an adverse judgment had been rendered. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate that same jurisdiction. Reasoning. Section 3 of RA 7691 provides that where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed P200k, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, atty’s fees, litigation expenses and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. -Administrative Circular 09-94 specifies guidelines in the implementation of RA 7691. Par 2 of the Circular provides that the term “damages of whatever kind” applies only to cases where damages are merely a consequence of the main action. In the instant case, the main cause of action is the collection of the debt amounting to P195k. The damages being claimed are merely incidental and are thus not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED
ONCE ATTACHED, JURISDICTION NOT OUSTED BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTE UNLESS SO PROVIDED SOUTHERN FOOD SALES CORPORATION vs. SALAS 206 SCRA 333 MEDIALDEA; Feb 18, 1992
NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - July 1979 – Private respondent Laurente (former sale supervisor of petitioner corporation) was notified and advised of his immediate termination for gross neglect of duty and/or dishonesty - August 1979 - Laurente instituted a civil action for damages against SFSC and Siao, its manager - Laurente filed a complaint for illegal dismissal (labor case). - January 1980 - Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on Civil Case, claiming that the jurisdiction should be vested with the NLRC. February 5, 1980 it was found that the termination of the complainant was for a just and valid cause February 28, 1980 – The court in Civil Case deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial. - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the determination or resolution of the motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court over claims for damages.
HELD NO. Ratio "(t)he rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute." (Bengzon v. Inciong) Reasoning
a. Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715 clearly provides that the labor arbiter shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from an employeremployee relationship. However, when the civil case for damages was instituted in 1979, the applicable law then was Article 217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1367 (May 1, 1978) which provides that Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. b. To require the private respondent to file a single suit combining his actions for illegal dismissal and damages in the NLRC would be to sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, where the same law does not expressly so provide, or does not intend to operate as to actions pending before its enactment, hence prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice. Disposition. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Of the plaintiff MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. GENERAL (page 1)
FACTS
-Manila Railroad filed an action for condemnation proceedings in CFI of Tarlac when they knew that the lands concerned are found in Nueva Ecija. Now they are assailing the jurisdiction of CFI Tarlac.
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Of the plaintiff: Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter,
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Avena nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached. - That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice - that is, by the process of the court - but also by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts.
Of the defendant 1. by service of summons 2. by voluntary appearance BOTICANO V CHU, JR 148 SCRA 541 PARAS; March 16, 1987 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA ruling of denying MFR.
FACTS - Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck which is used in hauling logs for a fee. It was hit at the rear by another Bedford truck owned by Manuel Chu and driven by Jaime Sigua while loaded with logs and parked properly by the driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national highway. - Chu acknowledged ownership and agreed to shoulder the expenses of the repair, but failed to comply with the agreement. Boticano filed a
complaint at the CFI at Cabanatuan against Chu and Sigua. Summons were issued but one was returned unserved for Sigua wile the other served thru Chu’s wife. - Boticano moved to dismiss the case against Sigua and to declare Chu in default. The Court granted the motions and adduced from evidence that Chu is responsible for the fault and negligence of the driver under Art 2180 CC. - Chu filed with the TC a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. Court granted the motions. - Boticano filed a MTD the appeal and for execution, but the appeal was still approved. The case was brought to the CA. CA set aside the TC decision for being null and void. - Boticano filed an MFR with the CA to which CA denied.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the question of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 2. WON CA erred in holding that Chu did not voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction of the TC despite his voluntary appearance
HELD 1. NO Ratio The defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived for failure to make seasonal objections. Reasoning The circumstances appear to show that there was waiver by the defendant to allege such defect when he failed to raise the question in the CFI and at the first opportunity. 2. YES, he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction. Ratio Under Sec 23, Rule 14 ROC, the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court shall be equivalent to service. It has been held by the court that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance by the appearance of the defendant. Disposition The assailed decision and resolution of CA are reversed and set aside. The decision of the CFI (now RTC) is reinstated.
3. by voluntary submission RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA 57 SCRA 455 CASTRO; June 25, 1974 NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS -Petitioner Rodriguez filed a case for recovery of the sum of P5,320.00 plus interest, attorney’s fees and cost against Sps. Robellado. -A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and served to Fe Robellado at their store in Divisoria. Sps Robellado pleaded to the Rodriguez for time before the attachment to be effectively enforced. Rodriguez agreed to the suspension of the judgment on the condition that Fe Robellado’s parents, the now respondents, Federico & Felisa Tolentino, to bind themselves jointly and severally with the Robellados, to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit. Felisa Tolentino, being present, immediately agreed to this proposal. -A compromise agreement was then entered to by the parties. The Rebellados subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement, thus prompting petitioner Rodriguez to request the City Court for a writ of execution on the properties of the Robellados and also of the Tolentinos. The request was granted by the City Court. The Tolentinos brought an action for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The CFI rendered judgment excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution. Thus this appeal.
ISSUE WON the CFI erred in excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution.
HELD YES -The contention of the CFI that the dispositive portion of the judgment of the City Court does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentinos to pay jointly and severally with the Rebellados the amount due to the plaintiff, and that the City Court never acquired jurisdiction over Tolentinos and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment rendered by said court, is erroneous.
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-The dispositive portion of the judgment of the City Court approving the compromise and enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties is adequate for the purpose of execution. Judgment on a compromise need not specifically name a person to be subject of execution thereof in obvious avoidance of repetition. -On lack of jurisdiction of the court over the Tolentinos : the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of judgment of the City Court. Under the circumstances, the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they invoked. And even assuming that estoppel lies, we cannot set aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a party to a case may be acquired, upon proper conditions, thru the voluntary appearance of the person before the court. By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case together with the Robellados, the Tolentinos effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court. - Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court.
- The order of the court was entered directing that publication should be made in a newspaper, the court directed that the clerk of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to Palanca at his last place of residence. - The cause proceeded in the CFI and Palanca not having appeared, judgment was taken against him by default. It was ordered that Palanca should deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of failure to satisfy the judgment, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. - Payment was never made and the court ordered the sale of the property. The property was brought in by the bank. - About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order.
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ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILINO v. PALANCA 37 Phil. 921 STREET; March 26, 1918 FACTS - A mortgage was executed by Palanca, as security for a debt owing to him to the bank. After the execution of this instrument, Palanca returned to China where he died. - As Palanca was a nonresident, it was necessary for the bank to give notice to him by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila.
ISSUE 1. WON the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. 2. WON the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of due process of law.
RULING 1. NO. - The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression, "action in rem' is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of adm iralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. - Several principles: (1) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself. - In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. It is clearly intended merely as compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the defendant shall be required to pay it. As further evidence of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt (sec. 260) - Whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the CFI to mail the proper papers to the defendant in China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that jurisdiction rests upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country. 2. NO. - In a foreclosure case, some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished by his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. - This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
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agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. - Failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such as irregularity as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires.
Midgely and Pastor, Jr. at their respective addresses in Alicante and Barcelona. - Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are nonresidents. They further alleged that earnest efforts toward a compromise have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family, The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned. - The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of real property and real rights. The respondents were instructed to file their answer. - De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court.
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Separate Opinion MALCOLM; dissent - The fundamental idea of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. - "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only in inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate it want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant."
DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS 64 SCRA 23 AQUINO, May 13, 1975 NATURE Original Actions. Certiorari and contempt.
FACTS - Quemada, allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., was appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of Cebu. As such, he filed a complaint against his half siblings, the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, and Sofia Midgely, who were all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. The suit also named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. The suit was to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. - Quemada, on his own, caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons through registered mail upon De
ISSUE/S WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her person.
required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident. It should be noted that the civil case filed by Quemada is related to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering the properties which in the understanding of Quemada, belonged to the estate of the Late Pastor, Sr. and which were held by De Midgely and her brother. Disposition. Petition is dismissed
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES SPS GONZAGA V CA (SPS ABAGAT) SCRA CALLEJO SR; October 18, 2004
HELD NO. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of earnest effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. Ratio. When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If the motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, Reasoning. Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely, her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. - The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. In that case, it ruled that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is
NATURE Petition for the Review of the Decision and resolution of CA
FACTS - October 22, 1991 > Sps Abagat filed complaint against Sps Gonzaga for recovery of possession of land in Baclaran, Parañaque issued in their names, as owners. Sps Abagat alleged in their complaint that they were the owners of a small hut (barong-barong) constructed on the lot, which was then owned by the government - February 22, 1961 > Abagat filed an application for sales patent over the land - January 26, 1973 > hut was gutted by fire and after that, Sps Gregorio built a two-storey house on the property without their consent. Sps Abagat filed a complaint for ejectment against Sps Gregorio but complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because in their answer to the complaint, the Sps Gregorio claimed ownership over the house - Sps Gregorio sold house to Sps Gonzaga for P100,000 under a deed of conditional sale, in which Sps Gregorio undertook to secure an award of the land by the government in favor of Sps Gonzaga. In an MOA, Sps Gregorio indicated that if they would
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Avena not secure such, they would return P90,000 as payment for the house - January 2, 1986 > Bureau of Lands granted the application of Abagat for a sales patent over the property. TCT No. 128186 was issued by the Register of Deeds in his name. Sps Abagat demanded that Sps Gonzaga vacate the property, but latter refused - September 29, 1992 > Sps Abagat filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Sps Gregorio. TC no longer resolved the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint - Trial Court > October 10, 1994, in favor of Sps Abagat - CA > December 19, 1997, affirmed the decision of the trial court on. On the plea of Sps Gonzaga that the TC should have ordered the Sps Gregorio to refund to them the P90,000.00 the latter had received as payment for the house, CA ruled that a separate complaint should have been filed against the Sps Gregorio, instead of appealing the decision of the TC.
P90,000.00 paid by them to the Sps Gregorio. Sps Gonzaga failed to assail the trial court ’s order of denial in the appellate court. Even after the trial court had granted leave to the Sps Gregorio to intervene as parties-defendants and the latter filed their Answer-in-Intervention, Sps Gonzaga failed to file a cross-claim against the intervenors for specific performance for the refund of the P90,000.00 they had received from the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute sale and the memorandum of agreement and pay filing and docket fees therefor. Disposition Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE . CA decision and resolution are AFFIRMED .
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION COURTS A. SUPREME COURT Question of law
ISSUE
URBANO V CHAVEZ 183 SCRA 347 GANCAYCO; March 19, 1990
WON RTC and CA erred in not ordering Sps Gregorio to refund to them the P90,000 they had paid for the house and which the latter promised to do so under their Memorandum of Agreement
HELD NO Ratio The rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings. Moreover, the right of a party to recover depends, not on the prayer, but on the scope of the pleadings, the issues made and the law. Reasoning - Sps Gonzaga failed to file any pleading against Sps Gregorio for the enforcement of the deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute sale, and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by them. The petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the intervenors, Sps Gregorio, and appended thereto their third-party complaint for indemnity for any judgment that may be rendered by the court against them and in favor of the respondents. However, Sps Gonzaga did not include in their prayer that judgment be rendered against the third-party defendants to refund the
OF
NATURE Petition to review decision of RTC Pasig
FACTS - there are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) and an civil action for damages arising from a felony (defamation through a published interview whereby Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close associate (crony?) of Marcos), both against Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (among others) - in the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman), the Office of the SolGen (OSG) entered its appearance for Chavez and the other accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as far as the Prelim Investigation is concerned. Urbano et. al. filed a special civil action for prohibition in the SC to enjoin the SolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for Chavez in the PI. The contention is in the event that an information is filed against the accused, the appearance of the OSG in the PI would be in conflict with its role as the appellate counsel for the People
of the Phils (counsel at the first instance is the provincial/ state prosecutor). - in the action for damages, the OSG likewise acted as counsel for Chavez, who was then the SolGen and counsel for PCGG, the agency responsible for the investigation of graft and corrupt practices of the Marcoses. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required pleading, and afterwards filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. Petitioner Co objected to appearance of OSG as counsel, contending that he is suing Chavez in his personal capacity. - OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public official even if the said official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of PD478 which defines the functions of OSG, as well as EO300 which made OSG an independent agency under the Office of the President - RTC denied the petition, thus allowing the appearance of OSG as counsel. It also denied the MFR. Thus, this petition for review
ISSUE/S 1. WON the OSG has authority to appear for (a) a certain gov’t official in the PI of their case before the Ombudsman and (b) the SolGen in a suit for damages arising from a crime
HELD 1. NO Ratio The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony (applies to all public officials and employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches). Reasoning PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG: SEC1. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. x x x - the OSG submits that since there is no qualification, it can represent any public official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation. - Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin Code (Sec. 1661: As principal law officer of the Gov’t, the SolGen shall have the authority to act for and represent the Gov’t , its officers and agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer). In Anti-Graft League v Ortega, SC interpreted Sec. 1661 to embrace PI. However,
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Avena should an info be filed after, then OSG can no longer act as counsel. The rationale given was that public officials are subjected to numerous suits, and threats of criminal prosecution could stay the hand of the public official. OSG provides assurance against timidity in that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI. - However, the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The anomaly in this ruling becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People, is expected to take a stand against the accused. More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical considerations, where the OSG, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the PI, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the People, represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the law. It is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court. - another reason why the OSG can’t represent an accused in a crim case: the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it says or does is lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the state. As such, a public official who is sued criminally is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal (the State) can never the author of a wrongful act. The same applies to a suit for damages arising from a felony, where the public official is held accountable for his act; the state is not liable. ** Re: Question of Law (copied verbatim. This is all that is mentioned) -both issues raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be evaluated by this Court. Moreover, if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of law (Torres v Yu). Thus, the Court resolved to consolidate both Petitions and to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. Disposition Petition is granted.
ORTIGAS V. CA 106 SCRA 121 ABAD SANTOS, 1981
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS -In 1974, Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo Belmonte in the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal, praying that judgment be rendered 1.) ordering the defendant his successors-in-interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff; 2.) declaring the residential building constructed on the lot by defendant as forfeited in favor of plaintiff; 3.0 condeming defendant to pay monthly rent of 5,000 from July 18, 1971 up to the time he vacates, together with attorney's fees and exemplary damages. The Ruled in favor of plaintiff and granted the relieves prayed for. -Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MC. CFI denied motion and affirmed in totot the MC judgment. The said court also issued a writ of execution. Belmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminsry injunction in the CA, assiling the 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI. The Ca ruled in favor of Belmonte, holding that the MC has no jurisdiction. Hence the present petition.
ISSUES 1. WON the CA h as appellate jurisdiction over this case 2. WON the MC h ad jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the original complaint
HELD 1. NO. Reasoning. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the CA, namely 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI, the SC held that the same are purely legal in nature. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in the SC by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296), it is apparent that the decision under review rendered by the CA without jurisdiction should be set aside. 2. NO. Reasoning. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject the lot buyer who defaulted in his
payments but also prays that the residential building constructed by the buyer be forfeited in plaintiff's favor, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the CFI not the MC in an ejectment case. The issues raised before the inferior court did not only involved the possession of the lot but also rights and obligations of the parties to the residential building which under Art. 45 of the CC is real property. Aslo, plaintiff's claim to the bldg raises question of ownership. -A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it under SECII Rule 40 where one of the parties objected to its jurisdiction. Since the original case was decided by the MC without jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, the CFI should have dismissed the cases when it was brought before it on appeal. Disposition. Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper action in the proper court, the decisions of the CA, CFI and MC of San Juan Rizal are set aside.
JOSEFA V ZHANDONG GR 150903 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; December 8, 2003 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS Tan represented himself to be the owner of hardboards and sold them to Josefa. Josefa paid all his obligations to Tan. The hardboards apparently belonged to Zhandong. When Tan failed to pay Zhandong, it sent a demand letter for the payment of the hardboards to both Tan and Josefa. Trial Court ruled in favor of Zhandong The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner ascribes to the CA the error in affirming the ruling of the trial court that Josefa is liabe to Zhandong despite “THE MOUNTAIN OF EVIDENCE” showing that they had no business transaction with each other and that it was Tan who was solely responsible to Zhandong for the payment of the goods.
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Avena ISSUE 1. WON Josefa is liable to Zhandong for the payment of the merchandise
HELD 1. NO Reasoning. Evidence indicate that Tan bought the hardboards from Zhandong and, in turn, sold them to petitioner. However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored this glaring reality and instead held that petitioner purchased the boards directly from respondent. General Rule : Only questions of law may be entertained by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari
Exceptions: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals m anifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Disposition Petition is granted.
Petition for certiorari3
FACTS -September 15, 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the CFI of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused MAYOR Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. -September 16, 1980: armed with warrant, elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. -September 23 and October 1, 1980: the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the m unicipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. -However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven
3 The one who filed this appeal which partakes of a nature of certiorari are private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors is that they are instituting the action `subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal. (CJ Fernando’s prefatory statement states that the two have no legal standing to raise this petition. Since Sol Gen Mendoza never bothered to question their legal standing, the Court contented itself with the fact that the Solicitor General has authority to raise this
Change of venue PEOPLE v. MAYOR PABLO SOLA 103 SCRA 393 (1981) FERNANDO, C.J. NATURE
petition in behalf of the People of the Philippines)
The Solicitor General adopted a two-pronged thrusts in this petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. -In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds. -March 15, 1981: this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (A) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice; (B) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan; and (C) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." THUS, THE ISSUE OF A CHANGE OF VENUE HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC. -The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981 , dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
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Avena ISSUE Whether or not the bail bonds of respondents should be cancelled
HELD YES. Ratio. There being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must b e cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. Reasoning. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. -Justice Capistrano: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." -J. Cardozo: "THE LAW, AS WE HAVE SEEN, IS SEDULOUS IN MAINTAINING FOR A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH CRIME WHATEVER FORMS OF PROCEDURE ARE OF THE ESSENCE OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND. PRIVILEGES SO FUNDAMENTAL AS TO BE INHERENT IN EVERY CONCEPT OF A FAIR TRIAL THAT COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE THOUGHT OF REASONABLE MEN WILL BE KEPT INVIOLATE AND INVIOLABLE, HOWEVER CRUSHING MAY BE THE PRESSURE OF INCRIMINATING PROOF. BUT JUSTICE, THOUGH DUE TO THE ACCUSED, IS DUE TO THE ACCUSER ALSO. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." -the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the
questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." -People v. Gutierrez, J.B.L. Reyes: "…to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. -The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. -there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. -The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue, Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
B. COURT OF APPEALS ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC G.R. No. 130866 REGALADO; Sept 16, 1998
NATURE Petition for certiorari which stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the NLRC
FACTS - . Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. - In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. - Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE WON the SC should entertain the present petition
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Avena HELD NO (should be remanded to CA) Ratio. All references in the amended Sec 9 of BP No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Reasoning. It will be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. -Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as
he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning: i.e., , to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed. -Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. -While the SC does not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score it adds the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor. -This case therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Disposition. The instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
C. RTC CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JOSE B. FERNANDEZ, VS CA, JUDGE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and PRODUCERS PROPERTIES, INC.
208 SCRA 652 DAVIDE; May 8, 1992 NATURE The common origin of these cases is Producers Bank of the Philippines and Producers Properties, Inc. vs CB, Jose B. Fernandez. Jr. and the Monetary Board filed before the Makati RTC. - the consolidation of the 2 cases was ordered: FIRST CASE- a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the resolution of the CA. The impugned decision upheld the Order of respondent Judge Guadiz granting the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CB, Fernandez and the Monetary Board from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions No. 649 and No. 751, or from taking the threatened appropriate alternative action and the Order in the same case denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and vacate said injunction. The challenged resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners' MFR. SECOND CASE- a petition for review directed principally against the decision of the CA dismissing the petition therein filed and sustained the various Orders of the respondent Judge, but directed the plaintiffs therein to amend the amended complaint by stating in its prayer the specific amount of damages which Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP) claims to have sustained as a result of losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses; the Clerk of Court was also ordered to determine the amount of filing fees which should be paid by the plaintiffs within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
FACTS - Petitioners claim that during the regular examination of the PBP, CB examiners stumbled upon some highly questionable loans which had been extended by the PBP management to several entities. Upon further examination, it was discovered that these loans, totalling approximately P300 million, were "fictitious" as they were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Said loans were deemed to be anomalous particularly because the total paid-in capital of PBP at that time was only P 140.544 million. This means that the entire paid-in capital of the bank, together with some P160 million of depositors' money, was utilized by PBP management to fund these unsecured loans.
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Avena - at the height of the controversy surrounding the discovery of the anomalous loans, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers. These news items triggered a bank-run in PBP which resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank's demand deposit account with the CB. On the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector, Department I of the CB, the Monetary Board (M B placed PBP under conservatorship. - PBP nonetheless requested that the same be lifted by the CB. Consequently, the MB directed the principal stockholders of PBP to increase its capital accounts by such an amount that would be necessary for the elimination of PBP's negative net worth. - CB senior deputy Governor Gabriel Singson informed PBP that the CB would be willing to lift the conservatorship under the following conditions: (a) PBP's unsecured overdraft with the Central Bank will be converted into an emergency loan, to be secured by sufficient collateral (b) A comptroller for PBP and any number of bank examiners deemed necessary to oversee PBP's operations shall be designated by the CB, under terms of reference to be determined by the Governor; (c) A letter from the Management of PBP authorizing the CB to automatically return clearing items that would result in an overdraft in its CB account shall be submitted to the CB. - the MB approved the consolidation of PBP's other unsecured obligations to the CB with its overdraft and authorizing the conversion thereof into an emergency loan. The same resolution authorized the CB Governor to lift the conservatorship and return PBP's management to its principal stockholders upon completion of the documentation and full collateralization of the emergency loan, but directed PBP to pay the emergency loan in 5 equal annual installments, with interest and penalty rates at MRR 180 days plus 48% per annum, and liquidated damages of 5% for delayed payments. - PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB. Although said proposal was explored and discussed, no program acceptable to both the CB and PPI was arrived at because of disagreements on certain matters such as interest rates, penalties and liquidated damages. No other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years; as a result thereof, its overdrafts with the CB continued to
accumulate. Consequently, per Resolution No. 649, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. - There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued Resolution No. 751 on 7 August 1987 instructing CB management to advise the bank that: a. The CB conservatorship over PBP may be lifted only after PBP shall have identified the new group of stockholders who will put in new capital in PBP and after the Monetary Board shall have considered such new stockholders as acceptable; and b. The stockholders of PBP have to decide whether or not to accept the terms of the rehabilitation plan as provided under Resolution No. 649 within one week from receipt of notice hereof and if such terms are not acceptable to them, the Central Bank will take appropriate alternative action on the matter; . . . - the PBP, without responding to the communications of the CB, filed a complaint against the CB, the MB and CB Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. The complaint, alleged that the conservatorship was unwarranted, ill-motivated, illegal, utterly unnecessary and unjustified; that the appointment of the conservator was arbitrary; that herein petitioners acted in bad faith; that the CB-designated conservators committed bank frauds and abuses; that the CB is guilty of promissory estoppel; and that by reason of the conservatorship, it suffered losses. It prayed for a judicial review of the MB Resolutions and the issuance of a TRO. - The case was raffled to Branch 147 of Makati RTC court which was then presided over by respondent Judge. - respondent Judge issued a TRO; Subsequently, he issued an Order enjoining defendant-petitioners or any of their agents from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. 649 and 751 or from taking the threatened "appropriate alternative action" including exclusion of plaintiff bank from settlement of clearing balances at the Central Bank clearing house or any other action that will disturb the status quo or the viability of plaintiff bank during the pendency of this case conditioned upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00. - PBP filed the Amended Complaint impleading PPI as an additional plaintiff. No new allegations or causes of action for said plaintiff were made. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
- the respondent Judge handed down an Order denying the motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the amended complaint alleges ultimate facts showing that plaintiff has a right and that such a right has been violated by defendant; the questioned MB Resolutions were issued arbitrarily and with bad faith, "being a part of a scheme to divest plaintiff's present stockholders of their control of PBP and to award the same to the PDIC or its unknown transferees"; and the averments of legality or illegality of the conservatorship are relevant to the cause of action since the complaint seeks the lifting of the conservatorship; (b) While it is true that under Section 28-A of the Central Bank Act the conservator takes over the management of a bank, the Board of Directors of such bank is not prohibited from filing a suit to lift the conservatorship and from questioning the validity of both the conservator's fraudulent acts and abuses and its principal's (MB) arbitrary action; besides, PPI is now a party-plaintiff in the action; and (c) plaintiffs have paid the correct filing fees since "the value of the case cannot be estimated." FIRST CASE - Unable to accept the above Order, CB and Fernandez filed with respondent CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the Orders of the respondent Judge, restrain the implementation of the same and nullify the writ of preliminary injunction. They contend therein that: 1. The trial court's injunctive order and writ are anomalous and illegal because they are directed against CB acts and measures which constitute no invasion of plaintiff's rights; and 2. The complaint filed was, on its face, dismissible: (a) for failure to state a cause of action, (b) for being unauthorized by the party in whose name it purports to have been filed, and (c) for failure of the purported plaintiff to pay the required filing fees. - CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the CB's sudden and untimely announcement of the conservatorship over PBP eroded the confidence which the banking public had hitherto reposed on the bank and resulted in the bank-run; it then concluded that when the CB "peremptorily and illtimely announced" the conservatorship, PBP was not given an opportunity to be heard since the CB arbitrarily brushed aside administrative due process notwithstanding PBP's having sufficiently established its inherent corporate right to autonomously perform its banking activities without undue governmental interference that would in effect divest its stockholders of their control over the operations of
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Avena the bank." It further held that the challenged resolutions of the MB are not just advisory in character "because the same sought to impose upon the respondent bank petitioners' governmental acts that were specifically designed and executed to devise a scheme that would irreparably divest from the stockholders of the respondent bank control of the same." On the issue of the non-payment of the correct docket fees, the said court, in ruling that the correct amount was paid, said that "the instant case is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the value of the losses incurred by the respondent b ank cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the community." - petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for review. It is alleged therein that the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) Ignoring petitioners' contention that since PBP did not pay the correct filing fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case; hence, pursuant to Manchester Development Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court; (2) . . . ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the conservatorship as a basis for determining the existence of a cause of action since the amended complaint does not seek the annulment or lifting of the conservatorship; (3) . . . not holding that the amended complaint should have been dismissed because it was filed in the name of PBP without the authority of its conservator; and (4) . . . not setting aside the Order of the trial court granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which unlawfully restrained the CB from exercising its mandated responsibilities and effectively compelled it to allow the PBP to continue incurring overdrafts with it. - private respondents argue that the Manchester rule is not applicable in the case at bar because what is primarily sought for herein is a writ of injunction and not an award for damages; it is further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is neither appealable nor be made the proper subject of a petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. SECOND CASE
- Pursuant to the powers and authority conferred upon her by the Central Bank, Atty. Leonida Tansinsin-Encarnacion, in her capacity as conservator, instituted reforms aimed at making PBP more viable. With this purpose in mind, she started reorganizing the bank's personnel and committees. - In order to prevent her from continuing with the reorganization, PBP filed an Omnibus Motion asking the trial court for an order: (a) reinstating PBP officers to their original positions and restoring the bank's standing committees to their respective compositions prior to said reorganization; (b) enjoining the lease of any portion of the bank's space in Producers Bank Centre building to third parties and the relocation of departments/offices of PBP as was contemplated; and (c) to hold, after an opportunity to be heard is given her, said conservator in contempt of court for disobedience of and resistance to the writ of injunction. An opposition to the contempt charge was later filed by said petitioner. - respondent Judge issued an Order (a) requiring conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion to reinstate PBP officers to their original positions prior to the reorganization of the bank's personnel and restore PBP's standing committees to their original compositions, and (b) restraining her from leasing out to third parties any portion of PBP's space in the Producers Bank Centre building. - A second Order directed Tansinsin-Encarnacion to publish the financial statement of PBP - On several occasions thereafter, conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion caused the publication of PBP's financial statement as required by regulations, without, however, carrying the items enumerated by the trial court as "suspense accounts." Consequently, contempt charges were filed against her, of which she was found guilty. Tansinsin-Encarnacion filed a petition for certiorari against respondent Judge, Henry L. Co and the law firm of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista. She prays therein for judgment declaring respondent judge to be without jurisdiction to entertain both the complaint and amended complaint; declaring null and void all his orders, specially the contempt orders; and finding respondent Judge and respondent lawyers guilty of violating their respective oaths of office. - In her Memorandum submitted to the CA, TansinsinEncarnacion alleged that: (1) respondent Judge has no jurisdiction because the filing of the case was not authorized by the petitioner or the conservator in violation of Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as
amended, it was filed after the ten (10) day period prescribed by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended, and the correct docket fees were not paid; (2) respondent Judge illegally ordered her to return to PPI the administration of the bank's three (3) properties, contrary to his own writ of preliminary injunction and earlier order to make the bank viable, and to publish the alleged "suspense accounts" contrary to Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as amended, the writ of preliminary injunction and her constitutional right to silence; (3) respondent Judge erred in declaring her in contempt of court notwithstanding his lack of jurisdiction over the case and failure to set any date for the hearing and reception of evidence, in violation of her right to due process of law; and (4) respondents Judge and lawyers are administratively liable for their grossly illegal actuations and for depriving the Government of at least P13.2 million in filing fees. - In disposing of the issues raised, respondent Court merely adopted with approval the ruling of the respondent Judge on the question of jurisdiction, sustaining the respondent Judge's ruling. As to the filing of the complaint after the lapse of the 10-day period provided for in Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, it ruled that the Section does not apply because the complaint essentially seeks to compel the conservator to perform his duties and refers to circumstances and incidents which transpired after said 10-day period. - On the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct filing fees, to which an exception was made in the dispositive portion, the respondent Court found the same to be "partly" meritorious. It agreed with petitioner that while the other losses and damages sought to be recovered are incapable of pecuniary estimation, the damages inflicted on PBP due to losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses were in fact pegged at P108,479,771.00 in paragraph 26 of the amended complaint. This specific amount, however, should have been stated in the prayer of the complaint. It also held that the Manchester case "has been legally construed in the subsequent case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd. and the case of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. to the effect that applying the doctrine initiated in the case of Manchester, together with said subsequent thereto (sic), plaintiffs in the original case should be given a reasonable time to amend their complaint, more particularly, to state in their prayer in the amended complaint the specific amount of damages . . ."
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Avena - On the orders of contempt and the reasons therefor, respondent Court merely stated: . . . Generally, when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon or questions pertinent to the cause are decisions within its jurisdiction, and however, irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. - Finally, on the administrative liability of the respondent Judge and the lawyers, the respondent Court declared the claim to be without merit.
ISSUE WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the Civil Case on the ground of nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fee in violation of the rule enunciated in Manchester Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
HELD Ratio The action must be dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs therein to pay the correct docket fees, pursuant to Manchester. The said case was decided by this Court on 7 May 1987, exactly 3 months and 20 days before the filing of the original complaint and 5 months and 18 days before the filing of the Amended Complaint. It was ruled therein that: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. Reasoning The respondent Judge, in ruling that PBP and PPI had paid the correct docket fee of P102.00, said that "the value of the case cannot be estimated" since what is sought is an injunction against the enforcement of the challenged resolutions of the MB; in short, the claim for damages is merely incidental. Upon the other hand, respondent Court, in its Resolution, ruled that the case is "incapable of pecuniary estimation" because the value of the losses incurred by the PBP "cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the community." Both conclusions are unfounded and are the result of a misapprehension of the allegations and causes of action in both the complaint and amended complaint.
- While PBP cleverly worded its complaint to make it appear as one principally for injunction, deliberately omitting the claim for damages as a specific cause of action, a careful examination thereof bears that the same is in reality an action for damages arising out of the alleged "unwarranted, ill-motivated and illegal conservatorship," or a conservatorship which "was utterly unnecessary and unjustified," and the "arbitrary" appointment of a conservator. Thus, as stated earlier, it devoted the bulk of its petition to detailed events, occurrences and transactions in support thereof and patiently enumerated the losses it sustained and suffered. - These are the very damages referred to in the prayer: “to fully repair the damages inflicted on PBP consisting of losses of operation and the conservators' bank frauds and abuses” but not specified therein. To this Court's mind, this was done to evade the payment of the corresponding filing fees which, as computed by petitioner on the basis alone of the specified losses of P108,479,771.00, would amount to about P 437,000.00. The PBP then clearly acted with manifest bad faith in resorting to the foregoing clever strategy to avoid paying the correct filing fees. The pronouncements in the Manchester case should thus be reiterated: The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. . . . - The respondent Court itself, confronted by the same issue, but perhaps unaware of its earlier Resolution, ruled that PBP and PPI are liable for the filing fees on the claim for damages. - respondent Court applied the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office and Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. which were, by then, already overturned by Manchester . Even granting for the sake of argument that Sun Insurance and Pilipinas Shell may apply in this case, the Court categorically stated: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow the payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. - The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. - There can be no question that in the instant case, PBP's claims for damages arise out of an injury to its rights. Pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the action therefor must be initiated within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued. Since the damages arose out of the alleged unwarranted, illmotivated, illegal, unnecessary and unjustified conservatorship, the cause of action, if any, first accrued in 1984 and continued until 1987, when the original complaint was filed. There is no showing that PBP paid the correct filing fee for the claim within the prescribed period. Hence, nothing can save the case from being dismissed.
DISPOSITION PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case. All proceedings undertaken and all orders issued by respondent Judge are hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void.
ASCUE v CA (ANTONIO) GR No. 84330 Padilla; May 8, 1991 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS - Private respondents Ramon Antonio, Salvador Salenga and Ulipia Fernandez (lessees) filed a complaint with the MetroTC alleging that petitioner Ascue (lessor) refused to collect their rentals. Hence, they sought consignation of the payments with the MetroTC. - Ascue filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground that it is the RTC not MTC which has jurisdiction over consignation cases, the subject matter of litigation being incapable of pecuniary
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Avena estimation. The MetroTC denied Ascue’s motion to dismiss and held that the inferior court had jurisdiction since the consigned amount was P5,625 (well below 20K). - Ascue later appealed to the RTC but the same dismissed the appeal for being premature. Ascue brought the case to the SC on direct appeal but the case was referred back to the CA. The CA then dismissed the petition and ruled that the jurisdiction of a court in consignation cases depends on the amount consigned, consignation being merely a form of payment and the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment.
NEGRE v CABAHUG SHIPPING 16 SCRA 655 DIZON; April 29, 1966 NATURE Appeal
FACTS -
ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that consignation cases fall within the jurisdiction of the MetroTC and that the amount consigned determines said jurisdiction
HELD No. Ratio In valid consignation cases, where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money, the amount of debt due is determinable, hence, the subject matter is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned then determines the jurisdiction of the court. Reasoning petitioner is of the belief that it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as the subject matter of litigation (the amount to be consigned) is incapable of pecuniary estimation. This is wrong. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. Two of the requisites of it valid consignation are (1) that there is a debt due. and (2) the amount is placed it the disposal of the court. Thus, where no debt is due and owing, consignation is not proper. In a valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money, the amount of the debt due is determinable. Clearly, the subject matter (i.e., the amount due) in consignation cases is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned determines the jurisdiction of the court. - In the case at bar. the amount consigned being P5,625.00, the respondent metropolitan trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129. Disposition Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
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On August 14, 1961, Negre (appellant) filed his complaint against Cabahug Shipping & Co (appellee), a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting persons and goods for a price within Philippine waters, to recover the sum of P3,774.90, representing the value of a cargo of dried fish belonging to him which was loaded on the latter's vessel, and which was totally destroyed on board thereof, before it could be transported to its place of destination, due to the gross negligence of the officers and members of the crew of said vessel As Cabahug’s answer admitted liability for the loss of said cargo, but only up to the amount of P3,733,78, appellant moved for a judgment on the pleadings. In replying thereto, however, appellee moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the amount of the claim did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Resolving this motion, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the right of appellant to file the same with the corresponding municipal court. Appellant maintains in this appeal that his action is one in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which, pursuant to the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the courts of first instance, irrespective of the amount or the value of the goods involved.
ISSUE/S WON the case falls within the jurisdiction of CFI (RTC)
HELD YES Ratio. It has been held that, to give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract, the same must relate to the trade and business of the sea Admiralty
jurisdiction, it has also been held, extends to all maritime torts. Reasoning. The action was based upon an oral contract for the transportation of goods by water. -Moreover, the allegations of the complaint clearly show: first, that the contract entered into between the parties had already been partially performed with the loading of the goods subject-matter thereof on board appellee's vessel and the acceptance thereof by said appellee, and second, that the maritime contract binding the parties was breached by the carrier because through his fault and that of his agents and representatives the cargo became a total loss. Disposition Reversed.
BAITO V SARMIENTO 109 Phil. 148 PADILLA; APR 25, 1960 NATURE Appeal from CFI Samar
FACTS -Lucina Baito filed action for support against her husband Anatalio Sarmiento. -CFI Samar dismissed her complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, the amount demanded as support being only P720
ISSUE WON the CFI has jurisdiction over an action for support if the amount claimed or demanded as support is only P720, or not more than P2,000 (now P5,000)
HELD Ratio. An action for support does not only involve the determination of the amount to be given as support, but also the relation of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, the needs of the claimant, the financial resources of the person from whom support is sought, all of which are not capable of pecuniary estimation. Reasoning. An action for support falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance under section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613. Disposition The order appealed from is set aside
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Avena and the case is remanded
D. METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil and estate settlement proceedings/over provisional remedies Exclusive original jurisdiction in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases LIM V CA (PIZARRO) 00 SCRA 00 GANCAYCO; March 18, 1991 NATURE Petition to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS - Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. owns a building in Manila. One of the rooms in the building (Room 301) is occupied by Reginaldo Lim, an MTC judge. - The original occupant of Room 103 was Lim Eng Piao, the father of Reginaldo. When Lim Eng Piao died, the occupancy was continued by Reginaldo. Eventually, Reginaldo was able to acquire a house and lot in Quezon City but he still used the room where he kept his books, documents, appliances and other important belongings. - September 1987 – LKT, Inc. changed the lock of the main door of the building which was commonly used by all the occupants of the building. - September 30, 1987 – Reginaldo was unable to enter the building because he did not have a key to the new lock. He was unable to get his law books for a case he was working on so he had to purchase new ones which cost him P1,235.00. - October 1, 1987 - He requested for a new key from the OIC of the buiding but his request was not complied with. - October 2, 1987 – Reginaldo instituted a civil case against Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The complaint was denominated as an action for damages with injunction but was subsequently dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. - October 23, 1987 – Another complaint was instituted in the MTC which had the same allegations. Reginaldo alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room, entitling him to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in the amount of P1,253.00, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit. - November 2, 1987 - A temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge pending trial on the merits, commanding LKT, Inc. to deliver the appropriate keys to Reginaldo and to allow him to enter the premises and Room 301 of the building. November 3, 1987 – LKT, Inc. instituted the instant petition. - The Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said civil case. With regard to the issue of possession: Force was used by LKT, Inc. in depriving Reginaldo of physical possession of the room when the main door’s lock was changed without the knowledge and consent of Reginaldo. - The issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. - The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. - Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied, a motion to dismiss being one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure.
ISSUE WON the action for specific performance in this case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC
HELD NO Ratio In Vichanco vs. Laurilla, it was held that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action. Reasoning - The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It was through stealth that LKT, Inc. prevented Reginaldo from using the room. - Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. - This relief is available to a landlord, vendor and vendee and also to a tenant or lessee or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part of it, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession within 1 year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding possession. Disposition Petition is denied. No costs.
Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession of real property RUSSELL V VESTIL 304 SCRA 738 KAPUNAN; March 17, 1999
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction: - LKT, Inc. argued that when the amount of damages claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would fall under the RTC as the failure to so allege would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. - In Singson vs. Aragon, the SC held that exemplary damages must be specified and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it, if together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim does not exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000).
NATURE Petition for Certiorari
FACTS - Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the RTC of Mandaue City - The complaint alleged that petitioners are coowners of that parcel of land in Liloan, Cebu. The
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Avena land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. - Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION" - By virtue of this deed, respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners. - The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. - Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the action is one for repartition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu - Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the complaint is for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARA TI ON OF HEI RS AN D DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the RTC - The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. - A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners - Respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. - Respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration. - Hence, this petition
ISSUE WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case.
HELD YES. Ratio Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance. While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Disposition The petition was GRANTED.
E. SPECIAL RULES
MANUFACTURER'S DISTRIBUTORS, INC., V YU SIU LIONG 11 SCRA 680 REYES, JBL; April 29 1966 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI Manila sustaining and affirming an order of the MTC Manila dismissing the original complaint for want of jurisdiction.
FACTS -Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. had filed action in MTC Manila, Branch III, seeking to compel Yu Siu Liong to accept delivery of 74,500 pieces of plastifilm bags, balance of 100,000 pieces ordered by said Yu Sio Liong and supplied by the Manufacturer’s Distributors; to pay P3,376.00, the value of the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags ordered by him, plus 12% interest per annum thereon until fully paid; and to pay the amount of P844.00, for and as stipulated attorney's fees. Manuufacturer’s Distributors also prayed for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. -Yu Sio Liong filed MTD on the ground that, the subject of the litigation being specific performance, the same lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI. MTC upheld Yu Sio Liong and dismissed the complaint. -CFI affirmed the order of dismissal with costs, saying: “Manufacturer’s Distributors's action before the MTC was one for specific performance… Whether refusal to accept delivery of said plastifilms was justified or not is not capable of pecuniary estimation and was, therefore, not cognizable by the Municipal Court." -Manufacturer’s Distributors contend that the subject of the litigation were the 100,000 plastifilm bags, contracted for by Yu Sio Liong at a total price of P3,376.00, and, therefore, it was susceptible of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE WON the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and is therefore not within the jurisdiction of MTC
HELD YES.
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Avena -There is no controversy, as to the contractual price for the plastifilm bags; the dispute is whether or not Yu Sio Liong was justified in its refusal to accept the delivery of the bags. This matter plainly is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the M TC. -Speaking of the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts, the Judiciary Act, as amended, in its sec88, after conferring original jurisdiction in Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts over cases where the value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed P5,000.00, provides nevertheless in its par2 that "The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace and judge of a municipal court shall not extend to civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation, except in forcible entry and detainer cases; nor to those which involve the legality of any tax, impost or assessment; nor to actions involving admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; nor to matters of probate, the appointments of trustees or receiver; nor to actions for annulment of marriages; . . ." Jurisdiction over the classes of cases thus excluded is conferred on the CFI (Judiciary Act, sec44). -That Manufacturer’s Distributors's complaint also sought the payment by Yu Sio Liong of P3,376.00 plus interest and attorney's fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident or consequence of Yu Sio Liong's liability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the payment cannot be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation. -Subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, has reference, not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of litigation, the nature of the action and of the relief sought. -The [Municipal Trial] Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction. -Cruz vs. Tan (87 Phil. 627) is inapplicable. In said case, the plaintiff had made an alternative prayer: specific performance or payment of the sum of P644.31. The alternative prayer meant that the
payment of the latter sum was a pecuniary estimation of the specific performance sought, since it would equally satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs. In the present case, the payment in money is not an alternative equivalent, but a consequence or result of the specific performance, and hence can not constitute a pecuniary estimation thereof. Disposition CFI order affirmed.
CRUZ V TAN 87 SCRA 627 JUGO; November 27, 1950 NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with injunction.
FACTS - August 3, 1949: respondent Telesfora Yambao filed a complaint against the petitioner Manuel Cruz, praying that the latter be ordered to finish the construction of a house mentioned in the complaint, or to pay her the sum of P644.31. - Within ten days from the receipt of the summons, the petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars, which was denied by the court. - September 19, 1949: petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit—the demand contained in the prayer is only for P644.31, which falls under the Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the Municipal Court. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court, and trial for the merits was also set. - Order setting the case for trial on October 10, 1949 was received by petitioner’s counsel on October 12 (two days after). Since the parties did not appear at the trial, the court dismissed the case for lack of interest of the parties on October 10, 1949. - October 12, 1949: respondent Yambao filed a motion praying that the trial of the case be set for November 14, 1949. The motion was heard on October 15, 1949, but as the petitioner’s counsel received notice of the said motion on Oct. 15, he could not appear in the said hearing.
ISSUE 1.
WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD NO
Ratio The jurisdiction of the respective courts is determined by the value of the demand and not the value of the transaction out of which the demand arose. Reasoning - The case comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court or justice of the peace court.
Judiciary Act of 1948 SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction.—CFI shall have original jurisdiction: (c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than two thousand pesos. SEC. 86. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities.— (b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their respective municipalities, and not exclusively cognizable by the CFI. SEC. 88. Original Jurisdiction in civil cases.— Xxx exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter or amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs. - The alternative prayer for specific performance is also of the same value, for the alternative prayers would not have been made in the complaint if one was more valuable than the other; the specific performance alternatively prayed for is capable of pecuniary estimation at P644.31.
DISPOSITION Judge of CFI is declared without jurisdiction to try the case, and is ordered to stop further proceedings by dismissing the case.
LAPITAN V SCANDIA 24 SCRA 477 REYES, J.B.L., July 31, 1968 FACTS - Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the CFI of Cebu, dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for rescission and damages against appellees Scandia, Inc., of Manila and General Engineering Co. of Cebu. Plaintiff avers that on April 17, 1963 he purchased from Scandia, Inc., one ABC Diesel Engine; that he bought the engine for running a rice and corn mill; that defendants had warranted and assured him that all
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Avena spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to avoid loss due to long periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break within 12 months after delivery. - The cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it stopped functioning; the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August 29, 1963; barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor material, so L apitan notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale; he sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. - Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, under RA 3828, amending the Judiciary Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases involving P10,000.00 or less. The CFI dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Lapitan appealed directly to this Court, arguing (1) that rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as he claimed moral and exemplary damages, besides the price of P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual damages, and P1,000.00 attorneys' fees, the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
ISSUE WON CFI had jurisdiction
HELD YES. Ratio. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the CFI would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by theCFI. Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by the CFI. And no cogent reason appears why an action for rescission should be differently treated. We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of pecuniary estimation.
THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V TUTAAN 73 SCRA 189 CONCEPCION; September 30, 1976
Ratio Although the purpose of the action is to recover an amount plus interest which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, yet when said action involves foreclosure of chattel mortgage covering properties valued at m ore than P10,000, the action should be instituted before the CFI. Reasoning In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is P1520 plus interest and costs, and chattel mortgage of properties valued at P15340. It is therefore within the jurisdiction of the CFI. Disposition Petition granted
NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - A complaint was filed before the CFI of Rizal against private respondents Guillermo delos Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo for the recovery of the sum of P1520 plus interest and the sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due as attorney’s fees, and in default of payment thereof, to order the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage (worth P15,340) executed by the said respondents. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party defendants since they were co-makers of the promissory note. - Private respondents, in their answer claims that the loaned sued upon is only one of five loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they were charged usurious interest. They claim that the balance due is only P1260. - For failure to plead, Emperado was declared in default while the case against de la Cruz was dismissed w/o prejudice. - Respondents file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since the petitioner only prays for P1520. It therefore comes under the jurisdiction of the original jurisdiction of the municipal court. Also, since the petitioner prays for foreclosure of chattel in Bulacan, it should have been filed there where the deed of chattel mortgage is located. The CFI dismissed the case. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the city court has jurisdiction
HELD 1. YES.
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SCOPE AND CONSTRUCTION UNIFORM PROCEDURE ACTIONS NATURE Real/personal/mixed HERNANDEZ V. RURAL BANK OF LUCENA 81 SCRA 75 AQUINO, 10 Jan. 1978 FACTS -This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a distressed rural bank, which is under judicial liquidation, to accept a check in payment of a mortgage debt. -Spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000 secured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon City. Three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena bank became a distressed bank. -Before the expiration of the one year term of the loan, or on August 22, 1961, Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by means of a check for P6,000 which was drawn against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Hernandez. As the bank's executive vice-president was not available, the payment was not consummated. At the time that the check was issued, the San Pablo Colleges had a deposit in the
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Avena Lucena bank amounting to P11,890.16. Instead of withdrawing P6,000 from that deposit, the San Pablo Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount to Hernandez. He sent to the bank by registered mail a photostat of the check and a letter inquiring whether the bank would honor the check and when he could go personally to the bank for that purpose. That letter was received by the bank. The executive vicepresident wrote to Hernandez and informed him that the check could not be honored for the time being because of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations. What the vice-president meant was that by reason of the letter of the Central Bank Governor dated June 16, 1961 the operations of the Lucena bank were suspended. The vice-president explained that because there was a run on the bank its assets were exhausted, and so the check sent by Hernandez, which check was drawn against the Lucena bank, could not be accepted. The vicepresident said that when Hernandez presented the check, the Lucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdrawals and that had Hernandez paid cash, his payment would have been accepted. To honor the check would have been tantamount to allowing a depositor (San Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucena bank could not entertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Bank examiners. Payment by check was a disbursement. Apparently, the vice-president did not take the trouble of asking the Central Bank examiners whether the payment by check made by Hernandez could be accepted. Hernandez himself who should have known that the bank was a distressed bank which had suspended operations and which was under the supervision of Central Bank examiners, did not bother to take up his problem with the said examiners. -Hernandez again asked the bank when he could deliver the check. The executive vice-president told Hernandez that the bank could not yet honor the check because it had not resumed its banking operations; that it was awaiting the outcome of a case filed by the bank against the Central Bank; that it might reopen in January, 1962, and that, anyway, the loan would not be due until March 21, 1962. Hernandez sent another letter and enclosed the original check (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank sent by registered mail and special delivery. Letter was returned to Hernandez because the bank's manager was allegedly in Manila. Undeterred, Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank with the request that his mortgage be cancelled.
-Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Lucena bank. To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation of the Lucena bank, the Central Bank, pursuant to section 29 of its charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27 , 1962 for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank. Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative. -Among the accounts receivable of the Lucena bank inventoried by the Central Bank's representative was the account of Hernandez. In a letter dated October 29, 1963 Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had sent to the Lucena bank on April 25, 1962 the check for P6,000. He again requested that his mortgage be cancelled. The Associate Superintendent of Banks in his answer returned the check to Hernandez and informed him that, according to the Lucena bank's executive vicepresident, the check could not be applied to the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was already closed when he received the check. Moreover, the check was drawn against the current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank which was in the process of liquidation. Hernandez was advised to settle his account by paying cash or by means of a check drawn against a bank other than the Lucena bank. -Disregarding that suggestion, Hernandez announced to the Associate Superintendent of Banks in his letter that he was going to deposit the said check in the Court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before December 26, 1963. -Instead of filing a consignation complaint. Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. Hernandez wrote a letter dated January 11, 1964 informing the Associate Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. Copies of that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges. - Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10,000 and attorney's fees of P3,000.
- Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. It contended that there was improper venue because, as the action allegedly involved title to real property, it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the encumbered lots are situated. It further contended that since the Lucena bank is under liquidation and is in the hands of a receiver, its properties and assets are in custodia legis and may, therefore, be reached only by motion or petition in Civil Case No. 50019 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The motion was denied. -Counsel for the Lucena bank on January 30, 1967 offered to compromise the case by stipulating that the Central Bank would apply the check in question to the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check of P6,000 and that, by virtue of that compromise, the complaint and counterclaim would be dismissed.That conditional and equivocal compromise offer fizzled out because the lawyers of Hernandez and the Central Bank did not assent to it. -Lower court ordered the Lucena bank or the Central Bank, as liquidator, to accept and honor the check, to cancel the mortgage, and to pay the Hernandez spouse P25,000 as moral damages (not P10,000 as prayed for in the complaint) plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. -The Lucena bank, the Central Bank and its employee, the receiver, appealed to the SC.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the action of the Hernandez spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated. 2. WON Lucena bank had not lost its juridical personality after it was placed under liquidation thus making it not fall under the jurisdiction of the liquidation court
HELD 1. No it is a personal action. Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies"
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Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage.
residence is at 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City, which apparently is the place where the said lots are located. The plaintiffs did not testify during the trial, So, they have no testimony in the records as to their actual residence.
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That action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of Rule 4, does not involve the title to the mortgage lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. Plaintiffs' title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4). The plaintiffs in their brief confound a real action with an action in rem and a personal action with an action in personam. They argue that their action is not an action in rem and, therefore, it could be brought in a place other than the place where the mortgaged lots are located.
A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is not the same as an action in personam. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person (1 C. J. S. 943-4), Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action, in personam and not necessarily an action in rem. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were residents of San Juan, Batangas, which in their brief they characterize as their legal residence and which appears to be their domicile of origin. On the other hand, it is indicated in the promissory note and mortgage signed by them and in the Torrens title covering the mortgaged lots that their
We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or the place of abode and not necessarily to the legal residence or domicile (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Sarmiento, L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128). (Of course, the actual residence may also in some cases be the legal residence or domicile.). San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their domicile or legal residence but there is no question that 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City is their place of abode or the place where they actually reside. So, the action in this case, which is a personal action to compel the defendants to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage, should have been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their residence as the basis for their choice of venue. The Central Bank points out that the redemption action of the Hernandez spouses would ultimately affect the funds and property of the Lucena Bank. Hence, the liquidation court is the competent tribunal to pass upon the issue as to whether the Hernandez spouses could validly pay their mortgage debt by means of the check of the San Pablo Colleges. 2. No. The liquidation court or the Manila court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Hernandez spouses. At the time the Hernandez spouses filed in 1964 their consignation complaint the Lucena bank was already under liquidation. The Manila court in its order of March 28, 1963 had ordered the officers of the Lucena bank to turn over to the Central Bank or to the receiver, the Superintendent of Banks, all of its assets, properties and papers. Among the assets turned over to the receiver was the outstanding or unpaid account of the Hernandez spouses which appears in the inventory as: "393. Hernandez, Francisco S., 11 Chicago St., Cubao, Q. C. And among the papers or obligations turned over to the receiver was Ledger No. 056 evidencing the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank in the sum of P11,890.16, against which the check
for P6,000 was drawn. It was that check which the Hernandez spouses had issued to pay their m ortgage debt to the Lucena bank. Under section 29 of the Central Bank Act, Republic Act No. 265, when the Monetary Board, upon information submitted by the Superintendent of Banks, finds a bank to be insolvent, it shall forbid the bank to do business and it shall take care of its assets according to law. In that case, if the Monetary Board finds out that the insolvent bank cannot resume business with safety to its creditors, it shall through the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance, praying for the assistance and super vision of the court in the liquidation of the bank's affairs. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Banks, upon order of the Monetary Board and under the supervision of the court, shall convert to money the bank's assets. "Sabido es que uno de los deberes primordiales de un depositario es hacerse cargo inmediatamente de todo el activo y pasivo de un banco" (Luy Lam & Co. vs. Mercantile Bank of China, 71 Phil. 573, 576).
The fact that the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business, that its assets are turned over to the Superintendent of Banks, as a receiver, for conversion into cash, and that its liquidation is undertaken with judicial intervention means that, as far as lawful and practicable, all claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience only one court, if possible should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of Banks and control his operations. In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a full-dress hearing would be required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Hence, it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and should act as umpire and arbitrator in the allowance and disallowance of claims.
The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness.
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Avena DispositioN. WHEREFORE, the trial court judgment is reversed and set aside. The case is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take up with the liquidation court the settlement of their mortgage obligation. Costs against the plaintiffs appellees. SO ORDERED.
In personam/ in rem/ quasi in rem DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS (SUPRA) FACTS Half-brother appointed as administrator, caused the extraterritorial service of summons to half siblings living in Spain to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. De Midgely and Pastor both filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction BUT further alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise have not been made
ON ACTIONS IN REM Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely, her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. -in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident.
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
FACTS
CB V. CA (supra)
Consolidated cases. Issue was payment of the correct docket fee.
regarding
the
RULING ON COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION -It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow the payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. - The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period.
GO V TONG G.R. No. 151942. PANGANIBAN; November 27, 2003 NATURE Petition for review on Certiorari
FACTS - Petitioner Juana Go purchased a cashier’s check of P500K from the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), private respondent Tong. On Go’s instruction, the cashier’s check bore the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ after the name of payee Tong allegedly to insure that Tong would honor his commitment that he would no longer ask for further payments for his interest in the ‘informal business partnership’ which he and she had earlier dissolved. To ng d ep os ite d i t w it h th e w or ds ‘F in al Payment/Quitclaim’ already erased, hence, it was not honored. - Tong’s lawyer requested that the check be replaced with another payable to ‘Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim’ with same amount, the bank charges to be paid by his client-Tong, which was denied by FEBTC. So, Tong filed complaint against FEBTC and Go at RTC Manila. FEBTC and Go answered that erasure was intentional, which justified the dishonor and refusal to replace check.
- Case pending, Go’s son, George, filed a criminal complaint against Tong falsification of the check. The criminal complaint was dismissed. - Tong filed ‘Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint’ which Supplemental Complaint alleged that Sps. Go’s ‘used’ their son to file the criminal complaint against him which caused damages, hence, the prayer for an increase in the amount of MD and ED sought to be recovered from P2.5M to P55M and praying for the award of AD of P58K. RTC granted the motion and admitted the Supplemental Complaint. - Go filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court P500K representing the amount of the check, ‘subject to the condition that it shall remain deposited until the disposition of the case.’ MFRs of FEBTC and Go were denied. - One of the defenses of FEBTC and Go: Tong cannot prosecute his Supplemental Complaint, and the same should be dismissed, unless the corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims of P55M are paid for. - On Feb. 5, 1999, RTC, acting on the verbal motion of Tong’s counsel, allowed the release of petitioners’ P500K deposit to Tong. Later, RTC, in the interest of justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court considers the business climate and the peso crunch prevailing), allowed Tong to first deposit P25K on or before Dec.15, 1999 and P20K every month thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and “only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket fees.” FEBTC and Go filed MFR but was denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUE WON respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private respondent to pay the docket fee on a staggered basis.
HELD NO Ratio Docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory pleadings. However, for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge, staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed. Reasoning An action commences from the filing of the original complaint and the payment of the prescribed docket fees. However, where the filing of
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Avena the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (Sun Insurance Office Ltd. V Asuncion) In other words, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such paym ent. Disposition Petition is DENIED.
HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR G.R. No. 140954 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 12, 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS - Private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane own a 1,399- square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714. Sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00 only, considering the close relations of the parties. After the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of private respondents. - Accordingly, private respondents filed a com plaint for “Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages” against Bertuldo. - Trial ensued but on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence. Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for B ertuldo as his services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Veronico G. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo. - On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground
that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that under Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. It was further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. - Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds: (a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the institution of the case; (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party whom he is representing [this was later on complied with by Atty. Petalcorin]; (c) collectible fees due the court can be charged as lien on the judgment; and (d) considering the lapse of time, the motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners. - In their Rejoinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the correct docket fees. As to the contention that deficiency in payment of docket fees can be made as a lien on the judgment, petitioners argued that the payment of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken. - On January 21, 1999, the trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees. - On January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee, private respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case. Petitioners opposed the reinstatement but on March 22, 1999, the trial court issued the first assailed Order reinstating the case. - On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court having expunged the complaint and nullified all court proceedings, there is no valid case and the complaint should not be admitted for failure to pay the correct docket fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated and no case to proceed as there is no complaint filed. - After the submission of private respondents’ opposition and petitioners’ rejoinder, the trial court
issued the second assailed Order on August 13, 1999, essentially denying petitioners’ manifestation/rejoinder. The trial court held that the issues raised in such manifestation/rejoinder are practically the same as those raised in the amended motion to expunge which had already been passed upon in the Order dated January 21, 1999. Moreover, the trial court observed that the Order dated March 22, 1999 which reinstated the case was not objected to by petitioners within the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999. - On August 25, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court in its third assailed Order dated October 15, 1999. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE WON grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees
HELD NO - The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order dated March 22, 1999 which they never sought reconsideration of, in due time, despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or after more than three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be expunged. - After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court. - It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. It is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else to be done by the trial court
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Avena with respect to the merits of the case. The remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case. - Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint was just and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate assessment because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. They were in good faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of court. - While the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees.
CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED FELIPE V LEUTERIO 91 Phil 482
Bengzon; May 30, 1952 NATURE Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
FACTS: In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines' Sur, first honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of first instance of that province to reverse the award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen into error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection. of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place
ISSUE WON the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition
HELD No. Reasoning.. The Court held: “We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges Disposition. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions
SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188 BARREDO : MARCH 30, 1970 NATURE Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for certiorari, injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
FACTS -Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. -When the school year was about to end the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. The above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as third honor. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place. SANTIAGOs alleged that: (1) Plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; (2) That the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whoserave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; (3) That Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; (4) That Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter,
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Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; (5) That the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; (6) That there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat; (7) That there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; (8) That the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; (9) That petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00; and (10) The petitioners prayed to the Court to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. LC: denied injunction -As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students. The Court then required the respondents to answer the petition within 10 days but respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead on the grounds
(1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss was granted. Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same was dismissed. Petitioners appealed
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ISSUE/S WON the said committee of teachers does falls within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65
HELD: 1. NO (therefore, no cause of action exists) Reasoning. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations; (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end; (3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. - It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. Before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what
that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. - There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Dispositive. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
SAGRADA V NATIONAL COCONUT CORP. G.R. L-3756 LABRADOR; June 30, 1952 NATURE Action to recover piece of property
FACTS - The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name the title was registered before the war. During the Japanese occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation, Taiwan Tekkosho, for the sum of P140,000, and thereupon title thereto issued in its name. After liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession, control, and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national. During the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian, and when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein. The defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land, and actually spent thereon the repairs the sum of P26,898.27. - Plaintiff brought an action in court to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued. - The present action is to recover the reasonable
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rentals from August, 1946, the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it.
1949, is hereby reversed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.
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Avena MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO V BARRIOS 79 PHIL 666 FERIA; December 3, 1947
ISSUE/S 1. WON defendant is liable for rent of the said period
HELD 1. No Ratio If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namley, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil Code.) Reasoning Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the Alien Property Administration. Neither was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law. Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiffappellee herein, but a trustee of then Government of the United States, in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment on February 28, 1948, Alien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiffappellee, the owner, but to the United States Government. Disposition Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August, 1946, to February 28,
NATURE Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of respondents
FACTS - respondents filed a complaint seeking to recover amounts of money due to them from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war. - the ground of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners is that the complaint of the respondents does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the defendants’ debts until after the termination or legal cessation of the moratorium provided in EO No. 32: Enforcement of payment of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations, entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation, that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.
ISSUE/S 1. WON complain of the respondents states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
HELD 1. NO Ratio. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of another, and its essential elements are: 1. legal right of plaintiff, 2. correlative obligation of the defendant, and 3. act or omission of defendant in violation of said legal right. Reasoning. In this case, there was no omission on the part of the defendant in vilation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid, because EO No. 32 said debts are not yet payable or their payment cannot be enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force.
***BUT (not related to topic Cause of Action): even if the complaint of the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action, the SC holds that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do NOT entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. Because judge HAD jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. This Court, in actions of certiorari, can only determine WON the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. So… disposition: Disposition Petition is denied.
DANFOSS V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 143788 CORONA; SEPT. 9 2005 NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
FACTS - On November 5, 1998, respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the RTC of QC, B ranch 80, alleging that: (1) CCC purchased from MINCI two Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter for use in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant. The said purchase is covered by a Purchase Order which indicated the delivery date to be within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the opening of the letter of credit. CCC executed and opened a letter of credit under in favor of DANFOSS INDUSTRIES PTE. LTD; (2) CCC through a letter dated 7 November 1997, reiterated its demand that every delay in the shipment of the two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter will cause substantial losses in its operations and requested for the early work out and the immediate shipment of the frequency converter to avoid further loss to the company; However, on 9 November 1997, DANFOSS, informed the other MINCI through fax transmission, copy furnished plaintiff CCC, that the reason why DANFOSS has delivery problems was that some of the supplied components for the new VLT 5000 series did not meet the agreed quality standard. That means that their factory was
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canvassing for another supplier. And at that moment, there was no clear message when normal production will resume. -Due to this information received, CCC surmised that defendants MINCI and DANFOSS could not be able to deliver the two (2) unit Frequency Converter within the maximum period of ten (10) weeks period from the opening of the Letter of Credit, as one of the conditions in the Purchase Order. Thereafter, no definite commitment was received by plaintiff CCC from defendants MINCI and DANFOSS for the delivery of the two unit Frequency Converter. -By reason of the delay to deliver, CCC informed MINCI in a letter dated 13 November 1997, of the plaintiff’s intention to cancel the said order. As a consequence thereof, CCC has suffered an actual substantial production losses in the amount P8,064,000.00 due to the time lost and delay in the delivery of the said two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter. Likewise, plaintiff CCC was compelled to look for another supplier. - On February 17, 1999, DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. - The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss in its order[4] dated May 28, 1999. - Danfoss filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but it was denied. On appeal to the CA, the latter also denied Danfoss’ petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this appeal.
petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date? -Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides that: Section 1. Grounds – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; -ON CAUSE OF ACTION: A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the same Rules Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.*** -It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.
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ISSUE WON the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.
HELD YES. Ratio. In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Reasoning. After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for damages against
-Disposition. WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed decision of the CA dated February 11, 2000 and its resolution dated June 7, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, is hereby DISMISSED.
MISJOINDER UNION GLASS V SEC (Hofileña) 126 SCRA 32 ESCOLIN; November 28, 1983 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul and set aside the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
FACTS - Carolina Hofileña is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the manufacture of glass and glassware. Since 1967, Pi on ee r G la ss h ad ob ta in ed v ar io us l oa n accommodations from the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP], and also from other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed. The proceeds were used in the construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and the operation of seven silica mining claims owned by the corporation. - As security, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets to the DBP in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its corporate officers over their personal assets. Through the conversion into equity of the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans DBP was able to gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of Pioneer Glass, and to get three regular seats in the corporation's board of directors. - When Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its financial obligations with DBP, it entered into a dacion en pago agreement with the latter, whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the corporation's obligations in the total amount of P59 million. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, which DBP leased and subsequently sold to Union Glass and Container Corporation. - Hofileña filed a complaint before the SEC against the DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass. Hofileña prayed that the dacion en pago be declared null and void and the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken over by DBP particularly the glass plant be returned. - Of the five causes of action pleaded, only the first cause of action concerned Union Glass as transferee and possessor of the glass plant. Union Glass moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit. Respondent Hofileña filed her opposition to said motion, to which Union Glass filed a rejoinder. - SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio Reyes granted the MTD for lack of jurisdiction. However, upon a MFR, he reversed his original order. Unable to secure a reconsideration of the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the Commission En Banc, Union Glass filed this petition in the SC.
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Avena ISSUE 1. WON the SEC has jurisdiction over the case and not the regular courts
HELD 1. NO. Ratio In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: [a] between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c] between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and [d] among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. Reasoning While the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to proceedings before the SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure however is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Since Union Glass has no intra-corporate relationship with Hofileña, it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do so would violate the rule on jurisdiction. Hofileña's complaint against Union Glass for cancellation of the sale of the glass plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court. - Such action, if instituted, shall be suspended to await the final outcome of the SEC case, for the issue of the validity of the dacion en pago posed in the SEC case is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the action against Union Glass. Thus, Hofileña's complaint against the latter can only prosper if final judgment is rendered in SEC Case No. 2035, annulling the dacion en Pago executed in favor of the DBP. NOTE: The jurisdiction of the SEC is delineated, by Sec 5 of PD 902-A: SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative function of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and devices, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) Devices and schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or the stockholders partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission; b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. Disposition Petition GRANTED. Questioned orders of SEC, set aside.
PARTIES Who may be parties JUASING HARDWARE V MENDOZA 115 SCRA 783 GUERRERO; July 30, 1982 NATURE Special Civil Action for certiorari
FACTS - Juasing Hardware, alleging to be a single proprietorship duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines and represented by its manager Ong Bon Yong, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. - In her Answer, defendant stated that she "has no knowledge about plaintiff's legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in the complaint." - After plaintiff had completed the presentation of its evidence and rested its case, defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to Evidence) based on plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue. Defendant contended that Juasing Hardware is a single proprietorship, not a corporation or a partnership duly registered in accordance with law, and therefore is not a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in court. Plaintiff filed an Opposition and moved for the admission of an Amended Complaint.
- Judge Mendoza dismissed the case and denied admission of the Amended Complaint. MFR was likewise denied
ISSUES WON the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case and refused to admit the Amended Complaint
HELD YES Ratio A defect in the designation of the parties may be summarily corrected at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. (Sec. 4, Rule 10, Revised Rules of Court) Reasoning - The complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegations in the body of the com. plaint would show that the suit is brought by such person AS proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware". The descriptive words "doing business as Juasing Hardware' " may be added in the title of the case, as is customarily done. - Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court , Sec. 1. Who may be parties.-Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action - Petitioner is definitely not a natural person; nor is it a juridical person as defined in the New Civil Code of the Philippines. 4 The law does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. - However, the defect of the complaint is merely formal, not substantial. Substitution of the party plaintiff would not constitute a change in the Identity of the parties. - The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that t he real controversies 4 Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
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Avena between the parties are presented and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This rule applies with more reason and with greater force when the amendment sought to be made refers to a mere matter of form and no substantial rights are prejudiced. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concurring] - It should appear in the amended complaint (a copy which was not attached to the petition) that the plaintiff is Ong Hua or Huat, doing business under the tradename, Juasing Hardware, and in the body of the complaint the personal circumstances of Ong Hua should be stated.
Parties in interest CARILLO, GUYOT, SENOY, RISONAR, GONZALES V. CA (DABON AND DABON) GR No. 121165 QUISUMBING; September 26, 2006 NATURE Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals
FACTS - Gonzales filed complaint (action for specific performance) against Manio sps, seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought fr Priscilla Manio. Gonzales said she pd downpayment to Priscilla because she had an SPA from her son Aristotle, the owner of the land. - TC ruled in favor of Gonzales. Gonzales deposited balance w/ the court and filed motion for execution, w/c was w/drawn bec decision wasn’t served on defendants. Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of 12 mn. - TC’s decision became final and executory. - The Dabons, claiming to have bought the land fr Aristotle, filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the TC. They alleged that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons as the real parties in interest. CA issued resolution restraining TC from implementing its decision. Hence, this petition by Gonzales.
ISSUE/S 1. WON there was basis to annul the decision of the TC. 2. WON the Dabons can seek annulment of the TC judgment
HELD 1. YES. Ratio An action should be brought against the real party in interest. The real party in interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit. Reasoning - Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge), Guyot (Clerk of Court), Senoy (Deputy Sheriff), Risonar (Registrar of Deeds), and Gonzales. Carillo, Guyot, Senoy and Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs sought. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case. - Gonzales insists that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC’s judgment bec they’re not parties to the specific performance case. But the Dabons insist that they are parties in interest bec they are buyers, owners and possessors of the contested land. The specific performance case brought by Gonzales to the TC named Priscilla Manio and husband as defendants. However, the lot is owned by Aristotle, their son. Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no interest in the judgment of the TC. Failure to implead Aristotle Manio renders the proceedings in the specific performance case null and void. 2. YES. Ratio A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove that the judgment was obtained by fraud and he would be adversely affected thereby. Reasoning Although the Dabons are not parties to the specific performance case, any finding of extrinsic fraud would adversely affect their ownership and could be basis of annulment of judgment. In this case, Gonzales knew of the sale of lot by Aristotle Manio to the Dabons yet Gonzales did not include the Dabons in her petition. This is extrinsic fraud. Disposition Petition is denied.
DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, et al. v. PCGG, EXEC. SEC. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR. & PCGG CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS 225 SCRA 568
BELLOSILLO/ August 24, 1993 NATURE : Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale by Christie’s (of NY) of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank.
FACTS: - Pres. Aquino, through Exec. Sec. Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing the auction sale of 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. - According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the 82 Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in 71 cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. - PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote Pres. Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COAudit Chairman Domingo (that the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. - Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued
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Avena a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence, this petition. - After the oral arguments of the parties, the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks was DENIED on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. - The sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. - On motion of petitioners, 12 more were joined as additional petitioners and Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents.
ISSUE: WON the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
HELD: NO. The paintings and silverware, which were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum (the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof.) - The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties - the true owners thereof -whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
REASONING :
- Dumlao v. Comelec: The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: t hat the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy ; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity ; and, that the decision on th e constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. - SC: we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. (Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. L-29341) - This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs.
- The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest (House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-75287) - Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. - Tañada v. Tuvera : There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works) when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
-AS regards Mandamus: it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. -In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus. -As regards Taxpayer’s Suit: Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. - A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. - -Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED. OPOSA V FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 DAVIDE JR; JULY 30, 1993 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari of the dismissal order
FACTS The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
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Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said r es ou rc e b ut a re " so n um er ou s t ha t i t i s impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: ". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements." and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." - The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. -Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim —
that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. -Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
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ISSUE WON Civil Case No. 90-777 is a class suit
HELD YES. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since t he p ar tie s ar e s o n um er ou s, i t b ec om es impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. -This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. Dispositive Petition granted. Challenged order set aside.
KINDS OF PARTIES Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties ARCELONA V. CA (FARNACIO) G.R. No. 102900 PANGANIBAN; Oct. 2, 1997 NATURE Petition for review
FACTS -Olanday, et al. (petitioners) are co-owners proindiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. -A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. -Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond. -After the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al. -Three days thereafter, Farnacio instituted Civil Case for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et al., before Respondent Regional Trial Court. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond. -RTC ruled in favor of Farnacio -IAC affirmed with slight modification -SC sustained IAC -Petitioners filed with CA a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment. CA said to implead RTC -Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this petition for review
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Avena ISSUES 1. WON a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside from extrinsic fraud? 2. WON all the co-owners pro-indiviso of a real property indispensable parties?
HELD 1. YES. Ratio. Under the present procedure, aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud.' (I Moran's Rules of Court 1950 Ed., p. 697, citing Anuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921). Reason of public policy which favors the stability of judicial decisions are (sic) mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors (Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25). Reasoning Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Its exercise must strictly comply with the legal requisites; otherwise, a challenge on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. Such jurisdiction normally refers to jurisdiction over the subject.
2. YES. Ratio Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded. Reasoning As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not p arties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits b y requiring the person asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as codefendants, all persons standing in the same
position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Disposition PETITION GRANTED.
Disposition PETITION DENIED.
CEREZO V. TUAZON G.R. No. 141538 CARPIO; March 23, 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS -Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle. -tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda"). -Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda, an indispensable party. Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda.
ISSUE 1. WON Fronda is an indispensable party
HELD 1.NO. Ratio COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible Reasoning Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not
Permissive Joinder FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS 144 SCRA 377 FERIA; September 24,1986 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the order of the RTC of Baguio
FACTS -Petitioner Remedio Flores filed a complaint with the RTC of Baguio: his first cause of action was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982. -On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). -It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. -At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. -RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. -Petitioner appealed by certiorari to the SC
ISSUE
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Avena WON the application of the totality rule in Sec 33(1) 5 of BP 129 and Section 11 6 of the interim rules is subject to permissive joinder of parties under Sec 6 7 of Rule 3
HELD Petitioner maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. -Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows: Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test, and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. -This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and present rules in 5
Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ... 6
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. 7
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in aconnection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. -There is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant joined in a single complaint. -Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.” As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant. -Under the present law, the totality rule is applied
also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3 . -In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test . Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. -In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction . Disposition The order appealed from is affirmed.
Class suit NEWSWEEK V IAC (NFSPI et. al.) 142 SCRA 171 FERIA; May 30, 1986 NATURE Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction
FACTS - Petitioner, NEWSWEEK, Inc. seeks to annul the decision of the IAC sustaining the Order of the CFI Bacolod City. CFI denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss complaint for libel. (Question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence.) - Initial complaint: Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed in their own
behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, a ga ins t p et it io ne r an d tw o o f petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. - It was alleged that they committed libel by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the Feb 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek . It supposedly portrayed their island as a place dominated by big landowners who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers, but also brutalized and killed them. - Complainants therein alleged that said article,
taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts. - They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine. - NEWSWEEK filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that --(1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
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Avena - NO CAUSE OF ACTION because no allegation that anything contained in the article regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
ISSUE 1. WON respondents failed to state a cause of action 2. WON this case is a class suit
HELD 1. YES Ratio Defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of the individual defamed. It is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. 2. NO Ratio It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community . They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
CLASS SUIT - Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing
as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be. Disposition The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No. 15812 of the CFI Negros Occidental is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,INC. 00 SCRA 00 Tinga, September 30, 2005 NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the MIAA assailing the Decision of the CA which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings.
FACTS -The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration, operation, m an ag em en t, c on tr ol , m ai nte na nc e an d development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the NAIA. The CAA entered into individual lease contracts with its employees for the lease of portions of a 4-hectare lot situated in Rivera Village, Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a 25-year period to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20 per annum as rental. - Thereafter, EO 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903), creating MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA. - MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent homeowners association, purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016. The MIAA denied the request, claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related activities. - Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA) with the RTC of Pasay. The petition sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned and to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the
property in favor of the members of the homeowners association. - After the preliminary, the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court held, among others, that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as respondent homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired. - Upon appeal, the CA annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from evicting the members of Rivera Village Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. The CA ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek the registration of the titles to the land in its name. - MIAA argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by respondent shows that it was only the board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the members thereof, which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the suit.
ISSUE WON the petition filed by respondent with the trial court states a cause of action against petitioner/ WON respondent has personality to sue
HELD YES The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
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interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr., upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "All necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related acts necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the Association." Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the requisites therefor not being present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one party. In Board of Optometry v. Colet, it was held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process. There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit brought by the homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the complaint. Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly. Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. As correctly noted by the CA, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the association.
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Disposition
The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The civil case in the RTC of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.
DEL CASTILLO VS. JAYMALIN, ET AL. 112 SCRA 629 MELENCIO-HERRERA, March 17, 1982 NATURE Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI which dismiss the case for Damages due to the death of plaintiff
FACTS 1960: Deaf-mute Mario del Castillo fell upon alighting the bus of the respondents and died. 1962: Action for recovery of damages was filed by Severo del Castillo, the father of the victim, against the driver, conductor, and the owner c ompanies. 1966: Severo died. Counsel for Motion for Annulment Proceedings after having learned that plaintiff Severo already died without resting his case. Court ordered plaintiff’s counsel to verify existence of heirs willing to be substituted as parties-plaintiffs. Allegedly, a “Deed of Assignment” was executed by Severo in favor of his son-in-law Wenceslao Haloc of all his rights in the proceedings in 1960 so plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, substituting Wenceslao as party-plaintiff. Amended Complaint was admitted by the court. CFI: dismissed original and amended complaints due to the death of Severo. Wenceslao had no personality to continue the case, not being a heir of Severo.
ISSUE 1. WON the complaint should be dismissed due to the death of the plaintiff, even if he had already assigned his rights before he died 2. WON damages should have been awarded
HELD 1. NO Ratio. Where an assignable right has been transferred before action brought, the proceeding ought to be instituted in the name of the assignee; and where an assignment is effected pendente lite, it is proper to have the assignee substituted for the original plaintiff. If such substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the right of action should not be brought to the attention of the court, the original plaintiff, if successful in the litigation, would
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hold the fruits of the action as a sort of trustee for the use and benefit of his assignee. Reasoning. This is not a case where the provisions of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on "death of a party" are applicable. Rather, it is a situation where plaintiff, while alive, had assigned his rights to another, in which case, the proper procedure would have been for the transferee to have been substituted for the transferor as plaintiff. The rights of Severo to claim damages for his son were transferable. Severo had transferred his rights as plaintiff to Wenceslao Haloc but after the assignment the case continued in Severo's name and there was no immediate and formal substitution of party plaintiff. This is but a formality, however, and the fact remains that, after the assignment, the substantial plaintiff and real party in interest became Haloc, with Severo as a sort of trustee of whatever fruits the litigation would bring.
purchase price. 10 years after the execution of said document, Gojo filed a case with the CFI against Goyala by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. Gojo alleged that the period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in the Registry of Property, it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to that effect. -Goyala filed an answer to the petition, alleging that they had obtained a cash loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that to guarantee payment, Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on the parcel of land in question. Hence, although the deed was executed in the form of a pacto de retro sale, the true intention of the parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure payment. Goyala further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. By way of counterclaim, Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the document of mortgage be declared so, and not a pacto de retro sale. He further prayed for P1800 per annum until the final termination of the case for the fruits of said property and in the case that the instrument be deemed a true pacto de retro sale, that petitioner be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of respondents in accordance with A1606CC. -Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named defendant, Antonina, had died, prompting the TC to issue an order requiring counsel for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint substituting Antonina with one of her successors in interest as party defendants. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a copy of the said TC order, said appellant failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint required of him. A ppellant opposed the motion but the TC dismissed the complaint. -Appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said appellee’s counterclaim, which was granted by the TC, which further required Goyala to submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court. TC rendered favorable judgment on appellee’s counterclaim, declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordering Gojo to receive the P810 and to restore possession to the defendants and allowing them to redeem the same.
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2. YES Reasoning. Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code. Failure to exercise extraordinary care for the safety of its passengers even after being apprised of the fact that the victim was a deaf-mute. Should have been remanded to CA for determination of amount of damages but due to pendency of case for 13 years + put an end to controversy, Court imposed P12,000 for death of victim, plus P2,000 atty’s fees Disposition. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and defendants hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay Wenceslao Haloc, the amount of P12,000.00 as damages for death, without interest, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. No costs. SO ORDERED.
GOJO V GOYALA 35 SCRA 557 Barredo, J.: Oct. 30, 1970 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon
FACTS -Appellee Segundo Goyala, with his now deceased wife Antonina sold to Gojo a 2.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land for P750 by a “Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale”, the repurchase to be made within one year, as stated in the deed. The deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in addition to the
-Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
ISSUES Parties: Re contractual money claims / Dismissal by claimant / Compulsory counterclaim/ Answer: Defenses WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s counterclaim
HELD YES. The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. -While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one, as in this case. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3, the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. In Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed b y Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside
VENUE
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Avena PEOPLE v. MAYOR PABLO SOLA (page 8) FACTS -Bodies found in Mayor Sola’s hacienda. Information filed against Mayor, Chief of Police and other accused. Accused were granted bail. Witnesses fear for their lives because the trial was to be held near the town where the accused were powerful. Also, the witnesses had been receiving threats on their lives. Relevance: Change in venue
ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." -People v. Gutierrez, J.B.L. Reyes: "…TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO PROCEED TO TRIAL IN A LOCALITY WHERE ITS WITNESSES WILL NOT BE AT LIBERTY TO REVEAL WHAT THEY KNOW IS TO MAKE A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, AND TO BETRAY THE VERY PURPOSE FOR WHICH COURTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED." -The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. -there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. -The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue
TIME, INC. vs. REYES 39 SCRA 303 REYES, J.B.L.; May 31, 1971 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued and to prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said civil case.
FACTS
- Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile (Mayor of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs, respectively, with offices in the City of Manila) filed a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to recover from the herein petitioner damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia", wherein the defendants allegedly impute to plaintiffs the commission of the crimes of graft and corruption and nepotism. - Petitioner Time, Inc., is an American corporation with principal offices at Rockefeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine.
PROCEDURE - Villegas and Enrile filed a Motion for leave to take the depositions "of Mr. Anthony Gonzales, Time-life International", and "Mr. Cesar B. Enriquez, Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in connection with the activities and operations in the Philippines of the petitioner. It was granted by Judge Reyes and he also issued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time, Inc. - Time Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363 (According to this law, 'The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations. . .where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published).
- Respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered that the grounds relied upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable. - Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment; The respondent judge issued an order re affirming the previous order of deferment for the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against nonresident defendants, and because questions involving harrasments and inconvenience, as well as
disruption of public service do not appear indubitable . . ." - Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Subject of the petition: The orders for the taking of the said depositions, for deferring determination of the motion to dismiss, and for re affirming the deferment, and the writ of attachment are sought to be annulled in the petition.)
ISSUES 1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication; 2. If it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition; and
HELD 1. No. The proper venue is the CFI of Manila. Ratio: Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, actions for damages by public officials for libelous publications against them can only be filed in the courts of first instance of the city or province where the offended functionary held office at the time of the commission of the offense, in case the libelous article was first printed or published outside the Philippines. Reasoning: a. (Intent of the law) The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was fixed under Republic Act No. 4363, pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the public service when the offended party is a public officer, by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the discharge of his duties. b. (Textual and strict interpretation of the law) The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No 4363 should be
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deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here. 2. Yes. Ratio: The action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is in excess of jurisdiction and correctible by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate Court, even before trial on the merits is had. Reasoning It would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court had no jurisdiction.
Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other venues." - In an order, the RTC denied petitioner's MTD and required it to file an answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. - PILTEL filed a MFR, through registered mail, of the order of the trial court. In its subsequent order, TC denied the MFR. - Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. - CA saw no merit in the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the TC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion.
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DISPOSITION The writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case No. 10403; and its orders issued in connection therewith are hereby annulled and set aside. Respondent court is further commanded to desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No. 10403 aforesaid. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court is made permanent.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE V TECSON 00 SCRA 00 VITUGJ; May 7, 2004 NATURE Special civil action of certiorari
FACTS - On various dates in 1996, Delfino C. Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL), which applications were each approved and covered, by six mobiline service agreements. - On 05 April 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, a complaint against petitioner for a "Sum of Money and Damages." Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue, citing a common provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that "Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila.
ISSUE/S WON parties may stipulate on the venue of any litigation between them
HELD YES Ratio Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing of the suit. Reasoning. The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the "Mobile Service Agreement," a standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers, apparently accepted and signed by respondent. The added stipulation that the subscriber "expressly waives any other venue" should indicate, clearly enough, the intent of the parties to consider the venue stipulation as being preclusive in character. The appellate court, however, would appear to anchor its decision on the thesis that the subscription agreement, being a mere contract of adhesion, does not bind respondent on the venue stipulation. But such an agreement is not per se inefficacious. The rule instead is that, should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it. If, however, the stipulations are not obscure, but are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling.
A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully and not selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception. Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
PLEADINGS In General: Manner of making allegations in pleadings Actionable document SANTIAGO VS DE LOS SANTOS 61 SCRA 146 FERNANDO; November 22, 1974 FACTS Santiago applied for registration of a parcel of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. The application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita V. de los Santos on the ground that the property applied for is part of the public domain. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the application were filed by the oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos and the Director of Forestry which motions are principally based on the allegation that the property applied for is a portion of the public domain which was leased to Mrs. Pacita de los Santos under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305. The motion to dismiss was granted based on the documents attached to their motion by Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. In this appeal, Santiago seeks for the decision to be reversed. His new counsel, the firm of Luna and Manalo, is thorough and comprehensive.
ISSUE WON the order of the lower court should be reversed.
HELD NO. Even the most cursory reading of the order of dismissal can lead to no other conclusion except that it should be affirmed. Notwithstanding the vigor with which the appeal is being prosecuted by new counsel, it cannot suffice for a reversal. The infirmity of the case is incurable.
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The pleading left no choice to the then Judge Muñoz Palma except to dismiss the case, which wrote: “... the portion of the said parcel of land subject of this registration which was claimed as part of the public forest has already been released by the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes as evidenced by its order dated August 10, 1961.” Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public d omain. Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive and binding. It would clearly appear that Santiago could not in truth show that there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner It is a familiar doctrine," according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Joe's Radio & Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 5 "that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not ... ." 6 Even if there had been a full hearing on the case, therefore, the result would not have been any different. There was no choice then for the lower court except to dismiss the complaint. The present counsel of Santiago tries to extricate himself from a predicament of his own making by arguing that the motion to dismiss of Pacita de los Santos is not entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her and that she has no interest to oppose the application although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a pasture lease agreement in her favor. But in the motion to dismiss of de los Santos, it was alleged that the son of Santiago, Juanito was one time the lessee of the timber area sought to be registered by Santiago.
There was no denial of such allegation. It is quite obvious then that the facts, no less than the law, call for precisely the conclusion reached by the then Judge Muñoz Palma. "Rules of pleading are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. Wh at is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. Technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." 13 Well could Justice Cardozo observe: "A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity."
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Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 17, 1961 of the then Judge Muñoz Palma is affirmed. Costs against appellant Luis R. Santiago
The Claim Counterclaim/cross-claim answer
after
NAMARCO v. FEDERACION 49 SCRA 238 ANTONIO; January 31, 1972 NATURE Appeal by defendantfrom a decision of the Court of First Instance ordering said defendant to pay the plaintiff
FACTS - NAMARCO is a GOCC organized and existing under and by virtue of RA 1345. FEDERATION is a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. - They entered into a Contract of Sale which says that the Management of NAMARCO was authorized to import items worth $2,001,031. FEDERATION deposited P200,000 as partial payment and the balance shall be paid on cash basis upon delivery of
the duly indorsed negotiable shipping document covering the same and - To insure payment, the NAMARCO accepted three domestic letters of credit for the account of the FEDERATION. - The FEDERATION and some of its members filed a complaint against the NAMARCO for specific performance and damages, alleging that after the NAMARCO had delivered a great portion of the goods listed in the Contract of Sale, it refused to deliver the other goods mentioned in the said contract. - CFI ordered the NAMARCO to specifically perform its obligation in the Contract of Sale, by delivering to the FEDERATION the undelivered goods. - SC: The Contract of Sale was valid." - NAMARCO: FEDERATION'S act or omission in refusing to satisfy the former's valid, just and demandable claim has compelled it to file the instant action; and praying that the FEDERATION be ordered to pay the NAMARCO the costs of merchandise plus damages. - FEDERATION moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action alleged therein is barred forever, pursuant to section 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. In support thereof, the FEDERATION alleged it filed a case for specific performance to enforce compliance with the contract of sale; that said contract is also the basis NAMARCO's present complaint; that when NAMARCO filed its answer to the complaint, it did not set up any counterclaim therein; that the CFI promulgated the decision in said case ordering, among others, the NAMARCO to specifically perform its obligation under the contract of sale by delivering to the FEDERATION the goods subject-matter of the contract as are involved in the complaint. - NAMARCO opposed the motion to dismiss contending that its claim for the recovery of the cost of merchandise delivered to the FEDERATION is not necessarily connected for specific performance and, therefore, does not fall under the category of compulsory counterclaim; that NAMARCO's failure to set it up as a counterclaim in its answer does not constitute res judicata; that the deliveries of the merchandise were effected through the fault or negligence of one of its personnel, Juan T. Arive, who was administratively charged therefor, found guilty and accordingly dismissed.; that the present claim is not necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 42684, as the same evidence would not support or refute both.
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Avena - The FEDERATION filed a rejoinder reiterating that the requirements on the rule of compulsory counterclaim are present; that the first requirement that the counterclaim arises out of or is necessarily connected with the contract of sale subject-matter of NAMARCO's cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint itself. - LC issued an order holding "in abeyance" action on the motion to dismiss till after the trial on the merits. - FEDERATION filed its answer to the NAMARCO's complaint admitting some material averments of the complaint, specifically denying other allegations and consistently with its position averred as affirmative defense that NAMARCO's failure to assert its claim against the FEDERATION before judgment in Civil Case No. 42684 on October 15, 1960 constituted a bar to the institution of the present action. By way of counterclaim, the FEDERATION sought P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation, as well as P17,000.00 as damages for improper issuance of a writ of attachment which writ, evidently had been issued earlier by the court. - NAMARCO filed an answer to the FEDERATION'S counterclaim specifically denying the material averments thereof and maintaining that the present action is not barred by Civil Case No. 42684.
ISSUE WON this action of NAMARCO for the collection of the payment of the merchandise delivered to, but not yet paid by, the FEDERATION, is already barred as a consequence of the failure of NAMARCO to set it up as a counterclaim in the previous case, (Civil Case No. 42684).
HELD - A counterclaim has been held to be compulsory if there is a logical relationship between it and the main claim. - But even assuming for the nonce that NAMARCO's present claim is logically related to the claim of the FEDERATION in the previous case, NAMARCO's claim having accrued or matured after the service of its answer in the earlier case is in the nature of an afteracquired counterclaim which under the rules is not barred even if it is not set up in the previous case as a counterclaim. An after-acquired counterclaim, is one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that a counterclaim is compulsory and must be asserted if it arises out of the same transaction as the opposing party's claim.
- The party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the time he serves his pleading. This is derived from the language in the rule limiting its application to claims the pleader has 'at the time of serving the pleading.' A counterclaim acquired by defendant after he has answered will not be considered compulsory, even if it arises out of the same transaction as does plaintiff's claim. Similarly, a counterclaim acquired by plaintiff after he has replied to a counterclaim by defendant is not compulsory under Rule 13(a). However, if a party should acquire a matured counterclaim after he has pleaded, Rule 13(e) provides that he may obtain the court's permission to include it in a supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d)." - A counterclaim may be asserted under Rule 13(e) only by leave of court, which usually will be granted in order to enable the parties to litigate all the claims that they have against each other at one time thereby avoiding multiple actions. However, Rule 13, (e) is permissive in character. An after-acquired counterclaim, even if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, need not be pleaded supplementally; the after-acquired claim is not considered a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) and a failure to interpose it will not bar its assertion a later suit. - The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filling the answer, though not at the commencement of the action for under Section 3 of the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the time" against the posing party. That phrase can only have reference to the time of the answer. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer. This construction is not only explicit from the language of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the aforecited sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which provides that "a counterclaim . . . which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim . . . by supplemental pleading before judgment." - Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff's suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation. However such claim may with the court's permission be
included in the same case by way of supplemental pleading before judgment under Section 4 of former Rule 10 of the Rules (now Sec. 9 Rule 6). And the same may be allowed unless the case has progressed so far that it may be inconvenient or confusing to allow the additional claim to be pleaded. - We therefore rule that NAMARCO's present action, is not barred by its failure to assert it as a counterclaim the previous case. BARREDO, dissenting: - Namarco's present claim arise out of or was necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Federation's action in Civil Case No 42684 within the contemplation of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. - It was the element of time herein involved that somehow induced me at the beginning to be inclined, albeit reluctantly, to sustain Namarco's position in this appeal. At the precise time that Namarco filed its answer in Civil Case No. 42684, it w as not yet certain that the Federation would not pay or that payment of its sight drafts would not be effected by the bank. In other words, from that point of view, Namarco's cause of action had not yet matured then. It is also clear, however, that said cause of action accrued before judgment was rendered by the trial court. - Under Section 4 of Rule 10 of the old rules, now Section 9 of Rule 6, a counterclaim which either matured or was acquired by a defendant after serving his answer may be set up in a supplemental pleading later before judgment. Since this may be done or not in the case of counterclaims not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, the question that arises is, must it have to be done in the case of counterclaims that do arise from the same transaction or occurrence, such that if not interposed, they must be deemed barred? - I agree that the Court rule for the present that for a counterclaim to be considered as barred, under the above provisions, the cause of action thereof must have already accrued at the time the answer is filed by the defendant, although I, for one, would prefer supplemental counterclaims, the defendant should just the same be compelled to allege it in such a supplemental pleading in those cases where his claim accrues before trial has began or at the latest, before the defendant has started presenting his evidence. Otherwise stated, my position is that the claim of Namarco in this case did arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject
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Avena matter of the Federation's anterior action, but inasmuch as, on the hypothesis that the contract were binding, the formers' cause of action could not have been considered as already matured when it filed its answer, there would have been no need for it to file this counterclaim. - The whole trouble with Namarco's pose in this a appeal lies, however, in the fact that in its answer to the Federation's complaint, it pleaded the defense of illegality or nullity of the contract. From that point of view, it was immaterial to Namarco's recovery of the purchase price of goods it had already delivered under the contract that there was in said contract any term for the payment thereof. As far as Namarco was concerned, those goods had been delivered illegally and should have been immediately returned unless their value had been paid for, (Article 1412 (2), Civil Code) or Namarco was in pari delicto (Article 1411, id). Such being the case, it is quite evident that when Namarco filed its answer to the Federation's action, its cause of action for the recovery of the price of the delivered goods was already existing and could have been the subject of a counterclaim. This means that as of the time Namarco filed its answer contesting the legality or validity of the contract, it was incumbent upon it to then and there seek recovery of whatever it had delivered thereunder.
Amended pleadings
and
Supplemental
YOUNG VS SPOUSES SY GR No. 157745 AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, September 26, 2006 NATURE Consolidated petitions for review on Certiorari
FACTS - Petitioner filed a complaint for nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial settlement, mortgage, foreclosure sale, and tax declaration against respondents on May 20, 2000. The complained alleged that the questioned partition which was executed by her mother was unenforceable since at the time of the execution the petitioner was only 15 years old and that no court approval was secured. Her mother obtained a loan from the spouses respondents and used the property
as security (mortgage). Due to non-payment the property was foreclosed and sold to respondents as highest bidders. The deed of sale has been filed with the Register of Deed and the respondents obtained n their name a tax declaration over the property. - Petitioner subsequently filed with the same RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint to invoke her right to exercise legal redemption over the property. This supplemental motion was denied by the RTC on December 28, 2000. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the cause of action in the Supplemental complaint is entirely different from the original complaint, that the said complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies, and that, at any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still the same. Petitioner filed this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC. - With regard the original action, the RTC dismissed the case upon motion of the respondents on the ground of failure to prosecute. Apparently, the petitioner had asked for postponements opening the door for a claim by the respondents of non-suit. (This is where it becomes more interesting) Petitioner filed two appeals with the CA. Both appeals raised essentially the same issues. One of the appeals an ordinary appeal and the other is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed four months after the first. The CA ruled in favor of the petitioner under the ordinary appeal but a motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and the CA has yet to rule on this reconsideration motion. The other appeal was dismissed on the ground that judgment of the RTC can only be appealed via an ordinary appeal and not by certiorari. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC.
ISSUE/S 1 . W ON t he d en ia l o f t he M ot ion t o a dm it supplemental Complaint is valid 2. WON the dismissal of the petition for certiorari with regard the original action is proper
HELD 1. No. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplement. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and
that the issues jpined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. In this case, the consolidation of the title over the property in the name of the respondent, Manuel Sy, and the issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from exercising the right of legal redemption, are new matters that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. The relief prayd for in the Supplemental complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal redemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the nullification. The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. Hence petitioner’s cause of action for legal redemption as embodied in the supplemental complaint stems directly from and is an extension of her rights as co-owner of the property subject of the complaint. Also as petitioner correctly pointed out, even if the trial court decides in her favor, the redemption period would have lapsed already and would not form part of the decision since it is not prayed for, much less alleged in the original complaint. In such a case, the respondents could oppose the exercise since it would not have been included in the decision over the original complaint. 2. Yes. The petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping consists of filling multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, the the purpose of obtaining a favorably judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. The decision of the RTC is dismissing the case is a final order and the proper remedy against such final order is appeal and not certiorari. As a general rule, a writ of certiorari sill not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. hence the special civil
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action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. This is a firm judicial policy.
NATURE
third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction that the third-party complaint was filed after the passage of RA 3828 conferring original jurisdiction on the Municipal Court in civil cases involving not more than P10,000.00, and that the third-party complaint refers to a claim of only P6,000.00 - December 3, 1963 > TC ordered surety to pay the Republic P5,000, with interest - CA: Surety interposed its appeal from the order dismissing its third-party complaint and from the decision ordering it to pay the Republic the amount of P5,000, contending that the trial court erred in (1) not declaring itself without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, and (2) dismissing the third-party complaint. But it certified the case to SC pursuant to Sec 2 Article VIII of the Constitution and Sec 17(3) of RA 296 where jurisdiction of TC is in issue
FACTS
ISSUES
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Avena Disposition Petition for the non-suit is denied. Petition for the admission of the supplemental order is granted. The trial court is directed to admit said complaint.
Third Party Complaint, etc. REPUBLIC V CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY 26 SCRA 741 CASTRO; October 26, 1968
- October 23, 1959 > Republic of the Philippines filed suit against the Central Surety & Insurance Company and Mangoba, manager of the bond department stating that Po Kee Kam who was the subject of deportation proceedings in whom the bond was made in favor of, did not appear in such proceedings despite notice to the Surety. This constituted a violation of the conditions of the bond causing the forfeiture of the bond made by the Surety in favor of the government. Republic claims P5,000 (amount of bond) and P1,000 (atty’s fees) - July 5, 1963 > Surety filed its answer: (1) that its bond cannot be made liable beyond the amount of P5,000; (2) that it is not liable for attorney's fees in the absence of any stipulation to that effect; (3) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case as the amount involved is only P5,000; and (4) that the Republic has no cause of action. - July 30, 1963 > Surety filed a third-party complaint, with leave of court, against Po Kee Kam and Tony Go alleging that for consideration of the bond, the thirdparty defendants, executed an indemnity agreement in favor of the Surety to indemnify it for damage, loss, expenses etc and that in the event judgment is rendered against it, the third party defendants be ordered to reimburse - September 7, 1963 > the third-party defendants answer: defense that the case is premature as the main case has not yet been terminated. - December 2, 1963 > upon verbal motion of the third party defendants, the trial court dismissed the
1. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the main action 2. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the thirdparty complaint
HELD 1. YES - Even though the total amount involved is only P6,000 (P5,000 under the bond and P1,000 as attorney's fees) and a court of first instance is vested with jurisdiction only over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, exceeds P10,000, pursuant to section 44 of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act 3828 which took effect on June 22, 1963, the present action having been filed on June 20, 1963 (two days before the effectivity of Republic Act 3828 which broadened the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts to include cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, does not exceed P10,000) it is cannot be argued that the court's jurisdiction over the case was lost on June 22, 1963, when Republic Act 3828 took effect, and therefore the case should have been remanded to the municipal court. - It is not disputed that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter on June 20, 1963 when the complaint was filed with it. It is of no moment that summons was served and that the case was heard and decided after the effectivity of Republic Act 3828, because the rule is firmly
entrenched in our law that jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated 2. YES - It is true that the third-party complaint was filed after the effectivity date of RA3828. It is likewise true that the demand therein made does not exceed P10,000, and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance if it were an independent action. But the third-party complaint is an ancillary suit which depends on the jurisdiction of the court over the main action. Since the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the complaint, it necessarily follows that it likewise had jurisdiction over the third-party complaint which is but an incident thereof. This must be so because jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and connected therewith. A contrary rule would result in "split jurisdiction" which is not favored, and in multiplicity of suits, a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., et al. vs. CIR, et al: The third-party complaint is but a continuation of the main action, its purpose being merely to seek "contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim." (Rule 6, See. 12.) The aim is to avoid the actions which should be tried together to save the time and cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from identical or similar evidence, and to do away with the serious handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against him and a judgment in his favor against the third party defendant. Petitioners urge that a rule similar to the rule on counterclaim be adopted. But a third-party complaint cannot be likened to a counterclaim which must be within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case, because unlike a third-party complaint, a counterclaim "need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim itself exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the opposing party's claim" (Rule 6, Sec. 6). A third-party complaint may likewise be likened to a cross claim under Rule 9, section 5. ... The principle is at once apparent, namely, that where an action is ancillary to a main action over which a court has jurisdiction, no independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to take cognizance of the ancillary action. Disposition the order dated December 2, 1963 dismissing the third-party complaint is set aside; the decision dated December 3, 1963 is modified in the sense that the third-party defendants are hereby
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ordered to pay to the Surety whatever sums the latter will pay to the Republic by virtue of the judgment appealed from.
action, called the 3rd (fourth, etc.) – party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.” Reasoning Purpose of the rule: permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a 3 rd-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a 3rd-party complaint against a 3 rd-party rests in the discretion of the trial court. The 3 rd-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint. - Prerequisite to the exercise of right: some substantive basis for a 3 rd-party claim is found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. Bringing of a 3 rd-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to plaintiff, defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the 3 rd-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction. - The defendant may implead another as 3 rd-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the 3 rd-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the 3 rd-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant. - There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the 3 rd-party defendant. - Capayas v. CFI: Court made out the ff tests: (1) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff’s claim is based; or whether the 3rd-party claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiff’s claim; (2) whether the 3 rd-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the 3 rd-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction; and (3) whether the 3 rd-party defendant may assert any defenses which the 3rd-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiff’s claim. - 3rd-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery against the 3 rdparty defendant; sufficient that pleadings show
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Avena ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V CA (MONARK EQUIPMENT) 00 SCRA 00 CALLEJO; May 17, 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA
FACTS - Asian contruction leased from Monark Equipment several pieces of equipment which it failed to pay for, despite demands. Monark then filed in the RTC an action to recover a sum of money amounting to P5 million plus 12% interest. Asian filed a motion to file and admit answer with 3 rd party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corp. Asian, although admitting the its indebtedness to Monark, claimed that it used the leased equipment to perform services in favor of Becthel, which in turn failed to pay Asian for the same. Asian claims that it needs to implead Becthel for “contribution, indemnity, subrogation, or other reliefs to off-set or to pay the amount of money” claimed by Monark. Monark in turn filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues raised. - RTC: Motion of Asian for leave to file a 3 rd part complaint was denied, but motion of Monark for summary judgment granted (RTC considered this as motion for judgment on the pleadings). Judgment ordered Asian to pay Monark P5 million plus interest - Asian appealed to CA. CA affirmed, sustaining the disallowance of the 3 rd party complaint on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not arise out of the same transaction on which Monark’s claim was based. MFR was also denied.
ISSUE/S 1. WON a 3rd-party complaint is proper 2. WON judgment on the pleadings is proper
HELD 1. NO Ratio Section 11, Rule 6 provides: “ 3rd (fourth, etc.) party complaint . – A 3 rd (fourth, etc.) – party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the 3 rd-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the 3 rd-party complaint must be examined. A 3 rd-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the 3 rd-party defendant. - In this case, the claims of Monark against Asian arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and Asian where the equipment leased from Monark was used by the petitioner. There is no showing in the proposed 3 rdparty complaint that Becthel knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by Asian for the said project - fact that Asian used the equipment it leased from Monark in connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a 3rd-party complaint against the latter. There is no causal connection between the claim of Monark, and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to Asian after the completion of the project. 2. YES Ratio Section 1, Rule 34: “ Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or, otherwise, admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.” Reasoning The denial of the petitioner’s motion with leave to file a third-party complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a separate complaint against the latter. - Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability for the principal claim of the respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint, the trial court did not err in rendering judgment on the pleadings against it. Disposition Petition is denied.
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM/CROSS-CLAIM CALO appellant, vs.AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INC, defendantappellee
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Avena 22 SCRA 996 BENGZON, March 13, 1968 NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on decision of CFI of Agusan dismissing the complaint of Calo
FACTS -Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. The transaction was evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00. According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the same was found short of 300 ft. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for either completion of delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope. -On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax In ternational, Inc. Charge Order No. 37071 was among those included in the assigned account. Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo. -On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation.2 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 860. -Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. When this failed, she instituted the present appeal. -The dismissal of Civil Case No. 860 by the court a quo because of the pendency of Civil Case No. IV93062 in the municipal court of Manila is predicated on the supposition that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case. There is no question that it arises out of
the same transaction which is the basis of the complaint in Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire jurisdiction.
ISSUE WON plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the earlier case
HELD No. Plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. IV-93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Reasoning The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction. Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related controversies. Disposition Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. VI93062, it need not be filed there. The pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. 860. Consequently, the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
GOJO V GOYALA NATURE
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Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon
FACTS -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a mortgage), Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership. -Goyala’s, the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to the loan, and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused. Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due, for the document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale, for P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that, if ever the document be deemed a pacto de retro sale, for Gojo to be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas. -Goyala’s spouse died, TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party. Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order, Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition. TC dismissed complaint, Gojo was also declared in default in re G oyala’s counterclaim. TC ruled in favor of Goyala. -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
ON COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. -While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one, as in this case. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3, the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these
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Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. In Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed b y Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction. Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside
reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
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Barred if not set up CHAVEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 91391 GUTIERREZ, JR; January 24, 1991 FACTS - July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. -After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution which deferred The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government until after trialRespondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. The motion praying for leave to implead additional parties(Chavez et al) to his counterclaim was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to
Petitioner’s claim -no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v . Borja,8 - since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
ISSUES 1.WON Chavez (SolGEn)is immune from suit 2.WON it is proper to implead Chavez (as SolGen) petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile
HELD 1.No. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties wh ere they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
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The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in t heir behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of another ? such as trustees ? in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he f iled the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. ( id ., at page 586) Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" ( Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. 2. No. Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. -The charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. In the case of Tiu Po v . Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself. -To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences. -The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a
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Avena stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.
LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO vs. PURIFICACION VILLEGAS 184 SCRA 374 FERNAN, NATURE The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition raises the ultimate issue of whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case may be stayed by a co-equal court in order that the right of indemnification and retention of an alleged builder in good faith may not be rendered meaningless or illusory in an independent civil action for specific performance.
FACTS Petitioner Lualhati Aldaba Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel of residential land containing an area of 585 square meters and situated at San Agustin, Malolos, Bulacan. Many years back (about sixty years, according to the municipal trial court) the parents of private respondent Purificacion Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco, constructed a residential house and later a structure housing a bakery on the aforesaid lot. It was understood that they could remain on the land with his blessings and without paying rentals on condition that they would vacate the premises when needed by the owner. After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the property, renovating the same and spending P300,000.00 in the process. She also leased out a portion of the land to Siapno Appliances at P600.00 a month without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan Cojuangco. This latter act apparently destroyed her congenial relations with the landowner because soon thereafter, Don Juan Cojuangco, through his attorney in fact, demanded that she leave the property. Despite his repeated written demands for her to surrender possession of the property, Villegas refused, prompting Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch I on August 23, 1978. On February 5, 1979, Don Juan Cojuangco died intestate. In the trial court's order of October 22, 1979, his wife Lualhati, herein petitioner, together with nephews and nieces, were substituted as parties-plaintiffs. In its decision dated June 30, 1983, the inferior court dismissed the action for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction. It cited the unassailable fact that Villegas and her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the subject land for no less than sixty years and that in addition, Villegas asserted an adverse claim of ownership, thus transforming the suit into an "accion publiciana" which is properly cognizable by courts of first instance (now regional trial courts). On appeal to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Malolos, Branch XV, the inferior court w as reversed insofar as it had erroneously denied jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The trial court then ordered Villegas to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to herein petitioner Cojuangco. The case was elevated to the appellate court and to the Supreme Court and in both instances, herein petitioner Cojuangco's right of possession over the land was upheld. After entry of judgment was made on November 20, 1985, herein petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch XV, where she filed a motion for execution of the judgment, which the court granted on June 30, 1986. On July 29, 1986, a writ of demolition was issued against Villegas, who did not oppose the ordered dem olition but instead asked the lower court to give her more time (forty days from August 7, 1986) to effect the transfer of her personal properties and to remove the improvements on the subject lot to which motion the court acceded. On September 16, 1986, before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. 9094- M against petitioner Cojuangco and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction." This case, instead of being referred to Branch XV which had earlier issued the writ of demolition, was raffled to another Malolos branch of
the Bulacan Trial Court, specifically Branch XVII which issued on the same day, September 16, 1986, a temporary restraining order enjoining Cojuangco and particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or implementing the Order of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. 7042-M . . ." This was followed by another order dated October 6, 1986 granting a writ of preliminary injunction. The twin orders are now the subject of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that they have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES 1. Whether or not the respondent court validly issued an injunction 2. Whether or not Villegas can successfully raise an independent action to assert that she and her predecessors are builders in good faith and that they are entitled to recover the value of improvements on the lot.
HELD 1. NO. Ratio. As early as 1922 in the case of Cabigao v. Del Rosario, this Court laid down the doctrine that "no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction." Reasoning. The various branches of the court of first instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. 2. NO Ratio. Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim provides the answer. It states: "A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or co- party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Reasoning. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is essentially in
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the nature of a counterclaim since it is interwoven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. -The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire c onflict at one time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to DISCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. -According to Villegas, the reason why the counterclaim for indemnification was not made in the original action was because it became a "ripe issue" only after the ejectment proceedings. Villegas contended that the estoppel of judgment could only extend to those facts and conditions existing at the time the judgment was rendered and not to those which supervened before the second suit. -The argument is untenable. In her pleadings, Villegas repeatedly stressed that the residential house which her parents had constructed was already there on the questioned lot for as long as she could remember, that she herself has lived there all her life and that in the honest belief that the land had been "donated" to her parents by her "Aunt Tecla", she made various improvements and renovation thereon. Obviously, such declarations on the part of Villegas completely negate her absurd claim that the factual basis for her subsequent action arose after the ejectment suit became final. -Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. -And while it may be argued that the defense of being a builder in good faith would have been inconsistent with her claim of ownership, in the case of Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno, the Court held that a party may set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have, whatever be their nature. These may even be inconsistent with each other because what is sufficient is that each is consistent with itself. -Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i.e. a builder in good faith is entitled to recover the value of improvements) and instead relied on the sole defense that she inherited the land
from her parents, the rejection thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy between the parties which bars a later case based upon the unpleaded defense. The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not. 13 -It bears emphasizing that in ejectment cases, the rule is explicit that the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff to prevent further damages to him arising from the loss of possession. The sense of urgency is more pronounced in the case at bar where the ejectment case in favor of Cojuangco was decided in 1978 and subsequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. But the final victory continues to elude Cojuangco to this day due to a large extent to the legal maneuvers utilized by Villegas to forestall the inevitable. -For its part, respondent trial court has attempted to justify its writ of injunction by stating that the impending demolition of Villegas' house and other buildings on the disputed property would render inutile her right as a builder in good faith. We cannot agree. The loss to Villegas is not sufficient to warrant a blatant disregard of established precedents especially when it is borne in mind that for more than half a century, Villegas and her family have enjoyed the fruits of the land without paying a single centavo in return. Surely, the equities are more in favor of Cojuangco, the landowner.
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Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent court is hereby ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 9094-M and all proceedings held therein are declared null and void. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XV is ordered to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. Civil Case No. 7042-M. Costs against private respondent Villegas. This decision is immediately executory.
CARPENA VS MANALO GR No. 74262 PARAS; October 29, 1987 NATURE Action to recover possession
FACTS Lot 74 of the Calamba Cadastre was co-owned Beatriz Manalo and her common-law husband, Luciano Manalo. On November 5, 1947 Beatriz sold her one-half interest therein to the spouses Demetrio Carpena and Salud Catindig for the sum of P5,000.00. To keep the transaction from Luciano, the sale was made in the neighboring town of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and the parties agreed that Beatriz would remain in possession of the property but with the obligation of paying the land taxes due thereon. On May 22, 1948 Beatriz and Luciano were married, but she died three months thereafter. On August 30, 1948 the deed of the sale was registered and, as a result, TCT No. 1 6833 was cancelled and TCT No. 2004 was issued in the name of the Carpena spouses for the portion purchased by them, which was identified as Lot No. 74-B of subdivision plan Psd-23230. Upon the death of their vendor, the Carpenas notified Luciano of the sale and besides demanded of him the possession of lot 74-B, but the latter, instead of acquiescing thereto, filed an action against them to annul the sale made in their favor by Beatriz and to have himself declared owner of the property subject matter thereof (Civil Case No. 9194). Defendant's answer in said case alleged, as defense, that the sale in their favor was valid and that by virtue of the same they became owners of the property subject matter thereof. Consequently, they prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages. The case was dismissed by the lower court after a trial on the merits and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It appears that in 1945 a barong-barong was erected on Lot 74-B by a tenant occupying the same. Two years thereafter the building was sold to Beatriz Manalo for P200.00, and thereafter said improvement, with an assessed value of P150.00, was declared in her name for taxation purposes. After her death, Luciano Manalo and their children continued to occupy said house, making considerable improvements thereon in the years 1952 and 1953, but in December 1954 Luciano Manalo sold it to Pelagia Cailles Vda. de Unson and B eronica Capareda who began occupying the same on April 2, 1955. The present action was commenced on April 11, 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the Carpena spouses against Luciano Manalo, Pelagia Cailles Vda. de Unson and Beronica Capareda to recover the possession of Lot 74-B and the house erected thereon as well as reasonable rental for its use and occupancy from August 1, 1948. Appellees
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herein alleged in their answer that the sale executed by Beatriz Manalo in favor of appellants covered only Lot 74-B and not the house erected thereon. While the case was pending in the lower court, or more specifically on April 17, 1955, appellees, without the consent of appellants, moved the house in question to the adjoining lot, which compelled the latter to file a supplemental complaint to recover from the former the sum of P2,500.00 representing the value of the house, plus attorney's fees. As appellees had already vacated Lot 74-B, the lower court, after trial on the merits, rendered judgment declaring appellant the owners of the house in question and sentencing appellees to pay appellants the sum of P1,000.00 representing the fair market value thereof. Appellants' claim for damages for the use and occupancy of the premises was, however, dismissed for not having been set up in Civil Case No. 9194, the same being compulsory counterclaim. The present is their appeal from this portion of the decision of the lower court
property, otherwise his claim would be barred. That this ruling applies to the present case can not be disputed because the only difference between both cases is that in the one before us the counterclaim is for rents for the occupancy of the land sought to be recovered and of the house constructed thereon, instead of being ? as in the Berses case ? for the recovery of the value of improvements made on the property Appellants, however, argue that even assuming that their claim constituted a mandatory counterclaim in relation to Civil Case No. 9194, still they could not have pleaded it as such in said case because it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the case was pending. In this connection they contend that their counterclaim against Luciano Manalo and his co-plaintiffs would have been for unlawful detainer and the collection of one month rent only, because when the action was commenced Manalo had been in possession of the lot and house involved therein only for one month. This is not entirely correct. The record on appeal filed by Manalo in the aforesaid ease shows that the defendants (appellants herein) filed an answer in which they alleged that they were "the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land" subject matter of the action by virtue of the deed of sale executed in their favor by Beatriz Manalo, upon the registration of which a transfer certificate of title was issued in their name. Their answer also interposed a counterclaim which they incorporated all the allegations made in their answer and further alleged that the plaintiffs had filed the action against them maliciously, thus causing them damages in the sum of P2,000.00. Said answer prayed not only for the dismissal of the complaint but also for judgment declaring said defendants as true and lawful owners of the property in question" (Exhibit C, pp. 18-23). It is obvious therefore that, for all legal purposes, appellants had, by way of counterclaim, filed an accion reivindicatoria which, of course, necessarily included the question of possession. This notwithstanding, they failed to claim rents or compensation for the use and occupancy of the lot and house subject matter of the complaint filed against them. The right to collect these rents or reasonable compensation being merely incidental to the counterclaim, it seems clear that the fact that the amount thereof was less than the jurisdictional amount for the Court of First Instance of Laguna did not deprive said court of authority to take cognizance of the same.
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ISSUE WON the action filed by Luciano Manalo is a compulsory counterclaim
HELD Yes. As stated above, the purpose of the action filed by Luciano Manalo (Civil Case No. 9194 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna) was to annul the sale made by his wife, Beatriz Manalo, in favor of the Carpena spouses and to recover ownership of the property subject matter thereof. The rents which appellants now seek to collect from appellees were for the occupancy of said property and of the house constructed thereon. Had the sale been annulled, it would have meant that the Carpenas, appellants herein, had no right to collect rents from the occupants of the lot and of the house aforesaid, while if the court sustained the validity of the sale, they would have had such right. It is thus obvious that the claim which they seek to enforce now as, to say the least, a matter necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence subject matter of the complaint filed against them in Civil Case No. 9194. It follows that the same constituted a compulsory counterclaim which they should have pleaded in their answer filed in the aforesaid case. In Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473, it was held that in an action for the recovery of a parcel of land, the defendant must set up a counterclaim for the value of improvements made or introduced by him on the
Lastly, appellants contend that there was absolutely no mutuality of claims because the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9194 were Luciano Manalo and the heirs of his deceased wife, whereas the claim for rents in the present case is directed, jointly and severally, against Luciano Manalo, Pelagia Cailles Vda. de Unson and Beronica Capareda. This is likewise untenable because a party may not evade the effect of the doctrine of res judicata by simply including additional parties, in the subsequent litigation or by not including as parties in the latter persons who were parties in the previous suit Disposition. Decision affirmed
CABAERO VS CANTOS G.R. No. 102942 PANGANIBAN; April 18, 1997 NATURE Petition filed under Rule 65 assailing the Orders of respondent Judge for being contrary to law and for having been issued in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Order of July 1, 1991, reads: "THE Answer with Counterclaim filed by the accused through counsel, dated February 12, 1991, as well as the Opposition thereto; the Memorandum filed by the Private Prosecutor, in Support of Motion to Expunge from the Records And/Or to Dismiss Answer with Counterclaim; the Supplement; and Comment on Supplement, are all ordered expunged from the Records, considering that this is a criminal case wherein the civil liability of the acused (sic) is impliedly instituted therein." Petitioners pleaded for reconsideration of said Order but respondent judge, in the Order of August 21, 1991, denied their motion, thus: "ACTING on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 17, 1991, of the accused through counsel, this Court finds no merit therein, such that said motion is hereby denied."
FACTS - This petition emanated from a criminal case in the RTC of Manila. Said case commenced on October 18, 1990, with the filing of an Information against petitioners charging them with estafa for allegedly defrauding private respondent Epifanio Ceralde of the sum of P1,550,000.00. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
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"... the said accused induced and succeeded in inducing the said EPIFANIO CERALDE to advance the total amount of P1,550,000.00 to be paid to M.C. Castro Construction, Co. representing the purchase price of 6 parcels of land located in Pangasinan which the Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation, a joint business venture organized by accused AMADO F. CABAERO and the said EPIFANIO CERALDE, purchased from the said company, with the understanding that the said amount would be returned to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE as soon as the loan for P1,500,000.00 applied for by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation with Solid Bank, of which said accused AMADO F. CABAERO is the Senior Vice-President, is released, but both accused, once the said loan had been approved by the bank, in furtherance of their conspiracy and falsely pretending that accused CARMEN C. PEREZ had been authorized by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation to receive the check for P1,500,000.00 for and in its own behalf, succeeded in inducing the cashier of said Solid Bank to release the same to accused CARMEN C. PEREZ, thereby enabling her to encash the aforesaid check, and instead of turning over the said amount to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE; accused failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so despite repeated demands made to that effect, and with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their own personal use and benefit...” - petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. - Atty. Ambrosio Blanco entered his appearance as private prosecutor. - The Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Hon. Elisa R. Israel, inhibited herself "out of delicadeza" from further hearing the case "considering that the complainant is a relative by affinity of a nephew of her husband." Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to Branch VII presided over by respondent Judge Alfredo Cantos. - On April 2, 1991, petitioners filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the money loaned from Solidbank mentioned in the Information was duly applied to the purchase of the 6 parcels of land in Pangasinan, and that the filing of said Information was unjustified and malicious. Petitioners included the following prayer: "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after trial judgment be rendered:
1. Dismissing, or quashing the information, and the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action; 2. Ordering the complaining witness Ceralde to pay to the accused the following amounts: (a) P1,500,000.00 as moral damages; (b) P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (d) P20,000.00, as litigation expenses. Accused pray for such other reliefs, legal and equitable in the premises." - During the initial hearing on April 15, 1991, the prosecution verbally moved that the answer with counterclaim be expunged from the records and/or be dismissed. The respondent judge gave the contending parties time to submit a Memorandum and Comment or Opposition, respectively. - The Memorandum of the private prosecutor justified his Motion to Expunge the answer with counterclaim for two reasons: (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the answer with counterclaim for non-payment of the prescribed docket fees and (2) the
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"compulsory counterclaim against complainant is barred for failure to file it before arraignment." - In their Opposition, petitioners argued that this Court in Javier vs. IAC laid down, for "procedural soundness," the rule that a counterclaim should be permitted in a criminal action where the civil aspect is not reserved. Further, inasmuch as petitioners' counterclaim was compulsory in nature, they were not required to pay docket fees therefor. Additionally, the Rules do not specifically provide for the period for filing of counterclaims in criminal cases, whereas Section 3 of Rule 9 and Section 9 of Rule 6 allow the filing, with leave of court, of a counterclaim at any time before judgment. Thus, petitioners contended that their filing was within the proper period. - respondent Judge Cantos granted the prosecution's motion to expunge and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. - - Petitioners invoke Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. They contend that it is not only a right but an "outright duty" of the accused to file an answer with counterclaim since failure to do so shall result in the counterclaim being forever barred. - Petitioners argue that under Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 8 thereof, clerks of court are instructed to "keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for
receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases x x x." Thus, respondent Judge Cantos allegedly erred in expunging all records with respect to the Answer with Counterclaim for, on appeal, "if the records elevated x x x are incomplete and inaccurate, there arises a grave danger that the ends of justice and due process shall not be served and instead frustrated." - Petitioners further allege that the Order failed to resolve the legal issues raised by the parties as it neglected to state the legal basis therefor
ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering that the answer with counterclaim of the petitioners in the criminal case, together with all pleadings filed in relation thereto, be expunged from the records. (WON the accusedpetitioners who were charged with estafa may file an answer with counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against the private complainant in the same criminal action.) Preliminary Matters Litis Pendentia as a Defense - Private respondent belatedly interposes litis pendentia to defeat the petition alleges that the present petition is barred by the cross-claim of the petitioners against Aqualand Ventures and Management Corporation, of which petitioners are stockholders and officers, in Civil Case No. 90-53035 (filed against both petitioners and the private respondent by Solidbank). - SC said : Considerations of due process
prevent us from taking up the merits of this argument in favor of private respondent. This cross-claim was never raised in the trial court -- certainly not in the Memorandum dated April 19, 1991, submitted to the court a quo in support of respondent Ceralde's motion to expunge the answer with counterclaim. The Rules require that "(a) motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." Consequently and ineluctably, the ground of litis pendentia which was not argued in the court a quo is deemed waived. The Payment of Filing Fees
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- The Court agrees with petitioners that inasmuch as the counterclaim is compulsory, there is no necessity to pay such fees, as the Rules do not require them (as clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion).
of the accused, should not the accused have the right to file a counterclaim in the criminal case? Obviously, the answer is in the affirmative, as was held in Javier. Some Reservations in the Application of Javier - The logic and cogency of Javier notwithstanding, some reservations and concerns were voiced out by members of the Court during the deliberations on the present case. These were engendered by the obvious lacuna in the Rules of Court, which contains no express provision for the adjudication of a counterclaim in a civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal case. The following problems were noted: 1) While the rules on civil procedure expressly recognize a defendant's entitlement to plead his counterclaim and offer evidence in support thereof, the rules on criminal procedure which authorize the implied institution of a civil action in a criminal case are, in contrast, silent on this point and do not provide specific guidelines on how such counterclaim shall be pursued. 2) A judgment in a criminal action is not required to provide for the award of a counterclaim. 3) Allowing and hearing counterclaims (and possibly cross-claims and third-party complaints) in a criminal action will surely delay the said action. The primary issue in a criminal prosecution that is under the control of state prosecutors is the guilt of the accused and his civil liability arising from the same act or omission. Extending the civil action arising from the same act or omission to counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, and allowing the accused and other parties to submit evidence of their respective claims will complicate the disposition of the criminal case. 4) Adjudication of compulsory counterclaims and/or related claims or pleadings logically includes the application of other rules which, by their very nature, apply only to civil actions. The following matters may be invoked in connection with the filing of an answer with a counterclaim: the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath; affirmative defenses like res judicata, prescription and statute of frauds which are deemed waived by failure to interpose them as affirmative defenses in an answer; and the failure of a defendant to file an answer seasonably may result in his default in the civil aspect but not in the criminal. As a consequence of these matters, the entry of plea during arraignment will no longer signal joinder of issues in a criminal action.
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Main Issue HELD NO. (NO) As held in Javier, counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances are present: (1) that it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. As categorically recognized in the case of Javier, a claim for malicious prosecution or "grossly unfounded suit" as a compulsory counterclaim has no appropriate venue other than the same criminal case which is alleged to be a malicious suit. The counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. Compulsory counterclaim is one which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up. - In justifying his Order, Judge Cantos ruled that "this is a criminal case wherein the civil liability of the accused is impliedly instituted therein." This justification begs the question. Basically, that is the reason why petitioners herein filed their answer with counterclaim for, apparently, in hiring a private prosecutor, Ceralde intended to prosecute his civil claim together with the criminal action. Hence, as a protective measure, petitioners filed their counterclaim in the same case. Since under Section 1 Rule 111, the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, if not waived or reserved, includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, and damages under Art.32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission
5) In an impliedly instituted civil action, an accused is not sufficiently apprised of the specific basis of the claims against him. An accused learns of the implied institution of a civil action from the contents of an information. An information, however, is filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines. Hence, it does not contain the ultimate facts relating to the civil liability of the accused. 6) Because an accused is not sufficiently apprised of the specific basis of the civil action against him, he may file a motion for bill of particulars or take advantage of discovery procedures. The end result, in any case, will be delay and complication in the criminal action and even confusion among the parties. 7) The Rules of Court does not specify the reckoning date for the filing of an answer in an impliedly instituted civil action. 8) An accused can file his answer with counterclaim only after the initial hearing, because the private complainant may still reserve his civil action at any time before the prosecution commences to present evidence. On the other hand, an answer in an ordinary civil action should be filed before the start of hearing, because hearing commences only after the issues have been joined, i.e., after the responsive pleadings have been filed. 9) Confusion in the application of the rules on civil procedure will certainly encourage litigants to challenge before appellate courts interlocutory incidents of the impliedly instituted civil action. 10) Some members of the Court believe that a cause of action for malicious prosecution may be premature because there is as yet no finding of such wrongful prosecution. This fact is precisely what the trial court still has to determine.
--By the foregoing discussion, we do not imply any fault in Javier. The real problem lies in the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. For this reason, the counter-claim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal case because, as already discussed, it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings. Thus, the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counter-claim (and crossclaim or third party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without
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Avena prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time. At balance, until there are definitive rules of procedure to govern the institution, prosecution and resolution of the civil aspect (and the consequences and implications thereof) impliedly instituted in a criminal case, trial courts should limit their jurisdiction to the civil liability of the accused arising from the criminal case. Disposition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Orders are hereby MODIFIED. The counterclaim of the accused is hereby set aside without prejudice. The Respondent RTC of Manila is DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of the criminal action and the civil action arising from the criminal offense that is impliedly instituted therein, with all judicious dispatch.
CHAN V CA (CU) G.R. 109020 DAVIDE; MARCH 3, 1994 NATURE Review on certiorari
FACTS - On Feb.1, 1983, petitioner Felisa Chan and private respondent Grace Cu, entered into a contract of lease, the terms of which were: >>Cu will occupy Room 401 and rooftop of Room 442 of a bldg in Urbiztondo owned by Chan. >>Term of lease is 1 year at a monthly rental of P2,400. >>The premises shall be used as a learning center. - The contract was renewed for the succeeding 2 years or up to Feb.1, 1986, after which date, no written contract of lease was executed although Cu continued to occupy the premises. Increasing every year, the monthly eventually came to P3, 484.80 in Jan. 1989. - Nov. 1989: Chan locked the way to the rooftop. In the ensuing exchange of communication, Cu insisted that she be allowed to use the rooftop of Rm.442, while Chan maintained that only Rm.401 was leased and that the use of the rooftop was merely tolerated, adding that the use of the rooftop posed danger to the students. Chan eventually terminated the lease, refused to collect the rental for Dec.1989 (turned
down a check tendered by Cu) and gave Cu only until Jan.1990 to vacate the premises. - Cu’s lawyer tendered the payment in cash with notice to Chan that in case of non-acceptance, the same will be deposited in court by way of consignation. At this point, Chan gave Cu up to March, 1990 - Jan.15, 1990: Cu filed a civil case for consignation with the MTC. Chan answered with a counterclaim for ejectment. The MTC’s decision: >>declared that the rooftop is included in the lease >>fixed the term of the lease until June 30, 1992 >>held valid and legal the consignation by Cu - Both parties appealed to the RTC. Cu maintained that the MTC should have fixed a longer period while Chan contended that the MTC erred in extending the term of the lease and in upholding the validity of the consignation. RTC later affirmed the MTC. Cu then went to the CA on petition for review, with the same allegation that that the RTC erred in not fixing a longer period of extension of the lease. The CA reversed and set aside the decisions of the MTC and RTC and dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint for consignation. The CA held that Chan had justifiable cause (Cu’s overstay) to refuse to accept the payment. It ruled that the MTC and RTC erred in passing upon the issue of ejectment raised in Chan’s counterclaim since an action for ejectment can only be initiated through a verified complaint, not a counterclaim. Chan’s MFR was denied by the CA and so she filed this instant petition.
ISSUE WON Chan’s action for ejectment set up in a counterclaim was proper
HELD YES. Reasoning Sec.7, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the answer may contain any counterclaim which a party may have against the opposing party provided that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 9, a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. A counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive. - Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsory counterclaim because it is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint, viz., the lease contract between them. Consequently, the CA erred when it held that Chan's cause of action for ejectment could not be set up in a counterclaim. - The case of Ching Pue vs. Gonzales is inapplicable because in Ching Pue the consignation cases were filed with the CFI which did not have jurisdiction over ejectment cases; necessarily, no counterclaim for ejectment could have been interposed therein. The ratio of the said case is that consignation is not proper where the refusal of the creditor to accept tender of payment is with just cause. In the instant case, the ejectment was set up as a counterclaim in the MTC which has jurisdiction over it and Cu joined that issue and the incidents thereto by her answer to the counterclaim, and the counterclaim to the counterclaim. - The CA therefore should have confined itself to the principal error raised in Cu's petition in (the duration of the extended term of the lease fixed in the decision of the MTC and affirmed by the RTC). As fixed, the term of the lease was extended to June 30, 1992. That period had expired six months before the CA promulgated its challenged decision. Considering that Chan did not file any petition for the review of the RTC decision and was, therefore, deemed to have agreed to the extension; and considering further that Cu did not come to us on a petition for review to seek reversal of the decision therein and should thus be considered to have agreed to the dismissal of her consignation case, the parties must be deemed b ou nd b y t he e xte nd ed te rm , w hic h h as , nevertheless, already lapsed. **On Counterclaims - A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. It need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's claim. Counterclaims are designed to enable the disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties conflicling claims, at one time and in one action, provided all the parties can be brought before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party. A counterclaim "is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that
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Avena when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant . . . . A counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules, as if it were an independent action. In short, the defendant is a plaintiff with respect to his counterclaim. Disposition petition GRANTED. CA decision SET ASIDE.
The Answer Defenses GOJO V GOYALA Page 26 FACTS -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a mortgage), Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership. -Goyala’s, the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to the loan, and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused. Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due, for the document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale, for P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that, if ever the document be deemed a pacto de retro sale, for Gojo to be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas. -Goyala’s spouse died, TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party. Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order, Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition. TC dismissed complaint, Gojo was also declared in default in re G oyala’s counterclaim. TC ruled in favor of Goyala. -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
ON DEFENSES
Rule 8, allegations deemed admitted TEC BI & CO v CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA, AUSTRALIA AND CHINA 41 Phil 596 CARSON; Feb 5, 1916 FACTS: - on the 7th of November 1912, the plaintiff sold to the "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," a quantity of leaf tobacco. - on 16th January, 1913, the "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," pledged to the defendant corporation as security for the payment of an indebtedness of P25,000 the bales of tobacco. The bales of tobacco thus pledged were stored in the bodega of a third person, Messrs. Sprungli & Co., situated at No. 42 (now No. 214) of Calle David, Manila. - on or about the 1st day of February, 1913, the defendant corporation demanded and obtained from Messrs. Sprungli & Co. the keys to the said bodega, and discovered that of the 436 bales of tobacco there remained only those set forth in paragraph 4 of the answer. (I have no idea how many. Sorry.) - the defendant bank did not know and had been unable to ascertain whether "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," misrepresented the quantity of the tobacco in the said warehouse at the time of the execution of said document of pledge, or whether the difference between the amount described in the document of pledge and that found on hand on the 1st of February, 1913, and in the meantime been disposed of by "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in collusion with Messrs. Sprungli & Co., but that if such disposition was made it was without the knowledge or consent of the defendant bank. - from said 1st day of February, 1913, the defendant corporation had been in the absolute and exclusive possession of the tobacco, until the 15th of May, 1913, when same was sold under and by virtue of the document of pledge by the defendant bank for the sum of P12,722.36 which was applied on account of said loan, the entire amount of which was then past due and unpaid, leaving a large balance thereof still due and unpaid. - on the 22nd day of April, 1913, the plaintiff Tec Bi & Co., filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," claiming the payment of the sum of P11,572.96 as
the balance of the unpaid purchase price of the tobacco - on the 5th day of May, 1913, Tec Bi & Co. asked for and obtained from the Court of First Instance an attachment against the said bales of tobacco, but inasmuch as the bodega was locked and the sheriff was informed that the keys were in the possession of the bank, he demanded the delivery thereof from the latter, which demand was refused by the bank, alleging that it held possession of the tobacco under a pledge. - the sheriff notified it that the bales of tobacco were attached subject to the results of the complaint filed by Tec Bi & Co. against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.),” - on 8th day of May, 1913, the bank answered the notification of the sheriff, confirming the fact that it had in its possession the bales of tobacco specified in the notification, as security for the payment of a loan and that it intended to sell the same; that the sheriff communicated the answer of the bank to the attorneys to Tec Bi & Co., who replied insisting upon the levy of the attachment. - on the 19th day of May, 1913, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in said case against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in favor of Tec Bi & Co., for the sum of P11,572.96, with legal interest from April 22, 1913, and costs. - on the 22d day of May, 1913, the sheriff attempted to execute the judgment upon the bales of tobacco attached and in the possession of the defendant corporation, but was unable to do so due to the statement of the agent of said corporation, that the tobacco had been sold and that the proceeds of the sale had been applied upon the payment of the amount due to from "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," - Court of First Instance found that the plaintiff's claim was a preferred credit under the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 1922 of the Civil Code; that the pledge executed by "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," in favor of the defendant corporation was not binding upon the plaintiff for the reason that it was not set forth in a public instrument as required by article 1865 of the Civil Code in order to be effective against, third person, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the amount of the former's judgment against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.)," with interest and costs.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in holding that the plaintiff did not waive any defect in the private instrument of
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Avena pledge by expressly admitting its genuineness and the correctness of its date by stipulation, and by failure to object to its introduction in evidence. NOTE: the case dealt with a pledgor-pledgee [credit] relationship. The discussion here is limited to that pertaining to civil provision. Please see case re issues on credit.
HELD: A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is not an admission of the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn from other facts set out in the pleading, nor of a wrong conclusion of law based on the allegations of fact well pleaded, nor of the truth of a general averment of facts contradicted by more specific averments. Thus, if a pleader alleges that two pesos were borrowed on one day and two more borrowed on another making five Pin all, a stipulation of the truth of the allegations in the pleading does not amount to an admission by the opposing party that twice two make five. Again if a pleader alleges that one hundred pesos were loaned without interest for one year and had not been paid, and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of one hundred and ten pesos, that being the amount of the capital together with interest for the year for which the money was loaned, a stipulation as to the truth of the allegation set forth in the pleadings is not an admission of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the interest due by the borrower. These elementary principles have been quite fully developed in a great variety of cases arising on demurrers, and sufficiently dispose of the attempt of counsel to fix the attention of the court upon this single averment of the answer, apart from the context and to the exclusion of the specific allegations of fact, the truth of which, as stipulated by the parties, cannot be questioned.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed
PHIL ADVERTISING COUNSELORS V. CA, HON. PEDRO REVILLA, SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS GRN L 31869 ANTONIO; AUG 8 1973 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CA
FACTS -Southern Industrial Projects (SIP) hired Philippine Advertising Counselors (PAC) to promote SIP’s products. SIP accumulated unpaid accounts. -PAC filed complaint. Attached w/ the complaint were two letters (Annexed A&B) from SIP’s lawyer, saying that it would not be possible for SIP to settle in full its account of P97,952 08 in one payment and suggested that it (SIP) be allowed to settle its account by "periodic amortization"; and that SIP had included PAC in its list of creditors "to whom payments are regularly scheduled."
- SIP filed answer stating: 1. That it admits the allegations in paragraph 1 insofar as its personality is concerned but is w/o sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the rest of the allegations. 2. That defendant is w/o sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth, correctness or accuracy of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 2 to 6 of plaintiffs complaint." - PAC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as the answer failed to tender an issue or "otherwise admits the material allegations of the complaint”. SIP did not oppose to this motion. Judge Revilla denied the motion and set the case for pre-trial. Then the case was set for trial on the merits. - PAC presented its case and filed memoranda saying that SIP’s answer failed to tender an issue as said party "could not have denied knowledge of the account in the face of its written admissions," hence, judgment on the pleadings was proper. - SIP presented its case and filed memoranda saying that under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, its answer had sufficiently denied the allegations of the complaint and placed them in issue, so that it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove its allegations… ; and that a denial for "lack of sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth" of the averments of the complaint is a specific denial and as such places in issue the allegations of the complaint so denied.
- TC declared that said answer really failed to tender any issue and that the claims alleged in the complaint are, therefore, deemed admitted. TC ordered SIP to pay PAC the sum of P89,100.03 with legal interest, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. - SIP filed motion for reconsideration. PAC filed an opposition to the MFR on the grounds that the decision was in accordance with law and the evidence. Judge Revilla granted MFR "in the interest of justice” and set the case for hearing on the merits. - PAC filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for execution, contending that the MFR being pro forma, did not interrupt the running of the period for appeal, and since SIP received notice of the decision, the judgment became final and executory, and consequently it could no longer be modified, or set aside. Judge Revilla denied the omnibus motion. -PAC filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, w/ prayer for preliminary injunction w/ the CA, which gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. CA later dismissed the petition and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. CA said that private respondent could do no more than claim in its motion for reconsideration that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to Rule 8, Section 10, of the Rules of Court
ISSUE (for this topic) 1. WON respondent’s answer constitute (allegation not deemed admitted)
denial
HELD 1 NO -The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not
apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be Capitol Motors palpably untrue (as held in Corporation v. Yabut) - "an unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records, the means of information concerning which are within the control of the
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pleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial."
interest. The loan became due on January 31, 1960 but was not paid on that date. The debtors asked for an extension of 3 months (April 30, 1960). - March 17, 1960 – Another loan document was drawn up wherein the obligation was increased by P6,000 (to answer or attorney’s fees, legal interest and other costs). Defendants failed to pay their dues by April and when a action was instituted against them by Law in September, they claimed that the additional interest as usurious. - A writ of attachment was then executed on real and personal properties of the defendant. - TC: ordered Olympic Sawmill to pay Liam Law P10,000 plus the P6,000 interest.
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Avena Reasoning: The rule that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint is insufficient to raise an issue, for the defendant must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged, must be applied in this case, for petitioner's complaint explicitly averred that the letters (AnnexA&B) were written by private respondent, albeit thru its lawyer. Whether or not the said averments in the complaint were true, could not conceivably be unknown to private respondent. As a matter of fact it has never been denied by private respondent that it was indebted to petitione. It has not been asserted that the letters attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the complaint which were sent to petitioner by the counsel of private respondent were not authorized by the latter. There was thus a failure on private respondent's part to deny the material averments of the complaint. Consequently, the same, including the contents of Annexes "A" and "B", which formed part of the complaint, and in which the existence and validity of petitioner's claim were unequivocally conceded, must be deemed to have been admitted. Although sanctioned by the rules, the form of denial adopted by private respondent must be availed of in good faith and with sincerity and not resorted to merely for the purpose of delay or to confuse the adverse party as to what averments in the complaint are actually put in issue. Disposition Appealed judgment reversed and set aside, and Southern Industrial Projects, Inc. to pay Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. the amount of P89,100.03, with legal interest until fully paid, plus 10% of the principal amount due by way of attorney's fees, and costs.
LIAM LAW V OLYMPIC SAWMILL 129 SCRA 439 MELENCIO-HERRERA; May 28, 1984 NATURE Appeal from a Decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
FACTS - Law loaned P10,000 to Olympic Sawmill without
ISSUE WON the decision of the trial court was correct
HELD YES Ratio Sec. 9 of the Usury Law envisages a complaint filed against an entity which has committed usury, for the recovery of the usurious interest paid. In that case, if the entity sued shall not file its answer under oath denying the allegation of usury, the defendant shall be deemed to have admitted the usury. The provision does not apply to a case, as in the present, where it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury. Reasoning - Sec. 9 of the Usury Law states: “The person or corporation sued shall file its answer in writing under oath to any complaint brought or filed against said person or corporation before a competent court to recover the money or other personal or real property, seeds or agricultural products, charged or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The lack of taking an oath to an answer to a complaint will mean the admission of the facts contained in the latter.” - For sometime, usury has been legally nonexistent. Interest can now be charged as tender and borrower may agree upon.4 The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect. Disposition Judgment affirmed
How to contest document
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION V CA (AMALIO L. SARMIENTO) SCRA CORONA; January 13, 2004 NATURE Petition for review
FACTS - Amalio L. Sarmiento, registered owner of A.L. Sarmiento Construction, applied for a loan from Philippine Banking Corporation in the sum of P4,126,000, evidenced by promissory note no. 62684. - Pursuant thereto, Sarmiento obligated himself to pay the amount with interest at the rate of 29% per annum. Additionally, it was stipulated that if payment was not made upon maturity of the loan, penalty charges of 1% per month and 25% of the total amount due would be charged against him. - Sarmiento signed the aforesaid promissory note together with the disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction provided by the bank. - Sarmiento failed to pay the obligation on maturity, prompting PBC to send him a letter of demand. Despite the demand, however, Sarmiento still failed to settle his indebtedness. - PBC filed a complaint for a sum of money against him. In his answer, Sarmiento denied that he received the proceeds of the loan transaction and prayed that the case against him be dismissed. - The trial court rendered its decision finding that plaintiff miserably failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence. The case was dismissed. - PBC filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently granted despite the opposition of Sarmiento. - The trial court rendered a decision finding the evidence adduced by the bank to be insufficient to substantiate its claim. The trial court reinstated its earlier dismissal of the case against Sarmiento and denied Philippine Banking Corporation’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. - PBC appealed to the CA - CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s by deleting the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. - Hence, the instant petition
ISSUE
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WON no proof was required of petitioner to establish the contents of the said documents documents because such judicial judicial admissions admissions of respondent respondent created a prima facie case in petitioner’s favor
applied. applied. Moreover, Moreover, petitioner petitioner failed to explain just exactly what said obligations were or to what extent the purported proceeds were applied in satisfaction thereo thereof. f. What What appeared appeared clearl clearly y was that the proceeds of the loan were deposited then withdrawn the same day by petitioner itself, thus negating its claim that respondent actually actually received it. Petitioner ther theref efor ore e fail failed ed to esta establ blis ish h its its case case agai agains nstt respondent Sarmiento. - Be that as it may, the general rule is that only questi questions ons of law may be raised raised in a petiti petition on for review review on certiorari. certiorari. Barring Barring a showing showing that the findings of fact complained of are totally devoid of support support in the records, such determinati determination on must stand for the Court is neither expected nor required to examin examine e or refute refute the oral oral and documen documentar tary y evidence submitted by the parties. Disposition Petition DENIED.
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Avena
HELD NO. - It is undisputed that respondent Sarmiento signed the the prom promis isso sory ry note note and and the the acco accomp mpan anyi ying ng disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction. transaction. But said pieces of evidence proved only the existence of such documents. There was even no question as to that because respondent Sarmiento himself admitted the due execution thereof. - The important issue was whether or not respondent Sarmie Sarmiento nto actual actually ly receiv received ed the procee proceeds ds of the subject subject loan so as to make him liable therefor, therefor, a matter which should have been ventilated before the trial court. - The trial court did in fact make a finding that the documentary evidence of petitioner failed to prove anything anything showing showing that respondent indeed received received the procee proceeds ds of the loan. loan. The Court Court of Appeals Appeals affirm affirmed ed the conclusi conclusions ons of the trial court court and declared: A pre-existing obligation, it may be conceded, constitutes value and may, of and by itself, itself, serve as valuable valuable and sufficient sufficient consideration for a contract such as the loan sued upon. As an essential element of a contract, however, the same should have been satisfactorily proved by the appellant – particularly when, as in the instant case, the a bsence of consideration was precisely put in issue by the pleadings and was buttressed by both oral and documentary documentary evidence. evidence. Having Having failed in this material respect, the appellant’s withdrawal of the amount supposedly credit credited ed to the appell appellee’ ee’s s accoun accountt was unders understan tandab dably ly interpreted by the court a quo as a termination/cancellation of the loan the latter applied for. Considering further that contracts contracts without consideration do not exist in contemplation of law and produce produce no effect whatsoever whatsoever (Article (Article 1352, Civil Civil Code of the Philip Philippin pines) es),, the the trial, trial, likewi likewise, se, correc correctly tly dismis dismissed sed the appellant’s case.
- A statement statement in a written written instrument regarding regarding the payment of consideration is merely in the nature of a receip receiptt and may be contra contradic dicted ted.. Respon Responden dentt Sarmiento Sarmiento denied having received received the proceeds proceeds of the loan and in fact presented evidence showing that on the day petitioner claimed to have credited the subject amount, it was again debited or withdrawn by petitioner, admittedly upon the instruction of the officials from petitioner’s head office. - Petiti Petitione onerr attemp attempted ted to contro controver vertt this this fact fact by claiming that the proceeds of the loan were applied to respondent’s previous obligations obligations to the bank. But ther there e is noth nothin ing g in the the reco record rds s show showin ing g that that respon responden dentt had other other obliga obligatio tions ns to which which the procee proceeds ds of the loan could could or should should have been been
Defense/objection Defense/objection waived KATON V PALANCA G.R. No. 151149 PANGANIBAN; PANGANIBAN; September 7, 2004 9
NATURE Petition Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing CA decision, and resolution denying MFR.
FACTS -August 2, 1963: George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Prin Prince cesa sa,, Pala Palawa wan, n, for for the the re-c re-cla lass ssif ific icat atio ion n (forestagricultural land) of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island (~18has). -BFDO -BFDO Puerto Puerto Prince Princesa sa ordere ordered d the inspec inspectio tion, n, investigation and survey of the land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent. 9 For other footnotes in this case: [14]
The said section provides that “[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except as
otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.”
-Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the presence of George, his brother Rodolfo (deceased) and his cousin, Manuel Palanca, Jr., (respondent). (respondent). During said survey, there were no actual occupants occupants on the island island but there were were some some coconu coconutt trees trees claime claimed d to have have been been planted by George and Palanca (alleged overseer of George) who went to the island from time to time to undert undertake ake develo developmen pmentt work, work, like like planti planting ng of additional coconut trees. -The -The appl applic icat atio ion n for for conv conver ersi sion on of the the whol whole e Sombrero Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed endorsed by BFDO Puerto Puerto Princesa Princesa to its main office office in Manila Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo Fresnillo were included included in the endorsement endorsement as coapplicants of George. Authorities noted that since the subj subjec ectt land land was was no long longer er need needed ed for for fore forest st purpos purposes, es, the same same is theref therefore ore certif certified ied and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. -George Katon says: the whole Sombrero Island had been classified classified from forest land to agricultura agriculturall land and certif certified ied availa available ble for dispos dispositi ition on upon upon his request and at his instance. -However -However land investigators investigators of the Puerto Princesa Princesa District District Land Office, Office, later favorably favorably endorsed endorsed the reques requestt of respon responden dents ts Manuel Manuel Palanc Palanca a Jr. and Lorenz Lorenzo o Agusti Agustin, n, for author authority ity to survey survey vacant vacant portions of Sombrero Island consisting of 5hectares each. -Subs -Subseq eque uent ntly ly,, resp respon onde dent nts s file filed d thei theirr own own homestead homestead patent applications: applications: Lorenzo Lorenzo Agustin Agustin (4.3 (4.3ha has) s),, Juan Juan Fres Fresni nill llo o (8.5 (8.5ha has) s),, and and Jesus Jesus Gapilango (??has). Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. and OCT for 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. Katon n file filed d Comp Compla lain intt for for “Nul “Nulli lifi fica cati tion on of -Kato Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title” and prayed for reconveyance of the whole island in his favor, arguing that the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondent respondents s were invalid for having been obtained through fraud.
[35]
§1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent’s arguments:
[37]
§2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
-Manuel -Manuel Palanca Palanca asserts asserts that he himself himself requested requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute; that about the time of such request, Fresnillo, Gapilango and himself already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements; that Katon
“SEC. 2. Parties in interest.- A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
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Avena never filed any homestead application for the island; that that Gabr Gabrie iell Mand Mandoc ocdo doc c neve neverr unde undert rtoo ook k the the inspection inspection and survey of the island; that he is not a mere overseer of Katon because he was acting for himsel himselff in develo developin ping g his own area area and not as anybody’s caretaker. -Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions, have declared declared such for taxation taxation purposes and have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. They conten contend d that that Katon Katon has no legal legal capaci capacity ty to sue insofa insofarr as the island island is concer concerned ned (an action action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant) and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land land for an unreas unreasona onable ble and unexplained period of time. -Afte -Afterr fili filing ng thei theirr Answ Answer er with with Spec Specia iall and/o and/orr Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the allege alleged d defian defiance ce by Katon Katon of the RTC’s order to amend his Complaint (substitution by the legal heirs of the deceas deceased ed Gapila Gapilango ngo). ). MTD was grante granted. d. Katon’s MFR was denied. -Katon filed petition for certiorari before CA. Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, CA ruled on the merits & held that while Katon had caused caused the reclassificati reclassification on of Sombrero Sombrero Island Island from from forest forest to agricu agricultu ltural ral land, land, he never never applied applied for a homestead patent under the Public Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. Also, granting arguendo that Katon had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Palanca’s title had been issued -On MR, CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with Katon that that the the TC had had acte acted d with withou outt juri jurisd sdic icti tion on in perfunctori perfunctorily ly dismissing dismissing his Sept10, Sept10, 1999 MFR, on the the erro errone neou ous s grou ground nd that that it was was a thir third d and and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion. motion. Nonetheless Nonetheless,, the complaint complaint was dismissed dismissed motu proprio by the CA – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its “residual prerogative” under Sec. 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. CA said that from the allegation allegations s of the complaint, complaint, Katon clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. patent. It reiterated reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the
land land to the the publ public ic domai domain. n. It also also rule ruled d that that prescr prescript iption ion had alread already y barred barred the action action for reconveyance.
ISSUES 1. WON CA was correct in resolving the petition for certiorari based on an issue not raised in the petition (WON CA was correct in ruling on the merits) 2. WON CA was correct correct in invoki invoking ng its alleged alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition (and eventually dismis dismissin sing g the case for prescrip prescriptio tion n and lack of jurisdiction)
HELD Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state state a cause cause of action action clearly clearly appear appear from the compla complaint int filed with the TC, the action action may be dismissed motu proprio by the CA, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations. 1. This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling ruling on the merits. He raised it with with the CA when he moved for reconsideration of CA’s Dec8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its Nov20, 2001 Resolution. -That should have been enough to settle the issue. The The CA’s CA’s Resolu Resolutio tion n on this this point point has render rendered ed petitioner’s issue moot. There is no need to discuss it further. further. Suffice it to say that the appellate appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case case when when the only issue issue that that could could have been, and was in fact, raised raised was the alleged alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying Katon’s MFR. -Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari certiorari is the correction of errors errors of jurisdicti jurisdiction. on. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, [10] more so when no determinati determination on of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
defenses defenses and objectio objections ns not pleaded either in a motion motion to dismis dismiss s or in the answer answer are deemed deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident evident from the pleadings pleadings or the evidence evidence on record. record. In the four excepted excepted instances instances,, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. -RESIDUAL JURISDICTION: Sec 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court 10: The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmit transmittal tal of the original original records records or the records records on appeal. In either instance, instance, the TC still still retains retains its so-called residual jurisdiction jurisdiction to issue protective protective orders, orders, approve approve compromises compromises,, permit permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. -CA’ -CA’s s motu motu prop propri rio o dismi dismiss ssal al of peti petiti tion oner er’s ’s Complaint Complaint could not have been based on residual residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal appeal.. What What the CA referr referred ed to as residu residual al prerog prerogati atives ves were were the genera generall residu residual al powers powers of the courts courts to dismiss dismiss an action action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules. -Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determi determined ned by the allegati allegations ons in the 10Rule41.“SEC. 9. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. “A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed i n due time. “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
2. NO -CA’s “residual prerogatives” under Sec1 of Rule9 of the Rules of Court is different different from the “residual jurisdiction” of TC over cases appealed to CA. -RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES: Sec 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court:
“In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. “In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.”
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Avena complaint complaint and the character of the relief sought. Katon Katon prayed prayed,, among among others others,, for a judgmen judgmentt (1) nullif nullifyin ying g the homest homestead ead patent patent applic applicati ations ons of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) orderi ordering ng the direct director or of the Land Land Manage Managemen mentt Bure Bureau au to reco reconv nvey ey the the Somb Sombre rero ro Isla Island nd to petitioner. -Q: did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for decl declar arat atio ion n of null nullit ity y of the the free free pate patent nt and and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? -Ans: The complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the TC could have exercised jurisdiction. -In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff plaintiff prior to the issuance issuance of the assailed assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that that the the defe defend ndan antt perp perpet etua uate ted d a frau fraud d or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. -In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Management Bureau had no jurisdiction jurisdiction to bestow bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio. -In an altern alternati ative ve action action for reconv reconveya eyance, nce, the c er er ti tif ic ic at at e of t it itl e is a ls ls o r es es pe pe ct ct ed ed as incontrovert incontrovertible, ible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully wrongfully or erroneously erroneously registered registered in the defendant’s defendant’s name. The complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally illegally dispossess dispossessed ed the plaintiff of the property. -In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the the land land in quest questio ion. n. On the contr contrar ary, y, he acknowledged acknowledged that the disputed island was public public land, that it had never been privately privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. -Reversion? No. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer officer in his stead may instit institute ute such an action. A private person may not bring an action for
reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain. -The dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdict jurisdiction, ion, but also becaus because e of the utter utter absence absence of a cause cause of action, action, a defense defense raised raised by responden respondents ts in their Answer. -Assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should should still be dismissed for being timebarred. A. 1977, Feb21: a homestead patent and an OCT was issued to Palanca 1988, Oct6: filing of the complaint, way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the the pres prescr crip ipti tive ve peri period od for for reco reconv nvey eyan ance ce of fraudulently registered real property. B. Palanca’s title attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977. It is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Trial Trial courts courts have have author authority ity and discre discretio tion n to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so -on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or -an answer answer whic which h sets sets up such such grou ground nd as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or -even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or -even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as wher where e no stat statem emen entt ther thereo eoff is foun found d in the the pleadings; or -where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptiv prescriptive e period period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. Disposition Petition denied. CA resolution affirmed. Compla Complaint int dismisse dismissed d on the ground grounds s of lack lack of jurisdict jurisdiction, ion, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.
COMMON PROVISIONS Re parts of pleading
FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. V CA (CABUCO-ANDRES) 265 SCRA 614 KAPUNAN; December 16, 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
FACTS - Petitioner Petitioner Fil-Estate Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Biñan, Laguna. - December 29, 1992: Felipe Layos filed a Complaint for Injunc Injunctio tion n and Damage Damages s with with Applic Applicati ation on for Prelim Prelimina inary ry Injunc Injunctio tion n agains againstt Fil-Est Fil-Estate ate Realty Realty Corporation (FERC) with the RTC of Biñan. It alleged that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and possessor of thwo parcels of land having a total area of 837,695 sq. m. located in Biñan, Laguna known as Lots 1 & 2 of Plan Psu-201. Layos claimed that the Southwoods project project encroached encroached upon the aforecited lands and thus his rights rights of ownership ownership and possession possession were violated violated when FERC brought in men and equipment to begin development of the said properties. - Februa February ry 2, 1993: 1993: FERC FERC filed filed an Opposi Oppositio tion n to Application Application for Writ of Preliminar Preliminary y Injunction Injunction and explicitly explicitly stated therein that the developer developer is its sister company, FEGDI. - March 29, 1993: Judge Sultan of RTC Biñan issued an orde orderr deny denyin ing g the the pray prayer er for for prel prelim imin inar ary y injunction in view of Layos’ inability to substantiate his right. - June 25, 1993: Layos along with his wife and other indivi individua duals ls filed filed anothe anotherr case case for Injunc Injunctio tion n and Damage with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of San Pedro, this time against FEGDI. The complaint complaint is basically basically identical identical to that filed in the Biñan Biñan case, case, except except for change changes s in the number number of party-plaintiffs and party-defendants and in the area size of the claimed landholdings. - FEGDI moved to dismiss the San Pedro case on grounds grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping, lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. FEGDI argues that a similar complaint was previously filed with the RTC RTC Biña Biñan n cour court. t. FEGD FEGDII also also aver averre red d that that the the documents relied upon by the private respondents are of doubtful veracity and that they failed to pay the correct filing fees.
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Avena - Judge Cabuco-Andres of San Pedro RTC denied FEGDI’s motion to dismiss, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. FEGDI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction with the CA. CA ordered an RTO enjoining Cabuco-Andres. - January 25, 1994: RTC Biñan case was dismissed without prejudice on grounds of forum-shopping.
initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the SC xxx. The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counter-claim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
ISSUES
2.
1. 2.
Ratio In the determination of WON the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint. Reasoning The San Pedro case also did not state a cause of action. In determining WON a complaint states a cause of action, only the allegations in the complaint must be considered. The test if sufficiency of the facts is WON admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. - There is no cause of action because Layos’ claim on the land in question is based on a fabricated document. The affidavit of self-adjudication is a vital part of the complaint that should be considered in the determination of whether or not a cause of action exists. - The land Psu-201 is an original survey for J. Reed located in Malate, Manila, and Si-14769 is a survey number for the plan of a land parcel situated in Bo. Bessang, Cagayan in the name of Gregorio Blanco - However the CA and RTC limited itself to the allegations in the complaint proper of the San Pedro case in concluding that said complaint stated a cause of action. This is erroneous. - In the case of Marcopper Mining v Garcia, the RTC had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner’s answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. It was but logical for said court to consider all of these pleadings in determining WON there was a sufficient cause of action in the petitioner’s complaint. - Regalado: The exception is provided in Sec. 2 Rule 9. It as also been held that under this ground the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record.
WON Layos is guilty of forum-shopping. WON the San Pedro case has cause of action.
HELD 1. YES Ratio Reasoning Private respondents have indeed resorted to forum-shopping in order to obtain a favorable decision. The pattern is undisputably revealed by the fact that after Felipe Layos instituted in 1992 a case for injunction and damages with application for preliminary injunction in the RTC of Biñan, and after his prayer was denied in March 1993, he (and other individuals) filed an identical complaint for injunction and damages with preliminary injunction in June 1993, this time with RTC San Pedro. An examination would show that the San Pedro complains is simply an improved version of the Biñan complaint. - Respondents content that there is no identity of part-defendants since it was FERC in the Biñan case a nd F EG DI i n t he S an Pe dr o c as e. Th is is unmeritorious, because FEGDI voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing its answer and expressly stating that it is the developer of Southwoods, and not FERC. The Biñan court expressly recognized FEGDI as the defendant in the said case. - The willful attempt by private respondent to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process.
SC-Administrative Circular 04-94: Revised Circular 29-91 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of the petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals. The following requirements xxx shall be strictly complied with in the filing of the complaints, petitions, applications or other
NO
DISPOSITION The petition for review on certiorari is granted. Respondents’ complaint is dismissed.
DBP v CA G.R. No. 147217 October 7, 2004 NATURE petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the DBP and Atty. Nilo Galorport
FACTS - Bibiana Guerra de Azarcon, herein private respondent, and her late husband Inocentes Azarcon, obtained a loan from PNB. As collateral, they mortgaged 2 lots with the bank. But they could not pay their loan. Asuncion Calceta told Bibiana that she is willing to pay their loan if Bibiana would mortgage the lots to her. Private respondents agreed. Asuncion Calceta then made an initial payment of P273,000.00 to the PNB. The bank extended the redemption period to allow Asuncion to apply with the DBP a loan of P3.5M to be paid to the PNB. Private respondents executed a simulated deed of sale of their lots in her favor to enable her to mortgage the same with the DBP. - When the proceeds of the loan were released, Asuncion paid the PNB P900,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of respondents’ loan. However, she failed to pay her loan with the DBP, prompting the bank to foreclose the mortgage covering the 2 lots. After hearing private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction, the RTC issued an Order enjoining the DBP and Atty. Nilo Galorport, the bank’s deputized special sheriff, from proceeding with the auction sale of the lots pending the final determination of the civil case wherein private respondents prayed for annulment of the contract and the TCTs transferring title over the lots to Asuncion Calceta. - DBP and Atty. Galorport filed an MFR but were denied by the RTC. Hence, they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging that in granting the injunctive relief in favor of private respondents, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure of one of the petitioners, Atty. Nilo Galorport to sign the certification against forum shopping. The CA denied petitioners’ MFR, holding that Atty. Demosthenes Demecillo, Branch Manager of the DBP at Tagbilaran City, failed to show that he is the bank’s authorized representative to file the petition for certiorari.
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Avena Petition is DENIED
ISSUE WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari
HELD NO Ratio The certification against forum shopping is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners. This procedural flaw warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. Reasoning The petitioners before the CA were the DBP, represented by Atty. Demosthenes Demecillo, the bank’s Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City, and Atty. Nilo Galorport, DBP’s deputized special sheriff. The certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Demecillo only. Petitioners explained in their MFR that in the verification of the petition for certiorari, Atty. Demecillo stated under oath that he is the DBP’s incumbent Branch Head and its duly authorized officer. They submitted a copy of a resolution passed by the DBP Board of Governors, authorizing Branch Heads of the DBP to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping of all initiatory pleadings of the bank. What petitioners failed to explain, however, is their failure to attach a certified true copy of the resolution to their petition. Their omission is fatal to their case. Courts are not expected to take judicial notice of corporate board resolutions or a corporate officer’s authority to represent a corporation. Petitioners’ failure to submit proof that Atty. Demecillo has been authorized by the DBP to file the petition is a "sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." Atty. Galorport contends that the signature of Atty. Demecillo, representing the DBP, is sufficient since he and DBP are being sued jointly, they having a common interest in the lots under litigation. His contention lacks merit. DBP is being sued as a mortgagee, while he is impleaded as the bank’s deputized special sheriff who conducted the extra judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Their interests are not the same. The certification against forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners in a case, and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. Disposition
WEE V GALVEZ 436 SCRA 96 QUISUMBING; August 11, 2004 NATURE
complaint. An MFR was filed but was likewise denied.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the certification of non-forum shopping executed by the plaintiff’s atty-in-fact is defective 2. WON the amended complaint before the RTC states a cause of action
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS - Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters. Rosemarie lives with husband Manuel in Bataan. Rosario lives in New York, USA - They entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be earned therefrom would be given to Rosario's son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance - In accordance with her agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie gave Manolito his monthly allowance ranging from P2,000 to P4,000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. However, sometime in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an accounting. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so. A written demand was sent to her. When Rosemarie did not comply, Rosario filed a suit against her. - The Wees moved to dismiss the case based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance with Article 1515 of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was defective, having been executed by an attorney-infact and not the plaintiff. - Rosario amended her complaint to add that “Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed” (mali talaga yung sinulat nila). The trial court accepted the amended complaint and dismissed the Wee’s motion to dismiss. Wee moved for an MFR. It was also denied. - The Wee couple brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. It was also denied. The Court of Appeals held that the complaint, as amended, sufficiently stated a cause of action. It likewise held that the questioned certification against forum shopping appended thereto was not so defective as to warrant the dismissal of the
HELD 1. No Reasoning The Special Power of Attorney executed by her in favor of Grace Galvez, if subjected to careful scrutiny would clearly show that the authority given to the latter is not only broad but also all encompassing that it includes the power and authority to institute both civil and criminal actions. Corollary with this power is the authority to sign all papers, documents, and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the said purpose. The SPA includes: 1. To ask, demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any person natural, juridical and/or corporation in the Philippines; 2. To file criminal and/or civil com plaints before the courts of justice in the Philippines to enforce my rights and interest[s]; 3. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s], to make stipulations, adjust claims, to settle and/or enter into Compromise Agreement[s], to litigate and to terminate such proceedings; [and] 4. To sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the above purposes. 2. YES Ratio It is true that the lead sentence of paragraph 9-A, may be incomplete or even grammatically incorrect as there might be a missing word or phrase, but to our mind, a lacking word like "compromise" could be supplied by the rest of the paragraph. Reasoning Petitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule 8, Section 133 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A of the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" is clearly insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in
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Avena deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to petitioners. -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. Thus taken together, in their entirety, the amended complaint and the attachments to the original complaint, clearly show that a sufficient cause of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, according to respondent. -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a rhetorical unit. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences dealing with a single topic," a paragraph must necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. In the instant case, paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise between the parties. Hence, it is in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or construed. -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the documents attached thereto, following the rule that documents attached to a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading, we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action. Disposition Petition is denied.
BAGUIARO V. BARRIOS 00SCRA 00 FERIA, 30 Aug. 1946 FACTS -Complaint filed on January 7, 1945, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas against Baguiaro. -De Atas is the exclusive and absolute and registered owner of the following described property, situated in the City of Iloilo. The above lot, without the improvements which were burned during the war, is assessed at P4,680. -That sometime in the month of July, 1946, Baguiaro verbally solicited the permission of herein de Atas to construct a house of light materials on the lot of some three brazas wide and three brazas long just enough for them to sleep, at a monthly rental of twenty pesos (P20), payable in advance, and de Atas
told Baguiaro that she would think the matter; she found out that defendant had already begun the construction of a nipa and bamboo house with no approval from her; -Instead of constructing a house of three brazas by three brazas as above Baguiaro has built additions after additions to the house such that the present house constructed is twenty-eight and one-half feet on the front and forty-two and one-half feet on the side, and has rented a part thereof to other persons, and that when plaintiff discovered this anomaly and violations of their verbal and initial agreement, defendant was told sometime on October, 1945, to pay a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50) a month, or vacate the lot in question. For the month of October, Baguiaro paid only the sum of P25, leaving a balance of P25, and for subsequent months Baguiaro has refused and still refuses to pay the said rentals of fifty pesos (P50), or vacate the premises, in spite of repeated demands. -Prayer: defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of fifty pesos (P50) as monthly rentals for the lot occupied by him of the property of herein plaintiff, beginning with the month of October, 1945, or to vacate the lot in question, with costs against the defendant, and for such other and for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable. -Baguiaro filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or suit, the action being either for the collection of rentals of a real estate which do not reach to two hundred pesos (P200) or for ejectment from the premises in jurisdiction over the subject of the litigation. -CFI motion to dismiss denied and sentencing Baguiaro either to pay two hundred fifty pesos (P250) or to vacate the lot in question. -Petition for Certiorari on the ground the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter in trying and deciding the case, and at the same time asked this Court to enjoin the respondent judge from taking further action in the case during the pendency of this petition.
ISSUE WON the court acted without jurisdiction
HELD Yes, court acted without jurisdiction. It is an axiom, in civil procedure that if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of the
plaintiff's action, and that the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action. And that is the reason why it is generally added to prayers for relief, though not necessary, the words "and for such other relief as the law warrants," or others to the same effect. So if a plaintiff alleges, for instance, that the defendant owes the former a certain amount of money and did not pay it at the time stipulated, and prays that the defendant be sentenced to return a certain personal property to the plaintiff, such prayer will not make or convert the action of recovery, of debt into one of recovery of personal property, and the court shall grant the proper relief, or sentence the defendant to pay his debt to the plaintiff. The attorney of the plaintiff, in his opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss filed in the court below, and in his answer to the petition for certiorari in this Court, contends that the plaintiff's principal action is for breach of contract, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, because it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. There is no such kind of action. Breach of contract may be the cause of action, but not the action or relief itself. According to our Civil Code, a breach of contract is accuse of action, either for specific performance, or performance, or rescission of the contract. As the plaintiff is entitled is entitled only to one of the two reliefs, if he prays that the defendants be sentenced to perform the obligations imposed upon him by the contract the action is specific performance, and if he prays that the contract be rescind the plaintiff's action is rescission. In contracts of lease of a real estate, if the lessee violates the terms of the contract by his failure to pay the rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease, and refuses to vacate or return the possession of the property leased to the lessor notwithstanding demand to do so, the action is illegal detainer if filed within one year, and recovery or restoration of possession if filed after one year, from the demand. That the prayer of relief in the complaint seems to convey the idea that the plaintiff would agree to let the defendant continue in possession if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff, does not change the nature of the action, since the court may only grant the proper relief according to law, that is, the ejectment of the defendant and the payment by the latter of the damages due for the occupation of the land, though the plaintiff is free to
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Avena condone said payment. It is evident that the court can not author authorize ize the defend defendant ant petiti petitione onerr to continue in possession the land as lessee if he pays the rents or damage damages s demand demanded ed by the plaintif plaintiff f since such continuation continuation depends not only upon the plaintiff's will but also upon that of the defendant. A judgment authorizing the defendant to continue as lessee for a certain and definite period of time after the judgment, will not bind the plaintiff to grant such lease nor the defendant to continue as lessee paying the monthly rental fixed by the court. A court cannot make and impose a contract upon the parties. Even assuming, arguendo, that the complaint may contain two alternatives or independent actions, one of forcible entry and another for recovery of rents or damages, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has no jurisdiction to entertain either one or both. It has no jurisdiction over the action of forcible entry, for it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace; nor over that of recovery of rents or damages, because the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, which determines the court jurisdiction, is less than two hundred pesos (P200). According to the complaint, complaint, the petitioner petitioner had occupied occupied the lot in question during the months of October, November, December and January when the complaint was filed, and the total amount of rents or damages claimed as due for that that occupa occupatio tion n at the rate rate of fifty fifty pesos pesos (P50) a month, minus the sum of twenty-five pesos (P25) (P25) which was paid paid on account account of the rent for October, October, aggregate only one hundred and seventyseventyfive pesos (P175). The fact that, in its judgment, the lower court has awarded the plaintiff the sum of P250, including the rent for February, and not the P25 paid on account by the petitioner for the month of October as alleged in the same complaint, did not confer upon the court juris jurisdic dictio tion n over over the case. If the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter according to the allegations in the complaint, it can not acquire it just becaus because e the rents claime claimed d and those that that may accrue during the pendency of the suit may amount to a sum within its jurisdiction. jurisdiction. To hold otherwise otherwise would lead to the absurdity that the jurisdiction of the court depends not upon the allegations allegations in the complaint, complaint, but upon a contingency contingency which may or may not arise or occur. As the damages claimed in the the compl complai aint nt amount amounted ed to one one hundr hundred ed and and seventy-five seventy-five pesos (P175), (P175), could the lower court have sentenced sentenced the defendant to pay the amount clai claime med d had had the the latt latter er made made a conf confes essi sion on of judgment?
Disposition The respondent judge's decision in this case is set aside; aside; with costs against against the respondent Emiliana Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas. So ordered.
PARAS, J., dissenting: - The willingness of the plaintiff to let the defendant, herein petitioner Manuel Baguioro, retain possession of the land upon payment of the rent (which, plaintiff alleges, should be P50) is plainly repugnant to the theory theory that the principal principal purpose of the action action is ejectment ejectment of the defendant or, in the language language of section 1 of Rule 72, "the restitution of possession." Upon Upon the the othe otherr hand hand,, givi giving ng such such reas reason onab able le intendments to the allegations of the complaint as are consistent with and implied by the relief sought, the action may be one for the enforcement of a lease contract — implied or otherwise — in which the court is asked to fix the amount of the rent for want of correspondi corresponding ng stipulati stipulation. on. The claim that the rent ought to be P50, when considered with the prayer "for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable," merely invokes the discretion and judgment of the court regarding the righteousness of said claim. -While -While the complain complaintt may be treate treated d ;as one for simp simple le ejec ejectm tmen ent, t, in the the ligh lightt of some some of its its averments, the circumstance nevertheless does not prevent it from being an action — its denomination immaterial — that may be filed originally in the Court of First Instance, in view of the other allegations and the prayer. In the latter situation, matters contained in the pleading which are not necessary to, or are incompatibl incompatible e with, the jurisdiction jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance may be considered considered surplusage. surplusage. The complaint complaint might have been awkwardly awkwardly drafted, drafted, but unless unless the defend defendant ant was actually actually misled misled to his surpri surprise se or injury injury,, it should should be held held suffic sufficien ient. t. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil., 504.) It is needle needless ss to state state that the nature nature of an action action is determined by its allegations and prayer. As long as the complaint makes out a case cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the latter's jurisdiction will not be altered or taken away simply because the action cannot cannot prosper. prosper. The judgme judgment nt in this this case case was rendered after the defendant had been declared in default. HILADO, J., dissenting: -Liberally construed, as it should be (Rule 15, section 17), the plaintiff' plaintiff's s complaint complaint is susceptibl susceptible e of two constructions: as a complaint in ejectment, and as
one aimed at invoking the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in actions for possession of real property, property, as regards regards the plaintiff's plaintiff's land under section 56, paragraph 2, of Act No. 136. In choosing between between these two constructi constructions ons in justice justice to the learning and intelligence of counsel for the plaintiff, it seems seems to me that the court court should should have have had no difficulty in concluding that he meant and intended to resort to the latter procedure, procedure, as he should should be presumed to know such an elemental rule as that which confers upon the municipal or justice of the peace court exclusive original jurisdiction of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases within the first year following the accrual of the cause of action. -Even where the defendant defendant employs, e. g., violence violence in taking possession of the plaintiff's land, the law does not compel the latter to resort to the summary remedy y furnished by Rule 72, section 1, just as it does does not compel the plaint plaintiff iff to file file a crimin criminal al compl complai aint nt for for any any crim crimin inal al offe offens nse e whic which h the the defendant may have committed with the use of such violence. The law grants the plaintiff of remedies, as well as a choice of courts, so long as he lays before the court of his choice the facts calling for a proper proper exercise exercise of its jurisdicti jurisdiction. on. So that an undisputed undisputed owner of land who, as such, is by law entitled entitled to its possession, and who is deprived thereof, e.. g., by force, while entitled to the summary remedy afforded by Rule 72, section 1, which according to said section he may resort to, is neither compelled to bring his case case ther thereu eund nder er,, alle allegi ging ng the the char charac acte teri rist stic ic circumstance circumstance of violence, violence, lodging his action action in the proper inferior court, nor forbidden to seek redress from the proper Court of First Instance by bringing his case under its general jurisdictio jurisdiction n "in all civil action actions s which which involv involve e . . . the possessi possession on of real real property property . . .", waiving waiving the effects effects of the violence violence committed by the defendant as well as the summary remedy to which such characteris characteristic tic circumstance circumstance may entitled, entitled, had simply simply alleging, as his cause of action, action, his ownership ownership of the land, his right to its possession and the fact that he has been deprived of such possession by the defendant, regardless of the manner employed in such deprivation. The same law which does not compel the owner to bring a criminal action by reason of such violence does not compel him to bring a forcible entry suit by reason reason thereof. And it would be to my mind scandalous to affirm in a government of laws that in such circumstances the owner will be prevented from bringing his case under the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of the province without invoking invoking the characteristic characteristic
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circumstance of violence. Of course, in an ordinary action commenced in the Court of First Instance, he will not be entitled entitled to the summary proceedings, proceedings, such as the immediate execution of the judgment, etc., provided for in Rule 72. So long as the plaintiff does not rely on any of the specific circumstances characteriz characterizing ing the action action as one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, it cannot be said to be within the exclusive exclusive original jurisdiction jurisdiction of the municipal municipal or justice of the peace court, even within the first year following the accrual of the cause of action.
- In 2001, MIPI and Gonzales filed MTD on the ff. grounds: [1] the complaint failed to comply with the requir requiremen ements ts set forth forth under under SC Adminis Administra trativ tive e Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Procedure as regards regards certificat certifications ions agai agains nstt foru forum m shop shoppi ping ng;; and and [2] [2] ther there e was was noncomplian noncompliance ce with a condition condition precedent precedent for the filing of the case and/or the same failed to state a cause of action or was premature - RTC denied MTD and MFR of MIPI and Gonzales. CA granted the petition for certiorari and reversed RTC. CA rule ruled d that that CBC CBC fail failed ed to comp comply ly with with the the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as there was nothing in the records showing that the signatory of the certification against forum shopping was authorized by CBC. It referred to the Corporation Code and jurisprudence which state that corporatio corporations ns exercise exercise their corporate powers through their board of directors and no person can bind bind the corpor corporati ation on withou withoutt author authority ity from from the latter. latter. CA denied denied CBC’s MFR. Hence, the present present petition.
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CHINA BANKING CORP V MONDRAGON INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 164798 PUNO; November 17, 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - In 1994, 1994, respon responden dentt Mondra Mondragon gon Intern Internati ationa onall Philippines, Incorporated (MIPI), entered into a Lease Agreeme Agreement nt with with Clark Clark Develo Developme pment nt Corpor Corporati ation on (Clark)to (Clark)to develop the 232-hectare Mimosa Leisure Leisure Estate. Estate. They also entered entered into supplemental supplemental lease agreements to develop other additional areas. Part of the funds used for these projects was generated from loans loans obtain obtained ed from from petiti petitione onerr China China Bankin Banking g Corpor Corporati ation on (CBC). (CBC). To secure secure these these loans, loans, MIPI execut executed ed promis promissor sory y notes notes in favor favor of CBC. CBC. In addition, respondent Antonio U. Gonzales executed a Surety Agreement in favor of CBC in the amount of P100M. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis transpired. The The ensu ensuin ing g shoc shock k to the the Phil Philip ippi pine ne econ econom omy y affected MIPI’s ability to pay its obligations to CBC. - In 2000, CBC filed a complaint for a sum of money with RTC Makati City against MIPI and Mr. Gonzales. The certification of forum shopping was attached to the complaint. It was to the effect that: MERCEDES E. GERMAN, the Manager of Loans & Discounts Dept of the China Banking Corp certified that the defendant China Bank has not commenced any other action or proceeding proceeding involving involving the same issues in the SC, CA or before any other tribunal or agency, and that to the the best best of her her know knowle ledg dge, e, no such such acti action on or proceeding is pending, and that if a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before SC, CA or any other tribunal or agency, agency, she undertakes undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days.
ISSUE WON CBC’s CBC’s failur failure e to attach attach the requisit requisite e board board reso resolu luti tion on maki making ng Ms. Ms. Germa German n an auth author oriz ized ed signatory signatory of certificat certifications ions against against forum shopping was was a fata fatall erro errorr and and cann cannot ot be rect rectif ifie ied d by subsequent submission thereof.
HELD NO The Court Court has relaxe relaxed, d, under under justif justifiab iable le Ratio The circumstance circumstances, s, the rule requiring requiring the submission of these these certif certifica icatio tions ns and has applie applied d the rule rule of subs substa tant ntia iall comp compli lian ance ce unde underr just justif ifia iabl ble e circumstance circumstances s with respect respect to the contents of the certificati certification. on. If the belated filing filing of the certification certification against against forum shopping shopping for compelling compelling reasons reasons in previous rulings is allowed, with more reason should the Court sanction the timely submission submission of such certif certifica icatio tion n though though the proof proof of the signat signatory ory’s ’s authority was submitted thereafter. Reasoning The court has used the doctrine of stare decisis to enunciate this principle. The ff. cases were cited as authority: authority: Shipside Shipside Incorporate Incorporated d v. CA, Ateneo De Naga University v. Manalo, and, Pascual & Sant Santos os Inc Inc v. Tram Tramo o Waka Wakas s Neig Neighb hbor orho hood od the meet meetin ing g of CBC’ CBC’s s Boar Board d of Association. At the Direct Directors ors,, the Board, Board, in a resolu resolutio tion, n, approv approved, ed, confir confirmed med and ratifi ratified ed Ms. German’ German’s s author authority ity..
Though the wording of the board resolution leaves much to be desired, it remains equally susceptible of interpretation in favor of Ms. German’s preexisting status as an authorized signatory. Disposition Petition is GRANTED.
CRUZ-AGANA V LAGMAN G.R. No. 139018 CARPIO; April 11, 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - On 18 March 1996, petitioner petitioner filed a Complaint for annulm annulment ent of title title with with prayer prayer for prelim prelimina inary ry mandatory injunction against respondent. Petitioner claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificat Certificate e of Title No. T-3907. Petitioner Petitioner further further claims that the lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez Lopez,, Jr. Jr. who who late laterr on tran transf sfer erre red d the the lot lot to respondent. - Respon Responden dentt season seasonabl ably y filed filed its Answer Answer with with compul compulsor sory y counte countercl rclaim aim.. Petiti Petitione onerr moved moved to dismis dismiss s respon responden dent’s t’s counte countercl rclaim aim for lack lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping. - In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied petitioner’s petitioner’s motion to dismiss dismiss respondent’ respondent’s s coun counte terc rcla laim im.. The The tria triall cour courtt reas reason oned ed that that respon responden dent’s t’s counte countercl rclaim aim is compul compulsor sory y and therefore excluded from the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved that the trial trial court court recons reconside iderr its Order Order invoki invoking ng the mandat mandatory ory nature nature of a certif certifica icate te of non-fo non-forum rum shoppi shopping ng under under Suprem Supreme e Court Court Admini Administr strati ative ve Circular Circular No. 04-94. On 25 May 1999, the trial trial court reversed reversed its 11 March 1999 Order and dismissed dismissed respondent’s counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping. - Resp Respon onde dent nt seas season onab ably ly file filed d a motio motion n for for reconsideration arguing that Administrative Circular N o. o. 0 44- 94 94 do es es n ot ot a pp pp ly ly t o c om om pu pu ls ls or or y counterclai counterclaims ms following following the ruling ruling in Santo Tomas University University Hospit Hospital al v. Surla. Surla. On 4 June 1999, the the trial court again reversed itself and recalled its Order dismissing respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court ruled that the filing filing of a compulsory compulsory counterclaim counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE
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HELD NO - Santo Tomas clarified clarified the scope of Administra Administrative tive Circular Circular No. 04-94 with respect respect to counterclaims. counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is intended primari primarily ly to cover cover “an initiato initiatory ry pleadi pleading ng or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.” The distinction between a compulsory and a permissive counterclaim is vital in the application of the circular. The Court explained: It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact, fact, been been contem contempla plated ted to includ include e a kind kind of claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding outstanding for independent independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso proviso in the second paragraph paragraph of Section Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule “shall not be curable by mere amendment xxx but shall be cause for the dismissal dismissal of the case withou withoutt prejud prejudice ice,” ,” being being predic predicate ated d on the applic applicabi abilit lity y of the need need for a certif certifica icatio tion n agains againstt forum-s forum-shop hoppin ping, g, obviou obviously sly does does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up. - The Court reiterated this ruling in Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr. - Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initia initiator tory y and similar similar pleadin pleadings. gs. A compuls compulsory ory coun counte terc rcla laim im set set up in the the answ answer er is not not an “initi “initiato atory” ry” or simila similarr pleadi pleading. ng. The initiat initiatory ory pleading pleading is the plaintiff’ plaintiff’s s complaint. complaint. A respondent respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the the momen momentt the the plai plaint ntif ifff file files s the the compl complai aint nt.. Otherw Otherwise ise,, respon responden dentt waives waives the compul compulsor sory y counterclaim. In short, short, the compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiv waiver er,, to an init initia iato tory ry plea pleadi ding ng whic which h is the the complaint.
- Petitioner’s counsel fails or simply refuses to accept the distinctio distinction n between between a permissive permissive counterclaim counterclaim and a compulsory counterclaim. This distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas and Ponciano. The sole issue for resolution in the present case is whether respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. permissive. If it is a permissive permissive countercla counterclaim, im, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is fatal. If it is a compu compuls lsor ory y coun counte terc rcla laim im,, the the lack lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is immaterial. - A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s plaintiff’s complaint.[9] It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties parties over whom the court cannot acquire acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive. - Respondent’s counterclaim as set up in its answer states: 3. That because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjust unjustifi ified ed acts acts of the plaint plaintiff iff,, herein herein defendant defendant has suffered suffered and continue continue to suffer suffer actu actual al dama damage ges s in the the sum sum of at leas leastt P400,0 P400,000, 00,000 000.00 .00 which which the law, law, equity equity,, and justice require that to be paid by the plaintiff and furthe furtherr to reimbu reimburse rse the attorn attorney’ ey’s s fees fees of P2,000,000.00; - It is clea clearr that that the the coun counte terc rcla laim im set set up by respon responden dentt arises arises from from the filing filing of plaint plaintiff iff’s ’s complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case case that that it is incapa incapable ble of procee proceedin ding g independent independently. ly. The counterclai counterclaim m will require a relitigation of the same evidence if the counterclaim is allowe allowed d to procee proceed d in a separa separate te actio action. n. Even Even petitioner recognizes that respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory. compulsory. A compulsory compulsory counterclaim counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compuls compulsory ory counte countercl rclaim aim is not an initia initiator tory y pleading. Disposition The decision petition is denied.
Re manner of making allegations PERPETUAL SAVINGS V FAJARDO 223 SCRA 720
FELICIANO; June28,1993 FACTS: -J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation ("J.J. Mining") executed and delivered to petitioner Perpetual Savings ("Bank") a promisory note in the amount of P750.000.00 payable in one lump sum upon maturity with interest at 23% per annum. The note also contained, inter alia, a clause providing for penalty interest at the rate of 3% , nor month on the amount due, compounded monthly. The promisory note was executed for J.J. Mining by respondents Jose Oro B. Fajardo and Emmanuel F. Del Mande. Messrs. Fajardo and Del Mundo are said to be officers of J.J. Mining. Upon maturity of the promissory note, neither J.J. Mining nor anyone else paid the amount of the indebtedness, notwithstanding petitioner's repeated written demands for payment. -petitioner Bank filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, against J.J; Mining, Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni and herein respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, for collection of the amounts due under the promissory note -Defendant's Fajardo and Del Mundo were impleaded as agents/or representatives of Defendant Corporation who were signatories in the Promissory Note or alternatively, in their personal capacities “if it be shown that they contracted the loan fully knowing that the Defendant Corporation would be unable to pay the same upon maturity, and/or that they used the proceeds of the loan foe their own personal benefit” -Respondent Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint had failed to stated cause of action against them. RTC denied motion to dismiss. Fajardo and Del Mundo raised the case to the SC but SC referred case to CA. Respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, basically alleged that petitioner Bank's complaint did not set forth any cause of action as against them personally, and that Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on alternative defendants was not applicable to the case at bar. CA granted motion of Fajardo and Del Mundo
ISSUE WON complaint of Perpetual Savings stated a cause of action against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, as distinguished from J.J. Mining, on whose behalf they had purported to act.
HELD
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YES. Reasoning. In Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner: 'The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid Judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. - In its Decision, CA said, among other the that petitioner Bank's complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities for the reason that. no evidence had been presented to support such alleged liability on the "so called alternative cause of action." -The SC held that the CA was in reversible error. It was quite premature for the Court of Appeals to consider evidence (or lack of evidence) outside the complaint since the trial had not yet started. The allegations made by the bank could be proven on trial.
complaint and the attachments to the original complaint, clearly show that a sufficient cause of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, according to respondent. -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a rhetorical unit. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences dealing with a single topic," a paragraph must necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. In the instant case, paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise between the parties. Hence, it is in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or construed. -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the documents attached thereto, following the rule that documents attached to a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading, we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action.
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Re Effect of Failure to Plead
WEE V GALVEZ (supra)
CEREZO V. TUAZON (supra)
FACTS
NATURE
-this is regards the sisters, one in US and one in RP who is taking care of the son of the sister in US. Allowance issues…
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS -Bus collided with tricycle
ON MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS etitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule 8, Section 133 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A of the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" is clearly insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to petitioners. -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. Thus taken together, in their entirety, the amended
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence. Reasoning there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a motion for new trial or a
petition for certiorari. It was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment.After the SC’s resolution denying Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court. Annulment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground, or could have been used as a ground, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud, was her ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief, which was denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the remedy of annulment. Disposition PETITION DENIED.
SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO) G.R. NO. 153696 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11, 2006 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS: -
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On January 3, 2001, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or "Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On January 22, 2001, petitioners were served with the summons, together with a
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copy of the complaint. As petitioners failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, Metrobank, on February 8, 2001, filed a motion to declare them in default. The motion was set for hearing on February 16, 2001. Acting on the motion, the lower court, presided over by Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio (or "respondent judge"), issued an order dated February 12, 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the ex parte presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7, 2001. On February 15, 2001, petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s motion to declare them in default, claiming that upon receipt of the summons, they immediately sought the services of Atty. Philip Pantojan but it was only on February 12, 2001 that they were able to meet with Atty. Pantojan. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law", they were unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer." On the same date, February 15, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to admit answer, as well as the answer. In an order dated February 16, 2001, respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s motion for default On February 19, 2001, Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to admit answer, arguing that said motion was rendered moot and academic by the February 12, 2001 order. Metrobank also chided petitioners for violating the threeday notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order dated February 20, 2001, the motion to admit answer was denied. On February 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default; Metrobank opposed the motion. On March 2, 2001, respondent judge issued an order holding in abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default. On March 5, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of Metrobank’s evidence on March
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7, 2001, as previously scheduled. On that date (March 7, 2001), Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March 5, 2001 order but their motion was denied. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders, declaring them in default and denying their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) Motion to Declare them in Default; and the Orders denying their Motion to Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the same. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners. It also ruled that for an order of default to be set aside, petitioners must have a meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the order of default set aside The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default; that under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in default, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default; and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by petitioners, the trial court had properly declared them in default. The CA further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled hearing of Metrobank’s motion, such error is not so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: 1. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense is a meritorious defense.
HELD:
1. YES ReasoningSection 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Default; declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule. In filing motions, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides: Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare defendant in default. The Court then ruled that there is no need. However, the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party should be with notice to the defending party. The purpose of a notice of a motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments. The notice of a motion is required when the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of
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Avena such motion to the defending party, it is not enough that the defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to be a sufficient ground for declaration in default. Disposition. Petition for review is GRANTED . The Decision of the Court of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of Default of the Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is deemed ADMITTED . The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below.
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SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO) G.R. NO. 153696 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11, 2006 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
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On January 3, 2001, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or "Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On January 22, 2001, petitioners were served with the summons, together with a copy of the complaint. As petitioners failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, Metrobank, on February 8, 2001, filed a motion to declare them in default. The motion was set for hearing on February 16, 2001. Acting on the motion, the lower court, presided over by Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio (or "respondent judge"), issued an order dated February 12, 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the ex parte presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7, 2001. On February 15, 2001, petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s motion to declare them in default, claiming that upon receipt of the summons, they immediately sought the services of Atty. Philip Pantojan but it was only on February 12, 2001 that they
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were able to meet with Atty. Pantojan. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law", they were unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer." On the same date, February 15, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to admit answer, as well as the answer. In an order dated February 16, 2001, respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s motion for default On February 19, 2001, Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to admit answer, arguing that said motion was rendered moot and academic by the February 12, 2001 order. Metrobank also chided petitioners for violating the threeday notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In an order dated February 20, 2001, the motion to admit answer was denied. On February 27, 2001, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default; Metrobank opposed the motion. On March 2, 2001, respondent judge issued an order holding in abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default. On March 5, 2001, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of Metrobank’s evidence on March 7, 2001, as previously scheduled. On that date (March 7, 2001), Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March 5, 2001 order but their motion was denied. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders, declaring them in default and denying their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) Motion to Declare them in Default; and the Orders denying their Motion to Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the same. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners.
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It also ruled that for an order of default to be set aside, petitioners must have a meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the order of default set aside The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default; that under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in default, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default; and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by petitioners, the trial court had properly declared them in default. The CA further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled hearing of Metrobank’s motion, such error is not so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: 1. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense is a meritorious defense.
HELD: 1. YES ReasoningSection 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Default; declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to
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Avena declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule. In filing motions, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides: Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare defendant in default. The Court then ruled that there is no need. However, the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party should be with notice to the defending party. The purpose of a notice of a motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments. The notice of a motion is required when the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party, it is not enough that the defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to be a sufficient ground for declaration in default. Disposition. Petition for review is GRANTED . The Decision of the Court of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of Default of the Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is deemed ADMITTED . The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below.
HOLLYWOOD FAR EAST PRODUCTIONS, INC., and VALENZUELA 27 SCRA 1276 REYES, J.B.L.; April 30, 1969 NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari to set aside certain orders of the CFI dismissing a complaint for breach of contract and damages, denying reconsideration, refusing to admit an amended complaint, and declaring the dismissal final and unappealable.
FACTS - Petitioner, actress Dauden-Hernaez, files a complaint to recover P14,700 (the balance allegedly due to her for her services as leading actress), plus damages, against private respondents Hollywood Far East Productions (HFEP) and its President Valenzuela - Upon motion of defendants, respondent court dismissed the complaint because “claim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document, either public or private”, and the complaint was “Defective on its face” for violating CC A 1356 and 1358 11, as well as for containing defective allege, petitions. - Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the dismissal, and for admission of an amended complaint, attached to the motion 11
Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered
into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be i n some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised.
Article 1358. The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405; (2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains; (3) The power t o administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person; (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.
All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by
STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS DAUDEN-HERNAEZ V ANGELES,
articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405. (1280a)
- court denied the reconsideration and the leave to amend. - a second reconsideration was filed - court denied it as its allegations were more or less the same as the first motion, and not accompanied by an affidavit of merits. The court further declared the dismissal final and unappealable. - hence this petition - the respondent court’s defense: The proposed amendment suffers from the same vital defect of the original complaint, which is violation of A 1356 because the contract sued upon was not alleged to be in writing, and A 1358 in because the writing was absolute and indispensable because the amount exceeds P500; and that the second motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period for appeal because it was not served on 3 days’ notice.
ISSUES 1. WON the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the original dismissed complaint 2. WON xxx
HELD 1.YES Reasoning Twhen a court sustains a demurrer or motion to dismiss, the court must give the party plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint if he so chooses. The first order of dismissal did not provide that the same was without prejudice to amendment of the complaint, or reserve to the plaintiff the right to amend his complaint, so the order was erroneous. Hence, petitioner was within her rights in filing her so-called second motion for reconsideration, which was actually a first motion against the refusal to admit the amended complaint. Also, since a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading, the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the original dismissed complaint. Paeste v Jaurigue: “Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice. (Torres vs. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913). Moreover, under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course, that is, without leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading is served. A motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading". (Moran on the Rules of Court, vol. 1, 1952, ed., p. 376). As plaintiffs
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amended their complaint before it was answered, the motion to admit the amendment should not have been denied.” Disposition The order dismissing the complaint is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not at variance with this decision.
as against respondent BF Homes and denying respondent PII's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, hearing on the merits ensued. During trial, petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo, its treasury department manager, who testified that the amount of P19,035,256.57 was paid by petitioner to the PNB through the account of the National Treasury to cover the principal loan and interests incurred by PII. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to amend the pertinent portions of the complaint insofar as it refers to the fact of payment and the amount paid by petitioner to PNB. Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court, at that time presided by Judge Joselito J. Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order, dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing the Order issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied by Judge de la Rosa. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari against the trial court. The SC issued referred the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
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PHILIPPINE EXPORT vs. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC. G.R. No. 120384 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 13, 2004 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondents Philippine Infrastructures, Inc. (PII), Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. (PBAC), The Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid), B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), Pilar Development Corporation (PDC) and Tomas B. Aguirre (Aguirre). The complaint alleged, among others, that: (i) petitioner issued 5 Letters of Guarantee in favor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for credit accommodations extended by PNB to PII; (ii) PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre executed a Deed of Undertaking binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or reimburse petitioner upon demand such amount of money or to repair the damages, losses or penalties which petitioner may pay or suffer on account of its guarantees; (iii) on April 24, 1985, PNB called on the guarantees of petitioner; (iv) thereafter, petitioner demanded from PII the immediate settlement of P20,959,529.36, representing the aggregate amount of the guarantees of petitioner called by PNB and the further sum of P351,517.57 representing various fees and charges; (v) PII refused to settle said obligations; (vi) respondents Solid and PBAC also refused to pay petitioner despite demand. Respondent BF Homes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it is undergoing rehabilitation receivership in the SEC and pursuant to P.D. 902-A, the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Respondent PII also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. The other respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings. The trial court, through Judge Roberto M. Lagman, issued an Order suspending the case only
ISSUES: (1) WON an order dismissing a petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of ordinary appeal; (2) WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner failed to state a cause of action for not alleging loss or actual payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees; (3) WON the complaint stated a cause of action.
HELD: (1) NO (under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an action may be appealed by ordinary appeal. However, under Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. It may be subject of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Considering that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated in 1994, respondent appellate court could not have
committed any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 31483. Nevertheless, in
the higher interest of substantial justice and pursuant to the hornbook doctrine that procedural laws may be applied retroactively, 16 the Court gives due course to the present petition. (2) YES. It should be stressed that the amendment of the complaint was sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, more specifically, the testimony of petitioner's Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from the PNB proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the amount of P19,035,256.57 pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent PII. The record shows that respondents did not raise any objection when it presented evidence to prove payment to PNB. Hence, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by respondents reveal that none of them denied petitioner's claim that said evidence was presented before the trial court without objections having been raised by respondents. None of them claimed that they raised any objections at the time when petitioner presented its evidence to prove its payment to PNB. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted the presentation of the said evidence. Respondents contend that since they had already alleged the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense in their answer, there was no further need for them to raise an objection at the time the evidence was introduced. This is not plausible. It is settled that even if the complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
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in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
had been validly and duly staked and located by the plaintiff or its grantors and predecessors in interest. - On November 23, 1935, the defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint was ambiguous and unintelligible. On January 9, 1936 the CFI entered an order requiring Surigao Mining to amend its complaint so as to contain a detailed description of its placer claims. - On January 13, 1936 an amended complaint was filed to which another demurrer was interposed but was overruled. On June 11, 1936, a third amended complaint in which thirty-two other individuals were included as parties-defendant. In this third amended complaint the placer claims were reduced, to eleven, and the relief prayed for was about the same as that asked in the original complaint, although the amount sought as damages was increased to P49,000. - Exhibits O and O-1 to 0-9 were presented. With the exception of Exhibit O-7, all are deeds of sale in favor of Surigao Mining covering the placer claims and bear dates posterior to (AFTER) October 24, 1935, the date of the filing of the original complaint. Exhibit O-7 is a deed of sale executed by Pablo Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23, 1935. The mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo, to Surigao Mining under Exhibit O-9 were the same claims acquired by Maximo Borromeo, under Exhibit O-7. - Before Surigao Mining could close its evidence, the defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint o n th e g rou nd th at , w he n t he a cti on w as commenced, plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued, since the plaintiff did not become the owner of the claims until after the original complaint was filed on October 24, 1935. The CFI granted the MTD.
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Avena Respondents' failure to object to the evidence at the time it is presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived defect the complaint had was cured by the introduction of petitioner's evidence proving actual loss sustained by petitioner due to payment made by it to PNB. (3) YES. Petitioner's cause of action against respondents stemmed from the obligation of respondents under their Deed of Undertaking, a copy of which was attached to the complaint. In the present petition, petitioner had become liable to pay the amounts covered by said guarantees when, as the original complaint alleges, the PNB called upon said guarantees. Respondents' obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents. The mere inclusion in petitioner's original complaint of the allegation that the PNB had already called on the guarantees of petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. Clearly therefore, the original complaint, by itself, stated a valid cause of action.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is GRANTED. Let the original records of Civil Case No. 86-38169 be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Manila, for continuation of the trial on the merits.
SURIGAO MINING V HARRIS 68 PHIL 113 LAUREL; May 17, 1939
ISSUE 1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint
NATURE
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Appeal from the order of the CFI of Surigao dismissing the complaint filed by Surigao Mining against Harris, et al.
1. NO. Ratio Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such later accrued cause of action is not permissible. Reasoning Subject to certain qualifications and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced before the cause of action has accrued
FACTS - On October 24, 1935, Surigao Mining filed a complaint claiming that it is the owner by purchase of 14 placer claims and that lode claims were staked by the defendants Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate. Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., and Otto Weber on plaintiff's placer claims after the latter
is prematurely brought and should be dismissed, provided, an objection on this ground is properly and seasonably interposed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while it is pending is of no moment. - In this case, timely objection was made by counsel for the appellees upon discovery of the immaturity of the action. The date when a civil action is deemed commenced is determined by section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 389, which was taken from section 405 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the action is deemed commenced upon the "filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is to be instituted." The original complaint was filed on October 24, 1935. - The right to amend a pleading is not an absolute and unconditional right. It is to be allowed in furtherance of justice under a sound judicial discretion. This judicial discretion, upon the other hand, is of course not without any restriction. The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced. As soon as an action is brought and the complaint is filed, the proceedings thus initiated are not subject to the arbitrary control of the parties or of the court, but must be dealt with in accordance with recognized rules of pleading and practice. Amendments must be such, and only such, as are necessary to promote the completion of the action begun. - It is true, that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of the originals which are thereby regarded as abandoned. That, however, which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a cause of action: Nihil do re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jua accresceret habet. Disposition Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Filing/ Service of pleadings, judgments and other papers BAUTISTA V MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES INC G.R. No. 148361 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Nov. 29, 2005 NATURE
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Petition for review on certiorari assailing decision and resolution of the CA
responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a
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Avena FACTS - Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a lot in Batangas. - MMCI. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of petitioners’ title and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction, alleging that “without any color of right and through dubious means,” petitioners were able to obtain original title in their names. - Spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it does not state a cause of action. They averred that respondent is a private corporation, hence, disqualified under the Constitution from acquiring public alienable lands except by lease, and cannot be considered a real party in interest. - RTC granted motion to dismiss. - MMCI filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for quieting of title. Respondent alleged that the technical description in petitioners’ title does not cover the disputed lot. - Spouses filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint does not also state a cause of action and if admitted, respondent’s theory of the case is substantially modified. - RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. - Petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the amended complaint does not cure the defect in the original complaint which does not state a cause of action. - CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. - Petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint. What they filed was a motion to dismiss, which is not a responsive pleading as contemplated by the Rule. Thus respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final, as in this case. - As to petitioners’ contention that MMCI is barred from acquiring the subject lot, suffice it to say that this is a matter of defense which can only be properly determined during the full-blown trial of the instant case. Dispositive Petition DENIED. CA decision affirmed in toto.
GCP-MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES INC. V. PRINCIPE GR No. 141484 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; Nov 11, 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
NO - Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure12 shows that before the filing of any
- This petition is filed by GCP, seeking reversal of CA decision. - The case started when Recolizado filed complaint for damages for physical injuries sustained by him as passenger of GCP’s bus. RTC rendered decision in favor of Recolizado. - Copy of decision sent to petitioner was returned because it had “moved” (residence), while copy sent to Atty. Aquino, then petitioner’s counsel, was returned “unserved” being unclaimed. Petitioner states that copy of decision was personally delivered by Civil Docket Clerk of TC on Atty. Aquino who refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel for petitioner, although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by him. - Private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment, copy furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and petitioner which the court granted. Writ
12 “SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a
at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.”
ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting respondent’s amended complaint
HELD
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply,
of execution was issued, which petitioner received. - Atty. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that petitioner had not been duly notified. Petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the decision. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 2 mos later, respondent court issued assailed resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration or to quash writ of execution. - Petitioner went to CA on petition for certiorari. CA found no abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition. Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. - Petitioner argues that: when a copy of the decision which the court sent to Atty. Aquino was returned to sender, respondent Judge resorted in causing the service of the decision to said counsel in open court, as petitioner’s counsel on record, when said lawyer appeared in the sala of respondent Judge for another case; petitioner should be deemed as having no notice of the trial court decision since its counsel, who had not withdrawn as such, refused to receive a copy of the same. What the civil docket clerk of the trial court should have done was to resort to substituted service. - Respondent in his Comment contends that since Atty. Aquino is counsel of petitioner and there is nothing to show that he withdrew as counsel of petitioner, the copy of the decision mailed to him by registered mail although returned unserved is sufficient to serve as notice to him and to his client following Sec. 5 of Rule 13 of RoC; it was the duty of petitioner to notify the court that Atty. Aquino was no longer its lawyer; if a lawyer is going to withdraw as counsel for his client, he should file a motion to withdraw as such with the conformity of the client.
ISSUE/S WON CA decision should be reversed
HELD NO - Clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer’s mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced. The only
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Avena exception to the general rule is when the counsel’s actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client. In this case, while Atty. Aquino, counsel of petitioner, was far from being vigilant in protecting the interest of his client, his infractions cannot be said to have deprived petitioner of due process. - Petitioner was able to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. While it may have lost its right to appeal, it was not denied its day in court. Right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process but only a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. When petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence. - Petitioner was wanting in all these areas. Not only did it fail to regularly check on the status of the case, it also failed to ensure that it could be notified of the decision as soon as it was promulgated. Petitioner did not inform the court that it has severed its relationship with Atty. Aquino. Neither did it hire a new lawyer soon after Atty. Aquino allegedly ceased to be its counsel. - That Atty. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision and no substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a copy of the trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail to Atty. Aquino This is sufficient service of the decision on petitioner since service upon counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. - In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. Even then, in the present case, the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to petitioner’s known address. Obiter Court reiterates the distinction between petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It should be recalled that a petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment while a petition under Rule 65 concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents abused their discretion.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
COMPUTATION OF TIME SPS. CONRADO and MA. CORONA ROMERO vs. CA, SATURNINO S. ORDEN G.R. No. 142406 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; May 16, 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari filed [R65]
FACTS - Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden. - In said contract, Orden proposed to purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao, QC for the total amount of P17M. - The contract stipulated that private respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later than December 19, 1996 and that Orden shall shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property. - When Orden failed to pay the down payment, petitioner Corona told him that she was rescinding the contract to sell. - Orden then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the QC RTC alleging that he has complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. - Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Orden caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT. - August 11, 1997, Manuel Y. Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos, subsequent buyers of the subject property sold by Corona and her siblings, filed a motion for leave to intervene with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. - They filed a motion for the cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution saying that the evidence presented by Orden does not bear out the main allegations in the complaint and that he does not have any actionable right over the subject property there being no deed of sale executed between him
and the defendants over the subject real properties as offered in the alleged agreement. - RTC: denied Orden’s MR. - Nov. 16, 1998, Orden filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the reannotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT. - The CA granted the petition on 4 grounds: First, they said that the general rule is “a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined except in cases expressly provided by statute.” Second, CA cited Sec.77 of PD 1529-Property Registration Decree which provided for two grounds for the court to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens during the pendency of an action which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded (NOW SEC 14, R13 ROC). Third, the Doctrine of Lis Pendens would be rendered meaningless if the private respondents are allowed to file a bond regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice and that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated. Fourth, if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the petitioner and the private respondents-owners (which question of fact is not for this court to determine in this petition), then the said parties are bound by the provisions of A1475 of the Civil Code (The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.From that moment, the parties m ay reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contract.) -CA denied Romeros MR on January 26, 2000. Petitioners’ contention. by ordering the reannotation of the notice of lis pendens, when private respondent did not even assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property, the CA went against the doctrine in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals where this Court held that the applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the subject litigation, assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property in order to give due course to his application; the CA, in concluding that there was no hearing before the annotation was cancelled, overlooked the fact that the motion for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12, 1997, that
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private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear, and that he was able to file his opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which the RTC considered before promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, 1997. Orden’s contention. the court a quo cancelled the notice of lis pendens even before it has been apprised of all the relevant facts of the case; the CA was correct in ruling that while the parties are locked in legal battle and until it becomes manifest that the grounds set forth in Sec. 77, P.D. No. 1529 exist, the trial court should not allow the cancellation of the lis pendens; In their Reply, petitioners reiterate their arguments and cited AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals where it was held that a notice of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real property. They further maintain that the requirement of prior hearing was sufficiently complied with in this case and petitioners did not act in bad faith when she sold the subject property pending the outcome of this case since there was no outstanding injunction or restraining order which would have prevented her from doing so.
within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. - Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. CA: a notice of lis pendens is appropriate in the following: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action to quiet title thereto; (c) an action to remove clouds thereon; (d) an action for partition; and (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. -Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp.: Resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property but also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. - The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio. -To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a party has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property. It is not necessary that ownership or interest over the property is proved. -By praying for the Romeros to be bound by the terms of their contract (ie. Specific performance and damages), Orden in effect asks the court to order petitioners to fulfill their promise to sell the property for the amount of P17M. -While Orden did not explicitly state that he was running after the ownership of the property, a simple reading of the complaint would show that such was
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ISSUE WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis pendens.
HELD NO. Petitioners have failed to show that the CA committed GAD. Reasoning. Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez: Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. -Lim v. Vera Cruz: Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. - Yared vs. Ilarde: Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. - The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation
his intent. This is sufficient for purposes of annotating lis pendens. - There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Thus, even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. -Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. - The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It only protects the applicant’s rights which will be determined during trial. Dispositive the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
LUZ V NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION 00 SCRA 00 CALLEJO, SR; SEP 24, 2004 NATURE Petition for review of the Resolution of the CA
FACTS -On July 18, 1988, the petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 427. On March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. In due course, the board denied the said application. On August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) issued a Resolution affirming that of the Local Amnesty Board. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC, per its Resolution dated November 13, 2002, a copy of which was received by the petitioner on November 22, 2002. -Under Rule III, Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1999, the petitioner had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday, within which to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals. On December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an
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extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 2002, or until December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The petitioner alleged therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel who needed additional time to study the case and draft the petition. However, the petitioner failed to file his petition for review. -December 24, 2002 was declared a national holiday; December 25, 2002 was also a holiday. On December 26, 2002, the petitioner filed a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26, 2002 or until January 10, 2002, within which to file his petition. The petitioner filed his petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2003. -On January 13, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution granting the petitioner ’s first motion for a fifteen-day extension counted from December 7, 2002 or until December 22, 2002, within which to file said petition. On February 20, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner ’s second motion for having been filed out of time. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 20, 2003 Resolution claiming that, since the last day to file his petition was a Saturday, December 7, 2002, and the next day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the last day for filing the petition was December 9, 2002. He reasoned that since he filed his motion for extension of time to file his petition for review on the said date, the said motion was timely filed. -On August 19, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner ’s motion, relying on A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000, which provides that any extension of time to file the required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that the said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. 3 -The Court clarified the provision when it issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, which reads: Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time; Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period; NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. -The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the CA has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the expiration of such period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. -The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the petitioner ’s first motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his petition for review, reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from December 9, 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. In so doing, it merely applied, with fealty, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, as clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC. Had the CA granted the petitioner �s first motion for extension and reckoned the fifteenday period from December 9, 2002, instead of from
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ISSUE WON the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his petition for review.
HELD NO. Petitioner’s motion for a second extension of time to file his petition for review was filed out of time. Reasoning. Section 1, Rule 22, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute,
December 7, 2002, the appellate court would have acted with grave abuse of its discretion. Dispositive Petition granted
SUMMONS modes of service 1. voluntary appearance 2. Voluntary submission RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA (supra) FACTS -Spouses Tolentino were co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a compromise with Spouses Rebollado
VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of judgment of the City Court. Under the circumstances, the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they invoked. And even assuming that estoppel lies, we cannot set aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a party to a case may be acquired, upon proper conditions, thru the voluntary appearance of the person before the court. By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case together with the Robellados, the Tolentinos effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court. - Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court.
3. service in person TOYOTA CUBAO V. CA (GUEVARRA) G.R. No. 126321 VITUG; October 23, 1997 NATURE
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FACTS -Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Guevarra. The repair costwas paid by means of BPI Check drawn by Guevarra in favor of Toyota. -The check was dishonored. -Guevarra failed to make good the check -Toyota a civil case for collection of the unpaid account. -trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his
address in 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna.
-Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted to the trial court a return on the service; it read in full: "Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 92, Quezon City, the herein attached original summon in the above entitled case with the information that it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA, thru her sister-in-law,
GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign.” -Toyota claims that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default. A copy of the motion was furnished Guevarra, through registered mail with return card, at 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna. -petitioner filed the registry return card indicating receipt of the motion -trial court granted petitioner's Motion To Declare Defendant In Default and allowed an ex-parte presentation of petitioner's evidence. -TC in favor of Toyota - a writ of execution was issued to implement the decision. The Deputy Sheriff, implementing the writ, levied on Guevarra's Toyota Corolla. The notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that he was not aware of any case instituted against him. Guevarra turned over the vehicle but filed a certiorari petition before the CA claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him. -CA in favor of Guevarra-annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy upon execution and the sale at public auction of the vehicle-saying that substituted service of summons was not valid -Toyota went to SC
ISSUE 2. WON service of summons is defective
HELD 2.YES. Reasoning It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., exacts that the service (of summons) be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served." Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that "Irregularities of this kind (substituted service) (might) be cured by proof that the copies (have) actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff. The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server (declaring the concomitant facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without hearing, would have again been a denial to the defendant (herein private respondent) of his right to due process.
Disposition PETITION DENIED.
4. Substituted service QUELNAN V. VHF PHIL. G.R. No. 138500
GARCIA; September 16, 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS -VHF Phils filed an ejectment suit in the MeTC against Quelnan involving a condominium unit -MeTC in favor of VHF Phils. -on its finding that "summons together with a copy of the complaint was served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted service" and that petitioner "failed to file his answer within the reglementary period", came out with a decision dated November 23, 1992 -Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three
(3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992.
-No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and executory. -a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. -petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, thereunder alleging, that he was never served with summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, adding that he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18, 1993
when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge . He thus prayed the RTC to annul and
set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection therewith. -In a decision dated June 3, 1996 , the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision. The RTC explained that petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble. -VHF went to SC but SC remanded to CA -CA-in a decision dated September 17, 1997, upon a finding that petitioner's petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the 60-day mandatory period therefor under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of
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and reinstated that of the MeTC, ISSUE
3. WON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER, HENCE ITS DECISION CANNOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
HELD 3.NO. Reasoning The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25, 1992. It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on November 25, 1992. Thereafter, subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992. For sure, a certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Hence, service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: SEC. 10. Completeness of Service. — Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied) There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, there arises a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point.
With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the postmaster on November 25, 1992, it follows that service of a copy of the MeTC decision was deemed complete and effective five (5) days therefrom or on November 30, 1992. Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must be reckoned from such date (November 30, 1992) as this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. In
short, petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision on November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief thus expired on January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24, 1993, or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have learned of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the RTC. Indubitably, the petition was filed way beyond the 60-day period provided by law.
Disposition PETITION DENIED. CA AFFIRMED
SUMMONS – RULE 14 Contents, when issued, by whom issued Modes of Service 1. Voluntary Appearance 2. Voluntary Submission 3. Service in Person 4. Substituted Service 5. Extra-territorial Service GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC V TORRES G. R. No. 170926 YNARES-SANTIAGO; September 15, 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS -Respondents Aida Torres, Nonilo Torres, and Sheryl Ann Torres-Holgado, are members of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI). They availed of loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates despite demands. -On March 24, 2003, petitioner filed a complaint
before the RTC of Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages -Summons against respondents were served
through their Secretary, a certain Benita S. Pagtalunan, who received the same on April 22, 2003. The Return of Summons was filed on April 24, 2003 by Process Server V aleriano P. Badato -On November 18, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondents in default -TC granted said petition, thereby allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex-parte -After presenting petitioner’s evidence ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment on September 15, 2004, ordering respondents to pay petitioner the ff: 1. For Aida Torres, the amount of P163,516.80 from April, 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid; 2. For Nonilo Torres the amount of P278,151.58 from April, 2004 plus legal interest u ntil the said amount is fully paid; 3. For Sheryl Ann Torres the amount of P15,903.93 from April, 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid; 4. To pay P10,000.00, jointly and severally, as attorney’s fees 5. Costs of suit. -Petitioner thereafter moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted and accordingly, the writ of execution was issued on even date. -On May 4, 2005, Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte levied respondents’ house and lot and the same was scheduled to be sold at public auction on June 7, 2005 when the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order. -On August 24, 2005, the Court of Appeals annulled the judgment of the trial court on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents since they were not validly served with summons and neither did they voluntarily appear in court. -According to the appellate court, the service of summons to Pagtalunan was in violation of Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because there was no explanation why resort to substituted service of summons was made. Thus, the appellate court held that respondents were deprived of their right to due process. -The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition
ISSUE WON summons was not validly served on the respondents, and therefore the CA correctly annulled the judgment of the RTC
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Avena HELD Yes. -Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to the court. -Where the defendant is a natural person, service may be personal, substituted, by publication and such other mode of service as the court may deem sufficient. -In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
-If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of the said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. -In these types of civil actions (in personam), summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or in case of refusal, by tendering it to him. If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. -The proper service of summons is a critical step in litigation because upon such service rests the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. -In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. -In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that since substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service, there should be a report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a relationship of trust and confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified of the summons issued in their names. -This is because substituted service may only be availed of when the respondents could not be served personally within a reasonable period of time, and such impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating that earnest efforts have been made to find the respondents personally and that such efforts have failed. -Such requirements under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully in order not to deprive any person of his property by violating his constitutional right to due process. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of summons, availed of only under certain conditions imposed by the Rules of Court. Any substituted service other than that authorized under S ection 7 is deemed ineffective and contrary to law. -Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres, as appearing in the Affidavit of Merit of Sheryl Ann Torres and attached to the Petition of Annulment filed before the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the former had indeed a relationship of trust and confidence with the three respondents.
It appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents. Such service of summons is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and Sheryl Ann Torres whose relationship with Pagtalunan was neither readily ascertained nor adequately explained in the Return of Summons. Also, no earnest efforts were made to locate respondent Aida Torres who was allegedly working abroad at the time summons was served on her person. No explanation was stated in the Return why substituted service was resorted to through Pagtalunan. -Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. -In the instant case, there was an undue, if not
indecent, haste to serve the summons at the first attempt without making sure that personal service was an impossibility because either the respondents had left for a foreign country or an unknown destination with no definite date of returning within a reasonable period, or had gone into hiding to avoid service of any process from the courts. Since the substituted service was not validly effected, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the p ersons of the respondents. The order of default, the judgment by default, the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the respondents’ properties levied on execution are, therefore, null and void. Disposition. Petition is denied.
BONNEVIE V CA (Phil Bank of Commerce) G.R. NO. L-49101 GUERRERO; October 24, 1983 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA decision
FACTS - Honesto Bonnevie filed with the CFI Rizal a complaint against Philippine Bank of Commerce seeking the annulment of the Deed of Mortgage dated Dec 6, 1966 executed in favor of the PBC by spouses Lozano, as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure made on Sept 4, 1968. They assail validity and legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure on the following grounds: a) petitioners were never notified of the foreclosure sale. b) The notice of auction sale was not posted for the period required by law. c) publication of the notice of auction sale in the Luzon Weekly Courier was not in accordance with law. - History: Lozano spouses were the owners of the property which they mortgaged to secure the payment of the loan in the principal amount of P75T they were about to obtain from PBC. - They then executed in favor of Bonnevie the Deed of Sale with Mortgage for P100T, P25T of which amount being payable to the Lozano spouses upon the execution of the document, and the P75T to PBC.
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Avena - When the mortgage was executed by the Lozano spouses in favor of PBC, the loan of P75T was not yet received them. - From April 28, 1967 to July 12, 1968, Bonnevie made payments to PBC on the mortgage in the total amount of P18,944.22. Bonnevie then assigned all his rights under the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage to his brother, intervenor Raoul. - PBC then applied for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and notice of sale was published in the Luzon Weekly Courier on June 30, July 7, and July 14, 1968; auction sale was conducted a month after, and the property was sold to PBC for P84,387.00. - PBC specifically denied most of the allegations: (a) that the defendant has not given its consent to the sale of the mortgaged property; (b) that the demand letters and notice of foreclosure were sent to Jose Lozano at his address; (c) that it was notified for the first time about the alleged sale after it had foreclosed the Lozano mortgage; that the property in question remained registered in the name of Lozano in the land records of Rizal and there was no entry, notation or indication of the alleged sale. - After petitioner Honesto Bonnevie had rested his case, petitioner Raoul SV Bonnevie filed a motion for intervention, which was granted. - CFI dismissed the complaint. MFR was also denied. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S 1. WON the mortgage executed by the Lozanos in favor of PBC is valid 2. WON extrajudicial foreclosure is valid
HELD 1. YES Reasoning A mortgage follows the property whoever the possessor may be and subjects the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. Petitioners voluntarily assumed it and are, therefore, estopped from impugning its validity. They did not secure the consent of respondent Bank to the sale with assumption of mortgage. 2. YES Reasoning Act No. 3135 does not require personal notice on the mortgagor.13 Honesto 13
Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a
Bonnevie was not entitled to any notice because as of May 14, 1968, he had transferred and assigned all his rights and interests in favor of intervenor Raoul without informing the Bank. - Also, petitioners were placed on constructive notice. The notice of sale was published in the Luzon Courier on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 and notices of the sale were posted for not less than twenty days in at least three (3) public places in the Municipality where the property is located. Act No. 3135 merely requires that such notice shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks. Such phrase, as interpreted by this Court in Basa vs. Mercado does not mean that notice should be published for three full weeks. - To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that "it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals." The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. - Whether or not the notice of auction sale was
posted for the period required by law is a question of fact. It can no longer be entertained by this Court. Nevertheless, the records show that copies of said notice were posted in three conspicuous places in the municipality of Pasig, Rizal namely: the Hall of Justice, the Pasig Municipal Market and Pasig Municipal Hall. - A single act of posting (which may even extend beyond the period required by law) satisfies the requirement of law. The burden of proving that the posting requirement was not complied with is now shifted to the one who alleges non-compliance. Disposition The appeal being devoid of merit, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
DIAL CORPORATION v SORIANO (RTC Judge) 00 SCRA 00 GRINO-AQUINO; May 31, 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
FACTS - The petitioners ( Dial Corp., C & T Refinery Inc., Nalin sdn. bhb. Berisford Commodities, Ltd., and Pacific Molasses Co.) are foreign corporations (US, UK and Malaysia). They are not domiciled in the Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here. The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. (IVO) is a Philippine corporation which through its president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute between the parties will be settled through arbitration under the rules of either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) or the National Institute of Oil Seed Products (NIOP). Because IVO defaulted under the contracts, the petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained arbitration awards against IVO. - On April 8, 1987, IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages (RTC Manila) against 19 foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners, with whom Dominador had entered into contracts for the delivery of coconut oil. IVO repudiated Dominador's contracts on the grounds that they were mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties; that the Board of Directors of IVO removed Monteverde from his position as president of the corporation, named in his place, Rodrigo Monteverde, and disowned Dominador's allegedly illegal and unauthorized acts; that the defendants have allegedly "harassed" IVO to comply with Dominador's contracts and to come to a settlement with them. IVO prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from harassing IVO with their insistent demands to recognize the contracts entered into by Dominador and from portraying the IVO as one that defaults on its contracts and obligations and has fallen into bad times and from interfering with IVO's normal conduct of business. IVO also prayed that the defendants pay it damages worth more than P21M. - Respondent Judge Soriano authorized IVO to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines Corp. Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with
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summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service. - On April 25, 1987, without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only for the purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction over their persons, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The court denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or equitable. And one of the reliefs demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendants from any interest in such property for the reason that their transactions with plaintiff's former president are ultra vires." Furthermore, "as foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, they opened themselves to suit before Philippine courts, pursuant to Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines." The petitioners' motions for reconsideration of that order were also denied by the court. Hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person." A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. As the civil case filed is a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But, when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines, or is intended to seize or dispose of any property, real or personal, of the defendant located in the Philippines, it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts, for then, they have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the defendant and their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. Venue in such cases may be laid in the province where the property of the defendant or a part thereof involved in the litigation is located. In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders. Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam
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ISSUE WON the extra territorial service of summons was proper
HELD NO. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides only 4 instances in which extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely: "(1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The
over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment ." Respondents' contention that "the action below is related to property within the Philippines, specifically contractual rights that petitioners are enforcing against IVO" is specious for the "contractual rights" of the petitioners are not property found in the Philippines for the petitioners have not filed an action in the local courts to enforce said rights. They have not submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. The lower court invoked Section 33 of the Corporation Code which provides that a "foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunal on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." It assumed that the petitioners are doing business in the Philippines, which allegation the latter denied. Even if they can be considered as such, the Corporation Code did not repeal the rules requiring proper service of summons to such corporations as provided in Rule 14 of the ROC and Section 128 of the Corporation Code. The respondent court's finding that, by filing motions to dismiss, the petitioners hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint that they are doing business in the Philippines without any license, and that they may be served with summons and other c ou rt p ro ce ss es t hro ug h t he ir a ge nt s or representatives enumerated in paragraph 2 of the complaint, is contradicted by its order authorizing IVO to summon them by extraterritorial service, a mode of service which is resorted to when the defendant is not found in the Philippines, does not transact business here, and has no resident agent on whom the summons may be served. Disposition. The extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioners is held to be improper, hence null and void. The petition for certiorari is granted. The orders of Judge Soriano are set aside. The complaint is dismissed as against the petitioners for failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over them.
MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO 22 SCRA 1070 SANCHEZ, March 15, 1968
NATURE
Appeal from the orders of CFI Manila
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Avena FACTS -Fr. Gerardo Maximo was involved in a motor vehicle accident where the son of the petitioners suffered injuries. Petitioners filed suit against Fr. Maximo for damages. Summons were served at the Malabon Parish where Fr. Maximo was allegedly residing. However, Fr. Maximo was in Europe when the summons were served, Fr. Bautista was the one who received the summons. Fr. Bautista wrote to the Clerk of Court of CFI Manila informing him that Fr. Maximo was in Europe. -On Plaintiff’s motion, lower court declared Fr. Maximo in default, sentenced Fr. Maximo to pay for damages. The Montalbans even wrote to Fr. Maximo at the Malabon Catholic Church informing him of the lower court’s decision and requesting hi to comply with the decision. Fr. Maximo replied that he was not aware of the civil case against him and that he was acquitted in the criminal case. -Deputy Sheriff of Rizal notified Fr. Maximo of the issuance of writ of execution and demanded payment. Return to writ expressed that Fr. Maximo is “financially hard up” and had no property. Alias writ of execution issued. Copy received by Fr. Maximo. Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house in Caloocan allegedly belonging to Fr. Maximo. -After 2 years, 2 months, Fr. Maximo admittedly learned of lower court’s decision and filed for ANNULMENT OF ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS on verified motion on the grounds that the summons were not duly served (based on then Sec.7, Rule 7 and Sec18, Rule 14 of ROC) therefore, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person so the trial and the decision were null and void. His verified motion was denied, MFR was rejected.
ISSUE WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted service under Sec. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the Philippines)
HELD *ON argument that Sec18 (in relation to sec17) is the sole provision that governs summons upon a defendant temporarily absent in an action in personam: substituted service – out of the Philippines - is but one of the modes of effective service to bring a defendant in court. The normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service. Personal service
outside the country and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants. -in suits in personam, the more circuitous procedure delineated in Sections 17 and 18 is resorted to by a plaintiff if defendant’s dwelling house or residence or place of business in this country is not known; or, if known, service upon him cannot be had thereat upon the terms of Sec8. Since personal service is impossible, resort to substituted service becomes a necessity. *ON fact that judgment has been long final: the judgment enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is, unless striken down, entitled to respect. Non quieta movere. Because “public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law.”
toward a compromise have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family, The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned. - The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of real property and real rights. The respondents were instructed to file their answer. - De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her person.
HELD Disposition. Orders affirmed.
DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS 64 SCRA 23 AQUINO, May 13, 1975 NATURE Original Actions. Certiorari and contempt.
FACTS - Quemada, allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., was appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of Cebu. As such, he filed a complaint against his half siblings, the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, and Sofia Midgely, who were all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. The suit also named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. The suit was to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. - Quemada, on his own, caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons through registered mail upon De Midgely and Pastor, Jr. at their respective addresses in Alicante and Barcelona. - Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are nonresidents. They further alleged that earnest efforts
No. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of earnest effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. “When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If the motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, - Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely, her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. - The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. In that case, it ruled that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident. It should be noted that the civil
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Avena case filed by Quemada is related to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering the properties which in the understanding of Quemada, belonged to the estate of the Late Pastor, Sr. and which were held by De Midgely and her brother. Disposition Petition is dismissed
SAHAGUN V CA (MADAYAG/FILINVEST CREDIT CORP.) G.R. NO. 78328 REGALADO; June 3 1991 NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - It was alleged that petitioner's spouse, Abel Sahagun (Alias Abelardo), manager of Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (Rallye), made it appear that his company had sold a motor vehicle to Salazar who issued a promissory note for the price and executed as security a chattel mortgage on said vehicle in favor of Rallye. Rallye, through Abel, assigned the note and chattel to Filinvest for valuable consideration. When the note matured, Salazar failed to pay, compelling Filinvest to sue. However, Filinvest found that the mortgaged car had not been delivered to Salazar by Abel. A writ of attachment was issued and levied on a house and lot in Las Pinas, registered in Abel's name. Petitioner had been continuously residing in said house and claims ownership, having allegedly paid for it with her own earnings. -The TC denied the respondent's motion to declare Abel in default but directed it to "take steps to effect service of summons and complaint upon defendant, whose whereabouts in the US was unknown. The TC later dismissed the complaint of Filinvest for failure to serve summons extra-territorially upon Abel despite said order. Filinvest filed an MFR praying that said order be reconsidered and set aside and that Abel be declared in default and to deny petitioner's motion for leave. TC granted petitioner time to file intervention and denied the motion to declare Abel in default. Petitioner intervened, questioning the jurisdiction of the
TC. Petitioner was declared in default for failure to appear, as was Abel for failing to answer the complaint. The court rendered judgment against Abel, ordering him to pay P97,066.59 (equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation due as liquidated damages + 25% as attorney's fees). -petitioner elevated the case to the IAC (Feb. 27, 1985) which granted her petition for certiorari with prohibition and set aside the TC's aforesaid decision, ruling that petitioner was deprived of opportunity to present evidence (including evidence she and Abel had been living separately since 1970). Filinvest filed a petition for review with the SC which was denied. Filinvest filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publicatio on Abel, which the court granted, stating that pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 14, "the summons be effected out of the Phils. by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Phils., to which this matter may be assigned after due raffle, for 3 successive days. Said defendant was ordered to file his answer in Court within a reasonable time (not less than 60 days after notice); that the CoC send copies of the summons and tills Order by registered mail to last known address of said defendant in Las Pinas. Plaintiff is ordered to implead Rallye as co-defendant within 1 month from notice." -Filinvest filed an amended complaint, this time impleading petitioner and Rallye as additional defendants. Respondent court admitted the amended complaint and directed service of summons and the complaint upon Abel at a different last known address in Antipolo. Summons was supposedly served on Abel through publication in the Manila Evening Post according to the affidavit of publication of its president, with a confusing entry in the notice of order which stated the Las Pinas address, contradicting the Antipolo address stated by the TC. Petitioner filed her answer to the amended complaint. Abel and Rallye filed no answer, so Filinvest filed a motion to declare them in default which respondent Judge Madayag of the RTC of Makati granted, but not as to Rallye since summons had not been served upon it. Petitoner went on certiorari to the CA (Feb. 6, 1987), assailing as grave abuse of discretion the declaration of default of Abel; CA dismissed the petition and a subsequent
MFR, hence this petiton.
ISSUE 1. WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over Abel by the publication of summons in the Manila Evening Post
HELD 1. YES Ratio As a nonresident defendant, and since the suit involves real property wherein the defendant ostensibly has an interest and which the property has in fact been attached at the instance of private respondent, the court correctly ordered the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order. Although it would appear that publication should have been made in a newspaper in the US as it would most likely give notice to Abel, such a sweeping doctrine would virtually unsettle a long standing interpretation of the aforesaid rule on extraterritorial service of summons by publication, as well as its implementation sanctioned by the practice followed in this jurisdiction. Reasoning The instant case is based on the attachment of defendant's property, and as such is an action quasi in rem, wherein summons by publication is allowed. Such is called constructive or substituted service, which does not constitute a service of process in any true sense but serves as a means whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is subject to judicial proceedings and that he should take steps as he sees fit to protect it. Such is required to physically acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and for purposes of fair play by informing him of the pendency of the action against him. Even then, there is no guarantee that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice; as such, under law, actual notice is not considered to be absolutely necessary (as held in Banco Espanol). Considering this, publication in the US would be all the more difficult as Abel's exact location is unknown; to have at hand the available newspapers, research the laws governing judicial processes in each state would be too taxing for the TC. Still, it was held in De Midgely that in actions quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident alien is not essential and service of summons is only required to satisfy due process. Relief in an action against a nonresident defendant who chooses not to submit himself to Phil. courts is limited to the res. -There is no specific proscription against resorting to
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Avena foreign publication in the place where the defendant resides, but publication in a local newspaper should not altogether be interdicted since the rule specifically authorizes service of summons "in such places and for such time as the court concerned may order". The matter should be left to the sound discretion of the TC in each particular case since it has the facts before it. Still, the publication in the Manila Evening Post was defective as there was no showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly served at the defendant's last know correct address. -The Court is not inclined to dismiss the case for noncompliance of private respondent to serve the amended complaint to Abel at his Antipolo address as there is prima facie justification for extraterritorial service of summons, and transmission of copies of the summons to the wrong address is a matter which the TC can more readily remedy. Even if Abel is declared in default, his interest can be duly represented by the non-defaulting defendant since a common cause of action is involved. Disposition Petition is granted
SEPARATE OPINIONS Sarmiento, J. [concurring and dissenting] -service of summons to the wrong last known address is a defect which cannot justify an order of default. Assuming default were proper, it will not preclude petitioner from presenting her own evidence. -However, as to extrajudicial service of summons to a nonresident alien, it is only valid when effected in the territory in which the absent defendant may be found. Sec. 17 was in part, taken from Sections 398 and 399 of Act. 190, which in turn were an adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure of California which states that personal service outside the state must be named and designated in the publication as most likely to give notice to the person to be served. Publication in the Phils. is not likely to provide notice to a US resident. -As to Banco Espanol and De Midgely: although the court acquired jurisdiction over the res, the res belongs to the defendant, and as such he reserves the right to be heard when his possessions are in peril. Although the court cannot award money by way of relief, judgment condemning the res would yield the same result, that is, liability against the defendant. This would lead to the fundamental injustice of trial in absentia, especially considering
the increase in immigrant Filipinos.
6. By Publication -MODE OF SERVICE UPON CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 1. Upon domestic private juridical entity PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK vs. KING 172 SCRA 131 GANCAYCO; April 12, 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari
FACTS - Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation (MFC) and private respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5. - Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, Metro Manila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot, Jr. who acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983. - The parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a Compromise Agreement for the approval of the court which was approved. - Counsel for defendants filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. (denied) - Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside decision on the following grounds: a. there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation
was not their address they were no longer connected therewith; b. that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; c. that they were not served copies of the decision of the court; d. that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; and e. that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction. (denied) - CA reversed - Motion for reconsideration (denied)
ISSUE WON private respondents were properly served with summons
HELD NO. Ratio Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. Reasoning The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not
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appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation then. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no longer connected. Such substituted service is not v ali d. T he re w as n o co mp li an ce w it h t he requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.
Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government; that respondent J. V. Catuira, though an employee of respondent corporation presently stationed in M anila, i s w it ho ut po we r an d au th or ity o f le ga l representation; and that the employment contract between petitioner and respondent corporation carries -the approval of the DOL. - On May 3, 1968. respondents filed MTD the subject petition on the ground that this Court has no Jurisdiction over the instant case, and on May 24, 1968, petitioner interposed an opposition thereto. Said motion was denied.
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Disposition. Petition is DENIED
2. Upon Foreign Entity
Private
Juridical
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT V DELA OSA 89 SCRA 131 MAKASIAR; March 26, 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CIR
FACTS -On July 1, 1967, Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that he was employed by respondents as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March, 1964 to November, 1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.26 from December, 1964 to November, 1965, inclusive; (3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33 from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August, 1966 to March 27, 1967, inclusive. - Respondents filed on August 7, 1967 their letteranswer without substantially denying the material allegations of the basic petition but interposed the following special defenses that respondents Facilities
ISSUE/S 1. WON Court can acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused provided that they are domiciled beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government 2. WON petitioner has been 'doing business in the Philippines' so that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction.
HELD 1. Yes. While it is true the site of work is Identified as Wake Island, it is equally true the place of hire is established in Manila. Moreover, what is important is the fact that the contract of employment between the parties litigant was shown to have been originally executed and subsequently renewed in Manila, as asserted by petitioner and not denied by respondents. Hence, any dispute arising therefrom should necessarily be determined in the place or venue where it was contracted. 2. the petitioner may be considered as doing busuness un the Philippines within the the scope of Section 14, Rule 14 of the ROC in compliance with law, the petitioner had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and receive, in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC. It is a fact that when the summons for the petitioner was served on Jaime V. Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. Mr. Catuira was a on officer representing petitioner in the Philippines. Aetna Casualty & Curety Company v Pacific Star Line
– WON the plaintiff appellant has been doing business in the Philippines, considering the fact that it has no license to transact business in the Philippines as a foreign corporation. The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts (Marshall Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil 70,75). if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines. Disposition WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
3. Upon Resident Temporarily Abroad MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO (SUPRA) FACTS -Fr. Maximo was sued by the parents of the child he injured during a motor vehicle accident. He was in Europe when the summons were served upon Fr. Bautista in the Malabon Church where Fr. Maximo was known to reside. Since was away when trial was being held, he was declared in default and a decision was made in favor of the Sps. After 2y, 2m Fr. Maximo questioned the validity of the judgment against him, questioning the service of summons made
ISSUE WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted service under Sec. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the Philippines)
HELD
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Avena YES. In suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country. Reasoning. HISTORY. Common Law (Power Concept of Jurisdiction): Jurisdiction of Courts to render judgments in personam was granted on their de facto power over defendant’s person. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. -Continental Law: Principles of Roman Origin: (1) Suits in personam and those relating to MOVABLES – courts of the domicile of the defendant have general jurisdiction [ Actor Rei Forum Sequitur ]; (2) actions concerning IMMOVABLES: Courts of the situs have exclusive jurisdiction -FORGED DOCTRINE: Domiciliaries of a state, though temporarily out of its territorial jurisdiction, are ALWAYS amenable to suits in personam so substituted service is binding on absent residents. -MILLIKEN V MEYER : “The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state was provided and employed a REASONABLE METHOD for apprising such an absent party of the proceeding against him. *ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS & DUE PROCESS : the constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give reasonably calculated to give the notice desired -MILLIKEN V MEYER, supra: its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on WON the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is REASONABLY CALCULATED TO GIVE HIM ACTUAL NOTICE of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
actual notice. This will not affect the validity of the service. -A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Disposition. Orders affirmed.
4. Upon Defendant whose identity/whereabouts unknown BALTAZAR VS CA (GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES) G.R. No. 78728 FELICIANO; December 8, 1988
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Nature Petition for review on certiorari to annul CA decision
FACTS -
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Two parcels of land located in Barrio San Isidro, Paranaque were adjudicated to Lorenzo Molera pursuant to the decree in a land registration case by the CFI of Rizal acting as a cadastral court. They were titled in the name of Lorenzo Molera, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1866. On 15 August 1965, the parcels of land were acquired by Good Earth from successors-in-interest of Lorenzo Molera. A transfer of Certificate title was issued in the name of Good Earth. On 22 March 1977, Artemio Baltazar instituted Civil Case No. 5552-P against Good Earth for
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declaration of ownership and reconveyance
*interpretation of then Sec8 on substituted service: Same meaning shaped out by the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction where it was patterned (American Legal System); the “defendant” means any resident of the country without distinction as to whether he is physically present or not. -on Sec18, Rule 14, according to CJ MORAN: Since resident of RP, jurisdiction may be acquired over his person under Sec8; Extraterritorial Service also allowed . Plaintiff is not duty bound to see to it that the person upon when service was actually made delivers the summons to defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not in fact receive
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of the parcels of land before the CFI, Rizal. Baltazar traced his claimed rights from an alleged vast Spanish land grant to one Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, Governor General of Intramuros, down to a deed of sale over the subject lots allegedly executed by one Pedro Asedillo (for whose mother, Baltazar had been a tenant sharing in the rice harvest from the lots) The Deputy Sheriff of the trial court, Mr. Ernesto Pre, received a copy of the summons and complaint for service on Good Earth at its address set forth in the complaint 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila. On 1 April 1977, the Deputy Sheriff pre-certified in his Sheriffs Return that: notwithstanding three attempts made by the undersigned Deputy Sheriff, particularly on March 25, 27 and 30, 1977, to serve
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the summons and copy of the complaint upon the defendant Good Earth Enterprises, Inc. at the given address, the same has failed as according to information defendant Corporation has never held office thereat and its present office address is unknown. On the same date, Baltazar filed a motion for leave to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint upon therein defendant Good Earth by publication. The trial court granted Baltazar's motion. Publication of the summons and the complaint in the "Times Journal," a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks was effected on 6, 13 and 20 August 1977. Subsequently the trial court, on motion of Baltazar and upon finding that Good Earth had failed to file its answer within the sixty (60) day period counted from the day following the last day of the publication, declared Good Earth "as if in default" and allowed Baltazar to present his evidence ex parte 10 days later the trial court then issued the questioned judgment by default against Good Earth which: 1) declared Baltazar true and owner of the property covered by TCT No. 191048, 2) ordered Good Earth to reconvey that property to Baltazar and, should Good Earth fail so to reconvey, 3) decreed the cancellation of TCT No. 191048; and 4) required the Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new TCT in the name of Baltazar. These were done accordingly all without the knowledge of Good Earth. Baltazar lost no time at all in selling the land so titled in his name to Aurora Galvez, Rizaliana Garments, Inc. and to BGB Development CorporationOn 9 August 1979, Good Earth instituted a complaint for annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5552-P and for reconveyance, against Artemio Baltazar and his vendees Aurora Galvez and BGB Development Corporation, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. PQ-7410-P, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 28, the same court which had issued the judgment by default against Good Earth. Good Earth later impleaded Baltazar's third vendee, Rizaliana Garments, Inc. as an additional defendant. Good Earth assailed the judgment as null and void, upon the ground that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Good Earth. It was urged by Good Earth that the suit commenced by Baltazar was an action in
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personam which required personal service of summons; hence, service of summons by publication was improper and unwarranted in this case. It was also urged by Good Earth that Land Registration Decree No. N-70457, by virtue of which OCT No. 1866 was issued to Lorenzo Molera, predecessor-in-interest of Good Earth, became incontrovertible one year after its registration on 5 February 1959. The trial court rendered judgment against Good Earth. It held that the trial court which issued the judgment by default had acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Good Earth through service of summons by publication; that the suit brought by Baltazar against Good Earth was an action quasi in rem such that service of summons by publication was appropriate; that Lorenzo Molera, the original registered owner of the subject lands, was not an indispensable party to the suit brought against Good Earth; that the action instituted by Good Earth was barred by res judicata; and that defendants Galvez, BGB Development Corporation and Rizaliana Garments, Inc. were purchasers in good faith and for value. CA reversed TC’s decision and directed the defendants to reconvey the parcels of land in question to Good Earth free from all liens and encumbrances. Hence this Petition for Review instituted by Baltazar and Galvez.
ISSUE WON the service of summons by publication upon respondent Good Earth was proper.
HELD − The regular mode of serving summons upon a
private domestic corporation (i.e., a private corporation organized under Philippine law and hence registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission) is governed by Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The regular mode, in other words, of serving summons upon a private Philippine corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers of such corporation identified in Section 13. − For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by it, a corporation is Identified with its agent or officer who under the rule is designated to accept service of process. " The corporate power to receive and act on such service, so far as to make it known to the corporation, is thus vested in such officer or
agent." A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. − It is not disputed that Deputy Sheriff Pre did not comply and did not attempt to comply with the requirement of Section 13 of Rule 14. Since personal service of summons was clearly not effected upon Good Earth, we come to the question of whether the substituted service by publication purported to have been effected by the trial court in Civil Case No. 5552-P was proper and effective to vest jurisdiction upon such court over the person of Good Earth. The first point that
must be made in this connection is that the propriety of service of summons by publication is not dependent upon the technical characterization of the action being initiated as an action in rem or quasi in rem. The propriety of service by publication is dependent, rather, upon compliance with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. We note secondly, that
service of summons of publication may be allowed under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court in three 3 different situations. The first is the situation of an "unknown defendant" addressed by Section 16 of Rule 14. The second refers to situations where "extra-territorial service" is proper, governed by Section 17 of Rule 14. The third situation is that of a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of the Philippines and who may be served with summons by publication under Section 18. − Even a cursory examination of Sections 16,17 and 18 of Rule 14 above will at once reveal that, if at all, service of summons by publication upon Good Earth could only be done under Section 16. Section 17 can find application only where the defendant is both a non-resident and not actually found in the Philippines. Since Good Earth is a corporation organized under the Philippine law, it cannot be regarded as a non-resident corporation. Section 18, upon the other hand, appears to contemplate a defendant who is a natural person. In any case, petitioner did not pretend that Good Earth was at any time temporarily out of the Philippines,
assuming such a condition were possible. Section 16 itself covers two (2) distinguishable situations: where the identity of the defendant is unknown; and where the address of the defendant is unknown. Under Section 16, therefore, petitioner must show that the address of Good Earth was "unknown" and that such address "could not be ascertained by diligent inquiry." − In the case at bar, petitioner acted as if the address of Good Earth was "unknown." Petitioner claimed that Good Earth could not be found at the address appearing in the TCT issued in the name of Good Earth. The sum total of what the Sheriff actually did, was to ask a security guard he found at 666 Muelle de Binondo and this security guard apparently pointed to the building directory where the name of Good Earth did not appear. It is argued by Good Earth that had the Sheriff inquired at any of the offices actually found in the building at 666 Muelle de Binondo, he would have found Good Earth which is a corporation owned or controlled by the Ching family, considering that all the corporations quartered at 666 Muelle de Binondo are Ching family corporations. Good Earth, in other words, did not dispute that 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila was its correct corporate address. The court does not believe, therefore, that the address of Good Earth could be regarded as "unknown" within the meaning of Section 16 of Rule 14. More importantly, it does not believe that the acts of Deputy Sheriff Pre satisfied the standard of diligent inquiry' established by Section 16 of Rule 14. Deputy Sheriff Pre should have known what every law school student knows, that Good Earth being a domestic corporation must have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and that the SEC records would, therefore, reveal not just the correct address of the corporate headquarters of Good Earth but also the addresses of its directors and other officers. We believe and so hold that a litigant or process server who has not gone through the records of the SEC cannot claim to have carried out the "diligent inquiry" required under Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court for valid service of summons by publication upon a domestic corporation. − It may be noted, finally, that the record does not show that Baltazar sent a copy of the summons and the order for publication to Good Earth by registered mail to its last known address which
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Avena was 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, as required by Section 21 of Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court. We hold that the purported service of summons by publication upon Good Earth in Civil Case No. 5552-P was legally and constitutionally vitiated and hence invalid and ineffective to vest jurisdiction over the person of Good Earth upon the trial court, and that the judgment there rendered by that court was null and void. It vested no rights upon Baltazar and imposed no liabilities or burdens upon Good Earth. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the trial court in Civil Case No. PQ-7410-P fell into profound error in not setting aside and annulling the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 5552- P. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Decision dated 14 January 1987 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 00104 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
5. Upon others MOTIONS IN GENERAL MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 US v. RUIZ 136 SCRA 487 ABAD SANTOS; May 22, 1985 NATURE Petition to review to set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779-M of the defunct CFI of Rizal.
FACTS - US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. - US invited the submission of bids for the following projects: 1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines. 2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
- Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. US requested it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. - The company received a letter which was signed by Dir. Collins, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. - The company sued the US and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of p reliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. - The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." - Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
ISSUE WON trial court has jurisdiction
HELD NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. But State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. - The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non-governmental acts." However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. - The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. - That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated. It held: "On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one
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against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof." (At p. 323.) - In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
without redress in his own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name. - Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces - because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United States government, always looms large, thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country b y United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines. - In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance. The opinion of the majority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations. American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.
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SEPARATE OPINION MAKASIAR, dissents: - The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein. - When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract. - Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation - in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay - should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and
SEAFDEC V NLRC (LAZAGA) (supra)
receive separation benefits but SEAFDEC-AQD failed to pay private respondent his separation pay so Lazaga filed a complaint for non-payment of separation benefits, plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. -In their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM (NOT MOTION TO DISMISS), SEAFDEC alleged that NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case because: (1) It is an international organization; (2) Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid (and clearances has not been paid) COUNTERCLAIM: Lazaga had property accountability and outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD amounting to P27, 532.11 and that Lazaga was not entitled to the accrued sick leave benefits due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment -LA: for Lazaga -NLRC: affirmed LA, deleted attorney’s fees and actual damages -SEAFDEC-AQD filed MFR, denied
ISSUES WON SEAFDEC-AQD is estopped from claiming that the court had no jurisdiction
HELD NO Ratio. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the p arties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the d ecision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. -The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. -The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC
FACTS -SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. Private Respondent Lazaga was hired as a Research Associate and eventually became the Head of External Affairs Office of SEAFDEC-AQD. However, he was terminated allegedly due to financial constraints being experienced by SEAFEC-AQD. He was supposed to
NATIONAL UNION VS STOLT-NIELSEN 184 SCRA 682 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; April 26, 1990 NATURE Petition to review. Certiorari
FACTS
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Avena - United Coconut Chemicals shipped on board MT Stolt Sceptre, a tanker owned by Stolt-Nielsen Philippines 404 tons of distilled C6-C18 fatty acid from Batangas to Rotterdam Netherlands.The cargo was insured with National Union Fire Insurance, an American insurance company, thru its Philippine Agent, American International Underwriters. - Upon arrival and after inspection, the shipment was found to be totally contaminated and discolored. The Carrier denied the claim but the Insurer indemnified said shipper. As subrogee, the insurer filed suit against Carrier before the RTC to recovery the sum of P1,619,469.21, the amount paid to the Shipper. - Carrier filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the claim the same being arbitrable as provided by the terms of the Charter Party dated 21 December 1984 between Shipper and Parcel Tankers. - Insurer opposed the motion on the ground that it was not legally bound to submit the claim for arbitration as the arbitration clause in the Charter Party was not incorporated into the Bill of Lading. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but issued a resolution on the Motion to Dismiss until trial on the merits since the ground alleged in said motion does not appear indubitable. - Carrier filed motion for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA seeking to nullify the RTC order which it set aside. - Hence the appeal to the SC
reference the terms of the Charter Party. It is settled law that the charter may be made part of the contract under which the goods are carried by an appropriate reference in the Bill of Lading (Wharton Poor, Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading (5th ed., p. 71). This should include the provision on arbitration even without a specific stipulation to that effect. The entire contract must be read together and its clauses interpreted in relation to one another and not by parts. Moreover, in cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party, and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, "the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as document of title passing-the property of the goods, but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner" (In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F 2d 89, 103 [2d Cir. 1972]; Ministry of Commerce vs. Marine Tankers Corp. 194 F, Supp 161, 163 [S.D.N.Y. 1960]; Greenstone Shipping Co., S.A. vs. Transworld Oil, Ltd., 588 F Supp [D.El. 1984]). The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for the contract is the Charter Party (Shell Oil Co. vs. MIT Gilds, 790 F 2d 1209, 1212 [5th Cir. 1986]; Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. L-25599, 4 April 1968, 23 SCRA 24), and is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code).
ISSUE/S 1. WON the CA order setting aside the RTC order, which was interlocutory, is valid 2. WON the terms of the Charter Party, particularly the provision on arbitration, binding on the Insurer.
HELD 1. Yes. Generally, an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of a special civil action on certiorari and prohibition. . However, the case before us falls under the exception. While a Court Order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be challenged until final judgment, still, where it clearly appears that the trial Judge or Court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2. Yes. A reading of the charter Party and the Bill of Lading shows that the Insurer is in fact bound to arbitration. Clearly, the Bill of Lading incorporates by
Disposition Petition for certiorari is denied and the judgment of the CA is affirmed.
BALO V CA (JUDGE ASIS, GARRIDO) GR No. 129704 CHICO-NAZARIO; September 30, 2005 NATURE Petition for review of CA Resolution under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS - complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages was filed by Josefina Garrido against Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas, Eugenio Balo, Ulpiano Balo, Jr., Nida Balo-Moraleta,
Nora Balo-Catano, Zaida Balo, Judith Balo-Mandreza, Danilo Balo and Ronilo Balo, before RTC Abuyog, Leyte alleging that Garrido and Balo’s are the coowners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. According to her, these lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who, at the time of the filing of the complaint, were already deceased. The Balo spouses were survived by their two (2) children, Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, the latter likewise deceased. Garrido is the daughter of Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. Ulpiano Balo is the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr. and the other petitioners, the children of Ulpiano, are Eugenio’s grandchildren. - Garrido alleged in her complaint that immediately upon the death of her grandfather, Eugenio Sr., the Balo’s took possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and consent. Her uncle and cousins were earnestly requested by Garrido that they come up with a fair and equal partition of the properties left by her grandparents. The Balo’s outrightly refused her proposal. - Garrido filed a complaint. In lieu of an Answer, Balo’s filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Failure to state a cause of action - plaintiff, though daughter of Maximino, failed to allege WON she is a legitimate child thus fatal considering A992 CC and to allow Garrido to inherit from the estate of the spouses Eu gen io and Maria B alo in representation of her father Maximino Balo would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate parent of his father, assuming that she is the child of Maximino Balo (2) complaint does not show that estate have been settled and its obligations have been paid. (3) properties enumerated in the complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, Ulpiano repurchased the properties and has been openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the properties - RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and said that the complaint clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo, Sr., and Maria Pasagui Balo had two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino. The plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao; while the defendants are children of the late Ulpiano Balo, Sr. and Felicidad Superio. The complaint enumerates/annexes 13 tax declarations in the name of Eugenio Balo, Sr. The plaintiff as an heir prays that these parcels of land be
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partitioned in accordance with Article 982 of the Civil Code which states: “The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.” No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion. The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts. Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit. - Balo’s filed an MFR which the RTC denied - Balo’s filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. After the filing of Comment and other pleadings, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In a resolution, the CA denied due course to the petition and accordingly dismissed the same and justified the dismissal in the following manner: It is an established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. When a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss. - Balo’s filed an MFR which the CA denied
abuse of discretion as alleged by the Balo’s. CA having failed in this regard, it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the petitioners. Reasoning - The general rule regarding denial of a motion to dismiss as a basis of a resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. - Specific instances whereby the rule admits certain exceptions are provided as follows: Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case - Contrary to petitioners’ contention, allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for partition may be found in private respondent’s complaint. Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Moreover, the inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
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ISSUES 1. WON CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari filed by the Balo’s is valid 2. WON the failure to allege the nature and extent of plaintiff’s title in a petition for partition is fatal to its cause of action 3. WON the action for judicial partition and accounting has prescribed, was waived, or was otherwise abandoned
HELD 1. NO, CA should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion. Instead, it should have proceeded to determine WON the trial court did commit grave
- Section 1, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. - In her Complaint, the private respondent made the following assertions: That the afore-described parcels of lands were originally owned by Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo, who are now both deceased and after their death, were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, both surnamed Balo, the later (sic) being already dead; That plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her father’s death, had inherited her father’s share of the inheritance; That defendant Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants in this case; The defendants took possession of the above-described real properties immediately after the death of plaintiff’s grandfather Eugenio Balo, Sr. without her knowledge and consent; That plaintiff is desirous that the above-described real properties be partitioned between her and defendants; That plaintiff has proposed to the defendants that the above-described real properties be amicably partitioned between them by mutual agreement in a very fair and practical division of the same, but said defendants refused and continue to do so without any justifiable cause or reason to accede to the partition of the said properties. The foregoing allegations show substantial compliance with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as required under Section 1, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. NO - Briz v. Briz: proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. - In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
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Avena shares. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action. 3. NO - On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, it is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the Balo’s did not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed; otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. Disposition instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of CA affirming the Order of the RTC is affirmed
SEA-LAND SERVICE INC V CA (A.P. MOLLER/ MAERSK LINE) 00 SCRA 00 YNARES-SANTIAGO; March 2, 2000 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA
FACTS - Sea-land Service Inc and AP Moller/Maersk Line (AMML) are both carriers of cargo and common carriers. They entered into a contract entitled “Cooperation in the Pacific,” which is essentially a vessel sharing agreement whereby they mutually agreed to purchase, share, and exchange needed space for cargo in their respective containerships. Under the Agreement, they could be, depending on the occasion, either a principal carrier (with a
negotiable bill of lading or other contract of carriage with respect to cargo) or a containership operator (owner, operator or charterer of containership on which the cargo is carried). - During the lifetime of the contract, Florex delivered to AMML cargo of various foodstuffs. A corresponding Bill of Lading was issued by AMML to Florex. Pursuant to the agreement, AMML loaded the cargo to a vessel of Sea-land. Thus, under this arrangement, AMML was the principal carrier while Sea-land was the containership operator. - However, the consignee (not named in the case) refused pay for the cargo, alleging that delivery was delayed. Florex then filed a complaint against AMML for reimbursement of the value of the cargo - AMML’s answer: even on the assumption that Florex was entitled to reimbursement, it was Sea-land who should be liable. Thus, AMML filed a 3 rd Party Complaint against Sea-Land, averring that whatever damages sustained by Florex were caused by SeaLand, which actually received and transported Florex's cargo on its vessels and unloaded them. - Sea-land filed a motion to dismiss the 3 rd party complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction, the amount of damages not having been specified therein. Also, Sea-Land prayed for either dismissal or suspension of the 3rd party complaint on the ground that there exists an arbitration agreement between it and AMML - RTC denied motion to dismiss. Sea-Land filed petition for certiorari with CA: dismissed. Hence, this appeal. WON the 3rd party complaint should have been dismissed
HELD YES Ratio AMML is barred from taking judicial action against Sea-Land by the clear terms of their Agreement. Reasoning To allow AMML's 3 rd Party Claim against Sea-Land to proceed would be in violation of Clause 16.2 of the Agreement. As summarized, the clause provides that whatever dispute there may be between the Principal Carrier and the Containership Operator arising from contracts of carriage shall be governed by the provisions of the bills of lading deemed issued to the Principal Carrier by the Containership Operator. On the other hand, to sustain the 3 rd Party Complaint would be to allow
AMML to hold Sea-Land liable under the provisions of the bill of lading issued by the Principal Carrier to Florex, under which the latter is suing in its Complaint, not under the bill of lading petitioner, as containership operator, issued to AMML, as Principal Carrier, contrary to what is contemplated in Clause 16.2. - As the Principal Carrier with which Florex directly d ea lt w ith , A MM L c an a nd s ho uld b e h el d accountable by Florex in the event that it has a valid claim against the former. Pursuant to Clause 16.3 of the Agreement, AMML, when faced with such a suit “shall use all reasonable endeavours to defend” itself or “settle such suits for as low a figure as reasonably possible”. In turn, AMML can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land as Containership Operator for whatever final judgment may be adjudged against it under the Complaint of Florex. The crucial point is that collection of said damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land should be by arbitration. In the light of the Agreement, it is clear that arbitration is the mode provided by which AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land, as Containership Operator. - Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly provided for by the Agreement, the 3rd Party Complaint should have been dismissed. “This Court has previously held that arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully vaunted as ‘the wave of the future’ in international relations, and is recognized worldwide. To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward.” (bottomline, the court considered the existence of the arbitration clause as binding between the parties, thus a ground for dismissal of the 3 rd party complaint) Obiter : “CA did not err in reading the Complaint of Florex and AMML's Answer together with the 3 rd Party Complaint to determine whether a cause of action is properly alleged. In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. CA, this Court ruled that in the determination of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint.” Disposition Petition is granted.
SWAGMAN HOTELS V. CA
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Avena G.R. 161135 Davide, Jr., C.J.: April 8, 2005 FACTS : - Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13,500. - On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. - The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no cause of action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. - In due course and after hearing, the trial court rendered a decision on 5 May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the loans had been reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. The TC reasoned: When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date however, the first and the second promissory notes have already matured. Hence, payment is already due. Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without
objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants’ obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable. - In its decision of 5 September 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. - The petitioner came to this Court harping on the absence of a cause of action at the time the private respondent’s complaint was filed with the trial court.
ISSUE: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case?
HELD: No, it cannot be cured. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. The interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by the TC and CA is erroneous.
RATIO: - It is undisputed that the three promissory notes were for the amount of P50,000 each and uniformly provided for (1) a term of three years; (2) an interest of 15 % per annum, payable quarterly; and (3) the repayment of the principal loans after three years from their respective dates. However, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a renegotiation of the three promissory notes indeed happened in December 1997 between the private respondent and the petitioner resulting in the reduction – not waiver – of the interest from 15% to 6% per annum, which from then on was payable monthly, instead of quarterly. The term of the principal loans remained unchanged in that they were still due three years from the respective dates of the promissory notes. Thus, at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three promissory notes was due
yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also found that the petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and even during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted all these monthly payments. - With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint. - Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms of the three promissory notes and that the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the complaint was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall b e treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
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Avena According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, this Section allows a complaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without objection during the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause of action when he filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three promissory notes was due yet, he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in view of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during the trial. - Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. - Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other m atters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial. - However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. - A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.
DISPOSITION: The petition is hereby GRANTED
GOODYEAR V. SY G.R. 154554 PANGANIBAN;Nov 9, 2005
Nature Petition for Review under Rule 45
Facts In 1983 Goodyear Philippines purchased from Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. an Isuzo JCR 6-Wheeler. the truck was hijacked on April 30, 1986. This hijacking was reported to the Philippine National Police (PNP) which issued out an alert alarm on the said vehicle as a stolen one.It was later on recovered also in 1986. Goodyear sold it to Anthony Sy on September 12, 1996.Sy, in turn, sold it to Jose L. Lee on January 29, 1997. Lee filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against Sy on December 4, 1997 because he could not register the vehicle in his name due to the certification from the PNP Regional Traffic Management Office in Legazpi City that it was a stolen vehicle and the alarm covering the same was not lifted. Instead, the PNP in Legazpi City impounded the vehicle and charged L ee criminally.Sy informed Goodyear.Goodyear requested on July 10, 1997 the PNP to lift the stolen vehicle alarm status. This notwithstanding, Goodyear was impleaded as third-party defendant in the third-party complaint filed by Sy on January 9, 1998.Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss on March 24, 1998 on the twin grounds that the third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action and even if it did, such cause of action was already extinguished. The Regional Trial Court [(RTC)] resolved to dismiss the third-party complaint because it does not expressly show any act or omission committed by the third party defendant which violates a right of the third party complainant. CA granted the appeal, holding that that the Third-Party Complaint had stated a cause of action. First , petitioner did not make good its warranty in the Deed of Sale: to convey the vehicle to Respondent Anthony Sy free from all liens, encumbrances and legal impediments. The reported hijacking of the vehicle was a legal impediment that prevented its subsequent sale. Second , Respondent Sy had a right to protect and a warranty to enforce, while petitioner had the corresponding obligation to honor that warranty. Goodyear moved for reconsideration, which CA denied.
Issues WON the third-party complaint states a cause of action against Goodyear
Held No. The Third-Party Complaint filed by Sy is inadequate, because it did not allege any act or omission that petitioner had committed in violation of his right to the subject vehicle. Reasoning: A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it “must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint “warrants its dismissal.”
Elements of a Cause of Action A cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, has these elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the d efendant to respect that legal right; and 3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.”
TEST In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?” To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The court may consider -- in addition to the complaint -- the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records. In the present case, the third element is missing. The Third-Party Complaint filed by Sy is inadequate, because it did not allege any act or omission that petitioner had committed in violation of his right to the subject vehicle. The Complaint capitalized merely on the fact that the vehicle -- according to the records of the PNP, which was a stranger to the case -- was “a stolen vehicle.” The pleading did not contain
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“sufficient notice of the cause of action” against petitioner. without even going into the veracity of its material allegations, the Complaint is insufficient on its face. No connection was laid out between the owner’s sale of the vehicle and its impounding by the PNP. That the police did not lift the alert status did not make petitioner less of an owner. The Deed of Sale between petitioner and Respondent Sy was attached as Annex A to the Third-Party Complaint filed by the latter against the former. The Deed stated that petitioner was the absolute owner of the subject vehicle. No contrary assertion was made in the Complaint. Hence, the trial court correctly observed that the Complaint had failed to show that, at the time of its sale to Respondent Sy, the vehicle belonged to a person other than petitioner.
respondents Antonio Laviña (now deceased) and Teresita Laviña protested the free patent application. -On August 10, 1993, Regional Office No. IV of the DENR decreed the reduction of the area covered by the FPA. The Spouses Antonio and Teresita Laviña were directed to file the appropriate public land application covering the other half of the lot in question particularly the northern portion thereof. Morcal’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil action to nullify the two Orders of the DENR Regional Office. The trial court, however, dismissed petitioner’s civil action and sustained DENR. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter eventually affirmed the TC. -Petitioner contends the trial court is vested with the power to rule on the substantial rights of the parties in this case. She insists the issue of jurisdiction has been settled when the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents. Petitioner alleges the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply because there is urgent need for judicial intervention and because what is involved is a small piece of agricultural land, all of 2,420 square meters. She adds she has lost trust in the DENR as a body, which she believes would not reverse itself. -However, private respondent Teresita Laviña counters that petitioner’s failure to pursue and exhaust the proper administrative remedies was fatal to her cause. She maintains that the Regional Executive Director of the DENR did not commit any palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, private respondent contests petitioner’s claim that the disputed land is very small; she alleges that the same is valued at a considerable amount, over a million pesos.
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ANGELITA MORCAL VS. ANTONIO LAVIÑA ET. AL. 476 SCRA 508 (2005) QUISUMBING, J. NATURE For review on certiorari are the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75402, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64. The trial court Decision sustained the Orders issued by Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in DENR IV Case No. 5441 CENRO Case No. 91-02.
FACTS -The case involves a parcel of unregistered land with an area of 4,840 square meters, situated at Barangay Cagsiay, Mauban Quezon, identified only as Lot No. 2056-Cad-245. -Petitioner Angelita Morcal, with her sister Ildefonsa Morcal and other members of their family occupied, cleared and planted seasonal crops on the land up to the time it was declared as public land on May 14, 1941. Thereafter, their family declared the land for taxation purposes and began planting coconut and other fruit bearing trees. Having been in possession of the said land for almost forty (40) years, petitioner filed Free Patent Application No. (IV-3) 14661 in 1976. However, on September 11, 1990, private
ISSUE WON the petition should be given due course
the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.[9] -There are exceptions, however, to the applicability of the doctrine. Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. -In this case, however, none of the foregoing exceptions may be availed of. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, we see no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioner’s free patent application for the subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The impugned Orders of the DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. Petitioner cannot circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency. -Neither are we prepared to sustain petitioner’s claim that exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be complied with on the ground that the value of the disputed parcel of land is allegedly insignificant. Records show that the land in question consists of 2,420 square meters, no doubt a sizable parcel of land, regardless of its agricultural nature and the fact that it is located in a remote area; and its value of over a million pesos is certainly substantial and not insignificant.
HELD NO, for failure to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Ratio. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in
Dispositive. In sum, we are convinced that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it sustained the trial court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint seeking to nullify the questioned DENR Orders for petitioner’s failure to exhaust the proper administrative remedies.
PASCUAL VS PASCUAL G.R. No 157830
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Avena CARPIO-MORALES; November 17, 2005 NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the February 10, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code)
FACTS - Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorneyin-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002: (1.) To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate court; ( 2.) To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant; (3). To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of payment/and/or dispute resolution; (4). To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be necessary relative to the above acts. - Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 (pursuant to the SPA) before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T271657 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages - Defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code. She contends that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003, Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. It stated that : -RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 “All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.” Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A. 7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the
barangay where the property is located, regardless of the residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-
in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute (sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said
Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the case of Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, “Ordinarily, noncompliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.” -Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the abovesaid order was denied. This order stated that “Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.
ISSUE/S WON the dismissal of the case by the RTC is valid
HELD NO Ratio. Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read: SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: xxxxx -In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso the Court held that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays,
there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 ( Katarungang Pambarangay Law). -[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other. Reasoning. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest” as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent. -In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest , is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court. Dispositive. The petition is granted.
PHILVILLE VS JAVIER 00 SCRA 00 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Dec. 13, 2007 NATURE Instant petition for review on certiorari
FACTS - This case traces its antecedents to a verified complaint filed by Mercedes Javier, herein respondent with the RTC for damages and injunction. Impleaded as defendant was PHILVILLE Development and Housing Corporation (PHILVILLE). - The complaint alleges that spouses Crisanto (now deceased) and Javier have been tenant-cultivators of a 5.5 hectare parcel of rice land owned by Felimon Emperado, a holder of a free patent. - Sometime in 1977, PHILVILLE proposed to buy the land for conversion into a housing subdivision. Spouses Javier, PHILVILLE and Emperado then entered into a Kasulatan ng Pagsasalin at Kusang Loob na Pagsusuko. Among the terms agreed upon by the parties was that the Javiers would be given a
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Avena 2 ,0 00 s qu are m ete r l ot a s a d is tu rb an ce compensation. However, instead of giving them a single lot measuring 2,000 square meters, what they received were 2 separate lots of 1,000 square meters each located far apart. This prompted Mercedes to sue PHILVILLE for damages. - In its answer, PHILVILLE specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and raised the following affirmative and special defenses: (1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (2) it does not allege that the parties resorted to conciliation proceedings before the barangay; and (3) plaintiff is estopped from filing the complaint. - Mercedes filed a motion for leave of court to amend her complaint. In her attached amended complaint, she alleged that the Kasulatan did not express the true agreement of the parties and that the sale is void as it was executed within the 5-year prohibitive period from the issuance of the free patent. - The trial court denied the motion, holding that the proposed amendment is inconsistent with the cause of action in the original complaint; and that the proposed amendment is the subject of another civil case between the same parties pending before another branch of the trial court. - PHILVILLE moved to dismiss the original complaint alleging that the plaintiff had filed a protest with the Land Management Bureau seeking the revocation of the free patent issued to Emperado and the reversion of the land to the public domain. - the trial court granted PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss - Mercedes filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order but it was denied. This prompted her to interpose an appeal to the CA which reversed the order and remanded the cast to the trial court. - PHILVILLE filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or suit; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations; (g) That the complaint states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; (j) The suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.” In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Rafor, this Court
interpreted “within the time for pleading” to mean within the time to answer. Reasoning Under Section 1, Rule 11, the time to answer is 15 days after service of summons upon the defendant. In the instant case, we note that PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss the complaint was filed after it had filed its answer. - The only exceptions to the rule, as correctly pointed out by the CA, are: (1) where the ground raised is lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (2) where the complaint does not state a cause of action; (3) prescription; and (4) where the evidence that would constitute a ground for the dismissal of the complaint was discovered only during the trial. None of the foregoing grounds is present in PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss. Dispostition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
DIU V CA (BUSHNELL AND PAGBA) G.R. NO. 115213 REGALADO; DEC.19, 1995
WON the CA erred in reversing the challenged Orders of the trial court dismissing the complaint of Mercedes.
NATURE
HELD
FACTS
NO. Ratio Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court then applicable provides: “SEC. 1. Grounds. – Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds:
- Private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various merchandise from petitioners’ (Wilson and Dorcita Diu) store in Naval, Biliran all valued at P7, 862.55. - Respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners then brought the matter to the
Appeal by certiorari from judgment of CA which set aside the RTC’s
Barangay Chairman of Naval and so the case was set for hearing but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. - Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the MTC of Naval to which private respondents interposed the counterclaim that petitioners also had existing obligations to them: one for alleged maintenance and repair of petitioners’ boat and another for the cost of 2 tires that petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before the barangay chairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent and her husband - The MTC dismissed the complaint for noncompliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508 on conciliation. Petitioners appealed to the RTC, which did not pass upon the issue of the alleged noncompliance with P.D. 1508 but instead, decided the appeal on the merits and rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. - Private respondents then went to the CA and said appellate court set aside the judgment of the RTC on the ground that there had been no compliance with P.D. 1508. The CA said thus: “It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. If no conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be brought to the regular courts.” “In the case at bar, it has been established that there was no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The efforts of the barangay captain of Naval, Biliran to mediate the dispute between the p ar tie s h av in g f ail ed , t he Pa ng ka t ng Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However, the Pangkat was not constituted, and instead, a Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor of respondent spouses Diu. In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 5 66, it was held that “failure to avail of conciliation process under P.D. 1508, x x x renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss.”
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Avena ISSUE WON the confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement in P.D. 1508, there was substantial compliance with the precondition (for filing the claim)
HELD YES. Ratio Under Sec.412 of the Local Government Code, confrontation before the Lupon Chairman OR the Pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. Reasoning P.D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code, which took effect on Jan.1, 1992. Sec.410 (B)14 of the Local Govt. Code which mandates that the barangay chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts, should be construed together with Sec.412 15, as well as the circumstances obtaining and peculiar to the case. On this score, the barangay chairman or punong barangays is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Govt. Code. - While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. Although no pangkat was formed, there was substantial compliance with the law. - From the facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with P.D.1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any 14
SEC. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. (b) x x x. If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 15 SEC. 412. CONCILIATION. - (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. - No complaint x x x shall be filed or instituted in court x x x unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.
prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman and, their sham insistence for a meeting before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay. Technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions therein. - The Court noted that although the basic complaint was filed by petitioners on July 10, 1991, before the effectivity of the Local Govt. Code, or when P.D. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local Govt. Code are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense. - The Court further reasoned that the failure of Pagba to specifically allege in their Answer that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constituted a waiver of that defense. Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation procedure under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Disposition petition GRANTED. The CA judgment is SET ASIDE. RTC judgment is REINSTATED.
BERBA V. PABLO 474 SCRA 686 CALLEJO, November 11, 2005
and collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay .
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On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a complaint against Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the MTC of Manila for unlawful detainer. Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the that no Lupon ng Tagapamayapa conciliation or settlement has been reached.
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In their answer, defendants admitted they stopped paying rentals because of financial distress. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon. During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that despite earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as WON the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against defendants.
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Nature
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts -
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Estela Berba was the owner of a parcel of land located at M. Roxas St, Sta. Ana, Manila. A house was constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976, covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis. The lessees failed to pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818. Berba filed a complaint for eviction
On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat , wherein: 1) Pablo undertook to pay Berba P3000 every tenth of the month until fully paid; 2) Pablo will voluntarily leave the leased premises upon failure to pay; and 3) Pablo will pay P3450 as monthly rental, on top of the P3000. By May 2000, the lessees still had a balance of P71,716. As of May 2001, the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63. O n M ay 2 , 2 00 1, B erb a t hro ug h c oun se l wrote to lessees, demanding payment of the arrearages and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue them. The lessees ignored the demand.
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In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by the Punong Barangay and the members of the Lupon. She also appended a Statement of Account.
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In their position paper, defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing
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of the complaint; hence Berba’s complaint was premature. In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of Maligaya St., Malate, Manila, while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana Manila. MTC ruled in favor of Berba. Defendants appealed to the RTC. On motion of Berba, RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal. The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order, but before the court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.
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In their Appeal Memorandum, defendants insisted that Berba’s action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. Berba averred there was no need of a prior referral to the Lupon, and cited Sec 408(f) of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away from the barangay in Sta. Ana where the defendants lived.
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RTC granted the appeal, reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice. The RTC ruled that under Sec 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.
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RTC denied Berba’s MFR. She then filed petition for review with CA, claiming that Sec 408 of Local Government Code should be construed liberally together with Sec 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed.
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CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition and declaring that there was no substantial compliance with the mandate of the law with respect to prior referral to the Barangay Court.
Held NO
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Berba and Pablo executed the Agreement which was approved by the Lupon. This agreement had the force and effect of a final judgment. When Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the back rentals, Berba had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or an action in the MTC for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an action against Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals. The action of Berba against Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.
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Berba’s complaint against the Heirs of Carlos Palanca was premature. They were not impleaded by Berba as partiesrespondents before the Lupon. Moreover, they were not privy to the agreement, and as such, were not bound by it.
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Under Sec 408 of the Local Government Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the for Lupon conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein.
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If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
Disposition Petition denied.
SUSTIGUER V TAMAYO
G.R. No. 29341 FERNAN; AUG 21 1989 NATURE Appeal to order by CFI
FACTS -Sustiguer and Aposaga both claimed that they were qualified and entitled to purchase a subdivision lot in Bacolod for the reason that they possess the preferential right to buy it from the Govt of Bacolod, being the actual occupants of the lot. - they agreed that the award of the lot be given to Aposaga and that a down payment of 20% of the total cost of the lot shall be made (or else the lot will be awarded to other applicants) -Aposaga failed to pay the price. The same lot was sold to Jose Tamayo. -Sustiguer and Aposaga filed for annulment of the sale on installment and award of said lot against the Govt of Bacolod and Tamayo, claiming that Tamayo was not qualified to apply for the award nor to purchase the lot under Ordinance No. 149. It was also claimed that Tamayo maliciously filed for unlawful detainer against Aposaga and Sustiguer - 5 years and 5 months after the complaint was filed, Aposaga filed a "Motion to Withdraw in Case 6528 (annulment of sale)” and “Confess Judgment in Civil Case No. 7512 (unlawful detainer case)" declaring she is no longer interested in its prosecution. The court allowed her withdrawal as plaintiff. - Sustiguer filed a manifestation that the withdrawal of Aposaga as party-plaintiff in Civil Case 6528 and as party defendant in Civil Case 7512 does not change the status and character of the said cases considering that she was merely accommodated by her codefendant in occupying the lot in question. - Tamayo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative and special defenses and to dismiss both the complaint and complaint in intervention (of Villamarzo) invoking Sec 5 of Rule 16. He prayed that he be allowed to submit a written memorandum in support of his affirmative and special defenses. -Tamayo filed his memorandum on the issue WON Sustiguer has any cause of action against the defendants. Sustiguer filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule 19. -lower court dismissed the complaint of Sustiguer for lack of cause of action
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Avena -Sustiguer filed MFR and new trial claiming that the dismissal of the complaint is contrary to law as there was no preliminary hearing and that she still has a valid cause of action even after the withdrawal of Aposaga from the case as she was suing in her own right as an awardee entitled to the award in question. CFI denied.
ISSUE WON dismissal of complaint was proper
HELD YES - Rule 3.2 “Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. . . ." -The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. - Sustiguer is not entitled to the relief prayed for, she not being the real party-in-interest. The dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action is proper under the circumstances. It is well-settled that where the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. -Sustiguer’s interest cannot be categorized as material interest within the meaning of Rule 3.2 considering that it is contingent upon the final execution of the contract of sale on installment in favor of Aposaga. -Although the ground of lack of cause of action was pleaded by Tamayo as one of his special and affirmative defenses in his answer, the said ground for dismissal of the complaint may be heard preliminarily as if a motion to dismiss had been filed pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Tamayo took this procedural step by filing a motion for preliminary hearing and thereafter to
dismiss the complaint and the complaint in intervention. Records show that instead of a preliminary hearing, the parties filed their respective memoranda on the issue WON Sustiguer has a cause of action. -When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, the rule provides that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the complaint and no other, the test being whether the court can render a valid judgment from the facts set forth.The rule is that when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint. Thus it was erroneous for Sustiguer to claim that the lower court should have conducted a trial on the merits instead of dismissing the complaint upon a mere motion. Disposition dismissal of complaint for lack of cause of action as well as the order denying MFR affirmed
HEIRS OF LICAROS V SANDIGANBAYAN 440 SCRA 483 PANGANIBAN; October 18, 2004 FACTS - Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioners’ predecessor-ininterest, served as governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines from 1970 to 1980 during the presidency of Marcos. He died on August 3, 1983. - July 17, 1987 – PCGG, assisted by Office of SolGen, filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against Marcos and alleged crony Lucio Tan. The complaint was to recover ill-gotten wealth which was allegedly acquired and accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers. - Aside from the main defendants (Marcos, wife Imelda and Tan), 23 other persons who had purportedly acted as their dummies, nominees or agents. - It alleged, among others, that Tan (with the connivance of some government officials, including CB Governor Licaros) had fraudulently acquired the assets of the General Bank and Trust Company, now known as the Allied Bank.
- Despite the allegation, Licaros was not impleaded in this Complaint or in the subsequent Expanded Complaint. - September 13, 1991 - 4 years after the original action was filed, RP filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and for Admission of a Second Amended Complaint, which impleaded the Estate/Heirs of Licaros for the first time. - The Amended Comp laint, reiterating earlier allegations in the Expanded Complaint, detailed Licaros’ participation in the alleged unholy conspiracy. - Licaros had allegedly facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets of GBTC worth over P688 million at that time, to favor the Marcoses and the Lucio Tan Group who acquired said GBTC assets for only P500,000.00. Hence, his estate represented by his heirs was impleaded as a party defendant for the purpose of obtaining complete relief. - In 1976, GBTC got into financial difficulties and a loan was extended to it by CB amounting to P310 million. - In extending this loan, the CB took control of GBTC when the latter executed an irrevocable proxy of 2/3 of the bank’s outstanding shares in favor of the CB. 7 of the 11-member Board of Directors were CB nominees. - March 25, 1977 – GBTC was declared insolvent and placed under receivership. - A public bidding was held for the shares of GBTC. Among the conditions was the attachment by the bidder of a letter of credit. This was not fulfilled by Tan, et. al. who only paid P500,000 and attached a letter from PNB president Domingo. Marcos, Domingo and Licaros allegedly conspired with each other and gave Tan, et. al. favors. - September 3, 2001 - The heirs of Licaros filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, raising as grounds (1) lack of cause of action and (2) prescription. - The Sandiganbayan held that the averments in the Second Amended Complaint had sufficiently established a cause of action against L icaros. - The Sandiganbayan ruled that the argument of petitioners that Licaros could not be held personally liable was untenable because the GBTC assets had been acquired by Tan through a public bidding duly approved by the Monetary Board. According to the anti-graft court, this argument was a matter of defense that could not be resorted to in a motion to dismiss, and that did not constitute a valid ground for dismissal.
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Avena - It was immaterial that Licaros was not a business associate of the main defendants and not an officer, a director, or a stockholder of any of the defendant corporations. The paramount issue hinged on his acts as Central Bank governor, particularly his participation in an allegedly illegal conspiracy with Marcos and Domingo to give undue advantage to Tan’s bid for the GBTC assets.
ISSUE WON the motion to dismiss should have been granted on the grounds of: Lack of cause of action Prescription
HELD 1. NO Ratio It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether these allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? So rigid is the norm prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the facts averred, it must not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits. Reasoning - Petitioners are seeking the dismissal of the present case, because (1) the actions imputed to Licaros as Central Bank governor were allegedly official acts of the members of the Monetary Board acting as a collegial body; and (2) the acquisition was done through a public bidding and in good faith. These contentions are evidently matters of defense, the veracity of which must be determined in a full-blown trial (or in a pretrial stipulation), and not in a mere motion to dismiss. - A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect and not to violate that right; and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. - The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
clearly and unequivocally outlines its cause of action against Licaros. - The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that Licaros, during his lifetime, had conspired with the main defendants in facilitating the allegedly questionable transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan. - This charge of "conspiracy" casts a wide net, sufficiently extensive to include all acts and all incidents incidental, related to or arising from the charge of systematic plunder and pillage against the main defendants Ratio An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription, as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Reasoning - The instant action for reconveyance, restitution, and accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by the decedent during his lifetime, more particularly for conspiring with the main defendants to prejudice the Republic. - Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that “the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.” - The intent of the constitutional provision p re sum ab ly l ie s in th e s pe ci al a tte nd an t circumstances and the primordial state interests involved in cases of such nature. Disposition Petition dismissed
TANCUNTIAN V GEMPESAW 00 SCRA 00 CORONA; October 18, 2004 NATURE Petition for review under Rule 45 for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing an action for cancellation of title and damages for alleged lack of legal personality of petitioners.
FACTS
- Plaintiffs, Fausto Tancuntian, Macario Tancuntian and Cristina Cayang are beneficial owners of that parcel of land - Sometime in May 1994, the plaintiffs discovered that defendants applied for a free patent and fraudulently and anomalously secured titles on the portions of the same parcels of land from the Bureau of Lands - Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from selling, alienating and disposing the subject properties or any portion thereof during the pendency of the case. They also sought the cancellation and nullification of all the titles of the subject properties in the names of respondents as well as the reconveyance thereof to petitioners, plus damages and attorney’s fees. - Private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners had neither the legal personality nor the authority to institute the proceedings for cancellation of title. - Petitioners clarified that they were not asking for the reversion of subject private land to the public domain, which would have required the participation of the Director of Lands or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) through the Solicitor General. In essence, petitioners were seeking the quieting of their original titles that would ultimately lead to the cancellation of private respondents’ unlawfully issued and void free patent titles on the same private land. - RTC motu propio dismissed the complaint because only the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General can file a case for cancellation of title on the ground of fraud in the processing and issuance of the said title - Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration of the said order and inhibition of the presiding judge. - Judge Salvador Ibarreta, Jr. of Branch 8 of the Davao City RTC, to whom the case was re-raffled after Judge Quitain’s inhibition, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of dismissal. In reinstating the complaint Judge Ibarreta reasoned that “it was error for the court to have dismissed the case without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed by private respondents.” - Respondents Vicente Gempesaw, et al. filed their answer to the complaint, while Jofre Saniel, another respondent, filed a motion to dismiss. They principally invoked petitioner’s lack of legal
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Avena personality and authority to institute the action for cancellation of their titles. - Respondent Saniel asserted that since the action was for the cancellation of the original certificates of title issued to them through free patent, it was only the Government through the Solicitor General or his duly authorized representative who could institute the reversion proceeding. - Eventually, Judge Ibarreta issued an order dismissing the complaint. - Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court and held: There is no dispute that the titles registered in the names of the defendants-appellees are free patent titles issued by the State through the Bureau of Lands. Thus, not being owners, much less grantors, plaintiffsa pp el la nt s c an not as f or c an cel la ti on or reconveyance. - Petitioners filed this petition. - Petitioners contend that the suit they initially filed in the RTC of Davao City was not an action for reversion (wherein the real party in interest would have indeed been the Republic of the Philippines) but rather an action for cancellation of titles with damages, since the problem was “double titling.” - Petitioners thus pray for the cancellation of titles and free patents fraudulently secured by respondents over the same parcels of land which were already registered to them through OCTs which were still intact and in their names at the time of the issuance of respondents’ allegedly void titles. - Petitioners insist that since the land in question was already private land at the time it was issued a free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the inclusion of the Republic of the Philippines as the real party in interest was unnecessary.
ISSUE WON the petitioners have legal personality to institute the proceedings.
HELD YES - This legal dispute does not involve an action for the reversion of land to the public domain but one for the cancellation of null and void free patents over private land. - Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala vs. Heirs of Honorio Dacut : An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the
character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. - In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. - Petitioners claim continuing ownership over the subject parcels of land since 1976, as evidenced by OCT No. 0-328 and 0-329 in their names. This can only mean, according to petitioners, that the free patents and OCTs issued to respondents in 1990 and 1991 were null and void because the land was their private property, and as such, could not have been validly disposed of by the Government. Conformably with our ruling in Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, petitioners are therefore the real party in interest in this case. - Furthermore, Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be presented or defended in the name of the real party in interest. - Since, petitioners are the real parties in interest under the rules, then they have the legal personality to sue respondents. The land subject of the controversy is titled either in their names or that of their predecessors-in-interest. They stand to be benefited or injured by whatever decision the court may decree. Hence, they are entitled to the opportunity to defend their titles and present their side of the controversy since their titles date even earlier than those of the patent holders-respondents.
Disposition Petition GRANTED.
MALLION V ALCANTARA G.R. No. 141528 AZCUNA; October 31, 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, ROC
FACTS -Oct24,1995: Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with RTC San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing Alcantara’s alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the merits, RTC denied the petition upon the finding that Mallion failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. CA dismissed the appeal for failure of Mallion to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. -After said decision attained finality, Mallion filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with Alcantara was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, Alcantara filed an answer with a MTD praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. -RTC granted MTD and dismissed the case forforum shopping and multiplicity of suits. Mallion’s MFR was also denied. Hence, this petition. -Mallion argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition . In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. -Alcantara, in her comment, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in the earlier civil case (validity of their marriage) and prays for the same remedy (declaration of nullity). Respondent
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thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in the first case.
-Based on this test, it is apparent that petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage. -Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. But in the earlier case, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. -Parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. -A party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. Perez v. CA: the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. -Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.
Prof. Victoria A.
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Avena
ISSUE WON a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity is bar to a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license
HELD: YES -Res judicata, defined : a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. -This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, &(2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. -In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Sec47(b) and (c) of Rule 39 of ROC. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits ; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. -test to determine whether the causes of action are identical: ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
-Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the earlier decision dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
LEE BUN TING V ALIGAEN 76 SCRA 416 ANTONIO; April 22, 1977 NATURE Original petition in the SC. Certiorari with preliminary injunction.
FACTS - The case involves a question of res judicata. The first case was Dinglasan v Lee Bun Ting. The present case seeks for the reversal of the decision in aforementioned case.
DINGLASAN V LEE BUN TING - Petitioners sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen (predecessor of Lee Bun Ting), a parcel of land situated in Capiz, for P6,000. After the sale Lee Liong constructed a concrete building which he used for his lumber business and his residence. - Petitioners sought for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Petitioners contend that the sale was a conditional sale with the right to repurchase, but the RTC and CA found that the sale was absolute. Another contention was that the sale is null and void as it violated the 1973 Constitution, Art XIII, Sec. 5 (that foreigners cannot own land in the Philippines). On June 27, 1956, the Court upheld the sale. - The Supreme Court held that even if Lee Liong violated the Constitution, the sale cannot be deemed null and void because at the time of the sale, one of the plaintiffs, Judge Rafael Dinglasan (an assistant attorney at the DOJ) knew of the said Constitutional provision. The vendor was equally guilty, and the doctrine of pari delicto applied. The doctrine of in pari delicto barred petitioner-appellants from recovering the title to the property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments presented.
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Avena - The Court pointed out the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens in violation of the Constitutional prohibition.
PRESENT CASE - Twelve (12) years later, private respondents Dinglasan et al. filed a complaint on JULY 1, 1968 for the recovery of the same parcel of land (subjectmatter of the previous case), on the basis of the decision of the SC in Philippine Banking Corporation v Lui She. The respondents again asserted that the sale violated the Constitution. They prayed that they be declared the legal owners, the land be surrendered, that Lee Bun Ting receive P6K as restitution for the land, and that they be paid P2K monthly until the return of the property. - A motion to dismiss was filed by Lee Bun Ting on the ground of res judicata, alleging that the issues have definitely been settled in the Dinglasan case. - On Oct. 10, 1968 Aligaen of Capiz CFI denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants. The claimed that in the case of Philippine Banking Corporation, there is no statement which would have the effect of reopening and changing previously adjudicated rights of parties and finally settled cases (meaning there is no express prohibition against changing previous cases). - Lee Bun Ting reiterated their defense of res judicata on the basis of the decision of the SC on June 27, 1956. They prayed that the complaint
be dismissed. ISSUE
WON the case Rafael Dinglasan, et al. v Lee Bun Ting, et al. could be relitigated in view of the subsequent decision of the SC in Philippine Banking Corp. v Lui She
- The doctrine of res judicata applies where, between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Parties should not be allowed to litigate the same issue more than once. Rule 39, Sec. 49(b) (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by the title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same title and in the same capacity. (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon it face to have been so adjudged, or was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. - 49(b) refers to bar by prior judgment, while 49(c) refers to conclusiveness of judgment. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. (However, even if there is identity of parties but no identity or cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case. - In the present case, the names of the parties involved were the same, and the action and relief prayed for are identical—annulment of sale and recovery of the parcel of land. - a subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but not to an old one finally and conclusively determined by the people. Once the judgment of the SC becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.
- Petitioners spouses Villarino filed an action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance, Damages and Injunction against respondents the Avilas and the Provincial Sheriff. Petitioners opposed the application of the Avilas for the registration of Lot No. 967 on the ground that a portion of Lot No. 967 encroached upon Lot No. 968 to the extent of 2,146 square meters. Lot No. 968 is the adjacent property belonging to petitioners. In their complaint, petitioners averred that the registration of Lot No. 967 was based on an erroneous survey and technical description. They sought the reconveyance of the disputed area and the cancellation of the OCT to reflect the consequent reduction in area. The Avilas moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata. After a preliminary hearing, the RTC issued the order dismissing the case. - Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA, contending that the RTC erred in dismissing the case based on res judicata. The CA upheld the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration one year after its issuance. It also debunked the erroneous survey and technical description foisted by petitioners as not the fraud contemplated under Sec. 53 of PD 1529, which allows the reconveyance of fraudulently registered land. - Petitioners filed the instant petition. They argued that the judgment in the land registration case is not yet final because the aggrieved party can still avail of the remedy of reconveyance and recovery of damages, and that the trial court therein had no jurisdiction over the disputed area since it had already been covered by an OCT issued in the name of petitioners.
ISSUES WON petitioner’s complaint is barred by res judicata
HELD NO. Ratio It is clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of the SC cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether civil or criminal. Reasoning - Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. RES JUDICATA
DISPOSITION Certiorari is granted, with costs against private respondents.
VILLARINO v AVILA G.R. No. 131191 TINGA, J.; September 26, 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the order of dismissal of the RTC
FACTS
HELD YES Ratio For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
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judgment. The rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. Reasoning All the elements of res judicata in the mode of bar by prior judgment are present. There is no question that said decision was an adjudication on the merits. Petitioners and respondents were the same party litigants. The subject matter of the civil case was the same property that was the subject matter in the LRC case. Petitioners ’ cause of action in the civil case would call for the determination and adjudication of ownership over the disputed portion, an issue already passed by the land registration court when it confirmed the Avilas ’ title over Lot No. 967. Petitioners point out that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the disputed portion as this had already been decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. Petitioners claim that the disputed portion is covered by their title, but that it was erroneously included in the survey and technical description subject of the Avilas’ land registration application. That was precisely the content and thrust of petitioners’ opposition to the Avilas’ land registration application. But the land registration court debunked the opposition and upheld the application. Petitioners could have appealed the decision of the land registration court. Their failure to do so rendered said decision final and executory. Disposition Petition DENIED.
- TC’s decision became final and executory. - The Dabons, claiming to have bought the land fr Aristotle, filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the TC. They alleged that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons as the real parties in interest. CA issued resolution restraining TC from implementing its decision. Hence, this petition by Gonzales.
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CARILLO V. CA (DABON AND DABON) (supra) NATURE Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals
FACTS - Gonzales filed complaint (action for specific performance) against Manio sps, seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought fr Priscilla Manio. Gonzales said she pd downpayment to Priscilla because she had an SPA from her son Aristotle, the owner of the land. - TC ruled in favor of Gonzales. Gonzales deposited balance w/ the court and filed motion for execution, w/c was w/drawn bec decision wasn’t served on defendants. Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of 12 mn.
ISSUE/S 1. WON there was basis to annul the decision of the TC. 2. WON the Dabons can seek annulment of the TC judgment
HELD 1. YES. Ratio An action should be brought against the real party in interest. The real party in interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit. Reasoning - Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge), Guyot (Clerk of Court), Senoy (Deputy Sheriff), Risonar (Registrar of Deeds), and Gonzales. Carillo, Guyot, Senoy and Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs sought. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case. - Gonzales insists that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC’s judgment bec they’re not parties to the specific performance case. But the Dabons insist that they are parties in interest bec they are buyers, owners and possessors of the contested land. The specific performance case brought by Gonzales to the TC named Priscilla Manio and husband as defendants. However, the lot is owned by Aristotle, their son. Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no interest in the judgment of the TC. Failure to implead Aristotle Manio renders the proceedings in the specific performance case null and void. 2. YES. Ratio A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove that the judgment was obtained by fraud and he would be adversely affected thereby. Reasoning Although the Dabons are not parties to the specific
performance case, any finding of extrinsic fraud would adversely affect their ownership and could be basis of annulment of judgment. In this case, Gonzales knew of the sale of lot by Aristotle Manio to the Dabons yet Gonzales did not include the Dabons in her petition. This is extrinsic fraud. Disposition Petition is denied.
REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 10538 KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS - This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth including shares of stocks in certain corporations. ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. organization and acquisition of business associations/orgs. Sometimes, members of the firm act as incorporators or stockholders. They acquire info relative to assets of clients and their personal/biz circumstances. In this case, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings. - PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded respondent Raul Roco because he promised to reveal identity of principal/s for whom he acted as nomineestockholder - ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and they became holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or acquiring stockholders, and as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in said shares. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who separated fr ACCRA, filed a separate answer. - ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude them as parties-defendant as it did to Roco. PCGG set conditions for exclusion of the petitioners: - disclosure of identity of clients submission of docs substantiating lawyerclient relationship submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
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- PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the said conditions. - Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG case. That denial is now being questioned.
2. Yes Ratio - The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this issue. If client were made to choose bet legal representation w/o effective communication and disclosure and legal representation w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled to stay away from the judicial system or lose right to counsel.
and blood. Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been established. It does not attach until there is a client. - Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the relationship. - Due process requires that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. - EXCEPTIONS - Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for w/c he sought the lawyer’s advice. - It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client to civil liability. - It is also privileged when govt’s lawyers have no case against an atty’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime. - Apart fr the exceptions above, other situations could qualify as exceptions. Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in privilege when client’s name itself has independent significance such that disclosure would reveal client confidence. The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. First, disclosure would lead to establish the client’s connection w/ the very fact in issue. Also, the link bet the offense and the legal advice/svc was duly established by no less than the PCGG itself. Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them. Revelation of the name would provide the link for prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. - It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes, seeking advice on how to around the law. In this case, a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults atty abt it. - Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. After all, there are alternative sources of info available to prosecutor w/c does not depend on utilizing a defendant’s counsel as convenient and readily available source of info. - Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during relationship but even after termination of the relationship.
Reasoning - GENERAL RULE: - Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is sought to be protected is flesh
3. Yes - Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the identity of his clients. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as a species apart fr the
Prof. Victoria A.
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ISSUE/S 1. WON there is a cause of action against the defendants 2. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case 3. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated, thus, making the denial of the ACCRA lawyers’ exclusion from the PCGG case a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD 1. NO. Reasoning - It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the “bigger fish” as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint - It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint
ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification w/c made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist. Disposition Decision of the Sandiganbayan annulled and set aside
DISMISSAL BY CLAIMANT GOJO V GOYALA (supra) NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon
FACTS -Appellee Segundo Goyala, with his now deceased wife Antonina sold to Gojo a 2.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land for P750 by a “Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale”, the repurchase to be made within one year, as stated in the deed. The deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in addition to the purchase price. 10 years after the execution of said document, Gojo filed a case with the CFI against Goyala by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. Gojo alleged that the period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in the Registry of Property, it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to that effect. -Goyala filed an answer to the petition, alleging that they had obtained a cash loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that to guarantee payment, Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on the parcel of land in question. Hence, although the deed was executed in the form of a pacto de retro sale, the true intention of the parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure payment. Goyala further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. By way of counterclaim, Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the document of mortgage be declared so, and not a pacto de retro sale. He further prayed for P1800 per annum until the final termination of the case for the fruits of said property and in the case that the instrument be deemed a true pacto de retro sale, that petitioner be
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ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of respondents in accordance with A1606CC. -Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named defendant, Antonina, had died, prompting the TC to issue an order requiring counsel for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint substituting Antonina with one of her successors in interest as party defendants. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a copy of the said TC order, said appellant failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint required of him. A ppellant opposed the motion but the TC dismissed the complaint. -Appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said appellee’s counterclaim, which was granted by the TC, which further required Goyala to submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court. TC rendered favorable judgment on appellee’s counterclaim, declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordering Gojo to receive the P810 and to restore possession to the defendants and allowing them to redeem the same. -Appellant appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC.
entered. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. In Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed b y Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside
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ISSUES
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PRE-TRIAL JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO. V. MANGUDADATU 00 SCRA 00 PANGANIBAN, August 16, 2004
WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s counterclaim
NATURE
HELD
FACTS
YES. The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. -While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one, as in this case. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3, the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is
Petition for Review under Rule 45 -Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu (Respondent) filed with the RTC of Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat, a Complaint for damages against Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI" -Petitioner). Parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. -Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial had led the trial court to declare it in default. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision. It filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution but was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order. Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. Its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate
withdrawals of appearance. On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. To its Supplement, petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. On the same day, January 7, 2002, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice regarding the public auction sale of its properties. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their written comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing thereon for February 1, 2002. Petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its Supplement) dated January 16, 2001. Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record. The Certification pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received a copy of the Order intended for him. The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had p ersonally received his copy on December 21, 2001. -Petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. At 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled -- at the Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary public acting as deposition officer. At 12:00 noon of the same day, respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express, advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion, a copy of which it eventually received later in the day, at 3:10 p.m. On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys. Mario and Peligro, as witnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies. On the same date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the RTC
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attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her; (2) a transcript bearing their signatures, attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy of the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by respondents’ counsel. Hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner submitted its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary exhibits marked during the deposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents’ Vigorous Opposition to the Motion to Quash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the Notice to Take Deposition. Meanwhile CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition for Prohibition. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Resolution dated February 21, 2002, denying the Motion to Quash, it received a copy of respondents’ Motion to Set Auction Sale of Defendant’s Levied Properties. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to hold in abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution and the December 4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed.[33] It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not be the subject of a writ of execution. Ruling of the Court of Appeals = It ruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated. The appellate court also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court -- when the latter disregarded two witnesses’ oral depositions -- was an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari or prohibition. Finally, it ruled that between the denial of a lawyer and the certification of a postmaster, the latter would prevail.
impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial; and that, if presented, would probably alter the result. In its Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner argued that its counsel Atty. Mario was sick, a fact that allegedly constituted excusable negligence for his failure to appear at the August 8, 2000 pretrial. With regard to Atty. Rogelio Fernandez, the collaborating counsel, it alleged that the Board of Directors had terminated his legal services on August 4, 2000. -These grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial. Counsels are not the only ones required to attend the pretrial. The appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant is also mandatory. The pertinent rule states: Section 4. Appearance of parties. -- It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. -The rationale for this requirement of compelling the parties to appear personally before the court is to exhaust the possibility of reaching a compromise. While notice of the pretrial is served on counsels, it is their duty to notify the party they represent. The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is therefore unacceptable. It should have also justified its own absence therefrom. Having failed to do so, it had no valid ground to request a new trial. Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal is granted, lawyers are deem ed to be the representatives of their clients. Atty. Fernandez may have been notified of the termination of his services on August 7, 2004. But as far as the trial court was concerned, he continued to be petitioner’s counsel of record, since no withdrawal of appearance had yet been granted. Hence, his absence from the pretrial was still not excusable. While he could no longer represent petitioner, his presence would have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of appearance. An improvident termination of legal services is not an excuse to justify non-appearance at a pretrial. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be rendered
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ISSUES (1) whether petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New Trial; (2) whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances.
HELD 1. No. It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising factual issues that this Court does not review. A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been
meaningless, as they would be subject to the counsel’s will. -The Proper Remedy under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to be considered "as in default," but "to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof." This procedure was followed in the instant case. To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s remedy is a motion for reconsideration. An affidavit of merit is not required to be attached to such motion, because the defense has already been laid down in the answer. Liberality is the rule in considering a motion for reconsideration. It is best for the trial court to give both the plaintiff and the defendant a chance to litigate their causes fairly and openly, without resort to technicality. Unless the reopening of the case is clearly intended for delay, courts should be liberal in setting aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence. Judgments based on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon. In the present case, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had allowed respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability of a motion for reconsideration. But the failure to file the latter motion -- without due cause -is a factor in determining whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts, petitioner did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration. The lapse of time -- from the August 8, 2000 pretrial to the September 5, 2000 ex parte presentation of evidence, and until the June 19, 2001 promulgation of the Decision-- shows the negligence of petitioner and its counsels. Prior to the trial court’s resolution of the case, it had ample opportunity to challenge the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence. Too late was the challenge that it made after the Decision had already been rendered. -In addition to the foregoing facts, petitioner fails to convince us that it has not received the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial. There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. On this basis, we have ruled
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that the postmaster’s certification prevails over the mere denial of a lawyer. This rule is applicable here. Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial. This Court notes the trial court’s finding that petitioner received a copy of respondents’ September 24, 2001 Motion for Execution and November 21, 2001 Motion for Early Resolution, as well as the trial court’s September 28, 2001 Order submitting the Motion for Execution for resolution. Given these unrebutted facts, it is unbelievable that petitioner did not know that a ruling on the Motion for New Trial had already been issued. At the very least, the Motions filed by respondents should have alerted it of such issuance. Otherwise, it could have opposed their Motion for Execution by requesting the RTC to resolve the Motion for New Trial; or the trial court could have been informed by petitioner of the latter’s non-receipt of the Order resolving respondents’ Motion.
4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court. 5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried. 6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial. 7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases. -The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pretrial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge." Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. However, it is well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.
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2. No. A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law." Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows: -1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. x x x 2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses. 3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed. -The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness were present and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. As a rule, depositions should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party. -Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances specified hereunder: Section 4. Use of Depositions. -- At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions: (a)Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness; (b)The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose; (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part
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Avena introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken. We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its February 21, 2001 Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
PAREDES V VERANO G.R. No.164375 TINGA; October 12, 2006 NATURE Petition for review
FACTS - A complaint for the establishment of a right of way was filed at RTC Maasin by Paredes, Alago and Baybay (plaintiffs-petitioners) against Verano and Hinunangan (defendants-respondents). It culminated in a judgment by compromise. In the Compromise Agreement, Hinunangan granted a 2- meter-wide right of way in favor of Paredes for a consideration of P6K. - Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the Compromise Agreement, respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners. Petitioners answered, denied having violated the Compromise Agreement. They alleged that like them, respondents were not actual residents of Brgy Tagnipa where the "road right of way" was
established and that respondent Hinunangan had already sold his only remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes - Petitioners next filed MTD for lack of cause of action, which was denied by RTC. Petitioners elevated case to CA and SC but to no avail. Petitioners asked Judge Kapili to inhibit himself from the case. The judge denied the motion - Pre-trial was initially set and reset and reset again. In the pre-trial, Baybay's counsel moved to reset it to another date on account of a conflicting hearing. However, petitioner Baybay, who is the father of the counsel for petitioners, was present in court along with the other defendants. RTC was informed of a proposed settlement between the parties, although respondent Baybay qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to inform his lawyer and the co-defendants of the said proposal. The RTC then commented unfavorably on the absence of petitioners' counsel, expressing disappointment towards his attitude, even making note of the fact that not once had the counsel appeared before the RTC, even though the case had already reached SC over the denial of MTD. RTC again reset the pre-trial date. - Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation. Apart from manifesting his willingness to settle the complaint, petitioners' counsel suggested to the opposing counsel that he be informed of the terms of the proposed settlement. So, petitioners' counsel requested the cancellation of the 23 Jan 2004 hearing. - But the hearing pushed through on 23 Jan 2004. Private respondents and their counsel were present. So were Baybay and Paredes, and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel. The RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, "for failure of the defendants’ counsel to appear before RTC. Petitioners filed MFR, but was denied - So, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA dismissed it for failure to attach duplicate original copies of the annexes to the petition other than the RTC Orders and for failure to submit such other pleadings relevant and pertinent to the petition. Petitioners filed MFR with Motion to Admit Additional Exhibits, adverting to the documents previously missing from the petition but attached to the motion. - MFR dismissed. CA resolved on the merits, ruling that under Sec 5, Rule 18 ROC, it is the failure of the defendant, and not defendant's counsel, to appear at
the pre-trial that would serve cause to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. CA noted that Baybay had made it clear that he would never enter into any amicable settlement without the advice of his counsel. - CA cited Sps. Ampeloquio, Sr. v. CA where the Court held that if every error committed by RTC were to be a proper object of review by certiorari, then trial would never come to an end and the appellate court dockets would be clogged with petitions challenging every interlocutory order of the TC. It concluded that the acts of Judge Kapili did not constitute grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE WON the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all defendants themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
HELD NO Ratio The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. It bears stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pretrial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and equity Reasoning - The order of RTC allowing respondents to present evidence ex parte was undoubtedly to the detriment of petitioners. Since the RTC would only consider the evidence presented by respondents, and not that of petitioners, the order strikes at the heart of the case, disallowing as it does any meaningful defense petitioners could have posed. A judgment of default against a defendant who failed to attend pre-trial, or even any defendant who failed to file an answer, implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations but not all their other rights. - Nothing in the ROC authorizes a trial judge to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte on account of the absence during pre-trial of the counsel for defendant. In Rule 18, Sect. 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel during pre-trial. The provision also provides for the instances where the non-appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec. 4 provides for
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a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. Instead, the penalty is provided for in Sec. 5. Notably, what Section 5 penalizes is the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant, and not their respective counsel. -The Court also cited cases and discussed why although they have similar facts are inapplicable or do not constitute a precedent to the instant case. These cases are: UCPB v. Magpay, Jonathan Landoil International Co. v. Mangudadat, SSS v. Chaves, Africa v. IAC. (See original) - Due process dictates that petitioners be deprived of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations if, and only if, there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law to do so. There being a manifest lack of such basis in this case, petitioners would be unjustly denied of the opportunity to fully defend themselves should the Court affirm the questioned orders which were evidently issued by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion. The better and certainly more prudent course of action in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities - While counsel is somewhat to blame for his nonattendance at pre-trial, incidentally the operative act which gave birth to the controversy at bar, it would be most unfair to penalize petitioners for what may be the deficiency of their lawyer when the consequent penalty has no basis in law. Disposition Petition is granted. RTC and CA rulings reversed.
agreement with Leyte Lumber through Roque Yu, Sr., whereby the latter agreed to supply Magno with building materials he may need in his construction business. The success of Magno's business g ave birth to the Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. - Owing to this fruitful relationship, the two (Roque Yu, Sr. and Magno) entered into a joint venture, the Great Pacific Construction Company (GREPAC), with Yu as President and Magno as Vice President. The relationship between Yu and Magno began in 1975 and continued until Magno's death on August 21, 1978. - On January 30, 1979, in the RTC of Tacloban City, the petitioners instituted two separate complaints for sums of money with damages and preliminary attachment against the respondents. One was Civil Case No. 5822, raffled to Branch 8 of the court, instituted by Leyte Lumber against BG Magno and the Estate of Basilio Magno, to collect on the principal amount of P1,270,134.87 for construction materials claimed to have been obtained on credit by BG Magno, and the other was Civil Case No. 5823, raffled to Branch 6, filed by the Yu spouses against BG Magno and the Estate of Basilio Magno, to collect upon loans and advances (P3,575,000.00) allegedly made by the spouses to BG Magno. - On June 17, 1993 the court rendered its decision i favor of the defendant on both cases. The two separate decisions of even date were penned by Judge Getulio M. Francisco, the presiding judge of Branch 6 to which only Civil Case No. 5823 was raffled. The parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an order for consolidation of the two cases. Instead, they directly interposed their respective appeals to the CA. - In the CA, the two cases on appeal were consolidated. In Civil Case No. 5822, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by declaring that defendant B.G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc., made an overpayment in the amount of P631,235.61, instead of P620,239.61 and ordering plaintiff to return said amount to defendant, with interest of 12% per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid, and by DELETING the award of exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000.00 in favor of defendan. In Civil Case No. 5823, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, defendant B.G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc. is ordered to pay
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COURSE OF TRIAL 1. trial proper 2. kinds of trial a. consolidated/ separate trial SPS. YU V MAGNO CONSTRUCTION G.R. No. 138701-02 GARCIA; October 17, 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS - The spouses Roque Yu, Sr. and Asuncion Yu are the controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber. During his lifetime, Engr. Basilio G. Magno entered into a verbal
plaintiffs the sum of P625,000.00, with 12% interest per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid, and the further sum of P50,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
ISSUE WON Branch 6 had jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 5822 pending in Branch 8 in the absence of a motion or order of consolidation of the two cases
HELD YES - There was nothing irregular in the procedure taken. The records show that there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate the two cases for decision by the presiding judge of Branch 6. - Indeed, when the respondents filed a Motion to Lift, Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on January 20, 1993, the caption thereof indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Likewise, on October 29, 1993, when the petitioners' new counsel entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof was also written the docket numbers of both cases. Petitioners' previous counsel of longstanding (whose representation dates back to the filing of the two complaints in 1979) filed his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on October 30, 1993, and the caption thereof similarly indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Subsequent orders of the court which emanated from Branch 6 also bear, in the caption thereof, the titles and docket numbers of both cases. In other words, as early as six months prior to the promulgation of Judge Francisco’s decisions in the two cases, there appears to have been a transfer or consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties knew of it, albeit the actual date when the two cases were consolidated or transferred does not appear on record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no opposition or objection in any manner was registered by either of the parties to the same, thereby evincing their consent thereto. It is, therefore, already too late in the day for the petitioners to question the competence of Judge Francisco to render the separate decisions in the two cases. Petitioners may not now question the transfer or consolidation of the two cases on appeal, for they knew of it and did not question the same in the court below. They may not now make a total turn-around and adopt a contrary stance; more so when the judgment issued is adverse to their cause.
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Avena - The next logical questions are: Is the consolidation of the two cases (Civil Case Nos. 5822 and 5823) a procedural step which the court a quo could have properly taken? Is it a remedy available within the context of the surrounding circumstances? We answer both questions in the affirmative. The two cases were filed just a few months apart; they involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical parties and no other; the respondents (as defendants therein) claim, in both cases, essentially the same defense, which is overpayment; they cover the same period of transacting continuous business that spans four years; they relate to simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other; they entailed the presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a broad part of the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or both parties. And the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or both cases on their own. - A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347). Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court: “Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” - The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 13421343). - Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action in consolidating
will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases. - The ordered consolidation of cases, to our mind, crystallizes into reality the thinking of our predecessors that: ". . . The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism." is hereby rendered Disposition Judgment MODIFYING the assailed CA decision by setting aside and deleting the award of the respondents’ counterclaim in the amount of P142,817.27 in Civil Case No. 5822; reiterating the P50,000.00 award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No. 5822; and deleting the award of attorneys’ fees to the petitioners in Civil
Case No. 5823. In all other respects, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
b. trial by commissioners ANGARA v FEDMAN G.R. NO. 156822 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 18, 2004 NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration FACTS: - On February 8, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and/or Quieting of Title against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas , claiming to be the rightful owners of the land currently occupied by petitioner. They even conducted a relocation survey. -petitoner on the other hand claimed that he is the lawful owner; the said parcels of land do not encroach on respondent's property; and assuming that there is such an encroachment, he nevertheless had acquired title thereto by virtue of acquisitive prescription -RTC ordered the constitution of committee of three surveyors composed of geodetic engineers representing the petitioner, respondent and the DENR -On June 22, 2000, the RTC issued subpoena ad testificandum to the three Geodetic Engineers who composed the Board of Commissioners to testify in connection with their individual reports. The RTC also reminded respondent that the case was filed as early as February 8, 1996, the pre-trial was conducted on January 20, 1999 and since then respondent has not even commenced presenting its evidence on the merits. -On September 27, 2000, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the case due to the failure of the respondent to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time. However, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered the order of dismissal. -petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying that judgment be rendered on the basis of the commissioners' report and, alternatively, all other
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persons who will be adversely affected by the relocation survey be impleaded as parties -RTC denied the said Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that according to respondent there was no joint survey conducted by the comm issioners as ordered by it and as agreed upon by the parties, hence the report of the commissioners cannot be the basis of the judgment, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was rejected by the RTC. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. this too was rejected. Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Court denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error. Hence, the present Motion for Reconsideration
survey, which literally means one that is conducted physically together or in the presence of one another." The order constituting the panel of commissioners, however, does not define what a joint relocation survey entails nor does it lay out the steps or procedures in conducting the same. Petitioner submits that the term "joint survey" does not rule out a survey that is coordinated and linked together resulting in a joint finding and recommendation. On the other hand, respondent subscribes to the pronouncement of the RTC that the record is replete with explicit motion and orders of the court calling for joint survey. *issue of certiorari (important to note) - It must be emphasized that the petition before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. -In this case, the assailed orders of the RTC are but resolutions on incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. They are interlocutory orders since there leaves something else to be done by the RTC with respect to the merits of the case. Consequently, the Court is perplexed that, in resolving the petition before it, the Court of Appeals chose to delve into the wisdom and soundness of the orders of the RTC, overlooking the nature of the petition before it. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case -Petitioner failed to demonstrate his claim that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's prayer for rendition of judgment based on the commissioners' report. The Rules of Court clearly provides that the trial court is not bound by the findings of the commissioners or precluded from disregarding the same. It may adopt, modify, reject the report or recommit it with instructions, or require the parties to present further evidence
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ISSUE: WON CA erred in rejecting the appeal HELD: no. -According to petitioner, this is a "simple case of an alleged 'encroachment' or 'overlapping' of property boundaries." Considering that the issue involves principally a factual and technical matter for which the RTC, at the instance of the parties, created a Panel of Commissioners has done its job and the chairman submitted his report on the basis of his evaluation of the separate surveys conducted by the members. The RTC, however, simply ignored the report on the technical and lame excuse that the Panel of Commissioners did not conduct a "joint survey." -petitioner submits that the RTC cannot simply ignore the commissioners' report without considering its merits simply because the parties agreed that the same is not final and binding. Petitioner argues that the RTC should have considered the merits of the report and acted on its recommendation instead of rejecting it outright without any cause or reason. As to the insistence of respondent that the RTC ordered a "joint survey", petitioner submits that there is nothing in the order of the RTC defining or specifying what a "joint" survey is. -Petitioner reiterates his arguments in the petition that a joint survey, as understood by respondent, wherein the commissioners literally go out together, conduct a survey in the presence of one another, and prepare one report, could not have been contemplated by the RTC since the commissioners nominated by the parties insisted on two different methods or approaches for the survey. -A battle of semantics is principally being waged before this Court. Petitioner argues that undue emphasis was placed on the words "joint relocation
3. incidents/ processes a. calendar of cases
b. intervention HOLIDAY INN V SANDIGANBAYAN 186 SCRA 447 MEDIALDEA: June 8, 1990 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (treated as a special civil action for certiorari)
FACTS: -
On January 1, 1976, Holiday Inn, Inc. (HII) entered into a management contract with New Riviera Hotel and Development Co., Inc. (NRHDC) for a period of ten (10) years. Article 18 of said agreement stipulates:
ARTICLE 18 RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL If Owner, at any time or times during the term hereof, shall receive a bona fide offer from a third party acceptable to Owner, or which Owner does not promptly reject, to purchase the Premises or any part thereof, or the business conducted in connection therewith, or in the buildings, equipment, or furnishings used in connection therewith, or any interest in Owner (whether a partnership, or corporation or otherwise), Owner shall deliver to Manager an executed original copy of such offer and agrees concurrently therewith to deliver to Manager an financial information (including but not limited to, certified balance sheets and operating statements) involved and such, other information as may be reasonably requested by Manager. Manager may, within twenty one (21) days of its receipt of such offer and said financial data, at its portion, purchase said interest of said Owner on the terms of said offer. -
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On January 1, 1976, NRHDC and HII assigned all their rights under the above mentioned agreement to petitioner Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. (HIP) On April 22, 1986, NRHDC was sequestered by the PCGG which subsequently appointed fiscal agents and/or placed an operating team to monitor the activities of said corporation. Because of numerous controversies and conflicts resulting in operational problems regarding NRHDC, PCGG and Roberto S. Benedicto, who is perceived to be the controlling stockholder of the company, entered into an agreement whereby 2/3 of
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the members of the Board of Directors of NRHDC shall be nominees of the PCGG and 1/3 thereof shall be nominees of Mr. Benedicto. On July 14, 1986, HIP and NRHDC, as sequestered by PCGG entered into an agreement (addendum) extending the terms of their January 1, 1976 agreement thereof to an indefinite period "on its existing terms and conditions" with either party having the right to terminate the agreement upon six (6) months prior written notice to the other party On May 10, 1988, NRHDC served upon HIP a letter advising that the management agreement shall be terminated six (6) months from said date. It was latter learned that the letter of termination was brought about by NRHDCs decision to have New World Hotel Philippines (NWHP) manage the property in lieu of HIP. Contending that there was breach of Article 18 of its original management agreement with NRHDC, HIP initiated on November 2, 1 98 8 a n a cti on f or in te rv en ti on i n Sandiganbayan, a sequestration case, and wherein NRHDC was included as among the firms sequestered, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth amassed by Roberto S. Benedicto in conspiracy with former President Ferdinand Marcos. The proposed complaint-in-intervention attached to the motion-in-intervention q ue st io ns t he t er mi na ti on of t he management agreement without the corresponding prior notice and/or right of first refusal under Article 18 of the Agreement. Petitioner likewise prayed for recovery of unpaid management fees under the agreement. On November 11, 1988, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned Resolution denying HIPs motion for intervention for lack of jurisdiction since HIP has flied the present petition contending that, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases civil or criminal, and all incidents arising from incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive, and original
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jurisdiction subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court The court a quo issued a temporary restraining order on November 16, 1988.
ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has a legal interest sufficient to justify its intervention 2. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention HELD 1. NO Reasoning Sec. 2 of Rule 12 tells us that a person may intervene in proceedings in progress if that person has a legal interest in the success of either of the parties, or against both or when a disposition of the property involved would affect the prospective intervenor. Holiday Inn, Inc., has not shown how the termination or continuation of its management contract would be legally affected by a finding of whether or not Roberto S. Benedicto lawfully acquired RIVIERA.
Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution, i.e., where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, as well as all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases and (b) cases filed by those who wish to question or challenge the commission's acts or orders in such cases. Evidently, petitioner's proposed complaint-inintervention is an ordinary civil case that does not pertain to the Sandiganbayan. As the Solicitor General stated, the complaint is not directed against PCGG as an entity, but against a private corporation, in which case it is not per se, a PCGG case. Dispositive. Dismissed.
ORDONEZ V GUSTILO 192 SCRA 469 PARAS; December 20, 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review decision and order of RTC Cavite, Br. 16, Cavite City, Gustilo, J.
FACTS The subject-matter of petitioner's proposed complaint-in-intervention involves basically, an interpretation of contract, i.e., whether or not the right of first refusal could and/or should have been observed, based on the Addendum/Agreement of July 14, 1988, which extended the terms and conditions of the original agreement of January 1, 1976. The question of whether or not the sequestered property was lawfully acquired by Roberto S. Benedicto has no bearing on the legality of the termination of the management contract by NRHDC's Board of Directors. The two are independent and unrelated issues and resolution of either may proceed independently of each other. Upholding the legality of Benedicto's acquisition of the sequestered property is not a guarantee that HIP's management contract would be upheld, for only the Board of Directors of NRHDC is qualified to make such a determination.
2. NO Reasoning The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to (a) cases filed by the PCGG, pursuant to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14. as amended by the Office of the President, and
- Respondent Espiritu filed complaint for specific performance and damages against respondents Municipality of Rosario, Cavite and Mayor Enriquez to enforce their agreement contained in a Reclamation Contract. Plaintiff prays that a portion of the foreshore land of the town be conveyed to him as assignee of Salinas Dev’t. Corp. (SADECO), the entity which reclaimed the land in question. Defendants resisted the claim stating it was barred by the statute of limitations. - Herein petitioner, the barangay captain of Tejeros Convention, Rosario, Cavite, together with 7 others intervened and alleged in their Answer-inIntervention that the area being claimed by Espiritu came about by natural accretion and that the Reclamation Contract is null and void. - At the pre-trial conference, where the original parties and intervenors were present, Espiritu and defendant municipality manifested that they would submit to a compromise agreement at a latter date. - On the other hand, intervenors asked that they be allowed to present evidence to prove their defense. - The principal litigants submitted to the court their compromise agreement. TC approved and rendered a decision in accordance therewith. Yet, intervenors continued to present evidence, regarding their allegations.
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ISSUE/S WON trial court erred in stopping/preventing the intervenors from further presenting evidence in support of their Answer-in-Interevention.
HELD 1. NO. Intervention is defined as a “proceeding in a suit or action by which a third party is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between the others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.” Ratio Intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal
action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action.
Reasoning A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and immediately executory. All pending issues will become moot and academic once a compromise submitted by the parties is approved by the trial court. The continuation of reception of intervenor’s evidence would serve no purpose at all. Should intervenors fail to prove that the Reclamation Contract is null and void and that no actual reclamation was made, the correctness and propriety of the decision based upon the compromise agreement would be strengthened. On the other hand, should they succeed in proving that the contract is null and void, and that the area in question came into being through the natural action of the sea, still the decision of the lower court could no longer be set aside, inasmuch as it has already become final and executed. Disposition WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
AGULTO v TECSON G.R. No.145276 CORONA;November 29, 2005 FACTS: -On August 25, 1997, the respondent William Z. Tecson filed an action for dam ages against petitioners Rolando Agulto, Maxima Agulto, Cecille Tenoria and a certain Maribel Mallari in the RTC of Quezon City. Agulto filedan answer claiming that Tecson had no cause of action and alleged malicious prosecution. RTC dismissed Tecson’s complaint (failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time). Tecson filed a motion for reconsideration, which was gracted. Court required the parties to appear during the pre-trial conference scheduled on January 21, 1999. The pre-trial was, however, reset to April 29, 1999. -During the scheduled pre-trial on April 29, 1999, petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. Counsel for Agulto suggested that it be re-scheduled on June 17. Employee advised petitioner’s counsel that the suggested setting was not yet official as it would depend on the calendar of the court and the counsel of respondent. -The pre-trial proceeded on June 17, 1999. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and to submit their pre-trial brief, the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his evidence ex parte -Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 17, 1999 order of the RTC. They claimed that they were not notified of the pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Before the motion could be heard, however, the court rendered its July 12, 1999 decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners were ordered to pay respondent moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of P170,000. -Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CA on November 24, 1999. They claimed that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the September 24, 1999 order -CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the proper remedy was appeal by writ of error, i.e., ordinary appeal, under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA also held that the petitioners failed to show
that their absence during the scheduled pre-trial was for a valid cause -Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: WON RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not considering Agulto’s motions for reconsideration regarding the pre-trial. HELD: YES -Under the present Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of pre-trial should be served on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party he represents. It is only when a party has no counsel that the notice of pre-trial is required to be served personally on him. -Thus, the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. It does not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial. -Thus, sending a notice of pre- trial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. Its absence will render the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings void. Thus, the trial court’s order allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte without due notice of pre-trial to the defendant constitutes grave abuse of discretion -Although the failure of the defendant to file a pretrial brief has the same effect as his failure to appear at the pre-trial (this is, the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof), a condition precedent is the service of notice of pre-trial. Otherwise, the defendant will be groping in the dark as to when exactly he is supposed to file his pre-trial brief. -More specifically, under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are required to file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs. Clearly, the date of the pre-trial is the reckoning point for the filing of the pre-trial brief. But without prior notice of pre-trial, the parties cannot reasonably be expected to know the date of the pre-trial.
c. subpoena d. Rule 22
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ISSUES : (1) WON petitioner’s motion for new trial
G.R. No. 167245 YNARES-SANTIAGO; September 27, 2006
was filed out of time; (2) WON a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to overturn the denial of a motion for new trial; (3) WON the motion for new trial should be granted.
NATURE : Petition for Review
HELD:
FACTS : Private respondent First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert), Midland Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and petitioner Elpidio Uy. The complaint arose from petitioner’s issuance of a check in the amount of P695,811.00 in favor of FMISC to cover payment for deformed steel bars delivered by the latter to petitioner and private respondents MICC and Robert. However, the check was dishonored upon presentment and despite demands, MICC, Robert and petitioner refused to pay. After the filing of the respective Answers of FMISC, Robert and MICC, hearings were thereafter conducted for the reception of their respective evidence. The initial reception of petitioner's evidence was set on February 28, 2001 but it was cancelled because petitioner had influenza. The hearing was reset six more times, but in each instance, petitioner, through his lawyers, moved for the cancellation and resetting of the presentation of his evidence. During the sixth scheduled hearing on February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares, counsel for petitioner arrived late. Upon motion of FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to present evidence is deemed waived and the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Atty. Bañares withdrew his appearance on January 8, 2003 with petitioner's conformity. On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and in favor of FMISC. On April 4, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the Decision. On April 21, 2003, petitioner through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, thus impairing his rights to due process. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
(1) NO. A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the Motion for New Trial was received by the trial court on April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry Receipt attached to the Affidavit of Service as well as that stamped on the envelope which contained the copy of the motion, reveals that it was filed and served by registered mail on April 21, 2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003, the last day for filing the same was a Saturday. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court states that if the last day of the period thus computed falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, the motion was actually filed on time it having been filed on April 21, 2003, the next working day, following the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday. (2) YES. Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides that the remedy to an order denying a motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or final order, must be read in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that “no appeal may be taken from an order denying a new trial or reconsideration.” Rule 41, Section 1 further provides that: “where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.” Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the denial of the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper. (3) NO. Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed within the period for taking an appeal based, among others, on excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. In the instant case, the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearings for the reception of evidence is inexcusable. The trial court scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence seven times. The initial hearing set on February 28, 2001 was cancelled because petitioner allegedly had influenza.
The hearings scheduled on April 26, 2001 and May 10, 2001 were cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Carpio, Jr. as collaborating counsel during the hearing on October 25, 2001 but no evidence was presented. Instead, the hearing was cancelled. On December 13, 2001, Atty. Bañares, petitioner's new counsel, appeared but he requested for a resetting. On February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares moved to postpone the hearing to February 28, 2002 as previously scheduled. On February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late. The records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled without any justification. However, the trial court accommodated the requests for postponement or resetting in order to accord petitioner due process. Under the circumstances, petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings is without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such, it cannot be a ground for new trial. In addition, the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. Under the Rules, the moving party must show that he has a meritorious defense. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition were granted, must be shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a new trial. Petitioner's Affidavit of Merit did not contain clear statements of the facts constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given the chance to introduce evidence. The allegations that he has a "meritorious defense" and a "good cause" are mere conclusions which did not provide the court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the case. An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of law. Petitioner's motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention the evidence which he was prevented from introducing, nor did it allege that such evidence would change the outcome of the case.
