consti part 9: the church & the state Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
law shal shalll be made made respe respect ctin ing g an Art Art III III sec sec 5. No law establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereo thereof. f. The free exercis exercise e and enjoym enjoyment ent of religi religious ous prof profes essi sion on and and wors worshi hip, p, with withou outt disc discri rimi mina nati tion on or prefere preference nce,, shall shall forever forever be allowe allowed. d. No religi religious ous test test shall shall be requir required ed for the exercis exercise e of civil civil or politi political cal rights. Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropr appropriat iated, ed, applie applied, d, paid, paid, or employ employed, ed, direct directly ly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Establishment Clause AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ
Justice Laurel 1937 FACTS:
Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom guaranteed in the Consti What is guaranteed guaranteed by our Constitution Constitution o is religious liberty, not merely religious toleration.
Religious Freedom: Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate is not not inhi inhibi biti tion on of profo profoun und d revere reverenc nce e for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence , o in order to establish a gov’t that shall embody their ideals…” in the preamble of the Constitution.
On May 1936, respon responden dentt announ announced ced in the news newspa paper pers s that that he woul would d order order of post postag age e rd stamps stamps commemo commemorat rating ing the 33 International Eucharistic Congress under Act No. 4052 (cited below) Petiti Petitione oner, r, Mons. Mons. Gregori Gregorio o Aglipa Aglipay, y, Supreme Supreme Head ead of the Phil. Indepen epend dent Church (Agl (Aglip ipay ayan an), ), seek seeks s a writ writ of proh prohib ibit itio ion n to prev prevent ent resp respon onde dent nt Direc Directo torr of Posts Posts from from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the said Congress. Petiti Petitioner oner alleges alleges that that respon responden dentt in o issuing and selling the postage stamps violated the Constitutional provision on the princi principle ple of separa separation tion of church church and and stat state, e, spec specif ific ical ally ly sect sectio ion n 13, 13, subsec subsectio tion n 3, Art. Art. VI which which says: says: “No public public money money or property property shall ever be appro appropri priate ated, d, appli applied ed,, or used, used, direct directly ly or ind indire irectl ctly, y, for the the use, use, ben benef efit it,, or supp suppor ortt of any any sect sect,, church, denomination… or system of religion…”
“… our history, not to speak of the history of mank mankin ind, d, has has taug taught ht us that that the the unio union n of churc church h and and stat state e is prej prejudi udici cial al to both, both, for for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims.” This This princi principle ple was recogn recognize ized d in the Malolos Malolos Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in the the inst instru ruct ctio ions ns of McKi McKinl nley ey to the the Phil Phil.. Commi Commiss ssio ion… n… and and fina finall lly y embod embodie ied d in the the Constitution as the supreme expression of the Filipino people.
General Concessions Concessions indiscrimi indiscriminately nately accorded accorded to religious sects: Tax Tax exem exempt ptio ions ns prop proper erti ties es devo devote ted d o exclusively to religious purposes Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a o priest, preacher, etc. is assigned to the arme armed d forc forces es,, pena penall inst instit itut utio ion n, orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in public o schoo schools ls is allow allowed ed by cons consti titu tuti tion onal al mandate, etc.
PRESENT CASE:
responden dentt violat violated ed the Consti Constitut tution ion in ISSUE: WON respon issuing and selling the postage stamps. HELD: No constitutional infraction. History of Separation of Church and State:
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Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to issu issue e and and sell sell the the stam stamps ps cont contemp empla lates tes no religious purpose, but gives the Director of the Posts the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” The The pres presen entt case case was was not not insp inspir ired ed by any any sectarian feeling to favor a particular religious denomination. The The stam stamps ps were were not not issu issued ed for for the the o benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to the church. Purpose of the stamps was “to advertise o the Philippines and attract more tourists to the country” offi offici cial als s took took advantage of an intern ernationa onally important event to give publicity to the Philippines and its people.
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The stamp as actually printed instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila with the inscription “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
What is emphasized is not the Congress but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. The propaganda resulting from the issuance and sale of the staff might redound to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church but this was not the intention and is only incidental to the original purpose. “We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.” There may have peen poor judgment in issuing and selling the stamp but a gap still exists between that and the unconstitutionality of the issuance and sale which was not filled by the petitioner.
the celebration of the saint's feast day. It was ratified in a plebiscite. 3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos
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GARCES vs. ESTENZO
FACTS:
1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socioreligious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " 2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during
4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. 5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. 6. Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. 7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image 8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. 9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced members of the Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. )
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more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
ISSUES
1)
WON that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions? NO
RATIO
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed. 2)
WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO
Ratio
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. (Lower Court’s decision affirmed)
LEMON vs. KURTZMAN
(1971)
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions." Question Presented
Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state financial aid available to "church-related educational institutions"? Conclusion
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the
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consti part 9: the church & the state subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support to religious schools. FACTS:
This case is actually 2 cases involving two States, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, laws were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools and teachers. In both cases, the statutes were challenged for being violitive of the first amendment for creating an entanglement between church and state.
Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded). RATIO:
What is held to have been violated is the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. In this, the court stated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was to protect against: 1) 2) 3)
It also stated 3 tests: 1) Statute must have a secular legislative purpose 2) Principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion 3) Statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion
RHODE ISLAND STATUTE: Purpose: Keeping the quality of nonpublic elementary schools. Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salary to nonpublic school teachers. Qualifications: Teaching in a nonpublic school where average per-pupil expenditure on secular education is less than the average in the public schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjects and must not teach religion else lose the benefits accorded by the statute. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 25% of the State’s pupils. 95% went to RC schools. Teachers who applied: all come from these RC schools.
PENNSYLVANIA: Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising costs. Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools on expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and instructional materials. Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught in public schools. Also limited to secular subjects. Textbooks must be approved. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 20% of State’s pupils. 96% attended RC schools.
ISSUE: WON the statutes enacted violated the first amendment re: separation of Church and State, and are therefore unconstitutional.
sponsorship financial support active involvement
Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as the legislative intent/purpose is most definitely secular. However, the court states that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion”. As the schools taken into are church schools, they are seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives rise to entangling church-state relationships. Also adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though the case doesn’t really say why). Also taken into consideration is the teachers’ means of teaching. There is no way of ascertaining if the teachers will inject a religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that the schools and their teachers are subject to religious authority, and teachers are even told (in the “Handbook of School Regulations”) to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary work. Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actual entanglement that will be caused through the implementation of the laws. Due to the need for surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must run through applications to see who qualifies), there is created the entanglement that the Clause protects against. “...the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role gives rise to entanglements...” The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as it provides direct financial aid to these schools. Another consideration is the divisive political potential of the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. This refers to the division that will occur between those for and against state aid, thereby making it a political struggle. Here the
HELD:
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consti part 9: the church & the state state says that while political debate and division are normal, those predicated on religious lines are what the First Amendment sought to protect the country from.
DECISION: The law is not in violation of the Constitution. RATIO:
The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption challenge fell to over 200 years of universal practice, state aid has no such support. Also, these statutes create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be avoided. The constitution deems religion to be a private matter, so the government must exclude itself from such an area.
1.
The language of 701 does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State claims no right to distribute religious literature. Although the books loaned are those required by the parochial school for use in specific courses, each book loaned must be approved by the public school authorities; only secular books may receive approval.
2.
The express purpose of 701 was stated by the New York Legislature to be furtherance of the educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
3.
The record contains no suggestion that religious books have been loaned. Absent evidence, the SC cannot assume that school authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law. In judging the validity of the statute on this record the Court must proceed on the assumption that books loaned to students are books that are not unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content.
4.
Everson v. Board of Education. The test for
BOARD of EDUCATION vs. ALLEN
(1968) Justice White FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
A law (701 of the Education Law) of New York requires local public school boards to purchase textbooks and lend those textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students attending private schools are included. The books loaned are "text-books which are designated for use in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education," and which "a pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends." Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 brought suit in the New York courts against James Allen because Allen would remove the members of the Board from office if they fail to lend books to parochial school students. The members of the Board contend that the law was invalid. The trial court held the law unconstitutional. The NY Court of Appeals held that 701 was not in violation of either the State or the Federal Constitution. The CA said that the law's purpose was to benefit all school children, regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only textbooks approved by public school authorities could be loaned. It considered 701 "completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the individual student and asking no question about what school he attends." Board of Education brought the case to the US SC.
distinguishing between forbidden involvements of the state with religion: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 5.
ISSUE:
WoN the statute is a "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, because it authorizes the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools.
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The Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education. The State's interest in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools maintained by a religious order (Pierce v Society of Siters). A substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function.
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consti part 9: the church & the state neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; 3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. •
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU
The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”
& LYNCH vs. DONELLY
LYNCH V DONNELLY
FACTS:
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This concerns the constitutionality of 2 recurring holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. •
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The first, a crèche depicting the Christian Nativity scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c is the main, most beautiful, and most public part of the courthouse. The crèche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect.
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The second was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed just outside the City County building next to the city’s 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor’s name & containing text declaring the city’s salute to liberty. The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each year by the city. Respondents (the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from displaying the menorah on the ground that the displays violated the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment.
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WON display of crèche Establishment clause. YES WON display of menorah Establishment clause. NO
2.
appears. •
The concurrence concluded that both because the crèche is a “traditional symbol” of Christmas, a holiday with strong secular elements, and because the crèche was “displayed along with purely secular symbols” (i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santa distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/ “Season’s Greetings”, etc), the creche’s setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display and negates any message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs represented by the crèche.
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The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agree that: 1) govt’s use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs; 2) effect of the govt’s use of religious symbolism depends upon its context.
1.
ON CRECHE There is no doubt that the crèche itself is capable of communicating a religious message. The angel in the crèche endorses a patently
violates violates
RATIO: The Establishment Clause •
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The Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..” 3 tests for determining whether a gov’t practice violates the Clause. A statute or practice w/c touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the Clause must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) Lemon
v
Kurtzman provides
J. O’CONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides framework for evaluating govt’l use of religious symbols: O’Connor recognizes any 1) endorsement of religion as invalid because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community; 2) She provides a method for determining whether the govt’s use of an object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion. The effect of the display depends upon the message that the govt’s practice communicates: the question is what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display . That inquiry turns upon the context in which the contested object
The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each display violates the Establishment Clause because each has the impermissible effect of endorsing religion.
ISSUE: 1.
ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had violated the Establishment Clause by including a creche in its annual Christmas display, located in a private park w/n downtown shopping district. By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of the crèche in the display, holding that it didn’t have the effect of advancing or promoting religion.
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“Glory to God in the
Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crèche display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche’s religious message. The Lynch display comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had its own focal point. Here, in contrast, the crèche stands alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase. Further, by permitting the display of the crèche in the main & most beautiful part of the building, the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God. The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing its ownership by a Roman Catholic group demonstrates that the govt is endorsing the religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of its own. The Clause prohibits what occurred here: the govt’s lending its support to the communication of a religious’ organization’s religious message. Govt may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the 1st Amendment, it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.
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Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate Xmas in
some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine as the Allegheny County did in displaying the crèche.
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On Justice Kennedy’s opinion upholding the display of the crèche as permissible under the Clause •
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Kennedy says the display of the crèche is consistent with the Establishment Clause. He argues that this follows from the Marsh v Chambers decision, which sustained the constitutionality of a legislative prayer. He also asserts that the crèche, even in this setting, poses no realistic risk of representing an effort to proselytize, having repudiated the Court’s in favor of a endorsement inquiry proselytization approach. Court’s analysis of the crèche reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion. Court answered that history cannot legitimate practices like the crèche display that demonstrate the govt’s allegiance to a particular sect or creed.
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The proselytization test preferred by Kennedy is much the same as the endorsement inquiry except to the extent that the former requires an
endorsement of the particular creed of a particular sect *Proselytization test: WON the practice would place the govt’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize for a particular religion Court said that Kennedy misperceived a respect for religious pluralism as hostility or indifference to religion. The Constitution mandates that the government remain secular, rather than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating against citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim that prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates against Christians in favor of nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts the fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In contrast, confining the government's own Christmas celebration to the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs. ON MENORAH The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol. But its message is not exclusively religious. It is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions.
Its display doesn’t have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion given its particular physical setting. Its combined display with a Christmas tree & a sign saluting liberty does not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone), but simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society. The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas season emphasizes this point. The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element in the city’s display by virtue of its size and central position. The placement of the menorah beside it is readily understood as a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of celebrating the season. Similarly, the presence of the mayor’s sign confirms that in the particular context the govt’s association with a religious symbol does not represent sponsorship of religious beliefs but simply a recognition of cultural diversity.
obvious allegiance between the government and the favored sect. •
*Endorsement inquiry: WON the practice demonstrates the govt’s support, promotion or
LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY FACTS:
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consti part 9: the church & the state The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the city's shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene, which has been part of this annual display for 40 years or more. Respondents brought an action in Federal District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche in the display on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the challenge and permanently enjoined the city from including the creche in the display. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
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ISSUE: WON display of crèche violates Establishment Clause. HELD: Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment Clause RATIO: •
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The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a useful metaphor but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation , not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. This Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause comports with the contemporaneous understanding of the Framers' intent. That neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, nor the First Congress itself, saw any establishment problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress is a striking example of the accommodation of religious beliefs intended by the Framers. Our history is pervaded by official acknowledgment of the role of religion in American life, and equally pervasive is evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of religious expression and hostility toward none.
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Rather than taking an absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause and mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized challenged conduct or legislation to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith or tends to do so . In the line-drawing process called
for in each case, it has often been found useful to inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is t o advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion . But this Court has
been unwilling to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.
Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the Christmas season. Focus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause.
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Based on the record in this case, the city has a secular purpose for including the creche in its Christmas display and has not impermissibly advanced religion or created an excessive entanglement between religion and The display is sponsored by the government. city to celebrate the Holiday recognized by Congress and national tradition and to depict the origins of that Holiday; these are legitimate secular purposes. Whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and incidental, and is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional and executive recognition of the origins of Christmas, or the exhibition of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums. As to administrative entanglement, there is no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content or design of the exhibition prior to or since the city's purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been necessary, and, since the city owns the crèche (worth $200), the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. Political divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct, and, in any event, apart from the instant litigation, there is no evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history of the city's Christmas celebration. It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to this Nation's history and this Court's holdings.
EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS
J.Fortas FACTS:
Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at
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consti part 9: the church & the state Central High School. Until 1964 the official textbook furnished for the high school biology course did not have a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the academic year 1965--1966, the school administration, on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which contained a chapter setting forth 'the theory about the origin * * * of man from a lower form of animal.' The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university 'to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,' or 'to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches' this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position. The Arkansas statute was an adaption of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law' which that State adopted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the celebrated Scopes case in 1927. Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma because she was supposed to use the new textbook for classroom instruction and presumably to teach the statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the 'anti-evolution' statute which the State of Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public schools and universities of the theory that man evolved from other species of life. ISSUE/HELD:
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence. Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.
SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP
Justice CLARK FACTS:
Applicable Amendments: First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress 1. shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. -
No. 142 – The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read without comment, at the opening of each Public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the request of his parent or guardian. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the building through an intercom system. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. Participation in the open exercises was considered voluntary. The student reading the bible must select the passages and read any form or version he chases. (King James version, Douay or the Revised Standard versions as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures)
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The constitutionality of the said statute was assailed by Edward Schempp, a member of the Unitarian faith who, along with his wife and children, questioned the validity of the statute, contending that his rights have been violated, under the 14th of table and to the Constitution of the United States. The children study in Abington Senior High School Schempp testified that he at first refused to exercise his prerogative of excusing his children from the morning exercises upon fear that his children would be labeled as odd balls. Their
W/O Not the statute violates the constitutional provisions respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise (1st Amendment), and free speech ( 14th Amendment) . YES RATIO:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion. There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.
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consti part 9: the church & the state classmates would be liable for lumping religious differences and objections as atheism with immoral and un-patriotic overtones. Doctor Solomon Grayzel (witness for the appellees): The reading of such verses without explanation may be psychologically harmful to the children and may cause a divisive force in the social media of the school. Doctor Luther A. Weigle (witness for the defense): The Bible is a non-sectarian piece of literature within among the Christian faiths. The exclusion of the New Testament would be in itself a sectarian practice. The trial court struck down the practices and the statute requiring them after making the specific findings of fact that attendance to Abington and undergoing the practices were compulsory. The court further found that the reading of the verses without comment would constitute in effect a religious observance. The court rejected the defense’s argument that the children were allowed to excuse themselves via their parents’ request, saying that it did not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony. This was still in violation of the establishment clause in that it threatens religious liberty by putting a premium upon belief as opposed to non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect the beliefs, ideals, and even morality of the petitioners. ISSUE: WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional under the violation of the Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.
amendment. Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over the other. Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton: The First Amendment’s purpose was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding any form of public aid or support for religion. III. Interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses: The former forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom to choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The latter protects the freedom to exercise the chosen form of religion. This it embraces two concepts: Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut) -
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HELD: Yes. RATIO: I.
II.
It is true that religion has been closely identified with American history and government. This background is evidence today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, “So held me God.” Indeed, only last year, an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership while 3% profess no faith at all. This is not to say, however that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in out public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution could have implanted such belief.
IV.
Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the court has decisively settled the First Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ has been made wholly applicable to the States under the 14th
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Public Schools are organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendment did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Engel v. Vitale: The establishment and free exercise clauses in certain instances overlap. The former does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws directly operate to coerce non-observing individuals or not. The former works also on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion. The neutrality of which the Court’s cases speak thus stem from the recognition from history of the tendency of religious sects to fuse governmental and religious functions or cause a concert of dependence of one upon the other placing State support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies.
Test for Establishment Clause: 1. Existence of a secular legislative purpose 2. The primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Test for Free Exercise Clause: 1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against anyone in the practice of religion.
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We agree with the trial court’ finding as to the religious character of the exercises and are thus in violation of the establishment clause. It is also insisted that unless religious exercises are permitted a ‘religion of secularism’ is established in schools. We agree that a religion of secularism cannot be established in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus preferring belief over non-belief. While the Free Exercise clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the state to practice beliefs.
ENGEL vs. VITALE
04/03/62 Black, J. FACTS: Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School District 9, acting under New York State law, composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start of each class that went: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." The program was supported by the NY State Board of Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting that use of this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their children. NY CA sustained an order of the lower state courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents' objection. petitioners appealed. petitoners : prayer violates the non-establishment of religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the State's use of the Regents' prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State.) respondents : prayer is "non-denominational"; the program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. ISSUE: WON the prayer is a religious exercise, the establishment of which is prohibited by the 1st amendment
HELD: YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is a religious exercise; the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Non-Establishment Clause. the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. In an effort to explain the clause, the court looked at the history of the separation of church and state saying that " it is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America" In England where there was a state religion, many people who held contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leaving the government of this country in the hands of the people rather than in the hands of any monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say -- that the people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office. Under that Amendment's prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. re: respondents first argument Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
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consti part 9: the church & the state students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. re: respondents second argument It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance. Reversed and remanded.
ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS
FACTS:
Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program gives educational choices to families in any Ohio school district that is under state control pursuant to a federalcourt order. The program provides tuition aid for certain students in the Cleveland City School District, the only covered district, to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing and tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate, as may public schools in adjacent school districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. The number of tutorial assistance grants provided to students remaining in public school must equal the number of tuition aid scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools participated, and 96% of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. Cleveland schoolchildren also have the option of enrolling in community schools, which are funded under state law but run by their own school boards and receive twice the per-student funding as participating private schools, or magnet schools, which are public schools emphasizing a particular subject area, teaching method, or service, and for which the school district receives the same amount per student as it does for a student enrolled at a traditional public school. Respondents, Ohio taxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The Federal District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the program offends the Establishment Clause. NO. RATIO:
(a) A government aid program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause if it is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice. Under such a program, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. (b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, and is part of Ohio's general and multifaceted undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children in a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion and permits participation of all district schools--religious or nonreligious--and adjacent public schools. The only preference in the program is for lowincome families, who receive greater assistance and have priority for admission. Rather than creating financial incentives that skew it towards religious schools, the program creates financial disincentives: Private schools receive only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third that given to magnet schools, and adjacent public schools would receive two to three times that given to private schools. Families too have a financial disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private school tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet, or traditional public school. No reasonable observer would think that such a neutral private choice program carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. Nor is there evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options: Their children may remain in public school as before, remain in public school with funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. The Establishment Clause question whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a scholarship and then choose a religious school. Cleveland's preponderance of religiously affiliated schools did not result from the program, but is a phenomenon common to many American cities. Eightytwo percent of Cleveland's private schools are religious, as are 81% of Ohio's private schools. To attribute constitutional significance to the 82% figure would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in parts of Ohio where the
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consti part 9: the church & the state percentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed. Likewise, an identical private choice program might be constitutional only in States with a lower percentage of religious private schools.
1. WON Act authorized grants to church-related
schools yes 2. WON religion clauses of the consti have been impaired in part, yes but the entire act is not unconsti * Vacated and remanded.
TILTON vs. RICHARDSON
RATIO: FACTS:
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The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed in 1963 in response to a strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education. The Act authorizes federal grants and loans to "institutions of higher education" for the construction of a wide variety of "academic facilities." But expressly excludes "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity . . . ." no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or the programs of a divinity school. If, during this period (a period of 20 years), the recipient violates the statutory conditions, the United States is entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to the original cost of the facility. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut receiving federal construction grants under Title I were named as defendants. Federal funds were used for five projects at these four institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield University; (4) a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. Appellants attempted to show that the four recipient institutions were "sectarian" by introducing evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the content of their curricula, and other indicia of their religious character. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliation in no way interfered with the performance of their secular educational functions.
We are satisfied that Congress intended the Act to include all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body. The Act makes no reference to religious affiliation or nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions of higher education" must be taken to include church-related colleges and universities. 2. Court have noted the internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. the Establishment Clause sought to protect: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or absent. There is only a cumulative criteria which is this: Against this background we consider four questions: a)
does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Yes
~> United States require that the youth be assured ample opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental action. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion. The Act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants and loans only for academic facilities that will be used for defined secular purposes and expressly prohibits their use for religious instruction, training, or worship. None of the four church-related institutions in this case has violated the statutory restrictions. There had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them; used solely for nonreligious purposes. There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination.
ISSUES/HELD:
b)
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is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Yes, in effect
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~> We note that an institution applying for a federal grant is only required to provide assurances that the facility will not be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship "during at least the period of the Federal interest therein(20 years). This obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion. So this part was held unconstitutional. c)
does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement with religion? No. the entanglement is very much lessened for three reasons. (application of strict scrutiny)
~> these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in fact followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular education. Their purpose is not religious indoctrination so there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities. ~> The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the nonideological character of the aid that the Government provides. Neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they attend. Facilities are religiously neutral. ~> Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpose construction grant. There are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies. *these three taken together shape a narrow and limited relationship bet church and govt to become in danger of realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect. d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion in violation of the 1st amendment? No. except of course that part of 20-year limitation… ~> Appellants, however, are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.
VELARDE vs. SOCIETY for SOCIAL JUSTICE
FACTS: •
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A case was brought by respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against petitioner Mike Velarde, together with Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, Erano Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva & Eli Soriano in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the rresolution of "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions”. The trial court opined that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision after its essay on the legal issue. Thus, petitioners filed separate Motions for Reconsideration on the assailed decision questioning whether or not the decision of the lower court was proper & valid in lieu of procedural deficiencies & substantive issues
ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? 2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?" HELD & RATIO:
1. NO. SJS miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the SJS was violated by the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate facts on which it relies on its pleading for its claim. SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men to public office who would in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government" & "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the people’s faith in the electoral process; &
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consti part 9: the church & the state reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be violative of the separation clause. Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the petitioners to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
The assailed decision did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion. It is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. 3. Religious Leaders’ Endorsement of Candidates for
There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right. Even if the court relaxed the requirements of locus standi in view of its transcendental importance, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway. 2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor." Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The significance of factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.
Public Office
The Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. It failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction. Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify. Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned."
Essential Parts of a Good decision: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Statement of the case Statement of the facts Issues Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved 5. Dispositive portion
MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS
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