China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-To-Air Missiles

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Int Interna rnatio tional Ass Asse essm ssment and Strat rategy Cen Center > Rese Resea arch > Chin China a’s Em Emerging rging 5t 5th Generat ration ion Air-to ir-to-Air -Air Miss Missile iles s

China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles Missiles by Richard Fisher, Jr. Published on February 2nd, 2008 ARTICLES

Internet source imagery from January 4 has offered the first glimpses of what may be China’s emerging 5th generation air-toair miss miss iles (AAM). (AAM). One missile, called called the PL-ASR or PL-10, show s a ve ry close close rese mbl mblance ance to the South African African Dene l A-Darter A-Darter AAM.. A second image AAM image , discovered o n a China’s Northwe stern University web s ite in mi mid-Decem d-December, ber, show s ano ther missile missile similar simi lar to the rada r-guided South African African Denel R-D R-Darter, arter, designe d in coopera tion with Israe l. Both of these missiles are likely des igned for use w ith mode mode rn Helmet-Mounted Helmet-Mounted Displays (HMD), (HMD), which enab le pilots to “look to kill” their targets . But there is more: mor e: additional imagery imagery suggests that a previously reported ramjet ramjet pow ered de velopm velopment ent of the Chinese Luoyang PL-12 active-radar guided AAM AAM,, called called the PL-13, could give the P eop le’s Libera tion Army Army (PLA) an AAM that could out-range existing U.S. AAMs.[1]

Luoyang PL-ASR/PL-10 : This image Luoyang image obtained from Chinese Chinese web pages on January 4 was the first first revelation of the existence existence of the advanced PL-10 5th generation AAM. The text indicates development began in 2004 and production is expected by 2010. The missile also has a 90 degree offoff-bore-sight bore-sight view view and a “Lock On After After Launch” capab ili ility, ty, meaning meaning it can bette r exploit high off bore -sight firing. firing. Source: CJDBY CJDBY we b pag e. Data along w ith one image image suggests the PL-10 could could enter production in 2010 but it it is not known w hen the other tw o new AAMs AAM s wo uld enter production. Whe n they do enter se rvic rvice, e, these AAMs could could give both old and ne w PL A Air Air Force Force fighters a decisive decisi ve advantage advanta ge o ver Taiwan Air Force Force fighters a rm rmed ed w ith shorte r range U.S U.S.. AIM-9 AIM-9 Sidew Sidew inder and AIMAIM-120 120 AMRAAM AMRAAM missiles mi ssiles . The PL-ASR/PL-10 PL-ASR/PL-10 could have up to do uble the range of the ne w U.S. AIMAIM-9X, 9X, the first first U.S. HMD sighted AAM, which is just no w e nterin g se rvice with U.S. Air Force a nd Na vy squ ad rons . The ramjet p ow ere d “P L-13” may o ut-rang e curre nt varia nts of the AIMAIM-120. 120. Absolute determination of AAM capabilities is greatly hampered by the efforts of governments and manufacturers to deny inform inf ormation, ation, such as that regarding missile missile range and countermeasures, which would a ll llow ow potential adversaries to gain an advantage. [2] Furthermore, the utility utility of an AAM is is also dete rmi rmined ned by many attributes of the carrying aircraft: aircraft: its its rada r and electronic support systems, the availability of off-board sensor data, and the degree of training and experience of the launching pilot. But there is little little margin margin for error when conside ring a major major factor such as wea pons , esp ecially whe n considering that China’s increasing numbers of competitive 4th generation combat aircraft may be followed by 5th generation combat aircraft early to mid-next decade. Absent a U.S. response, such as the purchase of more 5th generation fighters, the development of a new generation of AAMs, AAMs, or even the purc purchase hase of more capable European AAMs, the the a ir power b alance in Asia could shift dangerously toward China. 5th Generation Short Range Air to Air Missiles Since the 1940s the progress of combat aircr Since aircraft aft and their weapons have been measured in “gene rati rations.” ons.” The latest latest 5th Generation combat a irc ircraft, raft, of which the U.S. U.S. Lockheed-Martin F-22A F-22A Raptor is the o nly one op erationa l, are de fined usua lly by their ability to combine the attributes of stealth, advanced electronically scanned (AESA) radar, and engines powerful enough to cruise cruise sup erso nicall nically y without recourse to fuel-guzzling afterburners (super-cruise (super-cruise ). These capa bilit bilities ies give the F-22A F-22A the ability to detect and attack before being detected, and to evade new and deadly Russian surface-to-air missiles. But since their introduction in the 1970s, American, Russian and other manufacturers have been constantly upgrading their 4th generation fighters such as the Boeing F-15 Eagle and the Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker with ever more modern electronic systems and weapons. In the 1980s Russia began the trend toward the 4th generation AAMs with the introduction of the Vympel R-73, the first thrustvectored AAM with a 45-degree off-bore-sight view (90-degree field of view) infrared seeker, and the ability to be targeted with a helmet-mounte helmet-mounte d sight (HMS). (HMS). This gave Soviet-Russ Soviet-Russ ian fighters a decisive adva ntage over U.S. and Europ ean fighters : the Soviets could always launch their short-range AAMs first as they did not have to orient or “dogfight” their fighter, but merely nee ded to “lo ok” at the targe t to direct the R-73 R-73 AAM. AAM. This technology has evolved into a 5th gene ration defined by the inclusion of more sensitive imaging-infrared seekers that home in on a specific part of the target aircraft; seekers with wider 90-degree off-bore-sight view(180-degree fields of view); seekers that incorporate advanced anti-jamming and anti-decoy technolog y; and those w hich use more adva nced helmet-m helmet-mounte ounte d displays. Examples of 5th generation infrared guided AAMs AAMs include the British ASRAAM, German IRIS-T, Israeli Python-5, Japanese AAM-5, U.S. AIM-9X, the improved Vympel R-73 and the South African African A-Darter. A-Darter. Should a longer rang e 5th gen eration AAM like like the Python-5 miss miss its ta rget on the first pas s, it usually has the range and a gil gility ity to attack once more. more. file:///C:/Use file:///C:/Users/ma rs/mant ntan anfw fwi/Docu i/Docume ment nts/In s/Inte ternat rnation ional al Assessmen Assessmentt and Strate Strategy gy Center Center Research Research China’s Emerging Emerging 5th 5th Generat Generation ion Air-to-Air Missi les.htm les.htm

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International Assessment and Strategy Center > Research > China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles

MBDA’s Modern AAMs: The ASRAAM short-range an d Meteo r longrange AAMs se en at the recent Dubai Airshow . Source: RD Fisher While first generation short range infrared guided AAM relied on the pilot to find and maneuver to attack an often rapidly moving target, 4th and 5th generation short-range AAMs rely on aircraft sensors and advanced helmet mounted displays to target the se lates t AAMs which usually have much greater range tha n a pilot’s sight. In the 1980s, in add ition to using the aircraft’s rada r, the Soviets introduced more so phisticated o ptical infrared s earch and tracking (IRST) syste ms, which allow ed aircraft to turn off emitting radars w hich in turn could be targete d by oppos ing electronic sens ors and jamming. The Russ ian OLS-30 IRST used in late versions of Sukhoi fighters , and Shenyang co-prod uced Su-27/J-11 fighters , is repo rtedly able to pas sively search and track targets out to 50-90km. While Russian IRSTs are reported ly not able to de termine range , the Russians apparently network se veral fighter IRSTs a nd radar to find the range of targets, even stealthy targets. [3] HMDs are able to collate data from radar, optical sensors, plus aircraft performance data onto the pilot’s helmet visor, allowing him to target dista nt threats w ithout having to concentrate on cockpit instruments. Israel’s DASH HMD became the bas is for the U.S. Joint Helmet Mounte d Cue ing System (JHMCS) HMD, which supp ort the AIM-9X AAM that in 2003 sta rted e ntering se rvice o n U.S. F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 fighters.

Active Radar-Guided AAMs While the U.S. has lagged in the development of 5th generation HMD sighted AAMs, it has helped to lead the field in the deve lopment of medium range active-guided AAMs. The Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Me dium Range Air-to-Air Miss ile (AMRAAM) began in 1975 leading to fielding in the early 1990s, while the Vympel R-77 program began in 1982 and first appeared in the early 1990s. Both missiles so ught to perfect the advancement of incorporating an active radar see ker to allow the AAM to guide itse lf auto nomously for part of its flight. Previous “ semi-active” rada r guided AAMs like the AIM-7 Sparrow a nd the Vympel R-27 required continuous “ painting” by a ircraft radar w ith constant rad io signa ls to guide the missile until reaching its target. Active rad ar guide d missiles like the AIM-120 and R-77 still require ta rget location data from the launching aircraft, or more recently, from an o ff-boa rd sens or like an AWACS aircraft, but after the missile’s active radar acquires the target the launching aircraft has the option to maneuver to safety or commence another attack.

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AIM-120 D and R-77 : The AIM-120D is the latest model of the AMRAAM due to enter se rvice soon, whereas China may have purchased up to 1,000 of the Vympel R-77 AAM. Source: US Air Force and RD Fisher The AIM-120, the Russian R-77 and the Fre nch MICA dominate the market for active-guided AAMs. In this decad e Japan , China and Taiwa n have fielded active guided AAMs, with the latter two re lying on imported technolog y. All active-guided AAM makers have s ought to improve their products with be tter seekers, so me using satellite navigation guidance, enhanced e lectronic counter measures, the a ddition of data links to provide updated ta rget location data, and better engines to enable longer range . The U.S., Russia, Europe, South Africa, and pe rhaps more recently China, have de veloped ra mjet engine po we red AAMs to achieve longer ranges w ithout increasing missile size. Ramjets also a llow the missile to sustain its high spee d over most of its range, which significantly expands the “no escape zone” or area within which a target will likely be killed. The only ramjet powered AAM soon to enter service is the MBDA Meteor, which advertises a 100+km range, and a constant Mach 4+ speed and a “no escape zone” three times that of early AIM-120 AAMs. [4] More recently Russ ia has revived its very long range missile progra m with the Novato r K-100 or K-172, which has b een various ly repo rted to ha ve a 200km to 400km range . The last U.S. very long range Hughe s AIM-54C Pho enix, capa ble of reaching 150km, wa s retired from U.S. Navy service in 2004. While the U.S. had two-stage and ramjet missile engine AAM test programs in the 1980s and 1990s, [5] it has chosen not to replace the long rang e AIM-54C.


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China’s Record of Foreign AAM Technology Reliance Almost from the beginning the PLA has relied on foreign technology, whether from the United States, Russia, Israel and now South Africa, to deve lop ever more modern air-to-air missiles . In September 1958 a U.S. AIM-9B Sidewinde r short range a ir-toair miss ile (AAM) was captured b y China after it wa s fired by a Taiwa nes e F-86 Sabre fighter at a C hinese MiG-17, becoming lodge d in the airframe w ithout exploding. At the time the AIM-9B was th e most modern air-to-air missile anyw here a nd it was so on copied by the Soviet Union and China. For the Soviets it be came the K-13 (NATO: AA-2 Atol) and for Ch ina the P L-2 (PL meaning Thunderbolt). During the Vietna m Wa r China was able to ob tain unexploded copie s of more advan ced AIM-9 miss iles, which influenced the PL-5, as well as early version of the Raytheon AIM-7 Sparrow, which influence the radar-guided PL-11. During the 1980s China obtained the French Matra 550, which was copied as the PL-7 and the Israeli Python-3, which was copied as the PL-8. From the 1990s to the present period the PLA has purchased thousands of modern Russian AAMs, including the Vympel R-73 sho rt-range AAM, and multiple variants o f the semi-active rada r and infrared guide d Vympel R-27 medium range AAM. In add ition the PLA has purchas ed ab out 1,000 of the more mode rn active rada r guided Vympel R-77 medium range AAM. These missiles almost e xclusively arm Sukhoi/KnAAPO made Su-27SK/Su-30MKK/MKK2 fighters or the Shenyang Aircraft Co. coproduced version of the Su-27SK called the J-11, or J-11A. It has be en repo rted that s ome number of early purchas e Su-27SKs and early J-11s were upgraded in order to be able to fire the R-77, whereas the Su-30s had this capability from delivery. Starting in the 1990s, as it did w ith other wea pons purchases , the PLA decided to purchase the underlying technology of wea pons systems or their components, so as to make wea pon systems with increasing indigenous Chinese content. By the mid 1990s China’s main missile maker Luoyang had developed the PL-9, which took the fuselage of the Python-3, attached different guidance fins, and incorpora ted a copy of the Ukrainian Arsene l helmet sight, called the TK-14 in Chinese service, to make a new AAM.[6] The latest PL-9C featu res an increas e in range to 22km, up from 15km for the PL-9, PL-8 and Python-3 AAMs. One mystery has been w hy the PL-9 has not see n widespread us age in the PLA air forces. From the 1996 Zhuhai show and at subseque nt show s, Luoyang officials have noted to the author that the PLA was not interested in buying the PL-9, even though it has occasionally been seen on some fighters like the late model Chengdu J-7G.


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PL-9C and HMS: It is not clea r that the PL-9C AAM with the TK-14 helmet sight is in widespread PLA service, an indication that the PLA was instead waiting for a more advanced short-range AAM. Source: RD Fisher Perhaps a key reason for not purchasing the PL-9 has bee n the expectation that the PLA would be building an even better AAM. At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow Luo yang officials told this ana lyst and other reporters that the company was w orking on an adva nced AAM. The few de tails disclos ed, such as advanced guida nce, the use of thrust vectoring and helmet displays created a basis for speculation that Luoyang was interested in an AAM like the British ASRAAM. Despite the heavy reliance on purchased Russian short range AAMs like the R-73, the inspiration for Luoyang’s 5th generation AAM was to come from elsewhere. file:///C:/Users/mantanfwi/Documents/International Assessment and Strategy Center Research China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missi les.htm

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Possible “South African” AAMs At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow South African firms s et up a s mall booth and spoke of their desire to do business w ith the PLA but did not go into specifics. At subsequent s hows the South African prese nce grew larger and it is now clear that there have bee n severa l coop erative progra ms, including unmanned aircraft, air defense s ystems and air to air missiles. While South African firms have said little about the latter, in 2004 Yihong Chang reported on PLA interest in purchasing the 5th generation Denel A-Darter AAM.[7] The data revea led on January 4 indicated tha t development of the PL-10 started in 2004, which might track very well with the reported d eep ening of South African-PLA coopera tion. The few clear image s of the PL-ASR/PL-10 show a nea r 95 percent similarity with the Dene l A-Darter AAM. The main differences are in the rear fin shape and configuration, but it is a relatively minor difference. So it is po ssible to s peculate tha t the PL-10 may very well have a pe rformance similar to or bette r than the A-Darter, which would include use of adva nced imaging infrared g uidance a nd a maximum range of 20km or bette r. The Janua ry 4 revelation indicates the s eeke r has a 90-degree off-bore-sight capability (180 degree field of view). It also has a lock-on-after-launch capability, meaning it can be launched from a high off-bore-sight p osition a nd acquires th e target, us ually accomplished w ith the aid of a he lmet s ight or IRST.

PL-10 and A-Darter: This comparison shows the basic similarity between the Denel A-Darter (top) and the Luoyang PL-10. Source: CJDBY and Interne t This missile could arm most PLA fighters equipped with an IRST, even a short range radar but also with computers capable of proces sing for the he lmet mounted d isplay. This would likely initially include J-10 and J-11B fighters, but then o lder J-11As, and then late mode l J-8II and J-7 fighters. New Type AAM The revelation o f PL-10 image ry with the clear implication of South African technical participation also p rovides p oss ible insights into anothe r AAM found on a Chines e university webs ite in mid-December 2007. This AAM has no t yet been identified by any official or unofficial PLA so urce, but this single p icture s how s so me similarity to the Dene l radar-guided R-Darter, which is virtually the sa me missile as the Israe li Aircraft Industries Derby. The product of Israe li and South African coope ration during the 1980s and 1990s, the R-Darter has a light we ight of 120kg and reported range of 63km.[8] It appea rs that the RDarter/Derby program intended to produce a very maneuverable but light-weight radar-guided AAM that could be back-fitted to adva nced 3rd and 4th gene ration fighters. R-Darter entered s ervice with the South African Air Force but Derby has not yet entered service with the Israeli Air Force, though it is reportedly being used by the Singapore Air Force.


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New Radar Guided AAM: Two new-type AAMs s traddle a s ingle P L-12 on a three-miss ile pylon on a JH-7A fighter bo mber (top). This vague image was obtained from a Chinese university web site, and ap pears to sho w s ome similarity to the s omewha t larger South African/Israeli RDarter (bottom) radar-guided AAM. Source: Internet The key similarity between the new PLA AAM and the R-Darter appe ars to be their shape and the possible inclusion of a small roll stabilization fins beh ind the front fins. How ever, it also app ears tha t this new miss ile is app reciably smaller than the RDarter, perhaps w eighing only about 100 to 110kgs.[9] This wo uld mean a sho rter range, perhaps 20 to 30km. It is not known w hether this new AAM has a s emi-active, active, or even a pas sive seeker. One pos sibility may be a version of the new small 150mm seeker b eing marketed by Russia’s AGAT.[10] It is clear tha t the PLA intends to exploit this missile’s light weight, as its first public illustration sh ow s two o f the new miss iles paired with a PL-12 on a single three -missile launch pylon. This pylon configuration allow s new er fighters su ch as the FC -1, J-10, J-11B and JH-7A to increase the ir beyond-visual-range AAM carriage capab ility. This missile could also be intende d to quickly upgrade the late st models of 3rd genera tion fighters like the Shenyang J-8IIF/H and the Cheng du J-7E/G with a lightw eight rad ar guide d AAM to complement the PL-10 infrared/imaging AAM. If these two new PLA AAMs were aided substantially by South Africa, then it would stand to reason that South Africa may have also provide d key enabling technologies such as Helmet Mounte d Display syste ms and data links. Denel’s Archer HMD wa s developed to support the A-Darter and R-Darter and would likely have been sold to China along with the AAM technology. China’s Luoyang group has also long commented, albeit cryptically, on its interest in developing HMD technology, with images of experimental HMDs ap pea ring from time to time. A new Luo yang HMD may bene fit from indigenou s and fore ign technology. A helmet mounted sight displayed by the Cigong Group at the 2004 Zhuhai show uses prominent light-emitting diodes to allow cockpit computers to track the po sition of the pilot’s head, in order to target we apons, the same system used by the Denel Archer HMD.


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Advanced Helmet Systems: The South African “Archer” helmet mounted display (top) uses light emitting diodes to track pilot head position in order to target wea pons. The Cigong Group helmet sight seen a the 2004 Zhuhai show used a s imilar head tracking system. Any pote ntial South African he lp with new PLA AAMs likely included the s ale of adva nced helmet display techno logy. Source: Denel and RD Fisher PL-12 Indicating a major advance in its AAM technology, in 2001 Chinese sources began revealing the first data on the Leihua Electronic Technolog y Research Institute (LETRI) SD-10, later PL-12 active radar guide d AAM. It is likely that at ab out the s ame time that the PLA was negotiating to purchase the R-77, it was also pressing Russia’s missile concerns for technology to supp ort an indigenous Chines e program. Russia’s miss ile rada r maker AGAT reporte dly sold China drawings of the 9B-1103M rada r for the active-guided version o f the R-27 AAM. But China presumably also ga ined insights from the AGAT 9B-1348 rada r on the R-77.[11] The PL-12 also reportedly has a “pa ssive” see king mode that would allow it to home in on an emitting target, such as a jamming or AWACs rad ar aircraft.[12] How ever, the SD-10 uses a Chines e-made missile motor, which whe n combined with a “ lofted” flight profile, can achieve a maximum range of 70km, abo ut 10km less than the R-77. Nevertheles s, in the PL-12 the P LA has a modern se lf-guided AAM that is in the sa me clas s as the U.S. AIM-120 and the Russian R-77. In 2002 China revealed bas ic data abo ut the SD-10 and began to display models of the missile a t air-show s, such as Zhuhai in November 2002. By 2005 to 2006 the PL-12 bega n to appe ar in photos of PLA fighters, especially the Chen gdu J-10 and so me versions of the Shenyang J-8II. It has also been tes ted on the Shenyang J-11B, now in advanced development, and has b een seen in at least on photo on a wing pylon of a Xian JH-7A fighter attack fighter.


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PL-12 In Service: The 70km range P L-12 active-guided ra dar is know n equip s ome Shenyang J-8II fighters (top), all Chengdu J-10 fighters (bottom) and will in the future equip the Shen yang J-11B. Source: Chinese Internet “PL-13” Another surprise in the imagery made available on Chinese w eb pa ges on January 4 was a curious computer-generated dep iction of a missile called the “ PL-13.” Howe ver, it must be stres sed that this is the first image of this missile and a definitive dete rmination of its existen ce and performance must aw ait further disclosures . Arguing in favor of this program’s existence is the fact that its image appea rs w ith clear images of the PL-12 and the new PL-10, which w ould tend to lend credibility to the new missile dep iction. In addition, Luoyang wa s reported to have been interested in ramjet propulsion to d evelop the PL-12. [13] This PL-13 image a lso points to the po ssibility that Vympel has s old China the technolog y neede d to make such an AAM. The PL-13 image appears to show a two-intake ramjet motor, a configuration that Vympel had come to prefer as it was deve loping its R-77M-PD, follow ing ea rly 1990s collaboration with France’s former MATRA Corpo ration.[14] The ramjet intake sha pe on the PL-13 app ears to conform to one kno wn Vympel configuration. Furthermore, the four cruciform fins at the front end o f the PL-13 are a lso characteristic of other Vympel missiles like the R-27, and Vympel was also reporte dly discarding the “g rid” s hap e fins fo r conven tiona l fins,[15] which also coincides with the PL-13 image . Inasmuch as Russ ia appa rently decided not to purchase the R-77M-PD, it is possible that Vympel was allowed to sell this missile technology to China. [16] But it is also possible that South Africa was a source for some AAM ramjet engine technology, inasmuch as South Africa also had an unrealize d p rogram called the Long Range Air-to-Air Missile (LRAAM).

First “PL-13 ” Image: This computer generated image appeared on the CJDBY website on January 4, 2008. While little is known about this file:///C:/Users/mantanfwi/Documents/International Assessment and Strategy Center Research China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missi les.htm

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miss ile the image ’s credibility is suppo rted by the inclusion of images o f the PL -12 and the re cently revealed P L-10. Source: CJDBY we b site If a real progra m, then the PL-13 wo uld give the PLA a long-range AAM with cons iderable ne w capa bilities. The R-77M-PD was reported to have an e stimated range o f 160km and the PL-13 should be e xpected to do as well or better. Furthermore, as it a ramjet powered missile, it is expected to sustain its high speed, likely about Mach 4 and greater, throughout its engagement, meaning that it has a substantial “no escape” zone, perhaps similar to that of the MBDA Meteor. Should the PL-13 see a nea rterm introduction, the it will likely be used in conjunction w ith the PLA’s AWACS aircraft that can find distan t targets and the n pas s targe ting data to a ttacking aircraft, likely J-11B and J-10 fighter. But the potentia l range of the PL-13 offers an indication that the PLA is also likely developing long-range radar for its 4th and 5th generation fighters, or may be interested in upgrading existing fighters w ith new longer range Russian radar. Inasmuch as Vympel has be en marketing passive guided versions of the R-27 and R-77, it is reasonable to speculate that a version of the PL-13 may feature a passive guidance syste m, to be tter ena ble long-range attacks a gainst critical supp ort aircraft like AWACS, electronic warfare a nd tanke r aircraft. The PL-13 could also form the basis for a future light-weight anti-radar or supersonic anti-ship missile.

PL-13 and R-77M-PD Compared: The ramjet intakes of the PL -13 (top) and the R-77M-PD (botto m) sho w a clear similarity, whe reas the PL-13 adopts the two-intake configuration Vympel reportedly settled upon fo llowing ea rly 1990s collaboration w ith France’s MATRA. Source: CJDBY and Interne t There is also the possibility that the PLA could purchase new Russian very long-range AAMs or develop similar AAMs themselves. Inasmuch as the PLA is reportedly interested in purchasing so me number of the new Russ ian Sukhoi Su-35 fighter, it may also purchas e the unique w eap ons o ffered with this fighter, like the 300-400km range Nova tor K-100/172. India may be interested in an advanced version of this missile capable of anti-missile intercepts. [17] Asian military sources also note that China is developing a 400km range surface-to-air missile.[18] If this new PLA SAM is bas ed on Russian S-400 components, for which China is reportedly an investor, then this new SAM may be small enough to be developed into a very long-range AAM, perhaps even with future anti-missile intercept capabilities.

Novator K-100/172: In development since the late Cold War, the latest version of the very long range Novator K-100 design w as revealed at the 2007 Mos cow Airshow. Source: Internet Growing PLA Airpower, Growing Intimidation After nearly 15 years o f effort, by 2005 the PLA’s many investments in mode rn air combat capab ilities beg an pa ying off. The Chen gdu J-10 4th generation fighter and the indigenous Xian JH-7A fighter-bomber were both ente ring production. About a hundred or so of each have now been produced, each comprising about three to four operational units. In recent months the JH-7 has been seen with new electronic warfare pods perhaps conferring a capability similar to the U.S. Northrop Grumman EA6B. By 2005 PLA Air Force and Nava l Air Force had completed a cceptance of 180+ Russian made Sukhoi Su-27 fighters a nd Su30 attack fighters . The Shenyang Aircraft Corpo ration had co-produced a bout 100 Su-27s as the J-11, and w as making brea kthroughs in its effort to abs orb and “indige nize” the Su-27 as the J-11B fighter. Furthermore, by 2005 the PLA had two types of phas ed array radar AWACS and a po ssible phase d array radar ground mapping aircraft in advanced development, The file:///C:/Users/mantanfwi/Documents/International Assessment and Strategy Center Research China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missil es.htm

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venerable Xian H-6 (Tu-16) bomber was also being upgraded into a more powerful land attack cruise missile and PGM carrier. While open d ata is very scant, U.S. and Chinese s ources indicate that both Chengdu and Shenyang have 5th gene ration combat aircraft programs that could fly by the middle of the next decade, and both companies are likely developing a range of unmanned co mbat aircraft. The first PLA Naval Air Force carrier wing may include modified J-11B or J-10 fighters , to be fo llowed by a Chinese or Russian 5th generation naval fighter. These hardware improvements have been accompanied by the development of new offensive and joint-force aerial doctrines, and increases in training time and training sophistication. China’s leade rship has also show n its willingness to us e its Air Forces to intimidate Japa n and Taiw an. Japan ha d to s cramble fighters to inte rcept intruding PLA aircraft 13 times in 2005 a nd 107 times in the first three months of 2006. [19] For two days in September 2007 the PLA sent 40 bomber sorties into the disputed Shirakaba/Chunxiao East China Sea gas field region, prompting 12 Japanese fighter intercept sorties. [20] In November 2007 PLA Air Force exercises with KJ-2000 AWACS apparently followed coordinated East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet naval exercises de signed to intimidate Taiw an. Starting abruptly in 1999 the PLA Air Force has increas ed its prese nce in the Taiwan Strait, often flying up to or over the “mid line,” an unofficial boundary both sides have honored, offering some degree of “confidence,” but which Chinese commentators now say is no t recognized by China. [21] From 1998 to 1999 PLA air so rties in or nea r the Strait jumped from 400 to 1,100, and then jumped from 940 to 1,700 from 2005 to 2006. [22] But in late 2007, in a move consistent with Beijing’s efforts to intensify its “Legal Warfare” against Taiwan, China began indicating its intention to create a new air transport corridor which at some points would be barely 30km from the Taiwan Strait mid line, and also indicated it wa s go ing to create a Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Taiwan Strait. [23] By one definition, an ADIZ is “The area of airspace over land or water, extending upward from the surface, within which the ready identification, the location, and the control of aircraft are required in the intere st of nationa l security.” While China may wa nt the new air corridor to help ease airport congestion, China currently only allocates 30 percent of its airspace for civil traffic,[24] raising ques tions abo ut its real intent on the Taiwa n Strait. Both the new air corridor and a new ADIZ over the Taiwan Strait wo uld offer multiple o pportunities for miscalculation or for the creation o f “aerial incidents” that could justify military escalation. For example, what if Taiwanese fighters or SAM bases could not identify a Chinese airliner that has strayed well over the “mid line” prompting a trage dy similar to the 1983 Soviet shoo t-down o f the Korea n Airlines Flight 007? Might China then attack Taiwan o r just force concess ions? Or might a Taiwan Air Force scramble to indentify such an intruder give the PLA cause to launch S-300 SAMs or fighters at the Taiwanese? As there appears to be a relationship betwee n China’s growing airpower in its willingness to use its new capabilities to intimidate its neighbors, U.S. policy makers to pay close attention to how the PLA is quickly shifting the airpower balance on the Taiwan Strait. For example, Taiwan do es no t have a 5th genera tion helmet display guided AAM that can counter the PL-10. Should the PLA decide to upgrade its late model third generation J-7E/G and J-8F/H and newer 4th generation J-10 fighters with the P L-10 and its new light-we ight radar guide d AAM, it might quickly gain over 500 fighters tha t could dominate Taiwan ’s 126 F-16s, 57 Mirage-2000s , 90 or so F-5 and 126 IDF combat aircraft in a short-range ba ttle. The PLA’s Sukhoi fighter flee t has ha d this superiority since the mid-1990s due to its R-27 helmet sighted AAMs. All Taiwan fighters sa ve the F-5s have the ability to fire s elf-guided medium range AIM-120, MICA EM or Sky Sword 2 AAMs, but thes e could in the future be h andily outranged by a ramjet-powered PL-13. The PL-13 would also p ose a new threat to Taiwan’s s ix E-2 Hawkeye AWACS, es sential for Taiwa n to approp riately employ its smaller number of fighters a gainst a large r force. The introduction of these new PLA AAMs place greater pressure on Taiwan to replace its F-5s with 66 F-16 Block 50 fighters, as it has been trying to do for some time, and also to upg rade o ther elements of its air force. Taiwan no w has a n urgent requirement for the helmet display s ighted AIM-9X AAM for all of its fighters, as it also could handily justify an early purchase of Lockhee d Martin F-35 fighters which would give it a modest technical advantage in terms of stealth. Narrowing Choices for Washington China’s growing airpowe r also creates greater press ure for the United States to react, both in terms of improving its ow n capabilities and those of its allies a nd friends. The advent of the PL-10 and pos sibility the PL-13 raises the p ossibility of a new “AAM Gap,” a co nditio n tha t U.S. Air Forces e ndure d for the 1990 s. Soo n afte r the Co ld Wa r it wa s de termined tha t former Eas t German MiG-29 fighters had a decisive “first-shot” close-in battle advantage over U.S. fighters due to the helmet-sighted Vympel R-73 AAM. The PLA purchase d this AAM with its Su-27SK and Su-30MKK fighters in the 1990s, and had the same adva ntage over U.S. fighters until the 2003 introduction of the AIM-9X. But in the PL-ASR/PL-10 the P LA may have a close-in combat AAM that could po tentially have twice the range o f the AIM-9X.[25] This prese nts U.S. defens e planners w ith little alternative but to s eek an up grade d longer-range AIM-9. In 1998 Australia chose the 20km range HMD sighted British ASRAAM over the AIM-9X to arm its F/A-18A fighters . Furthermore, save for the F-35 which will not ente r U.S. units until 2012, no U.S. fighter ha s a n integral Infrared Se arch and Tracking (IRST) syste m, as is carried by PLA Su-27, Su-30 and J-11 fighters, and is employed b y the Europ ean Eurofighter and the French Rafale. This may enab le the PLA to get the first sho t with its new PL-10 AAMs whe n targete d pas sively by their IRST. The U.S. Navy is prop osing a dding an IRST to the F/A-18E/F, but its placement on a centerline fuel tank offers a re stricted field of view .[26] At the same time the U.S. may be facing stronge r competition rega rding longer-range AAMs. While the maximum range of the AIM-120D remains a classified number, limitations of size d ictate that it may very we ll be outrang ed by a ramjet powe red missile that do es no t need to include a n oxidizer in its fuel. For the 1990s the U.S. justified its lag in developing a 5th gene ration sho rt-range AAM due to the supe riority of the Raytheon AIM-120 self-guided AAM family. This, combined with the use of E-3 and E-2 AWACS, was believed to enable existing F-15 air superiority fighters to sustain a commanding edge in battle. This proved valid against less er air forces like those o f Iraq and Bosnia. And the U.S. expects that the Lockhee d Martin F-22A’s impressive ad vantages in s tealth, long range AESA radar and p assive se nsors, and s uper-cruising spee ds to sustain the a bility of the U.S. to find and a ttack it oppone nts first, thus securing air dominance. But as the emerge nce of PLA 5th genera tion AAMs indicates, this picture could change q uickly abse nt U.S. action. China is developing long-range AAMs like the PL-13 or could purchase the longer range Russian Novator K-100 and present an unaccepta ble threat to critical U.S. AWACS aircraft. Denied sup erior “situationa l awa renes s” from AWACS, U.S. F-15s and F-16s would be forced to rely on their own radar, electronics and we apons. The PLA’s development of new AAMs and its purchase of Russian AAMs wo uld then raise the po ssibility of uncomfortably reducing the U.S. margin of superiority, and thus redu cing dete rrence. The U.S. is now introducing the AIM-120D, which may have range in excess o f 100km and ha s the ad vantag e of a two -way data-link, so the missile’s radar can increase the situation al aware nes s of the combat netw ork. The U.S. is also developing a next generation AAM designed to combine short-range, medium range air combat superiority and ground attack capab ilities, called the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile (JDRADM). But desp ite expe rimental p rograms in the 1 980s a nd 1990s the U.S. doe s not app ear interes ted in a very long rang e AAM. It may now b e neces sary for the U.S. to revisit programs that sought to develop two -stage and ramjet powered very long-range AAMs,[27] or consider purchasing the ramjet pow ered MBDA Meteor. file:///C:/Users/mantanfwi/Documents/International Assessment and Strategy Center Research China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missil es.htm

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Ramjet ARM: The U.S. Air Force recen tly release d this image o f a new ramjet-powered missile being tested from a QF-4 drone, apparently a new version o f the AGM-88 anti-rada r missile. This pow er plant could also form the b asis for a ne w very long range AAM. Source: U.S. Air Force The U.S. introduction of the F-22A offers substantial compensation, as its stealth and super-cruise offer great tactical adva ntage s over most 4th gene ration fighters. But the U.S. decision to limit the number of F-22As to 183 means tha t only 58 are going to be based in Alaska and Hawa ii.[28] This advantage is also in danger of being neutralized by the potential emergence o f Chinese 5th ge neration fighters in the ne xt decade, or a possible Chinese decision to purchase Russia’s 5th gene ration fighter. Meanw hile, the U.S. faces eve n greate r pressure s from the pote ntial loss of over one-third of its 440 F-15 fighter fleet due to recently discovered structural flaws. [29] Even though there have been longstanding concerns about the aging F-15,[30] the U.S. Air Force has plans to upgrade about 177 with new AESA radar, a plan that may be reconsidered. [31] It may now b e more important that the U.S. build up to the U.S. Air Force’s requirement for 381 F-22As, or eve n be tter, consider an upgraded version that could carry more and better long, medium and short-range AAM, and include an IRST device. The brutal surprise of Russian MiG-15s early in the Korean War helped push the U.S. to remain a leader in air superiority, an expe nsive investment sustained for three gene rations. Pres erving air supe riority has als o bee n a critical factor in America’s ability to deter large-scale conflict, especially in Asia. The U.S. has also s ustaine d a po licy of providing its allies and key friends with ever more modern air defense syste ms so that they in turn contribute to the dete rrence of conflict. Wa shington ha s es pecially relied on maintaining Taiwan’s technical superiority in the air to undergird its ability to deter Chinese a ggres sion. But China’s sustained across-the-board investment in modern air combat capabilities is but one of many emerging areas of U.S.Chines e military competition. The U.S. has little choice but to e xceed China ’s capacity to produce s uperior combat aircraft, the weapons to arm them, and the support aircraft to ensure they sustain the ability to quickly establish command of the air in order to dominate ba ttlefields below.

Two of Japan’s Choices: Japan wa nts the F-22A and perhaps Australia may elect to se ek it as well. But of the tw o o nly Japan ha s a fall-back indigeno us 5th gene ration fighter prog ram. Source: RD Fisher Furthermore, it is necessary for Washington to consider additional measures to allow U.S. allies and friends to sustain local air supe riority. The U.S. will not se ll the F-22A to Australia and Jap an, desp ite their strong interes t. [32] Australia has decided to purchase up to 100 F-35s, which are optimized for attack missions, and the ne w Labour Pa rty-led go vernment is now reevaluating the Liberal go vernment’s 2007 decision to b uy F/A-18E/F fighters, in part becaus e they do not offer commanding superiority over Russian Sukhois being s old to China, Indonesia a nd Malaysia. Given China’s all-around progress in air power building, it may be necessary to review F-22 export restrictions, and perhaps consider a version that can be more safely expo rted. Japan has a n urgent requirement to replace its 1960s vintage F-4EJ fighters but is also quietly investing in its ow n 5th generation fighter that could fly by the end of the next decade if the U.S. does not sell the F-22A. [33] In addition, the U.S. must become far more responsive to Taiwan’s needs, to include rapid approval of Taipei’s request for 66 new F-16 Block 50 fighters, which can use the AIM-9X AAM. Assisting Taiwan ’s ability to dete r China in the air can also serve to d eter China’s ongoing buildup of missiles, naval blockade forces and invasion forces aimed at Taiwan. [1] Images of the PL-10 and “PL-13” viewed on the CJDBY website on January 4, 2008, http://bbs.cjdby.net/viewthread.php?

tid=445336&extra=page%3D1 [2] In the highly technical and competitive field aerial weapo nry, one of the be st filters has been Robert Hewson, the a ward

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winning editor of Jane’s Air Launched Weapons (JALW), which adds considerably to this study. [3] Po ssible Russian use of IRSTs a nd pas sive phased array radar against the stealthy F-35 are e xplored in, Grigory “Grisha”

Medved , “Sukhoi’s Lightning Strikes the F-35 JSF,” Air Power Australia NOTAM , January 20, 2008, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-030907-1.html . [4] “Meteor,” MBDA Web Page, http://www.mbda-systems.com/mbda/site/FO/scripts/siteFO_contenu.php?

lang=EN&noeu_id=123; Robert Hew so n, “Meteo r BVRAAM,” Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, 2006, p. 63. [5] In the late-1990s Raytheon developed a ramjet powered version of the AIM-120 for a British competition that w as won by

Meteor, see, Stewart Penny, “Long range dogfight,” Flight International , June 30 , 1999, http://ww w.flightglob al.com/articles/1999/06/30/53319/long-range-dog fight.html [6]

Luoyang officials first described the background of the PL-9 AAM to the author at the 1996 Zhuhai Airshow.

[7] “Late st China-South Africa Military Coo pera tion,” Kanwa Defense Review , October 15, 2004, p. 14. [8] Robert Hews on, “R-Darter (V4),” JALW 2007 , internet a ccess file. [9] The a uthor wo uld like to thank Robert Hewso n for prompting this o bservation. [10] Robert Hewson, “China hints at new air-launched missiles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , January 30, 2008. [11] Robert He ws on, “SD-10 (PL-12), JALW 2007 , op-cit. [12] Ibid. [13] Robert He ws on, “SD-10 (PL-12), JALW 2007 , op-cit. [14] Robert Hewson, “RVV-AE-PD (R-77M-PD),” JALW 2006, p. 82 [15] Ibid. [16] Vympel’s active marketing of the R-77M-PD since the late 1990s also suggests that this missile’s technology was offered

for export. [17] Sayan Majumdar, “After Brahmos More Co llaborations ?,” Indian Defence Consultant s , April 12, 2004. [18] Interview, May 2007. [19] Mainichi Shimbun, April 20, 2006. [20] Tsuyoshi Nojima, “China’s sudden show of force sent SDF jets scrambling,” The Asahi Shimbun, January 2, 2008,

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200801020031.html . [21] “Beijing Expert Says China Never Recognizes 'Cross-Strait Median Line,’” Zhongguo Tongxun She, Janua ry 7, 2008, Open

Source Center Translation, CPP20080107004004 . [22] Taiwan Ministry of Defense, 2006 National Defense Report Republic of China , Taipei: Ministry of Defense , 2006, p. 49. [23] On December 6, 2007 Taiwan President Chen Shui Bien gave the first indication of China’s intention to impose an Air

Defense Identification Zone on the Taiwan Strait, to prevent U.S. and Japanese intelligence gathering flights, and then to create a new air route in the Taiwan Strait, see, Ko Shu-ling, “Chen says Beijing altering status quo,” Taipei Times, December 7, 2007, p. 3; for further on Taiwane se o bjections, see, “Taiwan criticizes Beijing over air route nea r air force training zon e,” South China Morning Post , December 18, 200 7. [24] David Lague, “Ch ina planning Taiwa n Strait route for commercial aviation,” International Herald Tribune, January 8, 2006. [25] While the e xact range o f the AIM-9X is a classified number, Jane’s Air Launched Weapons credits it with a 10km range .

However, one o ther source notes it has be en fired to ranges of 20 to 22km by modified F-15C fighters, see Seymour Johnson, “Rayth eo n plan s da ta link for AIM-9X Side wind er,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, October 2005, p. 14. [26] Graham Warw ick, “Super Hornet se t to ge t air-to-air boo st from USN,” Flight International , April 17, 2007,

http://ww w.flightglob al.com/articles/2007/04/17/213274/supe r-hornet-set-to-get-air-to-air-boost-from-usn.html [27] The U.S. is ap paren tly developing a ra mjet po we red vers ion of the AGM-88 Harm anti-rada r missile to give it longer ran ge

to addre ss new long-range SAM threats . This effort could be redirected to provide a new long er range AAM, see , Bill Sweetman, “Fast Attack,” Ares Blog, January 22, 2008, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp? plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogP age =BlogViewP ost& plckPostId=Blog%3a 27ec4a53 dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a710a5216-59db-44d3-86ef-9aa5cfecfd90 ; Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie, “Pentagon Eyes High-Speed Missiles For Stea lth Aircraft,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , December 23, 2007, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw122407p1.xml [28]

A wing of 40 are now being de ployed to Elmendo rf Airbas e, Alaska , and 18 to Hickam Airbase in Hawa ii by 2011, se e, Tech. Sgt. Mikal Canfield, “Elmendorf w elcomes F-22 Rapto r,” Air Force Link , August 8, 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp? id=123063874&page=1 ; David Fulghum, “Hawa iian Raptors,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , June 8, 2007, http://aviationweek.typepad.com/ares/2007/06/hawaiian_raptor.html#more [29]

A mid-air breakup of a F-15C fighter in November 2007 forced repeated fleet groundings and has since led to the discovery of a structural flaw tha t may permane ntly ground ab out 160-180 F-15s, see , Graham Wa rwick, “Pictures: Manufacturing defects caused cracks that downed USAF F-15,” Flight International , January 11, 2008, http://ww w.flightglob al.com/articles/2008/01/11/220799/pictures-manufacturing-defects-caused -cracks-that-down ed-usa f-f15.html .


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[30] Carlos Bongioanni, “Age takes a toll,” Stars and Stripes, February 23, 2004. [31] Dave Montgomery, “F-22 rises as an option after F-15 faults found,” Star-Telegram, January 12, 2008, http://www.star-

telegram.com/business/story/405748.html; Amy Butler, “Flaw ed Ea gles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , January 14, 2008, p. 28. [32] Ian McPhedra n, “Australia wan ts F-22 Raptor for RAAF,” The Herald Sun, January 8, 2008,

http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23015033-661,00.html ; Siva Govindasamy, “Japa n as ks USA to ease fighter restrictions,” Flight International , May 1, 2007, http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/05/01/213551/japan-asks-usato-ease-fighter-export-restrictions.html . [33] See author, “Japanese Military Technology Advances ,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, December 6, 2007.


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China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-To-Air Missiles

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