Charles H. Kahn (Auth.), Simo Knuuttila, Jaakko Hintikka (Eds.) the Logic of Being- Historical Studies

And not only Plato's critics but also the more sympathetic commentators have problems with his assertions that largeness is large, beauty is

34

BENSON MA TE~

beautiful, etc. Professor Cherniss argues that these are to be understood as assertions of identity and not of attribution. He says: "Plato clearly distinguishes two meanings of 'is x', namely (I) 'has the character x' and (2) 'is identical with x', and states that alJ70 TO x and only aUTO TO X 'is x' in the second sense". Thus, assertions like" Justice is just" or "Beauty is beautiful" mean, as Cherniss puts it, "that' Justice' and 'just' or 'Beauty' and 'beautiful' are identicaf'. In general, he believes, " 'the idea of x is x' means 'the idea of x and x are identical and therefore the idea of x does not "have the character x" '''.16 Although Cherniss does not say so explicitly, this analysis would presumably lead to the conclusion that the Third Man argument, as formulated in our passage, is deficient in assuming that "is large" can be predicated of largeness itself in the same sense in which it can be predicated of any particular large thing. Professor Vlastos joins Cherniss in thinking that "is" has two senses - the so-called attributive and identity senses mentioned above - and he agrees that Plato was aware of the difference between the two. But he finds that Platonic sentences of the form 'A is B', where A is the name of a form and B is an adjective, are ambiguous in still another way, which was not evident to Plato. 17 In such cases, he says, 'A is B' can be read either as meaning that the universal denoted by the subject term has the attribute denoted by the predicate, or as meaning that whatever is an instance of the subject universal will eo ipso have the attribute denoted by the predicate. E.g., "Justice is pious" could mean that the universal, Justice, has the attribute of piety, or it could mean that whatever is just is eo ipso pious. Interpreted in the first of these ways, it is what Vlastos calls an "ordinary predication"; in the second, it is a case of "Pauline predication" (after St. Paul's "Charity suffereth long and is kind"). In terms of this distinction, one could say that if "Largeness is large", in the Third Man argument, is taken as a Pauline predication it is plausible but renders the argument unsound (because largeness will not be predicated in the same sense of both itself and the other large things), whereas if it is taken as an ordinary predication it becomes false or even "sheer nonsense". 18 3. THE SENSES OF "IS"

All of these noted commentators, with anyone of whom it is risky to differ, seem to me to base their analyses on two inter-related but highly doubtful assumptions: (a)

That there are, in English

Of

in Greek, at least (wo distinct

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

35

of "is" (EurL) , viz., the "is" of identity and ti-Jat of predication; and That if sentences like "Beauty is beautiful" are to be meaningful, let alone true, the word' 'is", as it occurs in them, cannot have the same sense it has when it occurs in sentences like "The Mona Lisa is beautiful". 19 sen~es

(b)

Of course Plato nowhere explicitly asserts any such principles as (a) or (b). Consequently, some of his critics have felt that he has indeed "no understanding of philosophical syntax" and that "he fails to realize how great is the gap between universals and particulars"; while his defenders strive to protect him by showing that he is after all aware of the point of (a) and that he does not mean that beauty is beautiful in the same sense of "is" in which a particular painting is beautiful. But critics and defenders alike seem to agree that to fly in the face of (a) and (b) is to risk making dreadful mistakes. So let us first consider (a). Needless to say, the doctrine that there are several senses of "is", including an identity sense and a predicative sense, was not invented by Professors Cherniss and Vlastos; it has a long history and by now is received in many quarters as philosophical gospel. 20 As evidence for the distinction, one is likely to be given examples like "Scott is the author of Waverley" and "Scott is human", and one is assured that the first of these means that Scott is identical with the author of Waverley (and not that he has the author of Waverley as an attribute since presumably the author of Waverley is a human being, not an attribute), while the second means that Scott has the attribute Humanity, with which he is obviously not identical. Do such considerations as these, together with corresponding ones for Greek, suffice to show that "is" and EurL are not used in the same sense in both kinds of case? They do not. The following analogy will help establish this point. Suppose that I have a number of straight sticks, which I am comparing directly with one another as to length. I report my observations by using the phrase "is no longer than", making statements that have either the basic form 'A is no longer than B' or are obtained from elements of this form by (possibly repeated) application of negation, conjunction, and quantification. Further, I employ 'A is the same length as B' or 'A matches B' as short for 'A is no longer than Band B is no longer than A'; and 'A is shorter than B' abbreviates the statement 'A is no longer than B, and it is not the case that B is no longer than A'. Now it is clear that whenever 'A is no longer than B' is true of a couple of sticks, either 'A matches B' or 'A is shorter than B', but not both, will

36

BENSON MATES

be true of those sticks; and whenever either of the latter is true, the former will be true. But obviously this does not suffice to show that "is no longer than" is here ambiguous, having sometimes the sense of "matches" and sometimes that' of "is shorter than". When I say 'A is no longer than B' of a couple of sticks that happen to be equal, I am using the phrase "is no longer than" in exactly the same sense as when I apply it to a couple of which the first is shorter than the second. Note further that to say 'A matches B' amounts to saying 'A is no longer than B' and something more; and likewise for 'A is shorter than B'. If this 'something more' were obvious from the context, I could communicate the fact that two sticks match by simply stating the first component of the conjunction. Thus, if the context makes 'B is no longer than A' obviously true, I can, as a practical matter, employ simply 'A is no longer than B' to convey the information that the two sticks match. But, again, this would not show that "no longer than" sometimes means "matches" and the rest of the time means "is shorter than". To spell out the intended analogy between "is no longer than" and "is" is probably unnecessary, but I hope that the reader will forgive my doing it anyway. The point is that perhaps the "is" of identity and the predicative "is", so-called, can both be defined in terms of a more primitive "is", in a manner similar to that in which "matches" and "shorter than" were defined above in terms of "no longer than". In fact Leibniz 21 and, if I am not mistaken, certain Polish philosophers beginning with LeSniewski,22 have done just that. Leibniz defines 'A is the same as B' as 'A is Band B is A', and 'A is (a) B' as 'A is B but B is not A'. Analogously to the situation with the sticks, we have the result that whenever 'A is B' is true either 'A is the same as B' or 'A is (a) B', but not both, will be true, and each of the latter implies the former. Thus, the fact that in "Scott is the author of Waverley" we can replace "is" by "is the same as" and get a true sentence, while if we replace "is" by "has as a property" we get a sentence that is false or nonsensical, in no way shows that in this sentence "is" means "is the same as". We can also carryover the point about what happens when the truth of one of the conjuncts is part of the background infQrmation or is in some other way too plain to need stating. Leibniz was defining "same" in terms of "is" for a sort of regimented Latin, where (because of the lack of a definite article and because of certain features of the regimentation) the indicated types of transformation work better than they do in English. I do not wish to claim that in Plato's Greek tad behaves in relation to TD:VTOIJ in exactly the way Leibniz sug-

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

37

gests for est and idem. Nevertheless the relation may well be similar enough to justify suspicion that the sort of evidence usually adduced in support of the multiple sense hypothesis for f.aTL does not at all rule out the possibility that that verb may be used in a single sense everywhere. We shall return to this matter in connection with (i) - (vii) below. In determining whether a word or other expression has more than one sense, the unwary may be tempted to make still other fallacious inferences. In modern introductions to logic, for example, one often finds it said that there are two senses of the connective "or"; the "exclusive" and the "inclusive" senses. Sometimes, we are told, "or" is used in a sense that excludes the possibility that both disjuncts are true, while in other occurrences it has a sense that allows such a possibility. (Then one is usually informed that for reasons of simplicity, etc., logicians have decided to use the word, or a corresponding symbol, in the inclusive sense only: a disjunction counts as true if and only if at least one of the disjuncts is true.) Now it turns out that finding indisputable cases of the exclusive sense of "or" in the natural language is not quite so easy as might be thought. If I tell you that I shall either go to the concert or stay home and read a good book, it is clear enough that I am not allowing the possibility that I might both go to the concert and stay at home; but it is also clear that we do not need to postulate an exclusive sense of "or" to account for the exclusion, for the content of the disjuncts suffices to eliminate the possibility that both might be true. (Note that even after the logician has given his "inclusive" sense to the symbol "v", he uses it, without change of sense, in disjunctions like' P v -P' , where it is impossible that both disjuncts be true). So, in order to have critical cases before us we must look for disjunctions which are such that (a) the whole disjunction will be considered false if both disjuncts are true, and (b) it is at least possible that both disjuncts be true. But even in these cases we must beware of such contribution as the context or background information may make to the inferences the hearer will draw from the disjunction. For example, if my daughter has been expressing a wish to go to the concert and also to buy a recording of the symphony that will be performed there, and I have responded that it's certain we cannot afford both of these, and even doubtful whether we can afford either, then, when I finally say, "All right, you may go to the concert or buy the record", it will be obvious to her that the possibility of both is excluded. But again the responsibility for the exclusion need not be pinned on the "or"; rather, it seems more properly attributable to the background information. In short, the fact

38

BENSON MATES

that a given disjunction is taken in such a way as to exclude the possibility of both disjuncts being true may often (and perhaps always) be accounted for without supposing that the word "or" is being used iJ1 an exclusive sense. Analogously, it may be the case that whenever a certain type of substantive, such as e.g. a proper name, occupies the predicate position in a Leibnizian sentence 'A is B', then' B is A' follows from' A is B' . On this basis, if 'A is Socrates' is true, then 'Socrates is A' is also true; hence 'A is Socrates' will be true if and only if 'A is identical with Socrates' is true; and still there will be no ground in this for saying that "is" is used in one sense in, e.g., "the teacher of Plato is Socrates" and in another in "the teacher of Plato is wise". Now, if the kinds of evidence indicated above are not sufficient to show that Plato sometimes uses "is" in the sense of "is identical with" and sometimes uses it in a "predicative" sense, what sort of evidence would justify that conclusion? The following might seem to be what we need. On the one hand, we note that Plato holds principle (I) mentioned at the outset, together with its consequence, (3). On the other hand, at Parmenides 158A5 - 6 we find (5)

It is impossible for anything but the one itself to be one.23

In the context of Plato's philosophy, (3) and (5) look incompatible. Thus, if he seriously means to assert both, and if the large itself and the one itself are not identical for him, and if he is in full possession of his logical powers when he writes each of these two sentences and has not changed his mind between times, it would seem justifiable to conclude that one or more components common to the two are ambiguous. From here it is but a short step to the conclusion that "is one" is ambiguous, and from there to the further conclusion that "is", or "one", or both are the culprits. But this whole argument collapses because it is not clear that Plato seriously meant to assert (5). After all, (5) occurs in a dialogue, in the mouth of a character representing a philosopher with whom Plato does not agree on the very matters under discussion. 24 Moreover, this philosopher, above all others in the history of philosophy, is notorious for playing fast and loose with "is". If anyone is to be charged with taking "to be" in (5) as synonymous with "to be identical with", it had better be Parmenides, and not Plato. Consequently, although we have here the right kind of evidence, in this particular case the proof fails because

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

39

it is not certain that the inconsistent statements are reaJly asserted by a single author . Summing up, then, I find no conclusive evidence that there are any such senses of "is" as the so-caJled "is" of identity, the "is" of predication, or the "is" of Pauline predication; afortiori I see no reason to suppose that Plato, knowingly or unknowingly, used the word equivocaJly in these various purported senses. 4. "BEAUTY IS BEAUTIFUL". AND THE LIKE

Let us next consider assumption (b), that there is something wrong with Platonic sentences like "Beauty is beautiful". Why are so many philosophers and other scholars ready to teJl us that such sentences, if taken literaJly, are "sheer nonsense"? It seems that the principal reason - and this is surely paradoxical - is that the Platonic metaphysics has been swaJlowed, hook, line, and sinker, and has then been interpreted in such a way as to rule out part of itself. That is, one first agrees that beauty (or, let us say, Beauty) is an abstract entity, eternal, changeless, existing or subsisting in a world apart, while particular beautiful things alf belong to the world of sights and sound, and, indeed, are beautiful precisely because of how they look, sound, or in other ways affect the senses . Then one infers that things so utterly different as these, belonging even to different categories (whatever that means), cannot have attributes in common; e.g., that neither "is beautiful", "is good", nor any other predicate can be true of the abstract entity Beauty if taken in the same sense in which it is true of particular concrete objects. These notions are occasionaJly reinforced by the mistaken idea that unless we subscribe to some sort of theory of types, which would declare it nonsensical to attribute a property to itself, we shaJl inevitably faJl into Russell's Antinomy and related contradictions. But, as is well known, type theory is not the only device, nor even the preferred one, for avoiding the fundamental antinomies; so that if Plato wishes to make statements like "Beauty is beautiful" he is thus far in no particular danger from the side of logic. Plato formulates his puzzling reflexive assertions in various ways. The most common of these is of special interest. Instead of using a standard abstract noun in the subject position, he employs the adjective with the article, thus producing what appear to be literal counterparts of the English sentences "the large is large", "the beautiful is beautiful", "the just is just", "the holy is iJoly", etc. What do these statements mean?

40

BENSON MATES

We are told by the grammarians that such an expression as TO XCiAOV ("the beautiful") is ambiguous in Greek; inter alia it can refer to the abstract entity, Beauty, or to a typically beautiful object, or to the beautiful object that is under discussion in the given context. 25 According to this, "the beautiful is beautiful" is dreadfully ambiguous, meaning perhaps "beauty is beautiful", or "whatever is beautiful is (perhaps eo ipso) beautiful", or "the beautiful object (we've been talking about) is beautiful". But the advice from our grammarians is less than satisfactory, for it is formulated in such a way as to presuppose the Platonic distinction between abstract entities and particulars, whereas, presumably, we should not have to accept Plato's metaphysics in order to understand the workings of the Greek language. One is also left with the uneasy feeling that the only evidence these experts have for the ambiguity of the Greek expressions is the lack, in each case, of a single corresponding English or German expression by whi.:h the Greek term may be translated at all of its occurrences. But does this show that there is something wrong with the Greek? It is striking that in the dialogues no interlocutor ever hesitates a moment before agreeing to TO XCiAOV XCiAOV Ean ("the beautiful is beautiful"), TO O[XCiLOV O[XCiLOV Ean ("the just is just"), and the like; nobody ever says "Wait a minute; that doesn't make sense" or even "I don't quite follow you, Socrates". The reason, I think, is that for any Greek such a sentence would be a logical truth, in the Quinean sense that (a) it is true, and (b) every result of substituting another adjective for its only non-logical constant is equally true. In short, such a sentence would be felt as obviously and trivially true. 26 The same holds, Mutatis mutandis, for .statements like 0 fan XA[VT] XA[VT] EaTl ("what (a) bed is, is (a) bed"); they too satisfy the Quinean criterion for logical truth. Thus, the various reflexive' assertions, when formulated in these fundamental ways, seem not only true but even trivially true. But Plato goes much further. In the relevant contexts he clearly uses regular Greek abstract terms interchangeably with the corresponding adjective-plus-article expressions just described. His readiness to do this, I believe, is based on a logical or linguistic error of monumental import for the subsequent history of philosophY. The sentences TO XCiAOV XCiAOV Ean ("the beautiful is beautiful") and b nCiQ(hvwv X CiAO 5 Ean ("the Parthenon is beautiful") are apparently of similar structure, and, as the latter informs us that the object denoted by b nCiQOfVWV is beautiful, it is tempting to interpret the former similarly, I.e., to take TO

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

41

xaM" as the name of something now asserted to be beautiful. But clearly this is a mistake, analogous to the well-known error of treating words like "nothing" and "something" as though they were names. 2? For what we have here is in effect a device for universal quantification; the article TO operates on the entire sentences and not just on the adjective immediately following. This becomes even more obvious when Plato strengthens the assertion to aUTO TO xaAO" xaM" fun ("the beautiful itself is beautiful" or "the be
42

BENSON MATES

The upshot of all this is as follows. There is no reason to doubt that "is large" is used by Plato in the same sense in "The large is large" or "The large as such is large" as it is in "The Parthenon is large". Furthermore, "The large is large" is, for Plato and any other Greek, selfevidently true. Things only begin to go awry when "the large" and "the large as such" are taken as names, interchangeable with "largeness". A first result of such interchange is that" Largeness is large" acquires the status of an obvious truth; another is that "The large as such is an idea, changeless, eternal, etc.", which is false if properly understood as a mod ali zed generalization, now appears to be true. Many other problems arise, including the crucial one that if any predicate I{J is denied of the Ideas, we shall have both 'No Idea is I{J' and 'The I{J is I{J' as true. 29 Despite all of these confusing complexities, however, I believe it possible to maintain that Plato uses the verb "to be" in a single sense throughout - a single sense in terms of which some of the other senses that have been proposed can be defined. Of course, he is not writing in a formalized language, and we know better than to look for exact defini~ tions and rules to cover even a philosopher's use of a natural language. But, very roughly speaking, his usage seems to be in accord with some such scheme as the following: For any terms A, B, C, (i) (ii)

(iii)

'A is the same as B' ('A = B') is true if and only if 'A is B' and 'B is A' are true;30 'A isp B' ("Pauline predication") is true if and only if (a) for all terms D, 'D is B' follows from 'D is A' and (b) for some terms D, E, 'D = E' does not follow from 'D is A and E is A',3l 'A is (a) B' ("ordinary predication") is true if and only if 'A is B' is true but 'A = B' and 'A isp B' are not.

While we are at it, we may add: (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)

'A is' is true if and only if, for some term D, 'A is D' is true;32

'A is similar to B in respect to C' is true if and only if 'A is C' and 'B is C' are true; 'A is similar to B' is true if and only if, for some term D, 'A is similar to B in respect to D' is true; 'A is A' is necessarily true.

If Plato's usage is more or less along these lines, then we can expect that, for him, whenever 'A is B' is asserted, then 'A is the same as B' or 'A isp B' or 'A is (a) B' could also be asserted. Of these three, the last is inconsistent with each of the first two, though the first two are consistent

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43

with each other. As examples of sentences that come out true according to the above scheme, we have "Socrates is identical with the teacher of Plato", "Socrates is a man", "The just isp good", "The just is eternal" (but not "Justice isp eternal"). In each case, the corresponding sentence with the primitive "is" will be true; i.e." "Socrates is the teacher of Plato", "Socrates is a man", "The just is good", and "The just is eternal" are all true in the same sense of "is". We shall also have such results as that if "The statue is large" is true, then "The statue is similar to the large" and "The large is similar to the statue" will also be true. I hasten to acknowledge, however, that the matter is very much more complex than these suggestions might indicate. A more satisfactory account would at least replace (i) - (vii) above by corresponding principles for Plato's Greek, and difficult problems of word order and the placement of the article would have to be dealt with. Still further complications will result from Plato's use of the abstract noun and other expressions as apparently synonymous with the corresponding adjective-plusarticle. So the most that can be claimed for the above scheme is that it shows one way in which the copula could be used univocally everywhere and yet give rise to the kinds of texts that have made scholars consider it ambiguous. 33 Returning in conclusion to the Third Man Argument, we may note that it is fortunate for Plato that there is another way out besides that of declaring that "is large" is ambiguous. For, as has often been noted, that sort of ambiguity would render almost unintelligible his important doctrine that the particulars are likenesses of their corresponding ideas. The text most clearly illustrating this is in the Symposium,34 where Socrates describes a hierarchy of beautiful things; there are beautiful bodies, but more beautiful than these are the beautiful souls, and the beauty of the laws and of the various branches of knowledge ranks still higher. Most beautiful of all, he says, is beauty itself. Then he goes on to explain in detail exactly why beauty itself is more beautiful than anything else. 35 Unlike the other beautiful things, it is eternal, neither corning to be nor passing away; unlike them, it is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another; nor beautiful from one point of view and ugly from another; and so on. If the predicate "is beautifui" were not used in a single sense throughout this comparison, the passage would be very dark indeed; for to say that beauty itself is more beautiful than a beautiful soul, but in a different sense of "is beautiful", would be like saying that light travels faster than sound, but in a different sense of "fast".36 Thus Plato cannot very well join those who would save him from the

44

BENSON MATES

Third Man argument by finding an ambiguity in the "is" or the "large" of "is large". His various assertions not only do not require us to postulate such ambiguity, they actually forbid it. Therefore, the other way out, namely, that of allowing the large to be large by virtue of itself, would seem to be his only real alternative. NOTES 1 A Swedish translation of an earlier version of this paper is included in a privately published memorial volume for the late Professor Anders Wed berg (Enfilosofibok, Stockholm, Bonniers, 1978, pp. 66 - 84). I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Wedberg's chapter on Plato's Theory of Ideas, in Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, whi~h was one of the earliest systematic and lucid expositions of the matters here considered. Even after a flood of further literature by other authors it still must be ranked as one of the best accounts available. 2 My treatment of the second formulation of the Third Man, at Parmenides 132D - 133A, would be exactly analogous to what I have to say here about the first formulation. Cf. Note 13. 3 Parmenides 132B5 - 6. Why would it "no longer be subject to the consequences just now mentioned"? Because, I suppose, the thought of the large, unlike the large itself, would not necessarily be large. 4 Vlastos (1973), p. 344n8; Cornford (1939), ad lac. S Thus, fl' must be construed predicatively at 13ICIO. 132B5. 132B7. 6 Cpo Wed berg (1955), p. 30 (3b). 7 Of course "character" might in this connection be used metalinguistically, as it were, to refer to those Greek adjectives and nouns for which we notice that Plato postulates corresponding forms. Thus, we observe that corresponding to the adjective XOI}..(J" he postulates one form. and similarly for various other nouns and adjectives. But when he says (3) he cannot mean "corresponding to the adjective P.f"{OIS there is exactly one form", for, whatever he may have in mind, he' is clearly not talking about words. 8 Phaedo 102D6 - 7. • Of course this assertion requires detailed argument, for which I do not have space here; I include this paragraph only to indicate why I do not follow the common practice of formulating the issue in terms of "characters" and "corresponding forms". 10 I am talking about the argument as thus staled, and not about one or another possible formalization of it by means of the notation of modem logic. II E.g .• Ross (1951), p. 87. 12 Here and in many other places throughout this paper I use single quotes as quasi-quotes. Cf. Quine (1947), pp. 33 - 7. 13 Note how, in lines 132A6-1O. Parmenidcs eases into the claim that there is another form of largeness: at 132A7 he says that "some one large will again appear", which strongI, suggests but does not strictly imply that it is a different form: and then this conclusion is ostensibly re-stated at 132AlO as "anotherform will show up ... " (my italics). but only if "some one large will again appear" is taken in the sense of "again, some one large will appear", does it follow from the general principle that Socrates has admitted; "again" here is metalogical, meaning "by another application of the principle". In the second formulation of the Third Man I locate the one and only fallacy at the corresponding point, i.e., at 132E7, where it is concluded that "besides that form, another form will always appear ... " (my italics).

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

14

45

De Soph. EI. 189b36 - 9.

Russell (1945), p. 127. Cherniss (1957), pp. 258 - 9. 17 Vlastos (1973), p. 307. 18 Vlastos (1973), p. 252ff. Cp o also Vlastos (1973), pp. 234 - 6, 270ff, and 318ff. 19 For reasons of style I have not always stated explicitly that my remarks are intended to apply not only to the English expressions specifically quoted but also to the Greek expressions that correspond to them. Since part of the problem before us is in effect that of determining what corresponds to what, I recognize that this policy introduces a certain amount of confusion, for which I apologize. 20 Cf. e.g . Russell (1903), p. 64n; Wittgenstein (1921), 3.323. 21 Couturat (1903), p. 382; Schmidt (1960), pp. 475, 479. 22 See Luschei (1962), p. 144ff. 23 vuv Of ivi I'fV dvctL 1rh~V aVT~ T~ lVI c,ouvaTov 1rOU. 24 It is immediately preceded and followed by a group of arguments so obviously fallacious that we should insult Plato's intelligence if we supposed that he accepted them . E.g., (157C - D): "If something were a part of a multiplicity, among which it was itself included, it would be a part of itself, which is impossible .. . "; and ultimately the absurd conclusion (166C): "it seems that, whether there is or is not a one, both that one and the others alike are and are not, and appear and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways with respect to themselves and to one another" - to which poor Socrates has to reply. "Most true"! 25 Brugmann-Schwyzer (1961), Vol. II, p. 175; Kuhner (1898), Part II, vI. I, p. 266'ff; Smyth (1920), pp. 272-4; Goodwin (1894), p. 204. 26 Vlastos' claim (Vlastos (1973), p. 249n77), that "justice is just" at Prot agoras 330C is not taken as self-evident but is inferred, is puzzling . Note that c.ea in 330C7 need not be read as strict logical "therefore" but only as "so then". 27 Cpo such fallacies as "Nothing is colder than ice; I have nothing up my sleeve; therefore, what I have up my sleeve is colder than ice", or "Something just bit me; you gave me something for Christmas; therefore, what you gave me for Christmas just bit me". Further, although any German is a German and any German can tell you where Goethe was born , that does not mean that there is some German whose name is "any German" and who can tell you where Goethe was born. 28 When a binary predicate, such as "equal to" or "similar to" is under consideration, the mistake leads to even more painful consequences. On the same basis as before we now have as obvious truths aUTa Ta ioa ioa faT! ("equals as sllch are equal") and OIUTa Ta 01'0101 OI'Ola faT! ("similars as such are similar"); if these are interpreted as saying, respectively, that what is denoted by "equals as such" is equal, and what is denoted by "similars as such" is similar, and if the phrase "equals as such" is interchangeable with "equality", and likewise for "similar as such" and "similarity", we arrive at a pseudoproblem as to whether equality and similarity are singular or plural. For if equality consists of the equals as such, does it not consist, as Geach «1956), p. 76) suggests, of at least two absolutely equal things? In short, the very same mistake that takes Plato from "the beautiful is beautiful" to "beauty is beautiful" will also take him from "equals are equal" to "equality is/ are? equal" . to Thus, e.g., both "no idea is plural" and "plurality is plural" will be true, and there are many other such examples. Vlastos (1973), pp. 259ff, tries to protect Plato from these contradictions by interpreting "plurality is plural" as a Pauline predication . On the other hand, he recognizes (pp. 262 - 3) that "beauty is beautiful", in Diotima's speech in the Symposium, has to be taken as an ordinary predication. Hence he is forced to hold that 15 16

46

BENSON MATES

Platonic statements of the form 'the", is '" are sometimes Pauline, sometimes ordinary. But it seems to me that whenever 'the", is rp' is asserted in the dialogues it is put forward on the same basis. To suppose with Vlastos (p. 265) that "justice is just" in the Prolagoras is Pauline, while "beauty is beautiful" in the Symposium is not (pp. 262 - 3), should be a last resort; far better to suppose that Plato uses "is" univocally but has not thought out what to do about the difficult cases. 30 This condition for identity may be too weak. In the Prolagoras, in a discussion initiated by the question "whether virtue is one, and justice, temperance, and piety are parts of it, or whether these things that I have just now mentioned are all of them names of the same one thing" (329C - D), it is concluded from "justice is pious" and "piety is just" that "justice is either the same as piety or maximally similar to it" (33IB, cpo 333B); and from considerations indirectly establishing that every temperate act is wise and every wise act is temperate it is concluded that temperance and wisdom are one (333B). (Cp. Vlastos (1973), pp. 243 - 6). Following this, Socrates begins what is plainly an attempt to show that temperance and justice are one; and it looks as though his argument, never completed, was going to involve establishing that every temperate act is just and every just act is temperate. Thus, he seems to be trying to show, perhaps only to discomfit Protagoras, that "wisdom", "temperance", "justice", and "piety" all name the same thi~. Whether he or Plato actually believed this, is irrelevant; the crux of the matter is whether the course of the argument sho"'s what he thinks would have to be the case if the various identity statements were true. However, the references to similarity suggest that perhaps the truth of 'A is the same as B' requires something more than that of 'A is B' and 'B is A', at least when A and B are names of ideas. 31 Clause (b) is designed to eliminate the possibility that A is a name or description of a particular. Otherwise, since e.g. "If anything is Socrates, then it is eo ipso a man" is true, we should have "Socrates is a man" as a Pauline predication. 32 Thus two possibilities suggest themselves for 'A is not': (I) for no term B is 'A is B' true, or (2) for some term B, 'A is not B' is true. 33 As emphasized in the text, there is in general no hope of finding simple, exact rules to cover the usage of a given author writing in a natural language. The following may help to indicate at least a significant subset of the Greek examples I seek to catch with clauses (i) - (vii). In forming substitution-instances of a given clause: (I) Any adjective, count noun, or proper name, prefixed by the definite article, may be substituted for a variable in subject position. (2) Any adjective or noun, with or without the article, may be substituted for a variable in predicate position. (3) Where, in the given clause, the same variable occurs both in subject and in predicate positions, it is to be replaced in subject positions by an expression with the article if and only if it is replaced in predicate positions by the same expression without the article. (4) An abstract term (e.g., ~ Ol){atOUUP'I) is interchangeable with the corresponding adjectival phrase (TO M){atOP) or a fun phrase (a fun M){atOP). Cases involving complex terms may, it is hoped, be treated by analogy with the foregoing principles. Some examples: Of (i): TO OL){CnOp ){aL TO autOp mUToP fun is true iff TO M){atOP amop fun and TO OUtOP M){atop fun are true. 0 Ew){ear"s ){aL 0 otOaU){aAOS IIAaTwPos mUToP fun is true iff 0 Ew){ear"s otOaU){aAOS IIAaTwPos fun and 0 otOaU){aAOS IIAaTwPos Ew){ear"s fUTL are true. Of (ii): TO M){atOP Cx-yalJol' fun (as a Pauline predication) is true iff (a) for all terms D,

IDENTITY AND PREDICATION IN PLATO

47

'D &."(CiIJOV Eun' follows from 'D ot)(CltOV Eun' and (b) for some terms, D, E, 'D = E'does not follow from 'D ot)(CltOV Eun )(Cit E o[)(CltOV Eun'. Of (iii): TO O[)(CltOV &')([V'1TOV Eun (or ~ O!)(CiWUUV'1 &')([V'1TOV Eun as an ordinary predication, is true iff TO ot)(CltOV &')([V'1TOV Eun is true but not as a Pauline predication, and TO ot)(CltOV )(Cit CiUTO TO &')([V'1TOV TCiUTOV Eun is not true. 34 Symposium, 210fr. 35 Op. cit., 21IA-B. 36 Perhaps I should state explicitly that, according to the interpretation I am advancing, the sentences "Beauty is beautiful" and "The soul is beautiful" are both true fOf Plato when the "is" is taken in what I am calling its "primitive" sense. When it is taken in the identity sense, only the first sentence is true, and when it is taken in the sense of "ordinary" (to us) predication, only the second sentence is true. As I have indicated in (v) and (vi), "The soul resembles Beauty" will be true on the basis of the two sentences mentioned, with "is" understood in the primitive sense in both cases.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Brugmann, K. and E. Schwyzer: 1966, Griechische Grammatik, 3rd ed., Munich. Cherniss, H.: 1957, 'The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues', American Journal of Philology 78, 225 - 66. Cornford, F. M.: 1939, Plato and Parmenides, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Couturat, L.: 1903, Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Geach, P. T.: 1956, 'The Third Man Again', The Philosophical Review 65, 72 - 82. Goodwin, W. W.: 1963, A Greek Grammar, London. Kahn, c.: 1973, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Kiihner, R.: 1898-1904, Ausfiihrliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Hannover and Leipzig. Luschei, E. c.: 1962, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski, North Holland, Amsterdam. Quine, W. V.: 1947, Mathematical Logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Ross, W. D.: 1951, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Russell, B.: 1903, Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, London. Russell, B.: 1945, A History of Western Philosophy, Simon & Shuster, New York. Schmidt, F.: 1960, Leibniz: Fragmente zur Logik, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin. Smyth, H. W.: 1956, Greek Grammar, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Vlastos, G.: 1973, Platonic Studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Wed berg , A.: 1955, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm. Wittgenstein, L.: 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, U. S.A.

RUSSELL M. DANCY

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

Aristotle tells us more than once that 'to be' is said in many ways, wratever that means. I had better say straight off that I can find very little in the present paper that tells us what that means. But in the course of considering what it might mean, Owen, a long time ago (1960), told us that, while some people held that 'being' has "a single meaning" in all its applications, Aristotle was one of those who denied this. In his view, to be was to be something or other I

In a footnote to this sentence, he added This is not to deny the distinction between elval n and ebal lX1l·AWS.

But it certainly sounds as if it is to deny just that: the Greek phrases translate as 'to be something' and "just 'to be' ". Owen says, of course, a great deal more than I have quoted, but not enough to remove my puzzlement on at least the first few dozen readings. Eventually, I came to think I saw what he might have had in mind, and wrote my initial puzzlement off to stupidity. But recent work 2 has shown that the message, if it had b~en Owen's, has not got around. So I am here going to state what I arrived at. But then, the message turned out not to be Owen's: I found myself in disagreement with some (by no means all) of his subsequent pronouncements on Aristotle's ways with being. 3 So what follows is an interpretation born out of misunderstanding. No doubt some, including Owen, would think that it is not only Owen I failed to understand. In any event, it seems to me right about Aristotle. Still, it must be admitted that the theory I am going to hand Aristotle is not one he anywhere outright states. The idea is that it will help us to understand some of the things I;te does outright state if we suppose that he held this theory. So the claim that he held the theory is underdetermined by the evidence. I take it that this situation is not unfamiliar to readers of Aristotle. I shall begin by stating the theory, as I think it emerged from Aristot-

49 S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic oj Being, 49-80. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

50

RUSSELL M. DANCY

Ie's reflections on Plato's mistakes, and fitting it into Aristotle's essentialism. This occupies Section 1 below. The theory is, in the first instance, a theory about the Greek word '€lvo:t' whose bearing on the English translation, 'to be', of that word is not obvious. But I think that, mutatis mutandis, it does have something to tell us about Anglo-Saxon being, and, ultimately, perhaps, something about Being (or even Sein: but I do not want to commit sacrilege). Accordingly, after stating the theory, I try to mutate the things that need mutation to bring it to bear on English. Here I hope to irritate any Heideggerians that are still with us. I also complain a bit about the theory's fringe benefits, and it is probably at about this point that my disagreement with Owen begins to set in (but I shall not be pursuing this disagreement beyondproviding relevant footnotes). At any rate, I make as many enemies as I can. Lastly, although it is a bit of a letdown after twitting the Heideggerians and so on, I turn to some texts with which this theory is to help us. On this occasion I consider only two: 4 one in De interpretatione 11 that famously conflicts with a passage in Categories 10, and one in Metaphysics A 7, the chapter on 'being' in Aristotle's 'dictionary'. Even with these texts, I shall be more cursory than the subject ultimately will allow. But brevity may at least yield clarity of outline, and in a preliminary statement such as this, that is perhaps best. 1. WHAT IT IS TO BE IN GREEK

The Greek that Plato and Aristotle wrote and probably spoke does not possess separate words, as English does, for 'to exist' and 'to be,.5 Firstyear Greek textbooks 6 tell the student that the single word EaTtV is to be accented differently depending on whether it means 'exist' or just 'is', but this orthographic convention, known as 'Hermann's rule', has no foundation in the writing of Greek or in what we can tell of its pronunciation in ancient times, and may have no foundation before 1801, when Hermann ruled it 7. The Greek word l:~{aT(Xat'}o:t, which, in the sense 'to be separated from', 'to stand out from', or just 'to stand out', is destined to travel through its Latin cognate into French and thence to appear in English as 'to exist', is not used to mean 'exist', at least, not in the time of Plato and Aristotle. So, for Plato and Aristotle, the claim that Socrates exists would be represented by a sentence shaped like this one: (1)

Socrates is. 8

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

51

Now, in fact, the sentence 'Socrates exists' has a peculiar ring to it. It helps here to change tenses and subjects: "So Prester John really existed, after all". Here the extra words, the tense, and, most importantly, one's background knowledge about the use of the quasi-proper name 'Prester John' help to give an air of realism to the enterprise. But for starters, it is easier to ignore friction and wind resistance; anyway, the theory itself will involve us in restoring some of the realism lacking in (1), or in its more normal but still rather peculiar English equivalent, 'Socrates exists'. In particular, we shall attend to the relevance of background knowledge. So I shall stick with (1). In this and subsequent formulations I am deliberately ignoring one subtlety. It has frequently been said that the English 'existential prefix', "there is (such a NP as) x", is not used to make existential claims, 'x exists', for a variety of reasons. 9 I do not want to deny this claim. On the other hand, I take it that, on occasion, the sentences "So Prester John really existed, after all" and "So there really was such a person as Prester John, after all" are interchangeable. And that admittedly sloppy equivalence is enough for present purposes: our focus is not, ultimately, on the English verb 'exists' anyway .. So a sentence like (I) translates the English 'Socrates exists', and the Greek word in it that corresponds to the word 'is' is the same word that appears in the Greek for these: (2) (3)

Socrates is pale. Socrates is [a] man [i.e., a human being].

Consider first Plato's response to this situation; Aristotle' grows out of it. At the end of Republic V, Plato tells us that, whereas the form named 'the beautiful' entirely (lI'ap7fAWs, 477a3) and purely (ffALXQLPWS, 478d6, 479d5) is, ordinary beautiful things both are and are not. It is tempting to lend a semblance of naturalness to this contrast by replacing 'is', etc., with 'exists', etc. The temptation should be resisted, at least at first, not because, as some 10 think, no rational man (much less Plato) would ever espouse the absurdity of degrees of existence - this seems to me to condemn too many philosophers too quickly to the asylums - but because that replacement severs the contrast from the argument for it. What condemns the fair Helen II to being tumbled about (XVALPOf'i7CXL, 479d4)12 in the region between what purely is and what purely is not is the fact that, although she is beautiful by comparison with a pot (cf. Hi. Ma. 289a, with Phd. 74a-c and R. V. 479ab), she is not beautiful by comparison

52

RUSSELL M_ DANCY

with the goddess Aphrodite. Throughout an important period of his life, Plato had the unfortunate habit of concluding from this that Helen both is beautiful and is not beautiful. 13 He managed to some extent to kick this habit, but not before writing the Republic: indeed, here he indulges in it with gusto and a further twist, for he goes on from the conclusion that Helen both is and is not beautiful to the conclusion that Helen both is and is not. That, then, is the contrast between Helen and the beautiful: Helen both is and is not, in as much as she both is beautiful and is not beautiful, but the form, the beautiful, is purely, that is, it is unadulterated by any admixture of nonbeing, in as much as it is simply beautiful, and in no way is it not beautiful. 14 We could put the view underlying these moves - or rather, one of the views - in terms that make it sound more philosophical by saying that, where we have a true predication'S is P', Plato is regarding the predicate 'P' as giving a mode of-being of the subject S; and, where we have'S is not P', P is a mode in which S lacks being. I should prefer to put it differently, and I shall; but even put this way it is possible to see, as Plato himself came to see, that it is thoroughly unsatisfactory for his purposes. For clearly, as he says in the Sophist, "for each of the forms, there is much that it is, but an indefinite plurality [of things] that it is not" (Sph. 256e5 - 6). 15 So there are lots of modes in which the form, the beautiful, lacks b~ing, and the contrast with Helen evaporates. And that, indeed, is just what happens to the contrast in late dialogues such as the Sophist: 16 the difficulty I am pointing to is one of which the Academy became acutely aware. And it is this that leads to Aristotle's theory. But this is better seen if we abandon the false depth of modes of being for a more austere formulation, as follows. Plato is, in the Republic, allowing the inference: (E)

S is P

->

Sis,

along with its negative counterpart: (NeE) S is not P

->

S is not.

And what makes (E) and its negative counterpart plausible to him is the idea that the consequent in each case is merely a simplification of the antecedent, just as in (P)

Socrates is a pale man

->

Socrates is pale.17

For this sort of simplification to work, the residue after the simplifica-

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

53

tion must have the same significance it had before: its contribution to the unsimplified original must be just what is left. Failure to meet this requirement is obvious where there is a gross change in the sense of one or another word, as, perhaps, in (L)

Socrates is a lousy provider

-+

Socrates is lousy,

but there are subtler failures. Consider (G)

Socrates is a good cobbler

-+

Socrates is good.

Here we need not, and, I think, should not, say that 'good' has changed sense from antecedent to consequent. 'Good' is what Geach once 18 called an 'attributive' adjective: a noun or noun phrase needs to be supplied that will answer the question 'a good what?'. And, although in a specific conversational context it may be clear that the noun to be supplied is 'cobbler' ("The cobblers in Athens are all terrible." - "No, Socrates is good.' '), we are talking about justified patterns of inference, and that means we need a conclusion we can, so to speak, carry away with us. But once we have carried away 'Socrates is good', the noun we should supply to complete the sense is no longer 'cobbler', but, presumably, 'man'. All this applies to (E) (and to (NCE». At the very least, the 'is' in its antecedent must be the same 'is' as that in its consequent. In particular, there can be no shift from an alleged predicative sense of 'is' to an alleged existential sense of 'is'. Since, as I shall be arguilig in the next section, there are no such senses of 'is', this is not a problem. But also there must not be any of the more subtle problems such as beset (G). And here, as we shall see, trouble may arise. Aristotle is going to abandon (E), as aid Plato, but in neither case does it have to do with shifting from a predicative to an existential sense of 'is'. In Aristotle's case, it is not so much a matter of abandoning (E) as of restricting its range of operation while preserving the idea that the consequent in the allowable cases is a simplification of the antecedent, and so contains the same 'is'. But still, I must part company with those whose distaste for degrees of existence leads them to read it out of Plato. As I have said, "Socrates is" is, as far as I can tell, the way a Greek goes about· asserting the existence of Socrates. Aristotle himself may be found using this format in Cat. 10, 13 b 16-17,19, etc. For realism, one must imagine a conversation, say, between Xenophon and Cyrus. Xenophon has been talking about Socrates, and Cyrus denies that there cuuld be anyone that strange; Xenophon replies "Oh, Socrates exists, all right; I was at a party with him just last month". Here a Greek might say (the Greek for) "Oh,

54

RUSSELL M. DANCY

Socrates is, all right; .... " So Plato is, as far as I can tell, committed to degrees of existence, as we might phrase the matter; when he says that the forms 'purely' and 'entirely' are, what he means can be put into English by saying that their hold on existence is absolute because they are what they are irrefragably, while Helen's hold is relative and weak, because some of what she is, if not all of what she is, she also is not. Then what is it that condemns (E)? I have already said something about that, although in the 'deep' terminology; before putting it more austerely, there are a couple of obvious problems with it that are not directly covered by the theory I shall have Aristotle adopting, which ought to be mentioned so as to avoid raising false hopes. First, there is a problem recognized and dealt with by both Plato and Aristotle: the notorious problem of what is not. Unicorns (a modern favorite) and goat-stags (Aristotle's favorite) do not exist: they are not. But goat-stags are believed in by some and used as examples by others. If we apply (E) to that last sentence, we end up having them in the zoo that is reality. The restriction on (E) needed here is not the one I am primarily after, although it is close by, in Aristotle's mind. As I see it, it would involve isolating the predicates, like 'believed in' and 'used as examples', that give trouble, call them 'intensional predicates', and pronouncing (E) unfit for use with intensional predicates. Aristotle does not, I think, see it quite that way. But I am not going to worry any more about that here. A second interesting problem not covered by the theory to come is provided by certain adjectives such as 'fake', 'mythical', and, particularly for Aristotle, 'dead'. A fake diamond is no diamond. So we do not want it to follow from 'that diamond is fake' that that diamond is (exists), and Aristotle does not want it to follow from 'that man is dead' that that man is. Here again we may simply label the problem and shelve it: call such adjectives 'adjectives alienantia' or 'alienating adjectives'; 19 (E) does not work for alienating adjectives as predicates. Now what is the trouble with (E)? As Plato uses it and (NeE) in the Republic, every predicate true of S contributes equally to its existence, and every predicate false of its detracts equally from its existence (ignoring intensional predicates and adjectives alienantia). I shall refer to this as the 'democratic' attitude toward S's predicates. For Plato, the democratic attitude is a problem because there are many things a form is not, yet its existence must be unadulterated. For Aristotle, the democratic attitude is a problem for a different reason.

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

55

The democratic attitude toward S's predicates suggests, as an account of what S's existence consists in: the logical sum of all the predicates true of S. But that account of S's existence ties S down entirely 'too firmly. Take Socrates as our candidate S, and let him be pale. First, then: he can lose his pallor at the local parlor and become dark; he is still Socrates. Of course, we could simply clock his pallor, and then his being pale on Thursday afternoon would be part of his existence, along with his being dark Thursday night. But, again, he might perfectly well have been there Thursday night, as much Socrat~s as ever, even if he had missed his appointment at the parlor and remained white as a sheet. The trouble is that the loss of Socrates' pallor is perfectly compatible with the retention of Socrates, while with the loss of other things - notably, the loss of his life, and perhaps the loss of his humanity - we seem to lose something more: namely, Socrates. The view just registered is by now pretty familiar, and equally controversial. It rejects the democratic attitude toward a subject's predicates in favor of a form of elitism that we can call 'essentialism;. This is a red flag to certain bulls. These bulls can be found in quite different pens. In one, there are the innocent democrats we have already met, for whom any of Socrates' predicates is part of his being as much as any other: these, in effect, believe that all relations are internal, and we might think of them as Idealists. The other pen has in it a contemptuous lot who share with the democratic Idealists an egalitarian attitude toward Socrates' predicates but will have nothing to do with any of them: these, who insist that none of Socrates' predicates is any part of his being, we may call 'Existentialists' . I shall not here argue against any of these anti-essentialist bulls; I simply content myself with name-calling. It is not news to anyone that Aristotle is an essentialist. Let us just suppose he is right. We shall need some of the terminology in which he expresses his essentialism. The predicate in (3)

Socrates is a man

is one that holds of the subject 'by· virtue of itself', 'in its own right', 'of itself', or per (or propter) se. These are varying translations of the single phrase' xed)' a,vro' .20 Let us adopt the first one: the predicate in (3) holds of the subject by virtue of itself. By contrast, the predicate in (2)

Socrates is pale

56

RUSSELL M. DANCY

holds of its subject accidentally, 'by virtue of an accident' (xaTa) avp.{3e{3T/ x os).

This distinction pertains to the relationship between a predicate and its subject, but Aristotle attaches it to the sentence at different points at different times. Initially, the reflexive pronoun (auTo, 'itself') refers back to the subject: its gender, number, and person are frequently determined by the corresponding features of the subject (as in Met. Z 4. 1029b 14-16, quoted below; for some other samples, see ilI8. 1022a 26-27, 28,31, [bis], 34, Z 3. 1029a 20,5. 1030b 19). But sometimes the phrase goes along with the predicate, when the predicate is taken in isolation, with only a more or less dim view of a possible subject: then the predicate becomes a 'by-virtue-of itself' term (as in An. post. A 4. 73 a 34ff, 22. 84a 13 - 17, Met. Z 4. 1029b 9, etc.). These different ways of employing the distinction are plainly connected, but it is not easy to say how. We might try, as a first approximation: a term T is a by-virtue-of itself term iff, whenever any subject S is T, S is by-virtue-of itself (viz., S) T. This can only be an approximation, since counterexamples or putative counter-examples abound: 'that pare thing is a man', e.g., which has as predicate a by-virtue-of itself term, but pale things are not by virtue of themselves (i.e., by virtue of being pale things) men. Aristotle takes the line that 'that pale thing is a man' is not of the form'S is T' (An. post. A 22. 83 a 1-17). The fact is, I think, that the 'by-virtue-ofitself' terminology carries with it an intensional element, and when Aristotle uses that terminology in An. post. A 22 in denying that 'that pale thing is a man' is of the form'S is T', he :mports an intensional element right into the form'S is T'. But that is part of another story. 21 There is another point in the sentence at which Aristotle will occasionally attach his distinction, and this will be part of the present story: he is prepared to distinguish the 'is' that occurs in (3) from the 'is' that occurs in (2), so that the 'is' of (3) is a by-virtue-of itself 'is', and that of (2) is an accidental 'is'. Here I suspect a blunder, of a type to be considered in the next section. For the present, we can make do with the initial form of the distinction: Socrates is by virtue of himself a man, but accidentally pale. It is in these terms that Aristotle defines 22 the phrase that is conventionally translated as 'essence' (Met. Z 4. 1029b 13 - 14): ... the essence of each thing is what it is said [to bel by virtue of itself (luTL TO TL

~P

eben iXCxUTW 0 'Af-yeTcXI xcd), aUTO).

In fact, the phrase (TO TL 1}v elvcn + dative) conventionally translated

57

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

'essence' is a curious one,23 and what is of interest here is that its core is an occurrence of the infinitive 'to be'. So, instead of the conventional "the essence of each thing", as above, I shall adopt the more literal "what it is24 for each thing to be". I take this to amount to things like 'what to be is for each thing', 'what each thing's being is, or consists in', etc. Then the above passage will be retranslated, along with its immediate sequel, as follows (1029 b 13 -16) ... what it is for each thing to be is what it is said [to be) by virtue of itself. For it is not [so) that for you to be is for [you) to be educated,zs for you are not by virtue of yourself educated. Therefore, [it's) what [you are) by virtue of yourself. (lcrTL TO TL ~V elvw l}(ixcrT~ 0 >.i-YfTW }(CII')' aUTO. ob -yixe lcrTL TO crOL dva, TO JLovcr,)(~ dvw. -yae }(aTa cravTov d JLovcr,}(os. 0 aea }(aTa cravTov.)

ou

If we take this to give us different senses of 'to be' for Socrates on the one hand (for whom 'to be' means 'to be a man') and Bucephalus on the other (for whom 'to be' means 'to be a horse'), we are committing another blunder of the type mentioned above and to be dealt with below. We need not. We might just take it that filling in the predicate tells us under what conditions 'Socrates is' (i.e., 'Socrates exists') is true, and leave open the a)ternative possibility (which is, in fact, the right one) that what determines which predicate to fill in is, not 'is', but 'Socrates'. For the remainder of this section, I shall take it that this alternative possibility has not been ruled out, and leave further discussion for the next. Consider once more the two inferences

(E)

S is P

-+

S is

and (NCE) S is not P

-+

S is not.

It is not that the essentialist view we have just handed Aristotle requires him to reject the unrestricted use of (E) (again, leaving intensional and alienating predicates out of the picture). In the first instance, what he must reject is its converse, by restricting its application to cases in which 'P' is a predicate essentially true of S: cases in which S is by virtue of itself p.26 And so he must reject (NeE): only where S is P by virtue of itself, essentially, does it follow from'S is not P' that S is not. But all this has, given the background, an indirect impact on (E) as well. For the justification for the inference (E) was supposed to be simp)e simplification, the sort of move that justifies (P)

Socrates is a pale man

-+

Socrates is pale

58

RUSSELL M. DANCY

but breaks down for (L)

Socrates is a lousy provider

-+

Socrates is lousy.

For (P), that meant that 'pale' had to have the same role in antecedent and for (G)

Socrates is a good cobbler

-+

Socrates is good.

(L) and (G) were ruled out on the ground that the simplified residue had changed character in the course of the simplification. (P) was to be allowed because its residue was constant. And so, if (E) is to survive, it must show a constant residue. Consider, then, the instance of (E) that reads (el)

Socrates is pale

-+

Socrates is.

This is to be an inference with a detachable consequent. So we write its consequent on a slip of paper and put it to sea in a bottle. But when it washes up on a distant shore, its readers, who know that "what it is for each thing to be is what it is said t.o be by virtue of itself", and know that what Socrates is by virtue of himself is a man, will supply 'a man' as the completing noun. So (el) is a failure, and (E) is not in general true. But no such failure is involved with (e2)

Socrates is a man

-+

Socrates is.

(E), restricted to essential or by-virtue-of itself predicates, survives. In fact, confining (E) to essential predications is overly restrictive. Consider (e3)

That pale thing is a man

-+

that pale thing is.

We should not count 'that pale thing is a man' as a straightforward essentialpredication, and, in fact, Aristotle would not so count it. To the extent that he is willing to count it as a predication at all, he thinks of it as accidental: he thinks of it as grounded in, or having for its truth conditions, 'that man is pale' (see Section 4 below). And, as we have noted, in the Posterior Analytics he would prefer to legislate it away: "either it doesn't predicate at all, or it predicates not simply, but accidentally" (~TOL p:"ocxp.ws xcxrrnoeeiv, 7} xcxrq'Yoeeiv p.Ev 1'1, a1rAWS, XCXTCx CTvp.{3e{31/xos oE xcxrq'Yoeeiv, 83 a 15 - 17). For simplicity of outline, let us allow him the legislation he tries to pass in the Posterior Analytics. We shall expand our horizon slightly in Section 4 below.

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We are now in a position to explain how Aristotle can suppose that to be is to be something or other without giving up the distinction between 'to be something or other' and just 'to be'. Take the latter, the distinction, first. According to this, dven n, to be something, or 'to be' + Pred., is not the same as dven cnrAws, just 'to be#'. The latter phrase is often translated 'to be without qualification', or, worse, 'to be absolutely'. These translations tempt one to make too much of the distinction. In fact, all Aristotle's phrase 'Elven a1rAWS' does is point to the 'is' in sentences such as (I)

Socrates is.

Here we have just 'is', not 'is' + Pred. Such occurrences mark existential sentences: if there were an existential sense of 'is' in Aristotle, this would be it. But there is plainly no special existential sense here; there is a merely syntactic difference between 'to be' followed by a predicate and 'to be #'. The latter results flom truncating a predication. So even 'to be #' is, implicitly, to be something. But, as we have seen, not just any predication may be so truncated: the predicate must be restorable. Under the simplifying assumption that such locations as 'that pale thing is a man' can be ruled out, the type of predication that allows truncation is an essential predication. So while to be# is to be something, it is not to be any old thing. In fact, (1) is elliptical for (3)

Socrates is a man.

That is the theory. Let us translate it into English . 2. BEING AND EXISTING IN ENGLISH

The word 'is' does not behave the same way in normal English: sentence (I) seems to be used in English primarily to translate philosophical Greek. There is a more or less archaic use of the verb 'be' that survives in recitations of Hamlet's soliloquy and Owen's example 'Arrowby is no more',26 and our ability to understand the locution may give a fingernail-hold for the theory in English, but it would be nice to have more. The first thing to notice is the oddity already mentioned about (4)

Socrates exists.

I have in mind not the oddity that can be corrected by changing tenses

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

and adding adverbs, but the requirement placed on understanding the sentence of some background knowledge associated with the name 'Socrates': if you spring it on someone not in the know, he may not have the faintest idea what is going on. So also with the sentence-form (5)

There is (such a - as) Plato.

Without the parenthetical material, properly filled in, this does not even scan.!7 And properly filling in the blank requires some fairly substantial covering noun or noun phrase: just 'thing', for example, will only work in quite special cases ("My good man, there is such a thing as decency, you know", and so on). 'Plato' is the name of a computer language as well as that of a philosopher, and, for that matter, I could use it to name my pet cat, my pet theory, my favorite number, the national debt, the coin Washington skimmed across the Delaware, or the value of that coin in real terms on Christman Day 1776 given in terms of the Laspeyres index. In the absence of a covering phrase that has some bite to it, we do not know what is being talked about. It is not altogether clear, in that case, what pigeon-hole to place the ignorance in. Some will, no doubt, feel the urge to argue that it is not linguistically relevant. The pattern for such an argument might be this: invoke the sense-reference distinction and couple it (although this would not have made Frege very happy), with Mill's doctrine of proper names. According to that doctrine (translated into Fregese), proper names do not have sense. So when someone says 'I'm studying Plato' (or 'I'M STUDYING PLATO'), and it is not clear to you whether she is trying to grasp the theory of recollection or the theory of programmed learning, that does not mean you have failed to get the sense of what she is saying: you have got all the sense there is to get if you know the rest of her words and, perhaps, the minimal fact that 'Plato' (or 'PLATO') is a proper name. This seems to me one of the many places where the sense-reference distinction and its alliance with Mill's theory of proper names lead us astray. It seems to me clear that there is something about the sense of what she said that we are not getting, and somethin£ associated with the proper name in it. 28 But I am not able to layout a proper account of the matter, at least not here. So I shall simply assert that (4) and (5) require for their understanding, for grasping their sense, some fairly substantial covering noun or covering noun-phrase, and admit that I do not know whether the 'explication' (I shudder at the word) of making sense belongs to the science of semantics, that of pragmatics, or necromancy.

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If this is correct, Aristotle is at least partly right: the demand for an informative covering noun or phrase is his demand for an answer to the question 'what is Socrates?' to complete the sense of 'Socrates is'. It is no accident that this is close to some of the things that have recently been said 29 in connection with identity by way of reviving Aristotle's essentialism. But as things are, an argument may suggest itself that would undermine any further steps in beating Aristotle's views into Anglo-Saxon shape. For it may seem that, whatever the facts about Greek (which is, after all, a dead language and perhaps should be allowed to rest in peace), we do in English have a special sense for 'is' that is plainly existential. Consider the 'is' in

(6)

There is such a person as Plato,

(again, embedded in a conversational context that gives it naturalness), or, better, the 'was' in 'there really was such a man as Prester John'. These verbs can be replaced by 'exists' and 'existed', respectively. But the 'is' in 'Plato is a person (who lives in Athens ... )' and the 'was' ·in 'Prester John was a man (who ... )' cannot be so replaced. So the 'is' in (6) is existential. I take it no one really falls for such replacement-arguments without further support. But, in the absence of any alternative account of the 'is' in (6), this one may cause consternation. So I shall say something about how an alternative account might go, without pretending to completeness or even correctness. I think we can see enough to tell that these are the right lines. 30 Consider the following sentences: (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)

There arose a furious clamor. There ensued a riot. There followed the entire retinue. There fought by his side the bravest of the Romans. There resulted the worst disaster he remembered. Outside her window there sang a popular singer. There sat next to me the saddest man in the world.

We do not need a special existential sense of 'arise', 'ensue', 'follow', 'fight', 'result', 'sing', or 'sit' to explain how we can have such sentences alongside their counterparts with the verb in the 'predicative' position. The latter are sentences such as

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

( 7') (10') (13' )

A furious clamor arose. The bravest of the Romans fought by this side. The saddest man in the world sat next to me.

And what we require is (to put it in a way that was fashionable in linguistics last week or the week before) a transformation that will get us from such sentences (or the structures that underly them) as (7') - (13') to (7) - (13). The transformation would be labeled 'THERE-insertion' and would look a little like this: (T)

X - NP! - V (NP2) y X - there - V (such NP 2 as) Y NP!.

At least, this would generate (7) - (13) from (7') - 13'). And, just among others, it would generate 'There is such a man as Plato' from 'Plato is a man'. I said I would not pretend to correctness. And (T) is, accordingly, not correct. It would generate some things we - or at least I - do not want. E.g., starting from (14')

These books weigh a lot

We could use (T) to derive *(14)

There weigh a lot these books.

And it is not clear where the stuff represented by 'X' in (T) should go: for the move from (13') to (13), (T) seems all right as it stands ('next to me' is carried along with the verb), but with (15')

Mice are in the bathtub

(T) would generate *(15)

There are in the bathtub mice

where what we (at any rate, I) really want is (15)

There are mice in the bathtub.

So the rule requires a lot of tinkering with. The point is that, blemished as it is, this is the right sort of thing: we do not want to rewrite the dictionary to take account of all these newly discovered existential senses of all these verbs. But if this is the right 30rt of thing, 'is' becomes just one verb among others subject to the transformation, and bears no special sense when it follows 'there' as in (5) or (6):

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

63

it is simply the same verb as in 'Plato is a man' with the surrounding sentence reprocessed. 31 So we are left with 'simple sentences': subject-predicate sentences. These frequently employ 'is'. But this word is, after all, quite meaningless: it is merely a syntactic device for connecting subjects and predicates where the predicates are not already verb phrases, just as the word 'thing' is a device for turning adjectival phrases and others (e.g. 'of the mind') into noun phrases (e.g., 'things of the mind'), and just as 'to' is merely a device for turning verbs into infinitives (e.g., 'to walk', 'to be or not to be,).32 So Heidegger is right: But being remains unfindable, almost like nothing, or in the end entirely like that: The word 'being' is finally, then, only an empty word. It means nothing actual, tangible, real. Its meaning is an unactual vapor. 33

But for Heidegger, this represents a lamentable loss: apparently, for the Greeks before Plato, Erven was chockful to bursting with meariing. And about that, Heidegger is wrong. But fifty percent is not bad. So far all we have done is to show that the part of Aristotle's theory that seems at first provincial to Greek may, in fact, have something corresponding to it in English. But, of course, that is not all there is to the theory. For one thing, there is also its essentialism. This is not, on the fact of it, a linguistic matter: the doctrine of essentialism is as plausible or implausible in English, I take it, as it is in Greek. But it scmetimes sounds as if the doctrine might not be plausible in Chinese,34 or Nootka,35 or Rortyspeak .36 Here I am going to leave these languages, along with others of which I am innocent, on one side. But there is one thing about Aristotle's employment of his essentialism that must be mentioned, that is closely connected with the presence or absence of different senses of 'is' in English or in Greek. To get at this, first consider another distinction that some have alleged to be pertinent to English and Greek being: that between identity and predication. 37 There is certainly a distinction here: it is between claims like (16)

Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde.

on the one hand, and claims like (17)

Dr. Jekyll is schizoid

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

or (18)

Dr. Jekyll is an addict

on the other.(16) states an identity; (17) and (18), I think,38 do not, and I shall characterize both as predications. Philosophers are, notoriously, myopic, and when they apply their magnifying glasses to sentences that do different things, they usually can only manage to bring into focus a single word. 39 Here the word is 'is'. They profess to spot the 'is' of identity in (16) and the 'is' of predication in (17), and then fall to arguing over the character of the 'is' in (18). I shall call this habit of supposing that every difference in character from one sentence to the next must be locatable in single ambiguous words the 'fallacy of the magnifying glass'. We do not need to pull the word 'is' out of those sentences and go into Angst over the meaning of being. The situation is completely described by saying that 'is' is followed in (16) by a singular definite noun phrase, in (17) by an adjective, and in (18) by an indefinite noun phrase. Sentences that show the structure of (16) state identities; the others are predications. But this has nothing to do with the occurence of 'is' in different colors: it is what comes next that counts. 40 Aristotle does not commit the fallacy of the magnifying glass in connection with 'dvOIL', identity, and predication. 41 But he is prone to the fallacy; conceivably he is its inventor; probably42 he is its most influential perpetrator. And if he falls into it anywhere, he falls into it with 'is'. He thinks that the fact that 'man' and 'pale' relate differently to Socrates makes for a different 'is' in (3)

Socrates is a man

from the one in (2)

Socrates is pale,

the former is an 'is' xed)' CXUTO, a by-virtue-of itself 'is'; the latter is an 'is' XCXTO: avp.(3f(31]XOS, an accidential 'is' (see, e.g., Met. d 7. 1017a 7 - 8, and below, Section 4). Unless there is more to it, this is just as much a case of the fallacy of the magnifying glass as the idea that 'is' varies in sense from identities to predications. Perhaps it is a natural mistake. That Socrates is a man is essential to him; .that he is pale is accidental to him. These are different relationships. They are both covered by the word 'is'. So it is natural to talk as if there

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

65

were two varieties of 'is'. In the sequel, I shall occasionally go along with Aristotle's talking that way. But I do it under protest. If this way of talking is not to be explained away merely as a way of talking, but is to be taken as marking a genuine distinction in senses of 'is', or concepts of being, or whatever, it is a case of the fallacy of the magnifying glass. It would be a great relief to get Aristotle off this particular hook. I do not at present know how to do it. Rephrased in these terms, and still leaving 'that pale thing is a man' out of account, the theory of Section 1 becomes this. The 'is' of (3) is a by-virtue-of itself 'is', and permits cancellation of the predicate. The 'is' of the residue, 'Socrates is', is then a by-virtue-of itself 'is', and also an 'is' &'1I'~Ws, 'is#', since it no longer has an attached predicate. But these are two different characterizations: roughly, the latter is syntactic and the former semantic. To go one step farther along the road to perdition, we might say: the existential 'is' is, paradigmatically (see Section 4), a by-virtue-of itself 'is', but the by-virtue-of itself 'is' is, in the first instance, a predicative 'is', and only becomes existential by cancellation of the predicate. 3. DE INTERPRETA TIONE II. 21" 25-28.

In the final lines (21 a 18 - 34) of De into 11, Aristotle is investigating the rule opposite to the one just dealt with: before he was investigating when things predicated on their own could also be predicated together. but in these lines he is investigating when things predicated together can also be predicated separately.

So Ammonius (in De into 210. 17 - 20)43 rightly says. Aristotle has just been pointing out, for example, that the argumentative rule we might call 'Addition': (A)

S is Adj. & S is NP

-+

S is Adj. NP

does not always work: from 'Socrates is good', where we have "simply 'good' " or 'good #' (b1l'~ws ayat'Jos, 21 a15) and 'Socrates is a cobbler', you cannot use (A) to get 'Socrates is a good cobbler' (20 b 35 - 36).44 Now he notes that the rule we have been calling 'Simplification' also needs restricting. He is very brief about this: he mentions all three of the exceptions we listed in Section 1 above, namely things that are not (see 21 a 32 - 33), dead men (see 21 a 23), and inferences to existence based on the wrong predicate, and it is not easy to see what he is trying to say about them. I have excused myself from dealing with the first two here. What he has to say about the third is this. 21 a 18 -21 tell us:

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

It is true to speak of the particular [more literally, 'of the something'] simply as well, for example, [to say that] the particular man [is a] man, or the particular pale man [is] pale, but not always ... (ah'1t?~~ 0' fUTiv fl1f'fiv xCiTa TOU TtVO~ xCii (X1f'hW~, olov TOV Ttva avt?eW1f'OV avt?eW1f'OV ij TOV Ttva hfUXOV avt?eW1f'OV hfUXCIV' oux afi Of. ... ).

It is not clear what the first of these examples is telling us we are permitted to do,45 but the second is plainly allowing us the inference labeled '(P)' in Section 1 above. 46 Aristotle then points out that simplification will not work with 'dead man': in cases of this kind, where there is a contradiction between the two terms antecedent to the simplification, the rule never works. (There is a puzzle here: apparently Aristotle·thinks 'this is a dead man' can be true, although 'dead man' involves a sort of contradiction.) But in other cases, sometimes it works and sometimes it does not; for example, Homer is something, e.g., a poet; well, is he, therefore, or not? For 'is' is predicated accidentally of Homer; for because he is a poet, not by-virtue-of itself, 'is' is predicated of Homer. (21 a 25 - 28: wune ·OJL'1eO~ fUT! Tt, oiov 1f'OI'1rT,~' &e' oOV XCi! EUTlV, ij ou; xCiTa UUJL(jf(j'1XO~ ,),ae XCiT7J')'OefiTCiI TO EUTIV TOU 'OJL~eOU' OTt ,),ae 1f'OI'1rT,~ iUTlV, aM' OU XCit?' CiUTO, XClT7J,),oefiTClI xCiTa TOU 'OJL~eOU TO EUTlV.)

The traditional way of taking these lines is as saying that it does not follow from (19)

Homer is a poet

that (20

Homer is.

And along with this, often the denial that 'is' by-virtue-of itself applies to Homer is understood to be the denial that the existential 'is' applies to Homer (and then Aristotle must have had advanced views about the 'Homeric question'). In my view, neither of these things is correct. That is, to be as explicit as possible: Aristotle is not denying that (20) follows from (19), and "'is' by-virtue-of itself" is not the 'is' of existence. 47 I take up these points in reverse order. Both bring in the theory of Section 1. The latter is a simple application of it. The theory of Section 1 tells us that the 'is' of 'Homer is a man' is a }(cxf)' CXUTO 'is', a by-virtue-of itself 'is', yielding 'Homer is #', and that this is the existential claim, 'Homer exists'. And the theory tells us that the 'is' of (19) is a }(CXTa (JUP.{3f{3.,.,}(O~ 'is', an accidental 'is', and so simplification may not be performed on (19). That is what Aristotle is here telling us. Since he is giving as a reason for prohibiting simplifica-

ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

67

tion the claim that 'is' is not here used xat'}' aUTO, he cannot mean by this claim that 'is' is not here used existentially. That, after all, is the question. He is simply saying: since (19) is not an essential predication, and its 'is' is therefore not xat'}' aUTO, the predicate may not be canceled by simplification to yield 'is' a7rhWS, the "existential 'is'''. This way of putting it yields considerable ground to the fallacy of the magnifying glass, but it certainly shortens the work. So much for the second point: simplification cannot be applied to (19) because its 'is' does not apply to Homer xat'}' aUTO. But then the first point is clear: Aristotle is not saying that (20) does not follow from (19), but that it does not follow by simplification. He puts forth the question: "Homer is ... a poet; well, is he, therefore, or not?" In its context it is not hard to read this, not as asking "does it follow, by some devious means or other, that Homer is?", but "does the move we are talking about apply here?" This may, at first sight, seem unnecessary. But there are two good reasons why we should not take Aristotle to be saying that it does not follow from 'Homer is a poet' that 'Homer is'. The first is that we know from elsewhere that, when it comes to the question whether (20) follows from (19), he should say that it does. This is a point he considers in Categories 10, and quite unambiguously decides: when there is no Socrates, 'Socrates is healthy', 'Socrates is sick', 'Socrates is blind', etc., are false, and their negations true. The apparent conflict of that passage with De into 11 is a notorious cruX. 48 In my view, there is no conflict. The second reason for avoiding making Aristotle deny the entailment is that there is a very simple argument in favor of it, based in part on the De into passage itself. Homer is a poet. But poets are, after all, human; so they are men. So Homer is a man. But there the 'is' is a xat'}' aUTO 'is', and we can simplify. So Homer is. This argument is, admittedly, phrased in terms of my interpretation of the passage. But there is very little about it that is speci fie to that interpretation. On virtually any understanding of the passage, the inference has to fail because the 'is' of (19) is not xm'}' aUTO applied to Homer, where the 'is' in 'Homer is a man' is applied to him xat'}' aUTO. So all we need is the concession that poets are men, and we are away. It is extremely difficult to see how tha! could be denied. (It may be worth noting that it would not help to say: well, for all (19) has to say, Homer might have been a god. Then we would have another alternative, all right, but it would get us to the unwanted conclusion just as easily.)

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4. METAPHYSICS 67. 1017" 7 - 30

Here, especially, more needs to be said than I shall say. This chapter gives us four main headings 49 under which to rank 'that which is', 'to be', or 'is' (TO DV 1017 a6, bl,TO flvw a24, 31, 35, TO i!anv a31). About the latter two, the 'is' that signifies that something is true e31 - 35) and 'to be' signifying actually or potentially being (a35 - b9), our theory has nothing special to say. But the first two are accidental being and by-virtue-of itself being, and that is what our theory is about. But even here it will not explain everything. In particular, it will not explain, unaided, the most controversial of Aristotle's claims under these headings: the claim that 'to be' in the second of these ways of conceiving it shows variation from one category to the next. So, although I shall say a little to indicate how that claim might be dealt with, I shall not provide a full defence. It may seem that the sights have been lowered so far that we are in danger of shooting our toes off, but there are still difficulties to be met. Aristotle begins by stating that 'is' comes in an accidental variety and a by-virtue-of itself variety (a7 - 8), and promptly gives examples of the former 10):

e8 -

e.g., we say the just is cultivated, the man [is] cultivated, and the cultivated [is a] man. We may write: (21) (22) (23)

The just [one] is [a] cultivated [one]. The man is [a] cultivated [one]. The cultivated [one] is [a] man.

The English is pretty awful. The bracketed material has nothing to correspond to it in the Greek: it serves to remind us that, where in English the adjective 'cultivated' occurring as predicate is easily identified as a predicate because it is an unsupplemented adjective, in Greek the predicate adjective '/lovau(os' needs no supplementation in order to be treated as a noun phrase. These examples are to be construed as making reference to particular people in each case, the fellow holding up that lamppost over there, say: Aristotle is not talking about a maxim he and his friends like to utter to the effect that the just man is a cultivated man.

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ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

He adds another example which, he says, is similar (24)

nO - 11):

The cultivated [one] builds houses.

(Here 'builds houses' is a single verb, 'oixooop.f:iv'.) Notice that it is relevantly dissimilar to the preceding cases: it contains no 'is', and what we are talking about is accidental 'is'. Aristotle knows this, and promptly explains that (24) is so because it-is-accidental to the housebuilder to be cultivated, or to the cultivated [one to be al housebuilder (all - 12: OT! (Jup./3i/3rl'lt T~ oixooop..yJ P.OU(JLX~ dvOIL ij T~ P.OU(JLX~ oixooop.",,).

This imports the needed 'to be'. Aristotle is plainly not saying that (24) shows accidental 'to be', but its parapnrase, which he seems to think is more fundamental, does. So even (24) rests for its truth on accidental being. Aristotle's comment on (24) leads him to state the truth conditions for his examples: the general form for aJl, including the paraphrase for (24) (but not (24) itself) is "that this is this signifies that this is-accidental to this" (al3 - 14: TO -rae TOOf: dvcn TOOf: aT/p.CtLVH TO aup.{3f:{3T/XEvcn Tct>O(; TOOI':). More particularly, in cases like (21), both terms, 'just' and 'cultivated', are-accidental to the same thing e16) - namely, it appears, to the existent thing designated by the subject term; and in cases like (23), the subject term is-accidental to the predicate term (al7 - 18). These are paraphrases of sentences employing 'is' in predicative position. They do not themselves employ 'is' in that role, but in one of them, the paraphrase for (22), 'is' does occur. When Aristotle :.ummarizes in a19 - 22, it becomes clear that this occurrence is important: Well then, things said to be accidentally are so said either because both belong to the same [thing that) is, or because that [i.e., the predicate-term)so belongs to [a thing that) is, or because that, to which that of which it is predicated belongs, is.

These are occurrences of 'is # ': the claims are existential claims, and they are taken to justify the occurrence of 'is' in the predications (21) - (23). He is assuming stating (21) commits one to the existence of something both just and cultivated. And presumably he thinks that this requires the existence of, say a man who is both just and cultivated. 51 In a 18 - 19 he had made an incidental comment that pointed that same way: just as (23) is aJlowed because the cultivated belongs to the man, so also the not pale is said to be, because that to which it is-accidental is (OUTW Of 'Af-yf701L xed TO p.~ 'Awxov dvOlL, OT!

c;,

(JuP./3i/31/XfV, iXE;VO E(JT!V).

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

So (25)

The not pale [thing] is #

is, marginally or parenthetically, acceptable. There are two possible derivations for its 'is # '. One may be suggested by the comment just quoted, viz.: (3) (I)

Socrates is a man. Socrates is # .

(I) is to follow from (3) in the prescribed way. Assume that it is Thursday night, after Socrates' appointment at the tanning parlor, and (26)

Socrates is [a] not pale [thing].

The using this and something like Leibniz' Law, we might get (25) from (I). If we did, the 'is # ' of (25) would be that of (I), and so, ultimately, that of (3), and so, again, a )Cod)' cxilTo 'is'. But the immediately preceding context suggests an alternative. The parenthetical comment of al8 - 19 is attached to a statement of the truthconditions for (23), 'The cultivated one is a man': this is so because the cultivated is accidental to the man, and so, Aristotle adds, even the not pale is said to be. That sounds as if Aristotle had the following derivation in mind. Start, as before, with (3), and assume (26); this yields (27)

The not pale thing is a man.

Then cancel the predicate, yielding (25). If we do it this way, the 'is #' of (25) is that of (27), and we have a case of 'is #' which Aristotle would describe as also an accidental 'is'. That was ruled out only on the theory under the restriction provided by An. post. A 22. 83 a l - 23, that made 'that pale thing is a man', and presumably (27) along with it, not a case of predication. But there was nothing intrinsic to the theory that brought this restriction on. We could not allow simplification to operate on (2)

Socrates is [a] pale [thing],

because, once context-free, its predicate would not be restorable: the answer to the question 'what is Socrates?' would lead to the completion 'a man'. But if we now count (27), et al., as accidental predications, we have cases in which the restoration would work as well as it ever does: the question 'what is the pale thing?' would be answered by 'a man'. (Of

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ARISTOTLE AND EXISTENCE

course, to answer the question, you have to know what is being referred to, but that is just as much true of 'what is Socrates?' as of 'what is the pale thing?'.) The effect of this understanding of the passage, to which I am inclined, is to pry apart the 'existential "is" , and the xm'}' aUTO 'is' even farther: the 'is' of (25) is the former but not the latter. Still, it would remain so that the 'is' of (25) is dependent for its presence on a xat'}' aUTO 'is': that of (3). So the general message so far is that standing behind every accidental 'is' there is a by-virtue-of itself 'is'. What, then, about this latter 'is'? Aristotle has this to say (1017 a 22 - 27): As many things are said to be by-virtue-of themselves as the figures of predication signify, for in as many ways as [they) are said, in so many ways 'to be' signifies. So, since of things predicated, some signify what [itl is, some what-[it)-is-like, some how-big, some relative-to what, some to do or to undergo, some where, some when, 'to be' signifies the same things as each of these. (xali' aUTa Of dVaL hf-YfTat ouang Uf/p.aLVft Ta C1X~p.aTa rij5 xarrnogLa5' OUC
-yag

hi-YfTat,

TouaUTaXW5

TO

dvat

Uf/P.C.LVft.

inL

ouv

TWV

xCtrnogoUp.fVWV Ta p.fv TL lUTt CTf/P.OtLVft, Ta Of 71'OtOV, Ta Of 71'OUOV, Ta Of 71'g05 Tt, Ta 71'Otfiv ?raUXftv, Ta Of ?rov, Ta Of 71'OTf, IxauTVJ TOVTWV TO dVaL TauTo CTf/P.c
n

Of

About the only thing that is agreed on heie 52 is that Aristotle thinks that 'is' varies somehow from one category to the next. Our theory tells us that the 'is' he has in view is that occurring in essential predications, 53 the paradigmatic source for occurrences of 'is #'. So whatever variation there is will show up in existence-claims as well. But what essential predications are at stake? The passage recalls another, Top. A 9. There Aristotle lists his categories, naming the first one 'what [it] is', as here, and then says (103 b 27 - 39): It is clear from them S4 that one who signifies what [it) is sometimes signifies [a) substance sometimes [a) how-big, sometimes [a) what-like, sometimes one of the categories [xaTfl-yogLwV). For when, with a man set out, one says that what is set out is a man or an animal, he says what [it) is and signifies a substance; when, with a pale color set out, he says that what is set out is pale or a color, he says what it is and signifies [a) whatlike. And, similarly, if, with a magnitude of a cubit set out, he says that what is set out is a magnitude of a cubit, he says what it is and signifies [a) how-big. And similarly in the other [cases): each such [term), both if it is said about itself [lav Tf aUTO neL aUToii) and if its genus is said of it, signifies what [it) is, but whenever [it is said) about another [thing). it signifies, not what [it) is, but how-big or what-like or one of the other categories.

[ouuLav),

Here Aristotle unhesitatingly moves from the point that "all premisses signify either what [it] is or how-big or what-like or one of the other categories" (b25 - 27), where the sentences under consideration are ones like our old friends (3) and (2) and

(1I'QoTauHs) . ..

(28)

Socrates is a cubit tall

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RUSSELL M. DANCY

to sentences like (3) and (29) (30

This [color] is off-white This [viz., off-white] is a color

and (31)

This [height] is a cubit.

The sentences on this latter list are answers to 'what is it?' questions; those on the former list are answers to various question, 55 one of which is 'what is it?' (asked of the entities that Aristotle will call 'substances,).56 In the 'what is it?' list, the question is cut free from the first category, that of substances, and ranges over the entities that are signified in sentences on the variable list. (3), 'Socrates is a man', occurs on both lists. 57 It shows an 'is' by-virtue-of itself, as we have been saying. So do the other sentences on the 'what is it?' list. Here Aristotle describes those sentences by saying that in each something is either "said about itself" or "its genus is said of it"; the former terminology is familiar from An. post. A 22.83 a24ff,58 and is, for present purposes, merely a variation on the 'by-virtue-of itself' terminology. The transition in Top. A 9 from the variable list to the 'what is it?' list is fairly abrupt, but not as abrupt as that in Met . .:1 7, for Aristotle does not there even bother to give examples. 59 He merely sketches the variable list ("of things predicated, some signify what [it] is, some what-like, ... " 1017a24 - 27) and says that 'to be' will have a single force (to use as neutral a word as I can think of) for each entry on the list (a27). But he is discussing 'to be' }lod}' so it looks (at least to me)60 as if he is making the same transition. He follows it with a comment that has caused consternation 61 e27-30):

auro,

for there is no difference between 'a man is flourishing' and 'a man flourishes', or between 'a man is walking' or 'cutting' and 'a man walks' or 'cuts', and similarly in the other cases (OVt'JfP "yare Ola",eeEl TO apt?eW1rO~ U"y1a[pwp fUTIP ij TO apt?eW1rO~ U"y1a[PEI, OV& TO apt?eW1rO~ l3aOllwP lUTIP ij Tep.pwp Toii apt?eW1rO~ l3aOlIEl ij Tep.PfI" bp.o[w~ Of xal f1rl TWP aAAwp).

On any reading, this is going to be elliptical. The most natural one seems to me this: just as, at 1017 a lO-12, he had introduced an example (sentence (24), "the cultivated one builds houses") that did not employ 'is', and tried to show that it rested on an occurrence of 'is' anyway, so here he notices that on his list of categories there are two at least that are easily invoked in predications without using 'is': to do and to undergo;

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and others are easily imaginable, even if the category-name does not, as it does in these cases, make it obvious. 62 So he points out that here, too, there is an 'is' in the offing: where you have a sentence containing a verb other than 'to be', it may be replaced by a periphrastic verb phrase containing 'to be'. 63 The examples employ 'is' accidentally, but this would not have bothered Aristotle, for the 'figures of predication' apply in the first instance to the sentences on what we were just calling the 'variable' list, where all the occurrences of 'is' but the first are accidental anyway.64 I have passed by the important and difficult question of why Aristotle thinks that the 'is's of (3), (30), and (31) must all be different while those of (29) and (30) (e.g.) are the same. I have, in fact, very little to say here. Btlt there is, I think, a little more to it than one might think from what has so far been said. For, at this point, one might be tempted merely to re-invoke the fallacy of the magnifying glass: Aristotle is, one might think, merely transferring a distinction that properly pertains to the predicate to the 'is' that precedes (in English). 6S But, in fact, Aristotle has an argument available, and, ~lthough a full examination is beyond the scope of this paper, I should at least like to state it, and then stop. First, recall that our theory dictates that differences in the force of essential 'is' carry with them differences in the force of existential 'is'. This is to some extent usable as a two-way street: differences in the force of 'is #' should show differences in the force of by-virtue-of itself 'is', if the latter simply is the former with predicate uncanceled. 66 Notoriously, Aristotle denies that there is a genus of beings, that is, a genus labeled 'that which is' (An. post. B 7. 92b I3-14). Less notoriously, he provides an argument for that claim, in Met. B 3. 998 b 22-28 (see also Top. ~ 1. 121 a 14-19 for a related, but different, argument): 67 a genus, he says, cannot be predicated of something unless one of its species is predicated of that thing, and no species can be predicated of its own differentia; so, if beings formed a genus, its differentiae could not be beings, that is, they would not exist, which is absurd. I do not at present see how to make anything convincing out of this. But, as they say, tomorrow is another day.

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NOTES I G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century (Studia graeca ct latina gothoburgensia, XI, Giitenborg, 1960), pp. 163-90. The quotations are from p. 165. 2 Particularly W. Jacobs, 'Aristotle on Nonreferring Subjects', Phronesis 24 (1979), 282 - 300. On pp. 297 - 98 (Note 6) Jacobs is critical of my note on De into II . 21 "25 - 27, Appendix II to Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975), pp. 153 - 55. Others have found that appendix obscure, but it was only Jacobs's note that made me aware how grossly I might be misunderstood. The present effort (see Section 3 below) mayor may not help. 1 Especially in 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965), pp. 69 - 95. 4 The present paper is part of a larger project; I hope in carrying that out to remove some of the more outrageous demands on the reader's credibility that the present paper presents. S There are different verbs for 'to be' in the Greek of the period: for example, 'iJ1ro,QXfLv' is sometimes used in Aristotle where we might expect 'dvcn' and translate 'to exist' (see Bz. indo 788 b43ff). But it is also used occasionally as a copula (see ibid.). It could not be used to 'disambiguate' 'dvO/l' if there were any ambiguity to disambiguate (see below). 6 E.g., F. H. Fobes, Philosophical Greek: An Introduction (University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 51 Note I. Of course, this is not simply an artefact of introductory texts: it will also be found in, for example, R. Kuhner and F. Blass, Ausfiihrliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Ier Teil (Hahn, Hannover, 1966) [reprint of ed. 3, 1890), Vol. I, p. 344, § 90.2. 7 See here C. H. Kahn, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973), Appendix II, 'On the Accent of lUTi and Its Position in the Sentence', pp. 420 - 34, esp. pp. 422-24. 8 For Greek examples (a great many) see Kahn, The Verb 'Be', Ch. VI. 9 E.g., N. Fleming and N. Wolterstorff, 'On "There is" " Philosophical Studies (U.S.) 11 (1960), 41 - 48; G. Vision, 'Existentials and Existents', Theoria47 (1981), 1- 30; Y. Ziv, 'Another Look at Definites in Existentials', Journal of Linguistics 18 (1982), 73 - 88. 10 G. Vlastos, 'Degrees of Reality in Plato', in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965), pp. 1 - 20, reprinted in Vlastos's Platonic Studies (Princeton University Press, 1973, 1981). My disagreement with this article should not mask the fact that I am greatly indebted to it. II Here I pass by an interpretative possibility given a fair run for its money by J. Gosling,' Republic, Book V: Ta lI'o~a xcx}..o" etc.' , Phronesis 5 (1960), 116 -128. See also F. C. White, 'J. Gosling on Ta 1/'o~a xcx}..o,', Phronesis 23 (1978), 127 - 32, 'The "Many" in Republic 475a - 480', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1979), 291 - 306, and Gosling's 'Reply to White', idem 307 - 14. I am not convinced by Gosling, but I think the issue has little bearing here. 12 The treatment of what might as well be a static situation (Helen's being simultaneously beautiful and not beautiful) as if it involved change (Helen's vacillating between one and the other) is characteristic: see Aristotle, Met. A 6. 987"32 - bIO, etc., and T . Irwin, 'Plato's Heracleiteanism', Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1977), 1- 13 . " For a review of the evidence with a rather different conclusion, see C. Kirwan, 'Plato and Relativity', Phronesis 19 (1974),112 - 29. I seem to be adopting what Kirwan calls the

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'relativist interpretation' of R. 479, and, worse, I am going to reject the one thing that he says "is surely right in this interpretation, that it does not attribute to Plato any doctrine about existence": see below. As for the 'relativist interpretation' in general, I cannot follow Kirwan's emphasis on the formulation of the conclusion in 479b6 -7: there it is said that big things are no more big than small, and Kirwan wants to say that that does not mean they are both big and small. But they are picked out as big things, so they are at least that, and if they are no more big than small, it follows from that that they are small. I am not sure how much of an issue there is between us here. I certainly do not want to say that Plato at the time of writing the Republic was aware that 'big', 'beautiful' and other relational predicates were somehow special, and that is one of Kirwan's primary targets. 14 It is here especially that I am in agreement with Vlastos (see Note 10 above). The disagreement comes when I say, below, that the concept of being that operates in this argument just is Plato's concept of existence. Here I am siding with Owen, 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', p. 71. Owen partially retracts this in 'Plato on Not-Being', in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection oj Critical Essays, Vol. I (Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, N.!Y., 1970), pp. 223 - 67 and 265 - 67, but his retraction concerns only the Sophist, as far as I can tell, and I am saying as little as I can about that dialogue here (see the next paragraph). 15 On the Sophist's treatment of 'is' see M. Frede, Priidikation und Existenzaussage: Platons Gebrauch von " .. .ist . .. " und" . .. ist nicht . .. " im Sophistes (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, G6ttingen, 1967). Particularly relevant to my theme above is Chapter II, pp. 37ff. 16 W. KamIah, Platons Selbstkritik im Sophistes (C. H. Beck, Munich, 1963 [= Zetemata 33)) has much to say that is relevant here (see esp. Chapters V & VI), but he does not seem to see in Sph. 256e5 - 6 the flat rejection of R. v 476 - 80 that I do. 17 I ignore here complications that have come to light in recent discussions of adjectives (see, e.g., M. Platts, Ways oj Meaning [Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979) pp. 16lff on 'Adjectival Constructions' and the literature there cited, esp. 1. A. W. Kamp, 'Two Theories about Adjectives', in E. L. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics oj Natural Language [Cambridge University Press, 1975) pp. 123 - 55). I am, for purposes of expositiOl" adopting the simple-minded view that 'pale man' is merely a concatenation of 'pale' and 'man': that, in Montague's terminology, 'pale' denotes an intersection function (see 'English as a Formal Language', in Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers oj Richard Montague, ed. by R. H. Thomason [Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1974), pp. 188 - 221, at p. 211). Roughly: the pale men are the pale things that also happen to be men. This, of course, is false: what counts as a pale man varies with race, location, time of year, and so on. (So far, then, 'pale' might be an attributive adjective in the terminology of the next paragraph. In one of Kamp's two theories about adjectives, all adjectives are: see his The Verb 'Be'). It is this that I am ignoring, and it does not i!ffect the point at issue. 18 P. Geach, 'Good and Evil', Analysis 17 (1956),33-42 (reprinted in P. Foot (ed.), Theories oj Ethics [Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 64 - 73 ab init. 19 See Geach, 'Good and Evil'. Kamp (The Verb 'Be', p. 125) calls them 'privative adjectives' . 20 One of the faults of Ross's generally reliable (Oxford) translation of the Metaphysics is the astonishing variety of renderings it shows for the crucial phrase 'xed}' aUTo': 'in virtue of itself' (0 18), 'propter se' (Z 4), 'in itself' (Z 3. 1029"20), 'of itself' ("24), 'in virtue of its nature' (Z 5. 1030b 19 - 20), 'self-subsistent' (Z 6. 1031"28fl), and, no doubt, other things as well. 21 There is a great deal more to be said here. See A. Code, 'Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic', Journal oj Philosophical Logic 5 (1976), 159-86; F. 1.

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Pelletier, 'Sameness and Referential Opacity in Aristotle', Nous 13 (1979), 283 - 311, and my 'On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances', Philosophical Review 84 (1975), 338 - 73 (esp. 340 - 42, 365 - 68) and 'On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts about Substances: Matter', Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 372 - 413. Frank Lewis finds all of us objectionable in 'Accidental Sameness in Aristotle', Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), I - 36. 22 'Defines' should be taken with a grain of salt here, for in A 18. 10228 27 - 28 Aristotle 'defines' the phrase 'by virtue of itself by means of 'essence'. The point is that the two go together, and there is no understanding the one without the other. 23 For a review of the literature, and an interpretation of the Phrase with which (I think) I do not agree, see J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951, edition 2, 1%3), pp. 180ff. 24The Greek have the imperfect, 'was'. The explanation for this is not of importance in the present context, but the one 1 opt for is one rejected by Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924) 1 127: the imperfect is the 'philosophicM imperfect'. This occurs in English as well: 1 get you to agree to'S is P', we continue talking, and 1 later want to remind you of that, so 1 say'S was P' wasn't it?'. Here it could be that'S was P' was 'Two and two made four': there is no real implication of past ness about the tense. Often, in Plato, the 'philosophical imperfect' is employed in appealing to a previously stated definition. Ross (ibid.) objects that it "is used only when there has been an actual previous discussion of the subject in hand, which is the case in but few of the passages in which TO Tt 1}v flvm is used". But that is Aristotle for you: his (and the Academy's in general) technical terminology is arrived at by detaching terms from their dialectical contexts. The original context would have been an explicit definition, appeal to which would be made by the phrase 'what it was for virtue to be', and then that just becomes a label for whatever it is that virtue is correctly defined to be. 2S Alternatively: "for [something) educated to be", 1 have, admittedly, picked the translation that most favors my overall interpretation. But it could be done either way (and, in fact, 1 arrived at it thinking in terms of the alternative translation). 26 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', p. 71. For further examples, see OED s. v. 'be', B 1 I (Vol. I, p. 717, col. 3). 27 This consideration plays a part in the literature cited in Note 9 above. 28 1 do not want to reject the sense-reference distinction, and yet·1 do not find myself quite comfortable with saying that proper names have sense. Among those who are comfortable with saying that are P. Geach (Mental Acts [Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957), pp. 66fO; M. Dummett (Frege: Philosophy of Language [Duckworth, London, 1973, 1981), index 2nd edition only) s. v. 'proper names, sense of); and D. Wiggins ('Frege's Problem of the Morning Star and the Evening Star', in M. Schirn (ed.), Studien zu Frege II: Logik und Sprachphilosophie [Frommann - Holzboog, Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 221 - 55). S. Kripke hedges here: see 'Naming and Necessity', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 253 - 355, at p. 322 (in the reprint, Naming and Necessity [Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 127). See also M. Lockwood, 'On Predicating Proper Names', Philosophical Review 84 (1975), 471 - 98, and J. Cargile, Paradoxes: A Study in Form and Predication (Cambridge University Press, 1979), Ch. 2, 'MiII's Theory of Names'. 29 P. Geach, 'Identity', Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967/68), 3 -12 (in Logic Matters [University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972), pp. 238 - 47) and 'Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity', in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology (New York University Press, 1973), pp. 287 - 302; D. Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Harvard University

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Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980; a revision of Identity and Spatio- Temporal Continuity [Blackwell, Oxford, 1967)); N. Griffin, Relative Identity (Oxford University Press, 1977), and B. A. Brody, Identity and Essence (Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. Ch. I. 30 The following sketch took its departure from S. Soames and D. M. Perlmutter, Syntactic Argumentation and the Structure of English (University of California Press, Berkeley, etc., 1979); see esp. pp. 46 - 52, some of the claims of which I shall implicitly be challenging. 31 See also C. J. Fiilmore, 'The Case for Case', in E. Bach and R. T. Harms (eds.), Universals in Linguistic Theory (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, etc., 1968), pp. 1-88, esp. pp. 44ff; J. Lyons, 'A Note on Possessive, Existential and Locative Sentences', Foundations of Language 3 (1967), 390 - 96; 'Existence, Location, Possession and Transitivity', in B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science III (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 495 - 504; Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 388 - 90; K. Allan, 'A Note on the Source of THERE in Existential Sentences', Foundations of Language 7 (1971), 1-18. Allan's rl·":ction of the attempt (made by Fillmore and Lyons) to treat 'there' as a locative is correct, I think, but the above is independent of this issue. 32 This is a Fregean view: see 'Begriff und Gegenstand', Vierteljahrsschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (1892), 192-205, at p. 94, where the copula is said to serve "als blosst'~ Formwort der Aussage" (in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of GOlllob Frege, ed. by P. Geach and M. Black [Blackwell, Oxford, 1960], p. 43 "as a mere verbal sign of predication"). The view is heartily endorsed by Geach: see Reference and Generality (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1962, 1968), p. 34, where Geach ascribes the view to Aristotle as well, on the strength of An.pr. A I. 24 b l7 - 18 (where, unfortunately, Ross would delete the words that make Geach's case: see Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics [Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949, 1957], 290 ff: the parallel, De into I. 16"16 - 18, which Ross cites, seems to me to make the case for the deletion quite strong). For Frege, see also M. Dummett, Frege, p. 214. Both Frege and Geach want to retain special senses of 'is': Frege, the 'is's of identity and existenc~ (Ioc. cit.), and Geach, that of existence as opposed to predication (see 'Assertion', Philosophical Review 74 (1965),449 - 65 [= Logic Mailers 254 - 69): on p. 460 (265) he rails against those who "two thousand years and more after Plato's Sophist, will wantonly confuse [the 'is' of predication) with the existential 'is' "). See here the references in Note 37 below. For Aristotle, see also H. Bonitz, 'Uber die Kategorien des Aristoteles', Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-his!. Klasse, 10 (1853), 591 - 645, p. 601 (available as a separate reprint with the original pagination, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1967). J3 "Aber das Sein bleibt unauffindbar, fast so wie das Nichts oder am Ende ganz so. Das Wort 'Sein' ist dann schliesslich nur ein leeres Wort. Es meint nichts Wirkliches, Greifbares, Reales. Seine Bedeutung is ein unwirklicher Dunst." Einfiihrung in die Metaphysi~ (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tiibingen, 1957), p. 27. In R. Manheim's English translation (which I have departed from in the above), An Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale, New Haven, 1959), the passage occurs at the bottom of p. 35. 14 Cf. Tsu-Lin Mei, 'Subject and Predicate: A Grammatical Preliminary', Philosophical Review 70 (1961), 153 -75. 35 Cf. B. L. Whorf, 'Languages and Logic', in Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. by J. B. Carroll (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 233-45. 36 Cf. R. Rorty, 'Genus as Matter: A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H', in E. N. Lee,

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A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (Humanities Press, New York, 1973), pp. 393 - 420, p. 403; also, Philosophy and the Mirror oj Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 120. 37 On what follows, see also Frede, Priidikation und Existenzaussage (Note 15 above); Lockwood, 'On Predicating Proper Names; (Note 28 above); B. Mates, 'Identity and Predication in Plato', this volume, pp. 29 - 47; J. Hintikka, 'Semantical Games, The Alleged Ambiguity of "is", and Aristotelian Categories', Synthese 54 (1983), 443 - 468, and 'The Varieties of Being in Aristotle', this volume, pp. 81 - 114. '" Others prefer to inflate (18) to 'there is some addict that Dr. Jekyll is the same as', call this an identity, and, as an alleged consequence, call (18) and identity. But these moves will turn any predication into an identity; there is nothing but confusion along these lines. 39 Cf. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962), pp. 87 - 102. 40 See also C. H. Kahn, The Verb 'Be', p. 400, Note 33 : " . .. She is his Wife illustrates the is of identity under conditions of monogamy, but not under polygamy. Surely the grammar of the sentence is the same in either case." This argument is picked up by C. J . F. Williams, What is Existence? (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981), pp. 10- 12. But Williams still wants a separate existential sense. 41 J . L. Ackrill, in Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 25, says " . . . Aristotle points out that 'is' does not always assert identity. It also ... serves to ascribe a characteristic to something." He is discussing Aristotle's refutation of Eleatic monism in Physics A 2 - 3, but I cannot find Aristotle pointing this out anywhere in these chapters. 42 There is a slight basis for hope: Aristotle does not, in fact, have any Greek that directly translates the English "has many senses" or "is ambiguous". He says such things as "is said in many ways", and perhaps he should be taken to be saying something weaker than "has many senses". Hintikka once tried this out in a different connection (see Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory oj Modality [Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19731, Ch . I, 'Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity'), but he appears not to want it in this connection (cf. ' "Is", Seman tical Games, and Seman tical Relativity', Journal oj Philosophical Logic 8 (1979), 433-68, at p. 450 top). See also T. Irwin, 'Homonymy in Aristotle', Review oj Metaphysics 34 (1980- 81), 523 - 44. 43 CAG IV 5. So also T . Waitz, Aristotelis Organon graece (Hahn, Leipzig, 1844) I 351, Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963), p. 148. 44 There is another question running through this passage, as to when two predicates of a single subject combine to form a special sort of unity: see, e.g ., 21"10 - 14, and Ackrill's comment, Aristotle's Cat. & De Int. 126f. 4S Perhaps: if this is a man , Socrates, then this is a man? See 21"2f, which makes this less outrageous, bllt still not plausible. 46 I am unable to see what Jacobs (' Aristotle on Nonreferring Subjects', p. 287) makes of these lines. He is at the very least denying the Interpretation Ammonius and I (and the others cited in Note 43 above) accept. He apparently believes that we are still discussing the rule of Addition . But he does not, as far as I can tell, explain these lines. 47 On both points I am in conflict with Owen: see 'Snares' 77, 82. 48 Cf. other attempts to resolve it: M. Thompson, 'Aristotle's Square of Opposition', Philosophical Review 62 (1953), 251 - 65 (reprinted in J . M. E. Moravcsik (ed .), Aristotle: A Collection oJCritical Essays [Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y ., 1967). pp. 51-72: see esp. pp . 56 - 57 of the reprint); M. V. Wedin, 'Aristotle on the Existential Import of Singular

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Sentences', Phronesis23 (1978), 179 - 96, Jacobs, 'Aristotle on Nonreferring Subjects'. My resolution is closest to Thompson's. 49 This is deliberately vague (cf. Note 42 above). In E 2, 1026'33 - b2, Aristotle refers to this four-fold scheme with the formula 'what is is said in many ways' (TO O~ .•. Af-YfTOI< 7rOAAaxw~). In Z I. 1028'10 - 20 he uses the same formula in characterizing the subdivision of Har')' aUTa DVTa by means of the categories. There is no indication, in Aristotle, or, as far as I know, any of his commentators to the effect that these divisions differ in status, and certainly none in any of his commentators to the effect that one of them divides the uses of 'is' and the other senses of 'is' - until we get to J. W. Thorp, 'Aristotle's Use of Categories', Phronesis 19 (1974), 238 - 56, who suddenly finds this distinction 'notorious' (p. 238). 50 Cf. the employment of '{XftVO' as something like a predicate .. ariable or predicate-letter in An. post. A 22. 83'24, 27. 51 Cf. F. Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Herder, Freiburg, 1862; Olms, Hildesheim, 1960), p. 16. (In the English translation by R. George, On the Several Senses oj Being in Aristotle [University of California Press, Berkeley, etc., 1975], pp. 10-11.) 52 Since Thorp's article (op. cit., Note 49 above), there is not even agreement on this: cf. his retranslation 011 p. 247. I cannot see how this translation is supposed to work. 5) So also Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I 306. 54 i~ aVTwv. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford) translates "on the face of it"; Forster (Loeb) takes it the same way, as does J. Brunschwig, Aristotle: Topiques I (Societe d'Edition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1967), p. J3 ("de par la nature meme des choses"). But see also S. Mansion, 'Notes sur la doctrine des categories dans les Topiques', in G. E. L. Owen (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968), pp. 189 - 201 (p. 198: "a partir de la"). 55 Cf. C. H. Kahn, 'Questions and Categories', in H. Hiz (ed.), Questions (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1978), p. 227. 56 So the question 'what is it?' will not by itself mark out the category of substance. Neither, for that matter, will the word 'substance': cf. 'the substance of everything relativeto something', Top. Z 8. 146b3, for example, and the official doctrine (applied primarily to 'what it is') of Met. Z 4. 1030'17 - 27, 27 - bJ3. 57 It is misleading to say, as does Waitz, Aristotelis Organon II 447 (and endorsed by Mansion, loc. cit.) that 'Tt iUT!' is used in one sense (sensus) in 103 b - 22 and another in b27: that would make 'Socrates is a man' ambiguous. 58 I have discussed this passage in Sense & Contradiction, pp. 100-102. 59 Except in '27 - 30, and these are not examples of Har')' aUTO dvOl< at all (see below). Supposing that they are intended as examples of Har')' aUTO dvOl< leads some to think that this must include all predications, even 'Socrates is pale'. See, e.g., H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des AristotelesII, 2 (H. Laupp, Tiibingen, 1900; Olms, Hildesheim, 1970), p. 32M (Note I to p. 328), who thinks Aristotle is misspeaking himself here; H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica: Commentarius(Bonn, 1849; Olms,Hildesheim, 1960), p. 241; E. Buchanan, Aristotle's Theory oj Being (Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Monographs, University, Mississippi & Cambridge, Mass., No.2, 1962), pp. II - 13; M. T. Larkin, Language in the Philosophy oj Aristotle (Mouton, The Hague, 1971), p. 88; K. von Fritz, 'Die Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre', Archiv jur Geschichte der Philosophie 40 (1931), 449-85, 488-96 (reprinted in F.-P. Hager (ed.), Logik und Erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles [Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1972], 22 - 79), p. 452 (p. 26 of the reprint); and C. Stead, Divine Substance (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977), p. 67f, who finds the double classification of 'Socrates is pale' a "tiresome inconsistency".

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So also, perhaps, Larkin, Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 87 with Note 20, but I find pp. 87 - 88 very confusing (see also last note). 61 Cf. Note 59 above, and Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics I 307 - 308; Owen, 'Snares', p. 82, Note I; and Thorp, •Aristotle's Use of Categories', p. 250. 62 In fact, Aristotle refers 'flourishing' (irYlcdvfLV) to the category of quality in Soph. el. 4. 166b 16 - 19; cf. also Cat. 8. 9" 14 -16. 63 So far, I agree withThorp. As he points out (Aristotle's Use of Categories, p. 250), this interpretation fits Aristotle's use of the same examples in De into 12. 21 b 5 -10,10. 20"3ff. 64 Here I leave Thorp (Aristotle's Use of Categories, 252 - 254) for Ross (Aristotle's Metaphysics I 307 - 308). 6S This is certainly the way many presentations make it sound, e.g. von Fritz, loc. cit. Contrast C. Kirwan, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books r, .a., E (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), pp. 142f. 66 But it is still wrong to say, as does Owen, that J(a~' aUTO ov is "the (or an) existential use of the verb" ("Snares" p. 82). 67 The argument of Met. B is reviewed by Thomas Aquinas in his comments on .a. 7; see In duodecim fibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. by M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Marietti, Turin, 1950), p. 238 (§889). 60

Dept. of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1054, U.S.A.

JAAKKO HINTIKKA

THE VARIETIES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE

1. ARISTOTLE DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE FREGE - RUSSELL AMBIGUITY OF "IS"

In this paper, I shall try to enhance our understanding of Aristotle's thought by relating it to certain contemporary problems and insights of philosophical logicians. Now one of the most central current issues in philosophical logic is a challenge to a hundred-year old dogma. Almost all twentieth-century philosophers in English-speaking countries have followed Frege and Russell and claimed that the words for being in natural languages - "is", "ist", eun, etc. - are ambiguous between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity, and the generic is. The significance of this ambiguity thesis has not been limited to topical discussions but ha'S extended to historical studies, including studies of ancient Greek philosophy. A generation or two of scholars working in this area used the Frege - Russell ambiguity thesis as an important ingredient of their interpretational framework. Cases in point are Cornford, Ross, Guthrie, Cherniss, Vlastos, Ryle, and (from the German-language area) Heinrich Maier. Indeed, the Frege - Russell distinction is still being invoked occasionally by Aristotelian scholars; see e.g., Moravcsik(1967,p. 127),Kirwan(pp. 100-101, 141), Weidemann (1980, p. 78) and Gomez-Lobo (1980- 81, p. 79). However, many of us have by this time come to suspect that the Frege - Russell ambiguity claim is completely anachronistic when applied to Aristotle. The sources of this dark professional secret are various, ranging from G. E. L. Owen's brilliant studies of Aristotle on being to Charles Kahn's patient examination of the Greek verb TO d/lcn. Most of us good Aristotelians have nevertheless remained in the closet. As was illustrated by the fate that befell the first major study in which Plato's failure to draw the Frege - Russell distinction was noted, most of the unliberated Aristotelians seem to have thought that to note Aristotle's failure to draw the distinction is to accuse him of an object logical mistake. (See, e.g., Neal's introduction to Bluck.) Accordingly, we have shied away from such impiety. It is time for some consciousness-raising, however. It is not convincing enough merely to register the inapplicabili81

s. Knuuttila and .I. Hintikka (eds.),

(0) J 986

The Logic of Being, 81-114. by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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ty of the modern distinction to Aristotle. (Cf. Benardete 1976 -77.) We need a deeper understanding of the whole situation. In an earlier paper, I have shown that there need not be anything logically or semantically wrong with a theory which treats the verbs of being as not exhibiting the Frege - Russell ambiguity. (See Hintikka, 1979.) More than that: not only can we now say that Aristotle's procedure is free from any taint of fallacy; he may have been a better semanticist of natural languages than Frege and Russell in this particular respect. Hence I can without any impiety level at Aristotelian scholars the same criticisms as Benson Mates recently (1979) directed at Platonic scholars, viz. that they have been seduced by the modern myth that there is a distinction between the is of identity, the is of predication, theJs of existence, and the is of generic implication, and to proceed to argue that the distinction is not there in the Aristotelian Corpus. Relatively little argument is in fact needed here. Not only is it the case that Aristotle, one of whose main philosophical methods was to make conceptual distinctions, never labels the Frege - Russell contrast an ambiguity, or in his own terminology, a homonymy. He does not even say that, in its different Frege - Russell uses, fan is "said in many ways" (7rOAAaxW~ Af-yfTm). (For the force of this terminological distinction in Aristotle, see Hintikka (1959) and (1973), Chapter 1.) What this means is in effect that Aristotle never officially acknowledges the Frege - Russell distinction even as a difference between several uses, let alone as a difference between logically different meanings of senses of esti. To put these important points in somewhat different terms, in maintaining the unambiguity of TO dvm vis-a-vis the Frege - Russell distinction, Aristotle is not just a faithful Whorfian blindly following the Weltanschauung implicit in the language of the tribe, as might be suspected among other things on the basis of the absence of any separate verb for existence in the ancient Greek. Aristotle was cognizant of the controversies that had raged as to whether TO OV and TO €V mean the same or whether they have several different meanings. (See De Soph. EI. 33, 182 b 22ff.) Nor is Aristotle unaware of the dangers of uncritically assuming that what is, always is what it is, and not another thing, as is illustrated among other things by his criticisms of Parmenides in Phys. A 3. Nevertheless, his failure to acknowledge the Frege - Russell ambiguity is deeper than a conscious choice between competing conceptual schemes. Not only does he refuse to countenance the Frege - Russell distinction as a homonymy between several different meanings. He does

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ilOt always recognize the distinction as a separation between different uses of the Greek words for being. More accurately speaking, he does acknowledge some differences between the relevant uses, as we shall see, but he does not co-ordinate them into a three-part of four-part distinction. Furthermore, Aristotle never resorts to the Frege - Russell distinction in dealing with problems which we would deal with routinely in terms of the distinction. An example is offered by De Soph. EI. 5, 166 b 28 - 36, where Aristotle is considering inter alia the fallacious inference form "Coriscus is different from Socrates" (i.e. "Coriscus is not Socrates") and "Socrates is a man" to "Coriscus is different from a man" (i.e. "Coriscus is not a man"). Here we would expect Aristotle to make a distinction between the "is" of identity (used in the first premise) and the "is" of predication (used in the second premise). His point has been so understood by Maier (Vol. 2, p. 280), and there is sume primajacie evidence for doing so. For instance, the terminological distinction Aristotle uses to expose the fallacy, viz. between essential and accidental predication, will in Aristotle's later writings in fact assume (as we shall see) the force of a contrast between those predications which have an element of identity and those which do not. However, drawing the predication vs identity distinction is not what Aristotle is doing here. What he actually does is draw a distinction between transitive and nontransitive predication. The whole force of calling a predicate accidental is to say that it does not exhibit the appropriate transitivity: "It does not necessarily follow that all the same attributes belong to all the predicates of a thing and to that of which they are predicated". Applied to the example, this presumably means that "a man" in the second premise is predicated of Socrates in a manner that does not allow transitivity and that therefore the predicable "Coriscus is different from x" , even though it is true of Socrates, does not have to apply to "a man". This is not a distinction between two senses of "is", identity vs predication, even though it is perhaps not too hard to see how the latter distinction should have developed out of what Aristotle does here. (I have tried to follow here Dancy 1975, Appendix II.) Of course, it lies in the nature of things that we cannot expect to find explicit evidence for Aristotle's refusal to hold the Frege - Russell ambiguity thesis. Aristotle is not consciously rejecting a distinction he is aware of; he is completely oblivious to the very idea of the Frege - Russell contrast. Hence it would have been virtually selfdefeating for him first to make the distinction and thereupon try to deny

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it. Fortunately, even though Aristotle does not say in so many words that the word est; does not exhibit the Frege - Russell ambiguity, he does say as it were in the material mode of speech that the entities that would be differentiated from each other in the Frege - Russell distinction (if Aristotle had made it) in reality are one and the same thing. Thus in Met r 2, lOO3 b 22 - 32, he writes (the text is Ross's and the translation is Kirwan's): fi o~ TO OV )(al TO EV mUTOV )(al p.ia q,llCm,:r~ (noAoullftV aAA~AOtS wune I aex~ )(W Citnov aAA' oux ws IVI AO'YI" O"l/Aovp.fva (Otaq,feH Oi oullfv ouo' (xv bp.oiws iJ1rOAa/3wp.fP, aAAa )(al 1reO fe'YOU p.aAAov)· mUTo 'Yae ds av'oewr.os [)(al Orvllew1ros], )(al WV Ctvllew1ros )(al Orvllew1f"os, )(al oux fTfeOV n O"l/AOt )(aTa T~V Af~tV f1raVQ[H1f"AOVP.fPOV TO fis OrvlleW1f"Os )(QI ElS WV OrvlleW1f"Os (OijAOV 0' on ou xweil;€TQt OUT' f1r1 'YfVfUfWS OUT' f1r1 q,lIoeas), bp.oiws Of )(QI f1f"t TOU ivas, wun q,QVfeOV on " 1reaull£(1tS fV TOVTOtS mUTo O"l/AOt, )(QI OUOEV fneOV TO EV 1rQea TO OV, ....

Suppose it true, then, that that which is and that which is one are the same thing - i.e. one nature - in that each follows from the other as origin and cause do, not as being indicated by the same formula (though it makes no difference even if we believe them to be like that - indeed it helps). For one man and a man that is and a man are the same thing; and nothing different is indicated by the reduplication in wording 'he is one man' and 'he is one man that is' (it is plain that there is no distinction in [the processes of) coming to be or destruction); equa\1y in the case of that which is one. It fo\1ows obviously that the addition indicates the same thing in those cases, and that which is one is nothing different apart from that which is.

Although the text of the lines 1003 b 28 - 29 is especially messy, it is important to note that Aristotle is in the quoted passage employing est; in what I shall later in this paper argue to be a purely existential use. Nonetheless he is emphatically assuring us that this use is not different from the identity sense of est; "is one and the same man". As to the predicative sense, by the priority of the three cases announced a couple of lines earlier, "he is a man" will be a further synonym for the two phrases Aristotle mentions. An even blander assertion to the same effect is found in De Soph. E/. 6, 169 a 8 - 10: "For the same definition (horos) applies to 'one single thing' and to 'the thing' hap/os; the definition e.g. of 'man' and 'one single man' is the same, and so, too, with other instances". This confounds the first three members of the four-fold distinction of Frege's and Russell's. As for the fourth it is clear that there is no Frege - Russell type difference in meaning for Aristotle between the different occurrences of ;s in "Socrates is a man" and "a man is an animal". If further evidence is needed for the total absence of the Frege - Russell ambiguity thesis in Aristotle, it is easily forthcoming.

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Even though these observations do not automatically solve any hard interpretational problems concerning Aristotle, they help to clear away misunderstandings. For instance, we can now see that Aristotle's formulas for what has later come to be known as essence, TO TL fun (what [it] is) and TO TL 1}v dvcxt (what it is [for a thing] to be), exhibit for a true Fregean an irredeemable ambiguity between predication and identity. For Aristotle they express ipso facto both something's being such-andsuch and its being identical with some one entity. This is vividly shown by the fact that Aristotle frequently used the very same formulas as a name for his first category, substance, in spite of considering particularity ("separability and 'thisness''') as the main characteristic of substances. No wonder Aristotle could thus raise the question, which in our anachronistic ears may first sound paradoxical (Ross confesses that it is for him "difficult to see the point of this question") whether or not a substance is identical with its essence. (See Met. Z 6.) Similar remarks apply to esti. In general, it is not possible to understand the questions Aristotle is asking in such works as Met. Z without appreciating the simultaneous presence of several Fregean meanings in esti in his discussion. 2. THE NONAMBIGUITY OF ESTl DOES NOT PRECLUDE PURELY EXISTENTIAL USES

It is especially important to realize exactly what is involved in Aristotle's

failure - or perhaps rather refusal - to make the Frege - Russell distinction. What is denied in denying the Frege - Russell ambiguity claim is not that the force of "is" or esti is different in different contexts. Rather, what is ruled out is one particular explanation of these differences, viz. that they are occasioned by different meanings of the verb "is". In other words, what is asserted is that such differences are always traceable to the context and due to it. Indeed, it is an integral part of my position that fun can have on different occasions in Aristotle different Fregean uses. For instance, Aristotle can - and does - use esti with a purely existential force. When one says "Homer is" ('O!L1)eO~ fUTO, what is at issue is obviously the existence of a particular individual (Cf. De Int. 11,21 a 25 - 27.) In general, when one asks Ei fun, one is asking whether an entity or entities of a certain kind exist. (See Post. An. B 1 - 2.) Further examples of unmistakably existential uses of esti in Aristotle are easily found; e.g. Cat. 10, 13 b 27 - 33, and not to speak of Phys. VIII and Met. A (passim). In this respect, my thesis differs sharply from what currently seems to

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be the most popular reaction to the data that can be adduced against the presence of the Frege - Russell ambiguity in Aristotle. According to this competing view, esti is unambiguous because it has basically always the predicative sense. Where it apparently does not, e.g. in the existential uses listed above, we must understand the usage as being elliptical: "Socrates is" on this view basically means "Socrates is something or else". )There may be important restrictions as to what this "something or else" can be, but they need not detain us here.) This view seems to have been suggested by G. E. L. Owen, and it has recently cropped up in slightly different variants. There is a sense in which it probably comes close to being a true representation of what things are like according to Aristotle's last and final conclusions. Roughly, for any entity to exist is for it to be what it is, i.e., what it essentially is. However, admitting this does not mean that in the force of the term esti in Aristotle's actual argumentation is tacitly predicative. For one thing, the identification just offered is probably only an approximate one, anyway. It is not clear that for Socrates to exist is (apud Aristotle) for him to be a man. Rather, on a closer look it seems (as Balme has shown) very much as if for Socrates to exist is not so much for him to exemplify (more generally, to develop towards exemplifying) the speciescharacteristic form of man, but rather to exemplify (more accurately, develop towards exemplifying) the particular nature which consists in his likeness to his parents. And it is not clear at all that Socrates' exemplifying this particular form is a predicative relation rather than an identity. Be this as it may, even if the elliptical character of fun a1l'AWS is perhaps a conclusion of Aristotle's arguments for his metaphysical theory, it cannot for this very reason be a part of what he assumes in them. When I reject the ellipsis theories, it is thus as a claim of what the basic semantical force of esti and its con gates are for Aristotle, and not as a possible feature of his ultimate metaphysical doctrine. However, in the former sense I do reject it tout court, and hence also reject the mistaken idea that it is somehow implied by the absence of the Frege - Russell ambiguity assumption from Aristotle. This puts on me the onus of commenting on the recent denials of any purely existential uses of verbs for being in Aristotle. Suffice it here to deal with one of the most recent putative arguments for the absence of the existential uses in Aristotle or in certain parts of the Aristotelian Corpus. The ellipsis hypothesis has not been defended by its reputed originator

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at any greater length. It has recently been discussed by A. Gomez-Lobo (1980-1981). The part of the Corpus which Gomez-Lobo and his ilk have to worry about most is clearly Post. An. B 1 - 2, where Aristotle in so many words recognizes questions of simple being (El fun) besides the three other kinds of questions which figure in an Aristotelian science, viz. TO on, TO (iton, and TL fun. Actually, strictly speaking Gomez-Lobo does not deny that a sentence of the form [esti + noun phrase] can express mere existence in Aristotle. He admits that e.g. Met. A 7, 1072 a 25 is a case in point. But he strives to reduce greatly the scope of this way of reading Aristotle by removing Post. An. B 1 - 2 (in fact, it seems, all of Post. An.) from its scope. Hence a brief discussion of Gomez-Lobo's arguments are in order, for if they were valid, much of the plausibility of my point would be lost. The ei fun questions used to be taken without any further ado as questions of existence. Gomez-Lobo is entirely right in recognizing that the situation has changed. The insight that Aristotle did not believe in the Frege - Russell ambiguity and that the basic semantical meaning of esti in Aristotle is hence neutral with respect to the different Fregean senses of being certainly makes a fresh look at Post. An. B 1 - 2 necessary. Unfortunately, Gomez-Lobo fails to give the new look a run for its money, for his arguments are inadequate in several respects. For one thing, most of his discussion is predicated on a failure to understand in what sense Aristotle thinks that El fun questions, like all four questions, amount to looking for a middle term. "How can there be a middle term between a single term and the predicate 'exists'?" he asks rhetorically. A simple answer would be embarassingly obvious even if I had not pointed it out thirteen years ago (in Hintikka 1972a). Aristotle is, as it were, thinking of abbreviated syllogisms of the form (*)

Every B is simpliciter Every C is B Hence: Every C is simpliciter

which result from a regular barbara syllogism by omitting the major term, even though they are never found in Aristotle's writing in so many words. It is obvious that (*) requires a treatment of existence somewhat different from what contemporary philosophers have been used to. ,However, this is no argument against what I am saying. Even without discussing any details here, it is patently clear on other grounds that we have to shake our complacency concerning the adequacy of the received Frege - Russell treatment of existence in logic.

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It may be objected that quasi-syllogisms of the displayed form are never actually put forward by Aristotle. The explanation is that he does not need to do so. In the syllogistic structure of a science, the existence of the 8's is always a consequence of the existence of a wider term, say A. Hence Aristotle accomplishes the same effect by means of a regular barbara syllogism as he accomplishes by means of (*), as long as a proviso is explicitly or tacitly added to the effect that it is only the widest term that carries any existential force. This may perhaps be illustrated by the following quasi-syllogism: (**)

Every 8 is an A (and hence exists) Every C is a 8 (no existential force) Hence: Every C is an A (and hence exists)

I shall not discuss here what kind of treatment of existence is presupposed in (*) and (**). My interpretation gains further credence from the fact that, according to Aristotle, necessity is "carried downwards" in a syllogistic chain in the same way as I have argued existence is. (Cf. Aristotle's theory of apodeictic syllogisms in Pro An. A 8 - 12, especially 9.) In the same way as in (**) it is only the major premise that has to carry an existential force in order for the conclusion to do so, in the same way we can obtain a necessary conclusion from a barbara type syllogism if and only if the major premise is a necessary one. In fact, it seems to me that Aristotle's treatment of existence and necessity in the context of a syllogism are related to each other very closely. 80th of them are based on the presence of an element of identity in Aristotelian copula, whether or not it is in fact expressed by him in terms of esti or not. For if the minor premise of a syllogism like (**) expresses a numerical identity between each C and some 8 then we must be able to say all the same things of each C as are said of each 8, for the former literally are among the latter. Hence the validity (among other modal syllogisms) of the following form of barbara: (***)

Every 8 is necessarily an A Every C is (identical with) a 8 Hence: Every C is necessarily an A.

8e this as it may, there is plenty of collateral evidence that my construal of the role of existence in Aristotle's syllogistic theory is what Aristotle in fact meant. Since the whole argumentative structure of Gomez-Lobo's paper is thus mistaken, there is little that needs to be said of the rest of his paper.

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What I also find surprising is that there is conclusive evidence against Gomez-Lobo in the very passages he is addressing himself to. Witness this: I mean if one is or is not simpliciter and not if [one isl white or not (Post. An. B 89 b 33). fCTTLV ij 1'1, Q'JI"AWi Ai-yW, ahA' oux d AWXOS ij I'~.

TO 0' fi

How could Aristotle possibly have explained more clearly by the means he had at his disposal that he was presupposing a purely existential use of fi EUTL? It seems to me that we have to realize that Aristotle, like J. L. Austin, ordinarily means what he says. Ironically, Aristotle's very usage in Post. An. B I - 2 provides us with further counter-examples to the ellipsis thesis. When Aristotle there asks whether a middle term is (d fUTL piuo II , cf. 89 b 37 - 38,90 a 6), he cannot but mean whether the middle exists, for he contrasts this question in so many words with the question as to what it is. There is elsewhere, too, excellent direct evidence against the ellipsishypothesis. In discussing in De Soph. EI. 5 the importance of distinguishing the absolute and the relative uses of a term from each other Aristotle writes (167 a 4 - 6): OU -yae TCiUTO TO 1'1, flvcx! TL ){CX! Q'JI"AWi 1'1, dvCXI. q,CX!VfTCXt Of Ota TO 'JI"aef-Y-YVi TijS XCX! I't){eOV Otcxq,ieHV TO flvcx; TL Toii flvCXI,.xcx! TO 1'1, dvcx! n Toii 1'1, flvCXI.

Ai~fWi

For it is not the same thing not to be something and not to be simpliciter, though owing to the similarity of language to be something appears to differ only a little from to be, and not to be something from not to be.

One can scarcely ask for more direct evidence. At the same time the passage shows that, in spite of their differences, the predicative and the absolute (existential) uses of esti are not unrelated, for they are the relative and absolute uses of the same notion. The quoted passage hence also offers evidence against ascribing the Frege - Russell ambiguity to Aristotle. What we have found deserves a few additional comments. First, my defense of the presence of a purely existential use of esti in Aristotle is squarely based on the absence of a purely existential meaning as distinguished from its alleged predicative meaning and identity meaning. For, in order for (**) to do the double duty of both establishing a predicative link between C and A and at the same time carrying existence assumptions downwards from higher wider terms to lower (narrower) ones, the (**) must carry (for a Fregean) both a predicative sense and the existential one. Morc generally, it is undoubtedly the illegitimate

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assumption of the Frege - Russell ambiguity that has made it so difficult for philosophers to appreciate Aristotle's treatment of existential assumptions in the context of a syllogistically organized science. My second point is a word of warning. Even though there are clear uses of esti in Aristotle where the word has a purely existential force, because Aristotle does not make the Frege - Russell distinction we cannot expect to find a purely existential sense presupposed in Aristotle's general remarks. Above, I described how according to Aristotle existential assumptions filter downwards from the existence of the largest genus of a science downwards to the other terms studied in it. This is amply confirmed by such passages as, e.g., Post. An. A 10, 76 b 3 -11. However, as I have shown in Hintikka (1980), p. 141, these statements of Aristotle's cannot be understood to involve a purely existential sense of esti. Just because Aristotle does not operate with the Frege - Russell distinction, he is - mistakenly in this particular case, if you ask me - lending his pronouncements also a predicative sense. This explains his statements to the apparent effect that the widest premises of a science are the only truly unprovable ones. In order to be able to save such statements, Aristotle had to presuppose a non-syllogistic sense of proving or showing, a fact which vividly illustrates the consequences of the absence of the distinction in Aristotle. Third, our observations throw some fresh light on the ellipsis hypothesis. In order to see it, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that (**) is one of the ultimate premises of a syllogistic science in Aristotle. Then B typically expresses part of the essence of C. Now the C's are shown to exist in (**) by means of the middle term B. This is true generally. As Aristotle puts it, even in questions of El fun what we are searching is a middle term. (See Post. An. B. 2.) This is, from the vantage point of Aristotle's philosophy of science, a large part of the cash value of saying that what it takes for C to exist is for it to be what it essentially is, in our example (**), to be B. However, this is only a part of the story. The formula "for an entity to exist means for it to be what it essentially is" is seen to mean only that the essence is the immediate cause (immediate explanatory term) of its existence. In many contexts, it is more important to ask what the ultimate cause of an entity's existence is. A glimpse at (**) shows that the answer to this question is in terms of the megista gene into which each being must fit. There are the Aristotelian categories whose existence thus seem to be the logical basis of everything else's existence according to Aristotle. We cannot go beyond categories, for "being is not a genus". (This is the

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point Aristotle makes in Post. An. B 7 92 b 14.) Thus the ellipsis hypothesis in any case is only a part of the story. For an entity C to exist is perhaps for it to be what it essentially is in the sense that that is the immediate ground of C's existence. In the total structure of beings, however, the ultimate ground may be more important. And that is, not C's being what it essentially is, but what it categorically is. Thus at the very least the defenders of an ellipsis hypotheses should have two kinds of ellipsis available to them, not just one. This point can be illustrated by reference to Post. An. B 7,92 b 12 - 15: Et'Tor "ort 0" lx7rOOft~fWI or/lfV lxvor",("oriov dvm ofl"vvaOm a7rorv OTL laTtY, d It~ ouator fi'1. TO 0' dvm ou" oua[or OUOfVt. ou "'(a(! ",(ivOl TO ov. lx7rOOfL~'1 a(!' faTm OTL faTLv. Next, we say it is necessary for everything to be proved to be by a demonstration, unless it is its ousia. But being is not the ousia of anything. For what is is not a genus. Therefore there will be a demonstration that it is.

We can see what Aristotle is literally up to here. He comes very close to a denial of the usual form of the ellipsis view. For what he is saying is that the existence of anyone thing has to be demonstrated because it cannot be a part of its essence (ousia). In other words, in (*) the conclusion (')

Every C is (i.e., exists)

cannot be thought of as being obtained by ellipsis from (")

Every C is B

where B is a part of (or the whole) of the essence of C, for (hat would presuppose an irreducible existential force of "is" in the latter and thereby make being (existence) part of the essence of C. As an ultimate (atomic) premise of an Aristotelian science (' ') thus does not have an existential import. Rather, Aristotle's point is that the existence of the C's must be demonstrated, as in (*) or (**). It is not implied by C's essence alone. Hence there is a sense in which the existl!nce of the C's is not due to their being what they essentially are, but their falling under (as established by a potentially quite long chain of appropriate scientific syllogisms) the genus which characterizes the science in question. This genus is what we do assume to exist in the science in question. As Aristotle continues, And that is what the sciences as a mailer of fact do; for the geometer assumes what triangle signifies but proves that is.

Even though Aristotle docs not press the point in the quoted passages, if we proceed tov,'ard morc and more general sciences we never reach one

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where existence is part of the essence of the genus, so that it need not be assumed. That is what the quoted passage amounts to. Elsewhere Aristotle indicates that the upward chain comes to an end with one of the different categories. Hence the only case in which we are allowed to assume (according to Aristotle) the existential import is "every C is D" where D is a term for the category to which C belongs. In this sense, even if we believe that such attributions of existence as (') are elliptical, the omitted term is not the essence of C but the category of C. This view of the role of existential presuppositions in Aristotle thinking seems to be confirmed by Met. H 6, 1045 a 34 - b 8. A fourth observation may likewise be in order. Philosophers', difficulties in understanding all the different things that are going on in an Aristotelian syllogism like (**) illustrate a more general methodological moral. The Frege - Russell ambiguity assumption is built into all the better known formalisms of first-order logic (quantification theory, lower predicate calculus). Since this assumption is completely foreign to Aristotle, virtually all applications of modern logic to Aristotle are partly anachronistic, and have to be viewed with considerable caution. This flaw does not automatically invalidate them, however, nor does it make such historical applications of formal techniques inferior to the work of informal analysts of Aristotle's work, for most of the latter have likewise been relying on the Frege - Rw;sell ambiguity thesis, as was pointed out above. A further general observation is the following: The Frege - Russell distinction between different meanings of "is" and its cognates is correlated - at least roughly - with an ontological distinction between different kinds of entities. The is of identity equates in its clearest instances particulars, modern philosophers' "individuals". In contrast, the is of predication expresses the being of facts. Thus my thesis of the absence of the Frege - Russell distinction in Aristotle is not without consequences for the rest of his ontology. For instance, it is connected with the otherwise strange practice of Aristotle's in his syllogistic theory of scientific explanation, where he treats the being (existence) of what looks like individuals and the being (occurrence) of facts or events on a par without any apologies or explanations. (For examples, see, e.g., Met. Z 17, 1041 a 14 - 16, b 4 - 5.) Furthermore, another part of the same syndrome is the important fact that, appearances notwithstanding, Aristotle does not really have as sharp a notion of an individual (particular) as contemporary post-Fregean philosophers.

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3. ESSENTIAL PREDICATION INVOL YES IDENTIFICATION

Thus realizing Aristotle's failure to make the Frege - Russell distinction does not necessitate throwing overboard all earlier views concerning Aristotle's treatment of being, even though it does necessitate a fresh look at the evidence. (There seems to be a fashion in the current literature to disparage earlier interpretations just because they did not take into account some important aspects of Aristotle's treatment of "is". Such a failure may be regrettable, but it does not automatically invalidate all the interpretations of a scholar.) Nevertheless, dispensing with the Frege - Russell dogma opens the door to certain further lines of thought. In the same way as the Aristotelian esti sometimes has existential force and sometimes does not, in the same way it can sometimes have the force of identity and sometimes does not. This possibility is connected with Aristotle's central metaphysical doctrines. In Post. An. A 22, 83 a 24 - 30 we read: "En Ta !!Ev ouoiOlv OT/!!OIivOVTOI one f'(flVO ii 01l"fe hflVO n oll!!OIivft '(018' ou "OITlI-rOeflTOIL. 0001 oE 1'1, ouoiOlv oll!!OIivH, Crhha "OIT' CxAAOV V1I"O"ft!!fVOV Af-yfTOIL 0 1'1, fon y.~n (J1I"fe hflVO !!~n one hflVO n, OV!!(3f(3l1"oTOI, ot'ov "OITa TOU Crv8ew1I"ov TO hfV"OV' ou -rae fonv b Cxv8ew1l"o~ oim o'ne hfV"OV oun 01l"fe hfU"OV n, Crh>.a !~OV row~' one -rae !~OV fonv b Cxv8ew1l"o~. Again, the things signifying an ousia signify of what they are predicated of precisely what that thing is or precisely what is the particular sort of it; but the things which do not signify an ousia but are said of some other underlying subject which is neither precisely what that thing is nor precisely what is the particular sort of it, are incidental, e.g., pale of the man. For the man is neither precisely what is pale nor precisely what is something pale; but presumably an animal; for a man is precisely what is an animal.

It is not clear whether ousia here means essence or substance, but a comparison with such passages as Met. r 4, 1007 a 20 - 33 shows that the former possibility cannot be excluded here. This is also shown by Aristotle's reference to incidental predication at a 27 - 28, complete with Aristotle's stock example (AfV)(OV) of an accidental predicate. Hence what we have found is that one important element in Aristotle's distinction between essential and accidental predication is that the former is an assertion of identity whereas the latter one is not. In so far as predication is expressed by means of a verb for being, this means that in essential predication the verb is used to express identity whereas in an accidental predication it is used to express predication. Once again, this difference in use does not mean that Aristotle is thinking of esti as having different senses or meanings.

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This partial construal of the essential vs accidental distinction is further confirmed by such passages as Met. ~ 18, 1022 a 26 - 27 and Post. An. A 4, 73 b 5 - 10. It is by any token an important element in Aristotle'~ ideas of essence and essential predication. Further arguments for the same view have been presented by M. J. Woods, who argues that "Aristotle held that a staement like 'Socrates is a man' was, despite appearances, to be construed as a statement of identity". In defense of this view, Woods refers inter alia to Met. ~ 18, 1022 a 26-27; Z 4, 1029 b 28; Z 7, 1032 b 1 - 2; Z 8, 1034 a 8. As was noted above, the unmistakable (albeit not exclusive) presence of this idea in Aristotle's mind is also witnessed by the question he raises and discusses in Met. Z 6 as to whether each thing is identical with its essence. Woods's thesis is essentially that Aristotle answers his own questibn affirmatively. One intriguing feature of these observations is that they seem to turn the contrast between essential and accidental predication into a prima facie nonmodal distinction, whereas it has in recent discussions of "Aristotelian essentialism" been treated as an almost paradigmatic example of a modal distinction. It is of course true that in spelling out the distinction in systematic terms we soon get entangled with modal concepts, and it is equally true that in his discussion of the matter in Met. Z-H Aristotle likewise resorts in the end to the notions of potentiality and matter. Nevertheless it seems to me that the initial impression of a nonmodal distinction points to an interesting truth (and to an interesting flaw in recent discussions). Even I cannot elaborate the point here, the way in which the essential-accidental distinction involves modal concepts is not through any direct appeal to them, but through a modal element which there is in the very notion of an individual (for Aristotle, in the notion of substance). Individuation, in short, is a process which inextricably involves a modal element. My observation concerning the link in Aristotle between the essentialaccidental contrast and the difference between identity and copula - as well as Woods's thesis - nevertheless represent only the first step in understanding Aristotle's views on essence and substance. A telling indication of the problems one encounters in this direction is the fact that Aristotle occasionally coulitenances also "accidental unities" like "pale man" or "pale Socrates". In other words, in one of his moods he somehow construes "Socrates is pale" and "man is pale" also as identity statements , and not predications contrasted to " Socrates is man" or "man is an animal " , which alone were supposed to be identities. Aristotle's reasons are nevertheless clear. As was noted earlier, Aristotle's key

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terms for essence were double-barrelled, allowing a construal either in terms of identity or in terms of predication. Small wonder, therefore, that he was not consistent in his construal of essential attributions (in contradistinction to accidental ones) as identities. Even though it would take us far too far afield here to argue the point fully, it nevertheless seems to me that Aristotle in the end subscribes to the idea of essential predications as identities. In Met. Z 6 he concludes his discussion by affirming the identity of each thing from its essence. As he later formulates this point (see Met. Z 10, 1036 a 16 - 19), "the soul just is animal, ... or the soul of each thing is each thing, and for a circle to be [i.e., the "essence" of a circle] is a circle, and for a right angle to be, i.e., the ousia of a right angle is a right angle ... " (translation largely by Russell Dancy). When he resumes his main line of thought in Met Z 10 he nevertheless uncovers a mare's nest of further problems, which first led him to hesitate about the identification. In Met. H 3, 1043 b 2 - 5, he writes: "Sould and essence of soul are the same, but man and essence of man are not, unless the soul is also called man; and although this is so in one sense, it is not in another". These problems are due to the presence of the material factor. In fact, the quoted passage is prefaced by Aristotle by the explanation, "because the essence belongs to the form and the actuality", i.e., does not include material aspects of a particular substance which Aristotle identifies with its potentiality. As Aristotle puts it in Met. H 6, 1045 a 22 - 23, "man is part matter and part form". In short, the essence of a thing construed as a form cannot be identified with the thing itself because the thing also contains matter. However, when Aristotle comes around to offering his definitive solution to the individuation problem in Met. H 6, he ends up vindicating the identity of a thing and its essence. This is accomplished by Aristotle by considering matter and form the two sides of the same coin: matter is the passive potentiality which is correlative to the active potentiality which in turn is the form. Being correlative, the two are in a sense one; their essence is the same. "There is no other cause of the potential sphere's being an actual sphere; this was the essence of each." (Met. H 6, 1045 a 31 - 33). [OVOEV "fixe €OTLV ai"TLov €UeOV TOU T~V ovvixp.H oc/>a'ieav €VEe"fEip: ElVa! oc/>a'ieav, a'A'ACx TOUT' ~V TO Ti ~V dvO't fxaTl'e~.] In the sense spelled out by Aristotle in Met. H 6, 1045 a 14 - 34, he thus ends up subscribing to the identity of a man and what it is for a man to be, alias the essence of man. Hence in the last Aristotelian analysis, essential predications are in a sense identities. Be this as it may, what has been seen suffices to show that there are

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extremely important connections between the different uses (not senses!) of esti in Aristotle and his central metaphysical doctrines. Such uses mean that on certain occasions the force of to esti is purely existental or purely identificatory, even though these are not separate senses of the verb. For this reason it is misleading to describe the meaning of esti (absolutely or on a certain occasion) in ancient Greek philosophy as one in which the existential and copulative senses are "fused". (Cf. here Kahn, 1966, and Furth.) The converse image is more apt. Even though in the basic meaning of esti we cannot tell the allegedly different Fregean senses apart, contextual factors may on occasion have the effect of almost separating from each other the different Frege - Russell forces and nearly eliminating all but one of them. 4. INSTANTIATION IN NATURAL LANGUAGES: A SYSTEMATIC VIEW

Suffice this as an indication of one line of thought opened by our observations. To return to the main theme of this paper, notice that from the absence of the Frege - Russell ambiguity it does not follow that there might not be other ambiguities about esti, over and above the nonambiguous differences in use which Frege and Russell mistakenly raised to the level of ambiguities. Further light can be thrown on this question, too, by means of recent topical insights. There is in fact another major way in which recent logical and seman tical work on the concept of being puts Aristotle in an interesting new perspective. In order to see what it is, we have to stray temporarily away from Aristotle and discuss certain topical problems in the logic of natural languages. I shall discuss them in the case of English, even though similar things can be said of other languages, including ancient Greel(. These problems are as close to t.1e heart of all Sprachlogik as we can hope to get. Any logician knows that the lifeblood of virtually all interesting logical techniques in that basic part of logic which is variously known as first-order logic, quantification theory, or lower predicate calculus are the rules of instantiation (i.e., rules for substituting names or name-like terms for quantified variables). Now suppose w~ want to deal with the logic of natural languages directly, without first attempting the dubious and by this time largely discredited translation to formal languages. Then our first task is to formulate. likewise directly for natural languages, rules of instantiation far the quantifier phrases which take over the role of quantified variables in natural languages. How can we do that? How are we to deal with, say, a quantifier phrase like "every

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white horse which Alexander rode" or "some small town where Socrates lived", occurring in a context X - W? (We take here the general form of these quanti fer phrases to be every } some

Y + wh-word + Z

where Z contains a "trace" to indicate where the wh-word was "moved away from".) Now the obvious way of formulating instantiation rules for such phrases is to legitimize a move from the sentence in which they occur to sentences like (I)

X - b - W if b is a white horse and Alexander rode b

or, respectively, (2)

X - d - Wand d is a small town and

Socrates lived in d, where" b" and" d" are the respective instantiating terms. In general, the output of an instantiation step is of the form if (3)

X - b - W

} b is a Y and Z' and

where b is the instantiating term and Z' is like Z except that the trace has been replaced by "b" with the appropriate preposition. (We have been assuming that Y and Z are here singular.) The details need not detain us here. What is of interest to us here is an important difference between the situation in formal first-order languages and natural languages. In the former, a single domain of values for the substituting terms (e .g. my "b" and "d") is given. In the latter, the entities referred to by the substitution-values have to be chosen from different subdomains in different cases. For instance, in (I) b has to be a living creature, whereas in (2) d has to be a location in space. It lies close at hand for a logician to say that the only novelty here is that natural languages employ many-sorted quantification theory (more generally, many-sorted logic). And this need not by itself introduce any complications (contrary to what is, e.g., implied in Moravcsik, 1976). In-

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deed, many-sorted logics do not involve any serious new difficulties over and above one-sorted ones. Yet there is a new question present here. In many-sorted formal logics, the sortal differences are indicated by notational conventions. How are these differences marked in natural languages? How can one tell what subdomain b or d must belong to? Some clues are obvious, and the most obvious is the relative pronoun which disappears in the process of instantiation. (These relative pronouns can be taken to be question words in a new role, except that "what" is replaced by "that".) If the operative word is "who", the relevant subdomain consists of persons, if "where", of locations in space, if "when", of moments (and/or periods) of time, etc. Further subdomains are introduced by prepositional phrases containing similar words, for instance "like which" introducing a realm of qualities ("some color like which you have never seen"). Clearly there is not a sharp one-to-one correspondence between the ranges of natural-language quantifiers (my "subdomains") and different relative pronouns (or other wh-words, with or without prepositions or similar qualifiers), but a rough-andready correspondence certainly obtains. The main discrepancy here is the fact that "what" covers several different subdomains. By asking, "what is X?", we can mean at least three different things, to wit: (i) (ii) (iii)

Which partic4lar entity is X? What kind of entity is X? What does X consist of? (What is it made of?)

as illustrated by the following sample questions: (i) (ii) (iii)

What is Sirius? What is a gnu? What is cordite?

Similar things can be said of Aristotle's Greek word esti: This ambiguity is made especially important in Aristotle's case by the absence of the Frege- Russell distinction. For in terms of this distinction one could distinguish the different what-questions (i) - (iii) from each other by the different sense of "is" involved in them. But this distinction just is not available to Aristotle. In any case, the relative pronoun (or the corresponding question word) cannot be the only clue to the choice of the subdomain. For one thing,

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the whole relative clause can be missing from the quantifier phrase in question, and hence be unavailable to supply any leads. Hence it is the meaning of Yin (3) which must supply the main in formation as to which subdomain (sort) we are dealing with. Presumably we must assume some kind of semantical categorization of the terms (phrases) that can serve as the Y in (3). In the case of simple terms these must be part of their lexical meaning. Since the Y's in (3) are basically predicate terms, we end up in this way postulating a classification of all simple predicates of English into certain equivalence classes. These classes wi\l be correlated one-to-one with those subdomains of quantification, which we are dealing with, when using quantifiers in English, i.e., the largest classes of entities we can quantify over, and also correlated in a loose way with certain wh-words and phrases. The need of relying on Y for our choice of the subdomain is vividly seen from the fact that if we try to eliminate Y (in the way in which we could dispense with the relative clause), we would end up with an ungrammatical expression. In order to preserve grammatically, we must amplify the quantifier word itself so as to make it capable of conveying the crucial information. For instance, some becomes someone, something, somewhere, sometime, somehow, etc., where the added handle serves to betray the relevant sort (subdomain). Furthermore, since each instantiation step (witness (3» introduces an occurrence of "is", these correlated classifications are likewise correlated with a distinction between different uses of "is", viz., those that could have originated from an application of the instantiation rules, plus of course those that are logically on par with them. Thus we are led to recognize four correlated multiple distinctions. They distinguish from each other (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Certain wh-words (and phrases with wh-words). Different kinds of simple predicates. The largest classes of entities we have to recognize in the logic of our language as domains of quantification. Certain semantically different uses of "is". (In them we of course cannot distinguish from each other the ises of identity, existence, and predication.) 5. WHAT DO ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES CATEGORIZE?

At this point you are supposed to have a deja VII experience. For what I have arrived at by means of purely systematic (logical and semantical)

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considerations is to aJl practical purposes tantamount to Aristotle's theory of categories. One of the most fundamental and most perplexing questions concerning Aristotle's distinction between different categories is: What is being distinguished from each other? What is Aristotle classifying in separating the different categories from each other? He uses different Greek question words or question phrases (7£ fait, 7roaov, 7rOLOV, 7r(!OS it, 7rOV, 7rOT€) as names for six of the categories, and the other labels likewise go naturaJly with certain types of questions in Greek. This is pretty much how he presents his categories in Top. 1,9. He envisages different kinds of entities "put before one" and classifies the different things that can be said (and by implication asked) of it. But when Aristotle introduces his categories in Cat. 4, they appear as classes of simple predicates or "things that can.be said" of an entity. Which are they? The plot is thickened further by Aristotle's deeply ingrained habit of considering categories as the widest genera of entities that can be logically considered together. This is seen for instance in Met. r 1, 1003 b 19ft" or Post. An. A 22,83 b 10-17. Furthermore, Aristotle repeatedly indicates that the distinction between the different categories goes together with a correlated distinction between different uses of esti. What is more, occasionaJly he seems to run the two distinctions together. For instance in Met. Z 1, 1028 a lOff "that which is" is said to signify the different categories. See also Met. Ll 7, 1017 a 23 - 30. Scholars have debated intensively which of these different things Aristotle "reaJly" meant. For example, one persuasion maintains that the categories represent the different kinds of questions one can (according to Aristotle) ask of a given entity. This view is in different variants held by among others Ockham, Charles Kahn, Benveniste, and Ackrill. Other scholars hold that Aristotelian categories are what he says they are, predicables. Others, led by the formidable Hermann Bonitz, have have held that categories were for Aristotle first and foremost the widest genera of entities. "Sie bezeichnen die oberst en Geschlechter, deren einem jedes Seiende sich muss unterordnen lassen", he proclaims (p. 623 of the original). Still others have held that Aristotle's category distinction is primarily a differentiation between several senses of esti, a reminder of the "systematic ambiguity" of words for being in Aristotle. This view is found, e.g., in Phys. A 2, 185 b 25 - 32. Among commentators, it has been represented by Heinrich Maier, and in a sense it can be maintained

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that G. E. L. Owen is another case in point. He has certainly been followed by a host of younger scholars. If we had not seen that Aristotle is completely free from the Frege - Russell ambiguity assumption, we might also be puzzled by the fact that the distinction between the different uses of esti in the different categories sometimes appears prima facie as a distinction between different kinds of existential is (cf., e.g., the Topics discussion whether 'TO Oil is a genus), sometimes as a distinction between different kinds of predicative is (cf., e.g., Pro An. A 37, 49a 6 - 9, read in conjunction with the preceding chapter), and sometimes as one between different kinds of identity. These different emphases in Aristotle have found their fans. For instance, as Ross reports, "ApeIt regards the categories as primarily a classification of the meaning of the copula 'is' " whereas Bonitz stresses the existential and identity senses. Some of the shrewder scholars have responded to this problem situation by suggesting that Aristotle was led to his distinction between the different cate~ories by several convergent routes. For instance, AckriII suggests that in Aristotle's classification there are two elements, first the idea that different kinds of questions will have "categorically" different answers, and second the idea of categories as the highest genera. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. However, philosophers taking such a line will nevertheless face the almost equally perplexing problem as to why the different distinctions Aristotle had in mind should coincide - or at least why Aristotle should have thought that they coincide. By and large, they have not solved this problem. Ackrill says merely that, "It is not surprising that these two ways of grouping things together should produce the same results". This opinion simply will not stand up to scrutiny when viewed in the cold light of contemporary analyses of questions and answers. (Cf. Hintikka, 1976.) Contrary to what Ackrill suggests, it is not at all clear that answers to different questions fall into mutually exclusive classes which correspond to the widest classes of entities. For instance, it is perfectly legitimate to reply to the question "Who is the head of the Academy?" not only by saying "Plato" or "a man", but alternatively "a pale man", "the youngest brother of Potone", or even "he is lying there", alI of which have to be pigeonholed in different categories. Only by means of a further analysis can one perhaps hope to eliminate some of these replies as amounting only to partial answers (or as supplying collateral information to back up the conclusiveness of an answer). Worse still, AckrilI's account is intrinsically inconsistent. For if the appropriate answers to different questions belong

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to different categories, it is impossible to construe Aristotle's categories as answers to one and the same question "What is it?", as Ackrill also suggests. Even if what he says can somehow be salvaged in the last analysis, it does not help us to understand what Aristotle's categories really were in the least. Prima facie, it is far from obvious that the four correlated distinctions we find in Aristotle should go together, and Aristotelian scholars certainly have not supplied valid reasons why they should do so. Aristotle seems to be aware of the objection and tries to handle it, not so much by explicit reference to questions as in terms of definition and sameness. In Post. An. A 22 he argues that to define an entity means to specify what substance it is and in Top. I 8 he argues that strict (numerical) sameness means identity of substance. These explanations presuppose Aristotelian distinction, however, and therefore cannot serve as an independent theoretical motivation for it. A systematic theory of questions and answers thus cannot in itself serve to explain the nature of Aristotle's theory of categories, in the way some scholars seem to expect. For the same reason, I shall not discuss the details of these two chapters here. 6. ARISTOTLE RECONSTRUCTED

Now the brief analysis of the conditions of instantiation which I carried out above, puts both Aristotle's theory and discussions thereof into a new perspective. Led by purely topical (logical and semantical) arguments, we have arrived at a remarkable reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of categories. (My arguments have an even stronger theoretical motivation than I have spelled out here, for they ensue from the basic ideas of the highly successful approach to language analysis which I have called game-theoretical semantics (see Hintikka, 1982, and Saarinen, 1979). We can now recognize all the apparently discrepant ingredients of Aristotle's doctrine in the systematic situation revealed by my analysis. Aristotle's use of question words and phrases as labels for categories matches my use of wh-words as a guide to the subdomain involved in an instantiation. His view of categories as the different kinds of simple things that can be said of an entity matches my classification of the meanings of simple predicates as guides to the logical "sort" intended. His use of categories as the largest classes of logically comparable entities amounts to the focal point of my quest of the different largest domains of quantification presupposed in a natural language,

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and Aristotle's correlation of different uses of the word est; corresponds to the automatic alignment in my treatment of the other distinctions with certain differences in the use of the word "is". What is more important, the correlation of these several distinctions is seen not to be accidental or artificial. Its reasons lie deep in the logic of the situation. Charles Kahn has suggested that the different Aristotelian distinctions represent different strata in Aristotle's thinking. That may very well be so, but we don't understand Aristotle unless we also recognize the intrinsic logical connections between the different correlated classifications of his. No longer does it make any sense to ask which of the several distinctions Aristotle "really" means, for they are all inextricably intertwined. The extensive controversies that have been prompted by this question are simply otiose. (This does not mean that differences of emphasis are not called for here; cf. my comments below on those who stress the ties between categories and question types.) The interesting questions pertain instead (inter alia) to Aristotle's awareness of the connecting links between the different dinstinctions. Indeed, it is in spelling out the main interrelations between the distinctions which converge in Aristotle's theory of categories that my "transcendental deduction of the categories" goes essentially beyond those earlier scholars who have emphasized the multi-faceted character of Aristotelian categories. Even though the reconstruction of Aristotelian categories which we have just reached perhaps does not ipso facto solve any major interpretational problems, it yields valuable clues which help to understand Aristotle and in mar:ty cases even promise further insights. For instance, one problem we can now approach pertains to the relation of Aristotle's theory to the facts of the Greek language. Trendelenburg, Apelt, and Benveniste have claimed that the Aristotelian distinction between different categories reflects certain general features of the ancient Greek language. Ackrill's persuasive arguments to the effect that what is distinguished from each other in the category distinctions are not verbal expressions but entities may serve as an antidote to such excesses. However, Ackrill's thesis does not imply that Aristotle was not guided by logical structures which manifest themselves in the grammar of the Greek language. I cannot try to write either a transformational grammar or a game-theoretical semantics for the ancient Greek language. Suffice it merely to point out that the grammatical facts which are highlighted by my treatment are less eye-catching but subtler than those flaunted by Trendelenburg and Benveniste. They

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pertain to such things as the identity (in form) of indefinite relatives with indirect interrogatives in Greek, and the close relationship of both with quantifier words. These features of the Greek grammar serve to link the different correlated distinctions explained above to each other especially closely, and thereby to motivate Aristotle's theory. If I had to find linguistic evidence for my interpretation of Aristotle, that is the direction in which I could (and would) go. Even on the present superficial level, it is not hard to see that my treatment of instantiation works mutatis mutandis even better with Greek thari with English. Likewise, we are now in a position to draw an interesting conclusion from our observations. The different classes of questions with which Aristotle correlated his other distinctions were primarily indirect questions. The correlation depends crucially on an analogy between relative pronouns and question words, and this analogy (or near identity) can obviously be best argued for by comparing with each other the logical behavior of relative clauses and indirect questions. (An especially useful Mittelglied here is the class of relative clauses without antecedents. Their logic is remarkably similar to that of indirect questions.) Aristotle's distinction between different categories is less a distinction between different question types as between question words, and it pertains to these words in so far as they are doing duty of their relative clause twins. This observation reflects somewhat unfavorably on those scholars ·who have made much of the classification of questions as the alleged cornerstone of Aristotelian categories. It seems to me that their thesis remains unproven. Admittedly, the importance of the dialectical questioning games practiced in the Academy for Aristotle can scarcely be exaggerated. However, there is little evidence in the Topics or elsewhere that the theory of categories was developed for (or from) such games. 7. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RECONSTRUCTED ARISTOTELIAN THEORY. CATEGORIES VS LOGICAL TYPES

One respect in which my reconstruction matches Aristotle's ideas is what might first have seemed a blemish in it. It is the ambiguity of whatquestions (and of the corresponding mUltiplicity of that-clauses in quantifier phrases) registered above. In my reconstruction certain whatquestions correspond to the category of substance. Aristotle, too, relates the category of substance to suitable what-questions. As Aristotle puts in Met. Z I, 1028 b 2, the old question, "What is that w!1ich is?" really amounts to "What is substance?" Furthermore, and importantly,

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Aristotle's lists candidates for the status of substance in Met. Z, both in Met. Z 3 and in Met. Z 13. These lists contain matter, form, and the individual consisting of both. These three correspond to the three senses of what-questions listed in Section 4 above (in the reverse order). Moreover, the fourth main candidate, the universal, can perhaps be considered (as Russell Dancy has suggested) a hangover from the earlier academic practice of answering what-questions by reference to a genus ("the universal") and its differentiae. (This view is certainly supported strongly by such passages as Met . .::l 28, 1024 b 4 - 6, Top. A 9, 103 b 36 - 37 and A 18, 108 b 22 - 23.) We also have to raise one of the most crucial questions concerning Aristotle's theory of categories. Is the theory correct as an analysis of the "logic" of the Greek language (or of the English language)? Are there differences between different languages vis-a.-vis Aristotelian categories? The "transcendental deduction" of Aristotelian categories presented above might seem to vindicate the main features of Aristotle's theory. In spite of its persuasiveness, it nevertheless gives us only an approximation to the true seman tical theory of natural language categories. It is based upon assumptions which are only partly true, and hence it cannot be taken as the final word on the subject. In the next section, I shall indicate one specific limitation of my argument and consequently of our reconstructed theory of Aristotelian categories. On a general theoretical level, another major shortcoming of the theory is obvious, connected with its relation to logical type distinctions. It is in a wider logical and philosophical perspective clear that even Aristotelian category distinctions must in the last analysis be based on type distinction. Th(' latter distinctions may not coincide with Russell's. Indeed, the types (categories) of Frege and Russell seem to me too few and too far apart to serve as a realistic basis of our Sprachlogik. But, whatever the requisite types are, they must serve as the foundation of any viable distinction between different categories. In other words, some bridge has to be constructed from Aristotelian categories to logical ones to vindicate them. How foreign modern type distinctions were for Aristotle is also illustrated by his deeply ingrained habit of bracketing together the obtaining of (what we would call) facts and the existence of individuals. (This habit was noted above in Section 2.) This assimilation offers us in fact an additional illustration of the absence in Aristotle of any real distinction between the is of predication, which expresses the obtaining of facts and the is of existence. This general problem is highlighted by the more specific observation

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that Aristotelian categories turn out on my analysis to be quite different from logical categories in the sense of logical types . (This point is relevant here among other reasons because the contraty has been maintained by Gilbert Ryle; cf. Ryle 1937 - 1938.) Not only is it the case that entities of a different logical type (in what is roughly Russell's sense) belong to the same category, as Socrates, man, and animal all belong to the socalled category of substance. There is a sense in which all categories come close to containing entities of the same logical type. After all, they all contain items which can be said of a substance like Socrates. For instance, the members of the so-called category of relation are not relations for Aristotle, but relatives (relational predicates). This is amply shown by his discussion of this category in Cat. 7, 8 a 35ff, especially his comments on correlatives and their epistemic and bntological interdependence. (Cf. Cat. 6,6 a 35ff; De Soph. EI. 31, 181 b 26 - 28; Top. VI, 4, 142 a 28 - 31; and VI, 8, 146 b 3 - 4.) Likewise, quantities are not for Aristotle what we would think of as quantities (e.g. a certain length), but quantitative attributes (e.g. being of such-and-such length). These observations are perhaps not very surprising. There is a sense ill which the very "category" of relation (as distinguished from relational predicates) came to its own only much later in the history of philosophy. (Cf. Weinberg 1965.) However, the absence of relations proper from Aristotle's categorical scheme highlights the problems it leads into. For where else can he put relations? The only propositional form he seems to recognize is the subject-predicate one. If some of those predicates are relational, we need an account as to how some of them can be built of relations. Alternatively, we need a reduction of relational propositions to subject-predicate propositions. Neither task was attempted by Aristotle, although the latter one was undertaken by Leibniz, whose philosophy is in the last analysis much more Aristotelian than is usually recognized. (Cf. here Hintikka 1972b.) Another instance of the same unsatisfactory state of Aristotle's theory is the discrepancy between Aristotle's treatment of time in the Categories and in the Physics. Treating time as a category is simply inadequate for a satisfactory categorial analysis of time. Merely including temporal predicates as a class of predicables says next to nothing about the true "categorial" structure of time. No wonder, therefore, that Aristotle offers an entirely different (and deeper) analysis of time in the Physics. Similar remarks can be made about several other categories, especially about the categories of quantity, place, and action. These are illustrations of deeper and more widespread tensions in

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Aristotle's thought. In treating (at least in its first stage) all categories on a par Aristotle (as well as my rational reconstruction of his theory) fails to give a deeper account of the rationale of category distinctions. It is for this reason especially important to realize the differences between Aristotelian categories and logical types. It is here that Aristotle's relative neglect of the Frege - Russell distinction (even as a difference in use and not just as a difference in meaning) becomes a handicap for him. Admittedly, it was claimed by Maier that Aristotle's ·theory of categories was calculated to accommodate certain distinctions between different senses of "is" (see Vol. 2, p. 291 ff). Maier's distinctions include most of the Frege - Russell ones. Indeed, Maier's first two distinctions are identificatory being vs accidentally predicatory being, p. 280, and existential vs copulative being, p. 282. No major insights are forthcoming from Maier, however, into the way Aristotle managed to combine the Frege - Russell distinction with his. doctrine of categories. For he firmly believes that. according to Aristotle, "immediate reflection on the concept of being [Maier's emphasis) ... forms the principle of division for the table of categories" (pp. 298 - 299). Maier's immediacy claim notwithstanding, Aristotle himself does not trust immediate intuition here, but discusses the relation of other categories to that of a substance. However, these arguments are either calculated to show the dependence of other categories on that of substance, or (which may come down to the same thing) to point out the role of focal meaning in relating the being of the other categories to that of substance. They do not rely on the kinds of distinctions which Maier mentions or which are likely to be made by a twentieth-century logician. Instead, they mark a slightly different point of partial contact between Aristotle's theory of categories and modern type distinctions. For the primacy of substances over members of categories came to mean for Aristotle something very much like the claim that only substances are individuals in a modern philosopher's sense. This is shown by Aristotle's frequent reference to a substance as a "this" (TC>O€) or as a "this something" (TOOf n). Another indication is given by Aristotle iq Met. Z, 3, 1029 a 27 - 29, where he says that "it is taken to be chiefly true of a substance that it is separable and a certain this". [}(~ )'ae TO xWeWTOP }(at TO TOOf n lJ7rCxexHP oO}(fi p,CxALaTa Til ova[~.) More generally, Aristotle's use of separability (TO xwew rop) as a characteristic of substance (cf. e.g., Met. Z 1, 1028 a 24 - 25) points in the same direction. In Met. Z I, 1028 a 17 - 20 he says of the members of the other categories that they "are called beings because they are, some of them, quantities

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of that which in that way is [sc. of substances], some qualities, some affections, some something else" . Similar statements are found elsewhere, e.g., in Met. r 2, 1003 b 5 - 10. This passage is an especially clear indication of the fact that the Aristotelian primacy of substance is not due to any related recognition of the Frege - Russell distinction, for it is in the very same chapter that Aristotle denies (as we saw in Section 1 above) in effect most emphatically this distinction. However, Aristotle provides little by way of closer analysis of this mode of dependence of the other categories on substances. Nevertheless it seems fairly clear that Aristotle's celebrated manoeuvre of considering the differences between the uses of esti in different categories as not being homonymous but instances of focal meaning (7I'eos gv) is squarely based on the idea of treating substances as something very much like individuals in the sense of a Frege - Russell ontology. (Concerning Aristotle's attempted Aufhebung of category distinctions along these lines, see Owen (1960) and (1965).) 8. CATEGORIES, MATTER, AND FORM

We have found plenty of indication that Aristotle did not consider the doctrine of categories as being completely satisfactory in itself. On systematic grounds, too, it can be argued that the doctrine so far expounded is only an approximation to the real analysis of the relevant parts of our Sprachlogik. As a matter of historical record, in the Organon Aristotle seems to be satisfied with this approximation. However, in the Metaphysics, especially in rand Z - H, he realizes that he has to go beyond it. In order to understand how he does this, it is once again advisable to turn again to topical considerations. My discussion in Section 4 above was based on a simple analysis of quantifier phrases. If we look away from the relative clause, the structure we have presupposed is simply something like the following:

--

QUANT

I

some every each

NP ...............NP

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THE VARIETIES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE

This is too simple to be realistic, however. Indeed, Joan Bresnan has proposed the following more refined analysis: NP

/~

/'" QP

Q

Det

/~

some every

NUM

I

PP

P

/"'"NP

I

I

of

e:~h r;~ Here Q marks among other things quantity classifiers, such as the following:

Q

I

one (s) number part herd gallon ton

However, instead of this kind of Q we may have almost any correct noun. Examples of a quantifier phrases (sans the relative clause) to which Bresnan's analysis applies are the following: every two statues of bronze many tables of rosewood few cubes of ice. Roughly, we can thus think of the rightmost NP (under the PP) of Bresnan's analysis as specifying at least in a number of clear-cut cases,

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the material of which the individuals over which the quantifier ranges as being formed by imposing the individuation principle that goes together with Bresnan's Q. The rightmost NP must in such cases involve a mass term. The whole phrase thus expresses a kind of combination of matter and a certain individuating principle. This principle is what Aristotle calls the form, whereas the last NP specifies what Aristotle would call (he matter. Thus the closer analysis of quantifier phrases just sketched is closely related to the important Aristotelian contrast between matter and form. It is seen that this refinement is our analysis of quantifier phrases goes beyond the conventional logical languages which can be traced back to Frege and Russell. For in these languages, one starts from a given class of basic individuals. The way they are constituted from more basic ingredients, such as matter and form, does not come up in them at all. Hence the logic of Bresnan's refined analysis cannot be captured by means of the usual logical languages, even when they are turned into many-sorted languages capable of incorporating the reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of categories outlined above. From what has been said-it also follows that the systematic reconstruction of Aristotelian categories presented above can only be an approximation to the truth of the matter. It is based on an oversimplified analysis of quanti fer phrases. This need not make my reconstruction of Aristotelian categories any less interesting historically, however. On the contrary, it seems that the pressures on the reconstruction due to its approximative character are very closely related to the reasons why the simple picture of categories so far adumbrated did not satisfy Aristotle, either. Thus we are beginning to see what light do these systematic observations throw on Aristotle's argumentation in the Metaphysics. First of all, we can understand the role of one of the main concepts which Aristotle did not use in the Categories but which he relies on heavily in Metaphysics. That is the concept of matter. It is one of the main novelties of the Metaphysics treatment of being and substance as compared with the Categories. Now the role of this concept is roughly the same in my systematic treatment as it is in Aristotle, for Aristotle, too, discusses how what in the earlier approximation were unanalyzable values of quantifiers must now be thought of as if they were combinations of matter and some individuality principle. This principle Aristotle labels form. Several further similarities between Aristotle and my analysis can be registered.

THE VARIETIES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE

III

For one thing, Aristotle says that substances consist of matter and form (cf. e.g., 1029 a 27 - 30). Moreover, apparently it is only substances that do so, not members of other categories. For instance, in Met. H 4. 1044 b 8 - 9 Aristotle says that "things which exist by nature but are not substances have no matter; their substrate is their substance". [ouo' Qaa oh cj>vaH J1.fV, J1.h ouaLW Of, oux Ean TOVTOLS VA1], aAAO! TO V7rOXfLJ1.fVOV ~ oua[a.] On the systematic side, too, it is at least questionable whether the full Bresnan analysis can be found among entities other than individuals. Thus we can see how the introduction of the matter-form contrast seriously upsets the symmetry between different categories which they originally enjoyed in Aristotle's Categories. Another relevant observation is that in many instantiations of the Bresnan analysis we don't literally have to do with a clear matter-form combination. In a large number of cases, we may have as the lexical instantiation of the rightmost NP, not a mass term but the plural of a count noun. Then Q must be instantiated, not by a quantity word, but by a term which indicates a structure the entities referred to by the count noun can instantiate. Cases in point are the following: some discrete set of moments of time every large school of fish many ordered groups of numbers. We may describe these cases by saying that in them higher-order entities are thought of as being from lower-order one. In contrast, earlier we were dealing with the formation (construction) of individuals out of matter and form. It seems to me that Aristotle's notions of matter and form are calculated to cover both formation processes. It is very dubious that any unambiguous concept can bear such a burden. Hence we find here some reasons to be suspicious of Aristotle's concept of matter. We have to be very cautious, though. It might for instance seem that the more refined analysis of quantifier phrases indicated above embodies a mistaken admission to Aristotelian ways of thinking in that it in effect disregards the modern contrast between count nouns and mass terms. This distinction is linguistically much more dubious, however, than has been realized in recent literature. Perhaps this is another direction in which Aristotle is closer to the semantics of natural languages than Fregean logic. Be that as it may be, Aristotle's conception is far from unproblematic. Aristotle's problems are increased by the fact that he assimilated the form-matter contrast also to the traditional subject-predicate contrast

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and to the actuality-potentiality contrast. It is doubtful that anyone concept can happily cover all these cases. Furthermore, the assimilation increases once again the distance between Aristotle's conceptual framework and that of modern (Frege - Russell) logic. However, it would require more space than I have here to follow Aristotle in these ventures. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ackrill, l. L.: 1963, Aristotle's 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione', Clarendon Press, Oxford. Albritton, Rogers: 1957, 'Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's Metaphysics', Journal of Philosophy 54, 699 - 708. Apelt, 0.: 1891, Beitriige zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Leipzig. Balme, D. M.: 1980, 'Aristotle's Biology was not Essentialist', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 62, 1 - 12. Benardete, Seth: 1976 - 77, 'The Grammar of Being', Review of Metaphysics 30, 486-496. Benveniste, Emile: 1966, 'Categories de pen see et categories de langue', in Problemes de linguistique generale, Gallimard, Paris, pp. 63 - 74. Bluck, Richard S.: 1975, Plato's 'Sophist': A Commentary, Gordon C. Neal (ed.), Manchester University Press, Manchester. Bonitz, Hermann: 1853, 'Uber die Kategorien des Aristoteles', Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Vol. 10, pp. 591 - 645; reprinted as a separate volume 1967 by Wissenschaftlicbe Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt. Bresnan, loan: unpublished seminar notes, 'On the Syntax of English Quantifiers', Stanford University. Dancy, R. M.: 1975, Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Dancy, R. M.: 1975, 'On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances', Philosophical Review 84, 338 - 373. Dancy, R. M.: 'Aristotle and Existence', this volume, pp. 49-80. Frede, Michael: 1967, Priidikation und Existenzaussage, Hypomnemata, Vol. 18, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen. Furth, Montgomery: 1968, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', Journal of the History of Philosophy 6, 111 - 132. Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso: 1976 - 77, 'Aristotle's Hypotheses and Euclidean Postulates', Review of Metaphysics 30,430-439. Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso: 1980 - 81, 'The So-Called Question of Existence in Aristotle's An. Post. 2. 1 - 2', Review of Metaphysics 34, 71 - 89. Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso: 1981, 'Aristotle, Metaphysics H 2', Dialogos 38, 7 - 12. Graeser, Andreas: 1978, 'Aristoteles und das Problem von Substanzialitat und Sein', Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie 25, 120 - 4 I. Hintikka, laakko: 1959, 'Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity', Inquiry 2,137 - 151: reprinted with changes in Hintikka, Time and Necessity, pp. 1 - 26. Hintikka, laakko: 1972a, 'On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science', Nous 6, 55 - 69. Hintikka, laakko: 1972b, 'Leibniz on Plenitude, Relations, and the "Reign of Law" " in Harry G. Frankfurt (ed.), Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, Garden

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City, pp. 152 - 190; reprinted (with an important change) in Simo Knuuttila (ed.), 1981, ReJorging the Great Chain oj Being, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 259 - 286. Hintikka, laakko: 1973, Time and Necessity, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Hintikka, laakko: 1976, The Semantics oj Questions and the Questions oj Semantics, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Hintikka, laakko: 1979, '''Is'', Semaantical Games, and Semantical Relativity', Journal oj Philosophical Logic 8, 433-468. Hintikka, laakko: 1980, 'Aristotelian Axiomatics and Geometrical Axiomatics', in laakko Hintikka et al. (eds.), Theory Change, Ancient Axiomatics, and Galileo's Methodology, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 133 - 144. Hintikka, laakko: 1982, 'Game-Theoretical Semantics: Insights and Prospect', Notre Dame Journal oj Formal Logic 23, 219 - 241. Hintikka, laakko: 1983, 'Semantical Games, the Alleged Ambiguity of "Is", and Aristotelian Categories', Synthese 54, 443-468. Kahn, Charles: 1966, 'The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Concept of Being', Foundations oj Language 2, 245 - 265. Kahn, Charles: 1973, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Kahn, Charles: 1973, 'On the Theory of the Verb "To Be" " in Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology, New York University Press, New York, pp. 1-20. Kahn, Charles: 1976, 'Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy', Archiv Jur Geschichte der Philosophie 58, 323 - 334. Kirwan, Christopher: 1971, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books r, ~, E, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Loux, Michael 1.: 1974, translator and editor, Ockham's Theory oj Terms, Notre Dame University Press. Maier, Heinrich: 1896-1900, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Vols. 1- 2, K. F. Koehler, Stuttgart; reprinted 1969 by Georg Olms, Hildesheim. Mates, Benson~ 1979, 'Identity and Predication in Plato', Phronesis 24, 211 - 229. Moravcsik, 1. M. E. (ed.): 1967, Aristotle: A Collection oj Critical Essays, Doubleday, Garden City. Moravcsik, 1. M. E.: 1967, 'Aristotle's Theory of Categories', in Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection oj Critical Essays, pp. 125 -145. Moravcsik, 1. M. E.: 1976, 'The Discernability of Identicals', Journal oj Philosophy 73, 587 - 598. Owen, G. E. L.: 1%0, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in 1. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, Vol. ii), Goteborg, pp. 163 - 190. Owen, G. E. L.: 1965, 'Aristotle in the Snares of Ontology', in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp; 69 - 95. Owen, G. E. L.: 1978-79, 'Particular and General', Proceedings oj the Aristotelian Society 79, I - 21. Ross, W. D.: 1924, Aristotle's Metaphysics, A Revised Text With Introduction and Commentary, Vols. 1-2, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Ryle, Gilbert: 1937 - 38, 'Categories', Proceedings oJ the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 38, pp. 189-206; reprinted in 1971, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, Hutchinson, London, pp. 170-184. Ryle, Gilbert: 1939, 'Plato's Parmenides', Mind 48, 129 - 151, 302 - 325. Saarinen, Esa (ed.): 1979, Game-Theoretical Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Trendelenburg, Adolf: 1846, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Bethge, Berlin.

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Weidemann, Hermann: 1980, 'In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication', Phronesis 25,76-87. Weinberg, Julius R.: 1965, 'The Concept of Relation: Some Observation on Its History', in Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the History of Thought, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp. 61 - 119. Woods, M. J.: 1974-75, 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle', Proceedings 0/ the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 75, pp. 167 - 180.

Dept. of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306- /054, U.S. 4.

THE CHIMERA'S DIARY Edited by STEN EBBESEN

Institute of Greek and Latin Medieval Philology, University of Copenhagen

[Editor's note: This paper reproduces the manuscript left by the chimera, but I have added references to books and manuscripts, plus a few notes which appear in square brackets. The reader will notice that the chimera has wisely disregarded accidental changes of philosophers' choices of example when they need a composite animal. The chimera takes remarks about, e.g., the goat-stag as remarks aimed at itself. As a matter of fact, Aristotle and the Greek Aristotelian commentators prefer the goat-stag (TQOI-YMOIIPOS) and the centaur ({1r1rOXEJlTaIlQOS). In the Hellenistic period, the centaur, the scylla and the chimera are the standard examples. In Latin medieval texts the chimera (inherited from Manlius Boethius) is vastly more popular than any of the other composite animals.)

My feelings towards philosophers are mixed. For centuries they have used me as an experimental animal, keeping me on a minimum of being. In a way I may owe them my "life", but their experiments have weakened me so much that the end may be drawing near. If my weakness proves fatal, please inform the Centaur, Goat-Stag and Pegasus, who are my next of kin. If the philosophers kill me, I expect them to keep at least one of my relatives alive in order to continue the experiments. If we are all doomed, I would like to secure us a place in man's memory. This is why I have put together these eXtracts from my diary, recording the sufferings to which I and my tribe have been subjected. 1. LONG B.C.

"In front a lion, in the rear a serpent, in the middle a goat" - that's what I am. Zeus bless Homer for his excellent description [Iliad 6.181]. 2.400 B.C.

Philosophers exhibit an un savoury interest in the being and the nonbeing. Gorgias claims that I am not. He seems to say, though, that my claim to being is as good as anyone's because I may be thought about 115 S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being, 115-143. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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('PQoP€iat?m). But he does not intend to save me that way. Only to show

that being thought about is no criterion of being, so that even if something else is and I am not, men cannot single out that something else. [Here the chimera may be wrong in detail, though hardly in substance. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.80, mentions the chimera in a paraphrase of Gorgias' On the Non-Being (n€QL TOU p.r, OPTOS). He also mentions the Scylla. I doubt whether these examples occurred in Gorgias' text. They do not occur in our other source for that work, viz. Ps.-Aristotle's De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia (979a - 980b in Bekker's edition of Aristotle; new edition ill Cassin (1980) 610-643, at p. 64) = Bekker 980a).] 3.320 B.C.

This is an exciting century. Philosophers now seem to agree that I am not, but thanks to Plato [Sophist] they no longer throw all us non-beings into the waste-bin with the remark that "it shall never be established that things which are not, are" [Parmenides F. 7]. One brilliant representative of this new flexibility is Aristotle whose lectures I used to attend (invisibly, of course) until his recent decease. He once stated as a simple matter of fact that people do say "the non-being is non-being" [Metaph. 4.2 1003blO]. But he would not accept an unqualified 'the non-being is'. Thus he said that it does not follow that the non-being is because it is anobject-of-belief (oo~aaToP, I think I will henceforward render this 'opinable'), "for it is not the same to be something and to be simpliciter though the similarity of expression makes it seem so" [Sophistici Elenchi 5 167al - 6]. He also explained the failure of the inference with the words "for there is belief (or: opinion - oo~a) about it [i.e. the non-being] not because it is but because it is not" - or rather (because his use of OTt was ambiguous): "for there is belief concerning it, not [a belief] that it is, but [a belief] that it is not" [De interpretatione II 21a32 - 33. Cf. Analytica Priora 1.38 49a24 and the Greek commentators on the latter text, viz. Alexander, APr., CAG 2.1 :368 - 369; Philoponus APr. J, CAG 13.2:345; Leo Magentinus, APr. J, MS Vat. gr. 244: 229r, scholium P1'/'.] Whichever interpretation is correct, I think he wanted to say that the very point of saying 'the non-being is opinable' is to make it clear that one will not subscribe to the unqualified 'the non-being is'. In the same lecture he indirectly informed me that my friend Homer is no more, because he treated the inferences 'Homer is a poet, therefore Homer is' and 'the non-being is opinable, therefore the non-being is' as similar in structure [De interpretatione II 2Ia25sqq.].

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Other memorable remarks of Aristotle's include, "Not-man is not a name ... Let us call it an infinite name since it holds indifferently of anything, whether being or non-being". [De interpretatione 2 I6a30- 33; 'since' etc. omitted by the best mss. and in Boethius' Latin translation, but cf. Boethius, Int. £'C.'. 2a p. 62.7 Meiser: "et aequaliter dicitur vel in eo quod est vel in eo quod non est".] He made a similar remark about verbs with a prefixed 'not-' [De interpretatione 3 I6bI2-15]. Also, he said that "even the goat-stag signifies something, but not, as yet, anything true or false, unless 'is' or 'is not' is added" [De interpretatione 1 16al6 -18]; and "of that which is not, no one knows what it is, only what the account or the name signifies when I say 'goatstag', but it is impossible to know what a goat-stag is" [Analytica Posteriora 2.7 92b5 - 8; cf. Topica 4.1 121a21 - 25]. I must admit that I do not quite grasp all the implications of Aristotle's statements about the non-being and fabulous animals. I hope that future generations of men will help me understand him better. 4.50 B.C.

I have just read a beautiful poem by an Epicurean called Lucretius. He gives us monsters a physical existence, thinking that the atomic pictures thrown off by the animals of which we are composed may get mixed up so as to produce monstrous pictures which men may perceive. But he will not give us physical existence as sources of those pictures. The freedom of atoms to combine is not so great, he holds, that beings consisting of parts belonging to different natural species can arise [Lucretius, De rerum natura 2.700-717,4.722-748,5.878-924]. Others will only give us conceptual existence. It seems to be the common notion these days that there are two ways of forming concepts, (a) directly on the basis of things met with in nature; (b) through creative work on the materials gathered through direct confrontation with the things. Creative work which consists in joining things which have not been received together is called 'secondary combination' (€7rtavpt'hUL~) and is responsible for concepts of such monsters as me. [See Ebbesen (1981), I: 191.] 5. A.D. 650

I once wished for help to understand Aristotle. During the last 500 years or so there have been many Aristotelian commentators. By now they are

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few. I therefore think it may be time to try to summarize what they have said about us non-beings. Some of the more recent writers have the rather crude notion that our names are non-significative in the same way that 'blityri' and 'skindapsos' are; or that 'goat-stag', 'blityri' and 'skindapsos' share the property of signifying non-existent things. [Stephanus, Int., CAG 18.3: 7.17 - 18; Elias, Intr., CAG 18.1: 3.7 - 8; Ps.-Elias, Intr., 25.8, p. 52; David, Intr., CAG 18.2: 1.16-18; Anonymus Moraux, Intr., 111.107 -109 p. 80; cf. Eustratius, APo., CAG 21.1: 95 - 96.] As if it made no difference that you can describe a goat-stag or me, but not a blityri or a skindapsos since no sort of meaning or notion is associated with those words - in fact, they are "words" coined by philosophers precisely to show that it is . possible to have an articulated string of sounds with n.9 meaning at all. The better commentators - and even the naive ones, on occasion agree that 'chimera' and 'goat-stag' are significative and not to be confused with such nonsense "words" as 'blityri'. (After all, I have a nominal definition [cf. Simplicius, Ph., CAG 9: 696.3sqq; Ps.Philoponus, APo. II, CAG 13.3: 359.26-360.9]). In their standard theory, the semantic relation has three terms. The word signifies a concept which signifies a thing [cf. Ebbesen (l981a), 1: 141ff]. In my case, they hold, the semantic relation is not satisfied as far as the third term is concerned since there is no independently subsisting thing (or: "nature") to be signified by the word via the concept; but at least there is a concept of sorts. With 'blityri' there can be no semantic relation at all, since both concept and thing are lacking. [Ammonius, Int., CAG 4.5: 29.8-9 (cf. 184-185); Elias, Cat., CAG 18.1: 129.15-17, Cf. Boethius, Int. ed 2a p. 50; Ps.-Philoponus, APo. II, CAG 13.3: 362:32 - 363.2.] I should like to know whether the commentators will allow me to be in some Aristotelian category. The general attitude seems to be negative. [See lamblichus apudPhiloponus, Cat., CAG 13.1: 9; Ammonius, Cat., CAG 4.4: 9 - 10; Dexippus, Cat., CAG 4.2: 7.20 - 24.] But perhaps Porphyry accepted me as a quasi-substance, in the sense that my name names a concept of something which is not, as if it were a substance [Porphyrius apud Simplicius, Cat., CAG 8: 11.6 - 12]. At any rate, if there is a concept corresponding to my name, it may be argued that I have a sort of conceptual existence as long as people think of me - though they may kill me by ceasing to do so - and that it is possible to know and understand (E7rLamaiJw) what I am. This knowledge and understanding (E7rtaT~/L7J, scfentia) will be as perishable

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as its object (E7rtaT7]TOII, scibile), being totally dependent on the human mind which possesses the understanding. My being known and my being become inextricably joined. Some have suggested that this may in fact be the case [Porphyrius, Cat., CAG 4.1: 121.4-15. Cf. Boethius, Cat., PL 64: 229; Simplicius, Cat., CAG 8: 191; Ammonius, Intr., CAG 4.3: 39.14-40.6]. However, this line of though makes me similar to such abstract universals as the species "man". Too similar, most commentators think. Hence thei introduce a distinction between "constructive thought" (E7riIlOteX) and "mere constructive thought" (1/tt)..~ E7riIlOta). Abstract, post-rem, universals are (concepts) derived from extra-mentally existing things, and so they "are in constructive thought", but not "merely"; whereas the concept of a chimera "is in mere constructive thought" for lack of an extramental correlate. [See David, Intr., CAG 18.2: 116-117. Cf. Elias, Intr., CAG 18.1: 49.19 - 20; Anonymus Moraux, Intr., 111.102 - 109 p. 80. Cf. also David, Intr., CAG 18.2: 46.35 - 47.1, where 1/tt)..~ E7rillOta is distinguished from rpaIlTaaia]. By this move the commentators actually assign me a baser sort of concept than real things have, and so they can deprive me of my "scibility", leaving only things associated with the finer sort of concept as possible objects of genuine knowledge and understanding (scientia). They can reaffirm the Aristotelian dictum "about that which is not, one cannot know what it is" and they can deny that I have a being which consists in being known (in the pregnant, Aristotelian sense of the word), though they concede that man's thought may give me a precarious existence which lasts as long as the thought about me. [See Ammonius, Intr., CAG 4.3: 39.14 sqq; David, Intr.,CAG 18.2: 108.25-109.5 & 114.1-6; Elias, Intr., CAG 18.1: 47.3-9; cf. Boethius, Cat., PL 64: 229.] Since the commentators allow me and my kin a being in the mind, they can also allow us some predicates, such as 'not-just', 'nameable', 'opinable'. Ammonius in one place [Int., CAG 4.5: 184.25sqq.] imagines somebody who [in imitation of Aristotle, Physics 4.1 208a30] asks, "Where is that goat-stag of which we truly predicate 'not-just'?". The answer given by Ammonius is, "In constructive thought". Predication presupposes that the subject has been conceptualized - constructed in thought - but not that it has existence before being constructed in thought. The predicates I truly have include infinite nouns and verbs, 'not-just', 'not-man', 'does-not-run', for instance [Ammonius, Int., CAG 4.5: 42, 52,184-185; Boethius, Int. ed. la, p. 60; ed. 2\ pp. 62, 69-70]. This

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opens an interesting perspective. If these infinite terms can be truly predicated of me, does it not follow that some finite predicates of the same type can also be so? If I am not-just, not-man and do-not-run, doesn't this mean that I am some other substance than man, equipped with some other quality than justice, and exercising some other activity than running? I have little hope, though, that the commentators would admit as much. It looks as though the only finite predicates they will allow me are such as indicate being in thought and having a name ('opinable', 'nameable' etc.), plus, I suppose, my nominal definition ('animal composed of goat, lion and snake'). My manuscript of Boethius' second commentary on De interpretatione has a lacuna at the vital point [Boethius, Int. ed. 2 a p. 70], but I think he wants to say that in 'a/the centaur runs' running is predicated, but falsely. This indicates that he thinks that all categorical propositions with finite predicates and me for their subject are false when affirmative and true when negative. But he does not say this in so many words. Anyhow, the commentators agree that 'the chimera is not' is true. Ammonius [reported by Philoponus, APo. I, CAG 13.3: 323.12sqq.] once added that since this cannot be otherwise, to know it is to have genuine, "scientific" knowledge (€7rL(JT~p,.,.,). Some others similarly state that I neither am, nor will I possibly be [Boethius, Int. ed. 1a p. 60; Simplicius, Ph., CAG 9: 517.9 - 10; also Michael Ephesius (12th c.), Metaph., CAG 1: 573.33 - 34]. They do not say whether the impossibility of my being can be deduced from the principles of biology (essentially = Lucretius' position) or whether I am ex hypothesi a creature that cannot be. In either case, this bodes ill. If people become convinced that it is no contingent, but a necessary fact that I do not exist, my scarce ration of being may be curtailed even further. As I have mentioned, the commentators accept the truth of 'a/the chimera is opinable', but they do their best to explain away its apparent existential implication. One approach consists in saying that 'opinable' means 'being in thought, but not extra-mentally" [Boethius, Int. ed.2 a , p. 376; cf. ed. p. 166]. This interpretation of 'opinable' can be bolstered up with the following interpretation of Aristotle's remark in De interpretatione [11 21 a32 - 33]: "for there is opinion (and not scientific knowledge) about the non-being not because it is (because then there might be scientific knowledge about it) but precisely because it is not" [Boethius, II. cc.]. Secondly, they sometimes follow Plato in distinguishing between several kinds of being and not-being. The being which the proposition 'the chimera is opinable' truly asserts I have is a

r,

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vile one - viler even than being-different-from namely being-inopinion, from which it is not permissible to detach a simple "being" as it stands in an indissoluble relationship to opinion [Thus Ammonius, Int., CAG 4.5: 213; cf. Anonymus Tanin, Int. p. 98]. Thirdly, following a suggestion of Aristotle's (De interpretatione 11 21 a26 - 28], they say that in 'the chimera is opinable', 'is' is not primarily predicated of me but of the opinable, so that the sense is "there is an opinion, and that is an opinion of a chimera"; whereas 'is' is directly predicated of me in the false proposition 'the chimera is' [Boethius, Int. ed. 2 a p. 376; cf. Ammonius, Int., CAG 4.5: 184 & 211]. For good measure, rabid Platonists even deny me a concept (vorIlLCx). The Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias has used me in an explanation of one of Aristotle's arguments against the ideas [Alexander, Metaph., ad A 9 990b 14, CAG 1: 81 - 82; see also the text in Harlfinger (1975),26-27]. If, the argument runs, thinking (vofiv) of something requires a permanent, non-particular object - an idea -, there must also be an idea of me, since people think of me. Unfortunately, Alexander's intention is not to equip me with an idea. He uses me in much the same way as Gorgias did. Assuming that it would be silly to posit an idea of me, he concludes that one should not posit ideas at all. About a century ago the more Platonically oriented Asclepius delivered a counter-attack against Alexander, in order to save the ideas - but not mine. He pointed out that believing there to be an idea when something is intellectually grasped, with the grasp called vorWL~, does not entail believing in ideas of things which are not. For the sort of intellectual grasp people have of such things is not a VOTJal~ but a cpCivTCiaiCi [Asclepius Metaph., CAG 6.2: 74-75]. This seems to be the same sort of trick as the one used to save the abstract universals. A distinction between two sorts of intellectual grasp is introduced and the inferior one is associated with me. But I just wonder whether Asclepius' argument is not circular. How does a man know that a thought of me is no vOTJaL~ except by knowing that I have no idea? The Aristotelian may claim that he empirically knows that I do not exist in the particulars. and that therefore the concept of me has no real foundation. But can the Platoni~t have a similar knowledge of which ideas there are? Is the non-existence of an idea of me vouched for by the empirical fact that he sees no mirrorimage of such an idea in the world of coming-to-be and passing-away? Or did Asclepius have a reason for considering my non-existence a necessary fact? I just wonder.

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6. A.O. 1260

After several dull centuries, the last one and a half have been exciting. I have often wondered whether I am an individual or a universal. [The same doubt has haunted the editors of CAG. Some print XLJLmQex and give the references in the index nominum; others use lower-case and put the word in their index verborum.] It is now clear that I am a universal. An endangered species, in fact. Thus one introduction to logic says, Est quoddam universale quod praedicatur de nullo actualiter, sed de pluribus secundum intellectum, ut chimaera [Anon., Logica Cum sit nostra, LM 11.2: 432. 11 - 12; cf. Anon., Logica Ut dicit, LM 11.2: 387). [There is one sort of universal which is predicated of nothing actually but of several things in thought; thus (the) chimera.)

One recent philosopher claims that the opinable is my genus, saying, cum dicitur 'chimaera est opinabilis', haec est enuntiatio, et est de universali non universaliter sumpto. Unde si dicatur 'chimaera est opinabilis', praedicatur hic genus de specie. Et sciendum quod istae differentiae 'universale', 'singulare' ut hic sumuntur non sunt differentiae entis sed rei, et non sumitur ibi res secundum quod dicitur res quae habet esse actuale, sed dicitur res omne illud quod potest apprehendi ab anima [Anon., Int., MS Oxford Bod!. Canon. misc. 403: 43rB; minor scribal errors have been tacitly corrected). [When we say 'a/the chimera is opinable', this is a statement and it is about a universal not taken universally. In fact, when we say 'a/the chimera is opinable' a genus is predicated ofa species. It should be understood, though, that the differences 'universal' and 'singular' in the sense employed here are not differences of (a/the) being but of (a/the) thing; and 'thing' is not used in the sense in which a thing is so called because it has actual being, but 'thing' is used to cover everything which may be grasped by the mind.)

Like most people these days he holds that any proposition of the form 'A is (a) B' may be expanded ("expounded", they say) so as to yield "A is (a) B being", in which 'B' modifies ("restricts") 'being' in the same way that 'rational mortal' restricts 'animal' in 'rational mortal animal' [Gp. cit. 48rA, quoted in lewry (1978),128. lewry mistakenly gives the reference as 47vB]. The implication is that 'a/the chimera is opinable' may be expounded as 'a/the chi mara is (an) opinable being'. This philosopher is in express opposition to another group which tried to get rid of the being that appears to be assigned me in that proposition by distinguishing between two senses of 'is'. According to them, 'is}' = "'is' secundum adiacens" is short for 'is 2 being'; whereas 'is 2 ' = "'is' tertium adiacens" is a mere copula, i.e., solely a sign of composition of subject and predicate. Their 'is 2 ' cannot be subjected to "exposition", i.e. it cannot be considered shor.t-hand for 'is being' or any other phrase. Consequently, the move from "the chimera is opinable' to "he chimera

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is' would be a move from 'is 2 ' (the "substantive 'is' ", as some say) to 'is l ' (which they call "adjective"); and so the move is illegitimate as it hinges on the wrong assumption that 'is' has one sense only. [An excellent collection of 13th-century texts bearing on this question (as well as the others dealt with by the chimera in the present entry) is found in Lewry (1978) and (1981a - b). The interpretation of est tertium adiacens as a mere copula is at least as old as Abelard (see, e.g., his Dialectica, pp. 135, 162, 164; cf. De Rijk (1981a- b)). It is earnestly defended by Robert Bacon (early 13th c.) in his Syncategoremata; text in Braakhuis (1979), I: 131 - 135). Robert's view is criticized in an anonymous scholium on Sophistici Elenchi 166b37, in M. Osterr. Nat.bib!., lat. 166: 184v: Item quaeri potest de paralogismis quos ponit Aristoteles. Sunt autem huiusmodi: 'quod est opinabile, est; sed quod non est, est opinabile; ergo quod non est, est'; eodem modo: 'chimaera est opinabilis, ergo chimaera est'; alius paralogism us talis: 'hoc non est homo, ergo non est'. Videtur quod in primo paralogismo sit aequivocatio, quoniam proceditur ab hoc verbo 'est' secundum quod est substantivum ad idem secundum quod adiectivum. Dicitur 'est' dupliciter sumi: quandoque scilicet est adiectivum, quando[que] simpliciter praedicatur et non ponitur in numero, ut 'Socrates est'; quandoque est substantivum, ut quando ponitur in numerum, ut 'Socrates est homo'. Fit ergo processus in praedicto paralogismo secundum diversas acceptiones huius verbi 'est', scilicet in una est secundum quod est substantivum, in altera secundum quod adiectivum; et ita erit ibi aequivocatio vel nulla est praedicta distinctio. [Further, questions may be raised concerning the paralogisms in Aristotle's text. They are as follows: 'what is opinable, is; but what is not, is opinable; therefore what is not, is'; in the same manner: 'althe chimera is opinable, therefore althe chimera is'; another paralogism goes like this: 'this is not a man, therefore this is not'. It is arguable that in the first paralogism we have to do with equivocation because there is a move from the verb 'is' in its substantival function to 'is' in its adjectival function. 'Is' is presumed to be capable of two uses; sometimes it is adjectival (namely when it is precticatcd absolutely and does not enter in a count, as in 'Socrates is'); sometimes it is substantival (namely when it does enter in a count, as in 'Socrates is a man '). So, in the above paralogism the move from premisses to conclusion is accompanied by a shift in the interprelation of the verb 'is', which in one proposition is laken in its substantival funclion, in another in the adjectival one; this, then, must be a case of equivocal ion - or else the said dislinclion is void.]

This question is solved as follows: Ad hoc quod obicilur de primo paralogismo dicendum quod non eSI ibi aequi\ ocalio, sed processus secundum quid el simpliciler, quoniam 'esl' secundum sC pracdical esse simpliciler el secundum aClum, haec aulcm determinatio 'opinabik' Irahil ipsum ad nominandum esse quodam modo, scilicet esse secundum opinionem; unde proccdilu ibi ab esse quodam modo, scilicel secundum opinionem, ad esse simpliciler el in aL·IU. Unde dici POlcsl quod nihil esl dicere [ctislingucre cod.] hoc verbum 'esl' e"c aeqlliv()cum, nee quod quandoquc CSI subslanlivum, quandoque adieClivum: semper cnim esl substanli\ulTl, sive ponilur in numerum sive praedicelur simpliciICr.]

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[As regards the criticism raised concerning the first paralogism, the answer must be that there is no case of equivocation but a move from in-some-respect to absolutely, because 'is' in itself predicates being absolutely and actually, whereas the determination 'opinable' makes it name being in some way - being in opinion, that is. Hence a move is performed from being in some way - in opinion - to being absolutely and actually. Thus it may be said that there is no foundation for claiming that the verb 'is' is equivocal, nor for claiming that it is sometimes substantival, sometimes adjectival. For it is always substantival, whether it enters into a count or is predicated absolutely. 1

The distinction between the predicative and the existential 'is' has met with general disapproval, at least from the time of Robert Kilwardby (c. 1240). He flatly denies that 'is' is equivocal, and holds that the right way to expound both 'is l ' and 'is 2 ' is "is being" [see text in Lewry (1978), 128]. This exposition brings out that a predicate has both matter and form. The fo!'m is the means relating the matter to..the subject. When 'is' is secundum adiacens, as in 'a/the man is', the matter of the predicate is being simpliciter. If 'is' is tertium adiacens, the matter is a specified sort of being - substantial in '(a/the) man is (an) animal', accidental in '(a/the) man is just'. In his commentary on De interpretatione, Kilwardby says: Dubitatur postea si praedicetur tertium, propter hoc quod in omni enuntiatione est medium hoc verbum 'est' et subiectum et praedicatum extrema, cum praedicatur tertium adiacens; et nihil unum et idem potest esse medium et extremum; ex quo sequitur quod non praedicatur tertium. § Sed intellege quod uno modo extremum, alio modo medium: ratione compositionis medium, ratione substantiae sive rei verbi extremum. Est enim hoc ipsum 'est' praedicatum secundum materiam et formam; et dico formam praedicati medium per quod comparatur praedicatum [medium) subiecto, et praedicatum secundum materiam dir:o rem verbi; et ex hiis fieri unum praedicatum, ut cum dico 'homo est' id est 'homo est ens', et sic praedicatur hoc ipsum 'est' secundum adiacens. Et quam vis sit copula aliquo modo tertium (scilicet non ordine sed numero), quia iIIud cui adiacet (scilicet praedicatum secundum materiam) non ponit in numero cum eo, non dicitur hoc ipsum 'est' esse tertium adiacens, sed secundum, cum subiectum sit quod adiacet et praedicatum est quod adiacet; et quia in hac 'homo est iustus' et 'homo est animal' praedicatur esse specificatum (scilicet per substantiale et accidentale), quod quidem ponit in numerum cum esse simpliciter, ideo dicitur hoc verbum 'est' in talibus praedicari tertium adiacens, ita scilicet quod sit tertium numero, non ordine. Sic ergo aliquando praedicatur hoc verbum 'est' tertium adiacens. [MS Cambridge, Peterhouse, 206: 7?rB.) [Then doubt is raised whether it is predicated third. For in every statement the verb 'is' is the mean and the subject and the predicate the extremes, when it is predicated as a third supplement; and no one thing can be both mean and extreme. It follows that it is not predicated third. § But it should be realized that it is an extreme in one way, a mean in another way: a mean as far as the composition is concerned, an extreme as far as the substance or content of the verb is concerned. For this very 'is' is a predicate in respect of matter and form. By a predicate's form I understand the mean through which the predicate is related to the subject. By predicate in respect of matter I understand the verbal content. Now, my claim is that these two together constitute one predicate, as when I say '(a/the) man is' = '(a/the) man is being', and thus 'is' is predicated as a second supplem~nt. And

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although the copula is in a way a third - not in order, that is, but in number -, as that to which it is a supplement - viz. the predicate in respect of matter - does not add to the count together with it, 'is' is not said to be a third supplement but a second one, since the subject is one supplement and the predicate is another supplement. And since in the propositions '(a/the) man is just' and '(a/the) man is an animal' the being which is predicated is specified (as substantial or accidental), and this adds to the count together with being absolutely, for this reason the verb 'is' is said to be predicated as a third supplement in such propositions, i.e., in such a way that it is third in number, not in order. Thus, then, 'is' is sometimes predicated as a third supplement.)

There can be no doubt that for Kilwardby the matter of the predicate in 'a/the chimera is opinable' is opinable being. In fact, there has been quite a debate about the status of opinable being vis-a-vis simple being. Is the one somehow included in the other? If opinable being were a subjective part (species) of being, it would be permissible to argue, 'this is opinable, ergo this is'. The argument would be as good as 'Socrates is a man, ergo Socrates is an animal'. But since the substitution of 'the chimera' for 'this' would render the antecedent true and the consequent false, people deny that opinable being is a species of simple being. But then it might seem that opinable being is a wider term than being since both the (actually) being and the non-being is opinable. [So already Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Topica, CAG 2.2: 359.17 -18 ad Top. 4.6 127a34sqq.). This view would imply that 'this is, ergo this is opinable' is a sound inference. But then the converse inference, 'this is opinable, ergo this is' would commit the fallacy of consequent rather than the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter which Aristotle says it commits. Kilwardby, and many others, solve this difficulty by distinguishing between a proper and an improper sense of 'opinable'. In the proper sense, they hold, it means "in opinion only, not really". When 'opinable' is taken in this sense, the actually being does not fall under the opinable, and so there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, but not a fallacy of the consequent in 'this is opinable, ergo this is'. However, in an improper and general sense 'opinable (being)' does comprise actual being as well as non-being or imaginary being. When 'opinable' is taken in this sense, there is a fallacy of the consequent in 'this is opinable, ergo this is' - but then, did not Aristotle himself say that one and the same argument may be fallacious for more than one reason? [For an early (12th century) treatment of the above que~tion, see Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, MS Cambridge St John's College D.12: 90rB - vA (on Arist. SE 166b37). The following texts are all doctrinally close to Kilwardby's: Anonymus Monacensis, Commenlarium in Sophislicos Elenchos, MSS Admont

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241: 28rA - B & CLM 14246: 11 vA (presumably a little earlier than Kilwardby); Albertus Magnus, Expos. SE 1.3.7, ed. Borgnet 2: 570 (directly influenced by Kilwardby, as shown in Ebbesen (1981 b»; Anon., Scholium in Arist. SE 166b37, MS Cambridge Gonville and Caius 466/573: 137v; Anonymus e Musaeo, Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, MS Oxford Bodleian E Musaeo 133: 3rA. Kilwardby's own text (Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, MSS Cambridge Peterhouse 205:291rB-vA & Paris BN lat. 16619: 18rB-vA) runs like this (discrepancies between the mss. are few and not noted here): Adhuc dubitatur de primo paralogismo quem ponit in littera (SE 167al), in quo dicit esse fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter. Videtur enim quod ibi sit magis fallacia consequentis quam secundum quid et simpliciter cum dicit 'est opinabile, ergo est', hac ratione: quandocumque ali quod argumentum sic se habet quod sequitur econverso et non sic, ibi est fallada consequentis; sic autem est in praedicto paralogismo; ergo in ipso est fallacia consequentis. Maior huius ration is patel. Minor etiam manifesta est, cum omne quod est potest cad ere in opinione et non econverso. Penitus eodem modo opponitur de secundo paralogismo. Ibi enim est fallacia consequentis a destructione antecedentis cum dicit 'non est homo, ergo non est'; econverso enim sequitur, sic: 'non est, ergo non est homo' .... Ad primum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Aristoteles in secundo huius, nihil impedit plures occa· siones fallendi esse in una eademque oratione. Unde dico quod in prima oratione, si sumatur 'opinabile' communiter, est fallacia consequentis. Uno modo opinabile enim communiter est omne illud quod cadit in opinione, et hoc modo non sequitur 'est opinabile, ergo est', immo tenet econverso. Sumpto ergo opinabili communiter est in hoc paralogismo tam consequens quam secundum quid et simpliciter. Ipso autem sumpto proprie non est ibi fallacia consequentis: tunc enim non sequiter econverso, sic: 'est, ergo est solum in opinione'. Hoc enim est proprie opinabile quod est solum in opinione. Un de dico quod Iicet in hoc paralogismo sit tam fallacia consequentis quam secundum quid et simpliciter, est tamen hic proprius secundum quid et simpliciter, et dico "proprius" quia secundum quid proprie sumitur opinabile. In alio autem paralogismo, cum dicitur 'asinus non est homo, ergo non est', est fallacia consequentis et similiter fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Inducit tamen ipsum propter peccatum secundum quid et simpliciter. Dicunt tam en quidam quod non est ibi fallacia consequentis. Ponunt enim quod ista duo possunt simul stare 'est homo' et 'non est', et dicunt quod Caesar est homo et cum non est. Et cum arguitur contra eos sic: 'est homo, ergo est', dicunt quod hoc argumentum non valet, et hac ratione: omne praedicatum essentiale et universale dicit esse habitudinis; quandocumque autem praedicatur hoc verbum 'est' secundum adiacens, dicit esse temporis sive esse ut nunc. Unde dicunt quod cum arguitur sic 'Caesar est homo, ergo Caesar est' fit fallacia aequivocationis, quia proceditur ab esse habitudinis ad esse temporis vel ad esse ut nunc. Utrum autem dicant verum vel falsum non magnam habet dubitationem. "j [Next, doubt is raised concerning the first paralogism which he gives in the text claiming that it commits the fallacy of "in-some-respect-and-absolutely". For it is arguable that the fallacy involved in that of consequent rather than that of in-so me-respect· and-absolutely, and for the following reason: Whenever an argument is thus constituted that the reverse inference holds, but not the one stated in the argument, there is a case of the fallacy of con· sequent. But that is the situation with the paralogism in question. Therefore there is a fallacy of consequent in it. The major of this reasoning is evident. The minor is also clear

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since everything that is can occur in opinion, but not vice versa. Exactly the same objection is raised concerning the second paralogism. For there the fallacy of consequent from destruction of the antecedent is committed when he says 'it is not a man, therefore it is not, as it follows vice versa, in this way: 'it is not, therefore it is not a man' .... As for the first point, the response must be that, as Aristotle says in Book II of this work, nothing prevents joint occurrence of several possible reasons of fallacy in the same utterance. Accordingly, my position regarding the first utterance is that if 'opinable' is taken in a general sense, there is the fallacy of consequent. For in one way the opinable is, in a general sense, all that which can occur in opinion; and in that way 'it is opinable, therefore it is' is a non sequitur, whereas it does hold vice versa. So when the opinable is taken in the general sense, there is in this paralogism as well a fallacy of consequent as in-some-respect-andabsolutely. But when the opinable is taken in its proper sense, no fallacy of consequent occurs. For then it does not follow vice versa; thus 'it is, therefore it is in opinion only', as that is properly speaking opinable which is in opinion only. Accordingly, I submit that although there is in this paralogism as well a fallacy of consequent as in-some-respect-andabsolutely, more properly speaking there is here a fallacy in-some-respect-and-absolutely - and I say "more properly" because the opinable is taken in the proper sense in somc respect. But in the other paralogism, when it is said 'a/the donkey is not a man, therefore it is not', there is a fallacy of consequent and likewise a fallacy in-some-respect-andabsolutely. But he introduces the paralogism for the sake of its vicious in-some-respectand-absolutely. Some, however, claim that no fallacy of consequent occurs there. For they submit that the claims 'it is a man' and 'it is not' are compatible, and they say that Caesar is a man even when he is not. And when they are confronted with the arg).lmcnt 'it is a man, therefore it is', they say that this argument is not valid, and for the following reason: Every essential and universal predicate expresses habitudinal being; but whenever the \crb 'is' is predicated as a second supplement it expresses temporal being (or "being as of now"). Accordingly, they say that when it is argued as follows, 'Caesar is a man, therefore Caesar is'. a fallacy of equivocation is committed because a move is performed from habitudinal being to temporal being (or: "being as of now"). Whether they are right or wrong on this score is scarcely a mattcr of doubt.]

Long ago, after reading Manlius Boethius, I asked whether my infinite predicates confer some sort of existence on me. This question, whether infinite terms "posit anything" is now being eagerly discussed. [The question "utrum nomen infinitum ponat aliquid" is a standard one in 13th-century commentaries on De interpretatione. For Kilwardby and his contemporaries' treatment of the matter, see Lewry (1978). 45fT For later treatments, see (e.g.) Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiol1c\ sUf7cr lihrulll Peri hermeneias, MS Paris BN lat 16170: 102rB -103r13; Simon de Faverisham, Quaestiones super libra Perihermeneias pp. 159 -- 160.] Kilwardby holds that an infinite noun, such as 'not-man', docs signify substance with quality like any other noun. But the quality is lack-of-aquality (privatio qualitatis) and the substance, which the term does posit or at least "leave" (derelinquere) , is unspecified being, common to real physical being and being in notion (ratio), expression (dictio), or (mere) opinion. [Texts in Lewry (1978) 48ff. A characteristic passage from his

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commentary on Anatytica Priora, MS Cambridge Peterhouse 205: 1l6vA: Si autem tunc quaeratur expositio, dico quod sic exponitur 'non homo': "ens quod non est homo", sed hoc quod dico "ens" in hac expositione non dicit aliquid ens secundum naturam, sed accipitur communiter ad ens secundum naturam et ad ens secundum rationem vel intellectum, et sic ponendo ens non ponit aliquid simpliciter.] [But if an exposition is demanded, I say that 'not-man' is to be expounded as "being which is not (a) man". But when I say "being" in this exposition, this does not mean something which is physically, but the exprrssion refers indifferently to what is physically and what is notionally or conceptually; and when positing being in that way, it does not posit anything in an absolute sense.]

It follows that, in Kilwardby's view, 'the chimera is (a) not-man' does

not claim that I have some substantial being. Nor does 'althe chimera does-not-run' contain a claim that I exercise any activity; all that is posited or left is an unspecified being - in fact just as is the case when the predicate is 'is opined' (opinatur) [see Lewry (1978), 62J or 'is opinable' in the broad, improper sense. I am but the most extreme example of that which is not actually. Less extreme examples are extinct or not yet actualized species, and individuals of the past. Philosophers often perform an experiment in thought, saying "suppose there were no men". Their standard example of an individual of the past is Caesar (who has taken over the role Homer used to have). Now, if people can admit that there is a sort of being which is predicable of both me and actually existing things, they should have little difficulty in admitting that there can be true affirmative 'is'propositions about non-actual natural species or a defunct individual. Some do indeed claim that there is a way of being which renders this possible. They call it "habitual being" (esse habituate) and explain that no stronger being is needed for purposes of verification, and that all essential predications may be interpreted as not positing any stronger being. Hence 'Caesar is a man' is true even when Caesar is not (because he is dead), and 'man is an animal' is true whether the species has actual representatives or not. [For the 13th-century debate about habitual being, see Ebbesen and Pin borg (1970), Braakhuis (1977, 1981), Lewry (1981a, b), De Libera (1981), Fredborg (1981).J There would seem to be several interpretations of esse habituate, viz. (I) = esse habitu (as dinstinct from esse actu) , i.e. an incomplete way of being, being as a tendency to be actualized in a certain way. Thus 'man is (habitually) an animal' means "the nature of man is such that man can be actualized and an actual man will be an animal"; (2) = esse habitudinis or esse consequentiae (distinguished from esse temporis or

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esse ut nunc), i.e. a way of being which consists in entering into a relationship. Thus 'man is an animal' may mean "there is a relationship

(habitudo), viz. that of species to genus, between man and animal, such that man entails animal and 'this is a man' entails 'this is an animal". In other words, 'man is an animal' contains the true claim that there is a relation of entailment (consequentia) between man and animal. [The reader should be aware that the chimera follows general 13th-century usage in talking about entailment as a relation between terms as well as propositions. However, Roger Bacon (Compendium Studii Theologiae p. 57) shows awareness that this usage is dangerous: Adhuc cavillant de esse habitudinis, sed hoc in propositione (pro nomine ms & ed.) habet locum, et ideo destruetur postea, cum de propositionibus fiet sermo.l [They further use the trick of talking about habitudinal being. But this belongs in a proposition, and so it will be demolished below when I shall talk about propositions.l

(3) = esse habitum, i.e. to be present in human minds as a habitus, a structure reflecting an intellectual grasp of something. In this sense a habitus de homine is knowledge or opinion about man. Though not invented to help me, habitual being is tailored to my measure. On int!!rpretations (I) and (2), all I need in order to become as respectable as the natural species is a quidditative definition, such as 'an opinable being with such and such differentiae" or a recognition that my nominal definition is as good as a quidditative one. On interpretation (3) I just need people not to stop recognizing opinion as a habitus alongside the true grasp, understanding - and then I defy them to find a waterproof criterion by which to distinguish opinion from understanding! As a matter of fact, Nicholas of Cornwall seems willing to declare 'the donkey is a not-man' and 'the chimera is a not-man' equally true when interpreted as propositions about habitual being [Commentarium in De interpretatione, MS Oxford Corpus Christi 119: 126vB: De nullo (hoc MS) non ente praedicatur vere actus entis, ut currere etc. Sed de termino infinito vere praedicatur actus entis. Ergo etc. Minor patet per hoc quod sequitur 'asinus currit, ergo non homo currit'. [About no not-being can an act of the being be truly predicated, such as running, etc. But of an infinite term an act of the being can be truly predicated. Therefore etc. The minor is evident from the fact that this follows: 'a donkey is running, therefore a not-man is running' .1

The answer to this argument is: Potest dici secundum sententiam Bocthii quod terminus infinitus nihil ponit, respondendo huic rationi sic, quod nomen infinitum commune est ad ens et ad non ens secundum Boethium: eo quod est in quolibet, quod est et non est, ideo neutrurn ponit; de co tamen vere potest dici utrumque et ipsurn de utroque, surnpto esse habituali.]

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[Answering the argument one may follow the view expressed by Boethius, viz . that an infinite term does not posit anything, and say that an infinite noun extends indifferently to the being and the not-being according to Boethius. Inasmuch as it is in just anything that is or is not, it posits neither, but either may be truly said of it, and itself it may be truly said of either, when the being in question is taken to be habitual.l

But habitual being has its enemies. Even Kilwardby dislikes it. For it is clear that 'Caesar is a man' can have an esse actuate - interpretation, not only an esse habituate - interpretation. But then, why should it be different with 'Caesar is'? In short, 'is' becomes equivocal and 'Caesar is a man, therefore Caesar is' will be a valid inference if 'is' is taken in the same sense in the antecedent and the consequent, but invalid if it is taken in the habitual sense in the antecedent and in the actual sense in the consequent. Although he himself uses the habitus/actus distinction in another, but not unrelated, context [De artu scientiarum § § 433 - 434, p. 150], Kilwardby will have none of such "an equivocal 'is' [See the end of the extract from his Etenchi commentary, supra .] Yet, doesn't he make being equivocal when he says that simple real being has a finite meaning and may be infinitized so as to leave unspecified being, whereas unspecified being has no finite meaning and cannot be infinitized (or, if it can, the result will be "in-no-way-being")? [Kilwardby, Cammentarium in Anatytica Priara, MS Cambridge Peterhouse 205: 116vB Notandum autem quod non dicitur proprie infinitari ens nisi secundum (n.s. iecrio incerra) quod dicit ens simpliciter secundum naturam et veri tat em et tunc privatur simpliciter ens et derelinquit ens secundum opinionem sive secundum rem, illud tamen non ponitur per ipsum. Si autem accipiatur ens commune secundum animam sive opinionem et additur negatio, puto quod sola negatio erit, quia ilia privatio nihil derelinquit, cum privet tam ens secundum rationem quam ens secundum rem. Sic enim omnino privatur ens, et sonat idem quod nullo modo ens. Ens autem in tali communitate a<:<:eptum non l'st ali<:uius finitac significationis, et ideo in tali acceptione non infinitatur . Et ho<: cst quod prius diximus talc nomen non infinitari cuius non est aliqua finita significatio qualita!is.l [But it should be noticed that being cannOl properly speaking be infinitized except in so far as it means being absolutely, physically and truly. And in that case being. is eva<:uated in the absolute sense, and it leaves being in opinion or in reality, but that is not posited by it. If. however, we take it as general being in the mind or in opinion and add a negation , I think that the result will be a pure negation as this cvacuation Icaves nothing since it evacuates as well being in notion as being in reality. For in this way being is totally evacuated. and it means as much as "in no way being". Howevcr. being in this general sense has no finite signifi<:ation, and so it cannot be infinitizcd when taken in this sense. And that is what we expres sed earlier by saying that a name whIch is such as to have no finite signification of quality cannot be infiniti/ed.l

Moreover, Kilwardby's unspecified and (in the broad sense) opinable being shares with habitual being the property of being truly predicable

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as well as of things which are as of things which are not - the very property that makes habitual being an abomination to those who (like Robert Bacon from Oxford) are equipped with a robust sense of reality. By the way, Bacon is funnily old-fashioned in some respects. Thus it reeks of the 12th century when he says that a proposition one of whose terms has no referents is nonsensical (not: false) [Compendium Studii Theologiae p. 62]. I think some 12th-century philosophers considered sentences about me nonsensical. [On this aspect of 12th-century logic, see Ebbesen (1981c).] Something must happen. Bacon's semantics is bizarre and complex. With others, senses of 'is' and modes of being tend to proliferate. This may be to my advantage, but I do not think people will accept it in the long run. Even Kilwardby's philosophy is not immune to the tendency to multiply ways of being. And he lacks a good comprehensive theory to back the claim that 'is' can mean either real or (in the strict sense) opinable being, according to which environment it has in the proposition. 7. A.D. 1300

For some thirty years a brand of philosophers whom I think one ought to call "modists" have dominated the scene. They use the notion of "analogy" to explain the semantics of 'man' in 'this is a dead man, ergo this is a man' [cf. Ebbesen, 1979], and of 'is' in 'the chimera is opinable, ergo it is'. They claim that 'is' is an analogical term. When it stands alone, it means real being; when with an addition, the sort of being the addition indicates. Thus the addition of 'opinable' makes 'is' stand for being in the mind, which is a deficient sort of being ("esse deminutum"). Faced with the objection that an addition cannot change the significate of 'is', they counter that if 'to be' had been a normal univocal term, this would have been true. But as a matter of fact, it is "born" with the liability to influence from additions, and so it is OK that it should change its meaning according to the circumstances. They also say that my 'is' and my 'opinable' mix in such a way as to form one predicate, so that it is not possible to claim that one may take the 'is' out and predicate it separately on the ground that 'opinable' may be detached and separately predicated (however that was to happen). There is nothing revolutionary in most of this; but I think it is a step forward that they have found a way to classify 'is' with other terms, so that they need fewer ad hoc-rules for that verb. [For the above, see Incerti auctores, Quaestiones super Sophis:icos Elenchos, CPhD vii: quu. 56, 89; Simon de

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Faverisham, Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum, quu. 22 - 23; Anonymus Pragensis, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, MS Praha MK L.66: 89rA - B, quo 33; Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, quo 43, MSS Bruxelles BRoyale 3540-47: 526rA - B & Salamanca BUniv. 2350: 186vB -187rA.] "Habitual being" is not a term the Parisian modists favour, but for all that, many think they need something of the sort - essential being, quidditative being or whatever - to guarantee the permanence of objects of understanding, and thus the possibility of Aristotelian science. Boethius of Dacia is an interesting exception (or: was - I believe he is dead now, but I shall continue to talk about him in the present). He has a robust sense of reality and even goes so far as to declare that at a time when no man exists, the proposition 'man is man' is false, whereas 'man is not man' is true [Text in Ebbesen and Pinborg (1970), 15 - 16]. I have no doubt that he would also claim that 'the chimera is a chimera' is false when no chimera exists, i.e., according to his lights, always. And surely he would hold that 'the chimera is not a chimera' is true in the same circumstances. What horror! On the other hand, he accepts that things which do not exist in the exterior world may exist in the mind and even be objects of scientific knowledge. Thus it is possible to understand the phenomenon of an eclipse or of thunder when there is no eclipse or thunder. For something to be scibile it is only required that it have causes due to which its being is necessary or possible. In a sophism called Omnis homo de necessitate est animal he says: Rebus corruptis non oportet scientiam de rebus corrumpi, si ita sit quod illae res habeant causas et principia ex quibus sunt possibiles cognosci. Nam sicut causae effectus inducunt effectum ilium, sic cognitio illarum causarum facta in anima de necessitate inducit cogni· tionem illius effectus in anima, unde illo modo quo res habet causas et principia cognita, illo modo habet scientiam. Eclipsi enim non existente aut animali vel planta de eis non est scientia qua scitur quod ipsa sint (hoc enim falsum est), sed est scientia de eis reman ens in anima qua scitur ex qui bus causis et principiis et elementis habet fieri unumquodque illorum si fiat, ita quod ex aliis ullumquodque illorum est impossibile fieri; et est scientia de eis qua scitur quis est modus generationis uniuscuiusque illorum ex suis principiis, ita quod per alium modum ipsum fieri ex suis principiis est impossibile . [Preliminary text; critical edition to appear in CPhD in preparation.] [If things are destroyed, it is not necessary that understanding of the things be destroyed if it is the case that these things have causes and principles due to which they have the possibility of being known. For just as the causes of some effect produce that effect, so the knowledge of those causes, once established in the mind, by necessity produces knowledge of that effect in the mind, since the way in which understanding attaches to a thing is the same as the way in which the thing has known causes and principles. If, for example, an eclipse does not exist - or an animal or a plant - ,there is no understandin'l

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of them by which it is understood that they are (since this is false), but persisting in the mind there is an understanding of them by which it is understood due to what causes, principles and elements each of these things will be produced if it is produced, it being impossible for any of them to be produced due to any other causes, principles and elements. And there is an understanding of them by which it is understood which is the manner of generation of each of these things from its principles, it being impossible for it to be produced from its principles in any other manner.j

With Boethius the causal relationship has replaced being as the constant factor that makes Aristotelian science possible. [Cf. Pinborg (1974, 1976).] - But of course some cannot resist the temptation to make this a sort of being. Giles of Rome [Super Analytica Priara, quoted Pinborg (1976), 247] speaks of an esse in causis which strongly resembles a habitual being. As far as I can see, what Boethius says amounts to saying that if you can describe an object and state the precise conditions that will or would actualize it, then that object is a legitimate citizen in the city of understandable things. Now, if somebody could cogently argue that if a she-goat were to conceive after an orgy during which she had had intercourse with both a snake and a lion, she would bear a chimera - 'would the possibility of setting up such a causal explanation of my birth make me a first-class potential entity that men could have scientific knowledge of? On Boethius' theory it would. But he will not let me into the company of understandable things, and so he stresses that I have no causes due to which my being might be possible. I not only fail to be actual, I cannot be actualized. In this I differ not only from things which must be actualized, but also from such generabilia as have causes due to which their being is possible although they will not be actualized. In the sophism I quoted above, he says: Cum arguitur secundo "Quod non est, nemo potest scire quid est, ut tragelaphus et sphinx" - verum est de illo quod non est penitus, ita quod non habet esse in re nec causas ex qui bus esse suum est possibile; tale autem non est omne quod non est: eclipsis enim, cum non sit, habet causas tamen in re ex quibus suum esse non solum est possibile sed etiam necessarium, ut per easdem causas remaneat sua scientia apud animam .... Ad aliud dicendum, cum tu dicas quod omnis scientia est de ente: quia vel oportet iIIud esse ens actu vel tale quod non habet esse, tamen causas et principia, ex qui bus suum esse est necessarium vel possibile, habet; sicut apparet, cum eclipsis non sit, suum esse tamen necessario eveniet ex suis causis (dico "possibile" propter generabilia: non enim omne genera bile generabitur, habet tamen causas ex quibus ipsum esse est possibile). [As for the second argument, that "Concerning that which is not, nobody can understand what it is (e.g., a goat-stag or a sphinx)", this is true of that which is not at all, so that it does not have being in reality nor causes due to which its being is possible. But not everything that is not is of this sort. An eclipse, for instance, even when it is not, does have causes in reality due to which its being is not just possible but even necessary, so that in

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virtue of these very causes an understanding of it may persist in the mind .... As for your further claim that all understanding is about something that is, the response must be that this will have to be either something actually being or such that without having being, it does have causes and principles due to which its being is necessary or possible. A clear instance of the latter is an eclipse: even when it is not, its being will necessarily come about due to its proper causes. (I say "possible" because of generable things, as not every generable thing will be generated, yet does have causes due to which it is possible for it to be).)

I think it requires some strong assumptions about how the machinery of nature works to claim that one can distinguish between impossibilia like me and possible, yet never actualized, generabilia. But perhaps Boethius believes he knows that much about nature. This faith in human insight into nature Boethius shares with lesser philosophers, such as one Petrus (de Hibernia or de Alvernia - I really cannot tell one from another in the host of Peters) in whose Quaestiones super Analytica Posteriora I once read a discussion of the question "whether it is possible to know what a goat-stag or a chimera is" [MS Firenze BLaur. St. Croce Plut. 12 sin., 3: 36vB]. Echoing Plato's Sophist (via Avicenna), Peter says, "About that which absolutely is not, it is not possible to state anything" (de eo quod non est penitus non contingit aliquid enuntiare). But, he holds, it is possible to state something about me, and so in some sense I must exist extramentally, and in some sense be grasped by the human intellect. But thts happens in a tricky way. The man who has a concept (intellectus) of me has, in reality, a concept of the parts that I am supposed to consist of; and in so far as these parts exist, there is something extramental to state something about. However, the word 'chimera' does not primarily signify these parts but a compound of them, and that compound neither is nor can be; consequently men cannot understand what it is but only what the word signifies ("nomen chimaerae significat coniunctum ex partibus quod non est nec esse potest, et quia sic est, ideo non contingit intellegere quid est"). It is different with donkeys, he says. Even if there were no donkeys, men might understand what a donkey is since "the donkey is a nature which by itself is not prohibited to be" ("Quamvis enim asinus non esset, tamen asinus est aliqua natura quae de se non est prohibita esse, et ideo, si adhuc non esset ... asinus, non esset simile de asino et chimaera"). Peter's "natures" have much in common with Asclepius' "ideas", and I can only repeat myoid question. How does he know that I can have no "nature"? Besides, I think Peter's semantics (typical of the University of Paris c. 1275) is unnecessarily clumsy. Why doesn't he use the notion of suppositio (reference)?

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8. AD 1340

It is simply impossible to keep abreast of the enormous output of learned literature on me and other epistemological difficulties. But I think the most important contributions to the discussion during the last three decennia have been made by William of Ockham in England and John Buridan in Paris. These two monstrously sharp intellects have combined some of the most salient features of the views of Petrus de Alvernia and Boethius de Dacia while kicking out some of the main notions of modism, such as "natures", and reintroducing the notion of suppositio. The result is terrifying. At first sight, it may look promising that Ockham assimilates me to regular universals and thinks that both they and I may be either actual things in the sense of being qualities of the mind or fictitious entities whose only being is being objects of thought (esse obiective) [Expositio in librum Perihermeneias pp. 363 - 370]. But this is the only glimpse of kindness I find in the writings of either man. These people distinguish much clearer between word, concept and extramental thing, and between signification and supposition than did their predecessors. And then the onslaught sets in! They agree that the word 'chimera' does signify something, and that it is something which is also signifiable by means of normal general terms - in short, it signifies my constituent parts. Incidentally, they are not well versed in mythology. They believe I am a compound of goat and ox or ox, virgin and dragon. But in signifying thus, the word is subordinated to a complex concept, similar in structure, Buridan says, to mancapable-of-neighing or man-horse . This may be expressed in a nominal definition, such as 'a chimera is a compound of an ox and a goat', but even this proposition is true only when interpreted in the sense' 'the word 'chimera' means the same as 'compound of ox and goat' .. or "the concept to which the word 'chimera' is subordinated is a complex concept with the concept of goat and the concept of ox for its constituents" or "if anything is a chimera, it is a compound of an ox and a goat" . If the nominal definition is taken at face value, it is a false proposition, for no affirmative categorical proposition can be true unless it is the case that there is, was, will be, could have been or can be such a thing as the subject signifies. In other words, any proposition of the form 'the/a chimera is (was etc.) X' implies the assertion that 'this is a chimera' is or was etc. true at some time. Buridan and Ockham agree that if 'chimera' is taken in its natural sense, i.e. as purporting to refer to extramental entities,

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there never is, was or will be a time when 'this is a chimera' is actually or possibly true. It is simply impossible that I should ever be. I think it is due to a slip of attention that Ockham in one place [Expositio super libros Elenchorum, p. 264] accepts the traditional assignment of a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter in the case of 'the chimera is opinable, therefore it is' on the ground that 'if something is opinable, it is' is false. Buridan is adamant on this point: 'the chimera is opinable' is simply false. Here follows an extract from his quaestio 'Utrum chimaera sit intellegibilis' [Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, MS Krakow Blag. 736: 70r - v, minor scribal errors tacitly corrected.] Breviter ad istam quaestionem pono primo ill am conclusionem: haec propositio est falsa 'chimaera est opinabilis' vel 'chimaera est intellegibilis' vel 'chimaera est significabilis'. Ad quam probandam supponatur primo quod ad veritatem propositionis affirmativae requiritur subiectum et praedicatum supponere pro eodem. Secundo supponatur quod omnis terminus supponens supponit vel pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod potest esse vel pro eo quod fuit vel pro eo quod erit. Tertio supponatur quod sicut impossibile est chimaeram esse, similiter impossibile est chimaeram posse esse, similiter impossibile est chimaeram posse fuisse, similiter impossibile est chimaeram posse fieri. Hiis suppositis probatur haec conclusio. Si haec propositio est vera 'chimaera est opinabilis', cum sit affirmativa, per prim am suppositionem eius subiectum et praedicatum supponerent pro eodem. Sed hoc est falsum. Falsitas probatur: subiectus terminus pro nullo supponit, ergo falsum est quod terminus subiectus et terminus praedicatus pro eodem supponunt. Consequentia nota est de se. Antecedens probatur: omnis terminus supponens supponit pro eo quod est vel potest esse vel fuit vel erit, sed hic terminus 'chimaera' non supponit pro eo quod est nec pro eo quod potest esse nec pro eo quod fuit nec pro eo quod erit. Igitur hic terminus 'chimaera' non supponit pro aliquo. Maior est supposito. Sed minor patet ex eo quod per tertiam suppositionem impossibile est chimaeram esse, similiter impossibile est chimaeram posse esse, sim!1iter impossibile est chimaeram fuisse, similiter impossibile est chimaram fieri. Consimilem conclusionem poneremus de vacuo: supposito quod impossibile sit vacuum fuisse vel fieri, posse esse vel esse, haec est falsa 'vacuum est opinabile', similiter 'vacuum est intellegibile' et huiusmodi. Secunda conclusio: Non obstante quod haec sit falsa 'chimaera est significabilis', 'vacuum est significabile', tamen hic terminus 'chimaera' significat aliquid, similiter hic terminus 'vacuum' significat aliquid. Patet hoc ex eo quod hic terminus 'chimaera' significat caudam draconis, similiter vent rem virginis et collum ... is et caput bovis; similiter hic terminus 'vacuum' significat corpus et significat locum. Modo quodlibet istorum est aliquid. Circa quod notandum quod hic terminus 'vacuum' et hic terminus 'chimaera' vocalis vel scriptus subordinantur termino mentali in significando non incomplexo sed complexo, propter quod talis terminus mentalis veri us debet did oratio, licet extenso nomine posset dici terminus, non tamen complexus complexione distante quae fit mediante hoc verbo 'est', sed complexione indistante, ut si fieret talis complexio 'homo asinus' vel 'homo equus' ...... et quia tales orationes non supponunt pro aliquo, videtur quod huiusmodi termini 'chimaera' 'vacuum' etiam pro nullo supponunt, postquam tali bus orationibus subordinantur in significando; nec etiam oportet terminum supponere pro omni illo quod significat, nam hic terminus 'album' ,licet significet albedinem. sicut patet per definitioncm

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eius exprimentem quid nomimis 'album est res habens albedinem', non supponit pro albedine sed pro re subiecta albedini. Sic in proposito, licet hic terminus 'chimaera' significet ventrem virginis, non tamen supponit pro eo. Similiter hic terminus 'vacuum' licet significet corpus et similiter locum, pro nullo tamen eorum supponit. [To deal briefly with this question, I first submit this conclusion: the proposition 'a/the chimera is opinable' or 'a/the chimera is thinkable' or 'a/the chimera is signifiable' is false. To prove this, let it be presupposed that for the truth of an affirmative proposition it is required that the subject and the predicate suppone for the same. Secondly,let it be presupposed that every supponing term suppones either for that which is or for that which can be or for that which has been or for that which will be. Thirdly, let it be presupposed that just as it is impossible that a chimera is, so it is impossible that a chimera can be, and impossible that a chimera can have been, and impossible that a chimera can come to be. With these presuppositions, this conclusion is provable as follows. If the proposition 'a/the chimera is opinable' is true, then, since it is affirmative, according to the first presupposition its subject and its predicate would suppone for the same. But that is false. The falsity of this is provable as follows. The subject term suppones for nothing, therefore it is false that the subject term and the predicate term suppone for the same. The consequentia is selfevident. The antecedent is provable as follows. Every supponing term suppones for that which is or can be or has been or will be; but the term 'chimera' does not suppone for that which is, nor for that which can be, nor for that which has been, nor for that which will be; therefore the term 'chimera' does not suppone for anything. The major is one of the presuppositions, whereas the minor is obvious from the fact that according to the third presupposition it is impossible that a chimera is, and similarly it is impossible that a chimera can be, and impossible that a chimera has been, and i111possible that a chimera will come to be. We could posit a similar conclusion with respect to the vacuum. On the presupposition that it is impossible that a vacuum has been or will come to be or can be or is, the proposition 'a vacuum is opinable' is false, and likewise 'a vacuum is thinkable' and the like. Conclusion 2. Notwithstanding the fact that 'a/the chimera is signifiable' is false - and likewise 'a vacuum is signifiable' - yet the term 'chimera' does signify something, and similarly the term 'vacuum' does signify something. This may be seen from the fact that the term 'chimera' signifies the tail of a dragon, and likewise the belly of a young woman and the neck of a ... [illegible word) and the head of an ox. Similarly the term 'vacuum' signifies body and signifies space. Now each of these things is something. In this connection it should be noted that the term 'vacuum' and the term 'chimera' in the sense of vocal or written terms are subordinated in signifying not to an incomplex but to a complex mental term - for this reason such a mental term ought more truly to be called a phrase, though through an extension of the name it might be called a term -, but not one that is complex in virtue of the distant composition which is brought about by means of the verb 'is', but in virtue of an indistant composition, such as woule! occur in a combination of the type 'man ass' or 'man horse' .... And as such phrases do not suppone for anything, it appears that terms of the type represented by 'chimera' and 'vacuum' also suppone for nothing, since in signifying they are subordinated to such phrases. Nor is it required that a term suppone for all that it signifies. The term '(the) white', for instance, signifies whiteness, as is obvious from its nominal definition ("the white is a thing having whiteness"), and yet it does not suppone for whiteness but for the thing that is the subject of whiteness. So too in our case: although the term 'chimera' signifies the belly of a young woman, it does not suppone for it. Similarly, although the term 'vacuum' signifies body and space too, it does not suppone for either of these.)

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It is no use, says Buridan, to defend 'the chimera is opinable' on the ground that 'opinable' ampliates the subject term so as to make it stand for present, past, future and possible entities alike, even such possible entities as never were nor will be. [The idea that 'opinable' ampliates is as old as the 12th century. See Fallaciae Parvipontanae, LM 1: 564 - 566; Tractatus Anagnini III, LM 2.2: 268; Tractatus de univocatione Monacensis. LM 2.2: 338: Tractatus de DroDrietatihus sprmnnum. T.M 2.2: 729] Buridan holds that the ampliative force of 'opinabilis' does not extend to impossible entities. Here are his own words [Summulae 7.4.2, MS Krakow BJag. 662:83r]: Secundus modus (sc. fallaciae secundum quid et simpliciter) est si additio sit pure ampliativa, ut 'opinabile', 'intellegibile', 'possibile' etc. et multa alia. In hi is enim dictum secundum quid praedicatur universaliter de dicto simpliciter et non econverso. Ideo est bona consequentia affirmativa de dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid et econverso bona negativa, et non est bona affirmativa ex dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter nec econverso bona negativa, sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Unde fiunt tales paralogismi: 'Antichristus est possibilis, ergo Antichristus est' vel 'mons au reus est intellegibilis, ergo mons aureus est', vel 'vacuum est ens opinabile, ergo vacuum est' vel econverso 'vacuum non est, ergo vacuum non est ens opinabile': omne enim ens est ens opinabile et intellegibile, sed non omne ens intellegibile vel opinabile est ens. Hoc enim verbum 'est' vel hoc 'non ens' respectu huius verbi 'est' sine ulteriori additione non dicuntur nisi de praesentibus, sed istae additiones 'opinabile', 'opinatum', 'intellegibile', 'intellectum', 'sci bile' , 'scitum' et huiusmodi faciunt ea stare non solum pro praesentibus sed etiam pro praeteritis et futuris et hiis etiam quae numquam erunt vel fuerunt sed possunt esse. Aliqui etiam ponunt in hoc modo ilium paralogismum 'chimaera est ens opinabile, ergo chimaera est ens'vel 'chimaera est opinabilis, ergo chimaera est', sed non curo de hoc, quia antecedens ita est impossibile sicut consequens, prout alias dictum est. [The second mood of the fallacy of in-some-respect-and-absolutely occurs if an addition is purely ampliative, like 'opinable', 'thinkable', 'possible' etc. and many others. For in such cases that which is said in some respect is universally predicable of the same said absolutely, but not vice versa. Therefore there is a good affirmative consequentia from that which is said absolutely to the same said in some respect, and a good negative one the other way round; and there is not a good affirmative one from that which is said in some respect to the same said absolutely, nor a good negative one the other way round, but there is a fallacy of in-some-respect-and-absolutely. This is the basis of such paralogisms as 'Antichrist is possible, therefore Antichrist is' or 'a golden mountain is thinkable, therefore there is a golden mountain' or 'a vacuum is (an) opinable being, therefore there is a vacuum', or, the other way round, 'there is not a vacuum, therefore a vacuum is not (an) opinable being'. For every being is (an) opinable and thinkable being, but not every thinkable or opinable being is (a) being. For the verb 'is' or 'not being' with respect to the verb 'is' are not said of any but present things when not accompanied by any further addition, but the additions 'opinable', 'opined', 'thinkable', 'thought', 'understandable', 'understood', and the like make them stand not only for present things but also for past and future ones, and even for such as never will be or have been but can be. Some also put under this mood the paralogism 'a/the chimera is (an) opinable being, therefore a/the chimera is (a) being' or 'a chimera is opinable, therefore a chimera is'. But I do not care about that since the antecedent is as impossible as the consequent, as has been said elsewhere.]

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The "some people" (aliqUl), mildly censured toward the end of this text, may be Ockham. But, in general, Ockham and Buridan agree, and all the other affirmative categorical propositions which used to be accepted as true receive the same treatment as 'the chimera is opinable' does at Buridan's hands. 'The chimera is capable of being signified', the chimera is not-being', even 'the chimera is a chimera'. Ockham has the cheek to remark [Summa Logicae, p. 288]: "No proposition in which something is predicated of the name 'chimera' taken significatively can be truer than the one in which the name 'chimera' is predicated of itself. But it is consistent with this that neither one nor the other should be true. " In Buridan's and Ockham's philosophy I have ceased to be the menace to the theory of science that I was as long as people thought the objects of scientific understanding were things of which something may be predicated, and as long as they did not clearly distinguish between expressions, concepts and extramental referents. With the new semantics and theory of scientific knowledge, in which propositions are the object of understanding, the old difficulties disappear. If it is possible to know that 'this is an animal composed of a goat, a snake and a lion' can never be true, and if it is clear that the fact that there is a word 'chimera' equivalent to 'animal composed of. .. ' does not mean that the proposition 'the chimera is nameable' is true or that 'a chimera is an animal composed of ... ' or 'the chimera is definable' are true, then there is no dangerous similarity between the word 'chimera' and words associated with concepts to which actual or possible individuals correspond. So this is what is left of me: a word and a corresponding complex concept. But not a trace of old-fashioned being. The price Buridan and Ockham must pay for their achievement is to recognize that 'is' is equivocal. Buridan, at least, is not afraid of that consequence. Indeed, he distinguishes between 'is' as (1) an atemporal copula, (2) a temporal copula, (3) an abbreviation of 'is being', and (4) a catachrestic way of saying 'means the same as'. The only comfort I can find in this situation is that Ockham and Buridan may not be very interested in me for my own sake (they do not even bother to give me the same constituents parts on the different occasions on which they state my nominal definition). They assume for the sake of argument that there cannot be such a compound animal as the chimera. But it does not matter to them as logicians whether this assumption is true, as long as people will grant them that some name may be subordinated to a complex concept that can never be associated with extramental referents.

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Buridan is still active teaching. I would like to discuss with him whether he sees any difference between such impossibilities as me and a man capable of neighing, the square circle, and a man who is not a man. But after the proposition which states my self-identity has been declared false I feel too tired to take up the discussion. They have nearly done me in. [Here ends the chimera's diary. Let me add a few references to Ockham and Buridan. Ockham, Summa Logicae, pp. 88 - 89, 284 - 288, 507, 568; In librum Perihermeneias 434; In librum primum Sen tentiarum , Opera Theologica 3: 304, 4: 547. Buridan, Sophismata, pp. 21 - 47 (cf. Roberts (1960»; Quaestiones super Analytica Posteriora 1.9 (unpublished edition kindly put at my disposal by H. Hubien); Summulae 4.1.2, 4.1.3,4.1.4, pp. 181-185 Reina; on the senses of 'is', see Summulae 1.3.2 in Pinborg (1976b) 87 and the sources cited in Note 19 of Ebbesen (1984). For the chimera's fate after the end of the diary, see Ashworth (1977).] ABBREVIATIONS I In references to commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle the following abbreviations have been used: intr. = Commentary on Porphyry's Introductio (Isagoge). Cat. = Commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Int. = Commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione (Peri hermeneias). APr. = Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics. A Po. = Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Anaiytics. Top. = Commentary on Aristotle's Topics. SE = Commentary on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi. Ph. = Commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Metaph. = Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. 2 For a number of works reference has been made to volume and page or column (sometimes also line) in one of the following series. These works do not appear in the bibliography below. CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Regiae Borussicae, Vols. 1-23, Berlin, 1882-1907. CPhD = Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, consilio et auspiciis Societatis Linguae et Litterarum Danicarum editum, Copenhagen, 1955LM = L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, Vols. 1 - 2 (= Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies 6, 16), Van Gorcum, Assen, 1962, 1967. PL = Patrologiae cursus completus ... series latina ... accurante J. P. Migne, Paris, 1844ff.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Abaelardus, Petrus: 1970, Dialectica, ed. by L. M. de Rijk, 2nd ed. (Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies I), Van Gorcum, Assen. Albertus Magnus: 1890, 'Expositio Sophisticorum Elenchorum', in A. Borgnet (ed.), Opera, Vol. 2, Paris. Anonymus Moraux: 1979, Commentarium in Porphyrii Introductionem (my title), in Paul Moraux, 'Ein unedicrter Kurzkommentar zu Porphyrios' Isagoge', Zeitschrijt fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik 35, 55 - 98. Anonymus Tanin: 1978, Int. = Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064), ed. by L. Tanin (Beitrage zur Klassischen Philologie, Heft 95), Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan. Aristoteles: 1831, Opera ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, Vois. 1-2, Berlin. Ashworth, E. 1.: 1977, 'Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification', Vivarium IS, 57 - 79. Bacon, Roger: 191 I, Compendium Studii Theologiae, ed. by H. Rashdall, Aberdeen. = Commentarii in librum Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus: 1877, Int. ed. .Aristotelis ITEPI EPMHNEIAE, pars prior, ed. by C. Meiser, Teubner, Leipzig. Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severin us: 1880, Int. ed.2' = same edition, pars posterior, Teubner, Leipzig. Braakhuis, H. A. G.: 1977, 'The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation to Those of Roger Bacon', Vivarium IS, 1 I 1- 142. Braakhuis, H. A. G.: 1979, De J3de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen, 2 vols. (Diss., Leiden), Meppel. Braakhuis, H. A. G.: 1981, 'English Tracts on Syncategorematic Terms from Robert Bacon to Walter Burley', in Braakhuis et al. (1981), pp. 131 -165. Braakhuis, H. A. G., C. H. Kneepkens, and L. M. De Rijk (eds.): 1981, English Logic and Semantics from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, Artistarium, Supplementa I, Ingenium Publishers, Nijmegen. Buridanus, Johannes: 1977, Sophismata, ed. by T. K. Scott (= Grdmmatica Speculativa I), Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad-Cannstat. Buridanus, Johannes: 1957, Summulae, tractatus 4, in M. E. Reina (ed.), 'Giovanni Buridano, "Tractatus de Suppositionibus" " Rivista critica di storia della filosofla 12, 175 - 208 and 323 - 352. Cassin, B.: 1980, Si Parmenide, Cahiers de philologie pub lies par Ie Centre de Recherche Philologique de l'Universite de Lille III, Vol. 4, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de I'Homme, Presses Universitaires de Lille. De Libera. A.: 1981, 'Roger Bacon et Ie probleme de I'appellatio univoca', in Braakhuis et al. (1981), pp. 193 - 234. De Rijk, L. M.: 1981a, 'Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das mittelalterliche Denken', Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13,19-35. De Rijk, L. M.: 1981b, 'Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later Developments'. in Braakhuis et al. (1981), pp. I - 58. Ebbesen, S.: 1979, 'The Dead Man is Alive', Synthese 40, 43 - 70. Ebbesen, S.: 1981a, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, 3 vols. (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VII, I - 3), E. J. Brill, Leiden. Ebbesen, S.: 1981b, 'Albert (the Great?)'s Companion to the Organon', Miscellanea Mediaevalia 14, 89 - \03.

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Ebbesen, S.: 1981c, 'The Present King of France Wears Hypothetical Shoes with Categorical Laces. Twelfth-century Writers on Well-formedness', Medioevo 7, 91-113. Ebbesen, S.: 1984, 'Proof a.nd its Limits According to Buridan, Summulae 8', in Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux (eds.), Preuve et raisons al'Universite de Paris. Logique, ontologie et thiologie au XIV' siecle, Vrin, Paris, pp. 97 - 110. Ebbesen, S. and J. Pinborg: 1970, 'Studies in the Logical Writings Attributed to Boethius de Dacia', Cahiers de I'lnstitut du Moyen-Age grec et latin, Universite de Copenhague 3. Ps.-Elias,lntr. = Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David), Lectures on Porphyry's lsagoge, ed. by L. G. Westerink, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967. Fredborg, K. M.: 1981, 'Roger Bacon on "Impositio vocis ad significandum" " in Braakhuis et al. (1981), pp. 167 -191. Harlfinger, D.: 1975, 'Edizione critica del testa del "De ia-eis" di Aristotele', in W. Leszl (ed.), II 'De ideis' di Aristotele e la teoria Platonica delle idee (Accademia Toscana di scienze e lettere 'La Colombaria', Studi 40, pp. 17fO, Olschki, Firenze. Kilwardby, Robert: 1976, De Ortu Scientiarum, ed. by A. G. Judy (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 4). The British Academy/The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Lewry, 0.: 1978, Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica Vetus (Diss., Oxford). Lewry, 0.: 1981a, 'Robert Kilwardby on Meaning', Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13, 376- 384. Lewry, 0.: 1981 b, 'The Oxford Condemnations of 1277 in Logic and Grammar', in Braakhuis et al. (1981), pp. 235 - 278. Lucretius: 1947, De rerum natura, ed. by C. Bailey, 3 vols., Oxford. Ockham, Guillelmus de: 1979, Expositio super libros Elenchorum, ed. by F. del Punta (Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Philosophica 3), St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Ockham, Guillelmus de: 1978, Expositio in librum Perihermenias, ed. by A. Gambatese and S. Brown (Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Philosophica 2), St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. Ockham, Guillelmus de: 1977 -1979, Scriptum in librum primum Sen ten tiarum, Ordinatio, ed. by G. I. Etzkorn and F. E. Kelley (Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Theologica 3-4), St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. Ockham, Guillelmus de: 1974, Summa Logicae, ed. by Ph. Boehner, G. Gal, and S. Brown (Opera Philosophica et Theoiogica, Opera Philosophica I), St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Parmenides: 1966 12 , Fragmenta, in H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Vol. I, Weidmann, Dublin/Zurich. Pinborg, Jan: 1974, 'Zur Philosophie des Boethius de Dacia. Ein Oberblick', Studia Mediewistyczne IS, 165-185. Pinborg, Jan: 1976a, 'Diskussionen urn die Wissenschaftstheorie an der Artistenfakultiit', Miscellanea Mediaevalia 10, 240 - 268. Pinborg, Jan: 1976b, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I De Introductionibus', in J. Pin borg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan (Opuscula Graecolatina 9), Museum Tusculanum, Copenhagen pp. 71-90. Rijk, L. M. de: see De Rijk. Robert Kilwardby: see Kilwardby. Roberts, L. N.: 1960, 'A Chimera is a Chimera: A Medieval Tautology', Journal of the History of Ideas 21, 273 - 278. Roger Bacon: see Bacon.

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Sextus Empiricus: 1935, Adversus Mathematicos Vll- Vlll, in Sextus Empiricus, with an English translation by R. G. Bury, Vol. 2, Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge Mass. Simon de Faverisham: 1957, Quaestiones super libroPerihermeneias, in Opera omnia, Vol. 1: Opera logica, tomus prior, ed. by P. Mazzarella, Cedam, Padova. Simon de Faverisham: 1984, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum, ed. by S. Ebbesen et al. (Studies and Texts 60), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Toronto.

Institute for Greek and Latin Medieval Philology University of Copenhagen Njalsgade 92, trappe 2,2 DK-2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark

KLAUS JACOBI

PETER ABELARD'S INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MEANING AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SPEECH SIGN 'EST'·

Although Peter Abelard was the most distinguished teacher of logic of his time, a logic understood to be the science of argumentative discourse, he was not destined to found a new philosophical tradition. The historical situation offers at least a partial explanation - the pace of philosophical and theological research was so brisk in the twelfth century that many of the established schools enjoyed life spans of at most two or three generations of teachers. The restlessness of the times is embodied to a special degree in Abelard. 1 His writings include commentaries, in many cases several to a work, on the logical works of Aristotle and Porphyry then available, handed down in the form of Boethius' translations, and on Boethius' own logical works. Abelard has to take a number of positions into consideration here: several commentaries on Aristotle by ancient scholars, by Boethius, and by Abelard's own predecessors and teachers, and furtHermore the grammatical theories of Priscian and those deriving from Abelard's contemporaries. He discovers with distinctive acumen that the tradition he is examining is disunited and full of tensions on basic questions. It is in the analysis and discussion of these tensions that he finds the field of his own philosophical research. He expects to reach solutions by intensifying the controversies, not by seeking harmony. Thus he traces argument and counter-argument in great thoroughness of detail and from a dizzying succession of points of view, abandoning theses and offering countertheses. What his students could learn from him was not so much a particular theory as his method of formulating and discussing problems. The situation is much the same for us. If we turn to Abelard in our inquiry into the logic and semantics of the speech sign 'est', we must discover anew the questions which concerned him. In the first part of this paper, I will sketch some of the discussions conducted by Abelard in order to make clear in what contexts he found himself confronting questions on the variations of meaning, function, or use of the expression 'est'. In the second part, I will group various theses which Abelard deal~ with appropriately. It is my intention to plot out the full range of the theories discussed and to mark points of conflict. In the third and final part, I will make some cautious comments on the deeper current of unity 145 S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being, 145-180. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Compan v

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to be observed in Abelard's reflections, a current perhaps more easily discernible to the modern eye then it was to Abelard himself. 1. DISCUSSIONS

1. The Distinction between 'per se significative' and 'co-significative' Words and the Question to Which of These Two Classes the Copulative 'est' Should Be Assigned In his commentary on the second chapter of Peri Hermeneias, Abelard discusses the fact that Aristotle treated only nouns and verbs, disregarding prepositions and conjunctions. 2 Nouns and verbs are 'per se significative', meaningful in and of themselves: each individual noun or verb has a meaning which can be explicated. But prepositions and conjunctions are also elements of language which convey something - in contradistinction to single letters or syllables. The difficulty is to arrive at a precise determination of what they convey. 3 Some authors want to attribute meaning to prepositions and conjunctions when they are uttered alone, abstracted from all context. Yet compared with the way in which nouns and verbs have meaning, there is something uncertain, even vague, about them. Only when brought together with other words do they develop full, definitive meaning. 4 Abelard raises the objection that this view is incapable of providing an adequate criterion for distinguishing nouns and verbs from prepositions and conjunctions. For it can be maintained that the meaning of nouns and verbs is also less definitive when they are uttered in the abstract, that in discourse the understanding (intel/ectus) of each word is made more precise by the other words in context. S Abelard tends toward the view of other authors, according to whom prepositions and conjunctions uttered in the abstract convey absolutely nothing. They function as speech signs only when used together .with other words, words which are meaningful in and of themselves. 6 What do we conceive of when we hear such 'co-significative' words used together with significative words in a particular context? Abelard finds that it is not difficult to paraphrase what most prepositions indicate. They deal with relations of direction, proximity, possession, or origin, for example. In the case of some conjunctions, however, 'if' and 'and', for example, it is not easy to specify what they signify or what image of which particular thing our understanding of them is based upon. For if they have meaning, they can be understood,

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and to this end, there must be a thing or the image of a thing for our conception (intellectus) to be based upon. But what sort of a thing or construction of the mind do we conceive of when we use 'if or 'and'? Does it belong to the category of substance or to that of quality or to some other category? It must belong to one of them if we are to be able to have a proper conception of it. 7

It is likewise difficult to specify what is signified by the adverb of nega-

tion when it is placed before a connective. 8 Abelard inserts here a discussion of the copula, stating that a theory of affirmative and negative statements expressing predication is an indispensable prerequisite for any theory of the joining together of such statements. 9 Do 'est' and 'non est' have significative function when they serve as copulas? In the first part of the discussion Abelard seems to lean toward a positive answer to this question. 'An animal endowed with reason' and 'an animal which is not endowed with reason' are complex expressions which we understand as denoting something. If we join the two terms, each of which signifies something existent, with the verb 'est' - 'animal rationale est animal irrationale' - the result is a false statement. If we add a negating word, the result is a new statement which is true. Now if we can use the copula to join two denoting terms such that the result is a false understanding (intellectus), and if we can make a true understanding out of a false one by employing a negating word, then it seems that the copula and the negating word must have per se significative function. 10 Nonetheless, Abelard makes it clear in the second part of the discussion that he does not share this view. With vigor he proposes a thesis of his own: 'est' used as copula does not have significative function it has affirmative function. 'Non est' has negating function. Although 'est' and 'non est' do not constitute conceptions, they cause a joining or separating in the mind of the things of which the mind does have conceptions. Nonetheless, although they cause, they do not signify joining or separating, because they do not themselves constitute conceptions; rather they simply cause this joining or separating of conceptions. And so there are three acts involved in the understanding of a statement, namely the conceptions of the parts and the joining or separating of them. It is not inconsistent for that act which is not in itself a conception to be a part of the understanding of the full statement. 11

According to the thesis thus proposed, the copula 'est' is merely a connecting sign in affirmative statements or a sign of separation when used with a negating word. The hearer is directed to join the conception of the first term with that of the second or to separate the.two conceptions from each other. The validity of the thesis is not demonstrated here, neither

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by direct proof nor indirectly by refuting the counterthesis. No attack is made on the view first discussed. Abelard merely shows its ineffectuality: the joining and separating functions can be understood without deriving them from the significative function. Yet Abelard fails to say why the theory he has proposed is preferable to the traditional one. He takes up the theme of conjunctions once again and comes to the conclusion that just as 'est' and 'non est' are appropriate for joining and separating and not for signifying, 'st and 'non si' join and separate utterances which are appropriate for signifying something, but do not signify anything themselves. For they do not contain conceptions of anything, whether true or imaginary, but merely direct the mind to a particular manner of conceiving of other things.12

The essays in this book investigate whether the word 'to be' is indeed ambiguous, as is assumed in most modern discussions of logic. The first discussion sketched from Abelard's writings teaches that caution is required at the outset, in the formulation of the question itself. If asked whether the word 'to be' always conveys the same thing or whether it conveys different things according to context and use, Abelard would surely have been unable to favor either alternative. For this formulation of the question assumes that 'est' has a significative function wherever it is employed, an assumption which Abelard does not share. In at least one use, namely when' est' stands between two terms as the copula, it has connective function but no content, and is to be reckoned among the logical functors,13 the so-called syncategoremata. 14. This thesis was obviously not uncontroversial in Abela:-d's time. Abelard shares the following assumptions with his discussion partners: (1) A word has significative function if and only if it conveys something. (2) Every noun or verb has a categorial content which it conveys. (They are thus categorematic words.) (3) The copula does not have a definite categorial content to convey. How the negative thesis (3) could be reformulated in the affirmative is a matter of dispute. (3a) The copula can convey every categorial content in an indefinite manner. Which definite content is meant can be determined in context from the terms between which the copula is placed. (3b) The copula has no content to convey. It indicates that that which the predicate term conveys is to be joined with that which the subject term conveys.

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2. Theories on What Verbs Signify and the Question oj What the Word 'Esse' Signifies A. Aristotle's Criterium jor Verbs: Consignificatio Temporis. 'Esse' as a Linguistic Device jor the Verbalization ,oj Nouns It is evident from the expositions of Abelard's Logica '/ngredientibus,ls

and Dialectica l6 that the theory of kinds of words was a central theme in his time. In these works Abelard seeks to work out his own position on a question on which many a debate had already taken place. Following remarks by Priscian,17 grammarians q,ad attempted to distinguish different kinds of words using the criterium of meaning. They had manifestly taken the Aristotelian doctrine of categories as their starting point. Each category was thought of as forming a distinct semantic range. In Abelard's writings the viability of this theory is debated only as it applies to the verb. It can be inferred that the category of substance encompassed only nouns, that of quantity numerals, that of quality adjectives, etc. and that there was contention as to whether the theory was actually able to describe language adequately. The theory teaches that the verb is a word which signifies an action or a being-acted-upon. 18 In the discussion the objection is made that the theory does not do justice to the full complexity of language. As counterevidence, verbs such as 'lies' (as in the sentence 'Cologne lies on the Rhine'), 'live', 'have', and 'be' are cited. The reaction to this objection is indicative of the kind of theory being sought. The validity of the thesis is defended by drawing special distinctions. The object is obviously not to make an empirical, descriptive statement as to the meaning of most verbs but to-find a criterium which allows verbs to be distinguished from other kinds of words. The defenders reply that the examples cited do indeed signify something other than an action or a being-acted-upon, they signify something which must be ascribed to other categories. Since the meaning of these words is heterogeneous, they contain a semantic ambiguity. But the different meanings, it is maintained, must be ascribed to the different uses of the words. The words mentioned are used either in the verbal or in the nominative function. In the verbal function they signify either an action (active form) or a being-acted-upon (passive form), and as such (called expressions of action) they have temporal meaning (tense). In the nominative function, however, they signify something belonging to another category (for example, that of being-in-

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a-position, of having, or of substance); thus as expressions of states they have no temporal connotation. l9 Abelard considers this theory to be inadequate. With delight he parades the distinctions which had been elaborated in its defense and unmasks them as mere ad hoc contrivances. This becomes evident in the passage on 'esse' in particular. To be able to subsume this verb under the general thesis that verbs denote an action or a being-acted-upon the following auxiliary theses had been asserted: 20 (A) When used in the verbal function, 'esse' signifies something which falls under the categories of action or being-acted-upon. In contradistinction to all other verbs, however, 'esse' signifies no definite action or being-acted-upon. It stands equivocally for any and every action or being-acted-upon. Abelard reports that the grammarians had taught that 'I am' "has the strength of say 'I love' or 'I read', or 'I run' or 'I am loved' or 'I am read' etc.". It seems that, as a matter of fact, they did teach that 'I am' signifies all acting and being-acted-upon confuse and none praecise in the verbal function. 2l (B) When used in the substantive function, 'esse' signifies existence. Now one can maintain that not only substances have an existence, one can also assert that accidents, say a quality such as a particular color are to be found. Thus in this use too, 'esse' stands equivocally (or confuse) for the existence of things falling under one of the various categories. As far as Abelard is concerned, a theory which must make allowance for three kinds of equivocation, namely between (A) and (B), within (A), and within (B), does not really explain anything. At best, it makes one aware of a problem. His critique is bitingly sarcastic, but will not be reviewed here. 22 He rejects every attempt to distinguish verbs from nouns according to meaning. It is possible to form both a noun and a verb for every semantic content within each category. Aristotle did propose the proper criterium to distinguish them: nouns and verbs differ only in that verbs bear a definite time reference along with their meaning (consignijicatio temporis).23 Every noun can thus be transformed into a verb by the addition of a tense indicator. But sometimes it can only be determined in the context whether a word is being used nominally or verbally, that is, without or with temporal co-signification. For 'amans' is either a noun or a participle. and both of these signify the same activity. It is only the temporal connotation which allows one to distinguish when it is a noun and when a participle. Likewise. 'ens' can be either a noun or a participle. both in the meaning of existence, when it is used without or with temporal connotation. 24

In cases where no verb has been invented for a specific semantic content, one can form a substitute by combining a noun with a finite form

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of 'to be'. (It should be noted that Abelard's understanding of 'nouns' included nouns, adjectives, and pronouns.) One proceeds in this way with the conjugation of verbs in Latin (but in English and German, too): some passive forms and other finite forms are not constructed by adding a suffix but by using a participle together with a finite form of 'to be' .25 Abelard similarly regards verbs as a whole. There is no difference between 'sedere' and 'sedentem esse' or between 'sedisse' and 'sendentem fuisse', neither in the principal meaning, nor in the temporal connotation. Language could function in this way in all kinds of matters: Verbs could be formed such as 'substantiam esse, fuisse, fore', 'quantitatem . .. ', 'corpus . . .', 'hominem . . .', 'albedinem . . .', 'album esse, fuisse, fore' .26 'Esse' bears no semantic content of its own here. It func- . tions simply as a time word, as a substitute for a conjugational form. In comprehensive and precise analyses of the logic of tenses Abelard shows that an expression constructed from a noun or participle and a helping verb must be conceived of as a single unit of speech. 27 Assuming, for example, that we say of someone who is not walking at the moment 'erit ambulans', a contradiction would result if 'eri!' alone indicated the future and the participle 'ambulans' retained present significance. Thus 'this person who is not walking now (as postulated), will be a person who is now walking'. On the contrary, the view that the whole is a single unit of speech is correct, so that the participle loses the meaning of being in the present. 28 This analysis applies not only to the use of present participles but also to all sentences dealing (sensu diviso 2'1 with past or future states of a present subject, as Abelard demonstrates in discussions about the conversion of temporally definite statements and their use in syllogisms. 3o Abelard emphasizes that every significative word can be made into a verb, that is, it can be given an additional temporal meaning by the employment of 'to be'. "Just as some nouns signify things as concretely and independently existing and others signify them by one of their properties, so is it with verbs also.,,31 Abelard's thesis can be restated precisely with symbols: Let' to' symbolize the time of the statement (' to' is 'now'), '<' the relation 'before', and' >' the relation 'after'. 'vI' is a predicate. Then the following results: (4.1)

(4.2) (4.3)

'Xis 1/1' is equivalent to' X-/;-to';

'X was 1/1' is equivalent to 'X 1/1 - tm " tm < to'; 'X will be 1/1' is equivalent to 'X - tn " tn > to'.

Just as '1/1 - t' the equivalent forms are units of speech. The use of 'esse' to signify existential import (verbum substantivum)

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is to be kept strictly separate from its use as a time word. In the meaning of existence, 'esse' is a full and independent verb. Thus in the symbols chosen, it does not merely correspond to the conjugational form' - t', but to the full unit 'I/; - t'. Abelard emphasizes that one may assert the existence not only of substances ('homo est'), but of substantivated accidents as well ('albedo est'). Differing from the grammarians with whom he is disputing, Abelard does not consider the verb of existence to contain a semantic ambiguity. For him, 'est' does not have the force of 'exists as a substance' or 'exists as a quality' or 'exists as a quantity'. It "has in all cases the same meaning", that is "is something from among the multitude of things which exist". 32 Now the thesis: (5) 'Esse' as a full and independent verb signifies 'existence' does not harmonize with thesis (2) formulated above. 'Existence' is not a categorial content. It seems that thesis (2) will have to be reformulated for 'esse' also to be counted among the significative words. But then isn't thesis (3a) more natural than (3b)? Or if (3a) is too unclear, would it not be better to come to a thesis (3a '), according to which' esse' has existential import even in copulative use? Why does Abelard consider it necessary to maintain such a sharp distinction between the use of 'esse' as a full verb from its use as a copula, to the extent that all significative function of the copula is denied?

B. Temporal Co-signification and the Predicative Function According to Aristotle in Peri Hermeneias the consignificatio temporis allows the verb to be distinguished from the noun and thus serves to define the verb. Aristotle adds to this definition a remark on the predicative function of verbs: the verb "is always a sign for something which is predicated of something else". 33 From Abelard's statements on this passage it can be concluded that the sentence had caused earlier commentators considerable difficulty. Its location in the text was felt to be inappropriate. If Aristotle indeed intends to devote Chapter 2 to the noun and Chapter 3 to the verb in order to reserve for Chapter 4 the proposition as composed of noun and verb, then the location of the sentence cited above in Chapter 3 is quite difficult to justify. This peculiarity disturbs all the more when one discovers the sentence repeated shortly thereafter. Abelard reports no fewer than eight attempts to interpret the passage. 34 He does not get involved in an exhaustive discussion, nor does he betray which interpretation he considers best. Apparently, the

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systematic structure of Peri Hermeneias interests him less than the individual theses which Aristotle advocates. The correctness of the content of Aristotle's remark is scarcely a subject of contention among the interpreters, however: "Verbs were above all invented to be predicated, nouns that something be predicated of them". The "complete" proposition consists of at least a noun and a verb. 35 In Dialectica the function of .verbs to couple a predicate with a subject is given even greater emphasis. In his commentary to Peri Hermeneias Abelard said that this function is characteristic for verbs,36 but it was the temporal co-signification which served as the criterium for the definition. Not so in Dialectica. Here the copulative function, on account of which verbs were 'invented', is reckoned to be part of the 'concept' of the verb,37 but temporal co-signification seems not even to be accorded the recognition of being one of the verb's characteristic features. This thoroughly new idea stands in sharp contrast to the long tradition preceding it and must be investigated with great care. In the section on nouns, Abelard first relates Aristotle's view on the specific differences between the noun and the verb. 38 Then he starts to argue against this view, the same he had defended in his commentary on Peri Hermeneias. He asks if it is really so that only verbs, but not nouns, bear a temporal connotation "so that they assign their main meaning to the persons serving as subject in accordance with their tense". 39 Just as one understands in 'curro' and 'currens' that running (cursus) is to be attributed to a person in the present, one understands in 'album' something "which is determined by whiteness as an (accidental) form in the present" ;40 and also when 'man' is used to denote something it is because "a mortal animal substance endowed with reason is present", so that "'man' amounts to 'is a mortal animal endowed with reason which exists in the present' ".41 "Thus Aristotle seems to have been wrong in distinguishing nouns from verbs by saying that nouns aie without temporal connotation. For nouns are shown to indicate tense, too, namely that of the verb, that is, the present. ,,42 Does Abelard actually intend to contest all distinctions between nouns and verbs? Does he take the extreme extensionalistic point of view that nouns signify nothing more than their present denotata? The care which Abelard devotes again and again to non-denotative words (that is, those which have meaning, although they do not refer to anything which exists)43 speaks against such a view. Then how are his remarks to be interpreted? 'Album' does not mean 'white' here in the sense of a dictionary entry.

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It means 'something white', 'something that is white'. Abelard does not treat' homo' as a word to be regarded in isolation, either, but as a word which is attributed to someone, that is, one which is said of a particular person: 'he is a man'. Accordingly nouns have temporal co-signification if and only if they are predicated. 44 Of course the predication is only implicit when nouns are applied to things. A thing X is given the name 1{;, but the 1{;-ness of Xis not asserted expressly. To this extent there remains a difference between verbs and nouns' 'in the manner of signifying": the noun serves to name X as something to which a definite substantial or accidental form (for example, the quality 'whiteness') is to be ascribed. But only when a verb is joined to the noun is a proposition created. It is in the proposition that the inherence of something is asserted. 45 Nevertheless, a predication lies at the base of any naming. If the question is asked whether a word '1{;' does in fact presently name something, that is, whether the word is properly attributed, the answer consists of a proposition in which the description '1{;' moves to the predicate position. '1{;' is then joined to the subject with a conjugational form of a verb in the present or with 'est'. In Dialectica, the relative importance given to the copulative function of the verb exactly reverses to that in the commentary to Peri Hermeneias. It is no longer recognized as a mere feature of the verb, as in the commentary, but as the criterium which defines the verb. Verbs have copulative function and with it also temporal connotation. 46 Nouns receive temporal connotation when they are used in such a manner as to assert that a categorial content (their sense) subsists in a thing. 47 When this use of nouns to name is made explicit, it is revealed to be predication. The temporal significance does not belong to the signijicatio of a word but to a specific function. When one refers to something by means of a noun, one does predicate. The temporal co-signification is the result of the implicit or explicit predication. If Abelard's line of thought were to be followed to its ultimate consequences, one can imagine him giving up the difference between nouns and verbs altogether and continuing to observe only th~ functional difference between subject position and predicate position. But this would have meant turning the whole structure of logic upside down. The Aristotelian tradition had sought to synthesize the proposition from the various units of speech. Now one would have had to start from predication as the foundation of logic and then work one's way back to that which the individual units of speech, such as nouns and names, signify. It would hardly have been possible for Abelard, who had developed his theses in the course of an exposition of

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traditional texts, to free himself from this tradition to such an extent as to be able to recognise the far-reaching consequences of his line of thought. It is doubtless easier for the interpreter of a later generation to see them.

C. 'Est' as a Verb of Full Value and as a Copula Abelard notes several times in the course of his discussions that propositions can be formed in two ways. First, a finite form of the verb serving as predicate is joined to a noun, the subject. Second, a subject term and a predicate term are linked together by a finite verb placed between them. 48 When the verb serves as a predicate it has a double function: it is both copula and that which is being predicated, that is to say, it joins itself, its own meaning, to the subject. Only two verb~ are capable of linking subject and predicate terms, that is of joining a meaning other than their own to the subject. These are 'est' ('S is P') and 'nuncupatur' ('S is named p,).49 Now for Abelard, as shown above, propositions of the type'S I/; - t' and those of the type'S copula-t 1/;' are identical in their semantic deep structure. Why then does Abelard devote such great attention to the difference in surface structure? De Rijk has correctly recognized the target of Abelard's interest: the difference allows Abelard to discuss the problem of "the basic ambiguity of the verb 'est' ".50 'Petrus est' is as much a complete proposition as 'Petrus currit'. 'Est' has a double function: it is both that which is predicated of Petrus and that which links the predicate with the subject. 51 When 'est' is thus "predicated in the essential sense (proprie) " ,52 it links its own content to the subject. Thus 'Petrus est' means 'Peter is something which exists'. 53 The question so heatedly disputed in Abelard's time (but before his time, too, and afterwards again and again) was whether 'est' retains existential import when used as a copula. In his expositions on this matter Abelard grants 'est' a special status, showing that no other verb (except 'nuncupatur') can be used as a connecting link between the subject term and the predicate term. Contrary to first impressions, propositions such as 'iste fit bonus' and 'iste videtur bonus' have a completely different structure from 'iste est bonus' .54 In the first two examples, Abelard regards 'good' as a means to define more precisely the predicates 'fit' and 'videtur'. 'Bonus' functions in just the same way as the object' Socratem' in the sentence 'iste videt Socratem', where 'Socratem' limits the predicate' videt'. The proof can be arrived at by making a conversion, for here the complete verbal expression goes to the subject position. (For example, 'Many an evil doer seems to be good' <---> 'Many a man

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who seems to be good does evil. '). The point is that 'to be' cannot be regarded simply as a predicate which is defined more precisely by a predicate noun. The meaning of the other example sentences can be made clearer by seeing the limitation on the predicate as a namelyrider: 'This is becoming something, namely good'; 'This seems to be something, namely good'; 'He sees something, namely Socrates'. One may not, however, interpret linkages using the copula 'est' as meaning 'This is something, namely Can we thus safely conclude that 'est" in copulative function does not retain the existential meaning it has as a verb of full value? Abelard exhorts to caution in his further discussions. One thing has been clearly established: that the copulative use of 'est' should not be confused with its use as a predicate. The copula is not "predicated in the essential sense (proprie)". Its function is to link not its own semantic content but that of the predicate term to the semantic content of the subject term. Nonetheless, even if the copula is not predicated proprie, it is indeed predicated per accidens. 55 And although its principal function is to link ~ubject and predicate terms, it may be that the meaning 'existence' plays a certain role when 'est' is used as copula. In speaking of 'esse' Abelard points out that "there is always an existential import in its linkage" and "it allows us to determine that another thing exists", even when it is used as a copula. 56 But he says this with regret. 57 It would be ideal if the copula had absolutely no semantic content and functioned as a purely syncategorematic connecting symbol. 58 'Est' remains the word which comes closest to this ideal. Any other verb would convey a specific categorematic content. This content would make the verb unsuited to serve as a link between the subject and yet another such content as found in the predicate term. 59 'Est' is suitable for use as a copula because its own meaning preoccupies least of all and can be most easily kept in the background or, one could even say, suppressed by the subject and predicate terms. One can find passages in which recognition is granted to the existential import of the copula near other passages which emphasize that the existential meaning by no means belongs to the copulative function. My understanding of this pecularity derives from the role Abelard accorded to the science of argumentative discourse, this being to reflect on and explain language and yet not to shy away from correcting it and bringing to it a greater precision. The discussions carried on in these passages need not be summarized individually here. Nonetheless I consider it important at least to show briefly which semantic types of propositions play a special role in them.

vI'.

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In a first special case, the name of a person stands in the subject position of the proposition as an expression for a concrete substance. An expression for an accident stands in the predicate position. Take for exampIe 'Socrates est albus'. This predicate joins two items to the subject, first the whiteness (albedo) as an accidental form (in adiacentia), and secondly something white (album) in existence (in essentia).60 Abelard is himself unsure how the two should be weighted. In Logica '[ngredientibus' he considers the speaker's real intention to be to predicate the attribution or inherence of whiteness in the actual subject. The use of the concrete term 'white' seems to be misleading here due to the existential import which the copula bears. Because Socrates exists as something white, not as whiteness, the abstract term cannot be used here, contrary to the speaker's intention. In Dialectica. which was written later, Abelard defended the form of the proposition which is naturally given in the language, 'Socrates est albus' as being a sensible one. 61 The proposition asserts that Socrates is one of the things which are white. In the first chapter of Categories Aristotle makes a distinction between accidental predicates, which "are in a substance" and substantial predicates, which "are said of a substance". In reference to Socrates, 'white' belongs to the former group. But the "inherence of attributed whiteness" is merely "intimated" in this proposition. To make the meaning of this intimation explicit is a task for a categorial analysis of predicates; it is not a task for an analysis of the meaning and functions of predication. A second special case, one which plays a considerable role ill Abelard's investigations, is that of propositions whose subject terms signify something which in principle or in fact does not exist. A few classic examples: 'chimaera est opinabi/is', 'chimaera est non-existens' and' Homerus est poeta' .!>l It is obvious that such propositions are not to be understood as though the copula were asserting - even merely per accidens - that such creatures as chimaeras ever existed or that Homer were alive at the moment the proposition was uttered. Abelard and the logicians whose writings he uses as groundwork tryout a long series of transformations in search of a clear understanding of the meaning of the sentences given as examples. Thus the sentence 'chimaera est opinabilis' should be reworded as a sentence about someone who can imagine a chimaera. 63 The true meaning of the sentence about Homer requires it to be transformed into a sentence about a still existing poem written by him or about a memory of him which has not died out. 64 The purpose of the transformations is to return to sentences in which the verb 'to be', in both in its full meaning and its copulative use, is dealing only with

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items which exist. Alternatively, the possibility is considered that such sentences show best of all that 'est' in copulative use is fundamentally non-literal and devoid of all inherent meaning. It depends on the semantic content of the predicate term, and not on the existential import of the copula, whether one will or will not be in a position to infer that the subject term names something which exists. 6s For example, it can be inferred from 'Petrus est homo' that Peter exists, but it cannot be inferred that a chimaera exists from 'chimaera est opinabi/is' or 'chimaera est nonexistens,.66 Once "the heart of the semantic question of being has been transferred from the meaning of the copula to the meaning of the predicate noun used in the proposition" ,67 it is only a short step to the theory that the copula is not an independent part of the proposition at all, but that it, together with the predicate noun, should be regarded as one single verbal expression. Abelard finds this step to be a daring one, because it is so novel, but a solidly reasonable one. 68 The imposing arguments found in the analysis of verb tenses which follows in Dialectica provide a strong recommendation for it.

3. The Theory of the Proposition and the Question of the Exact Meaning of the Assertive Formula
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string, a person not only comprehends what is signified by each word, he also, not less important, joins together the meanings which he has comprehended. 73 Thus, for example, the difference between 'homo currens' and 'homo est currens' cannot consist of the copula's telling us to join together the two already comprehended words 'homo' and 'currens', for this joining has already been attained in the course of coming to understand 'homo currens'. Abelard goes even further: 'homo currens' conveys precisely the same joining of 'run' and 'man' as 'homo est currens' and 'homo currit,.74 The copula or, as it were, the inflectional ending of the verb brings no new understandable content to the terms which are to be joined, when the consignificatio temporis is left out of consideration. 75 The difference between a proposition and other "incomplete" or "complete word strings,,76 does not lie in the content of what is comprehended. But then how is the traditional definition of the proposition to be interpreted? Abelard answers 77 that the proposition signifies the truth or falsity of something by stating (proponendo) what is the case or what is not the case. An affirmative proposition differs from an "understanding which connects various elements" and a negative proposition differs from an "understanding which separates various elements" not in respect to content but in the way the content is "proposed" ("stated", asserted or contested). "For that reason declarative sentences (enuntiationes) or propositions (propositiones) are expressly named from the manner of proposing (proponendo). ,,78 Abelard supports his analysis by reformulating the propositions in such a way that their assertive meaning is made explicit. In the sentence, 'it is true that Socrates is sitting (verum esl Socralem sedere)', the phrase in the subject position, 'that Socrates is sitting', produces the same understanding as 'Socrates is sitting', and yet the phrase in the subject position cannot be called a 'proposition' because it is not formed in a way which would enable it to be stated affirmatively or negative1y.79

The dictum proposition is is not a proposition; it merely comprises the contents of that which can be proposed. A proposition is the assertion of the truth or falsity of these contents. The meaning of 'is true' is explained as 'it is so in the thing'. 80 But as further analysis shows, this explanation can be misleading. Simple words are normally not just signs for mere concepts but for concepts of things existing in reality. Nouns and verbs are ... namely signs in a twofold sense, for things on the one hand and for concepts on the other. They are signs for things in that they constitute concepts be1()n):ing to the things, that is, concepts which heed a particular characteristic feature or • peculiaritv of the things. 81

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When Abelard later distinguishes between "valid" and "empty concepts", he does not deviate from his basic assumption: "valid" concepts are those in which the basic intention to mean a thing is fulfilled. Abelard explains the meaning of 'valid (san us)' in relation to 'concept (intellectus)' as follows. "Every concept, whether simple or complex, through which we heed how the thing behaves, is valid. ,,82 This explanation is illustrated with an example: the word 'man' "yields a valid concept as long as (at least) one man exists". 'Chimaera' and 'hircocervus' are examples of words the concepts of which do not denote any existing thing; if there were no such thing as man, the concept of 'man', too, would be empty. The same holds for complex expressions and that of which they are concepts. 83 Simple words or incomplete word strings such as 'homo currens' fulfil their naming or descriptive function when there is at least one thing which is (in a specific respect) as the word or word string conveys. Now it is of great importance to Abelard that a distinction can be made between (6.1.) the truth criterium, 'the thing is in reality so as the proposition says', and (6.2.) the validity criterium, 'there is some real thing which falls under this naming or description'. His arguments are apagogic for the most part. He finds a theory among contemporary logicians according to which the content of a proposition is to be identified with the content of its components. 84 He shows in a penetrating analysis that this theory is unsatisfactory: it cC'nnot explain what is asserted in propositions of necessary consequences such as 'si est rosa, est jlos,85 or in tautologies such as 'Socrates est Socrates' .86 Abelard's critical deliberations cannot be presented here individually.87 The existence of the proof that (6.1.) must be differentiated from (6.2.) will have to be taken for granted. But what exactly is the difference between the two? In the first chapter of Peri Hermeneias, anticipating the more thorough discussion to come, Aristotle touches on the difference between (simple and complex) nouns and propositions. The noun alone does not signify anything which can be true or false, he says, unless "being or not-being, whether absolutely or with a definite tense, is added. ,,88 Boethius interprets this passage as a reference to the deep structure of every proposition. He reformulates such subject-predicate-propositions as 'homo vivit' and 'Socrates ambulat' into 'homo vivens est' and 'Socrates ambulans est'. 89 The word order is surely not arbitrary; it is re-

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tained in such examples as 'Socrates philosophus est' and 'Socrates philosophus non est'. The terms within each of the propositions 'A est B' and 'A non est B' are joined together here into a single complex term 'AB'. In Boethius' view, being or not-being is to be predicated of this complex term occupying the subject position. Abelard starts to develop an opposing theory. 'It is so' and 'it is not so' are impersonal expressions and are not what one normally understands as predicates. 'That A is 1/; (hominem vivere; Socratem ambulare), is not a noun in the normal sense or function, even if it can be reformulated as 'the 1/;-ing of A'. It is at best a quasi-nomen. 90 That which is said in a proposition, '1/;(A)', is not a thing. 91 It can be called the proposition's content,92 but then positive and negative contents, or states of affairs, would have to be admitted. 'Neg'ative things' are an impossibility. There are only negative descriptions of things. This consideration makes it clear that contents are not instantiations for propositions in the same way that things are instantiations for descriptions. ' ... is true ( ... is the case)' and' ... is false ( ... is not the case)' as well as '. . . is possible', ' ... is necessary', and their negations are impersonal expressions. 93 Grammatically they seem to be predicates for the dicta which seem to be their subjects, but differently from other predicates, they are not used denotatively.94 The denotative function of predicates can be explained by substituting a 'something' in the subject position as a realization (or a 'nothing' as a sign of the lack of realization): 'Something 1/; - t, namely .. .' (or, as the case may be, 'nothing 1/; - t'). If 'is the case' were to be predicated personally, the explanation by 'something, namely ... ' would be appropriate here, too. The difference would merely be that not individual things but rather a particular content would stand for 'something' here. The formulation 'something is true, namely that. . .' may as a matter of fact appear in linguistic, logical, or epistemological contexts,9S but Abelard contests resolutely that this formulation, in which 'true' is used denotatively, functions faithfully in the same way as ' ... is true ( ... is so in the thing)'. 96 'True' and 'false' should not be understood as general terms which could be applied to particular cases. 97 But then how can the meaning of 'it is so in the thing' and 'it is not so in the thing' be explained positively? Before attempting a solution, one must take care not to be misled by the question. To a related question on the words 'possible' and 'necessary', Abelard answers that these co-signify (consignijicare) more than they bear a meaning in and of themselves. For we can conceive of something in them only when they are applied to a word string in the subject

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position. And then they bring about that the things signified by the word string in the subject position are conceived of in a certain way, just as an interposed verb ('est') or a conjunction ('if. .. , then') whose coupling indicates necessity serve to do 50. 98

'. . . is the case' and '. . . is not the case' are syncategorematic expressions. Their meaning is nothing other than their function in a word string. The content which Abelard mainly has in mind in his analyses are events. The truth value of propositions about events is dependent upon the point in time at which the proposition is asserted. It is the case in a certain 'now' that Socrates is running, just as this is not the case in a different 'now'. The dictum as the content of a proposition does not receive a specific truth value before it is actually asserted to be true or false. Whoever understands the assertion comprehends the asserted content as existing (or not existing, as the case may be) at the time the proposition is asserted. II. POSITIONS

The inquiry into the logic and semantics of 'est' was developed by medieval authors as the inquiry into the nature of predication. It can be seen from Abelard's discussions that the theory of propositions and predication was a matter which provoked deep controversies. The discussion centers for the most part around the paradigm for all individual analyses and does not occupy itself merely with puzzle solving within a theory or the further development of an accepted one. The fact that all parties appeal to Aristotle and Boethius only contradicts what I have said at first glance. The deliberations of these authorities on semantics prove on closer scrutiny to be less than firm, for they allow widely varying interpretations. (A) The common ground of all parties to the discussions consists of the following assumptions: (1) The search for a theory of the proposition is seen as a search for a theory of predication. Following Aristotle, the basic structure of the proposition is thus held to be that something is said about something else. Relational propositions are put into predicative form. In 'A sees B', for example, the object 'B' is considered to be a more precise determination of the predicate. The first beginnings of a reorientation can be found with William of Ockham: he investigates the supposition of both the term preceding and following the relational word in relational propositions. The thought of constructing a theory of predicative propositions on a necessarily more comprehensive theory of relations and thus of

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regarding concepts, that is functions with one empty position, as borderline cases of relations, that is functions with several empty positions, was foreign to the Middles Ages. (2) What is sought is one single structural description of the proposition which works for all forms of language without exception, that is, a theory of the uniform logical deep structure of all kinds of predication. Simple propositions can be observed in two different grammatical forms. In the one, a noun in the nominative case is brought together with an inflected verb ('Socrates currit'). In the other, a predicate noun is coupled to the subject with .'est' ('Socrates est homo'; 'Socrates est albus'). Now Aristotle had already accepted the equivalence of 'hominem ambulare' and' hominem ambulantem esse'. 99 The validity of this view is taken for granted by all logicians who sought a unified theory of predication. The manners of constructing a sentence are interchangeable in principle. 'Socrates currit' has the same meaning and the same truth value as 'Socrates est currens' . (B) Widely differing theories can be constructed on the basis of the two assumptions listed above. The spectrum of discussion is exhaustive in Abelard's time. The basic features, if not the finer details, of all kinds of positions are developed and considered. The equation' 'Socrates currit' = 'Socrates est currens" can be read in both directions as an instruction on how to reformulate. This never caught anyone's attention before Abelard. Nor did anyone after Abelard, as far as I have been able to discover, consider the decision controversial whether the theory should be based on the two-part or the three-part structural description. Even Abelard does not seem to recognize the importance of this decision. He alternates between statements which work from the three-part description and statements which take the two-part description to be logically more transparent. I consider his discovery that tensions between the two theories of predication begin to develop at this point to be of great significance. (1) Normally, the three-part form is held to be an explanation of the two-part form. The authority of Aristotle is not the only source of support for this view. For the structur,e.of language also seems to suggest it: to resolve an inflected verb into a temporally definite copula and a participle seen as a predicate noun, just as language does to make certain tenses and passive forms, is manifestly easier than to conceive of all combinations made with the copula as substitutes for verb forms which the language has failed to "invent".

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Accordingly, the explicit logical standard form of an affirmative proposition has three parts: a subject term (about which something is predicated) is coupled to a predicate term (which is predicated) with an interposed 'est'. 100 The theory of predication then presents itself as the theory of the coupling capacity of this interposed 'est'. Now linguistically, 'est' is a form of the verb 'esse', which signifies 'to exist'. 'Est' has this meaning in all cases when it is used as secundum adiacens in such propositions as 'Socrates est'. It signifies here the existence of that of which it is predicated. The question arises whether 'est' also has existential import when it is used as tertium adiacens, that is, as the copula. In the answer to this question two contradictory stand-points part company: The first position (1.1.) maintains that the two uses of 'est' are not related; 'est' is equivocal. The second (1.2.) maintains that the two uses are interrelated. (1.1.) According to the equivocation theory, the copula has no semantic content, it simply functions as a coupling device. Thought out to the last consequence this would mean including the copula among such conjunctions as "si (if. .. , then)'. 101 The justification for this thesis is to be found approximately as follows: 102 'est' as secundum adiacens, that is, as a complete predicate, joins its own semantic content, namely existence, to that of the subject term. The copula has, however, a different function. Its function is to join the semantic content of the predicate term to that of the subject term. The copula can exercise this function only when it has no semantic content of its own, for it is not possible for a word to join itself and something else to the subject simultaneously. This last sentence, which is crucial to this line of argument, is supported by a comparison with other per se significative verbs: Just as one cannot add a further predicate to 'Socrates currit' or 'Socrates est currens', say 'homo', one can add no further predicate to 'Socrates est' or 'Socrates est aliquid existens'. Consequently, 'est' does not mean 'est aliquid existens' in the sentence' Socrates est homo'. By varying it a bit, one can use this argument to attack the opposing thesis. 103 If 'est' always meant 'est ens', then the predicate term in 'Socrates est ens' would be superfluous, seeing that it would already be contained in 'est'. To say 'Socrates est ens' would amount to saying' Socrates est ens ens', etc. Another argument with critical intent refers to propositions in which the subject term signifies something which does not exist. 104 The proposition 'chimaera est opinabilis' would be false if the copula had existential import. Further, the proposition 'chimaera est non-existens' would provide ground for the paradoxical inference that the chimaera exists (by virtue

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of the existential import of the copula) and does not exist (by virtue of the semantic content of the predicate term). Consequently, 'Petrus est' cannot be inferred from 'Petrus est homo', at least not by virtue of the alleged existential import of the copula. \05 (1.2.) The point at which parties to the opposing position can assail the equivocation theory is the following: the theory leaves one puzzle unsolved, namely why we use one and the same word, 'est', on the one hand (as secundum adiacens), as both significative per se and copulative, and on the other (as tertium adiacens), as merely copulative. This difficulty weighs iheavily on the logicians of linguistic analysis of the time. If someone were to succeed in constructing a theory which explained the relationship of the two uses to each other convincingly instead of deriding the double use of 'est' as a misleading accident of language, such a theory would clearly be more comprehensive than the equivocation theory. What must be demonstrated is that the word 'est' can join a term other than itself to a subject and yet retain existential import. The opponents of the equivocation theory want to do so by arguing for a stronger thesis: the compatibility of existential meaning with the copulative function has been established when one successfully derives the copulative function from the existential meaning. And inasmuch as 'est' means everything in being (essentia) indiscriminately, so it is said, it is capable of joining together any and all content l06 and of being the sign of the "existence of the thing" 107 in affirmative propositions. 'Socrates est' means 'Socrates is one of the things which exist'. When 'est' is used copulatively, so that a predicate term is added to it, what is thus determined is that as which the subject exists, thus, for example, 'Socrates is (as) a man' or 'Socrates is (as) a person who is presently reading'. In the argument brought to bear by the adherents of the equivocation theory that no word can simultaneously join both itself and another term to the subject, they overlook the special character of the semantic content of 'being': the predicates added are not principally different from this semantic content but are, rather, complementary predicative determinations of it. Thus, in 'Socrates est ens' the speaker merely makes clear that he does not wish to make a narrower determination of what Socrates is. Furthermore, propositions whose subject terms stand for things which do not exist are "non-literal" formulations. What they intend must be clarified by reformulating them. 'Homer' is the name of a person who no longer exists. The proposition 'Homerus est poeta' is to be reformulated into 'the renown of Homer is kept alive in human memory by his poetry'. 108 Propositions about the chimaera are to be interpreted as treating something

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which IS In the mind of the person thinking the proposition at that moment. 109 (2) Instead of regarding the three-part structure 'subject term copula - predicate term' as the explanation for the two-part structure 'subject - inflected predicate', one can also regard constructions with 'est' and a predicate noun simply as substitutes for verbs which have yet to be "invented". The equation' 'Socrates currit' = 'Socrates est currens' , is now to be read backwards, for the two-part construction of the proposition is the logically more transparent one - the predicate is considered to be a complete unit. In numerous passages in his works Abelard shows decided preference for the two-part analysis of the proposition (with the one-part theory of the predicate) over the three-part analysis of it (with the two-part theory of the predicate). That here we have to do with more than a flash of inspiration to solve some special problems in the logic of tenses follows from a passage of Dialectica: these discussions must be recognized as the groundwork for a new theory of predication. In the book of Dialectica entitled 'On the Parts of the Categorial Proposition', Abelard reviews the three-part analysis but notes that he is writing here "following general opinion", because he considers it important that the many people who adopt this thesis will be able to support it with arguments. He does not fail to use this opportunity to refer the reader back to his own two-part analysis as discussed in his book 'On Words with Definite Meaning', which, he says, does not conflict with the material discussed here but does offer a more elegant solution to the problem. 110 What distinguishes Abelard's theory from theories (1.1.) and (1.2.) can best be described negatively. An analysis of the meaning and function of 'est' does not lie at the heart of the theory which regards the structure 'subject - inflected predicate' as the explicit logical standard form of propositions. Propositions having 'est' as predicate ('Socrates est') are not accepted as being in principle different from propositions with other predicates (such as 'Socrates currit'). III It may be that the understanding of the existential predicate poses special problems, but this does not constitute the key problem. Constructions such as 'Socrates est homo', 'Socrates est albus' and' Socrates est currens' are, as it were, "non-literal" forms of predication. 112 In these constructions 'est' is not the member by the exclusive means of which the terms may be joined to one another, it is reduced more to functioning as a helping verb. (C) It is necessary to distinguish between the broad question which

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general structural description of the proposition is most suitable and the questions which are encountered in the course of the logical analysis of particular propositions. Supposition theory as a theory of the interpretability of the terms of the proposition and modal theory as a theory of the determinability of the linkage of subject and predicate are not bound exclusively to anyone of the theories of predication distinguished here and are compatible with all of them. The distinction both of the kinds of supposition and of modalities is indeed suitable for a differentiating analysis, independent of the position one takes on the controversy of predication theory, one which belongs to the philosophy of logic. One may suppose that this contributed to the m0dest estimation among logicians of the time as to the importance of the discussion of underlying principles. All interest was drawn by the ars sermocinalis then being developed. In scholarly writings on medieval predication theory, the inherence theory and the identity theory are mentioned time and again as the two competing models for predication theory. 113 According to the identity theory, in an affirmative proposition one asserts that the subject term and the predicate term stand for the same individual (or individuals); thus both terms are interpreted extensionally. According to the inherence theory, however, the predicate term must be understood intensionally: it is asserted that the "universal nature" (form) signified by the predicate term inheres in at least one (or in all) of the individuals denoted by the subject term, 114 or, to say it another way, that the individuals denoted by the subject term are of the universal form signified by the predicate term. As has been shown,115 Abelard is familiar with the question whether the predicate term indicates the form literally or the bearers of the form. He discusses it in his analysis of propositions in which an accident is predicated of individuals, but the discussion is conducted in such a manner that it can be applied only to this type of proposition or contents. So Abelard is by no means concerned to lay the groundwork for a new theory of predication with this discussion. He is merely dealing with a minor problem which was bound to come up in the course of reflections on the deep structure of a particular type of proposition, regardless of the position one started from. III. REFLECTIONS

After Abelard, the two-part analysis of the proposition won no further adherents. Subsequent logicians of the twelfth century did not feel com-

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pelled to refute it, either. Abelard's theory was simply not to be found in the universe of discourse. It was considered obvious that it is the copula which forms the proposition inasmuch as it relates the subject and predicate terms to each other. Now as long as the equivocation theory (II. B. 1.1.) and the theory maintaining the semantic and functional interrelation of the verb of existence and the copula (II. B. 1.2.) competed with each other, the thought of ending the dispute by taking up the position counter to both (II. B. 2) would not have been far-fetched. But the actual resolution came from an unexpected source. In the thirteenth century the reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' took place in the European schools. This is the theory of being as such. One of the methodological instructions given by Aristotle in order to open up a new area of research is to pay attention to the various aspects of the meaning of words and to investigate the interrelations between them. 116 The semantics of the word 'est' inevitably became the central theme of discussion now. Since the equivocation theory did not satisfy the second part of Aristotle's instruction, the theory quickly came to be regarded as obsolete. The opposing theory, on the other hand, fitted the theoretical requirements of the time perfectly. 117 Is "the logic of being" a theme which ontology brings to logic? Is this theme of central importance to logic only when logic is understood as being bound up with a metaphysical "theory of being"? The readers of this volume will be in a better position to reflect on the question than an author who has presently but a single voice in the concert. When surveyed from the distance of history, Abelard's contributions, as reported on here, show a common tendency. From the discussions of his contemporaries, Abelard was familiar with the problems which confront someone trying to answer the question whether 'est' is semantically ambiguous. His strategy was first to remove the word 'est' from the limelight in which it had stood for his predecessors and contemporaries. The logic and semantics of the word 'est did not necessarily constitute the central problem at the basis of a theory of the proposition and the sermocinalis scientia. Abelard's question was no longer why 'to be' was the verb used to form the proposition. The question he had to answer was why 'to be' could be substituted for inflected verb forms. Unlike the adherents of the equivocation theory, he sought to account for this linguistic phenomenon. Unlike the opponents of the theory, he attempted to do so not by offering a broadly encompassing theory,IIS but by offering one which bore a minimal burden of argumentation. 'To be' meant that something is simply given, that it exists, has existed, or will

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exist. And because it meant nothing more than this, it lent itself to functioning as an auxiliary verb to indicate the time for which the truth of a proposition was to be asserted. The theories of predication introduced in Part II of this essay are all tenable and also flexible enough to come to terms with the material of which such theories treat, namely with the proposition in normal language. Abelard realized this. Although he is one who normally does not let any opportunity for apagogic argumentation pass by, he makes no attempt to demonstrate that the three-part analysis of the proposition is inconsistent or not appropriate for the description of all types of propositions. Problems of the logic of tense and of propositions whose subject terms signify something which does not exist can also be resolved within the framework of the copula theories. To this end it must be shown that the meanings of the terms of a proposition are displaced or amplified in a specific manner when the copula is put into the past or future tense or when it is supplemented by a modal expression or an expression of knowing or being of an opinion. Abelard is able to adopt the terminology of the copula theories without reservation. When he refers to his theory as being "more elegant", he is thinking of the problems just reviewed. But one must bear in mind here that the logic of occasional sentences was accorded a much greater relative weight in medieval systems of logic than in modern ones. For Abelard, the occasional sentence is not a special case requiring the development out of general logic of a special branch to be called the logic of tenses. The occasional sentence is truly the normal case in his eyes, so that logical theory must come to terms with it right from the beginning, at its foundations. Thus a tense indicator is to be counted as a basic feature of the predicate. It specifies the relationship between the point in time at which the proposition is made and the content of the proposition. Is the two-part analysis indeed more elegant when seen in the context of logical theory as a whole and not merely of particular detail problems, assuming that the occasional sentence and a logic of tense corresponding to it playa central role? What kind of a structure would a logic have to have which did not from time to time merely bring in the two-part analysis to help clarify specific problems but which took the two-part analysis as its foundation? Up to now I have described the logical standard form of the proposition rudimentarily as 'X Vt - t'. When, instead of a personal name, a general term is placed in the subject position, distributors must be added specifying whether the predicate is to be asserted for all or only for some of the

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individuals which fall under the subject term. Now the denotative use of a noun is based on a predication. 119 'A man' amounts to 'some thing that is a man'. 'All men' amounts to 'every thing that is a man' .120 'Is' serves here, as in all other cases, as a replacement for the tense indicator as contained in the verb ending. Abelard shows this to be the case in passages on the proper conversion of temporally specific propositions. 121 He gives the sentence, 'Every old man was once young (Omnis sen ex jui! puer)' , as an example. By interchanging subject and predicate, a universal affirmative proposition can be transformed into a particular affirmative proposition. Abelard emphasizes in his discussions that the tense indicator of the predicate must also be transferred to the subject position: 'Some of the .men who were once young ... '. Likewise, the original subject must be given a tense indicator when it goes to the predicate position: ' ... are now old'. The original proposition can be reformulated in the same fashion: 'All men who are now old were once young'. The form of a proposition explained with the help of quantors and tense indicators is then as follows: 'All/some which l/; - t, If' - t'. It should be clear that a negating word can be added to the first predicate as well as to the second. The tense indicator must also be given. Thus: 'All/some which [not] l/;-t(l/;-tovl/;-tm V l/;-t n ), [not] If'-t(If'- (0 VIf'-tmVIf'-t n )'.

The transition from occasional propositions to propositions whose truth value does not change with time, as, for example, in '(omnis) homo est animaf, can be made without difficulty. Since one merely needs to abstract from the time of the utterance of the proposition, the transition consists of nothing more than an act of simplification. The tense no longer needs to be indicated specifically, for this function will now be absorbed by a quantor which is to stand before the proposition. Thus we have: 'Whenever some thing is a human being, it is an animal' .122 Expressed formally, this becomes: 'For every point in time t: All/some which l/; - t, If' - t'. APPENDIX

After the completion of my paper, the editors have kindly given me the opportunity to call the reader's attention to Kretzmann's article 'The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter Abelard' (in R. L. Benson and G.

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Constable (eds.), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982, pp. 488 - 501). Kretzmann's admirably clearly written contribution shares to a considerable extent the themes which I have dealt with here. At the centre of his discussion is Abelard's theory of predication, more specifically the logic of 'is'. Kretzmann distinguishes between three-piece predication and two-piece predication, and discusses the various theories in whose terms Abelard examines the role of the copula in three-piece predication and that of the substantive verb in two-piece predication. I cannot accept Kretzmann's attempt to prove that a development took place in Abelard's thinking on these matters, one which started from an "lngredientibus theory", then a "Dialectica revision" and a "Dialectica theory", ending with a "Dialectica suggestion" . As Kretzmann indicates, the "lngredientibus theory" was not, even at the time when it was written, Abelard's last word on the problems connected with the theory of predication. The" Dialectica theory" , like the" Dialectica suggestion", can be documented by reference to the Logica 'lngredientibus' (see above, 1.1.; 1.2.b., Note 52 and Note 55; 1.2.c. resp. 1.2.a.). The array of different theories in Abelard's work is not to be explained in chronological terms. As the title of his article shows, Kretzmann sees Abelard as an autumnal figure, a man reaping the harvest which had been grown on the ground of the 'old logic'. I see Abelard as more flexible and more restless. In his discussions, he neglects no question which has once been asked nor any suggested answer; but it is just through this placing in juxtaposition of a variety of suggestions that he allows himself to be led along quite new paths. And a theory which challenges the whole of previous tradition as emphatically as does Abelard's two-piece theory of predication must be placed more decisively in the foreground of his work than appears in Kretzmann's paper. The fact that it is possible precisely to describe the points of disagreement between us shows at the same time to what a great extent we are in accord. In fact it is not only the manner of our approaches which is very similar, nor do we merely both discover different theories of predication in Abelard's thought; we also name, describe, and evaluate them in ways which are largely similar. Such broad agreement encourages me to believe that in our attempts to understand this author, we find ourselves moving in the right direction .

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NOTES Parts of the following essay have been published in German; see Jacobi (1980) and Jacobi (1981). The invitation to contribute to the present volume has given me a gratifying opportunity to reexamine my earlier research, to incorporate supplementary material, and to strive toward greater precision and clarity. I wish to thank C. Sam Farler for preparing the English translation. ICf. Jolivet (1969), Chapter IV; de Rijk (1980). Also compare Haring (1975), who explains the meager transmission of Abelard's works as at least partially attributable to Abelard's style of thinking and writing. His philosophical "works" were not written as books intended to be recopied and handed down but as records of his own thinking to be used in teaching. A thesis which he adheres to with conviction at one point in his writings may reappear later or even in a reworking of the first source as being subject to doubt or in need of revision. 2pt' cus Abailardus, Logica 'Ingredicntibus', Super Peri ermenias, 336,27 - 340,18. Compare the notes of textual criticism in Jacobi (1981) pertaining to the edition of Abelard's commentary on Peri Hermeneias from which I quote. 3 Cf. Petrus Abailardus, Dialectica, 118,1 - 120,20. 4 Super Peri erm., 337,11-32. 5 Loc. cit. 337,41-338,7. 6 Loc. cit. 336,24 - 37; 337,33 - 40. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 140 - 141. 7 Super Peri erm., 338,21 - 339,4; cited 338,39 - 339,4: 'Si'vero vel 'et' sive aliae multae, quid significant, non est promptum assignare vel cuius rei imaginem eorum intel/ectus habeat subiectam. Si enim significant, utique intel/ectum constituunt, ad quod necesse est esse vel rem vel imaginem rei, in qua nilatur intel/ectus. Sed cuiusmodi rem vel cuiusmodi figmentum imaginis per 'si' sive per 'et' concipimuS, numquid ad modum substantiae vel qualitatis vel ad quem modum, ut sanus consistat intel/ectus? 8 Loc. cit., 339,5 -7. 9 Loc. cit., 339,7- 11. 10 Loc. cit., 339,11-19. 11 Loc. cit., 339,20-32; cited 339,24-32: Licet ('est' et 'non est') intel/ectus non conslituant, quandam tamen coniunctionem vel disiunctionem intel/ectarum rerum in anima haberijaciunt, quam tamen coniunctionem vel disiunctionem non significant, licet haberi jaciant, quia intel/ectum non dant in se, sed intel/ectorum coadiunctionem vel separationem habere nos jaciunt. Sunt itaque tres actiones in intellectu proposilionis, intel/ectus scilicet partium, coniunclio vel disiunctio intel/ectarum rerum. Nec est incongruum, si ea actio, quae intel/ectus non est, sit pars intel/ectus totius·proposilionis. Cf. 339,32 - 340,2. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 141-142; Tweedale (1976), pp. 231-234. 12 Super Peri erm., 340,2 - 6: Sicut autem 'est'vel 'non est' coniunctiva vel disiunctiva sunt, non significativa, ita 'si' vel 'non si' significativQS voces copulant vel separant, ut ipsa tamen non significent, cum nullius rei in se conceptiones teneant sive verae sive fictae, sed animum inclinant ad quendam concipiendi modum. 13 cr. Tweedale (1976), p. 234. 14 Cf. Kretzmann (1982). 15 Super Peri erm., 346,1-351,22. 16 Dial., 130,6-8; 130,26-131,3; 132,21-133,28. 17 Priscianus, Inst. gramm., 1118, t. I, p. 55,8-9; VIII I, t. I, p. 369,2-3; XVII 14, t. II, p. 116,26 - 27. Cited by Abelard, Super Peri erm., 346, I - 2; Dial., 132,38 - 133,2.

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Super Peri erm., 346,1 - 4; Dial., 130,6 - 7.

Super Peri erm., 346,4 - 12. Cf. de Rijk (198Ia), p. 30. 20 Super Peri erm., 346,13 - 24: Verbum etiam substantivum 'sum, es, est' dupliciteraccipi dicunt, cum modo in vi verbi sumitur, modo in vi substantivi. In vi quidem verbi sumitur, cum aequivoce pro quibuslibet verbis sumitur tam actionem quam passionem significantibus, ut scilicet tantumdem valeat quantum 'amo' vel 'Iego' vel 'curro' vel 'amor' vel 'Iegor' etc. Cum vero in ea significatione sumitur in qua est substantivum, tunc omnia in essentia significat. Unde secundum aliam significationem est verbum, cum videlicet quaslibet actiones vel passiones ut adiacentes significat, et secundum aliam institutionem substantivum, cum scilicet quaelibet in essentia significat tam actiones vel passiones quam res alias, et tunc quoque aequivoce sumitur, ut tantumdem valeat quantum vel 'substantia' vel 'quantitas' vel 'qualitas' etc. quae in essentia significant res. Cf. the excerpts from Glosule super Priscianum maiorem, which de Rijk (1967), p. \02, gives. 21 Cf. de Rijk (198Ia), p. 30. <22 Super Peri erm., 346,36-347,22; 348,2-14; cf. Dial., 132,36-133,28. 23 Aristoteles, De into c.3, 16 b 6 - 9, Arist. lat. 7,1 - 5; Petrus Abailardus, Super Peri erm., 346,25 - 36; 347,38 - 348,2; 348,15 - 28; 350,40 - 351,2. 24 Super Peri erm., 346,32 - 36: Nam 'amans' in designatione eiusdem actionis et nomen est et participium, nec differt nisi in significatione tan tum temporis, quando nomen est et participium. Similiter 'ens' et nomen et participium esse potest in eadem significatione essentiae, si modo cum tempore modo sine tempore sumitur. Cf. 347,2 - 6; 348,15 - 28. 25 Loc. cit., 348,28 - 349,1. 26 Loc. cit., 348,21 - 28: ... singula nomina secundum proprias significationes verba requirent, si essent, qui imponerent, substantiva quidem, ut 'esse substantiam, fuisse, fore' vel'quantitatem' vel'qualitatem' vel 'corpus' vel 'colorem' vel 'hominem' vel'albedinem', sumpta vero verba ut 'esse quale' vel 'fuisse' vel 'fore' vel 'colora tum , vel 'album', sicut 'ambulare' vel 'ambulasse' vel 'sedere' vel 'sedisse' dicimus pro 'esse' vel 'fuisse ambulantem' vel 'sedentem'. Nil enim, inquit Aristotell?s, differre 'hominam ambulare' et 'ambulantem esse'. 27 Loc. cit., 349,1-350,39; 351,\0-22; cf. Dial., 138,11-141,3. Cf. Tweedale (1976), pp. 285-292; 298-302; de Rijk (I981a), p. 28. 28 Super Peri erm., 349,6 - 19; cf. Dial., 138,26 - 139,3. 29 Super Peri erm., 350,19-39. 30 Dial., 139,12-140,14. 31 Super Peri erm., 346,25 - 28: Nobis autem placet omnia verba dici ab Aristoteles quaecumque cum aliquo tempus habent significare, et sicut nomina quaedam res in essentia significant, quaedam ex adiacenti proprietate, ita etiam verba. Cf. the passage cited in Note 26. As shown there, substantives signifying properties on the one hand ('qualitatem . . .', 'colorem . . .', 'albedinem esselfuisselfore') and properties as attributable on the other hand ('quale . . .', 'coloratum . . .', 'album esselfuisselfore') can be made into verbs by using the helping verb 'esse'. Cf. further 347,38 - 348,2: Sicut ergo nomina substantialia inveniuntur, ita et verba, et sicut nomina quaedam sumpta sunt, ita etiam verba non solum ab actionibus vel passionibus, verum etiam ab aliisformis, ut 'sedeo' a 'sessione' sumptum est. 32 Loc. cit., 347,23 - 26: Volumus itaque verbum substantivum in eadem significatione retentum, scilicet qua omnia significat in essentia, et substantivum esse et verbum et idem semper notari in ipso. Veluti cum dicitur 'homo est' et 'albedo est', eundem ubique sensum 'est' verbum tenet, ac si diceret 'est aliquid de numero existentium'. The explanation of 'est' by 'est aliquid de numero existentium' is to be found at this point only in manuscript 19

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B, not In manuscript A, upon which B. Geyer's edition is based. Compare also 362, 20 - 23, which is also to be found in Geyer's edition. 33 Aristoteles, De into c.3 16 b 7; 16 b 9 -10. Translatio Boethii, Arist. lat., 7,2 - 3; 7,5 - 6: et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota . ... et semper eorum quae de altero dicuntur nota est, ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto. 34 Super Peri erm., 351,23 - 354,5; cf. 357,16 - 363,24. 3S Loc. cit., 352,4 - 7: In quo innuit (Aristotelesj verba maxime propter praedicationem inventa, nomina vero propter subiectionem, ut ex his integram proposition is constitutionem doceat. 36 Loc. cit., 351,23 - 31: "Etest semper'. Datadefinitione, qua omne verbum includit tam copulativum praedicati quam non, tam rectum quam casuale, tamfinitum quam infinitum, quandam proprietatem verbi supponit, ex qua vim maximam in propositione praedicativa, de qua intendit, verbum habere monstrat. Unde in sequentibus dicet nul/am enuntiationem absque verbo consistere. Haec est autem proprietas, quod verbum semper est nota, id est copula, praedicatorum de altero, id est copulativum est praedicatorum, quae praedicata de altero quam de ipsis verbis copulantibus necesse est praedicari. 37 Dial., 129, 21 - 26: Quod itaque dixit verbum semper esse notam eorum quae de altero praedicantur, omne verbum monstravit habere officium copulandi praedicatum subiecto nec iIIud "semper" ad temporum, immo ad verborum comprehensionem referendum est. Potest enim verbum per se proferri nec aliquid copulare; semper tamen secundum inventionem suam copulativum est. 38 Loc. cit., 121,28-29; 122, 13-21. 39 Loc. cit.·, 122, 17 - 21: Nomina . .. non . .. sicut verba tempus consignijicant, ut scilicet, quemadmodum dictum est, primam signijicationem subiectis person is secundum tempus distribuere dicantur. Sed cur non? 40 Loc. cit., 122,22 - 29: Sicut enim 'curro' vel 'currens' cursum circa personam tanquam ei praesentialiter inhaerentem demonstrat, ita 'album' circa substantiam albedinem tam(quam) praesentialiter inhaerentem determinat; non enim album nisi ex praesenti albedine dicitur. Unde et tan tum 'albi' nomen dicere videtur, quantum quidem praesentialiter albedine est informatum, sicut et 'currens' in quodam praesentialiter cursum parlicipat. Sicut enim substantivi verbi signijicatio, cui quoque tempus adiunctum est, verbis adiungitur, sic et nominibus videtur. Cf. Twecdale (1982), p. 144. 41 Dial., 123,9-15: Quod itaque tempus verbis accidit, hoc etiam nominibus congruit, praesens scilicet, sive ea sint substantiae sive adiacentiae vocabula. Sicut enim 'album' ex praesenti albedine datum est, ita etiam 'homo' ex praesenti substantia animalis rationalis mortalis, et quem hominem dicis, iam animal rationale mortale ipsum ostendis et tantumdem 'hominis' vocabulum sonat, quantum quidem praesentialiter 'est animal rationale mortale'. Cf. de Rijk (1981 b), pp. 29 - 30. 42 Dial., 123,2 - 5: Male ergo per "sine tempore" nomina, quae etiam temporis designativa monstrantur, Aristoteles verbis disiunxisse videtur; eiusdem, inquam, temporis consignijicativa cuius et verba, idest praesentis. 43 Cf. Jacobi (1981), pp. 56 - 59; 67 - 68. 44 Tweedale's (1982) interpretation is different. He understands Abelard as associating a tense with the isolated noun, generally the present (p. 146: cf. p. 144). In this case the noun must change its meaning when it comes after a copula in past or future tense (p. 146). In this interpretation the wording of the passage has not been attended to with sufficienti:are. Nor is it clear how a noun in isolation is to convey a time connotation in addition to its main meaning. Moreover, in Super Peri erm., 349,31- 33, Abelard speaks out against the very theory which Tweedale attributes to him: Si qllis autem dicat 'homo' per adconiunc-

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tionem verbi 'fuit' transire in significationem praeteritorum, quia verbum adconiunctum tempus praeteritum significat, non videtur recto. Compare the further discussions at 349,33 - 350,5. 4S Dial., 123,15 - 25: Non tam igitur in significatione temporis nomen a verbo recedere videtur quam in modo significandi. Verbum enim, quod solum inhaerentiam facit, in eo tempus quoque designat quod inhaerentiam rei suae ad subiectam personam in tempore denotat. Nomen autem inhaerendi significationem non tenet nec aliquid quemadmodum verbum inhaerere proponit, etsi rem aliquando ut inhaerentem determinet, ut 'album' albedinem tamquam adiacentem atque inhaerentem significat, non tamen vel adiacere vel inhaerere proponit, sicut verbum facit, quod etiam substantivi verbi copulationem adiunctam propriae significationi continet; tantumdem enim 'currit' verbum proponit quantum 'est currens' dicit. Cf. 148,26-30; 149,20-26. Cf. Tweedale (1982), pp. 144-145. 46 Dial., 129,18 - 21: In quo quidem ipse (Aristoteles) monstravit omne verbum cum officio copulandi vel ea quae tantum dicuntur de subiecto - nec scilicet sunt in subiecto ut 'homo' et 'rationale', vel ea etiam quae sunt in subiecto, temporis quoque significationem continere. 47 Loc. cit., 123,20-21, cited in Note 45. 4H Within the context of a different theme, Abelard gives great attention to impersonal propositions. Compare Tweedale (1976), pp. 244-272; the same (1982), pp. 147-148. 49 Super Peri erm., 359,9 - 363,24; Dial., 134,28 - 141,3; cf. Super Peri erm., 351,31- 34; 351,37-40; Dial., 159,11-160,13; 161,24-165,9; 167,6-168,10; 170,21-30. Cf. Tweedale (1976), pp. 228; 242 - 244; 292 - 297; the same (1982), pp. 145 - 147; de Rijk (1981a), pp. 21-28; the same (1981b), pp. 33-38. so De Rijk (1981b), p. 33, section heading; cf. the same (1981a), p. 21, section heading. SI Dial., 134,30-32; 161,28-32; Super Peri erm., 359,22-28; 362,7-10. S2 Dial., 134,28-31; 135,6; Super Peri erm., 362,7-8. S3 Dial., 135,6 - 8; Super Peri erm., 362, 20 - 23. S4 Super Peri erm., 359,32 - 360,2. ss Dial., 134,28 - 34; Super Peri erm., 362,4 -7. In Dial., 138,17 - 20, this thesis is ascribed to Aristotle; cf. De into c.l1, 21 a 26 - 28, Arist. lat. 25,15 - 17. S6 Super Peri erm., 360,15 - 18: cum in essentia quaelibet significet, numquam ei copulatio essentiae deest, quia ubique per ipsum proponitur aliquid aliud esse, etiam quando adiectivis adiungitur, veluti cum dicitur: 'iste est albus'. cf. 361,12-25; Dial., 131,4-6; 131,23-25; 138,7-10. S7 Cf. de Rijk (1981a), pp. 21-24; the same (1981b), pp. 33 - 35. In both places de Rijk is speaking about Super Peri erm., 360,9-361,3. 58 Cf. Super Peri erm., 362,23-34; Dial., 135,11 - 13; 136,37-137,6; 162,10-12. S9 Super Peri erm., 362,13 - 20. 60 Loc. cit., 360,18 - 361 ,3; see de Rijk (l981a), pp. 21 - 24; the same (1981 b), pp. 33 - 35. Th,: background for this thesis is formed by the distinction between esse in subiecto and dici de subiecto, which Aristotle makes in Categories, Chapter 2. Cf. Petrus Abailardus, Logica 'Ingredientibus', Super Praedicamenta, 126,27 - 133,31; 145,25 - 146,18; Super Peri erm., 352, 13 - 22; 352,35 - 353,2; Super Top. (ed. dal Pra), 274,10 - 275,29; see de Rijk (1967), pp. 204-205. 61 Dial., 131,33 -132,13. 62 Super Peri erm., 361,12 - 25; Dial., 135,9 - 138,26; cf. de Rijk (198Ia), pp. 24- 28; the same (1981b), pp. 35-37; Tweedale (1976), pp. 292-297; Dial., 162,16-18; 167,6-168,2; 168,11 -169,28. 63 Super Peri erm., 361,22 - 25; Dial., 136,32 - 36; 168, 21 - 25.

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Dial., 135,24 - 25; 135,36 -136,36; 168, II - 17. Super Peri erm., 362,21 - 25: 'Est' verbum . . . secundo praedicalum id ex propria inventione tenet, ut tam existentia quam non existentia copulet. Copulet inquam quod intelligitur tantum ex supposita voce. Loc. cit., 362,32 - 34: Unde interpositum tertium nil signijicationis in se tenet, quod in intellectu copulet, sed tan tum rem praedicati suppositi. 66 Dial., 136,37 - 137,8: At vero mihi omnis ilia verbi praedicatio per accidens atque impropria videtur, quando ipsum, ut dictum est, tertium adiacens interponitur, cum non rem, ut dictum est, praedicatam contineat, sed solius copulae officium habeat, ut in ea quoque qua dicitur: 'Petrus est homo' vel '.. .albus'. Nec quidem quantum ad eius interpretationem pertinet, ex eo quod dicitur: 'Petrus est homo', inferri potest 'Petrus est', sed fortasse quantum ad praedicationem 'hominis', quod existentis rei tan tum nomen est. Si enim, quia verbum copula interponitur, simpliciter praedica(re}tur, et ex eo quod dicitur: 'chimaera est opinabilis' vel 'non existens', chimaera esse concederetur. 67 De Rijk (198Ia), p. 27 . 68 Dial., 138,11- 17. 69 Cf. Aristote1es, De into 'c.4, 16 b 26-27, Translatio Boethii, Arist. lat ., '7,20-21: Oratio autem est vox signijicativa, cuius partium aliquid signijicativum est separatum. Cf. Petrus Abailardus, Dial., 146,34 - 148,16. 70 Cf. Boethius, In Peri herm., II, 8,30-9,5; Petrus Abaihirdus, Dial., 148,18-151,4. 71 Cf. Boethius, loc. cit., 9,6-15; Petrus Abailardus, loc. cit., 151,5-153,2. 72 Aristoteles, De into c.4, 16 b 33 - 17 a 4, Arist. lat., 8,6 - 10. The formulation cited stems from Boethius, Dediff top. I, 1174 B7-8 . Cf. Nuchelmans(l973), pp . 132-135. 73 Super Peri erm., 330,11-18; cf. 325,24-326,15; see also Nuche1mans (1973), p. 143. 74 Super Peri erm., 327,1-4: Nam 'homo currens' vel 'homo non currens' nil intellectu discrepare videtur ab 'homo currit' vel 'homo non currit', quia eadem est animi conceptio hic et ibi, in coniunctione scilicet cursus ad hominem vel disiunctione. 7S Loc. cit., 327,7-13; cf. 329,29-330,36. 76 Cf. loc. cit., 327,27 - 40. 77 Loc. cit., 327,14-23. 78 Loc. cit., 327,40 - 41: Unde ex modo proponendi enuntiationes sive propositiones maxime dicuntur. Cf. Dial., 149,11 - 16: Sed dico hoc ad perfectionem orationis non sufficere, ut quasi adiacentem homini albedinem vel cursum determinemus, nisi etiam adiacere dicamus, quod sine verbo fieri non contingit. In hoc enim verbum a participio abundat quod non solum personam per impositionem demonstrat aut ei cohaerentem actionem vel passionem significat, verum etiam cohaerere dicit. 79 Super Peri erm., 327,23 - 26: Similiter et cum dicimus 'verum est Socratem sedere', oratio subiecta, quae est 'Socratem sedere', eundem intellectum constituit, quem 'Socrates sedet', nee tamen modum enuntiandi habet affirmando vel negando, ut propositio did possit. 80 Cf. Dial., 154,4-29; 204,29-205,30; see also Tweedale (1976), pp. 217-219; 265-266. 81 Super Peri erm., 307,26 - 30: Nomina .. . et verba duplicem signijicationem habent, unam quidem de rebus, alteram de intellectibus. Res enim signijicant constituendo intellectus ad eas pertinentes, hoc est naturam aliquam earum vel proprietatem attendentes. Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 139-140. 82 Super Peri erm., 326,30-31: Sanus autem est omnis intellectus tam simplex quam compositus, per quem attendimus, ut res se habet. 83 Loc. cit., 326,31 - 37, cited 326,33 - 34: . . . ut 'homo' quamdiu homo subsistit, sanum intellectum generat. Cf. 321,21- 36; also 332,30 - 334,17. Cf. Nuche1mans (1973), p. 144. 64

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Super Peri erm., 365,21-30; Dial., 157,17-22. Super Peri erm., 366,6-27; 367,2-9; 368,1- 8; Dial., 160,14-21. 86 Super Peri erm., 366,27 -40; Dial., 157,23 -158,3. 87 Cf. lolivet (1969), pp. 77-85; 201-203; de Rijk (1975), pp. 549-555; Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 150-161; Tweedale(1976), pp. 216-278. 88 Aristoteles, De into C. I, 16 a 17 -18, Arist. lat., 6,1-2. 89 Boethius, In Peri herm. I, 44,9 - 10; 44,15 - 16; II, 48,32 -49,4; 49,18 - 21. 90 Dial., 150,13 - 20; cf. Super Peri erm., 366,37 -40; Dial., 160,26 - 29. 91 Super Peri erm., 365,31-38; 367,9-20; 368,1-30; Dial., 160,14-15; 160,23. 92 Dial., 160,23 - 26. 93 Super Peri erm., 361,30 - 36; 370,4- 22; 390,11- 393,27; Super Peri erm. B, §§ 22- 31. 94 Cf. Nuchelmans (1973), pp. 149 - 150; 153 - 154; Tweedale (1976), pp. 244 - 272. 95 Super Peri erm., 370,11-15; cf. Nuchelmans (1973), p. 155; Tweedale (1976), pp. 264-265. 96 Super Peri erm., 370,15-22. 97 Super Peri erm. B, § 30; see also Tweedale (1976), pp. 263 - 264. 98' Super Peri erm. B, § 31, p. 20,19-25: Dicimus itaque 'necessarium' sive 'possibile' in huiusmodi enuntiationibus magis consignijicare quam per se signijicationem habere; nil quippe in eis est intelligendum nisi subiecte orationi applicentur, et tunc modum concipiendi faciunt circa res subiecte orationis sicut facit verbum interpositum vel coniunctio, si que ad necessitatem copulat. 99 Aristoteles, De into C. 12, 21a 9- 10, Arist. lat., 27,3 -4. 100 Dial., 161,8 - 15: Est autem categoricarum natura secundum membra sive species demonstranda. Sunt autem membra ex quibus coniunctae sunt, praedicatum ac subiectum atque ipsorum copula, secundum hoc scilicet quod verbum a praedicato seorsum per se accipimus, veluti in ea propositione qua dicitur: 'homo est animal', 'animal' praedicatur, 'homo' vero subicitur, verbum vero interpositum praedicatum subiecto copulat; et in his quidem tribus categoricae proposition is sensus perficitur. Most of the substantiating quotations used here and below are taken from Abelard's writings. The writings of Abelard's contemporaries have been preserved and edited only fragmentarily. It is in any case interesting and characteristic of the disputative style of Abelard's thinking that he takes on the whole gamut of possible positions in his writings. 101 Super Peri erm., 339,20 - 32; 340,2 - 6: see above, pp. 147 - 148. 102 Super Peri erm., 362,14-34; Dial., 159,11-18; cf. above 1.2.c. 103 Dial., 162,18-21. 104 Dial., 162,16-18; compare above, p. 157. 105 IJial., 137,3 - 8, cited above, Note 66. 106 See the interpolation in Glosule super Priscianum maiorem (ed. by R. W. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, I: Petrus Helias and His Predecessors', Mediaeval 'and Renaissance Studies I, (1943), 194 - 231; here: 226,28 - 227,14) which de Rijk (1967), p. 103, quotes: Cum . .. dico 'Socrates est', si consideremus 'est' in vi verbi, actiones quas signijicat, idest lectionem et alias, sub disiunct/one copulat cum Socrate; si autem in vi substantivi, Socratem existentibus annumerare, idest quod Socrates est unum de existentibus dicere, in tendo . ... Nam iIIud (verbum substantivum) positum in propositione diversas essentias convenienter ad se invicem iungere affirmamus. Nam ex hoc quod omnes res in essentia signijicat, aptum est ad hoc ut quaslibet res sibi coherentes copulare possit, verbi gratia cum dico 'Socrates est animal', excluso respectu verbalis significationis, non prorsus tamen verbi proprietate separata, copulat enim ipsum 'est', quantum -ad officium quod exercet in oratione in, vi substantivi con-

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sideramus. Unde aperte rem animalis cum re hominis copulat. Non tamen negamus idem 'est' consideratum in ipsa oratione vim verbi obtinere; sed aliud est agere de vocibus per se consideratis, aliud de eisdem ad vim et officium quod habent in oratione posite relatis. Nom quantum ad vim huius oration is 'homo est animal', 'est' non per se tan tum sed cum aliis hoc solum significat, quod ilia res que est homo sit ilia res que est animal. Hoc autem ex vi verbi habere non potest, immo ex vi substantivi. For Abelard's view compare Super Perierm., 347,23-27; 360,13-18. 107 Super Peri erm., 357,36-358,3. 108 Dial., 135,23 - 35. In Dial., 168,11 -169, 28, these interpretations are introduced as being the opinions of Abelard's teacher V. (Ulger). 109 Super Peri erm., 361,19-25; compare above, p. 157. 110 Dial., 165,3-8; compare the further reference to the earlier discussion 170,21-31; compare also the formulation at 167,7 - 8: secundum eos qui 'est' tertium adiacens praedicato non componunt, sed dictionem per se sumunt. III Super Peri erm., 359,22 - 28; 362,7 - \0; 362,20 - 23; Dial., 134,28 - 32; 161,28 - 32; compare above, p. 155. 112 Super Peri erm., 361,33 - 362,7; 362,23 - 36; Dial., 134,32 - 135,6; 136,37 - 137,6; 138,11 - 17; compare above 1.2.c. III Cf. Moody (1953), pp. 32- 38; de Rijk (1967), pp. \02-106; 183 -186; 203 -205; 561 - 562; the same (1956), pp. XXXVIII - XL; Pinborg (1972), pp. 46; 53 - 55; Maieru (1972), pp. 199 - 206. 114 Aristotle's explication of the proposition based on the word 'hyparchei' surely forms the background here. 115 See above, p. 157. 116 Cf. Aristoteles, Top. Icc. 13 and 15. 117 Cf. William of Sherwood, Syncategoremata, pp. 70-71; Thomas Aquinas, In Peri herm., L.I, l.V, §§ 70-73; see also Zimmermann (1971). 118 The countertheory to the equivocation theory is easily joined with metaphysical theorems about transcendentals and the actus essendi in the thirteenth century. 119 See above p. 154. 120 Cf. Tweedale (1982), p. 149. 121 Dial., 139,12 - 140,14; cf. Super Peri erm., 350,35 - 39. 122 Cf. Dial., 160,17 - 19. At Dial., 279,8 - 282,33, Abelard distinguishes between the case that no more men exist and the case that none have as yet existed. In the latter case, 'animaf would have a different meaning, namely no impositio for men.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle, De Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford, 1949; Translatio Boethii, ed. L. Minio-Pa1uello, Aristoteles Latinus II 1 - 2 (Corpus Philosophorum p1edii aevi Academiarum consociatarum auspiciis et consilio editum), Desclee de Brouwer, Bruges - Paris, 1965. Aristotle, Topica, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958. Boethius, Commentarii in lib rum Aristotelis nEPI EPMHNEIAE, ed. C. Meiser. Prima editio [I], Teubner, Leipzig, 1877; Secunda editio [II], Teubner, Leipzig, 1880. Boethius, De differentiis topicis, Patrologia Latina, t. 64. Peter Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Van Gorcum, Assen. 1956,21970. Peter Abelard, Glossae super Peri ermeneias, ed. B. Geyer, in Peter Abaelards

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Philosophische Schriften, I. Die Logica 'Ingredientibus', (BGPhThMA 21,3), Aschendorff, Miinster, 1927. Peter Abelard, Glossae super Periermenias B, cappo XII - XIV, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, in Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies II: Abaelardiana Inedita, edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma, 1958. Peter Abelard, Glossae super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. B. Geyer, in Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften I. Die Logica 'Ingredientibus' (BGPhThMA 21,2), Aschendorff, Miinster, 1921. Peter Abelard, Glossae super Topica, ed. M. dal Pra, in Pietro Abelardo, Scrittijilosojici, Fratelli Bocca, Roma - Milano, 1954. Priscian, Institutionum grammaticarum libri XVIII, ed. M. Hertz (Grammatici Latini, rec. H. Keil, II, III), Teubner, Leipzig, 1855. Thomas Aquinas, In libros Peri Hermeneias Expositio, ed. T. M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Rome, 1950. William of Sherwood, Syncategoremata, ed. J. R. O'Donnell, Mediaeval Studies 3 (1941), 46-93. Haring, N. M., 'Abelard Yesterday and Today', in Pierre Abilard - Pierre Ie Venerable, Actes du Colloque international, Cluny, 2-9 juillet 1972, ed. R. Louis, J. Jolivet, J. Chatillon, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1975, pp. 341-403. Jacobi, K., 'Diskussionen iiber Priidikationstheorie in den logischen Schriften des Petrus Abailardus. Versuch einer Ubersicht', in Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung, ed. R. Thomas (Trierer Theol. Studien, Bd. 38), Paulin us, Trier, 1980, pp. 165 -179. Jacobi, K., 'Die Semantik sprachlicher Ausdriicke, Ausdrucksfolgen und Aussagen in Abailards Kommentar zu Peri hermeneias', Medioevo (1981), 41-89. Jolivet, J., Arts du Langage et tMologie chez Abelard (Etudes de Philosophie Medievale 57), J. Vrin, Paris, 1969. Kretzmann, N., 'Syncategoremata, exponibilia, sophismata', in The C-ambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 211-241. Maieril, A., Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica, Edizioni dell' Ateneo, Roma, 1972. Moody, E. A., Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics), North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1953. Nuchelmans, G., Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity, North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1973. Pinborg, J., Logik und Semantik in Mittelalter. Ein Uberblick. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad Canstatt, 1972. Rijk, L. M. de, Logica Modernorum. I1- J: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1%7. Rijk, L. M. de, 'La signification de la proposition (dictum propositionis) chez Abelard', in Pierre Abilard - Pierre Ie venerable, Actes du Colloque International, Cluny, 2 - 9 Juillet 1972, ed. R. Louis, J. Jolivet, J. Chatillon, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1975, pp. 547 - 555. Rijk, L. M. de, 'Peter AbiiIard (1079-1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns', in Petrus Abaelardus (1079- J142), Person, Werk und Wirkung, ed. R. Thomas (Trierer Theol. Studien, Bd. 38), Paulinus, Trier, 1980, pp. 125 -138. Rijk, L. M. de, 'Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das mittelalterliche Denken iiber das Sein', in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Miscellanea Mediaevaiia, Bd. 13/1, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1981, pp. 19-35.

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Rijk, L. M. de, 'Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later Developments', in English Logic and Semantics. Acts oJ the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, Leiden - Nijmegen, 23 - 27 April 1979, ed. by H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H. Kneepkens, and L. M. de Rijk (Artistarium Supplementa I), Nijmegen, 1981, pp. I-58. Tweedale, M. M., Abailard on Universals, North-Holland Pub!. Co., Amsterdam - New York - Oxford, 1976. Tweedale, M. M., 'Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic", in The Cambridge History oj Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 143 -157. Zimmermann, A., "Ipsum enim ('est') nihil est' (Aristote1es Periherm. I, c. 3). Thomas von Aquin tiber die Bedeutung der Kopula', in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1971, pp. 282 - 295.

Philosophisches Seminar II Albert-Ludwigs-Universitiit Werthmannplatz D-7800 Freiburg im Breisgau, B.R.D.

HERMANN WEIDEMANN

THE LOGIC OF BEING IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Being acquainted with the familiar distinction between the "is" of existence, the "is" of predication, and the "is" of identity, which Hintikka has labeled "the Frege trichotomy" (1979, pp. 433f), a modern student of Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of being cannot fail to realize that this distinction, though it seems not to have been ignored by Aquinas, is overshadowed in his writings by another distinction between two semantically different uses of the verb "be", which he borrows from Aristotle. My aim in this paper is, first, to examine how the two distinctions are related to one another; secondly, to show that Aquinas, though drawing these distinctions, does not commit himself to the assumption that the verb "be" is genuinely ambiguous! and, finally, to elucidate how Aquinas avoids such a commitment. Since it is an ontological and to a certain extent even a theological rather than a logical point of view from which Aquinas approaches the problem of the semantically different uses of the verb "be", what he has to say concerning the logic of being is split up into a lot of scattered remarks, mainly the by-product of metaphysical reflections, from the larger context of which. they have to be gathered and put together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. In view of this, not a few of the moves I shall make in my following attempt to trace a coherent picture of Aquinas's logical treatment of the verb "be" will be little more than conjectural.

The distinction which plays the predominant role in Aquinas's theory of being is twofold rather than threefold and has indeed been called "a fundamental ontological dichotomy in Thomas Aquinas's thought" (Veres, 1970). In accordance with this dichotomy, for which he invokes the authority of Aristotle (Metaph . .:l 7, 1017 a 22-35)2, we have to distinguish between the use we make of the verb "be" to express the being of something which falls under one of the ten categories (i.e. the being of something which is either a substance, e.g. a man, or an accidental property, e.g. the white colour of a man), on the one hand, and the use 181 S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being, 181-200. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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we make of the verb "be" to express the truth (i.e. the being the case) of a true proposition,3 on the other hand: Philosoph us, in V Metaphys. [... J, ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens, sive sit substantia, ut homo, sive accidens, ut color. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis ... (In II Sent. dis!. 34, q. I, a. I, C).4

Used in the first way, we are told by Aquinas, the verb "be" refers "to the act of a being thing insofar as it is being, i.e. to that by which something is called actually being in reality" (esse dicitur actus en tis in quantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura: Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2 [3], c), e.g., to the act of living which is the being of whatever is alive (In I Sent. dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). Understood in this sense the term "being thing" (ens) applies to "something naturally existing, be it a substance, like a man, or an accidental property, like a colour" (In II Sent. dist. 34, q. 1, a. 1, c). Used in the second way, however, the verb "be" serves to answer the question whether there is (an est) such and such a thing (ibid., cf. S.th. I, q. 48,.a. 2, ad 2, De malo q. 1, a. 1, ad 19). The distinction between the two uses of the verb "be" so far considered thus amounts to distinguishing between two different existential uses of this verb, which we may, following Peter Geach, call its use in an actuality sense and its use in a there-is sense, respectively. 5 Whereas an entity A falling under one of the ten categories in virtue of its having an essence, can be said to be in the sense that A actually exists as well as. in the sense that there is such a thing as A, an entity A which lacks an essence, because it is rather a privation of some being than a being in itself, can be said to be only in the latter sense. Sentences of the form "A is" (i.e. "A exists"), where "A", to judge from the examples chosen by Aquinas, is a placeholder for concrete or abstract general terms, like "(a) man" or "(a) colour", and for concrete or abstract singular terms, like "Socrates" or "blindness", can thus be put to two different uses. In analysing the second use Aquinas comes close to the modern analysis of existence statements in terms of the existential quantifier. What we convey by saying that blindness exists, to take one of Aquinas's favourite examples, is, according to him, nothing but the fact that it is true to say that something is blind (Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum: In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 896; cf. De pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 1). Being the privation of sight, blindness is not being in the sense that it actually exists, however, because - unlike an animal that happens to be blind - it has no essence which could be actualized in reality. Since

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Socrates, e.g., has such an essence (or nature), to say that Socrates exists (" Socrates est") is either to say, on the one hand, that he actually exists (or is alive) as the human being that he essentially is, or to say, on the other hand, that there is such a person as Socrates (cf. In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 896).6 Of these two uses of the verb "be" the latter is regarded by Aquinas as the more comprehensive; for whatever can be said to be In the sense that it exists as a substantial thing or as an accidental property of such a thing can also be said to be in the sense that its existence can be truly affirmed, but not the other way round. The existence of blindness, for example, can be truly affirmed by saying that there is blindness (caecitas est); but none the less blindness is not to be found among the entities which belong to the furniture of our actual world, because it is rather a lack of actuality than something actually existing (cf. In II Sent. dist. 34, q. 1, a. 1, c). His distinction between these two existential uses of the verb "be" aside, Aquinas is well aware of the difference between the "is" of predication and the' 'is" of identity, as witness a couple of texts in which he distinguishes between something's being predicated of something' 'in the way of an identity" (per modum identitatis: S.th. I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 4) and something's being predicated of something "in the manner in which a universal thing is predicated of a particular one" (sicut universale de particulari: ibid.). A predication of the latter kind, which in contradistinction to the so-called praedicatio per identitatem (S.th. I, q. 39, a. 6, ad 2, In III Sent. dist. 7, q. 1, a. 1, c) he also calls (praedicatio) per denominationem sive informationem (In III Sent. dist. 5, expos. textus), is for Aquinas a predication "more properly" so called (magis propria praedicatio: ibid.).7 Concerning predications properly so called, Aquinas draws a distinction between substantial and accidental predications, which embraces the distinction between the two existential uses of the verb "be" already mentioned, in that this verb, according to whether it is used in its actuality senseor in its there-is sense, either functions as a substantial predicate, which corresponds to the question "What is ... ?" (quid est?), or as an accidental one, corresponding to the question "Is there such a thing as ... ?" (an est?) (cf. In II Sent. dist. 34, q. I, a. 1, c; In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 896; De malo q. 1, a. 1, ad 19). Aquinas's view that to use the verb "be" in its actuality sense and, hence, existentially is to use it as a predicate which .corresponds to the question of what a given thing is might seem rather odd. It is explained

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by the fact that, to Aquinas's mind, it is only in accordance with a thing's essence or nature that actual being (or existence) belongs to a thing; for the actual being of a thing is nothing but the actuality of that thing's essence (actus essentiae: In I Sent. dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). Despite this intimate connection between a thing's having an essence and its being actually existent, which accounts for Aquinas's tendency to assimilate the use of the verb "be" in its actuality sense with its use as a substantial predicate, there is a difference between the essence of a thing and its actual existence, which is the actuality of its essence. This difference is taken into account by Aquinas when, instead of drawing his standard twofold distinction between the use we make of the verb "be" to refer to "the essence of a thing or (to) its act of being", on the one hand, and the use we make of it to refer to "the truth of a proposition", on the other hand (De pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 1), he occasionally contrasts being as being true with being as being what a thing is (i.e. with the nature· or essence of a thing), on the one hand, and with being as being actually existent (i.e. with the actuality of a thing's essence), on the other hand: ... esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei [... 1. Ali" modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae [... 1. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod signific.!' veri tat em compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod 'est' dicitur copula (In I Sen' dis!. 33, q. I, a. I, ad I).

As regards Aquinas's doctrine that in answering the question whether there is such and such a thing we are using the verb "be" as an accidental predicate which signifies the truth of a proposition, it is not selfexplanatory either, especially since it is this use of the verb "be" that is taken by Aquinas to be its copulative one (ibid.; cf. In III Sent. dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, c, In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 896, S.th. I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2). For a modern reader who has become accustomed to distinguishing the copulative use of "is" and its use in the there-is sense as its respective predicative and existential uses from its so-called veridicaluse 8 such a doctrine looks highly implausible. Some comments on the view taken by Aquinas are therefore in order. From Aquinas's point of view it is by "signifying a propositional combination, additionally invented by the (human) soul in the act of linking a predicate to a subject" (signijicat composition em proposition is, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto: S. tho I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2), that the copula signifies the truth of the sentences in which it occurs (signijicat veritatem proposition is: S.th. I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2). That is to say that in its copulative use the verb "be" signifies that a predicate is said to be true of a subject or, more accurately, that a predicate-term

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is said to be true of what a subject-term stands for. 9 What Aquinas is obviously trying to say in this account of the copula is that, used in a simple sentence of the form" Sis P" to make a statement, the copulative "is" performs not only the predicative function of establishing a "propositional combination" 10 between the predicate-expression "P" and the subject-expression" S" (where" S" stands proxy for general terms, like "[a] man", II as well as for singular ones, like "Socrates"), but also the assertive function of indicating the speaker's commitment to the truth of what is expressed by the propositional combination of "S" and" P". In other words, when used to make the statement that Sis P, the copula serves not only as a propositional link between" S" and" P", but also as an expression for the truth-claim which, whether it is warranted or not, i.e., whether the sentence "s is P" is true or not, we are making to the effect that" P" is true of what" S" refers to whenever we assert that Sis P. As for Aquinas's doctrine that it is by means of the copulative "is" that the question whether there is such and such a thing is answered (cf. S.th. I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2), which seems to result from a confusion between the predicative and the existential uses of the verb "be", it is accounted for by the fact that existence statements of the form "There is F-ness" or "F-ness exists" (e.g. "Blindness exists") are analysed by Aquinas in terms of the corresponding predicative statements of the form "Something is F', in which the "is" functions as copula. When we assert the existence of a privation (e.g. the existence of blindness, which is the privation of sight), "our intellect links that privation", we are told by Aquinas, "to a subject as being something like a form (thereof)" (in-

tellectus componit privationem cum subiecto, sicut formam quamdam: In II Sent. dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3). This analysis can be expanded in a straightforward way to the effect that any predicative statement of the form" Sis P" can be viewed as the copulative counterpart of an existence statement of the form "There is such a thing as S (that is) P", to which it is equivalent. That Aquinas indeed assumes such an equivalence to obtain is suggested, e.g., by his account of what it is for something coincidentally to be. What is called "coincidentally being" (ens secundum [or per] accidens) is so called, Aquinas says in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 885), "on account of a comparison of an accident (i.e. an accidental property) to a substance; and this comparison is signified by the verb 'is', when (a sentence: like) 'a man is white' is uttered; whence this whole thing (called) a white man is

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(something which is) coincidentally being": ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae Quid em comparatio significatur hoc verbo 'est' cum dicitur 'homo est a1bus'. Unde hoc totum, homo lest) 12 albus, est ens per accidens (ibid.).

This account seems to rest on the assumption that the predicative statement that a man is white is equivalent to the existence statement that there is such a thing as a white man (or, in other words, such a thing as a man who is white). The relation between the so-called "Frege trichotomy" and what has been called Aquinas's "fundamental ontological dichotomy" may be depicted by the following diagram:

~"iS"Of

existence

predication (properly so called)

(predication of) identity

in act

actuality sense

substantial

substantial (?)

true

there-is sense

accidental

accidental (?)

to be

~

II

In the preceding section it was shown that Aquinas's dichotomy between being as actually being (or· being in act) and being as being true is related to the familiar Frege trichotomy between the "is" of existence, the "is" of predication, and the "is" of identity in such a way that each member of the former division may be subdivided in accordance with the latter one, to the effect that the verb "be" can be put to two different existential as well as to two different predicative uses (presumably including what Aquinas calls predications "per modum identitatis" [S.th. I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 4]). Does Aquinas, when distinguishing between different uses of the verb "be", ever imply that this verb is genuinely ambiguous? The passages of his writings so far considered favour a negative answer to this question, which, as a matter of fact, is expressly given by Aquinas in his Commentary on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias (De interpretatione). Commenting on the passage in which Aristotle says that "by itself" the word "being" is "nothing" (Ch. 3, l6b 23f), Aquinas rejects Alexander of Aphrodisias' explanation according to which the word "being" is said to be "nothing" because it is "said equivocally of the ten categories": ...

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scilicet ipsum ens, de quo dicit quod nihil est (ut Alexander exponit), quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedicamentis (In I Peri herm. lect. 5, no. 70 [19]). "This explanation", Aquinas says, "does not seem to be appropriate, for in the first place, 'being' is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally, but according to the prior and posterior; whence, said absolutely, it is understood of that of which it is said primarily": t3 haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur (ibid.) .

At first sight the passage just quoted might suggest that Aquinas'~ rejection of the view that the word "being" is used, strictly speaking, in an equivocal or ambiguous way is meant by him to be confined to the use we make of the verb "be" to express the actual existence of what falls under one or the other of the ten categories. That this is by no means the case, however, is shown by the fact, already pointed out, that on both sides of his dichotomy Aquinas tends to assimilate the existential and the predicative uses of the verb "be" by attributing to it, on the one hand, the role of a substantial predicate when it is used in its actuality sense and, on the other h.md, the role of an accidental predicate when it is used in its there-is sense. In addition, Aquinas assimilates the predicative use which, according to him, is made of the verb "be" even in a statement of identity with the predicative use of this verb properly so called in the following way: In every true affirmative statement the predicate( -term) and the subject(-term) must in some way signify what is really the same but conceptually different. That this is so is clear in the case of statements whose llTedicate is an accidental one as well as in the case of those whose predicate is a substantial one. For it is obvious that (the terms) 'man' and 'white' (e.g.) are the same as regards the subject-thing (they signify), but different with regard to the (respective) concept (under which they signify it); for the concept of (a) man is a different concept from that of (a) white (object). Similar considerations apply, when I utter (the sentence) '(A) man is an animal'; for the very same thing which is a man is truly an animal, because in one and the same subject-thing there is to be found both a sensitive nature, on account of which it is called an animal, and a rational nature, on account of which it is called a man. Hence in this case, too, predicate and subject are the same as regards the subject-thing (they signify), but different with regard to the (respective) concept (under which they signify it). Even with statements in which the same thing is predicated of itself, this is in some way the case. insofar as our intellect treats what it assigns to the subject(-position) as being on the side of a subject-thing, whereas what it assigns to the predicate(-positilln) is treated bv it as belonging to the nature of a form existing in a subject-thing, in 3(cordance "ith th~ saying that predicates are taken formally and subjects materially. While it is the plurality of predicate and subject which answers to the conceptual difference, it is the (propositional) comhination (of subject and predicate) hy means of which our intellect signifies the real identity (S.th. I. q. 13, a. 12. C).14

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The Latin text runs as follows: in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. Manifestum est enim quod 'homo' et 'albus' sunt idem subiecto et differunt ratione; alia enim est ratio hominis et alia ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico 'homo est animal'; illud enim ipsum quod est homo vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo; unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in qui bus idem praedicatur de se ipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur, inquantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati trahit ad naturam forrnae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur forrnaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti; identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem. IS

According to this text, there is a close affinity between predicative statements properly so called and statements of identity to the effect that, on the one hand, a predicative statement involves what has been called an "identity factor in predication" 16 insofar as it states the identity of what its subject-term stands for with what its predicate-term is true of, whereas, on the other hand, a statement of identity exhibits a predicative feature in that the identity it states is expressed as the inherence of a form (or property) in a thing being subjected to it. 17 That is to say - to make explicit what Aquinas seems to be implying - that, just as the predicative statement that Socrates is white states the inherence in Socrates of the property of whiteness as the identity of Socrates with something white, 18 the identity statement that· Socrates is Socrates states the identity of Socrates with himself as the inherence in Socrates of the property of being Socrates. 19 If Aquinas does not regard the verb "be" to be genuinely ambiguous as far as the so-called Frege trichotomy of the different uses of "is" into the "is" of existence, the "is" of predication, and the "is" of identity is concerned, does he not assume a genuine ambiguity to obtain at least with respect to his own dichotomy of the different uses of "is" into the "is" as applied to what falls under one of the ten categories, on the one hand, and the "is" as applied to a true proposition, on the other hand? That he in fact does so, is suggested by his saying that Avicenna (= Ibn Sina) "has been deceived by the equivocation of being (i.e. of the verb 'be')" (deceptus est ex aequivocatione entis: In X Metaph. lect. 3, no. 1982), which is equivocal, according to Aquinas, in that "the 'is' which signifies a propositional combination is an accidental predicate", whereas "the 'is' which is divided by the ten categories (i.e., which has

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its meaning specified by the kind of entity whose being it affirms) signifies the very natures of the ten genera" (ibid.). That the phrase "aequivocatio entis", as it is used here by Aquinas, is not to be understood in the sense of a genuine ambiguity of the verb "be", however, but rather in the sense of a "multiplicity of applications,,20 of this verb, is attested by the comparison which Aquinas makes between the two members of his "fundamental ontological dichotomy,,21 in several passages of his writings. Since this comparison throws some light on the reason why in sticking to the dichotomy at issue Aquinas does not commit himself to the view that with respect to it the verb "be" is genuinely ambiguous, it is worth entering into its details. This will be the task for the next section. III

Of the two modes of being that the verb "be" can be used to signify, namely being as being actually existent under one of the ten categories and being as being true, "the second is comparable to the first", we are told by Aquinas, "as an effect is to its cause; for it is from a thing's being in reality that the propositional truth and falsity follows which our intellect signifies by means of the word 'is' insofar as it is (used as) a verbal copula": ... iste secundus modus comparatur ad prim urn sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum 'est' prout est verbal is copula (In V Metaph. lec!. 9, no. 896).

The same point is made in Aquinas's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, where we read that "as signifying the truth of a propositional combination, in which respect (the word) 'is' is called the copula, being is to be found in the combining and dividing intellect (i.e. in the intellect forming affirmative and negative propositions) as the completion of truth, but founded upon the being of the thing (thought of), which is the act of (that thing's) essence": Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod 'est' dicitur copula; et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad veri 22 complementum, sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae (In I Sent. dis!. 33, q. I, a. I. ad I).

What prevents Aquinas's ontological dichotomy from reflecting a genuine ambiguity of the verb "be" is, according to the passage just quoted, the fact that being as actually existing (or falling under one of the ten categories), on the one hand, and being as'being true (or being

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the case), on the other hand, are two modes of being of which the latter depends on the former in such a way that the truth of what we say is effected by and founded upon the actual existence of what we talk about. As an attempt to account for the non-ambiguity of the verb "be" the passage to be considered next deserves especial attention. Commenting on Aristotle's statement, made in Peri herm. (De int.) 3, 16 b 24, that the word "being" (that is to say, the verb "is") "co-signifies some (propositional) combination" (or "composition"), Aquinas remarks that, according to Aristotle, it does so because it does not signify such a composition principally but consequently. It primarily signifies that which is perceived by our intellect in the mode of actuality absolutely; for 'is', said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb 'is' principally signifies is the actuality of every form or act commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act actually is in some subject, we signify it by means of the verb 'is' [... 1; and for this reason the verb 'is' consequently signifies a (propositional) composition (In I Peri herm. lect. 5, no. 73(22)).23

The Latin text runs as follows: 24 Ideo autem dicit [Aristotelesl quod hoc verbum 'est' consignificat compositionem, quia non earn principaliter signlficat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; nam 'est', simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum 'est', est communiter actualitas omnis formae 25 vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum 'est' [... 1. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum 'est' significat compositionem.

Far from being an interpretation which could be said to reveal [he proper sense in which Aristotle himself intended his saying that the word "be(ing)" co-signifies (i.e. additionally signifies) some (propositional) combination to be understood 26 the text just quoted is nevertheless peculiarly enlightening with regard to Aquinas's own view of the relation between being in the absolute sense of actually being (or being actually existent) and being in the copulative sense of something's being.. true of something else. In addition to what we have already been informed of, namely the fact that being in the latter sense depends on being in the former sense as an effect depends on its cause, the passage under consideration gives us the reason why it is by means of one and the same word (namely the verb "be") that these two distinct senses can be expressed. For Aquinas, the actuality sense of the verb "be" seems to be, as it were, its "focal meaning" (to borrow G. E. L. Owen's happy term),27

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i.e. its primary sense, by reference to which it is secondarily and derivatively used in whatever other sense it may have. If a given use or sense of a word can be shown to be derivative "if it can be explained how the word in question comes to have the sense that it has by reference to another sense which is for that reason primary" ,28 Aquinas's account of the relation between the use we make of the verb "be" in its actuality sense and the use we make of it in its copulative sense can surely be said to be an account of the derivability of the latter sense from the former and, hence, an account of the fact that the verb "be" is not genuinely ambiguous. Since to use the verb "be" as copula (i.e. as a sign of propositional combination) is for him "to signify that a (certain) form or act actual1y is in some subject" (significare . .. formam vel acturrtactualiter in esse alicui subiecto) , Aquinas is indeed able to explain the fact that the verb "be" can be put to this copulative use by reference to the absolute use we make of it to signify that something is actual1y existent - be it a substance, the actual existence of which is the actuality of the substantial form it has (or, for that matter, the actuality of the substantial act it performs, e.g., the actuality of the act of living performed by an animal; cf. In I Sent. dist. 33, q. I, a. I, ad I), or an accidental property, the actual existence of which is the actuality of the accidental form (or act) it identical1y is (e.g., the actuality of the form of whiteness or of the act of running). IV

A final comment on Aquinas's treatment of the verb "be", which wil1 serve to round out the picture, may conveniently be added to what has been said so far. It must be noticed, to begin with, that, according to Aquinas, the mode of being signified by the copulative "is" docs not belong to the reality of our world, but only to the proposition-forming activity of our intellectual soul: As opposed to the mode of being which is "the act of a being thing insofar as it is being" (actus entis ill quantulII est ellS: Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2 [3]. c), the copulative being (esse . .. , secundum qllO(} est copula verhalis: ibid.) is not to be found ill rerum narura, but only ill actu anil71ae cOl71ponentis et dil'identis (ibid.; cf. In III Sellt. dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, c: "hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae coniungit subicctunl cum pracdicato"). Since to be in the copulati\e sense of something's being something i" for Aquina), to be trill' in the sense of its being the case (or a fal't) that

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something is something, his view that the copulative being is, as it were, only an intellectual being, "additionally invented by the (human) soul in the act of linking a predicate to a subject" (S. tho I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2), commits him to excluding what we would call facts from his ontology, reserving to them, in a sense which reminds one of Frege's dictum that "a fact is a thought that is true",29 the peculiar status of true thoughts; or so it seems. That it is only substances and their substantial forms, on the one hand, and accidental properties of substances on the other that Aquinas is willing to admit into his ontology is obvious from his assumption that only things having an essence or a form, which makes them fall under one of the ten categories, can be said actually to be (cf. Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2[3), c; In II Sent. dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3), because the actual existence of anything is nothing but the actuality of its essence (cf. In I Sent. dist. 33, q. 1, a. I, ad I) or its form (cf. In I Peri herm. lect. 5, no. 73[22]). As for Aquinas's view that facts, as opposed to particular things and their properties, are not real entities but mental ones to which something in reality coaesponds, witness the account he gives of St Augustine's definition of truth in terms of his ontological dichotomy in De ver., q. I, a. I. The definition in question, according to·which "the true is that which is" (verum est id quod est), we are told by Aquinas, can be accounted for either by saying that "it defines truth (only) insofar as it has a foundation in reality, and not insofar as it belongs to the complete notion of truth that reality corresponds to (the way it is conceived of by our) intellect", or by saying that, when the true is defined as that which is, "the word 'is' is not (to be) taken in the sense in which it signifies the act of being, but in the sense in which it indicates that our intellect is establishing a (propositional) combination, i.e. in the sense in which it signifies that a proposition(-al content) is being affirmed; the meaning of (the words) 'the true is that which is' would then be that (truth obtains) when something which is (the case) is said to be (the case)": ... dicendum quod diffinitio ilia Augustini datur de veri tate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re et non secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum. - Vel dicendum quod cum dicitur verum est id quod est, Ii est non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi sed secundum quod est nota intellect us componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem proposition is significat, ut sit sensus: verum est id quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est (ibid. ad I; cf. De ver. q. I, a. 10, ad I, In I Sent. dis!. 19, q. 5, a. I, ad I).

What Aquinas seems to be contrasting here is, on the one hand, the sense in which the expression "something which is" means "something

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which actually exists" and, on the other hand, the sense in which it means "something which is the case". This is confirmed by his reply to the objection that from St Augustine's definition of truth it seems to follow that nothing is false, because this definition implies that the false is that which is not (De ver. q. 1, a. 10, obi. 1). After having repeated that in defining the true as that which is, the definition at issue "does not perfectly express the notion of truth but, as it were, materially only, save insofar as (the verb) 'be' signifies that a proposition(-al content) is being affirmed, so that we might say that true is what is said or thought to be such as it is in reality": ista diffinitio 'verum est id quod est' non perfecte exprimit rationem veri tat is sed quasi material iter tan tum, nisi secundum quod Ii esse significat affirmationem proposition is, ut scilicet dicatur id esse verum quod sic esse dicitur vel intelligitur ut in rebus est (ibid. ad I),

he points out that "in this way we might also say that false is what is not, i.e., what is not such as it is said or thought (to be); and this is to be found in reality": et sic etiam falsum dicatur quod non est, id est quod non est ut dicitur vel intelligitur: et hoc in rebus inveniri pot est (ibid.).

According to this account, the false is not to be identified with anything that does not actually exist, but with something said or thought to be the case without really being the case or, in short, with something that is not the case. Aquinas's concluding remark that "this is to be found in reality" does not refer, of course, to that which is false in the sense that it is not such as it is said or thought to be, i.e. to that which is not the case; for what is not the case is, by the very fact of its not being the case, excluded from reality . What the remark in question must be taken to refer to is rather the fact that something is not such as it is said or thought to be, i.e., the fact that something which is said or thought to be the case is not really the case, which "is to be found in reality" (in rebus inveniri pOlesl) insofar (and only insofar) as reality does not correspond to what is said or thought to be the case. That does not mean, however, that what in fact is the case when reality does correspond to what is said or thought to be the case is itself something to be found in reality; for it is nothing but a propositional content (or a thought), nowhere to be found but in our intellect truly affirming it, whereas in reality there are only substances and accidental properties thereof, whose actual existence is that which corresponds or fails to correspond to what is said or thought to be the case. This at least is the

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view which Aquinas seems to have adopted, as witness his statement, already quoted above, that "as signifying the truth of a propositional combination, in which respect (the word) 'is' is called the copula, being is to be found in the combining and dividing intellect as the completion of truth, 30 but founded upon the being of the thing (thought of), which is the act of (that thing's) essence" (In I Sent. dist. 33:q. 1, a. 1, ad 1).31 1f we have succeeded in putting together the scattered pieces of our jigsaw puzzle to form a correct picture of the position held by Aquinas with regard to the logic of being, we may note two interesting features of this position. For one thing, it enables Aquinas to subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth which is far from being trivial; for the way in which he tries to establish a connection between the two fundamental modes of being and the two corresponding uses of the verb "be" which we have seen him distinguishing throughout his work seems to have forced upon him the view that what makes a predicative statement of the form" Sis P" true is not simply the fact (or its being the case) that S is P, but rather the actual existence of the property signified by "P" as a (substantial or accidental) property of the subject-thing referred to by "S". That this is indeed a position which Aquinas would be prepared to defend is suggested by his saying, in a text already quoted above, that it is "a comparison of an accident(-al property) to a substance which the verb 'is' signifies when (a sentence like) 'a man is white' is uttered": "Quae quidem comparatio (accidentis ad substantiam sci!.) significatur hoc verbo 'est' cum dicitur 'homo est albus' " (In V Metaph. lect. 9, no. 885). Another piece of evidence is the above-cited passage from Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in which the copulative "is" is described as "signifying that a (certain) form or act actually is in some subject" (lib. I, lect. 5, no. 73[22]). In view of Aquinas's thesis that the copulative "is" signifies the truth of the sentence in which it occurs (cf. S.th. I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2, In III Sent. dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2, c) the two passages just quoted strongly support the assumption that, according to Aquinas, the sentence "a man is white" signifies - as the condition of its truth and, thus, as the condition of its being the case (or its being a fact) that a man is white - that whiteness is actually existent as a property inherent in a man. This brings us to a second point, which is closely related to the first. When Aquinas declares, on the one hand, that it is a "propositional COlTlbination, additionally invented by our (intellectual) soul" (compositio proposifionis. quam anima adillvenit: S.th. I, q . 3, a. 4, ad 2; cf. 111 II

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Sent. dist. 34, q. 1, a. 1, c), and, on the other hand, that it is "the actual being in some subject(-thing) of a (certain) form or act" (formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto: In I Peri herm. lect. 5, no. 73[22]) which the copulative "is" signifies, he seems to have in mind something like a distinction between a word's signifying something to the effect that it expresses a sense and its signifying something to the effect that it has a reference. In the light of such a distinction, which is crucial in cases in which, instead of a form actually existing in reality, a privation of some actual being (e.g. blindness) is combined with a subject-thing by means of the word "is" (cf. In II Sent. dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3), it must be noticed, as regards the passage quoted from Aquinas's Commentary on Peri hermeneias, that, though it is the copulative sense or meaning of the verb "be" which he intends to explain there by reference to the sense in which "to be" means "to be in act", what he does in fact explain by reference to this actuality sense of the verb' 'be" seems dot to be, strictly speaking, what the copulative "is" means, but rather what it refers to, namely a certain form's actually being in something subjected to it. What may have helped Aquinas in this way to blur the distinction between meaning (or sense) and reference, which he is elsewhere, following Aristotle, careful enough to observe (cf. In I Peri herm. lect. 2, no. 15[5]: " ... necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res"), is the fact that in drawing his distinctions concerning the different uses of the verb "esse" ("to be") he is making prominent use of the verb "significare" ("to signify"), which is, as it were, neutral with respect to the sense/reference distinction. 32 NOTES 1 By saying that a word is ambiguous, I mean that it has several distinct senses and can thus be put to semantically different uses; by saying that a word is ambiguous but not genuinely so, I mean that its different senses are in some way or other systematically con· nected, for instance in such a way that "a number of secondary senses depend upon a single primary one" (Hamlyn, 1977173, p. 6). Cf. B. Miller's distinction between "casually ambiguous" and "systematically ambiguous" expressions (1975, p. 346). 2 The question to what extent Aquinas's account of this dichotomy is faithful to the position held by Aristotle himself is not easy to answer. In the present paper it will simply be disregarded. For Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics cf. Doig (1972), together with the critical review by Georg Wieland, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 57 (1975), 73 - 78. 3 It must be noticed that it is, in general, a declarative sentence, and not the propositional content thereof, that Aquinas uses the term "propositio" to refer to.

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• Cf. De ente et essentia, Ch. 1, De pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 1, and the other passages listed by Veres (1970, pp. 92 - 97). 5 Cf. Geach (1969): "Existence in the sense of actuality (Wirk/ichkeit) is several times over emphatically distinguished in Frege's works from the existence expressed by 'there is a soand-so' (es gibt ein - ). Indeed, he says that neglect of this distinction is about the grossest fallacy possible - a confusion between concepts of different level" (p. 65). Cf. ibid., Ch. 4 ('Form and Existence', pp. 42 - 64), where Geach is discussing "what Aquinas meant by his term esse, or actus essendi, 'act of existing' " (p. 42). For an aHempt to defend Geach's view on the different senses of "exists", which has been criticized by Dummett (1973, pp. 386f) , see Miller (1975). 6 Cf. Weidemann (1979). 7 Cf. McCabe (1970, p. 77). 8 Cf. Kahn (1973), Ch. VII: 'The Veridical Use' (pp. 331- 370). 9 Like Aristotle before him, Aquinas seems to have muddled together what Geach calls "two sorts of truth", namely "the truth of propositions, and the truth of predications" (1972, p. 15). 10 For this term cf. Strawson (1974, pp. 20 - 22). "A truth-or-falsity-yielding combination we call a propositional combination" (p. 21). 11 If in a sentence of the form is P" a general term functions as subject-term, the sentence in question is traditionally called an "indefinite proposition" (cf. In I Peri herm. lec!. 11, no. 150[8)). Since its general subject-term is not explicitly quantified, such a sentence, e.g., "(A) man is white" (homo est a/bus: ibid.) can be treated as logically equivalent either to a particular proposition ("Some Sis P') or to a universal one ("Every S is P"). 12 The "est" of the Marietti edition which I have enclosed in square brackets should be deleted; cf. no. 894: " ... hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est". 13 Oesterle's translation (1962, p. 51), slightly modified. 14 My translation (for different ones cf. McCabe (1964, p. 95), Malcolm (1979, p. 394). " Cf. S.th. I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3: " ... compositio autem intellectu> est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellect us sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo est albus, idest habens albedinem; idem autem est subiecto quod est homo, et quod est habens albedinem". For the context of this quotation cf. Note 17 below. 16 Veatch (1974, p. 419). Similarly, Malcolm speaks of an "identity aspect of predication" (1979, p. 394 and passim). - Referring to S.th. I, q. 13, a. 12, c, and I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, Veatch launches a heavy attack on Geach to the effect that "Geach in his reference to both of these passages never gives his readers any intimation that they both contain unequivocal assertions as to the presence of an identity factor in affirmative predication" (Veatch, 1974, p. 418). In the face of such criticism it must be acknowledged that in the original version of his paper 'Subject and Predicate' (1950), apparently unknown to Veatch, Geach had commented on the latter of the two passages in question as follows (with an additional reference to S.th. I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 5): "As regards the truth-conditions of an affirmative predication (compositio), he [Aquinas] rejects the view that subject and predicate stand for two different objects, which we assert to be somehow combined; on the contrary, the truth of the predication requires a certain identity of reference. Thus, if the predicate 'white' is to be truly attached to the subject 'man' or 'Socrates', there must be an identity of reference holding between 'man', or 'Socrate,', and 'thing that has whiteness' ('quod est habens a/bedinem'); the two names must be idem slihiecto. Notice

"s

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that what is here in question is the reference of a descriptive name, not of a predicate; Aquinas does not hold. indeed he expressly denies, that predicates like 'white' stand for objects (supponunt). His theory is that if the predicate 'white' is truly attached to a subject, then the corresponding descriptive name 'thing that has whiteness' must somehow agree in reference with the subject" (p. 478; cf. Malcolm, 1979, p. 3951). Unfortunately this comment, which would have rendered Veatch's criticism almost pointless, is absent from the rather different version, referred to by Veatch, in which 'Sub· ject and Predicate' has been incorporated into Geach's book Reference and Generality (1968, pp. 22-46; 1980, pp. 49-72). 11 Leaving aside the controversy between Geach and Veatch, which it is not my present concern to settle, I should like to point out the following problem, which seems to have gone unnoticed by both authors: The text of S.th. I, q. 13, a. 12, c, suggests that to account for the truth-conditions of a sentence of the form" Sis P" in terms of the identity of what the subject-expression" S" stands for with what the predicate-expression" P" is true of is to answer the question of what the sentence refers to in reality, and that to account for the conditions of its truth in terms of the inherence of the form of P-ness in what" S" stands for is to describe the sense expressed by the sentence, i.e. the mode of conceiving the real identity it refers to; the text of S.th. I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, suggests, however, that it is just the other way round. For the passage quoted from this text in Note 15 above is embedded in the following context: "Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem formae ad materiam; et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur [... J. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum; et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellect us secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur 'homo est albus'. - Tamen differt compositio intellect us a compositione rei; nam ea quae componuntur in re sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur" (ibid.). Accor· ding to this account, it is the combination of the accidental property of whiteness with a man that corresponds to the (true) sentence "(A) man is white" in reality, whereas the iden· tity of a man with something that is white (or has whiteness) seems to be what the sentence in question expresses as the sense in which it is to be understood: " ... et secundum hanc identitatis rationem intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando" (ibid.). Other texts relevant to the problem of reconciling the apparently different accounts given in S.th. I, q. 13, a. 12, c, and in S.th. I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, are S.th. I, q. 16, a. 2, c, S.th. III, q. 16, a. 7, ad 4, In VI Metaph. lee!. 4, no. 1241, In IX Metaph. lec!. II, no. 1898. 18 If a predicate-term like "white" is combined not with a singular subject-term like "Socrates" but with a general one like "man", a word which, like "some" or "every", specifies "the kind of identity of reference" (Geach, 1950, p. 478; cf. p. 479) required for the truth of the resulting sentence must be added or understood from the context (cf. Note 11 above). 19 Cf. Geach (1950, pp. 4761). 20 Cf. Hintikka (1973, p. 6), together with the critical review by Dorothea Frede, Philosophische Rundschau 22 (1976), 237 - 242. 21 Cf. Veres (1970). 22 I have conjectured "veri" instead of the "'sui" of Mandonnet's edition, which does not make good sense. My conjecture is based on Aquinas's remark, immediately following the quoted passage, "sicut supra de veri tate dictum est", which refers back to dis!. 19, q. 5, a. I, ad 1: "Vel potest dici, quod definitiones istae dantur de vero non secundum com· pletam sui rationem, sed secundum illud quod fundatur in re". Other pieces of evidence are In II Sent. dis!. 37, q. I, a. 2, ad I ("verum dupliciter potest considcrari. Vel secundum

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quod fundatur in re [... J. Vel secundum quod completur operatione animae compositionem formantis") and De ver. q. I, a. I, ad I (" ... secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum"). 23 Oesterle's translation (1962, p. 53), slightly modified. 24 For a detailed analysis of this text cf. Zimmermann (1971). 25 I have deleted the comma after "formae" in the Leonine and Marietti editions, because it is misleading. As the clause "cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto" shows, the words "actualitas omnis formae[,J vel actus substantial is vel accidentalis" are not to be taken in the sense of "actuality of every form, be it a substantial or an accidental act" ("Wirklichkeit jeder Form, sowohl eines substanzialen wie auch eines akzidentellen Aktes": Zimmermann, 1971, p. 292), but in the sense of "actuality of every substantial or accidental form or act" (in Oesterle's translation "or act" is missing). 26 Cf. Weidemann (1982). 21 For a critical account of the idea of "focal meaning" cf. Hamlyn (1977178). 28 Hamlyn (1977178, p. 5). Although Hamlyn states this condition as a necessary one ("It will be possible to show the use or sense to be derivative only if ... ": ibid., my italics), he obviously assumes that it is also sufficient; cf. p. 6: "Thus the example satisfies the condition that a sense is derivative from another when an explanation of its derivability is in principle forthcoming. Without that it would have been a case of straight ambiguity." 29 "Eine Tatsache ist ein Gedanke, der wahr ist": Gottlob Frege, 'Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung', Beitr. zur Phi/os. des deutschen Idealism us 1 (1918/19),58 -77; reprinted in Gottlob Frege: Logische Untersuchungen, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von G. Pat zig (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, G6ttingen, 1966), pp. 30 - 53 (quotation, p. 50). For an English translation cf. Gottlob Frege: Logical Investigations, ed. with a preface by P. T. Geach, transl. by P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977); quotation, p. 25. 30 Cf. Note 22 above. 31 Cf. Aquinas's statement that "this man committing a sin (i.e., the fact that this man commits a sin) is a kind of mental entity insofar as it is called true": "hoc quod est istum peccare est quoddam ens ration is prout verum dicitur" (In II Sent. dist. 37, q. I, a. 2, ad I). Cf. also In VI Metaph.lect. 4, no. 1241:" ... compositio et divisio, in quibus est verum et falsum, est in mente, et non in rebus [... J. Et ideo iIIud, quod est ita ens sicut verum in tali compositione consist ens, est alterum ab his quae proprie sunt entia, quae sunt res extra animam, quarum unaquaeque est aut quod quid est, idest substantia, aut quale, aut quantum, aut aliquod incomplexum, quod mens copulat vel dividit." 32 For helpful comments I am grateful to Gregg Beasley.

REFERENCES Aquinas, SI. Thomas, De ente et essentia (Leonine edition, Vol. 43, Rome, 1976). Aquinas, SI. Thomas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum/super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi, Vols. I -II, ed. P. Mandonnet (Lethielleux, Paris. 1929); Vol. Ill, cd. M. F. Moos (Lethielleux. Paris, 1933); quoted: In I (II. III) Senl. Aquinas, St. Thomas, In ArislOlelis libros Peri hermeneias exposilio (Leonine edition, Vol. I, Rome, 1882; Marietti edition [Torino/Rome], 1964); quoted: In I (II) Peri herm. Aquinas, SI. Thomas, In duodecim libros Melaphysicorum Aristolelis exposilio (Marietti edition [Torino/Rome], 1964); quoted: In I (II, ... ) Melaph.

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Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa theologiae (Leonine edition, Vols. 4 - 12, Rome, 1888-1906); quoted: S.th. Aquinas, SI. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Leonine edition, Vol. 22, Rome, 1970 - 76); quoted: De ver. Aquinas, SI. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, de malo (Marietti edition [Torino/Rome], 1965); quoted: De pot., De malo. Aquinas, SI. Thomas, Quaestiones quodlibetales (Marietti edition [Torino/Rome], 1956); quoted: Quodl.

(If not otherwise indicated, translations from the Latin are my own.) Doig, James C., Aquinas on Metaphysics: A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972). Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language (Duckworth, London, 1973). Geach, Peter Thomas, 'Subject and Predicate', Mind 59 (1950), 461 - 482. Geach, Peter Thomas, Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London [1962], emended edition 1968; third edition, 1980). Geach, Peter Thomas, God and the Soul (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969). Geach, Peter Thomas, Logic Mailers (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972). Hamlyn, D. W., 'Focal Meaning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1977178), 1-18. Hintikka, Jaakko, 'Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity', in J. Hintikka, Time and Necessity (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973), pp. I - 26. Hintikka, Jaakko, ' "Is", Semantical Games, and Semantical Relativity', Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979),433 - 468. Kahn, Charles H., The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (The Verb 'Be' and Its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies, ed. by John W. M. Verhaar, Part 6; Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973). Malcolm. John, 'A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula', Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979), 383 - 400. McCabe, Herbert, St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 3: Knowing and Naming God (la. 12 - /3). Latin text. English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & Glossary (Blackfriars [in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, and McGraw-Hili Book Company, New York], 1964). McCabe, Herbert, 'Categories', in A. Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Macmillan, London, 1970), pp. 54 - 92. Miller, Barry, 'In Defence of the Predicate "Exists" " Mind 84 (197),338 - 354. Oesterle. Jean T., Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Peri Hermeneias) , transl. from the Latin with an Introduction (Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1962). Strawson, P. F., Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (Methuen & Co., London, 1974). Veatch, Henry, 'SI. Thomas' Do,trine of Subject and Predicate: A Possible Starting Point for Logical Reform and Renewal', St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 -·1974: Commemorative Studies (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1974), Vol. II. pp. 401 -422. Veres, Torno. 'Eine fundamentale ontologische Oichotomic im Den ken dcs Thoma' \on Aquin', Philosophisches Jahrbuch 77 (1970), 81 - 98.

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Weidemann, Hermann, '''Socrates est" /"There is no such thing as Pegasus": Zur Logik singularer Existenzaussagen nach Thomas von Aquin und W. Van Orman Quine', Philosophisches Jahrbuch 86 (1979), 42 - 59 (translated into English by David J. Marshall Jr., in Contemporary German Philosophy 3 {I 983), 159-178). Weidemann, Hermann, 'Aristoteles tiber das isolierte Aussagewort: De into 3, 16 b 19 - 25', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 64 {I 982), 239 - 256. Zimmermann, Albert, '''Ipsum enim ('est') nihil est" (Aristoteles, Periherm. I, C. 3). Thomas von Aquin tiber die Bedeutung der Kopula', Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8 (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1971), pp. 282-295.

Philosophisches Seminar, Universitiit Munster, Dompiatz 23, D-4400 Munster, B.R.D.

SIMO KNUUTfILA

BEING QUA BEING IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

I. THE METAPHYSICS OF ESSENCE IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas thought, like Aristotle, that individuals of the sublunary world could be classified into natural classes or species on the basis of their qualities. In this approach the invariant structure of the empirical world is seen as consisting of unchangeable bundles of qualities which are always exemplified and which belong to the objects they qualify as long as those objects exist. Some of these combinations of qualities distinguish natural species. They specify classes whose members are not distinguishable from one another by any qualifying differences belonging to the invariant system of qualities mentioned above. I In Aristotelianism, as Aquinas understood and accepted it, this empirical world order is taken to be based on a metaphysical deep structure of reality. It is thought that there must be something which explains the manifest fact of the invariant sets of qualities exemplified in objects, which are divided into natural kinds. The metaphysical answer to this question is found in the idea that the members of a species having the same fixed bundle of qualities are actualizations of one of the forms of substantial being which together constitute the ultimate structure of the unchangeably actual order of being. These essences or common natures do not exist as such, but they can have existence through their singular inferiors. The invariant sets of properties are concomitant with these actualizations of essences. The point of this view is that the members of species should not be considered simply as aggregates of the properties mentioned in the empirical definitions of species. It is thought that in some way the whole of the invariant properties in a singular being is more than a sum of the parts, and this idea is formulated by speaking about things as representatives of metaphysical forms of being. 2 In addition to essences, which make things to be what they are, there is in Aquinas's Aristotelian metaphysics another non-empirical constituent of the empirical world. In Met. Z, 3, 1029a20 - 28 Aristotle argues that characteristics of things other than substantial forms can be understood as properties of the substance. The ultimate possessor of the property of being such and such substance cannot be the individual 201 S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being, 201-222. !C) 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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substance, but rather the prime matter as the bare substratum. Aquinas understood this to mean that the prime matter, which does not exist as such, is a metaphysical principle having existence as the substrate of the singular instantiations of essences. 3 Thomas Aquinas says in De ente et essentia that the nature or essence of things, absolutely considered, is neither one nor many. Were it many, the humanity could not be actual in Socrates. And were it one, Socrates and Plato would be one and the same as men. Because essences as such cannot be one or many, they do not exist as such. Although an essence, absolutely considered, is abstracted from any being, it is said to have being in singular things and as a concept in the mind. 4 The essences exemplified in the sublunary world have being as many, because they are instantiated in matter, which functions as a principle of individuation in such a manner that it generates a plurality of instances of species. 5 These metaphysical ingredients of the sublunary world have being in the extramental reality as constituents of singular things. 6 The objects which they constitute belong to the domain of existent objects, although they themselves do not exist. From the metaphysical point of view we can characterize subjects of existence we are immediately acquainted with as actualities of essences individuated by matter. Aquinas believed that on higher levels of the great chain of being, essences can be actualized without being individuated by the prime matter, 7 and so he refers in his more general accounts of the quidditive being simply to the individual instances of actuality of essences. 8 The essences, which as such are neither one nor many, are intelligible. An essential part of Plato's and Aristotle's worldview is the belief that there is an intelligible framework of the cosmos consisting in a system of invariant forms of being. For them the most attractive part of the human perfectibility is the possibility of ascending into an immediate knowledge of this intelligible structure of the sensible reality. 9 Thomas Aquinas includes this kind of jelicitas theoretica in his conception of the final end of man. lo However, there are some remarkable reformulations in his handling of the subject. Prime matter has no properties of its own and it is unintelligible. Therefore, when essences are individuated by prime matter they become parts of compositions which, because of the unintelligible factor present in them, are not intelligible as such. II However, the human intellect can u'nderstand that there is an intelligible structure in the extra mental reality, because it can abstract the intelligible essence or form from the matter. 12 Through sensations we apprehend particular objects. From

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empirical data called phantasms the agent intellect abstracts likeness of the quiddity of sensible things. This intelligible species actualizes the potential intellect,I3 and it forms the corresponding concept or, as Aquinas also says, the mental word. 14 An important group of mental concepts consists of the kind-universals. The names of species signify directly these concepts and through them singular members of natural kinds. 15 Through the actuality of essences as concepts in their intellects, human beings are acquainted with the form-giving principles of reality and the extramental world is intelligible to them. However, on the scale of intellectual beings men occupy the lowest position. Their intellect is in many ways limited. 16 For example, it is only the essences of those objects exemplified in the external world which are actual in the human intellect in statu viae. 17 In some places Aquinas says that we can know the essences through the properties of their actualizations. 18 But there are many other passages in which it is stated that all or almost all essences remain unknown to us. 19 The discrepancy between these statements may be explained by the fact that according to Aquinas the human knowledge of essences is always imperfect and partial. The human intellect does not fully comprehend the intelligibility of the essences which are conceptualized in the intellect. Aquinas believes that in heaven the human intellect will be improved in this respect to the effect that it will fully understand the intelligible nature of the essences it already knows partially. And in addition, it will come to know, in so far as it is possible for the lowest intelligence to know, those actualized essences it did not know in statu viae and essences which could have been instantiated but which have not been. 2o I have argued in other places that until the late thirteenth century the use of modal concepts in Western thought was often based on paradigms of modalities in which the meaning of the modal notions was not made explicit by considering simultaneous alternative states of affairs. Instead of this intensional interpretation, there was a tendency to understand modal notions in extensional ways. Therefore it was natural to think, for example, that no genuine possibility can remain forever unrealized. Before Aquinas this "principle of plenitude" was explicitly accepted by many medieval thinkers for natural modalities, but for theological reasons it was usually denied for Divine possibilities. It seems that before Aquinas this partial denial of the principle of plenitude was often considered as only one case of the many anomalies which must be taken into account when supranatural things are discussed. 21 In Thomas Aquinas

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we find a more sophisticated theory of the unrealized Divine possibilities. According to him, the Divine Omnipotence must be defined by referring to absolute possibilities, which are expressed by statements whose terms are not contradictory. The number of these Divine possibilities is much greater than that of the actualized possibilities. Thomas Aquinas's absolute possibilities come close to what (since Duns Scotus) have been called logical possibilities. Their role in Aquinas's thought is very limited, however. 22 Certain general presuppositions made the extensional interpretation of modality attractive for Aquinas, and his doctrine of the imperfect knowledge of essences seems to be one of the factors which pushed him into this direction. Whenever we consider whether a member of a natural kind could have a quality not as yet exemplified by any member of that kind, Aquinas's theory of the partial knowledge of essences suggests that the answer is always the same: we don't know the essence as such and therefore we cannot know whether it is contradictory or not that this kind of property is predicated of this substance. We know that an actual instance of an essence can have those properties which manifestly belong to the members of the species. This means that we know that something is possible only if there is an example of it in the extramental reality, although we believe that the actual world is not an exhaustive manifestation of what is possible. As for unrealized essences, we cannot know about any imaginable example whether or not it is possible.23 2. AQUINAS ON THE ANALOGY OF BEING

In his Summa the%giae I, q. 13, a. 10 Thomas Aquinas writes as follows: Univocal names have exactly the same ratio and equivocal names have an entirely different ratio. As for analogical names, a name with a certain signification is used in the definitions of the same name considered as having other significations. So "ens" used in connection with substances occurs in the definition of "ens" used in connection with accidents, and "healthy" predicated of animals occurs in the definitions of "heal!hy" predicated of urine or medicine, for urine is a sign of the health of an animal and medicine restores it.

Aquinas thought that what is immediately signified by a name is a mental conception or a definition.24 This view is part of a philosophical theory of meaning which was well accepted in Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century. It was founded on a reinterpretation of some important technical terms of the early medieval terminist logic in the light of Aristotle's psychology and metaphysics of knowledge. 25 It was

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thought that the area of being manifests itself to the human intellect in different modes of being (modi essendl) and that there are fixed modes of intellection (modi intelligendl) , through which a conceptual picture of the extramental reality is formed in the intellect. Words as significant units signify directly something which exists in the intellect. They refer to extramental objects indirectly, through the intellect (sub modo intelligendl).26 Bearing this triadic view of signification in mind, we can say that in the first sentence of the above Guotation Aquinas claims that a univocal name signifies in all its applications one and the same element of the conceptual correlate of the extramental reality. Correspondingly, an equivocal name signifies at least two different ingredients of the intelligible order having no reference to each other in their definitions. In his characterization of an analogous name Aquinas says that in its applications there is one basic use connected with a certain meaning. This meaning is implied in the prima Jacie different meanings an analogous word seems to have when predicated of various types of things. 27 This corresponds roughly to what Aristotle says about the pros hen equivocity.28 It is not quite clear how the new terminology was introduced in Scholasticism; at all events, it seems to have been commonly applied in the first half of the thirteenth century. 29 For example, in the Summe Metenses written before 1220, the class of analogical terms is delineated as follows: Equivocity is understood in two ways, properly and commonly. The proper equivocity belongs to signifying units (dictio) which are actually multiplex. The common equivocity belongs to signifying units which are related to many, to one primarily and to others ex consequenti. And so analogical words are said to be equivocal, e.g., ens. unum, and aliquid. They are primarily said of substance, and secondarily (per posterius) of quantity, quality etc.; and similarly "healthy" is said primarily of animals and ex consequenti of urine and drinks and food. 30

When Aquinas speaks about "healthy" in the above quotation, he says that it is primarily applied to healthy organisms and secondarily to things which restore or preserve or are signs of healthy organisms. This means that in its various uses an analogous name signifies directly such different elements of the mental conceptual system the definitions of which are connected in certain ways with one basic definition. The ordered group of meanings corresponding to the many uses of an analogous name is, as a whole, a kind of microstructure belonging to the intelligible order realized in the world and repeated in the mind. This is implied in the distinction Aquinas sometimes makes between ratio propria and ratio communis of an analogous name. The ratio propria is the

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meaning or res signijicata signified by the primary mode of signifying. It is included in the definitions of what is signified by the secondary modes of signifying. Ratio communis is not a definite single element of the intelligible order. It is not an additional analogical meaning, and its formal structure is based on something like "to be related in some way to ratio propria". 31 It could be understood as a disjunctive totality of the analogous meanings, signified by the analogous word in those cases where it is indifferent which of the analogates the word refers to.32 According to Thomas Aquinas, being (ens) is an analogous term. When a member of the category of substance is spoken of as a singular instantiation of an essence, it is handled by means of concepts which make up the primary meaning of ens. Ens signifies directly, and has as its focal meaning a mental conception of essence having existence and being individuated. 33 The ratio propria of ens is thus not simple. It is a complex idea whose elements include the concepts of essence and actual existence which, as Thomas Aquinas says, are really distinct. The real distinction between essence and existence seems to mean that existence is the act by which the essence is or has being. The act of existence actualizes forms of being which are metaphysically prior to existent entities. 34 The interpretations of the details of this real distinction are controversial. To reiterate, the focal meaning of ens is the idea of an individuated actuality of essence through an act of existence, and Thomas Aquinas claims that this is what is primarily meant when ens is applied to things in the world known to us. The secondary uses of ens are those in which it is applied to the various qualifications of substances classified in the Aristotelian doctrine of categories. When these modifications of the actualizations of essences in singular instances are considered as beings, they are necessarily understood vis-a-vis the focal meaning. 3s In addition to this horizontal analogy of being, there is a vertical one, too. It is connected with the Neoplatonic construction of the hierarchy of being. Actualizations of essences taking place at different levels are not referred to by ens univocally. Quidditative beings at different levels of the great chain of being can be understood as more or less perfect imitations of the full being of God, however, and for this reason there is a basis for analogous uses of ens in the vertical order, toO. 36 In a well-known passage of De potentia Thomas Aquinas says that esse is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. 37 The meaning of ens corresponding to this abstract notion of esse is the ratio communis of ens. Even if we know of something nothing else but that

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it is a being, we understand that ens is said of it in one of the many analogous meanings included in the ratio communis of ens, i.e. in the ordered system of analogous meanings. This does not mean that ens could be used univocally of everything. 38 If ens is applied to something so that it signifies directly the ratio communis, that something is thought to be a being in one of the analogous meanings included disjunctively in the ratio communis. 39 3. SCOTUS'S NEW THEORY OF BEING QUA BEING

John Duns Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being is easily understood against this Aristotelian-Thomistic background. He does not directly discuss Aquinas' theories in his metaphysics. However, some features of the ontological theory just delineated were commonly accepted in Scotus's time, and they were brought under attack in Duns Scotus's thought. In his Scriptum super primum Sententiarum of 1316 Peter Aureoli states that in his time the common metaphysical view was that the concept of being ... expresses in a prior way the ratio of substance and expresses the other rationes by attribution; and it expresses each under its own proper ratio, not under some common ratio in which they agree . It is nonetheless a disjunctive concept. not a copulative concept. Wherefore. when we speak of something as a being. we immediately conceive it as a substance or a quality or a quantity. we do not conceive some common ratio. 4o

There are some recent studies on this disjunctive approach to the concept of being which is the direct object of Scotus's criticism. 41 In one of his arguments for the univocal metaphysical concept of being Scot us says that it is possible to know of something that it is without knowing what kind of being it is.42 In the disjunctive approach this kind of knowledge could be interpreted so that we know that one or another of the analogous meanings of being is applicable to something although we don't know which one. Scotus's point is now that when something is known to be in this way, that something is at the same time conceived recognizable, although we cannot identify it. 43 Things considered identifiable can be univocally referred to by ens, whatever they are. Scotus's position could be explained to the defenders of the disjunctive approach as follows: Imagine that an omniscient identifier has made a list in which a proper name is given to anything tqat is in the actual world and can be called a being in some of the many analogous meanings of the word. Whenever we hear a name taken from that list we know of that

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baptized being that it is to be found in the world althought we don't know it. It is because it can be identified and so we have an idea of its being before we know, for example, which of the analogical meanings of being can be applied to it. So there is, according to Scotus, a common and simple ratio of the notion of being and, contrary to the views of Aquinas and the disjunctivists, it is taken to precede conceptually all other meanings attached to the word "being". In the arguments just mentioned Scotus seems to think that the possibility of being identified as something is the most primary constituent of the positive nature of whatever is and, as such, is the real basis for the univocal metaphysical concept of being. 44 Although the concept of being delineated in this way is derived from our acquaintance with existent beings, real or mental existence is not a part of its meaning. Nonactual possible things are in principle identifiable, toO. 45 Therefore the content of the notion of transcendental being is expressed by the formulation "that to which to be is not repugnant" (cui non repugnat esse).46 In the metaphysical sense ens is a univocal word which can be truly applied to anything which can be thought of as identified and which therefore is something positive and distinct from the absolute nothingness of impossible things. 47 On the basis of his insight into the unity of the concept of being Duns Scotus could offer a remarkable new view on metaphysics as a science. It has one single object referred to by the univocal notion of being. This notion has two basic uses. It applies properly to the possible subjects of existence, and in addition to this quidditative use, it is applied denominatively to qualifications and modifications which inhere in a subject. Being (ens) is the first of the transcendentals. Other transcendentals studied in the metaphysics are (l) the attributes coextensive with being as such (passiones entis simpliciter convertibiles), (2) the disjunctive attributes (passiones entis disjunctae) , i.e. the primary differences of being which in disjunction are coextensive with being (like "infinite-orfinite", "necessary-or-contingent", "actual-or-potential"), and (3) the pure perfections (perfectiones simpliciter), which are the remaining attributes predicable of God and hence transcending the finite categories. 48 In addition to the argument just mentioned, there are many lines of thought Scotus takes in arguing for the univocal concept of being. 49 However, as for the later influence of his writings, the most important of the new metaphysical patterns of thought is the one in which the concept of being is connected with the idea of identifiability of things which can be existent. 50 This view plays an important role in Scotus's modal

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theory, too. In fact it is an essential part of the new understanding of modality introduced by Duns Scotus. As mentioned above, the modal paradigms commonly used in Western thought until the late 13th century contained presuppositions which easily led one to thing that modal potions are in the last analysis reducible to extensional terms. Although the medieval doctrine of Divine possibilities motivated some new considerations, they did not lead to a totally new philosophical understanding of the nature of modality before Duns Scotus. He seems to be the first to formulate a general theory of modality in which modal notions are interpreted intensionally and in which no role is left to the view that actuality in the real historical world should be taken as the criterion of the genuineness of an alleged possibility. 5 1 In Scotus's modal theory the meaning of modal notions is connected with the idea of considering several alternative states of affairs at the same time. The domain of possibility is introduced as an area of conceptual consistency. It rna)' be considered as consisting of all possible individuals, their possible properties and their mutual relations. This domain of all possible states of affairs is structured so that it is divided into equivalence classes on the basis of the relations of compossibility. One of the classes into which logical possibilities (possibile /ogicum) are partitioned is the actual world. Some logical possibilities are real alternatives of the actual world (possibile rea/e).52 Scotus uses this model in what could be called a sketch of the Divine psychology. Some formal distinctions are drawn and formulated by means of the medieval instantia naturae terminology. In the first instance of nature all thinkable entities are produced in esse intelligibile by the Divine Intellect. In the second instance of nature the content of the intelligible esse is the correlate of the Divine Omnipotence and the logical possibilities can be considered as objectively actualizable. As such they present themselves to the Divine Will in the next instance of nature, and then one particular compossible set of them is chosen to be actual by the Divine Will. 53 Scotus says in some places that the metaphysical notion of being is a real concept. This means that it refers to something which transcends the mental reality. 54 It follows from this that when the transcendental notion of being is applied to possible beings having some kind of existence in the Divine Intellect, it is not applied to them because they have this esse intelligibile, but because there is something in themselves which causes them to be in this esse as they are. Scotus seems to think that the Omnis-

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cience identifies every possible being because they can be identified. Although they themselves have no kind of existence, they get esse intelligibile in the Divine Intellect, when it identifies everything which can be. A possible being becomes identified as the possible being it is because it is what it is. 55 As a possible being in the Divine Intellect it is thought of as actual in those states of affairs in which it can occur, and it is implied that any intellect which could identify everything would find this same being. This is the real aspect of the notion of being applicable to anything which can be. Individuals occur in the domain of possibility in all forms and configurations which are intelligibly possible. It is typical of Scotus's modal thinking that according to it, individuals can have properties which are mutually exclusive. Therefore they must be considered simultaneously as members of several possible combinations. Although a possible being can occur in several possible states of affairs at the same time, only one of the possible alternatives is actual and correspondingly the possible being is existent only if it belongs to the actual world .56 According to this view, something can be considered as a metaphysical individual, if it can be identified in a world by virtue of its individual nature. 57 Because the same possible being can be thought of as actual in several possible states of affairs, its identifiability is not bound to any single world. It follows from this that there is in an actually existing being a not purely mental distinction between its individual identifiable nature and its actual existence, although they are not really distinct in the sense that one of the two could exist apart from the other. 58 The pair "potential-actual" of the coextensive disjunctive attributes of being implies that "existence" is a kind of predicate which belongs to those metaphysical beings which are instantiated in the actual world. A being which is existent in the actual world can be identified in an alternative possible world, too. Because of its existence it is not a merely potential being. We have seen that according to Thomas Aquinas quidditative beings are actualities of essence in singular instances. It seems that in this approach the individual identity of a substantial being is virtually equated with the real history of an actualized essence. It follows from this that there are certain problems if it is said that an individual at a certain moment of time could at that time have properties different from those it actually has. If the possibility of being otherwise is assumed to be realized, it is also assumed that the history of the individual would be different from what it actually is. However, if the identity of the thing under

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discussion is bound to one concrete history, it cannot be thought of as the subject of simultaneous alternative possible qualifications. So if we look at one individual being at a certain moment of time, it seems to have all its qualifications necessarily at that time. The alleged de re possibilities of this subject, which remain unrealized, are in fact not genuine possibilities of this being. Its actual history is what it is, and alternative ways of being would make it another singular actualization of essence. 59 This is, of course, in accordance with the above mentioned tendency to treat genuine possibilities in such a way that it is demanded that there must be place for their real actualization in one and the same historical world. Duns Scotus's intensional modal theory was developed as a conscious alternative to traditional models in which modal notions in the last analysis are merely means of speaking in a certain way of what happens in the one and only actual world at different moments of time. The basic new idea of considering different alternative states of affairs at the same time demanded a new theory of individuals and existence. If there are alternatives to an actual state of affairs at the same time, it seems that the individuals occurring in the actual world must be treated simultaneously as members of alternative states of affairs, too. And then it is required that the identifiability of an individual is not bound to its actual existence. It must be possible to speak about the same individual in alternative states of affairs at the same time. It is clear that Scotus's new doctrine of being qua being was developed in close connection with his modal theory which emerged as a result of a critical discussion of the traditional modal paradigms. The essentials of this interpretation of modal notions played an important role in the fourteenth century modal logic developed on the same lines by William Ockham, Pseudo-Scotus, John Buridan, and others. It was thought that the logical properties of modal statements can be obtained by considering the set of equivalence classes of compossible possibilities, which was taken to be an a priori domain of mod ali zed terms and to determine the logical behaviour of modal statements. Quantification over possibilia belonged to the standard methods of the new modal logic, and it was connected with a view similar to Scotus's theory, according to which individuals are identifiable entities in the domain of possibility (of which a part is actual) and they can be thought of as members of alternative possible states of affairs at the same time. The fourteenth century logicians were not very interested in the question of how the same individual could be picked up in alternative states of af-

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fairs. This kind of identifiability of the entities in the domain of possibilia was simply accepted as a structural presupposition of the model of modality which was found philosophically most satisfying. 6o In Duns Scot us it is explained in terms of the Divine Omniscience and the individual essence (haecceitas). One important figure in the history of the later influence of Scotus's modal metaphysics is Francesco Suarez. In his Disputationes Metaphysicae Suarez seems to reject the Scotistic univocatio en tis. But as argued by Walter Hoeres, the rejection is formal only and in fact Suarez broadly accepted the Scotistic teaching. 61 His concept of being in vi nominis is applicable to actual and potential individuals and it is used in a modal theory which is clearly influenced by Scotus's model described above. 62 This is historically interesting, because Suarez's metaphysics was particularly prominent and influential in the early modern period. It is one of the historical links between the modal theories of Duns Scotus and Leibniz. Although the idea of compossible sets of possibilities, the distinction between logical and real possibilities, the model of actual and possible worlds, and some other general elements of Leibniz's modal theory are more or less directly derived from the late medieval philosophy, there are some striking differences between the modal metaphysics of Scot us and Leibniz. One of them is that instead of speaking about the same individual existing in several alternative worlds Leibniz thinks that one individual substance can occur in one possible world only. What is prima facie considered as an unactualized possibility de re belonging to an actual being is in fact an attribute belonging to the counterpart of the actual being in a possible world. 63 Leibniz says that his doctrine of individual substances is influenced by Aquinas's view according to which each angel is an infima species, i.e., the only possible instance of a specific substantial form. 64 He takes this to mean that the factual history of an angel shows exactly what it is to be this angel. We have suggested that this conclusion could be deduced from Aquinas's metaphysics vis-a.-vis any individual, because it seems that the identity of an individual substance is virtually bound to its role of being the subject of one historical sequence. One corollary of this idea is that at any moment an individual has necessarily every attribute which belongs to it at that time. According to Leibniz something like this follows from his fundamental in esse principle. Leibniz thinks that every substance must have a complete notion which comprises every predicate which refers to any moment in its history. The only difference between

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Leibniz's view and what seems to be implied in Aquinas's metaphysics is that Leibniz applies this idea both to the individuals of the actual world and to the individuals of possible worlds. 65 If the general principles of Scotus's modal theory and Aquinas' theory of what it is to be a quidditative being are amalgamated, the natural result is something like Leibniz's counterpart theory. It is interesting that this syncretistic view is consciously accepted by Leibniz. NOTES 1 See, for example, An. post. B, 13, 96a20 - b 14; Thomas Aquinas, In II Post. an., \c. 13, Met. Z, 12, 1037b28 - 1038a27; Thomas Aquinas, In VII Metaphys., \c. 12. For the fixity of species, see PA 646a35-b2, GA 731b31-732al, De an. 415a26-bl and Thomas Aquinas, In II de anima, \c. 7, n. 314, 317. 2 Met. Z, 17, 104la6-104lb33 and Aquinas, In VII Metaphys., Ic. 17; see also De ente et essentia, c. 2, S.th. I, q. 3, a. 3 - 5, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3, q. 76, a. 4c, and 1. Owens, 'Common Nature. A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics', in 1. F. Ross (ed.), Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy. A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, Greenwood Pub!. Co., Westport, Conn. 1971, pp. 191-194. 3 S.th. I, q. 7, a, 2, ad 3, q. 66, a. 1-2. Aristotle's doctrine of matter and some modern

interpretations of it are discussed in R. Dancy, 'On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts about Substances: Matter', The Philosophical Review 87 (1978),372-413. See also H. Happ, Hyle. Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1971. For the doctrine of the bare substratum in Aristotle and some modern thinkers, see M. 1. Loux, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, D. Reidel Pub!. Co., Dordrecht, 1977, pp. 107 - \12. 4 De ente et essentia, c. 2, In II de anima, \c. 12, n. 378 - 380. l S.th. I, q. 84, 2c, In de trin., q. 4, a. 2c. 6 "esse substantiae compositae non est tan tum esse formae nec tantum esse materiae sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Vnde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens, non tan tum sit forma nec tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa." De ente et essentia c. 1. "Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam inquantum materia antequam recipiat formam est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per ilIam. Forma vero finitur per materiam inquantum forma in se considerata communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit forma determinate huius rei." S.th. I, q. 7, a. Ic; see also S.th. I, q. 3, a. 4c. 7 S.th. I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3, a. 3c, q. 12, a. 4c, q. 50, a. 2c. 8 S.th. I, q. 3, a. 4c, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3, q. 54, a. Ic, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4. For further examples, see 1. C. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics. A Historico-doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972, pp. 255 - 275, 358 - 367.-5ee also 1. Owens, 'The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas', Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), I - 40; reprinted in 1. Owens, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God. Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R, ed. by 1. Catan, State University of New York Pre,s, Albany, 1980, pp. 52-96. 9 Plato, Rep. 521C-54IB, Aristotle, EN VI, 6, 1140b31-\141a20. 10 "Naturale desiderium rationis creaturae est ad sciendum omnia ilia quae pertinent ad

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perfectionem intellectus, et haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes eorum." S.th. I, q. 12, a. 8, ad 4. 11 S.th. I, q. 79, a. 3c, q. 86, a. I, ad 3. 12 S.th. I, q. 54, a. 4c, q. 79, a. 4, q. 85, a. I. 13 Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur." S.th. I, q. 85, a. I, ad 4. "Species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essentiae rei, et est quodammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse naturale, prout est in rebus." Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2c. See also S.th. I, q. 14, a. 12c. 14 "Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operation is intellectualis, differat a verbo cordis, quod est per operationem intellectus formatum; quamvis ipsum verbum possit dici forma vel species intelligibilis, sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis quam intellect us adinvenit, dicitur quaedam species intelligibilis." Quodl. V, q. 5, a. 2c. IS "Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellect us possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et division em intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles, sed ea quae intellect us sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus." S.th. I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; cf. ad 2. For further texts and literature pertaining to these questions see R. W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, pp. 98-117, E. P. Mahoney, 'Sense, Intellect; and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger', in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 605 - 611. 16 S.th. I, q. 12, a. 4c, q. 55, a. 2c, q. 58, a. 3 - 4, q. 79, a. 2c, q. 84, a. 7c, q. 85, a. 5c. 17 S.th. I, q. 84, a. 7c and 8c, q. 85, a. Ic. 18 S.th. I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2, III, q. 25, a. 5, ad 4. 19 S.th. I, q. 29, a. I, ad 3, q. 77, a. I, ad 7, q. 87, a. Ic, In II Post. an, Ie. 13, n. 533, De spirit. creat., a. II, ad 3, ScG IV, c. I, De ver. q. 10, a. I. For further examples, see W. H. Kane, 'The Extent of Natural Philosophy', New Scholasticism 31 (1957),90-92; cf. A. Kenny, The Five Ways. St. Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of God's Existence (Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion), Schock en Books, New York, 1969, p. 90. 20 S.th. I, q. 12, a. 8c and ad 4. 21 'Time and Modality in Scholasticism', in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being (Synthese Historical Library 20), D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, 1981, pp. 163 -207. 22 Ibid., pp. 208-217. 23 For some relevant texts, see Note 20, ScG III, 56, De un. verbi inc. a.l, In II Post. an., 1.6. 24 See, for example, S.th. I, q. 13, a. I, a. 4, a. 9, ad 2, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, De pot. q. 8, a. I. 2S See J. Pinborg, 'Speculative Grammar', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Note 15 above), pp. 262 - 265, J. Pinborg, 'Die Logik der Modistae', Studia Mediewistyczne 16 (1975), 39 - 97. 26 See, for example, S.th. I, q. 13, a. 1-4, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, In VII Metaphys., Ie. I, n. 9; R. M. Mcinerny, The Logic of Analogy. An Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961, pp. 49-66.

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27 "Dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum; et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium ... sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis." S.th. I, q. 13, a. 6c. See also R. M. McInerny, op.cit., pp. 67 -79; J. F. Ross, 'Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language', International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961), 468 - 502; reprinted in J. F. Ross, ed. (Note 2 above), pp. 35 -74. In the same volilme, pp. 75 - 96, there is R. M. McInerny's paper 'Metaphor and Analogy', reprinted from Sciences Ecctesiastiques 16 (1964), 273 - 289. 28 G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XI), Almqvist & Wiksell, Gothenburg, 1960, pp. 163 - 190; J. Hintikka, Time and Necessity. Studies in Aristotle's Theory oj Modality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, pp. I - 26. 29 See H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World. An Investigation oj Its Background and Interpretation oj Its Use by Thomas oj Aquino, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1952, pp. 125, 159-162. 30 For the text, see L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II, I. The Origin and Early Development oj the theory oj Supposition (Wijsgerige teksten en studies), Van Gorcum, Assen, 1968, p. 475. 31 See R. M. McInerny, 'Metaphor and Analogy' (Note 27 above), pp. 81 - 90 and 'The ratio communis of the Analogous Name', Laval Thtiologique et Philosophique 18 (1962), 9-34. 32 "Sed dicendum est quod unum dividentium aliquid commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas. dividentium; aliomodo, secundum participationem ration is illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis .... Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa relatione entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio." In I Periherm., Ie. 8, n. 6. Quoted in McInerny, op.cit. (Note 26 above), pp. 96-97. See also S.th. I, q. 16, a. 6c. 33 S.th. I. q. 13, a. 10, De pot., q. 7, a. 7, In IV Metaphys., Ie. I, n. 539, In XI Metaphys., Ie. 3, n. 2197. See also Doig, op. cit., pp. 255-275, 358-367. 34 S.th. I, q. 3, a. 4c. See also the texts mentioned in Owens, Op. cit. (Note 8 above), pp. 248-9: In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, De ver. q. 27, a. I, ad 8, In Boethii de hebd., Ie. 2. 3S See the references in Note 33 above. 36 See Lyttkens, op. cit., pp. 266 - 283. 37 De pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9; cf. S.th. I, q. 3, a. 4c, q. 4, a. I, ad 3. 38 See Note 32 above. 39 Cf. In I Periherm., Ie. 5, n. 19-22. I have neglected to discuss the relations between the predicamental and other kinds of uses of ens in Aquinas, because they are treated by Hermann Weidemann in this volume, p.181 - 200. There has been a vivid discussion of the interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine of being among the contemporary thomists. The theories put forward are not purely historical and an analysis of them lies outside the purview of this paper. See, for example, J. Maritain, Existence and the Existent, trans!. by L. Galantiere & G. Phelan, Pantheon, New York, 1948, E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2. ed., Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952; C. Fabro, La nozione meta]lSica di partecipazione

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secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 3 ed., Societa Editrice Internazionale, Torino, 1963; L. B. Geiger, La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2 ed., Vrin, Paris, 1953; L. De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, trans\. E. Ziegelmeyer, Herder, SI. Louis, 1957; 1. De Finance, Etre et Agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas, 2 ed., Librairie Editrice de l'Universite Gregorienne, Rome, 1960; M. A. Kr'lpiec, 'The Theory of Analogy of Being', in S. Kaminski, M. Kurdzialec, and Z. 1. Zdybickaleds.), Theory of Being, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin, 1980, pp.31-106. 40 Quoted in S. F. Brown, 'Scotus' Univocity in the Early Fourteenth Century', in De doctrina loannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici lnternationalis 1966, Vo\. IV (Studia Scholastica 4), Romae, 1968, p. 36. 41 S. F. Brown, op.cit .. , 'Richard Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of Being', Franziskanische Studien 48 (1966),297 - 307; 'Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being', Franciscan Studies 25 (1965), 117 - 150; M. Schmaus, Zur Diskussion uber das Problem der Univozitiit im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Skotus (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-hist. K\' 1957, 4), Miinchen 1957. 42 Ord. I, d. 3, pars I, q. 1- 2, n. 27 - 29 (ed. Vat Ill), Ord. I, d. 8, pars I, q. 3, n. 68 - 69 (ed. Vat. IV). 43 Ord. I, d. 3, pars I, q. 3, n. 131-151. I don't discuss here the details of Scotus' ontology. However, it may be in order to mention shortly that according to him transcende;1tal being can be predicated in quid and in quale. It is predicated in quid of God and of everything which is or can be a finite concrete subject of existence. And it is predicated in quale of what is or can be a modification or qualification to the primary subject of existence. See A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1946, pp. 77-99. For Scotus' doctrine of the univocity of being in general, see also T. A. Barth, 'Being, Univocity, and Analogy According to Duns Scotus', in 1. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), John Duns Scotus 1265 - 1965 (Studies in Philosoph'y and the History of Philosophy 3), The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 210 - 262; C. L. Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1942; L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 16), Aschendorff, Miinster, 1979. 44 Ord. I, d. 3, pars I, q. I - 2, no. 29: "Quilibet philosophus fuit certus, ilIud quod posuit primum principium, esse ens, ... non autem fuit certus quod esset ens creatum vel increatum, prim urn vel non primum... . Confirmatur etiam, nam aliquis videns philosophos discordare potuit esse certus de quocumque quod aliquis posuit primum principium, esse ens, et tamen propter contrarietatem opinionum eorum potu it dubitare utrum sit hoc ens vel ilIud. Et tali dubitandi si fieret demonstratio concludens vel destruens aliquem conceptum inferiprem, puta quod ignis non erit ens primum sed aliquod ens posterius primo ente, non destrueretur ilIe conceptus primus sibi certus, quem habuit de ente, sed salvaretur in ilIo conceptu particulari probato de igne." 45 See, for example, Ord. I, d. 36, q. un., n. 60 (ed. Vat. VI): "Ita in proposito: homini in aeternitate inest "non esse aliquid" et chimaerae "non esse aliquid", sed homini non repugnat affirmatio quae est "esse aliquid" sed tantum inest negatio propter negationem causae non ponentis, - chimaerae autem repugnat, quia nulla causa posset in ea causare "esse aliquid". Et quare homini non repugnat et chimaerae repugnat, est, quia hoc est hoc et iIlud ilIud, et hoc quocumque intellectu concipiente." Cf. also Note 50.

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Ord. IV, d. 8, q. I, n. 2 (ed. Vives XVII), cf. Quod/. q. 3, n. 2 (ed. Vives XXV). Ord. I, d. 43, q. un., n. 14 (ed. Vat VI): ... per ipsam potentiam "sub ratione qua est omnipotentia" non habet obiectum quod sit primo possibile, sed per intellectum divinum, producentem illud primo in esse intelligibili, et intellectus non est formaliter potentia activa qua Deus dicitur omnipotens; et tunc res producta in tali esse ab intellectu divino - scilicet intelligibili - in primo instanti naturae, habet se ipsa esse possibili in secundo instanti naturae, quia formaliter non repugnat sibi esse et se ipso formal iter repugnat sibi habere esse necessarium ex se." Whatever can be thought of is produced in intelligible esse by the Divine Intellect. Possible objects are identifiable as members of possible worlds, of which the Divine Will chooses one to be the actual world (cf. Lect. I, d. 39, q. 1 - 5, n. 62 - 63). Possible individuals have a positive nature as identifiable candidates to existence, although they as such have no kind of existence. Cf. Ord. I, d. 36, n. 61. For the connection between Scotus' ideas of being and possibility, see also L. Honnefelder, op.cit. and 'Die Lehre von der doppelten ratitudo entis und ihre Bedeutung fiir die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns Scotus', Deus et Homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoli, Acta Tertii Congressus Scotistici Internationalis 1970 (Studia Scholastico-scotistica 5), Societas Internationalis Scotistica, Romae 1972, pp. 661-671. 48 See Wolter, op.cit. 49 See the discussions in the works mentioned in Note 43 above. 50 For the un~vocity of being in Ockham, see M. Matthew, The Concept of Univocily Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William Ockham, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, 1952; P. Boehner, 'Scotus' Teachings According to Ockham I. On the Univocity of Being', Franciscan Studies VI (1946), 100 - 107; D. C. Langston, 'Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being', Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), 105 -129. The influence of Scotus' doctrine of being on Suarez is discussed in W. Hoeres, 'Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on Univocatio entis', John Duns Scotus 1265 -1965 (see Note 43 above), pp. 263 - 290. Short remarks on later influence are to be found in L. Honnefelder, 'Duns Scotus/Scotismus II', The%gische Rea/enzyk/opiidie 9, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1982, pp. 232 - 240. 51 Knuuttila, op.cit., pp. 217 - 234. 52 Basic texts are Lect. I, d. 39, q. 1 - 5 and Ord. I, d. 43, q. un. For a discussion of these and some other texts, see Knuuttila, op.cit., pp. 217 - 234, 'Modal Logic', The Cambridge History of Later Medieva/ Philosophy (see Note 15 above), pp. 353 - 355; 'Duns Scotus' Criticism of the Statistical Interpretation of Modality', in Sprache und Erkenntnis im MiIte/alter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1), De Gruyter, Berlin - New York, pp. 441 - 450. 53 In addition to references mentioned in Note 47 above, see Ord. I, d. 35, q. un., n. 61; d. 38, q. un., n. 10 (ed. Vat. VI). 54 For the notion of real concept in Scotus, see Wolter, op.cit. pp. 15 - 17, 65 - 66. 55 After the passage quoted in Note 45 above Duns Scotus states: " ... quia homini non repugnat (sc. to be something), ideo est possibile potentia logica, ... et illam possibilitatem consequitur possibilitas obiectiva, et hoc supposita omnipotentia Dei quae respicit omne possibile (dummodo iIIud sit aliud a se), tamen ilia possibilitas logica, absolute - ratione sui - posset stare, licet per impossibile nulla omnipotentia earn respiceret." Ord. 1, d. 36, q. un., n. 61. 56 In Scotus's metaphysics actuality and potentiality (actus ct potentia) belong to the disjunctive transcendentals which are in disjunction proper to quidditative being. Actuality as a transcendental attribute means existence. See Wolter, op.cit., pp. 145 -148. Wolter quotes Ord. I. d. 7, q. 1, n. 72 where it is stated: " ... ens in communi non tantum dividitur per actum et potentiam, sed etiam quodcumque genus entis, et quaecumque species et in46 47

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dividuum, quia sic albedo eadem primo est in potentia et postea in actu". Cf. Ord. II, d. 16, q. un., n. 5: "Illud enim individuum, quod nunc est in actu, iIlud idem fuit in potentia". When an individual has become actual, that same individual was earlier a (merely) potential individual, i.e. it was a not yet actualized member of that possible world which is the actual one. It is a member of alternative possible worlds, too. See, for example, Ord. I, d. 41, q. un., n. 7, d. 44, q. un., n. II (ed. Vat. VI). S7 See, for example, Ord. II, d. 3, pars I, q. 5-6, n. 191. S8 Cf. A. Wolter, 'The Formal Distinction', in John Duns Seotus 1265 -1965 (Note 43 above), pp. 54 - 60; 'Is Existence for Scotus a Perfection Predicate, or What?", De doetrina loannis Duns Seoti II (Note 40 above), pp. 175 -182. S9 In S.th. I, q. 3, a. 5c Aquinas states: "omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditative vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est. Differunt aut em secundum esse: non enim idem est esse hominis et esse equi, nec huius hominis et iIlius hominis." For temporal necessity in Aquinas, see, e.g., In I Periherm., Ie. 15, n. 2, Sent. I, d. 38, q. I, a. 5, ad 3, De ver. q. 2, a. 12, ad 4. 60 John Buridan, Traetatus de eonsequentiis, ed. by H. Hubien (Philosophes medievaux 16), Publications Universitaires, Louvain, 1976, pp. 27, 31 - 40; 58,4 - 60,56; 75, 196 -76, 204; William Ockham, Summa /ogieae, ed. by P. Boehner, G. Gal, and S. Brown (Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica: Opera philosophica I), The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974, pars I, c. 72, pp. 215, 37-218,112. See also S. Knuuttila, 'Modal Logic' (Note 52 above), pp. 355 - 357 and 'Topics in Late Medieval Intensional Logic', in I. Niiniluoto and E. Saarinen (eds.), Intensional Logic: Theory and Applications (Acta Philosophica Fennica 35), Societas Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki, 1982, pp. 32 - 38; Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part 1 oj the Summa logieae, transl. and introd. by M. J. Loux, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1974, pp. 40-44. 61 W. Hoeres, 'Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on univocatio entis', John Duns Seotus 1265 -1965 (Note 43 above), pp. 263 - 290. 62 Disputationes metaphysicae (reprinted from Opera omnia, Vives 1856 - 78), Olms, Hildesheim, 1965, Vo!. II, pp. 176 - 177, 190- 203,207 - 223. There is a short discussion on Suarez's views on possibility and reality in J. A. Trentman, 'Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century', The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Note 15 above), pp.826-827. 63 For Leibniz's modal theory, see H. Poser, Zur Theorie der ModalbegrifJe bei G. W. Leibniz (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa VI), Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1969; H. Schepers, 'Zum Problem der Kontingenz bei Leibniz. Die beste der moglichen Welten', in Collegium Philosophieum. Studien Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburtstag, Basel, Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 326-350; J. Hintikka, 'Leibniz on Plenitude, Relations, and the "Reign of Law''', in S. Knuuttila (ed.) (Note 21 above), pp. 259- 286; B. Mates, 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds' , in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science lIl, Proceedings of the Third International Congress, ed. by B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics), North-Holland Pub!. Co., Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 507-529. 64 See, for example, Discours de Metaphysique, Sections 9 - II, transl. in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters. A selection translated and edited with an introduction by L. E. Loemker (Synthese Historical Library 2), 2 ed., D. Reidel Pub!. Co., 1976, pp. 308 - 309. 65 Diseoursde Metaphysique, Sections 8 - 9, 13; the letter to Arnauld, 14 July 1686, transl. in Loemker, op.cil., pp. 331 - 338.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle, De anima, ed. with introd. and comm. by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. by I. Bywater (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970 (first published 1894). Aristotle, Generation of Animals, with an English Translation by A. L. Peck (Loeb Classical Library), Heinemann & Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1953. Aristotle, Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1924. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, with an English Translation by A. L. Peck (Loeb Classical Library), Heinemann & Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1945. Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1949. Barth, T. A., 'Being, Univocity, and Analogy According to Duns Scotus', in J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), 1965, pp. 210-262. Boehner, Ph., 'Scotus Teachings According to Ockham I. On the Univocity of Being', Franciscan Studies VI (1946), 100-107. Brown, St. F., 'Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being', Franciscan Studies 2S (1965), 117 - 150. Brown, St. F., 'Richard of Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of Being', Franziskanische Studien 48 (1966), 297 - 307. Brown, St. F., 'Scotus's Univocity in the Early Fourteenth Century', in De doctrina loannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici lnternationalis 1966, Vol. IV (Studia Scholastico-Scotistica 4), Rome, 1968, pp. 35 - 41. Dancy, R., 'On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts About Substances: Matter', The Philosophical Review 87 (1978),372-413. Doig, J. C., A quinas on Metaphysics. A Historico-doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972. Fabro, c., La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 3 ed., Societa Editrice Internazionale, Turin, 1963. Finance, J. de, Etre et Agir dans 10 Philosophie de Saint Thomas, 2 ed., Librairie Editrice de l'Universite Gregorienne, Rome, 1960. Geiger, L.-B., La Participation dans 10 philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2 ed., Vrin, Paris, 1953. Gilson, E., Being and Some Philosophers, 2 ed., Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952. Happ, H., Hyle. Studien zum arislOtelischen Materie-Begriff, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1971. Hintikka, J., 'Leibniz on Plentitude, Relations, and the "Reign of Law" , in S. Knuuttila (ed.), 1981. pp. 259- 286. Hintikka. J .. Time and Necessity. Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1973. Hoeres. W., 'Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on univocatio entis', in J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.). 1965, pp. 263 - 290. Honnefelder, L.. Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand

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der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Beitrage zur Geschichtt! der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 16), Aschendorff, Miinster, 1979. Honnefelder, L., 'Die Lehre von der doppelten Ratitudo entis und ihre Bedeutung fUr die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns Scotus', in Deus et Homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti. Acta Tertii Congressus Scotistici Internationalis 1970 (Studia Scholastico-scotistica 5), Rome, 1972, pp. 661 - 671. Honnefelder, L., 'Duns Scotus/Scotismus II', Theologische Realen~klopiidie 9, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1982, pp. 232-240. John Buridan, Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. by H. Hubien (Philosophes medievaux 16), Publications Universitaires, Louvain, 1976. John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae, Civitas Vaticana, 1950 - . John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, Vives, Paris, 1891 - 5. Kane, W. H., 'The Extent of Natural Philosophy', New Scholasticism 31 (1957), 85 - 97. Kenny, A., The Five Ways. St. Thomas Aquinas' ProoJs oj God's Existence (Studies in . Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion), Schocken Books, New York, 1969. Knuuttila, S., 'Duns Scotus's Criticism of the "Statistical" Interpretation of Modality', in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1), De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1981, pp. 441-450. Knuuttila, S., 'Modal Logic', in N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.), 1982, pp. 342 - 357. Knuuttila, S., 'Time and Modality in Scholasticism', in S. Knuuttila (ed.), 1981, pp. 163 - 257. Knuuttila, S., 'Topics in Late Medieval Intensional Logic', in I. Niiniluoto and E. Saarinen (eds.), Intensional Logic: Theory and Applications (Acta Philosophica Fennica 35), Societas Philosophica Feunica, Helsinki, 1982, pp. 26-41., Knuuttila, S. (ed.), ReJorging the Great Chain oj Being. Studies oj the History oj Modal Theories (Synthese Historical Library 20), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. Krllpiec, M. A., 'The Theory of Analogy of Being', in S. Kaminski, M. Kurdzialec, and Z. J. Zdybicka (eds.), Theory oj Being, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin, 1980, pp. 31 - 106. Kretzmann, N., A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History oj Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. Langston, D. c., 'Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being', Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), 105 -129. Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans!. and ed. with introduction and notes by L. E. Loemker, 2 ed. (Synthese HistoricalLibrary 2), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976. Loux, M. J. (trans!. & introd.), Ockham's Theory oJ Terms. Part I oJthe Summa Logicae, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1974. Loux, M. J., Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, D. Reidel Pub!. Co., Dordrecht, 1977. Lyttkens, H., The Analogy between God and the World. An Investigation oj Its Background and Interpretation oj Its Use by Thomas oj Aquino, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1952. Mahoney, E. P., 'Sense, Intellect and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger', in N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.), 1982, pp. 602 - 622. Maritain, J., Existence and the Existent (trans!. by L. Galantiere & G. Phelan), Pantheon, New York, 1948. Mates, B., 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds', in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy oj

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Science Ill; Proceedings oj the Third International Congress, ed. by B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics), North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 507 - 529. Matthew, M., The Concept oj Univocity Regarding the Predication oj God and Creature According to William Ockham, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure. 1952. Mcinerny, R. M., The Logic oj Analogy. An Interpretation oj St. Thomas Aquinas, M. Nijhoff. The Hague, 1961. Mcinerny, R. M., 'Metaphor and Analogy'. Sciences Ecctesiastiques 16 (1964),273 - 289; reprinted in J. F. Ross (cd.), 1971, pp. 75 - 96. Mcinerny, R. M., The ratio communis of the Analogous Name', Laval Theologique et Philosophique 19 (1962), 9 - 34. Owen, G. E. L., 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato iti the Mid-Fourth Century (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XI), Almqvist & Wiksell, Gothenburg, 1960, pp. 163 - 190. Owens, J., 'The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas', Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), I - 40; reprinted in J. Owens, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence oj God, pp. 52 - 96. Owens, J., 'Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics', in J. F. Ross (ed.), 1971, pp. 185 -209. Owens, J., St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence oj God. Collected Papers oj Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R. (ed. by J. Catan), State University of New York Press, Albany, 1980. Pinborg, J., 'Die Logik der Modistae', Studia Mediewistyczne 16 (1975),39-97. Pinborg, J., 'Speculative Grammar', in N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.), 1982, pp. 254-269. Plato, The Republic with an English translation by P. Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library), Heinemann & Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930 - 35. Poser, H., Zur Theorie der Modalbegrifje bei G. W. Leibniz (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa VI), Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1969. Raeymaeker, L. de, The Philosophy oj Being (transl. by E. Ziegelmeyer), Herder, St. Louis, 1957. Rijk, L. M. de, Logica Modernorum II, I. The Origin and Early Development oj the Theory oj Supposition (Wijsgerige teksten en studies 16), Van Gorcum, Assen, 1967. Ross, J. F., 'Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language', International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961), 468 - 502; reprinted in J. F. Ross (ed.), 1971, pp. 35 - 74. Ross, J. F. (ed.), Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy. A Collection in Honor oj Francis P. Clarke (Contributions in Philosophy 4), Greenwood Publ. Co., Westport, 1971. Ryan, J. K. and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), John Duns Scotus 1265 - 1965 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 3), The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1965. Schepers, H., 'Zum Problem der Kontingenz bei Leibniz. Die beste der moglichen Welten', in Collegium Philosophicum. Studien Joachim Riller zum 60. Gebur/stag, Schwabe & Co., Basel, Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 326- 350. Schmaus, M .. Zur Diskussion iiber das Problem der Univozitiit im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Scotus (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.hist. KI., 1957,4), Munchen, 1957. Schmidt, R. W., The Domain oj Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, M. Nijhoff, The Hague. 1966.

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Shircel, C. L., The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1942. Suarez, Francisco, Disputationes metaphysicae (reprinted from Opera omnia, Vives, Paris 1856-78), G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1965. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum. Analyticorum expositio, ed. by R. Spiazzi, Marietti, Turin, 1964. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. by R. Spiazzi, Marietti, Turin, 1950. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate, ed. by B. Decker (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 4), Brill, Leiden, 1955. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum expositio, ed. by R. Spiazzi, Marietti, Turin, 1964. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium, ed. by A. Pirotta, Marietti, Turin, 1959. Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula philosophica, ed. by R. M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Turin, 1954. Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula theologica, ed. by R. A. Verardo et al., Marietti, Turin, 1954. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae I - II, ed. by R. M. Spiazziet al., Marietti, Turin, 1953. Thomas Al1uinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales, ed. by R. M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Turin, 1956. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros sententiarum, Vols. I - II, ed. by P. Mandonnet, Lethielleux, Paris, 1929. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, in Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, P. M., edita, Vols. 4-12, Vatican Polyglot Press, Rome, 1896-1906. Trentman, 1. A., 'Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century', in N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.), 1982, pp. 818-837. Weidemann, H., 'The Logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas', this volume, pp. 181-200. William Ockham, Summa logicqe, ed. by Ph. Boehner, G. Gal, and St. Brown (Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica: Opera philosophica I), The Franciscan Institue, St. Bonaventure, 1974. Wolter, A. B., 'The Formal Distinction', in 1. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), 1965, pp. 45 -60. Wolter, A. B., 'Is Existence for Scotus a Perfection, Predicate, or What?' in De doctrina loannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici lnternationalis 1966, Vol. II (Studia Scholastico-Scotistica 2), Rome, 1968, pp. 175 - 182. Wolter, A. B., The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, 1947.

Dept. of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki, Neitsytpolku 1b, SF-00140 Helsinki 14, Finland.

LILLI ALANEN

ON DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT KINDS OF BEINGS·

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is a well-documented and widely-known fact that Descartes, in defending his new philosophy, relied heavily on Scholastic theories and notions, and that he also adapted them skillfully for his own purposes. l For instance, in arguing that the mind and the body are radically different and mutually independent substances, Descartes used a theory of distinctions which he seems largely to have taken over from Suarez. 2 However, although Descartes's argument for the mind-body distinction has often been discussed and analyzed in recent literature, 3 the theory of distinctions on which it is based and to which Descartes also refers in developing his argument has not been extensively studied. This is somewhat surprising. 4 For the interpretation of Descartes's dualism, as well as the assessment of the argument supporting it is, it seems to me, dependent on the sense given to the notion of a real distinction as used by Descartes and his predecessors. It is my contention that Descartes's argument, when interpreted in the light of traditional uses of this notion, is both more cogent and less unproblematic than is usually thought. As I will try to show, Descartes can at least be said to have answered, in a satisfactory manner, the criticism of Arnauld, who was the most perspicacious and serious of Descartes's contemporary objectors. 5 I do not want to claim that Descartes's dualism is an unproblematic doctrine. My aim, rather, is to show that many of the difficulties of this doctrine are due to ambiguities in the terminology which Descartes took over from Scholasticism, as well as to the application he made of them. 6 Descartes's own theory of distinction which is exposed In the Principles, seems to be relatively simple and clear. (Cf. below, Section 5.) It is important, however, to bear in mind that Descartes's use of traditional Scholastic notions and concepts is not always very consistent. For although Descartes developed and exposed his views and arguments in terms of common, traditional concepts used by the School, he was an innovator in many respects. Whenever he thought it arpropriate, he also liked to stress the originality of his views. The problem is that it is not always very clear when Descartes, in using the terminology of the 223 S. Knuuttila and J. Hinlikka (eds.), The Logic oj Being, 223 - 248. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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Scholastics, aligns himself with the views that inform this terminology, and when he is on the contrary innovating, giving new senses to traditional terms. 7 The interpretation of the key-concepts of Descartes's theory of distinctions, such as substance, essence, attribute, and mode, for instance, is therefore delicate and problematical. This also contributes to the difficulty of evaluating the originality of Descartes's arguments and views. Descartes claimed to be the first to assert that the mind consists in "thought alone" or the faculty of thinking, and he seems also to have considered his proof of a real distinction between the mind and the body as unprecedented in force and cogency. 8 However, the mere assertion of a real distinction between the mind and the body, or between form and matter, seems to have been something of a commonplace among Scholastic philosophers and could therefore hardly, in itself, justify any claims to originality. (Cf. below, Section 4.) In order to compare Descartes's theory of distinctions with different accounts of distinctions given by some of his predecessors, I will begin by outlining briefly the general problem-context in which the medieval theories of distinctions were developed and discussed. I will also present, in a general manner, the main distinctions and concepts discussed by the Scholastics which are relevant to the understanding of Descartes's theory and his application of it in the proof for mind-body dualism. 2. SUBSTANCES, REAL BEINGS AND CONCEPTUAL BEINGS

Originally, the medieval discussions of different kinds of ontological distinctions were centered on two different but related problems, the one philosophical, and the other theological. The philosophical problem of distinctions was connected with the discussion of the nature of universals, and the common source for this discussion was mainly Aristotle's remarks on numerical, specific and generic sameness and difference. The theological problem was that of the nature of the Trinity, and the very term distinction seems first to have been introduced in the discussion of this problem. 9 Difficulties related to these problems were dealt with by nearly aU medieval philosophers, and different accounts or theories of distinctions can be found in the works of all the major Scholastics, e.g., Bonaventura, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The solution proposed by these philosophers to the particular problems mentioned above is usually of a wider interest, however. Since most of the medieval philosophers followed Aristotle in treating being and unity as convertible notions,10 there is a close connection between

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the general doctrine of being adopted by a particular philosopher and the theory of distinctions defended by him: the latter constitutes, as one author notes, a key to the understanding of the former. II The account of these distinctions offers, notably, an answer to the questions of what kind of entities or beings there are in the world, how they are related to each other, and where or how the distinction between so-called real (i.e., extra-mental) beings or things and merely conceptual (i.e., mental) entitie~ should be drawn. This holds good, ajortiori, of Descartes, who was concerned neither with the problem of universals, nor with that of the Trinity, at least not directly. But Descartes's reduction of real things to purely mental things or substances, on the one hand, and merely extended substances, on the other hand, could be accomplished only at the price of a radical change in the application of traditional terms such as substance, essence, accident and mode. Descartes was consequently forced to give his own account of the traditional ontological distinctions discussed by the Scholastics. 12 While all the Scholastics, and Descartes with them, seem to agree on a fundamental division of beings or things into real, extra-mental entities (res, entia realis), and mere conceptual beings (entia rationis), there is considerable disagreement on how this division should be drawn and also on the question of whether there are, in addition to these two classes, some kind of intermediate entities, and how these should be classified or accounted for. The origin of this difficulty can be traced to Aristotle's comments on the various uses (or meanings) of the terms to be, being, substance, essence and accident in the Metaphysics, and to his well-known and notoriously problematic distinction between primary and secondary substances in the Categories. 13 The question whether the categories introduced by Aristotle are to be understood as merely linguistic or logical categories, or instead as metaphysical or ontological categories, seems to be left open by Aristotle. Thus, while Aristotle seems to reserve the term substance primarily for things existing per se, i.e., as a subject of predication, and as opposed to what is said to exist only in alio or as predicated of something else, he also uses the term in a second sense, of that which is predicated of a subject(e.g., the "shape" or the "form" of each thing; Met.!:. 8, IOl7b23 - 25). Although these secondary substances are said to be "separable" from the subjects of which they are predicated they are not considered by Aristotle to exist independently of these. Without being capable of separate existence, they nevertheless are according to Aristotle real beings, i.e., extra-mental or mind-independent entities or

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things. The problem of accounting for these secondary substances posed by Aristotle constitutes, one could say, the core of the problem of universals discussed by the Medievals. 3. MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTIONS

As regards the medieval discussions of the distinctions to be considered here, a main difficulty, related to the above problem, was to determine the criteria for particular distinctions between things and concepts. Most of the medieval philosophers seem to have admitted the following three basic distinctions: (I) A real distinction (distinctio realis), i.e., a distinction between real things or individuals in the extra-mental world. This distinction was usuaIly defined as a distinction between thing and thing (inter rem et rem), existing before the operation of the intellect. (2) A purely mental distinction (distinctio rationis), i.e., a distinction created by the mind (per opus intellectus). (3) An intermediate distinction which was generally defined with reference to the mind, but which, differently from the purely mental distinction, was usually conceived as a distinction having a basis in the nature of things and therefore corresponding to some kind of diversity or non-identity outside the intellect. 14 There was, however, no general agreement on how this intermediate distinction should be accounted for or characterized. The controversial notion of a formal distinction introduced by Duns Scotus, for instance, can be seen as one attempt to clarify the nature of this foundation in reality. 15 The answer to the question concerning the criteria of these different distinctions depends of course on the sense given to the notion of a "thing" and the conditions required for something to be qualified as a "real thing". Following Aristotle on this point the Scholastic philosophers usually considered as real things not only individual things (substances in Aristotle's first sense of the term), but also their forms and qualities. In so far as the qualities were understood as "real", i.e., mindindependent entities or things, they were considered either as universal, common natures, or as individual qualities or "things' (res). The former view was represented, roughly, by thinkers considered to be "Platonic" realists and "Aristotelian" conceptualists, the latter by the nominalists. According to the teaching common to most of these thinkers, the distinctions between entities such as matter and form, the body and the soul, the mind and its particular thoughts, were considered as instances of a

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real distinction, i.e., of a distinction between thing and thing. This means that although these entities are actually united (e.g., matter and form which are always found together and the composition of which was supposed to constitute the individual substances or substances in Aristotle's primary sense of the word) they are separable in the sense that at least one of them can be conceived as existing independently of the other: more precisely, their existence is not necessarily bound to that combination in which they are actually found. Thus, most of the Scholastics seem to agree on the possibility of conceiving, for instance, this form without this specificity or this particular matter, or the body without the soul, or the soul without these particular thoughts, ot, more generally, a substance without its accidental qualities. This may be contrasted with the distinction between merely conceptual or mental entities (ens rationis) , for instance, between 'man' and 'rational animal', or with the more controversial distinctions defined as intermediates between the real and the mental distinction, e.g., the distinction between rationality and animality in man. Another instance of this intermediate or "formal" distinction is that between the Persons of the Trinity, or God's attributes, as his goodness, mercy and justice. The entities belonging to this intermediate class were often defined as conceptual (or formal) but they were not regarded as created by the intellect. Although they were supposed, contrary to the purely mental entities, to have some kind of basis in the nature of (extra-mental) thin~s, they were regarded as inseparable from these things. Not being capable of separate existence these entities were often characterized as different aspects of real things, existing in these things before and independently of the operation of the intellect. 16 A case discussed in this connection, besides those mentioned above, was that of the soul and its faculties: the faculties of the soul, according to many authors, can be conceived as distinct entities in spite of the fact that the soul is one and undivided and its faculties, consequently, are inseparable from the soul and from each other. As noted before, there was, however, much controversy on how these various distinctions should be classified. The Thomists, for instance, used the term real distinction in a somewhat different sense and extended it to items which, according to other authors, are separable only in thought, as the soul and its faculties, essence and existence. But later Scholastics, such as Duns Scot us, Ockham and their followers, seem to have restricted the real distinction to things considered as separable in the extra-mental reality. Hence, as opposed to the other distinctions assumed by these authors, a real distinction, for the later Scholastics,

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always presupposes either a mutual or at least a non-mutual separability with regard to the existence of the items or things considered. 17 Instances of a mutual separability, in the case of actually composed or united entities, are a house and the elements of which it is built, or the body and the hand, and so on. In the case of non-mutual separability, only one of the united things can exist without the other. This criterion of separability with regard to existence is, as will be seen, important for Descartes too. But contrary to some of his Scholastic predecessors Descartes insists that a real distinction always requires a mutual separability. Thus, for Descartes the contrast between a substance and its qualities, which Descartes considers as "modes", cannot be an instance of a real distinction, since the modes cannot (according to the common teaching) subsist in themselves independently of the substance in which they inhere. Such distinctions, which do not satisfy the criterion of a mutual separability, are not, according to Descartes, real but modal distinctions (cf. below, Section 5). 4. POSSIBLE SEPARABILITY AND REAL SEPARABILITY

It is important to note that things which are considered as separable need not, according to the later Scholastics, be actually separated in the extramental world; they need not even be naturally separable at all. It is sufficient that they can be conceived apart or independently of each other without contradiction. More precisely, it suffices that one of two things, which are perceived as united to each other, can be conceived independently of the other without contradiction, in order to conclude that it is really distinct from the other. According to a principle that the Scholastics generally agri'.:d upon, and that Descartes also frequently relies on, the omnipotence of God is limited only by what is selfcontradictory.18 It follows from this principle that whatever can be conceived without contradiction is possible, i.e., can be created or posited by the power of God. 19 Thus, although the mind cannot exist naturally, according to the Scholastics, apart from the body thai it is supposed to inform, nor the qualities without the substance in which they are perceived and independently of which they have no subsistence, the mind and the body as well as the substance and its qualities can be said to be really distinct by the above principle. For it is possible, at least, to conceive, without contradiction, the body as existing without the mind, and the substance without its accidental qualities . Conversely, although the soul or the form in general cannot be conceived as existing independently

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of some individual body or particular piece of matter, nor the qualities without some individual thing or substance of which they are predicated, it is possible to conceive, without contradiction, the soul or the form, and the qualities respectively, without this particular body or this particular substance in which they are actually perceived. They are therefore, according to the later Scholastics, real things which are really distinct from each other, in the sense that they can always be separated, i.e., created apart, by the omnipotence of God. 20 Interpreted in the light of this principle (i .e. the principle of God's omnipotence) and the application made of it by the Scholastics, Descartes's proof that the mind and the body are really distinct things does not seem very controversial; on the contrary, it seems rather trivial. That it was problematic in the eyes of Descartes's contemporaries is, however, not difficult to understand. For, as mentioned above, Descartes restricts the real distinction to mutually separable things, to things each one of which can exist separately (i.e., be conceived without contradiction independently of each other). Such things, as Descartes and his contemporaries understood it, are individual things or substances in Aristotle's primary sense. In order to prove that the mind and the body are really distinct in this restricted sense Descartes had therefore to prove that the mind is a substance in the primary and original sense of the word, i.e., a thing the existence of which can be known independently of, and as Descartes also purports to show, before the existence of the body is known. Although this is opposed to what most of the Scholastics considered as common sense, and challenges the Aristotelian definition of the mind as the form of the body, the doctrine, interestingly, is not new or unheard of in Scholasticism. For instance, the question of whether or not individual substantial forms or qualities are numerically distinct entities and hence mutually separable from the individual things in which they inhere was discussed before, and notably by Ockham, who, for his part, did not hesitate to answer it affirmatively (cf. Note 20 above). Ockham's position was however radical indeed, and it is clear from the objections of the theologians Caterus and Arnauld, that the thesis advanced by Descartes, according to which the mind, considered in itself, is a substance, i.e., a self-subsisting thing, or as Descartes also calls it, a "complete" thing which can be known independently of the body, could not be accepted without argument.

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5. DISTINCTIONS ADOPTED BY DESCARTES

Before discussing this thesis and Descartes's argument for it, I will present, briefly, the theory of distinctions upon which Descartes's reasoning is implicitly based, as it is developed in the Principles, I, §§ 60 - 62. As noted above it corresponds largely to the theory of Suarez. 2t Like Suarez, Descartes admits three different kinds of distinctions, but he interprets them, characteristically, in his own way. They are: the real distinction, the modal distinction and the distinction of reason. The real distinction according to Descartes "is properly speaking found between two or more substances" (AT VIII, 28; HR II, 243). By a substance, according to a definition given earlier in the same text, Descartes understands "nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist". Absolutely speaking, there is only one substance which can be said to fulfill this requirement, namely God: other things can exist only by the help or concourse of God. Therefore, Descartes adds, the Scholastics are right in saying that "the word substance does not pertain univoce to God and other things" because "no common signification for this appellation which will apply equally to God and to them can be distinctly understood" (AT VIII, 24; HR I, 239 - 249). However, the concept can be attributed to created substances, in so far as these' 'need only the concurrence of God in order to exist". And in this sense it can be attributed univocally, in Descartes's view, to the soul and the body (AT VIII, 24 - 25; HR I, 240). As regards the criteria or sign of a real distinction Descartes says that we can conch;de that two substances are really distinct one from the other from the sole fact that we can conceive the one ciearly and distinctly without the other. For in accordance with the knowledge we have of God. we are certain that he can carry into effect all that of which we have a distinct idea. (AT VIIl. 28; HR 1.243. Cf. also AT VII. 162 and 170-171; HR II. 53 and 59.)22

The modal distinction, as Descartes understands it, is of two sorts: (a) "between the mode properly speaking, and the substance of which it is the mode", and (b) "between two modes of the same substance" (AT VIII, 29; HR I, 244). What distinguishes the modal distinction from the real distinction is the fact that a substance can be clearly and distinctly conceived without the mode which therefore differs from it, whereas a mode cannot, reciprocally, be perceived without the substance (A T VII I, 29; HR I, 244). By a mode Descartes means "what elsewhere is termed attribute or quality", when a substance is considered "as modified or

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diversified by them" (i.e., by the qualities or attributes) (AT VIII, 26; HR I, 241). More precisely, by a mode Descartes seems to understand accidental qualities, and he reserves, generally, the term attribute to the permanent and essential properties of substances. Instances of a modal distinction in the first sense are: that between a corporeal substance (e.g., a stone) and its figure or movement, or between a mind and its act of affirming or recollecting; and in the second sense: the distinction between the form and the figure of the stone, or between the act of recollecting and the act of affirmating in the mind. It is characteristic of the distinction between two modes of the same substance that the one mode can be conceived or recognized without the other, but neither the one nor the other mode can be conceived "without recognizing that both subsist in one common substance". Thus, it is possible to perceive this particular stone clearly without thinking of its form or movement, but it is not possible to perceive either of these modes clearly and distinctly without perceiving the stone, i.e., without the substance or thing to which they are attributed and that they can be said to modify or diversify. In a similar way, the mind can be conceived without its particular thoughts, but none of these can be conceived without a mind, i.e., a thinking substance (AT VIII, 29; HR I, 244).23 Finally, the distinction of reason is defined as a distinction created by the thought, e.g., that between a substance and some of its attributes without which it is not possible that we should have a distinct knowledge of it, or between two such attributes of the same substance. (AT VIII, 30; HR t, 245; cf. note 16 above)

Such attributes, according to Descartes, are the only two essences or essential attributes of things that he admits, namely, thought, and extension, together with the common attributes as unity, being, duration, etc. (cf. the transcendentals of the Scholastics). Duration can be distinct from a substance only in thought, and this holds for all the other common attributes too: they are not separable from the substance in reality. They can hence be conceived without a substance only by abstraction of the mind. The crucial difference between the real distinction on the one hand, and the modal distinction and the distinction of reason on the other hand, is thus that these latter concern entities which cannot exist by themselves and which are therefore not separable with regard to their existence from the substances in whIch they subsist or inhere (of which they are predicated), and which can therefore not be clearly and distinctly perceived or conceived without the substance of which they are either ac-

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cidental or permanent properties. And although such entities can be conceived without the substance in which they inhere by way of abstraction, they can never be conceived or known clearly and distinctly in this way. In so far as they are conceived by abstraction they are not conceived or known as "complete" things. What Descartes has to prove, therefore, in order to show that the mind is really distinct from the body, is that the knowledge of the mind is not acquired by way of abstraction and that the mind is consequently neither an accidental nor a permanent property of the body to which it is united, but that it can on the contrary be known as a complete or self-subsisting thing in itself.

6. DESCARTES'S PROOF THAT THE MIND IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE BODY

Let us now consider Descartes's proof of a real distinction between the mind and the body. The main steps of this argument, which is presented in the Sixth Meditation, are the following: (i) (ii)

(iii)

(iv) (v)

Whatever I understand clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I understand it; It suffices that I understand one thing apart from another in order to be certain that the one is different from the other (follows from (i»; I know that I exist while in the meantime I notice nothing else to pertain to my essence excepting that I am thinking (i.e., while still doubting of all other things, the existence of my own body included, as is shown by the Cogito-reasoning or what corresponds to it in the Second Meditation, AT VII, 24 - 25; HR I, 149 - 150); My essence consists in this alone that I am thinking (supposed to follow from the Cogito); I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking, not extended thing. . . .(c/aram et distinctam

habeo ideam meum ipsius, quatenus sum tantum res cogitans, non extensa, ... ); Therefore, (vi)

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (AT VII, 78; HR I, 190)

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The structure of the argument, I take it, is roughly the following: (ii) can be said to follow from (i), which, as we have seen, was a commonly accepted principle. That (i) is essential to Descartes's proof is easy to understand against the background of the considerations above (cf. Section 4). This explains why Descartes insists that the distinctness of mind and body cannot be fully demonstrated until the existence of a veracious and omnipotent deity has been proved, although the argument for the other relevant premises «iii) and (iv» seems to be given already in the Second Meditation (cf. AT VII, 219; HR II, 96). On the basis of the reasoning there presented, (iii) at least can be accepted as - relatively - unproblematic. But (iv) is more controversial. It is, presumably, supposed to follow from (iii), since there seems to be no other place in the Meditations where the question of what really belongs to his essence (i.e., the essence of his mind) is explicitly discussed besides the passages subsequent to the Cogito reasoning in the Second Meditation. 24 However, the argument (the Cog ito reasoning) for (iii) can hardly be considered as sufficient for establishing (iv) as it is here formulated. And it is certainly not sufficient for inferring (v). The problem, then, which has often been raised, is to understand what further argument Descartes can give to justify this claim that the essence of mind consists in thought alone, in a way, as Descartes also seems to assume, which excludes the body and other things from its essence. The proof of the mind-body distinction presupposes, as Descartes himself recognizes, a move from the order of clear and distinct perception to the order of things, or, in other words, from concepts to reality. But how is it possible to infer, as he seems to do, from what merely looks like a subjective state of certainty (expressed in (iii», to the knowledge of the essential nature of the self or the mind ((iv) and (v»? For, as I have argued elsewhere, the clarity and distinctness of the knowledge of the self or the mind and its nature acquired in the Second Meditation, seem to consist of nothing more than the certainty of the facts expressed in the propositions" I think" and" I exist" . 25 And how can this knowledge justify any further conclusion about the objective nature of self or the mind? (Cf. the objection of Arnauld in AT VII, 203; HR II, 84.) However, instead of trying to look for a justification of these controversial premises, one could raise the question to what extent Descartes really needs such strong claims for the conclusion he wants. to draw. (iv) and (v), it seems to me, could be reformulated in a way that renders them more plausible without altering the force of the proof:

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Thinking or thought pertains to my essence; I have a clear and distinct idea of myself only inasmuch as I am a thinking and (possibly) unextended thing ....

For though it is problematic where and when Descartes can be said to have proved (iv) and (v), the weaker claims (iv ') and (v ') can at least be defended on the basis of the reasoning presented in the Second Meditation. Descartes himself actually insists that he did not intend to prove anything else in that place. (It is, by the way, questionable whether (iv) and (v) or the corresponding theses (iv / ) and (v') are independent premises or not: for my part I tend to consider them as merely different formulations of the same claim.) Thus, in commenting on the following passage: "I do not now admit anything which is not necessarily true: I am thus, in the strict sense, only a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul. .. (Nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum; sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus. [myef"lphasis] AT VII, 27; HR II, 152), Descartes points out that: ... by using the words in the strict sense, only I do not mean an entire exclusion or negation, but only an abstraction from material things, I said that, in spite of that, I was not sure that there was nothing corporeal in the soul, although nothing of such nature was known to exist in it; ... (AT IX, 205; HR II, 133)26

Now this, I want to argue, is all Descartes actually needs, besides the assumption of an omnipotent Deity, in order to conclude that the mind is really distinct from the body and can exist without it (vi). In this conclusion the same point seems to be repeated twice, since to say that one thing is really distinct from another, is, as we have seen, merely to say that it can be posited, i.e., exist, by the power of God, without the other. But by the same means Descartes can also be said to have proved (iv) and (v). Because, as the term is used by Descartes, essence is the attribute through which a real thing or being, i.e., a substance, is known. 27 Thus, to Arnauld, who wonders where Descartes has shown "how it follows, from the fact that one is unaware that anything else (except the fact of being a thinking thing) belongs to one's essence, that nothing else really belongs to one's essence" (AT VII, 199; HR II, 81), Descartes affirms that this is demonstrated in the place where he proves that God exists, "that God, to wit, who can accomplish whatever I clearly and distinctly know to be possible" (qui potest omnia quae ego clare et distincte ut possibilia cognosco, AT VII, 219; HR II, 96). And, he continues: For although much exists in me of which I am not yet conscious (for example in that passage I did, as a fact, assume that I was not yet aware that my mind had the power of

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moving the body, and that it was substantially united with it), yet since that which I do perceive (adverto) is sufficient for me to subsist with alone, I am certain that God could have created me without those other things of which I am unaware, and that these other things do not pertain to the essence of mind ( .. .Quia tamen id quod adverto. mihi sUfficit

ut cum hoc solo subsistam. certus sum me a Deo potuisse creari absque a/iis quae non adverto. atque ideo ista alia ad mentis essentia non pertinere. AT VII, 219; HR II, 97)

The essence, Descartes explains in the following paragraph, comprises nothing but that without which a thing cannot exist. To think is essential to the mind in this sense, to be united to the body is not essential to the mind (AT VII, 219; HR II, 97). As is made very clear in the passage quoted, to say that the essence of mind consists in thinking (alone) is yet to say nothing of the actual state or condition of the mind or its relation to other things, such as the body for instance. In drawing this conclusion concerning the nature of his mind Descartes does not know, clearly and distinctly, whether there are any bodies at all. Consequently he does not know whether he is (united to) or has a body. But he knows, clearly and distinctly, that he exists in so far as he thinks, and he can therefore conclude that his essence consists in thinking alone. And this, I take it, is also the point of the whole argument: namely, that he can know his essence (i.e., the essence of his mind) without knowing whether or not he also is or has a body. For whatever the way in which body or matter is defined, the knowledge of the essence of mind and the certainty of its existence, as acquired in the Second Meditation, is "complete" in the sense that it does not include or presuppose the knowledge of any other thing. 28 What Descartes has shown in proving by the Cogito reasoning that he exists as a thinking thing, while stiII doubting of the existence of his (or any) body is that the knowledge of his self or mind is not dependent on the knowledge of any other thing, his body included, and thereby he has also proved that his mind is logically independent of the body. The scholastic definition of the mind as the form of the body is thus indirectly refuted. For if the mind is defined as the form or the first actuality of the living body, it can neither exist nor be conceived without the body that it informs: the concept of the mind entails or presupposes the concept of the (living) body. Hence the mind cannot be considered, in itself, as a complete or self-subsisting thing, i.e., a substance in the proper sense of the word. But in defining the mind as a merely thinking thing, and showing that the existence of the mind, as a thinking thing, can be known before the existence of the body is known, and that the mind can thus be "clearly and distinctly" conceived without the body, Descartes can be said to have shown that the concept of mind does not entail the concept of the body. Relying on the assumption that whatever

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he conceives clearly and distinctly is true, Descartes can thus conclude that the mind is a substance, i.e. a complete thing, which is logically independent from the body and which, by the power of God, can be posited or created without the body. 29 7. HAS DESCARTES ANSWERED HIS OPPONENTS?

Descartes's proof of the real distinction between mind and body, as mentioned before, leaves his opponents unsatisfied. Let us now consider some of the objections raised against it. The first to oppose Descartes is Caterus who invokes Duns Scotus's formal distinction, understood by Caterus as a distinction intermediate between a real distinction and a distinction of reason. On Caterus's reading of Scotus two things which can be conceived as distinct and separated from each other are not (by that fact alone) really, but merely formally distinct, as is the case with the Divine attributes justice and pity. They have, Caterus observes, concepts prior to any operation of the understanding, "yet it does not follow that, because God's justice can be conceived apart from his pity (mercy), they can also exist apart" (AT VII, 100; HR II, 8). Descartes answers by identifying, mistakenly, as he later concedes, Scotus's formal distinction with his own modal distinction, that "applies only to incomplete entities, which", he says, "I have accurately demarcated from complete beings" (AT VII, 120; HR II, 22).30 He continues: Thus, for example, between the motion and the figure of the same body the distinction is formal, and I can quite well understand (inlelligere) the motion without the figure, and the figure without the motion, and either when abstracting from the body: but I cannot however completely understand the movement without the thing in which the motion is, nor the figure without the thing in which the figure is, nor finally can I feign that the motion can be in a thing lacking figure, nor the figure in a thing incapable of motion. Nor can I, similarly, understand justice apart from a just being, or compassion from a compassionate, nor may I imagine that the same being which is just cannot be compassionate. But yet I understand, completely, what a body is, in thinking merely that it is extended, figured, movable, etc., and by denying of it everyt!Jing which belongs to the nature of mind, and conversely I understand that mind is a compl-:te thing which doubts. understands, wills, etc., although I deny that there is anything in it of what is contained in the idea of body. Which would not be possible if there were not a real distinction between mind and body. (AT VII, 120- 121; HR II, 22-23)

Things which can be conceived apart from each other merely by abstraction of the intellect, are always conceived inadequately. Since they are inadequately conceived, they are not known as complete, self-subsisting things or beings. As Arnauld understands him, Descartes hereby claims to have proved not only that the mind can be conceived completely

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without the body but also that it can be conceived adequately apart from the body (AT VII, 200 - 201; HR II, 82). But, as we saw before, Descartes has not proved that the knowledge of his mind is adequate in the sense assumed by Arnauld: it is not a knowledge embracing all the properties of the thing known (cf. above, Section 5). Such knowledge, Descartes stresses, is unattainable for the human mind, which is created and finite, and it is therefore not required. An adequate knowledge presupposes that one knows not only all the properties which are adequate for a thing, but also that one knows that God has not given the thing in question other properties than those of which one has knowledge. In other words, it is necessary to know that the knowledge one has is adequate, which would require an infinite capacity of knowledge (AT VII, 220; HR II, 97). Such knowledge, i.e., a knowledge which is entirely adequate, is to be distinguished from a knowledge which "has sufficient adequacy to let us see that we have not rendered it inadequate by an intellectual abstraction" (ibid.). Similarly, in order to understand that the mind is a complete thing, we need not have an (entirely) adequate knowledge of it, but we must be able to see that the knowledge we have of it is not rendered inadequate by abstraction, i.e., that it is not incomplete. How then, according to Descartes, are incomplete entities to be distinguished from complete entities? A complete entity, in Descartes's view, is recognized by the fact that it can be conceived as existing in itself, i.e., it must be understood as a real thing or entity in itself, independently of any other entities. By a complete thing, Descartes explains to Arnauld, "I mean merely a substance endowed with those forms or attributes which suffice to let me recognize that it is a substance" (AT VII, 222; HR II, 98). Now certain substances, as Descartes recognizes, are popularly called "incomplete substances" (e.g., the mind and the body, or parts of the living body). But, he adds, if they are called incomplete because they cannot exist of themselves (i.e., without inhering in some subject); it is contradictory to call them substances. However, substances can be called incomplete in another sense, namely, when referring to some other substance together with which they form a single selfsubsisting thing: Thus. the hand is an incomplete substance, which taken in relation with the body. of which it is a part; but. regarded alone. it is a complete substance. Quite in the same way mind and body are incomplete substances viewed in relation to the man who is the unity which together they form; but. taken alone. they are complete. (AT VII, 222; HR 11.99)

As we saw above substances, according to Descartes, are not immediate-

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Iy known or perceived: the knowledge of a substance is always inferred. What we perceived are certain forms or attributes, and we know, by a principle of Natural light, that these forms or attributes must inhere in something in order to have existence. 31 Now if the form or the attribute perceived is sufficient to infer the existence of a thing, without knowing any of its other attributes or properties and without knowing any other things to which it might be united, the thing in which this attribute inheres can be considered as a complete thing, i.e., a substance: For, as to be extended, divisible, possessed of figure, etc. are the forms or attributes by which I recognize that substance called body; so, to be a knowing, willing, doubting being, etc. are the forms by which I recognize the substance called mind; and I know that thinking substance is a complete thing, no less than that which is extended. (AT VII, 223; HR II, 99)

I know that the mind or the thinking thing is a substance because I know with certainty that I exist (i.e., that my mind exists) by the sole fact that I think. This is sufficient to refute the contention of the Scholastics that my mind is related to my body as species to genus. 32 " •• .it can nowise be maintained", Descartes emphasizes, "that ... body is related to mind as genus is to.species; for, although the genus can be apprehended apart from this or that specific difference, the species can by no means be thought apart from the genus" (AT VII, 223; HR II, 99). Since the knowledge that the mind, conceived only as a thinking thing, exists, does not imply the knowledge that the body exists, the mind cannot be an attribute or property of the body but is a complete thing, i.e., a thing which, by the power of God, can exist independently of other things. The same argument is also supposed to prove that the body, the existence of which is not fully established until the Sixth Meditation (and to which the mind, according to Descartes, is in fact "very closely", intimately or "substantially' united, cf. AT VII, 222 and 228; HR I, 190 and II, 102), is a real, complete thing or substance in the proper sense of the word. The possibility that the body is merely an attribute or a species of the mind is hereby excluded. 33 The main problem with this argument, if it is accepted, and Arnauld seems actually to have accepted it since he never returned to the charge, is (as Arnauld also points out in his objections) that it proves too much. It seems therefore to give support to the opinion of Platonists according to which "nothing corporeal belongs to our essence, so that man is hence only a soul (animus), while his body is merely the vehicle of the soul" and according to which man is defined as "a soul that makes use of his body" (AT VII, 203; HR II, 84). This is, however, a doctrine that Descartes categorically rejects. He answers, characteristically, that "in

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order to prove that one thing is really distinct from another, nothing less can be said, than that the divine power is able to separate the one from the other" (my emphasis). He also claims that he actually proved the substantial union between mind and body in the Sixth Meditation while dealing with the distinction between mind and body, by employing arguments the efficacy of which he says he cannot remember to have ever seen surpassed (!). He adds: Likewise, just as one who said that a man's arm was a substance really distinct from the rest of his body, would not therefore deny that it belonged to the nature of the complete man, and as in saying that the arm belongs to the nature of the complete man no suspicion is raised that it cannot subsist by itself, so I think that I have neither proved too much in showing that mind can exist apart from body, nor yet too little in saying that it is substantially united to the body, because that substantial union does not prevent the formation of a clear and distinct concept of the mind alone as a complete thing. (AT VII, 228; HR II, 102 - (03)3.

The nature of man is hence not, according to Descartes, purely spiritual, i.e., man is not a mind but a mind united to a body. When pressed on the question of how this union between two really diverse and distinct substances should be understood, Descartes invariably answers by referring to a third primitive notion, known through experience. 35 This notion is precisely the Scholastic notion of the union of form and matter, or of a substantial form (quality) and the particular body that it informs. But this traditionally obscure notion of a substantial, or as it also was called, "real" union between the soul and the body (which was difficult to explain already for the Aristotelians and the Thomists) seems to be inconceivable for a Cartesian. 36 It presupposes that the soul or the mind and the body, which can be clearly and distinctly conceived only when considered separately, are at the same time conceived as one single and as two distinct things. This, as Descartes is forced to admit, is contradictory (AT III, 693; Philosophical Letters, 142). Descartes's way out of this dilemma is to distinguish between different kinds or "paradigms" of knowledge. This distinction, when properly understood, seems to render the whole question of how the union of the mind and the body can be "clearly and distinctly" understood inappropriate. The knowledge we have of the union and the interaction between the mind and the body, even if this cannot be explained, is based on our daily experience, and as such it is evident and indubitable. But it can neither be compared to the knowledge we have of the mind regarded as a purely thinking thing, nor to that we have of body when regarded as a purely extended thing: it is a fact "shown to us not by any reasoning or cC'mparison with other matters, but by the surest and plainest everyday experience". As such it

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is "one of those things which we can only make obscure when we try to explain them in terms of others" (AT V, 222; Philosophical Letters, 235). The notion of the union of the mind and the body is therefore characterized as "primitive": it is-given as such and cannot be rendered more intelligible or clear by means of simpler or more primary notions. 37 Although Descartes accepts the notion of a "real" union of an immaterial form «nd a corporeal body in his account of human nature, he rejects the use of this same notion in the explanation of physical phenomena. According to Descartes the familiar and daily experience that we have as sentient and acting conscious subjects of being "closely united to" and "intermingled" with our body is the only context where the use of this notion can be considered as legitimate (AT VII, 81; HR I, 192). For it is the only context where this notion is based on a clear and immediate experience. Applied to external, physical bodies it is confused and unintelligible: we have no concrete or clear experience of any immaterial forms attached to or operating in physical bodies, such as the "real qualities", "substantial forms" or forces (e.g. heaviness), postulated by the Scholastics. The assumption of such forms in the scientific explanation of nature is not only an illegitimate and "occult" hypothesis, it is also superfluous in Descartes's view. 38 I will not discuss the difficulties of Descartes's dualistic doctrine here. As the comparison of Descartes's argument for mind-body dualism and the theory of distinctions on which it is based with the ontological distinctions discussed by the Scholastics shows, many of these difficulties are connected to ambiguities inherent in the Scholastic terminology of distinctions and also to Descartes's application of this terminology in a conceptual and scientific framework which in many important respects differs from that in which it was originally developed. Descartes's main innovation can perhaps be said to consist in the definition be gives of the traditional notions of the soul and the body in terms of the concepts of thought and extension. 39 Relying on the view according to which a real distinction requires a mutual separability of the distinguenda, and accepting, for instance, like Ockham and Suarez did, logical independence and non-identity as a sufficient sign of mutual separability, Descartes has no difficulty in proving the separability and hence the real distinction of the soul and the body in his sense of these terms. At the same time Descartes reduces all other properties and things, considered as "real" entities or things by many Scholastics, Ockham and Suarez included, to modes in Suarez's restricted sense of the term. 40 The only objects of knowledge

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which according to Descartes can be considered as "real" things or beings in the proper sense of the word, are thinking and extended substances. All individual as well as generic properties of things, other than the attributes of thought and extension, are thus reduced to modes of these two attributes. Far from removing the original ambiguity related to the various uses and meanings of the term being and related concepts, Descartes's restructuring of the traditional conceptual framework leaves us with a host of unsolved and perhaps unanswerable problems. Among these, besides those encountered above, as the problem of interpreting the two apparently contradictory notions of a real distinction and a real union between the mind and the body, is the difficulty of accounting for individual things or substances in the framework of Descartes's theory of distinctions. No wonder that Descartes's opponents and followers are perplexed, or that the doctrine called Cartesian dualism is difficult for modern readers to understand or interpret in a satisfactory way. NOTES • I am greatly indebted to Erik Stenius, Georg Henrik von Wright, Simo Knuuttila, Norman Malcolm, and Karl Ginet for valuable remarks and useful criticism at different stages of my work. I wish especially to thank Erik Stenius for helping me to structure the present interpretation of Descartes's argument for the mind-body distinction by giving me in a private communication a very clarifying analysis of the argument.

••• Following a current usage a double reference will be given to the works of Descartes: one to the Adam & Tannery edition (1897 -1913), abbreviated AT, volume and page, and one to the English translation of Haldane and Ross (1911, 1978), abbreviated HR, volume and page. For Descartes's correspondence references will be given to the English translation by A. Kenny (1970), cited as Philosophical Letters. I have endeavoured to give literal translations of the Latin text and have therefore, occasionally, departed from the Haldane & Ross translation. For controversial or unclear passages, quotes are also given in Latin. I This has been amply shown by the work of scholars like Etienne Gilson, Alexandre Koyre, J. R. Weinberg and others. See, e.g., Gilson, Index Scolastico-Cartisien, 1912 (1964), and Gilson (1925), and (1930); Koyre (1922); Wei~berg (1977); Beck (1965), and Wells (1965). 2 Cf. Gilson 1912 (1964), p. 87; Weinberg (1977), pp. 75 -77, and below Notes 16 and 22. J See, e.g., Wilson (1978); Weinberg, J. R. 'Descartes on the Distinction of Mind and Body', in Weinberg (1977), pp. 71 - 81; Williams (1978), pp.102 -129; and the articles by M. Hooker, A. Donagan, F. Sommers in Hooker (ed.), Descartes, Critical and Interpretive Essays (1978). As appears from these studies there is no general agreement on the premises of Descartes' argument. It is not very clear either how the conclusion of the argument

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should be interpreted or understood. Cf. Wilson (1978), pp. 180ff; Wilson 'Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness', in Noils (1976), pp . 3 - 15, and Malcolm (1971), pp. 5ff. For other recent studies of Descartes' argument for dualism see the references given in Alanen (1982), p. 92, Note 16. 4 Cf. Wilson (1978), p. 243, Note 14. It is true that Descartes does not give any detailed exposition of his theory of distinctions before the Principles of Philosophy (AT VIII, 28 - 30; HR II, 244 - 245), written some years later than the Meditations on First Philosophy where the proof of the mind-body distinction is found (AT VII, 78; HR I, 190). It is, however, clear from the Objections and Replies, published with the Meditations (.e.g, AT VII , 120, 169-170, and 220ff; HR II, 22, 59, and 97ff), that Descartes already relied upon a definite theory of distinctions in developing his controversial argument, and that the notion of a real distinction, discussed by the Scholastics, hence plays a central part in it. The term distinctio realis appears also, e.g., in the title of the Sixth Meditation (AT VII, 71; HR I, 185). I have dealt, briefly, with Descartes's use of these terms in a previous study, 'Descartes on the Essence of His Mind and the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body', in Acta Philosophica Fennica 33 (1982), 66 - 73. S Descartes's argument for the mind-body distinction was severely criticized by Descartes's contemporaries, and notably by Arnauld whose objections Descartes, according to many later critics, was unable to meet. See Kenny (1967), p. 94, and Wilson (1978), p. 198f. 6 Thus, if Descartes's proof of a real distinction between mind and body is less problematic than is usually thought, when it is considered in the light of the traditional uses of the notion of a real distinction, the interpretation of this notion remains an open question (cf. below Note 29). As to the Scholastic theory of a substantial union between the mind and the body that Descartes defends as the only correct view of the human nature it is neither clear nor distinct in the framework of Cartesian dualism, as Descartes himself was forced to admit. Also, in trying to explain the union of mind and body to Princess Elizabeth whose question on this matter, as Descartes recognizes, is "the one which may most properly be put to me in view of my published writings" (AT III, 663, Philosophical Letters, p. 137), Descartes invokes a third "primitive" notion, and asks Elizabeth to forget about tne arguments proving the distinction between mind and body "in order to represent to herself the notion of the union which everyone has in himself without philosophizing" . AT III, 692ff; Philosophical Letters, 142. Cf. the Principles of Philosophy, I. § 48, and Section 7, below, esp. Notes 35 and 37. 1 Cf. Emile Boutroux' remark, often quoted, concerning Descartes' ability of "pouring new wine into old bottles". See, e.g., Wells (1965), p. 22. 8 See AT VIII 2, 347; HR I, 434; AT VII, 549; HR II, 335 . Cf. also AT VII, 3; HR I, 133-134; AT VII, 13 -14; HR 1,140-141; AT VII, 153-154; HR 11,47. 9 See Edwards (1974), pp. 1-2; Aristotle, Met. 1l7, 1017 6b33 and Topics, I, 7. 10 Whatever is, Aristotle says, is one thing, Met., G. 2 1003 b22. See also, e.g., F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (hereafter quoted as DM) VII, Opera Omnia, Vo!. XXV, p. 250, and Weinberg (1964), p. 245. II C. Vollert (trans!.), Francis Suarez: On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (1947), Introduction, p. 12. 12 The comparison of Descartes's theory of distinctions to those of his predecessors is therefore instructive in many ways. The account presented in this paper is preliminary and tentative: I hope to examine the problems here discussed more thorougl1'ly in a larger study on the same subject. il See, e.g., Met. Il 1017blO - 25, and Categ., Ch. 5, 2a1lff. Cf. Lloyd (1968), pp. 114-115.

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Edwards (1974), p. 10. Cf. also A. Wolters in Ryan and Bonansea (1%5), p. 45. Cf. Wolter, op.cil., p. 45. See also Note 16 below. :6 Suarez, for instance, divides the mental distinction into two kinds: (a) a distinction of reasoning reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis) which "arises exclusively from the ·reflection and activity of the intellect" and which is in this sense purely mental; and (b) a distinction of reasoned reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae) which is defined as a mental distinction preexisting in reality, and which, he says, requires "the intellect only to recognize it, but not to constitute it". (F. Suarez, DM VII, Section I, § 4; transl. by Vollert (1947), p. 18.) Descartes makes a similar distinction but rejects the former kind: he does not, he writes, admit "any distinction of reason rationis ratiocinantis - that is one which has no foundation in things - because we cannot have any thought without a foundation ... " (AT IV, 349-350; Philosophical Letters, 188). The formal distinction assumed by Scotus is reduced by Descartes to a distinction of reason of the latter kind, i.e., to a distinction of "reasoned reason", the only kind of mental distinction that Descartes admits and which he characterizes, like Suarez, as having some kind of foundation in reality. (See the letter referred to above and Descartes's Principles, I, § 62, AT VIII, 30; HR I, 245. Cf. also Alanen (1982), pp. 68 -70 and below, Section 7.) According to Suarez's characterization of the objects of a distinction of "reasoned reason~', they are not to be considered as merely mental or conceptual entities because they are not produced or created by the mind, but "real entities, or rather, a single real entity conceived according to various aspects. ... Hence it is not the objects distinguished but only the distinction itself that results from the reasoning" (DM VII, Section 1, § 6; Vollert (1947), p. 19, my emphasis). 17 See Wolter, op.cit., p. 46. Cf. also Wolter, A., in JP S9 (1%2), p. 726. 18 Cf. below, Section 6 and Note 19. Although Descartes seems to question this principle in some contexts, and suggests that God's omnipotence cannot be subjected to any such limitations (cf., e.g., AT IV, lI8; Philosophical Letters, 151, and AT V, 223f; Philosophical Letters, 236) the consequences of such a radical view, destructive for all knowledge, are not taken seriously by Descartes. Cf. Koyre, op.cit., pp. 20ff. 19 See, e.g., the Second Replies, Proposition III, Corollary and Demonstration: " .. .Deus. . . potest efficere id omne quod clare percipimus, prout idipsum percipimus. . . Est autem in nobis idea tantae alicujus potentia, ut ab illo solo, in quo ipsa est, coelum & terra & c. creata sint, ab eodem fieri possint" (AT VII, 169; HR II, 58- 59, my emphasis). Note that nothing corresponds in this passage to the words doivent avoir ete creees in the French translation (AT IX, 131). Haldane and Ross who follow the French Translation render the latin fieri possint by: ... whatever is apprehended by me as possible must be created by Him too" (HR II, 59). But this is not the view professed by Descartes. What the text says is merely that whatever exists has been created by the power of God, and whatever we conceive as possible can be created by him. Cf. the note of Alquie, F. (ed.), Oeuvres phllosophiques de Descartes, Vol. II, Note 1 to p. 597. See also the letter to Regius, June 1642, AT III, 567, and to Mersenne, March 1642, AT III, 544 - 545; Philosophical Letters, 132. 20 Cf. Suarez's discussion ofthe criteria of a real distinction, DM VII, Section 2, §§ 2-12; Vollert (1947), pp. 40-49, and Weinberg (1977), pp. 75ff. For Ockham's application of the principle of God's omnipotence, see e.g., Weinberg (1964), pp. 245ff. The radical position of Ockham requires a special mention in this context. True to his view that nothing other than individuals (ir.dividual things) exist in the extra-mental reality (outside human consciousness) Ockham reduced all distinctions (at least in so far as created things are concerned) having any basis in reality to real distinctions; and he consequently held that anything that can be conceived as distinct is a real thing or unity which 14

IS

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is really distinct from all other things to which it might be united. Ockham hence allows for no other kind of real distinctions than numerical distinctions. Therefore, the only kind of distinctions existing in nature, i.e., having any foundation in extra-mental reality, according to Ockham, are real, numerical distinctions. (Whether or not Ockham accepted any forlT)al distinction is a subject of controversy which we need not go into here. If he admits such a distinction he restricts it to supranatural things, e.g., the Trinity.) Whatever can be conceived as .distinct is thereby also a singular thing, distinct from all other things, by the principle of God's omnipotence. Any quality which can be distinctly conceived is a singular thing and hence also really distinct from the substance in which it inheres. See Edwards (1974), pp. 12-13 and pp. 180ff, and Weinberg (1964), pp. 248-249. See also Weinberg (1965), p. 49. It is interesting to note also how far Ockham carries this doctrine, which is based on purely logical arguments. Since matter and form, for instance, are distinctly conceivable parts of a composite substance, according to the common view, this means, in Ockham's view, that the particular matter of a given composite must be a singular thing which, logically, can exist also by itself without any form. Matter, as such, is thus not mere potentiality, as the Scholastics generally held, but has some actuality, being, nature, or whatever it is called, in itself. The same holds, according to Ockham, for the substantial forms and the qualities. See Weinberg (1965), pp. 51 - 52. 21 See Note 2 above and Alanen (1982) pp. 69ff. For Suarez's discussion of the distinctions to be retained, see DM VII, Section I; Voller! (1947) pp. 16-39. 22 Cf. Suarez' discussion of the signs for discerning various grades of distinction, DM VII, Section 2, and notably his discussion of the signs of a real distinction, ibid., §§ 9 - 28; Vollert (1947), pp. 46-6i. Cf. also Weinberg (1977), p. 75 and Alanen (1982), p. 78f. 2J Cf. Suarez, D., DM VII, Section I, §§ 16 - 21, and Section 2, §§ 6ff. - It is interesting to note how Descartes, while retaining Suarez's criteria for the modal distinction, gives the term mode (modus) a much wider application than Suarez. Suarez, in discussing different uses of the term mode, restricts it to a particular aspect of a given attribute (e.g., quality or quantity), namely the mode of inherence of the attribute in question. Thus, the inherence of quantity, for instance, is called its mode by Suarez "because it is something affecting quantity, and, as it were, ultimately determining its state and manner of existing, without adding to it any new entity, but modifying a preexisting entity" (DM VII, Sc.;tion I, § 17; Vollert (1947), p. 28). The mode of being of the inherence is such "that it cannot exist unless it is actually joined to the form of which it is the inherence" (ibid., § 18; p. 29). Suarez hence distinguished two aspects in quantity: the first, he says, is called the thing or being of quantity "comprising whatever pertains to the essence of the individual quantity as it is found in nature, and remains and is preserved even if quantity is separated from its subject" (my emphasis); the second, "the inherence of quantity is called its mode because it is something affecting quantity, and, as it were, ultimately determining its state or manner of existing, without adding to it a new proper entity ... " (ibid., § 17; p. 28). A mode, hence, in Suarez's restricted sense of the word, is not a thing or entity in itself: it has no being of its own. "Its imperfection is clearly brought out by the fact that it must invariably be affixed to something else to which it is per se and directl)! joined without the medium of another mode, as, for instance, sitting to the sitter, union to the things united ... " (ibid., § 19; p. 31). Having no being or essence of its own the mode "so necessarily includes conjunction with the thing of which it is a mode that it is unable by any power whatsoever to exist apart from that thing" (ibid., § 20; p. 32, my emphasis). Descartes, as we saw above, uses the term mode in a much wider and general sense: he treats all the qualities and accidental attributes or properties of things as modes in Suarez's

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restricted sense. Unlike Suarez Descartes makes no distinction between an individual quality, say this whiteness, and its actual mode of inherence, the whiteness of this paper. Thus, what for Suarez holds for the mode of inherence of a particular quality or quantity, holds according to Descartes for any particular quality or quantity: it has no being of its own and can hence not be clearly conceived without the essential attribute of the thing, i.e., the substance, in which it inheres. Since Descartes a<;lmits only two such essential attributes, namely thought and extension, this means that all other properties of things are reduced to mere modes of either thinking or extended substances. 24 AT VII, 24-25; HR 1,149-150. Cf. A1anen (1982), pp. 29ff. - In proving that he exists as a thinking thing, Descartes takes it that he has proved that his mind or soul exists (cf. ATVI, 32-33; HR 1,101; AT VII, 27; HR 1,152). In discussing his nature or essence, in the Second Meditation, Descartes makes therefore no distinction between his essence and the essence of (his) mind. This, however, does not mean that Descartes identifies his essence (as a human being) with the essence of mind, which, strictly taken is a pure reason or intellect. See AT VII, 78-79; HR I, 190-191; AT III, 479; Philosophical Letters, 125 - 126; AT III, 371; Philosophical Letters, 102, and below, Note 25 ..., 2S Alanen (1982), pp. 22 - 43, and pp. 63 - 64. Notice that the term to think (cogitare) is, deliberately, used in a very wide sense by Descartes, and covers all kinds of acts or states or consciousness, from the acts of the pure intellect to dreams and sensations. See, e.g., AT VII, 28; HR I, pp. 152ff; AT VII, 217; HR II, 52. Cf. Alanen (1982), pp. 115-116. 26 Cf. AT VII, 175; HR II, 63, and AT VII , 355; HR II, 209. 27 AT VIII, 24f, 30; HR I, 240, 245. Cf. AT VII, 219; HR II, 99. Descartes adheres to the view that substances, as such, are not immediately known in themselves. See AT VII, 161; HR II, 53; AT VIII, 8; HR I, 223; AT VIII, 25; HR I, 240. 28 As to the clear and distinct concept of matter, acquired partly through the analysis of the wax in the Second Meditation, and partly through the considerations in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations, it is not really indispensable for this conclusion, that the essence of mind is thinking. Descartes's definition of matter as mere geometrical extension, and the conception of the body as a piece of a mechanically moved extended substance that this implies (a conception that is, by the way, difficult to prove), can certainly - if it is granted - be said to give it additional support. But it is not essential to the argument as it is here understood. This is the reason for which I have omitted the second part of premise (v) which states (v)/ I have a clear and distinct idea of the body inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing (AT VII, 78; HR I, 190). For a discussion of the part played by this premise and Descartes's concept of body in the argument for a real distinction between mind and body see, e.g., Williams (1978), pp. 213ff, Gueroult (1953) I, pp. 121ff, and II, pp. 67ff, and Alanen (1982) pp. 45-65. 29 On this reading Descartes's argument is, it seems to me, both more simple and forceful than I was earlier inclined to think. This, however, is not to say that the argument as here interpreted is unproblematic, but I will leave the consideration of the probiems it raises aside for the moment (cf. Alanen (1982), pp. 84ff). The conclusion of the argument, notably, is perplexing. For what it states, as I want to stress, is the absence of a logical entailment between the concepts of mind and body, and the existence of the mind in separation from the body is therefore a mere logical possibility. What the implications of this scholastic notion of a real distinction are on the ontological level is and remains an open question. - For an interesting critical discussion of the import and consequences of Descartes' distinction between the concepts of mind and body see Malcolm, 'Descartes' Proof that He Is Essentially a Non-Material Thing, Thought and Knowledge (1977), 58 - 84.

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In the Principles, Descartes corrects himself and assimilates Duns Scotus's formal distinction with his own distinction of reason (cf. Note 16 above). This mistake or uncertainty concerning the classification of the formal distinction from Descartes' side is not important here. But it is quite interesting. For both the distinction of reason (i.e., reasoned reason) and the modal distinction, as understood by Descartes, require in fact an abstraction of the mind and are therefore opposed to the real distinction, which, as will be seen, is restricted by Descartes to entities or things which can be conceived in themselves as complete, i.e., self-subsisting things. Cf. Suarez's characterization of the distinction of reasoned reason: it "does not exist strictly by itself, but only dependently on the mind that conceives things in an imperfect, abstractive, and confused manner, or inadequately". DM VII, Section I, § 8; Vollert (1947), 20-21. 31 Cf. above, Notes 23 and 27. 32 Cf. Arnauld's objection to the effect that Descartes's argument that the body can be completely understood merely by thinking that it is extended, figured, movable, etc., is of little value: it does not exclude that the body might be related to the mind as genus is to species, for, as is commonly agreed, the genus can be conceived without the species (AT VII, 201; HR II, 82). See also the letter to (Mesland?), 2 May 1644, AT IV, 120; Philosophical Letters, 152. 33 Note that the fact that he has a body with which he is "very intimately conjoined" is fully established only in the Sixth Meditation, after the proof of the mind-body distinction is given. What this proof can therefore be said to show is that if the self or the mind is united to (or has) a body, then it is really distinct, i.e. can be separated from the body, and conversely. Cf. AT VIII, 28; HR I, 243-244. 34 According to Suarez and, I presume, most of the Scholastics, the soul and the body as well as form and matter in general, although they are considered as separable by the divine power and hence as really distinct in the sense given above, are regarded as incomplete and partial beings in themselves, whether they are united or in a separate state. What Descartes here says about the mind and the body would according to Suarez apply only to integral parts, e.g., homogeneous parts of a continuum, which unlike form and matter are not of themselves "ordained to the composition of another thing", i.e., to be parts of the union or compound to which they actually belong. Cf. Suarez, DM VII, Section I, § 23; Vollert (1947), pp. 33 - 34. 35 See, e.g., the letter to Arnauld, 29 July 1648, AT V, 222f; Philosophical Letters, pp. 235 - 236. Cf. also the letter to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, AT III, 667; Philosophical Letters, p. 139, and references given in Note 6 above. 36 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica III, Proposition II, scholium, Vloten et Land (ed.), (1914), p. 124. 37 See, e.g., AT III, 665; Philosophical Letters, 138f. Cf. Alanen (1982), p. 87f. 38 See, e.g., Descartes's letter to Mersenne, 26 April 1643, AT III, 648; Philosophical Letters, pp. 135 - 136. 39 For Descartes's definition of matter, see, e.g., Meditations, V and VI and Principles, I, § 60, AT VIII, 28; HR I, 243 - 244; ibid., II, § 22 and 64, AT VIII, 52 and 78 -79; HR 1,265. 40 See Note 23 above. 30

BIBLIOGRAPHY Descartes, R.: Oeuvres de Descartes (AT), publies par Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, Leopold Cerf, Paris, 1897 - 1913, 12 vols.

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Descartes, R.: The Philosophical Works of Descartes (HR), transl. by E. S. Haldane and G . T . Ross, London, 1911 (1978), 2 vols. Descartes, R.: Philosophical Letters, transl. and ed. by A. Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970. Alanen, L.: 'Studies in Cartesian Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind', in Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 33, Helsinki, 1982. Alquie, F. (ed.): Oeuvres philosophiques de Descartes, Garnier Freres, Paris, 1%3 -1973, 3 vols. Aristotle: The Works of Aristotle, Vols. I and VIII, ed. by W. D. Ross, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928. Beck, L. J.: The Metaphysics of Descartes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965. Donagan, A.: 'Descartes' "Synthetic" Treatment of the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body', in M. Hooker (ed.), Descartes, Critical and Interpretive Essays, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978. Edwards, S.: Medieval Theories of Distinction, University of Pennsylvania, Ph .D., 1974. University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan and London, 1981. Gilson, E.: Index Scolastico-Cartl!sien, Paris, 1912; repro Burt Franklin, New York, 1964. Gilson, E.: Rene Descartes: Discoursde la methode. Texte et commentaire, J . Vrin, Paris, 1925 (1967). Gilson, E.: Etudes sur Ie role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, J. Vrin, Paris, 1930 (1975). Hooker, M. (ed.): Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1978. Kenny, A.: Descartes, A Study of His Philosophy, Random House, New York, 1968. Koyre, A.: Essais sur I'idee de Dieu et les preuves de son existence .chez Descartes, Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1922. Lloyd, G . E. R.: Aristotle: The Growth and Structure ofHis Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968. Malcolm, N.: 'Descartes' Proof That His Essence Is Thinking', in The Philosophical Review (PR) LXXIV (1965), 315 - 338. Malcolm, N.: Problems of Mind, Descartes to Wittgenstein, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1971. Malcolm, N.: Thought and Knowledge, Cornell University Press, London, 1971. Sommers, F.: Dualism in Descartes: The Logical Ground, in M. Hooker (ed.), 1987, pp. 223 - 233. Spinoza, B. de: Opera, I - II, in l. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land, The Hague, MCMXIV. Suarez, F.: Opera Omnia, Vol. XXV, Paris, 1866; repr. Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1965. Suarez, F.: Francis Suarez: On The Various Kinds of Distinctions, transl. by C. S. J. Vollert, Marquette University Press, Wisconsin, 1947. Weinberg, J. R.: A Short History of Medieval Philosophy, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964. Weinberg, J. R.: Abstraction, Relation, and Induction. Three Essays in the History of Thought, Madison & Milwaukee, 1965. Weinberg, J. R.: Ockham, Descartes, and Hume, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1977. Wells, N. J.: 'Descartes and the Modal Distinction', The Modern Schoolman XLII (1965), 1-22. Williams, B.: Descartes, The Project ofa Pure Enquiry, Penguin Books, Hammonsworth, 1978. Wilson, M. D.: 'Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness', Noils 10 (1976),3 -15.

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Wilson, M. D.: Descartes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978. Wilson, M. D.: 'Cartesian Dualism', in M. Hooker (ed.), 1978. Wolter, A. B.: 'The Realism of Scotus', The Journal oj Philosophy OP) 52 (1962), 725-736. Wolter, A. B.: 'The Formal Distinction', in J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), John Duns Sco/us, 1265 - 1965, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1965.

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40B, SF-00J70 Helsinki 17, Finland.

JAAKKO HINTIKKA

KANT ON EXISTENCE, PREDICATION, AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT*

The subject matter of my paper can be discussed only against the background of two larger issues. They loom large both systematically and historically. They are the ontological argument for God's existence l and the Frege - Russell thesis that "is" is multiply ambiguous,2 indeed ambiguous between the "is" of existence, "is" of identity, "is" of predication, and "is" of generic implication. These allegedly different meanings can be illustrated by "God is" or (3x)(God = x), "Jack is John Jr." or Jack = John Jr., "Jack is blond" or Blond(Jack), and "man is an animal", or (x)(Man(x):::J Animal(x». Any discussion of Kant's treatment of being is thus being tacitly presided over by Anselm and Frege. As the case is frequently, the crucial aspect of one's discussion of the history of an interesting configuration of ideas turns out to be a topical analysis of the conceptual situation which these ideas exemplify. 3 Hence I will have to spend some time and care examining the logic and semantics of the ontological argument, as well as the logic of "is" and "being". My paper thus needs something like the familiar nineteenthcentury German subtitle 'Eine historisch-kritische Studie'. My conclusions concerning Kant's relation to these two overreaching issues are rather negative. Kant's criticisms of the ontological argument are misplaced, not to say mistaken. Nor is he an early herald of the Frege - Russell thesis, as has been claimed. 4 The mainstay of Kant's discussion, viz. his thesis that "existence is not a predicate", can be shown to be false. These are big claims, perhaps bigger than I can hope to prove in a single paper. I shall nevertheless spell out my results somewhat more fully and indicate why I think they are valid. To put my first point bluntly, most of the criticisms of the ontological argument have been misplaced, Kant's included. The mistake in the main version of the ontological argument, or what I find by far the best rational reconstruction of the argument, is an operator-switch fallacy. Consider first the sentence. (I)

N(3x)[(y)(y exists

:::J

x exists)]

249 S. Knuullila and 1. Hintikka (eds.), Tne Logic oj Beini!. . 249--267. <0 1981 by Dia/ecrica.

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where "N" is the necessity operator. There are two things to be observed about this sentence. First, it is trivially valid (logically true), and, second, that it looks very much like a summary of the ontological argument. Let me spell out these two points. I have noted before that (1) is trivially valid completely independently of what the "predicate of existence" used in it is. 5 I have also claimed that it is the logical truth of (1) that makes the ontological argument so perennially seductive. In fact, (1) might seem to express precisely the desired conclusion, viz. the necessary existence of an existentially perfect being. Indeed, it can readily be seen that (1) is closely related to the ontological argument in its actual historical versions. What (1) says is that, necessarily, there is an individual such that if anything exists, it does, which nearly says - or seems to say - that there is something which is greatest with respect to existence ("pre-eminent in its mode of existence", to use Kant's words in A 586 = B 614). Thus the inside conditional in (1), viz. (y) (y exists => x exists), can be considered as a characterization of god ( = x), conceived of as the most powerful being with respect to existence. Kant asserts what is very similar to this inside conditional of (1) when he says (A 588 = B 616) that "from any given existence ... we can correctly infer the existence of an unconditionally necessary being", that is, a God. Thus, the whole of (1) seems to express quite well the Anselmian idea that the most perfect being - a being greater than which cannot be conceived of - must necessarily exist, with the perfection in question restricted to perfection or maximal greatness with respect to existence. From (1) the defenders of the ontological argument in effect fallaciously infer (2)

(:lx)N[(y)(y exists => x exists)).

This quantifier switch is the crucial mistake in the most interesting versions of the ontological argument. For, appearances notwithstanding, it is (2) and not (1) that Anselm, Descartes & Co. really want to establish. Thus the logical truth of (1) helps them only if they could take the further step from (1) to (2). But this further step is illegitimate. I shall later return to the question as to what further premises might serve to validate the step. It remains to spell out more fully what is involved here. First why is it (2) and not (1) that the ontological argument is calculated to prove? This is seen easily by means of the obvious possible-worlds semantics of (1) - (2). What (1) says is that in each world there is something such that

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if anything at all exists in that world, it does. The reason why this is not enough is due to the fact that in different worlds such individuals can be entirely different from each other. Indeed, the triviality of (1) is reflected by the fact that any existing individual can be chosen as the value of the existentially bound variable "x" in (1).6 We would be able to infer (2) from (1) only if we could assume that all these individuals are (or can be chosen to be) identical with each other. In contrast, (2) attributes the status of existentially greatest being to some one individual in all (nonempty) worlds. 7 This is obviously what the argument is supposed to establish. In view of the validity of (1), the right way of criticizing the ontological argument is hence to spell out the difference between (1) and (2) and to show how and wh~ the step from (1) to (L) is fallacious. A prolegomenon to such a criticism is to point out how natural language tends to hide the differences between (1) and (2). Indeed, such English sentences as (3)

There necessarily is some individual which is existentially the greatest

are ambiguous between (1) and (2). Moreover, consider the use of any expressions which rely on grammatical cross-reference, e.g., "which" in (3) and "it" in the fuller form of (3), viz. in (4)

There necessarily is some individual which is such that if anything exists, it does.

The use of such expressions usually presupposes that their reference is well-defined in all the possible worlds which we are tacitly considering. Such well-definedness is, we saw, just what is needed to move from (1) to (2). How deep the sources of fallacy run here is illustrated by the etymology of the: English existential quantifier word "some" as having the same root as "same one". What is even more pertinent to note here is that similar locutions abound in philosophical discussions, not the least in discussions about the ontological argument. For instance, Kant speaks of, as we saw, a being (some one being) whose existence can be inferred from any given existence. Apart from explaining the temptation to infer (2) from (1) (or, better, to assimilate the two to each other) which ordinary discourse generates, the best way of defusing the fallacy seems to me to be to expose the general type of mistake that is exemplified by the fallacious derivation

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of (2) from (I). Probably the most effective way of doing so is to appeal

to the informal ideas which are systematized in my game-theoretical semantics. 8 We don't need thesystematization here except as a backup line of defense for the appeal to certain "iconic" ideas. In (I), malicious nature (who is trying to defeat me) chooses a possible world w for which I will have to show that in it there is something such that it exists in w if anything at all exists in w. In contrast, in (2) I have to be able to choose (for (2) to be true) an individual x such that, no matter what world w is subsequently chosen by nature, the very same individual x will exist in w if anything at all exists in w. As you can see, the difference is subtle but unmistakable. This is one of the many cases where informal seman tical ideas can perform a tremendous service in philosophical analysis and philosophical argumentation. It is perhaps not at all surprising that philosophers who were thinking much more in verbal than in semantical terms should have been confused about the interrelations of (I) and (2). The early medievals, including Anselm, would presumably be cases in point. Moreover, the informal use of the idea of possible worlds which I relied on was deeply foreign to most of the medieval tradition. Aristotle squarely refused to consider any world history different from out actual one. For him, my informal explanation would not have made any sense, because it employs crucially the idea of a mUltiplicity of possible worlds. Admittedly Aristotle operated freely with assorted possibilia, but they, too, had to prove their mettle in the course of the one actual course of events. 9 Even in the absence of a detailed historical investigation, it seems clear that Anselm had not disentangled himself fully from Aristotle's actualism. Hence the mistake is in a literal sense of the expression doubly natural for someone in his historical position to make. Kant, unfortunately, has much less of an excuse in this respect. Although the real fallacy of the ontological argument lies in the step from (I) to (2) and not in (1) itself, most of the actual criticisms of the argument have to be construed as criticizing (1) and not the transition from (1) to (2). Kant's thesis that "existence is not a predicate" is a case in point. \0 It amounts to an attempt to deny the legitimacy of the way (I) is formulated in the first place. For (I) will not get off the ground without some way of expressing the existence of individuals, i.e., of using "existence as a predicate". Hence the Kanti:m gambit is admittedly prima Jacie quite tempting, even though it is misplaced. There is a tempting way of trying to smuggle into the ontological argument what amounts to the crucial quantifier switch. It is to try to

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strengthen the "material implication" in (1) into something like a logical or analytical "strict" implication. This would indeed turn (1) into (2). It may be that Kant was in effect trying to guard himself against this manoeuver when he removed (Aristotle notwithstanding) all existential force from essential predications. This is not the crux of the matter, however. If we try to insert a necessity-operator to from the inner conditional of (1), we lose the trivial logical truth of (1). Why? Not, as Kant (and others) seem to have thought, because existential presuppositions are not fulfilled, but because we need what I have called a uniqueness premise to justify the existential generalization which the step from (1) to (2) in effect is. For suppose "g" (short for "a god") is a singular term which in each world picks out the kind of individual which is asserted to exist there by (1). In other words, it is true that (5)

N(3x)(g == x)

Now we know from modal logic that this term "g" can help to establish (2) only if we have at our disposal the additional premise (6)

(3x)N(g == x),

where no existential force is being assumed. What (6) expresses is precisely the identity (g == x) of g with some one individual (the x in "(3X)" in all the possible worlds (introduced by "N"). As we saw, the failure of this identity is precisely the fatal flaw in the usual versions of the ontological argument. The auxiliary premise (6) is analogous to the proposition (7)

(3X) it is known that (g == x)

which says that it is known who (or what) God is. In fact it is (7) and not (6) that we need as an auxiliary premise if we want to establish that it is known that God exists. It is no wonder, in view of these observations, that the literature on the ontological argument is full of considerations of whether God necessarily is who he (or she) is, and whether we can "conceive of" or "understand" who God is. As we know, Anselm and Gaunilo were already discussing the latter issue. As far as the former is concerned, the missing premise (6) seemed to be conveniently supplied by Exodus 3: 13 - 14, where God says: "I am who I am", presumably meaning that He necessarily is who He is. II It would divert our purpose to explore these historically important lines of thought here, however. I think it is the time to lay to rest the myth that "existence is not a predicate". It is embarrassingly clear what Kant's grounds for maintain-

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ing this thesis were. They were largely due to the paucity of the logics and languages he was contemplating. He envisaged only two types of judgment relevant here, viz. what I shall here call judgments of "essential" predication and judgments of existence. (Where contingent predication was supposed to find a niche was not explained by the good Immanuel. 12 In the former, exemplified by "God is omnipotent", a necessary connection is asserted to obtain between the subject and the predicate, without prejudicing the existence of either. As Kant puts it, "the omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a Deity, for the two concepts are identical". But this judgment carries no existential import. " ... if we say, 'There is no God', neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject" . The other kind of judgment Kant mentions is the existential one, e.g., "God exists". In neither one is existence a predicate, Kant says in effect. A judgment of essential predication has no existential force, whereas in an existential one we take a subject as it were all ready-made with its essential predicates and simply assert that this particular complex of predicates is in fact instantiated in reality. Here existence is not one of the configuration of predicates; it is what is asserted of the configuration. Nothing is wrong here. A faithful Aristotelian would have worried about the total absence of existential import in a judgment of essential predication, for on certain conditions Aristotle seems to have maintained such an import. He went so far as to worry lest this would lend other instances of copula a similar existential force, so that we could fallaciously infer from "Homer is a poet" that "Homer is", i.e., exists. 13 However, our worries are not Aristotelian. Kant's mistake is not that he says something false, but that his philosophical diet is one-sided: he nourishes himself on too few kinds of examples. In reality, there is a tremendous multitude of forms of proposition which go way beyond the ones Kant envisages. Among them, I suggest, we can safely assume to be included some in which' 'existence is a predicate" in whatever reasonable sense we can give to this phrase. The following argument may indicate why this assumption is eminently natural - and also why the use of existence as a proper predicate has met with such resistance among philosophers. This line of thought would of course have been rejected by Kant, but I think that it would have been appreciated by Leibniz. Obviously, we attribute to actual individuals all the time predicates

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which turn on what they would be like in other possible worlds, for instance, what they could be or could do. Sometimes these predicates turn on the existence or nonexistence of these individuals in those other circumstances. For example, speaking of the necessary conditions of life in the case of some particular organism involves this kind of predication. All that is needed to be able to use actual existence as a predicate (so as to refute Kant) is then apparently a parity of cases. If we can take an individual in the actual world and assign to it a predicate which involves existence or nonexistence in some other world, surely we ought to by the same token be able to take a "merely possible individual", i.e., a denizen of some other world, and attribute to it predicates definable in terms of its actual existence, maybe the "predicate of (actual) existence" itself. Basically, it seems to me that this argument is unanswerable. There certainly are concepts applied to actual individuals which can only . be defined in general in terms of (merely) potential existence, e.g., the biological concept of fertility. Even though we don't do it often, we surely can pick out one "merely possible" individual from others by specifying that it enjoys the dubious distinction of actual existence. Examples are not very easy to come by, but speaking of the actual Hamlet seems to be good enough. For many of us, Hamlet is first introduced as a merely fictional "possible individual", and we learn only subsequently that the melancholy Dane has a real-life counterpart. (You didn't know that Hamlet really existed? Yes, he did enjoy the predicate of existence!) There are several different kinds of difficulties here which have led some philosophers to deny the possibility of the sort of return of an individual from other possible worlds to the actual one which I am envisaging. Some philosophers have failed to see how we can individuate a merely possible individual. Doesn't the very possibility of considering some one definite individual (to which predicates are to be ascribed) presuppose its actual existence? The fact that philosopher-logicians as eminent as Montague and Kripke have maintained this presupposition shows that we are not dealing with a mere idle worry. I cannot here discuss this complex of problems in its entirety. A good descriptive account of how merely possible individuals can enter into our discourse is given by David Kaplan in 'Quantifying In' .14 In general, I believe that the denial of merely possible individuals is based on an unrealistically narrow view of how out language actually functions. IS There is another reason why rec'.!nt logicians may have been wary of the line of thought I just adumbrated. In it, we took an individual which had been considered qua citizen of another world and began to consider

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it also as a member of the actual world. A moment's reflection shows that in the conventional languages of modal logic there is no way of doing so. To consider an individual initially in an alternative possible world means having its linguistic representative within the scope of a modal operator. But then we cannot any longer consider it as a member of the actual world, for that would presuppose that its representative occurs outside the scope of all modal operators. But that would mean having introduced it initially qua an inhabitant of the real world. In brief, in conventional modal logic, you can have only one-way tickets from the actual world to its alternatives; no round trips are possible. In less metaphoric terms, anaphoric back reference to worlds considered earlier is impossible in the usual notation of modal logic. This feature of the modal languages most logicians are familiar with seems to have discouraged them from thinking that individuals introduced as members of the domains of other worlds can subsequently be considered also as denizens of the actual world. 16 David Kaplan used to illustrate this point by means of the following formula: (8)

M[(x)(A(x)]

~

B(x»

where "M" is the possibility operator. Of course (8) is ill-formed in traditionat modal logic. Yet it expresses a perfectly good semantical sense. It says that there is some alternative possible world such that everything that is there A is in fact (i.e., in the actual world) B. The remarkable thing is that this sense cannot be expressed by any well-formed formula of conventional modal logic. 17 This is nevertheless merely a limitation of one particular kind of notational systems. One can, as Esa Saarinen has done, introduce special "backwards looking" operators which effect just the kind of return journey I was envisaging. 18 What is more interesting, Saarinen has shown convincingly that the kind of anaphora which these operators are calculated to facilitate does occur frequently and importantly in ordinary discourse. He has thus removed one important obstacle from the way of vindicating existence as a genuine predicate, and incidentally illustrated how important metaphysical dogmas can be embodied in a perfectly innocent-looking formalism. Although further arguments are still needed, I hope to have persuaded you at least that there is no mistake in considering existence a predicate. The mainstay of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument is simply wrong. But doesn't Kant deserve at least the honor of anticipating the Frege

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distinction? I am not sure that such precursorship necessarily qualifies as an honor. I have shown that the Frege - Russell distinction is not indispensable. 19 There are correct alternative ways of dealing with the semantics of "is", ways which may even be preferable to the Fregean method for the purpose of understanding natural language and arguments conducted in natural language, including the arguments conducted by virtually all pre-Fregean philosophers. But even apart from this devaluation of Frege, Kant does not rate the non-honor of paving the way for Frege. It is amply evident from Kant's own words that he does not think of our words for being as exhibiting the Frege - Russell ambiguity. Seeing this is nevertheless made somewhat more difficult by the fact that Kant does not speak of just existence (Dasein, Existenz), being (Sein), and "is" (ist), but also of "position" (setzen). What is this "positing", anyway? Kant's pre-critical essay on proofs of God's existence shows unmistakably that it is merely another expression for being ("Sein"), and that it is unambiguous ("einJach"): Der Begriff der Position oder Setzung ist viillig einfach und mit dem vom Sein iiberhaupt einerlei. (Academy ed., Vol. 2, p. 73.)

In the Critique oj Pure Reason (A 598 = B 626), Kant says that" 'being' is obviously [sic] not a real predicate .... It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves". The reason why Kant introduces the term "setzen" is probably a desire to have a term which sits more happily with the cases in which "is" apparently has a merely predicative function. "God is omnipotent" could according to Kant be true even if there were no God. It merely expresses a necessary relation between the subject and the predicate. "God is omnipotent" does not logically imply for Kant that "God is", even though the step might seem tempting. In order to avoid this temptation, it seems, Kant uses his terminus quasi technicus "setzen" for positing something as being - in any sense of being. The explanation Kant gives of the difference between' 'God is omnipotent" and "God is" nevertheless shows that we are dealing with the same "is" in both cases. In both cases, we are "positing" something. The only difference is that in the former case the positing is relative but in the latter case absolute. Otherwise, it is the same old positing. lIn] the proposition, 'God is omnipotent' .... the small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit !he predicate in its relation IKant's italics] to the subject.

Here positing clearly means predication. But Kant continues:

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If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates ... and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates ...

Here positing clearly means to assume existence. The relation of existence to predication is thus merely that of an absolute positing to a relative one. This observation is confirmed by further passages; witness e.g. the following: [In an existential jUdgment) ... nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given absolutely [my italics).

In the Beweisgrund, Kant puts the same distinction as follows: Nun kann etwas als bloss beziehungsweise gesetzt, oder besser, bloss die Beziehung (respectus logicus) von etwas als einem Merkmal zu einem Dinge gedacht werden, und dann ist das Sein, das ist die Position dieser Beziehung, nichts als der Verbindungsbegriff in einem Urteil. Wird nicht bloss diese Beziehung, sondern die Sache an und fUr sich selbst gesetzt betrachtet, ~o ist dieses Sein soviel wie Dasein. (Academy ed., Vol. 2, p. 73.)

Thus Kant clearly thinks of the "is" of predication (the copula) and the "is" of existence as two uses of the same notion. Occasionally he even seems to consider the copulative "is" (at least in necessary judgments) as a variant of the "is" of identity. He thinks of a: necessary judgment like "God is omnipotent" as expressing the identity of a God and an omnipotent God. "The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a deity ... , for the two concepts are identical" (A 595 = B 623). Hence meaning differences between the first three elements of the Frege ambiguity are rejected by Kant. As to the fourth alleged sense of "is" apud Frege and Russell, Kant's assimilation of it to other senses (especially to the "is" of predication) is seen from his failure (or refusal) to distinguish the subsumption of one concept to another from the application of a concept to a particular (in other words, this particular's failing under the concept). This is particularly striking in the schematism chapter of the Critique oj Pure Reason, as has been often remarked. 20 The insight that Kant did not assumm the Frege - Russell distinction enables us to make further observations. Among other things, it follows that Kant's main thesis is expressed somewhat inaccurately - and in any case very narrowly - when it is said that according to him existence is not a predicate. What he maintained, and frequent[y said, is that being is not a real predicate. This applies to both existential and predicative uses of "is"; predication is accordingly for Kant as little a predicate as

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existence is. This parity of the two is of course just a corollary to Kant's failure (or refusal) to distinguish the different Fregean senses of "is" from each other. This helps to put certain puzzling-looking statements of Kant's perspective. For instance, one of Kant's main pronouncements on our topic in the first Critique runs as follows: 'Being' [SeinJ is obviously not a real predicate .. . . In its logical use lim logischen Gebrauchl it is merely the copula of a judgment. (A 598 = B 626; Kant's emphasis.)

Here Kant makes his claim about being in general and then goes on to apply it to predication rather than existence. Indeed, this predicative use is precisely what he means by the "logical use" of being. In other words, Kant's distinction between the logical use and other relevant uses of "is" is the same as his contrast between the relative and absolute positing discussed above. (This is, among other items of evidence, shown by our latest displayed quote from the Beweisgrund; see especially the words respectus logicus.) Philosophers have been puzzled by Kant's remarks as to what happens to "is" in its merely logical use, and declared it irrelevant to Kant's main thesis that existence is not a predicate. 21 Kant'~ remarks are indeed not directly relevant, but only because they pertain to a different but parallel case of his more general claim that being is not a predicate. There is one superficial aspect of Frege's and Russell's formalism which misleadingly encourages the idea that Kant's thesis "existence is not a predicate" is an anticipation of Frege. In the most literal sense, existence is not a predicate for Frege, either, viz. in the sense of being an explicit predicate of individuals. We cannot take a free singular term (Frege's "proper name"), say "b", and go on to assert "b exists". However, this is a merely contingent feature of Frege's notation. What is more, it partially hides one of the most fundamental features of his treatment of existence, viz. that existence is expressed only by the existential quantifier. In fact, the reason why Frege can get along without a predicate of existence is that he assumes that all proper names (free singular terms) are nonempty. This is reflected by the validity of existential generalization in Frege's system: from any proposition F(b) containing "b" we can infer (3x)F(x). This obviously presupposes that b exists. If we do not make this assumption, we have to amplify the rule of existential generalization and formulate it as saying that from the two premises (9)

F(b) and b exists

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we may infer (10)

(3x)F(x).

From certain eminently natural assumption one can show (as I have demonstrated)22 that the extra premise "b exists" must be equivalent with (11)

(3x)(b = x)

Indeed, all we need for this purpose is in effect that the logical constants have their customary semantics and that the "predicate of existence" , whatever it is or may be, is subject to the same substitutivity principles as other expressions of first-order logic . This result shows that in a Frege - Russell logic it is in the last analysis the existential quantifier alone that need carry existential assumption, contrary to the misleading appearance created by Frege's notation. This idea can be considered an integral part of Frege' s distinction between the "is" of existence and other senses of "is". Indeed, this privileged position of the existential quantifier seems to me to be a much more important feature of the overall Frege - Russell approach to logic than the alleged impermissibility of asserting the existence of an individual in Frege's canonical notation. We can now see that Frege's distinction does not presuppose that "existence is not a predicate". On the contrary, the full import of Frege's approach cannot be spelled out without a "predicate of existence". Hence Kant's thesis does not make him into a precursor of Frege and Russell. Thus we can likewise see that in the last analysis we could, and should, have "a predicate of existence" also for the extremely simple languages to which Frege (and mutatis mutandis also Kant) restricted his attention. Consequently, the reasons for having such a predicate in one's language are not applicable only to the rich languages envisaged above, but apply also within the present-day Frege - Russell languages. This observation nevertheless need not drive a wedge between Frege and Kant. One way of expressing our result concerning Frege might be to say that for Frege existence was a predicate, but not a normal or "real" predicate. In its primary use, existence is a second-order predicate, saying that a certain first-order predicate is instantiated. The question whether this second-order predicate can be extended to the trivial first-order predicates of the form "(b = x)" is of little interest to Frege. But if so, there is after all a partial agreement between Frege and Kant. For Kant frequently formulates his point by saying, no! that ex-

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istence is not a predicate, but that It IS not a real predicate. 23 Indeed, Kant must obviously allow us to express not only the nonemptyness of common nouns but also the nonemptyness of singular nouns. Then Kant's injunction that existence is not a real predicate might per haps be interpreted as saying merely that it must not be used in the definition of anything. 24 This is an interesting point, but on the reconstruction of the ontological argument presupposed here it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a refutation of the ontological argument. However, it is far from clear what the precise import of Kant's locution is when he speaks of a "real predicate", and it is not obvious a priori that his exclusion of existence from the definition of anyone thing cannot itself be turned into a line of defense for his critical claims. We shall return to these points later. That Kant's criticism of the ontological argument is largely beside the point can also be seen in terms of his own system. It is largely a Fremdkorper in the body of his own transcendental philosophy. Earlier, I quoted Kant as saying (in A 599 = B 627) that the concept "expresses merely what is possible [my italics]". Elsewhere, too, he clearly thinks of what I have called essential judgments as expressing possibilities. 25 in an existential judgment, this possibility is asserted to be actualized, without adding anything to the concept itself. Now this is precisely what Kant could not say as his definitive opinion in the case of God. For if God were in the fullest sense of the word possible for Kant, in the sense of being empirically possible (possible in experience), he would presumably be sometimes actual, and hence (since we are dealing with a putatively necessary being) always actual. This possibility of restoring something like the ontological argument by means of the additional premise that God is possible had been exploited by Leibniz. Even though Kant presumably would have rejected Leibniz' argument for other reasons, he could scarcely afford to admit God's possibility.26 (In order to see this, we may for instance recall Bill, where Kant says that "necessity is just the existence which is given through possibility itself".) It is true that the step I envisaged a moment ago from God's experiential possibility to his actuality is not backed by any outright assertions in the Critique of Pure Reason of what Lovejoy called the Principle of Plenitude, that is to say, of the principle that each genuine possibility is actualized in the long run. Howevec, a closer examination of Kant's position shows that he could not really countenance vi~lations of the Principle of Plenitude among full fledged experiential possibilities. This examination I have attempted, jointly with Heikki Kannisto, in an earlier

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paper. 27 If instant evidence is desired, suffice it to recall Kant's characterization of "the schema of modality and its categories" as "time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how it belongs to time" and of necessity as "existence at all times" (A 145 = B 185). The last point comes very close to asserting a version of the Principle ("what is always true is necessary"). Further evidence for the presence of this version in Kant is obtained from the Prolegomena §§ 18 - 19 and from B 183. All told, Kant's ambivalence notwithstanding, his commitment during his critical period to something like the Principle of Plenitude (for experiential possibilities) was too deep to allow him to rest content with an unqualified statement that the concept of God is a merely possible concept. In general, there is a (somewhat hidden but nevertheless unmistakable) connection between Kant's relative degree of adherence to the Principle of Plenitude and his willingness to infer God's existence from His possibility. Indeed, when Kant argues that from mere concepts (conceptual possibilities) we can never infer actual existence, he comes very close to criticizing one version of the Principle of Plenitude. But as I have shown (with Kannisto, see Note 27 above), such criticism is much more characteristic of Kant's interim philosophy (in the sixties and early seventies) than of his mature "critical" philosophy. God's possibility had to be banished from the realm of genuine transcendental (experiential) possibilities to the outer darkness of the attenuated possibility enjoyed by mere ideals of reason. This is a move we might have expected from the beginning that Kant the Copernican revolutionary would make. Without it, his criticism of the ontological argument does not do the whole job. It is the main link between Kant's criticism of Anselm's and Descartes' arguments and his own transcendental vantage point. Kant was fully conscious of the necessity of this further move in his campaign against God's existence on the level of experience (intuition) or even understanding. In A 60 1 - 602 = B 629 - 630 he writes: The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very useful idea; but because it is a mere idea, it is altogether incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us as to the possibility [Kant's italics) of any existence beyond that which is known in and through experience.

Kant was likewise aware of the specific arguments that are lurking here, ready to jump in at a mere admission of God's possibility: And thus the celebrated Leibniz is far from having succeeded in what he prided ~imself on achieving - the comprehension u priori of the possibility [my italics) of the sublime ideal being. (A 602 = B 630)

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Without taking up the details of Kant's line of thought in this direction, we can see the main idea clearly enough. God is a mere ideal because He is an ens realissimum, the sum total of all reality. Few philosophers or theologians would quarrel with this idea, and Kant is perhaps not so very wrong in seeing in this definition a ground for assigning to God merely ideal existence. The only remark I want to make here is that Kant's move is beside the point as a criticism of the original ontological argument, on the rational reconstruction offered above. For on this interpretation, nothing turned on God's being ens realissimum. God was not assumed (or defined) to embody all perfections. For my reconstructed argument, it sufficed merely to assume that God has one particular perfection. It suffices to assume that He is the most powerful being existentially, in precisely the sense asserted by Kant. (Cf. the quote above from A 588 = B 616.) For this is what the inside conditional of (I) expresses. Hence the move that Kant uses to undercut Leibniz-style arguments for God's existence is completely beside the point as an objection to the original ontological argument. Once again, we see how Kant misses the key fallacy in the argument. Perhaps there nevertheless is a charitable interpretation of Kant's position which makes his transcendental vantage point relevant to a valid line of criticism of the ontological argument. Very roughly, my initial diagnosis of the ontological argument may be expressed by saying that the trouble with the argument is not that existence is not a predicate, but that we don't know who God is in the sense that the designation ("definition") of him as existentially greatest being provides us with no grounds for concluding that the existentially greatest beings in different worlds are identical. We may try to interpret Kant's position (and perhaps even his slogan that existence is not a predicate) as emphasizing this aspect of the situation. Kant's slogan is applicable in that Kant's saying that existence is not a "real" predicate may perhaps be taken to amount to saying that it does not help us to determine God's identity in the sense of bringing us to know who God is. This idea is related to my earlier observation that according to Kant existence cannot be a part of the definition of any entity. This would make Kant's discussion relevant to a valid line of criticisms against the ontological argument. For it amounts to saying that Kant was in the last analysis denying the indispensable auxiliary premise illustrated by (6). This highly interesting line of thought is the thesis of Hans Wagner's paper (above, Note 5). If there is a kernel of truth in Kant's criticism of the ontological argument, this undoubtedly is it. In spite of the evidence

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Wagner marshals, I have nevertheless not quite been convinced that we can actually attribute this idea to Kant. The best primajacie evidence for this defense of Kant becomes from the analysis of his claim that existence is not a real predicate, which was indicated briefly above. Undoubtedly a closer examination of the texts could yield some evidence for this view. It finds some support for instance in C. C. E. Schmid's Worterbuch zum leichteren Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften (vide Bestimmung), where we find a contrast between merely logical predicates or accidents and real predicates which can be "a determination of a thing" (my italics). All told, it nevertheless seems to me that this line of thought in Kant is so hopelessly entangled with other ideas that there is little hope of reaching a viable defense of his views. Before a sharp distinction is made between (l) and (2), the need of the auxiliary premise is not obvious, and the true target of Kant's criticism is impossible to establish. It is nevertheless worth asking what precisely was meant by Kant when he said - as he occasionally did - that existence was not a real predicate. One passage in which he does so is A 598 == B 626, partially quoted above. A fuller version of the passage runs as follows: 'Being' (Seinl is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something that could be added to the concept ora thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves.

Kant indicates that this positing can be of two kinds: In its logical use, it [sc. beingl is merely the copula of a judgment. ... [Then I the small word 'is' adds no new predicate but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject.

In contrast, if, now, we ... say "God is" or "There is a God", we ... only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates.

Then I am thinking its [my concept'sl object (through the expression 'it is') as given absolutely.

Here we can also see what the force of Kant's little word "real" (in saying that existence is not a "real predicate") really is. Kant is merely following his customary contrast between what is logical and what is real and identifying the "real" use of "being" to its existential use. In other words, what is "unreal" about the purely predicative use of "is" is the absence of existential presuppositions. In fact, the quoted passage continues immediately: Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible.

We have already seen that Kant brackets together the merely possible,

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the predicative (copulative) use of being, and logic (i.e., the world of concepts).27 By contrast, the real or actual should go together with the existential use of being. If I may turn Kant's point into a tautology, what he is saying is that the predicative use of "is" is not its existential use. If this suggestion is correct, then the burden that many philosophers have tried to put on "real" in "real predicate" is largely misplaced. Some philosophers have for instance tried to find links between Kant's criticism of the ontological argument and his discussion of reality as one of the modal categories in the Transcendental Analytic, and assumed that they are what is highlighted by the word "real". Others have thought that they could perceive in Kant a contrast between being as a "real" predicate (as a predicate of individuals) and its "merely logical" use (as a higher order predicate). There is no foundation in the text for either view, and the passage we just examined suggests that what Kant intended was something much simpler. 28 It might seem at this point that one part of the Frege - Russell distinction does after all playa major role in Kant, viz. the distinction between the existential and the predicative uses of "is". It is true that Kant puts a premium on this distinction, but we have already established beyond all doubt that it is for him a difference in use and not a difference in meaning. NOTES • The writing of this paper was made possible by a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. In writing it, I have profited greatly from discussions with Merrill B. Hintikka, Russell Dancy, and Robert Beard, and esrecially from conversations and correspondence with Robert Howell. I also profited greatly from the discussion of an early version of this paper at the Fourth International Colloquium in Biel, May 1-4, 1980, and I .would like to thank all the participants in that discussion. 1 Cf. e.g. The Many-Faced Argument, ed. by John Hick and Arthur C. McGill, the Macmillan Co., New York, 1967; The Ontological Argument, ed. by Alvin Plantinga and Richard Taylor, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1965; Dieter Henrich, Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, J. C. B. Mohr, Ttibingen, 1960 (second ed. 1967); W. L. Gombocz, Uber £1: Zur Semantik des £xistenzpriidikates und des ontologischen Argumentes, Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften bsterreichs Verlag, Wien, 1974; Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument, Macmillan, London, 1972. All these give further references to the literature. For a contemporary journalistic view, see Time, April 7, 1980, Pi>. 65 - 68. 2 Cf. my paper ' "Is", Seman tical Games, and Semantical Relativity', Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979), 433 - 468, which provides further references to the literature. 3 Cf. here my AP A presidential address 'Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An Exercise in the Methodology of the History of Ideas', Proceedings and Addresses of APA 49 (1975 - 76), reprinted in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981, pp. 1 -17. 4 See e.g. Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,

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1974, pp. 228 - 240. Bennett even speaks in the title of this § 72 of "the Kant - Frege view". See my essay, 'On the Logic of the Ontological Argument', in laakko Hintikka, Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1%9. This essay prompted a perceptive attempt to show that my criticism of the ontological argument is related to Kant's; see Hans Wagner, 'Uber Kants Satz, das Dasein sei kein Priidikat', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 53 (1971), 183 - 186. 6 Cf. 'On the Logic of the Ontological Argument' (loc. cit.) 7 The difference between (I) and (2) is essentially a de dicto-de re contrast. Further discussion of the relation between the two constructions in Kant is found in Robert Howell's paper in Dialectica 35 No. I (1981). 8 See my essays collected in Esa Saarinen (ed.), Game-Theoretical Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979. 9 See here my books Time and Necessity, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973; and (with Simo Knuuttila and Unto Remes) Aristotle on Modality and Determinism (Acta Philosophica Fennica 29, No. I), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977. 10 Kant's thesis has implications beyond what is being discussed here. It can be construed as criticizing the medieval and neo-Platonic idea that existence qua existence carries with itself interesting attributes of which we can profitably theorize. The problems goes back to Aristotle's aporia concerning a science of being qua being. By and large, Aristotle was l1luch more wary of such a science than were his followers. Kant's denial that existence is a predicate may hence be viewed as the end of a long neo-Platonic and scholastic detour. (Cf. Notes 13 and 24 below.) II On the history of the interpretations of this pronouncement, cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, New York, 1955, pp. 3, 69 -70, 92,149,216,253,293,368,371,438-439,579, and 591. 12 Some indications are nevertheless found in Kant, Logik, Academy Edition, Vol. 9, pp. 60-61. 13 Cf. Russell M. Dancy, Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975. (See esp. Appendix II, pp. 153-155.) 14 In Donald Davidson and laakko Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, pp. 178-214. IS Cf. also lerome Shaffer, 'Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument', Mind 71 (1962), 307 - 325. Shaffer maintains that "the most that the Ontological Argument establishes is the intensional object, God ... ". Apparently Shaffer does not see any problem in the uniqueness of that "intensional object". 16 This observation helps in understanding other features of the literature on the ontological argument. For instance, why do most of the recent formal or semi-formal discussions of the ontological argument presuppose S5? Because the alternativeness relation is symmetric in S5, and thus allows for an attenuated form of "return journeys", which brings a merely possible individual back to the actual world. 17 Even some of the medievals seem to have been aware of the need of the kind of return trip logic exemplified by (8); see Simo Knuuttila and Esa Saarinen, 'Backwards-Looking Operators in Buridan', in I1kka Niiniluoto et al. (eds.), Studia Excel/entia: Essays in Honour of Oiva Ketonen (Reports from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 1977, No.3.), pp. 11-17. 18 See Esa Saarinen's own contributions to Game-Theoretical Semantics, ed. by Esa Saarinen, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979. 19 See Note 2 above. 20 Cf. e.g. Henry Allison, 'Transcendental Schematism and the Problem of the Synthetic A Priori', Dialectica 35 (1981); Gerold Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, Berlin, 1971, p. 103. 5

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21 See, e.g ., S. Morris Engel, 'Kant's "Refutation" of the Ontological Argument", in Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed . by Robert Paul Wolff, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1967, pp. 189-208, esp. pp. 193-194. 22 See my essay, 'On the Logic of Existence' , in Modelsfor Modalities (Note 5 above), and cf. my 'On the Logic of Existence and Necessity', The Monist 50 (1966), 55 - 76. For Frege, see, e.g., Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz, 'Freges Auseinandersetzung mit der Auffassung von "Existenz" als ein Priidikat der ersten Stufe und Kants Argumentation gegen den ontologischen Gottesbeweis', in Christian Thiel (ed.), Frege und die moderne Grundlagenforschung, Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, pp. 119-133. 23 For this issue, cf. Gerold Prauss, Einfuhrung zur Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1979. 24 Somewhat surprisingly, Kant is here completing a full circle in the history of philosophy and returning back to the views of Aristotle, who similarly held that "being is not the essence of anything" (An . Post. 11,7,92 b 13-14). 2S Cf. A 599 = B 627; "My financial position is . . . affeeted very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, by their possibility)" . (Kemp Smith translates this instead as " .... .. of their possibility". This is also grammatically possible, but seems to me to water down Kant's unmistakable point.) 26 Some reasons why Kant thought that the ontological argument cannot introduce God as a possible but individuated being (so that we could move from (I) to (2) can be gathered from Robert Howell's interesting papers. See his contribution to Dialectica 35 (1981) as well as his paper, ' Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason', NoUs 7 (1973), 207 - 232. 27 See laakko Hintikka and Heikki Kannisto, 'Kant on "the Great Chain of Being" " Philosophic Exchange 2 1976), 69 - 86, esp. 75 - 78 reprinted in Knuuttila (Note 2 above), pp. 287 - 308. 28 In any case, it does not help in trying to vindicate existence as a predicate (if not a 'real' predicate) apud Kant to appeal to his use of existence as one of the modal categories. Kant maintains that none of the modal categories is a predicate, either. Indeed, he says (in A 74 = B 99 - 1(0) that the distinguishing characteristic of modality is that it "contributes nothing to the content of judgment ... but concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general". Thus modality is basically also as a matter of different uses of the copula, i.e., of "being" .

Dept. of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1054, U.S.A.

LEILA HAAPARANTA

ON FREGE'S CONCEPT OF BEING*

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the doctrines which Frege emphasizes in his writings is the thesis that words for being, such as the English word is, are ambiguous. A large part of his philosophy can be seen as an attempt to make us realize the importance of keeping the different meanings of is apart and to catch the philosophical mistakes brought about by our failure to see the ambiguity. Jaakko Hintikka has recently argued that, except for John Stuart Mill and Augustus De Morgan, the ambiguity claim did not play any major role in philosophical thinking before Frege and Russell. l What Frege and Russell accomplished was to make the ambiguity of is a cornerstone of modern first-order logic. Therefore, as Hintikka has pointed out, "anyone who uses this logic as his or her framework of semantical representation is thus committed to the Frege - Russell ambiguity thesis" (Hintikka, 1983, p. 449). Hintikka has shown that in an alternative seman tical representation, namely, in game-theoretical semantics, no ambiguity claim need be made, which, of course, is not to deny that there are different uses of is. The operative question is whether the differences between these different uses have to be accounted for by assuming that one particular verb for being is ambiguous, i.e., has several altogether different meanings. Independently of Hintikka, Charles Kahn (1973) and Benson Mates (1979), among others, have called attention to the ambiguity doctrine and partly challenged the validity of what Frege considered as an "eternal truth" concerning the verb to be. But how is the verb is ambiguous in Fregean logic? Frege distinguishes from each other the following meanings of is: (1)

(2) (3)

the is of identity (e.g., Phosphorus is Hesperus; a= b), the is of predication, i.e., the copula (e.g., John is a philosopher; P(a)), the is of existence (i) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for identity (e.g., God is; (3x)(g = x)),

269 S. Knuuttila and 1. Hintikka (eds.), The Logic of Being, 269-289. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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or (ii) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for predication (e.g., There are human beings/There is at least one human being; (3x)H(x», and the is of class-inclusion, i.e., generic implication (e.g., A horse is a four-legged animal; (x)(p(x) ::::l Q(x))).

As is shown in the brackets, each putative meaning of is has its own formalization in first-order logic. Since the Fregean view of is has held such an indisputable position in modern first-order predicate calculus, few philosophers have tried to find out what actually led Frege to the ambiguity thesis. This paper is an attempt to give some hints of an interpretation of the Fregean distinction. I shall concentrate on the following questions: (1) How did Frege arrive at the distinction between the is of existence and the is of predication? (2) What is the philosophical background which motivated Frege's distinction between the is of identity and the is of predication? 2. FREGE ON 'IS'

Frege discusses the ambiguity thesis and the different meanings of is on various occasions, but he does not present all four meanings in anyone single text. His view of is can be gathered from pieces taken mainly from 'Dialog mit Ptinjer tiber Existenz' (written before 1884, published in NS), Die Grund/agen der Arithmetik (1884), and 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand' (1892). There are also several remarks on the subject in the rest of his writings. The distinction between first-order and second-order concepts (Begriffe erster und zweiter Stuftr), to which the ambiguity thesis is related, was one of the central innovations in Frege's logic. In various places Frege himself points out that he believes himself to be the first one ever to present the distinction sufficiently clearly. 3 It is true that closely similar suggestions had been made in the Middle Ages. 4 However, it was undoubtedly Frege's new grasp of the scope and the limitations of the first-order he created that made him sensitive to the contrast between first-order and higher-order concepts. According to Frege's terminology, an object literally speaking falls under (jallt unter) a firstorder concept (Begriff erster Stufe) , in which case we use the is of predication (copula), while a first-order concept falls in (jallt in) a second-order concept (Begriff zweiter Stufe). S

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Existence is, for Frege, a second-order concept. He expresses his view most clearly in discussing the ontological argument for God's existence and in criticizing Hilbert. As early as in the Begriffsschrift (1879) he hints at his account of the is of existence, but a detailed argumentation is presented only later in 'Dialog mit Piinjer iiber Existenz'. Frege continues his discussion in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, where he writes: Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. (GLA, § 53f

In 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand' he argues along the same lines: I have called existence a property of a concept. How I mean this to be taken is best made clear by an example. In the sentence 'there is at least one square root of 4', we have an asser· tion, not about (say) the definite number 2, nor about -2, but about a concept, square root oj 4; viz. that it is not empty. (KS, p. 173; Geach and Black, p. 49.)

Later, in a letter to Hilbert (1900), Frege criticizes inferences from essence to existence, which were used in the ontological argument for God's existence. According to Frege, we are not allowed to infer that if the propositions "A has the property ", "A has the property 'If", and "A has the property X" together with all their consequences do not contradict one another, there is an object which has the properties <1>, 'If and X (BW, p. 75). In Frege's logic, any concept which is not primitive can be decomposed into its characteristics (Merkmale) , i.e., into concepts to which the original concept is subordinate (untergeordnet). The is of class-inclusion is used to express this subordination (Unterordnung), which is a relation between two concepts of the same order . According to Frege, the object to which the proper name of a given singular sentence refers is related to the concept to which the remainder of the singular sentence refers in a special way, which Frege calls subsumption (Subsumtion). Sub sumption is the same as first-order predication, and Frege takes it to be totally different from subordination (NS, p. 210). For Frege, the is of classinclusion, which expresses the subordination, has no existential force (NS, p. 207). Frege regards the characteristics of a concept as its logical parts ('Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie', KS, p. 271). He stresses that the expressions Eigenschaft and Merkmal must be sharply distinguished from each other: The concepts under which an object falls are called its properties (Eigenschaften). An object has all the characteristics (Merkmale) of a first-order concept as its properties if, and only if, it falls under the con-

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cept. For Frege, existence is a property, not a characteristic, of a firstorder concept. 7 The distinction between the is of identity and the is of predication is presented in the article 'Ober Begriff und Gegenstand'. I shall repeat Frege's own words: Surely one can just as well assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is green or is a mammal? If anybody thinks this, he is not distinguishing the usages of the word 'is'. In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign of predication. (In this sense the German word ist can sometimes be replaced by the mere personal suffix: cf. dies Blatt ist grUn and dies Blatt grUnt.) ... In the first three examples, on the other hand, 'is' is used like the 'equals' sign in arithmetic, to express and equation. In the sentence 'The morning star is Venus', we have two proper names, 'morning star' and 'Venus', for the same object. In the sentence 'the morning star is a planet' we have a proper name, 'the morning star', and a concept-word, 'planet'. So far as language goes, no more has happened than that 'Venus' has been replaced by 'a planet'; but really the relation has become wholly different. (KS, pp. 168-169; Geach and Black, pp. 43-44.)

The roots of Frege's distinctions can, so it seems, be found quite easily. One obvious starting-point for Frege is Kant's criticism against the ontological argument for God's existence, which is perspicuous in Frege's early article on existence but which also appears in the Grundlagen. Another origin is, undoubtedly, the mathematical usage, as to the sign of identity. However, what we must still detect are the philosophical tenets which are implicit in Frege's ambiguity thesis. 3. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'SINN' AND 'BEDEUTUNG'

Before discussing the meanings of is in detail, I shall clarify the concepts of sense (Sinn) dnd reference (Bedeutung) in Frege's philosophy. Frege divides linguistic expressions into two groups: there are complete expressions, or proper names (Eigennamen), and incomplete expressions, or function-names (Funktionsnamen) (GGA I, pp. 43 - 44). A functionname is ungesiittigt, i.e., it has a "gap" which can be filled with other expressions. For example, "( ) is a capital" and "( ) is ( )'S son" are function-names. A proper name is gesiittigt, i.e., it has no gap. For example, "Walter Scott", "the present king of France", and "Helsinki is the capital of Finland" would be proper names according to Frege. Function-names include concept-words, which have one argument place, e.g., "( ) is a capital", and relation-words, which have two or more empty places, e.g., "( ) is ( )'S son". By filling gaps with complete expressions, we can form sentences, which are themselves complete expres-

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sions. Besides concept-words and relation-words, there are functionnames like "the capital of ( )" from which we do not derive sentences by filling their gaps with complete expressions. Proper names can refer to objects, e.g., particular things, numbers, classes, etc.; and sentences, which are -included by Frege among proper names, refer to truth-values, the True and the False. Function-names refer to functions: concept-words to concepts, relation-words to relations, and other function-names to other functions. 8 The values of functions named by concept-words and relations-words are always truthvalues. A concept, when filled with an object, will turn into an object, namely, into a truth-value, and the same applies to a relation (GGA I, pp. 7 - 8). When a function which is neither a concept nor a relation is filled with an object, it will also turn into an object, but not a truth-value. Names stand for their references (Bedeutungen) and express their senses (Sinne). 9 Frege tells us quite explicitly that the sense of a sentenceis a thought. It is, however, much more difficult to see what he actually means by the sense of a proper name which is not a sentence. In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' he remarks that the sense of a proper name is a way in which the object to which this expression refers is presented (die Art des Gegebenseins), or a way of 'looking at' this object. Furthermore, he states that the sense expressed by a proper name belongs to the reference. In other words, for Frege, senses are not primarily senses of names but senses of references. Hence, it is more advisable to speak about senses expressed by names than senses of names. Frege also gives some examples of Sinne, like the Evening Star and the Morning Star as senses of Venus, and the teacher of Alexander the Great and the pupil of Plato as senses of Aristotle ('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, p. 144). On the basis of Frege's hints, it is obvious at least that his concept of Sinn is throughout cognitive. I suggest that the Sinne are nothing but complexes of individual properties of objects. Frege regards it as possible for an object to be given to us in many different ways. For him, our knowledge of an object determines what sense, or what senses, the name of the object expresses to us. Furthermore, he argues that complete knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say whether any given sense belongs to the reference but that such knowledge is beyond our reach ('Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, p. 144). As far as the suggested interpretation of the concept of Sinn is correct, it is Frege's view that we know an object completely only if we know all its properties, which is not possible for a finite human being. It also follows that, according to Frege, each object can in principle have an in-

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finite number of names which correspond to the modes of presentation of the object. None the less, objects may not be bundles of properties for Frege, since he does not maintain that we know an object if, and only if, we know all its senses, which leaves us the possibility that there is something else than properties in an object. I shall return to this problem later on. Accordingly, Frege does not hold the position that knowing some arbitrary property or complex of properties of an object constitutes knowing the object completely since, for Frege, a necessary condition for knowing an object would be knowing all the facts, or true thoughts, of that object. 10 Nevertheless, according to him, in a weaker sense we know an object precisely by knowing some properties of that object. It is true Frege's weaker sense of knowing an object is not free from problems, either, even if it is more natural than the stronger sense. For Frege does not explain which properties of an object one must know in order to know the object. So far, I have limited my considerations to the senses of proper names. In the 1950s and 1960s Frege scholars held conflicting positions on function-names' having senses and references. II After Frege's posthumous writings were published in 1969, it could be easily documented that Frege attaches both senses and references also to function-names (NS, p. 135). Frege decomposes the thought expressed by a sentence, removing the senses of complete expressions, and we are left with the Sinne of the function-names, which are simply incomplete parts of the thought (NS, p. 187). 4. EXISTENCE AND PREDICATION

Frege's view of being is reminiscent of Kant's position in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where Kant states: •Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. (A 598/8 626)

It is far from surprising that Frege's view of is, as not being a common

first-order concept, originates from Kant's philosophy once we keep in mind that Frege repeatedly refers to Kant's writings. Admittedly he sometimes adopts a critical standpoint, but - what is particularly striking - even then he often pays homage to Kant's work. 12 However, the similarities between Kant's and Frege's texts must be carefully scrutinized if we wish to advance our understanding of how Frege came to

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regard existence as a second-order concept. This is in fact the position that led him to the distinction between the is of existence and the is of common first-order predication. What follows is merely a preliminary inquiry into the connections between Kant and Frege. Let us first look at Frege's argumentation in 'Dialog mit Piinjer iiber Existenz', which has also been analysed in an interesting manner by Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1975). According to Frege, such sentences as "Leo Sachse is" and "Leo Sachse exists" are self-evident. Piinjer opposes this view. He suggests that the word is carries the same meaning as is something that can be experienced (ist erfahrbar). He considers the set of objects of experience (Gegenstiinde der Erfahrung) to be a subset of the set of objects of ideas (Gegenstiinde von Vorstellungen). Frege argues that Piinjer's account results in a contradiction: If "A is not" means that A is not an object of experience, then there is something that is not an object of experience. This is an existential statement, which, according to Piinjer, ought to mean that there is an object of experience which is not an object of experience, which is a contradiction (NS, pp. 71-72). In the afterword of the dialogue Frege continues his discussion of "Leo Sachse is". He assumes for the sake of argument that this sentence is not self-evident. That amounts to saying that being is a real property of an object. If it is a property of an object, it is a characteristic of a firstorder concept. Frege proceeds with his argument as follows: If the word being has some content and the sentence "A is" is not self-evident, then the negation of the sentence "A is" could be true in some circumstances, i.e., there could be entities which do not have the property of being. From this it follows that the expression there are (es gibt) cannot be replaced with being, i.e., "There are B's" is not equivalent in meaning to "Something that has being (einiges Seiende) falls under the concept B". For if the sentence "There are entities which do not have the property of being" means the same as "Something that has being falls under the concept of not-being (der Begriff des Nichtseienden) " , it is evidently a contradictory sentence. Frege concludes that if the sentence "There are B's" is equivalent in meaning to the sentence "Something that has being is B" , then the concept of being is completely self-evident. It is in no way a determination (Bestimmung) of a thing, for it does not help us to distinguish between any two objects (NS, p. 73). Frege holds the view that we are forced to regard being as a concept which is superordinate to every concept and which therefore lacks all content. As Stuhlmann-Laeisz also remarks (p. 126), Frege's argumenta-

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tion actually shows that being can, after all, be used as a logical firstorder concept, although Frege himself does not propose anything of that kind. Frege's argument for the claim that sentences like "A is" or "A exists" are self-evident is based on the impossibility of negating these sentences without contradiction. But it is not conclusive. Why does he not suggest that the sentence "Something that has being is not" or "Something that has being falls under the concept of not-being" means that something for which it is possible to exist does not exist in the actual world? Interpreted this way, the contradiction seems to disappear. Precisely that kind of procedure can be used in possible worlds semantics. As laakko Hintikka argues, possible worlds semantics allows us "to take a 'merely possible individual', i.e., a denizen of some other world, and attribute to it predicates definable in terms of its actual existence, maybe the 'predicate of actual existence' itself" (Hintikka, 1981 a, p. 134). That kind of step is, however, impossible for Frege, due to his overall conception of language and world. Frege points out on several occasions that his aim in the Begriffsschrift was, in Leibniz's terms, not only to present a calculus ratiocinator but to create a lingua characteristica. 13 The idea of logic as language seems to be incorporated in many of the doctrines maintained by Frege, as has been emphasized by lean van Heijcnoort (1967) and laakko Hintikka (1981b). For Frege, the conceptual notation is a proper language, which must be learnt by means of suggestions and clues. Frege is committed to the doctrine that we cannot step outside the limits of our language in order to consider the seman tical relations between language and reality. Moreover, in the Fregean framework we cannot talk about changing universes. As van Heijenoort points out, "Frege's universe consists of all that there is, and it is fixed" (van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 325). Frege cannot pick out an individual from some possible world and attribute to it the property of actual existence for the simple reason that, for him, there are no alternative worlds. That kind of position prevents Frege from regarding the is of existence as an expression of a meaningful first-order concept. Frege attaches the meaning of an existential judgement to the form of a particular judgement. He states: Every particular judgement is an existential judgement that can be converted into the 'there is' form. E.g. 'Some bodies are light' is the same as 'There are light bodies'. (NS, p. 70; Long and White, p. 63.)

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The same point is repeated in 'Aufzeichnungen fur Ludwig Darmstaedter', which Frege wrote in 1919 (NS, pp. 274 - 275). A particular judgement serves to express a connection between two concepts. Because it always involves two concepts, it is, Frege notes, difficult to turn a sentence like 'There are men' into the form of a particular judgement. The problem can be solved, however, if the concept in question is definable by means of two concepts, as the concept man is definable by means of the concepts rational and living being. Frege chooses the concept being identical with itse/f(sich selbst gleich sein) as the most general concept of the hierarchy of concepts. It is a concept superordinate to all concepts and having no content since its extension is unlimited. Frege remarks that in natural language it is the copula that is purported to express the most general concept without content. He argues: This makes it possible to say: inen = men that have being; 'There are men' is the same as 'Some men are' or 'Something that has being is a man'. Thus the real content of what is predicated does not lie in 'has being' but in the form of a particular judgement. (NS, p. 71; Long and White, p. 64.)

Frege's view of being is also intertwined with his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung. That distinction throws some new light on Frege's view of existence as an empty first-order concept. In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' he writes: Idealists or sceptics will perhaps long since have objected: 'You talk, without further ado, of the Moon as an object; but how do you know that the name 'the Moon'· has any reference? How do you know that anything whatsoever has a reference?' I reply that when we say 'the Moon' , we do not intend to speak of our idea of the Moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense alone, but we presuppose a reference. (KS, p. 147; Geach and Black, p. 61.)

Thus, Frege's view is that if we talk about an object and then state that it exists, that statement does not add anything to what we have said so far. We presuppose the existence of objects; we do not say that they exist. For Frege, every predication carries with itself the claim for existence. None the less, Frege must admit that we talk about objects, for example, fictional entities, which do not exist. In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' he states that a name may have a Sinn, although it lacks a Bedeutung and, accordingly, a sentence may express a thought, although it lacks a truthvalue. In Frege's view, a sentence is deprived of a truth-value if it contains a name which has no bearer (KS, p. 148). Even if Frege takes being, or existence, to be included in every predication, he regards it as a proper concept in itself, since he paraphrases it

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as a specific relation of an object to itself, i.e., self-identity. Frege also suggests us a rendering of the statements" A is" and" A exists", which makes them even meaningful statements. In 'Kritische Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schr6ders Vorlesungen tiber die Algebra der Logik' he states: We must keep well apart two wholly different cases that are easily confused, because we speak of existence in both cases. In one case the question is whether a proper name designates something; in the other, whether a concept comprehends objects under itself. I f we use the words 'There is a -', we have the latter case. (KS, p. 208; Geach and Black, p. 104.)

According to Frege's clue, the sentences "A is" and "A exists" can be paraphrased as the metalinguistic sentence "the name 'A' has a reference". However, if Frege is consistent in his view of language as the universal medium, the limits of which we cannot exceed, he does not accept such statements as talk about the expressions of our language. In 'Dialog mit Ptinjer tiber Existenz' Frege concentrates on discussing the concept of being as an unanalysed univocal concept and insists on the Kantian claim that being is not a real predicate. Only at the end of the dialogue does he come to the idea which he later emphasizes and develops, i.e., taking existence to be a property of a concept: The existence expressed by 'there is' cannot be a characteristic mark of a concept whose property it is, just because it is a property of it. In the sentence 'There are men' we seem to be speaking of individuals that fall under the concept 'man', whereas it is only the concept 'man' we are talking about. (NS, p . 75; Long and White, p. 67.)

Frege maintains that we can use existence as a proper second-order concept which expresses that a concept is instantiated, that an object falls under a concept. Therefore, it is, after all, possible for Frege to say meaningfully that an object exists in the sense of saying that a certain bundle of properties is instantiated. Thus, existence is here something that is asserted of the bundle of properties. Now we are able to see more clearly the ties between Kant's and Frege's positions. In Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes Kant argues: Consider any arbitrary subject, e.g., Julius Caesar. Combine all his conceivable predicates, including those of time and space; then you will soon realize that it is possible for him to exist or not to exist with all these determinations .... Existence, which occurs in everyday speech as a predicate, is not a predicate of a thing itself but rather a predicate of the thought which we have of the thing (Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, Band 1/, p. 72.)

Frege's view of existence implies that we cannot talk about objects and their existence directly, i.e., independently of the properties of objects.

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At the same time, that is also one of Frege's basic semantical tenets. Between the name and the Bedeutung there is always the Sinn. An object is for us always an object that falls under some concept. The above extract from Kant's text shows how close Frege's view of existence as a property of a concept actually comes to Kant's statements. For Kant, existence is a predicate of a thought concerning an object. The same holds true of Frege since, in his view, objects exist for us only as subsumed under concepts, which means that we can know an object only by knowing some thought or some thoughts concerning the object. Thus, it seems as if Kant's views on existence influenced Frege's ideas at least in two ways: first, Kant argues that being is not a real predicate, which is the starting-point of Frege's discussion concerning existence, and secondly, the idea that being is a property of a thought is developed by Frege in the view that existence is a property of a concept. 5. IDENTITY AND PREDICATION

There are several discussions of Frege's concept of identity in the literature, although hardly any suggestions have been made as to the background of the distinction between the is of identity and the is of predication. 14 Frege deals with the problem of identity (Gleichheit) already in the Begriffsschrift. He begins his treatment with the remark that sometimes a name seems to stand for its content (Inha/t), sometimes, namely, in an identity statement, for itself. For Frege, it is, however, a false impression that an identity statement concerns names only. According to the Begriffsschrift, an identity statement expresses that two signs have the same content (Inhalt) but the content is determined in two different ways (zwei Bestimmungsweisen) (BS, § 8). In 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' Frege continues as follows his discussion of identity statements in connection with the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung: What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names 'a' and 'b' designate the same thing so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relatIOn between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something .... A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated. (KS, pp. 143 - 144; Geach and Black, pp. 56 - 57.)

Here the argument is essentially the same as in the Begriffsschrift, although Frege changes his terminology: he replaces the Inhalt of a name (but not that of a sentence) by Bedeutung and Bestimmungsweise by die

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Art des Gegebenseins or Sinn. In the article 'Funktion und Begriff' he explicitly identifies the concept of Inhalt with that of Bedeutung (KS, p. 126). Frege gives his account of identity in the Begriffsschrift as follows: Now let I- (A == B) mean: the symbol A and the symbol B have the same conceptual content, so that we can always replace A by B and vice versa. (BS, § 8.)

In the Grundlagen Frege not only suggests, but gives an explicit formulation of, Leibniz's law concerning the substitutivity of identicals (GLA, § 65).15 Again, in 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' he repeats the same law (KS, p. 150). In the Grundgesetze (Vol. I) he establishes his view of identity as the substitutivity of identicals, not only by referring to the substitutivity of the names of identical objects, but by stating that if two objects are identical, they fall under the same concepts, i.e., they have exactly the same properties (GGA I, § 20). Nevertheless, Frege does not regard his account as a definition of identity, as he unquestionably indicates in 'Rezension von: E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I' (KS, p. 184). For Frege, identity is indefinable but Leibniz has offered a valuable tool for understanding the identity relation. In this paper, I shall not discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between Leibniz and Frege in more detail. We can, however, conclude that Frege gives four different accounts of identity. First, he regards an identity statement as a rule for substitutivity of names in different contexts. Secondly, he takes it to be a metalinguistic statement concerning the number of senses and references of two names. Thirdly, he considers identity to be a relation between two objects. Fourthly, he takes it to be a relation of an object to itself, which occurs in sentences like "a = a". As we saw above, the fourth meaning is related to his view of existence. As far as objects are concerned, the contexts where the names occur express properties of the objects named. If two objects are said to be identical, they are claimed to have the same properties. Considered this way, identity can be regarded as a border-line case of predication. When paraphrased in the manner Frege suggests, i.e., by means of the expression no other than, it predicates of the object under discussion all the properties that it in fact has ('Uber Begriff und Gegenstand), (KS, p. 169). Nevertheless, I shall argue that Frege does not reduce objects to their properties. 16 Nor does he reduce the identity of objects to the sameness of their properties. What I seek to show is that those very tenets

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of irreducibility are what makes Frege speak so eagerly in favour of the distinction between the is of identity and the is of predication. Frege takes special pains to distinguish identity from predication in his article 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', where he deals with, and endorses, the crucial difference between objects and concepts. The importance of not blurring the distinction between objects and concepts is also strongly emphasized by Frege in the Grundlagen, so much so that he adds it to the list of his basic principles (see Einleitung, p. X). J7 In order to attend to that principle, Frege considers it necessary to realize that the is of identity differs from the is of predication and, moreover, that the difference is a reflection of how things actually are (see 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', KS, p. 169). In contrasting objects with concepts Frege comes up with a decisive innovation compared with traditional Aristotelian logic. Indeed, he himself recognizes some of the differences between his own treatment and traditional logic. He remarks: In fact, it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation I A uffassungsweise I and the Boolea~ mode - and indeed I can add the Aristotelian mode - that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgements. But this is certainly not to say that I would not be able to express the relation of subordination between concepts. (,Ober den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', BS, 1964, p. 10\; Bynum, p. 94.)

Frege's analysis of sentences differs from Aristotelian analysis and results in a new treatment of the relation of subordination between concepts. In the beginning of the Begriffsschrift Frege points out: A distinction between subject and predicate does not occur in my way of representing a judgement. (BS, § 3.)

Also, in the article 'Uber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', Frege notes that subordination is alien to predication (KS, p. 244). What is reflected in the distinction between subordination and predication is precisely the principle of always keeping in mind the difference between objects and concepts. Frege would also reject analyses like that given by Aristotle in Analytica Posteriora, in which man is said to be identical with animal, since man is identical with a species of animal (An. Post. 83 a 23 - 35). The innovation of Fregean logic that I am here aiming at is, however, related to the epistemological import of the distinction between objects and concepts. It amounts to an attack on the general philosophical doctrines implicit in the received logical analysis of Frege's day. Frege's view is that we cannot reach the essence of an object by means of our concepts and our cognitive capacities. To say, for instance, that Plato is a man,

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meaning that Plato is identical with a man, is not possible, according to Frege. He expresses his standpoint incontestably in 'Logik in der Mathematik' (1914): Since therefore we need inferences and a second premise, the thought that Cato is mortal is not included in what is expressed by the sentence 'All men are mortal', and so 'man' is not an ambiguous word which amongst its many references has that which we designate by the proper name ·Plato'. On the contrary, a concept·word simply serves to designate a concept. And a concept is quite different from an individual. If I say 'Plato is a man', I am not as it were giving Plato a new name - the name 'man' - but I am saying that Plato falls under the concept man. (NS, p. 231; Long and White, p. 214.)18

Traditional Aristotelian logic blurs the distinction between individuals and properties, since it allows the identification of individuals with their essential properties. Therefore, Frege's distinction proves to be a notable turning-point in the history of logic. 19 Frege does not give separate treatments of essential and accidential properties. What the Fregean distinction seems to bring about is a chasm between objects in themselves and objects as falling under the concepts that we are able to harness. What are objects, then, for Frege? In order to answer the question, I must try to grasp the basic elements of the Fregean universe. In 'Ober Begriff und Gegenstand' Frege writes: What is simple cannot be decomposed and what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition. (KS, p. 169; Geach and Black, pp. 42-43.)

When the reference to be assigned is logically simple, we cannot, according to Frege, give a proper definition but we must comply with elucidatory propositions, by means of which we give hints concerning the wanted reference (BW, p. 63). It is obvious that the logically simple elements of Frege's world can be concepts and, more generally, functions. That is implicitly expressed by Frege himself in 'Ober die Grundlagen der Geometrie I - III' (KS, pp. 288 - 289). Concepts can be decomposed into more primitive concepts, which are their characteristics. Still, we are not able to decompose for ever. The most primitive units that we reach are the Bedeutungen of the concept-words that can no more be defined. Eike-Henner W. Kluge argues that the concept of logisch einfach is important in Frege's ontology and that logisch einfach is, for Frege, always a functjon and never an object (Schirn II, 1976, pp: 60 - 65). Kluge's argument is as follows: For Frege, a thing without properties is an Unding. Now if an object were logisch einfach and had only one property, it ought to coincide with that propt;rty. For if it did not, it would be composed of this property and something that has this property, which is in-

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consistent with the assumption that the thing is logisch einfach. Consequently, if it coincides with the property, it is a property itself and, as a property, incomplete, which is inconsistent with its nature as an object. Since there are no other possibilities, it follows that objects cannot be logisch einfach. Kluge's argument is based to a considerable extent on the fact that Frege regards an object having no properties as an Unding. It is true Frege maintains that objects without properties are impossible or even absurd, but his wordings do not warrant the conclusion that the concept of Unding applies to ontological considerations. Frege formulates his claim ironically as follows: First, things are regarded as similar, so similar to each other, that they can no more be distinguished from each other; that is, all properties by which they are distinguished would be demolished ... .Is there still something left of those things? Certainly! There are still left the natureless things I die naturlosen Dinge I .... Nonetheless, it will be difficult to find the natureless pieces of wood, or, rather, not-pieces of wood, in the set of the natureless things. But even the gre~test difficulties are overcome by good will. The best means is always this: they are totally ignored. ('Uber die Zahlen des Herrn Schubert', KS, pp. 247 - 248.)

Frege continues: I have been led astray because I know the names of fixed stars but I do not know the names of natureless things. (KS, pp. 250 - 251.)

In these passages we only encounter a version of Frege's doctrine according to which it is via a'sense and only via a sense that a proper name is related to an object (NS, p. 135). Frege does not think that it is possible to talk meaningfully of an object without referring to the properties of the object. This is precisely the view that makes Frege an antihaecceitist (see, e.g., Kaplan, 1975, p. 725).20 For Frege, it is impossible to know objects in themselves or to talk about them. But if we wish to understand the structure of Frege's ontology, objects can be taken to exist without having any properties to carry. They are not known to us as simple, however, and strictly speaking we cannot even talk about their existing or not existing without properties. That is exactly what I emphasized in the preceding section when discussing existence. According to hege, we can say what an object is like, but we cannot say what it is. But it does not suffice to recognize Frege's concept of Unding as having an epistemological force, for his concept of logisch einfach is not applicable to ontological considerations, either. For Frege, a reference is logically simple if it cannot have a proper definition. But we can con-

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sistently assume that a reference has a complex structure even if we cannot define the reference by means of our concepts. 21 Nothing can be logically simple from an ontological point of view, for if one calls a reference logically simple, one already considers it within the limits of human knowledge. Frege's epistemological view comes up in Die Grund/agen der Arithmetik as follows: It is this way that I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensation, intuition and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of the reason - for what are things independent of the reason? To answer that would be as much as to judge withoUI judging, or to wash the fur without wetting it. (GLA, § 26.)

It is, perhaps, symptomatic that in the beginning of this paragraph Frege refers approvingly to Kant's ideas. Now I am able to suggest an answer to the question concerning the distinction between the is of identity and the is of predication: As I have argued, Frege did not regard it as possible to find out what objects really are in themselves. He relies on the distinction between what is accessible to human knowledge and what is beyond our cognitive capacities. He wants to contrast objects as metaphysical entities with objects as we know them through a finite number of concepts, and therefore he also stresses the sharp distinction between objects and concepts. In Frege's epistemology, we can approach objects from different points of view by means of the concepts that are available to us. But, for Frege, an object is neither identical with any property nor with any combination of properties that we can know it to have. The best we can do, he believes, is to handle identity, as it were, within the limits of our reason, i.e., to regard identity statements as statements which claim two objects to have precisely the same properties. However, according to Frege's philosophy, identity statements claim more than our reason is able to grasp. An identity statement concerns objects in themselves, while predication belongs to the sphere of our reason. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

What I have argued for in this paper requires some reservations. Although I have hinted at certain Kantian tenets, the connections between Kantian epistemology and Frege's ambiguity thesis are far from being completely clarified. One open question is, no doubt, Frege's relation to what Hintikka calls Kant's Aristotelian mistake, which is the doc-

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trine that we become aware of individuals and their existence by means of passive sense-perception. 22 Another reservation I want to make is related to Aristotle and Aristotelian logic. Here I have not carefully examined what Frege actually means in criticizing Aristotle. I have relied on the interpretation that he means the logic prevailing in his own day, that is to say, I have not discussed Frege's relation to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology; not even his relation to Aristotle's logic. I have focussed my discussion on Frege's critical standpoint concerning what he regarded as the errors of Aristotelian logic and of the epistemology which seems to be codified in that logic. Given these additional remarks, what I can conclude on the basis of the above discussion is the conception that Frege's thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word is is epistemologically motivated and that the epistemological tenets are, if not purely Kantian, at least strongly influenced by Kant's philosophy. NOTES • I wish to thank Prof. laakko Hintikka, Dr. Lilli Alanen and Prof. Ernest LePore for helpful comments. I See, e.g., Hintikka (1979) and (198Ia). 2 In GLA (§ 53) Frege uses the term Begriffe erster und zweiter Ordnung; in his later writings he talks about Begriffe erster und zweiter Stufe (see, e.g., Funktion und Begriff, KS, p. 140, and 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', KS, p. 269). 3 See BW, pp. 73 -74, and 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', KS, p. 269. 4 Angelelli (1967) discusses the subject to some extent (see pp. 192 - 200). I shall not go into the problem in this connection. 5 Cf. 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', KS, p. 174, and 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', KS, p. 271. 6 I have taken the quotations from the English translations mentioned in the bibliography. When no translation was available, I have referred only to the German text and proposed my own translation. 7 See 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', KS, p. 175, and 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', NS, pp. 106-121. See also BW, pp. 150-151. 8 Cf. GGA I, Vorwort, p. X; see also 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie 1- III', KS, p.285. ~ See 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', KS, p. 147. Frege formulates the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung in that very article. 10 For Frege's view of facts, see 'Der Gedanke', KS, p. 359. II See, e.g., W. Marshall, 'Frege's Theory of Functions and Objects'; M. Dummett, 'Frege on Functions: A Reply'; and W. Marshall, 'Sense and Reference: A Reply', in Klemke (1968), pp. 249 - 267, 268 - 283, and 298 - 320. 12 See, e.g., GLA, § 89. 13 See 'Uber den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', BS, 1964, p. 98, and 'Uber die Begriffsschrift

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des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', KS, p. 227. See also' Anmerkungen Freges zu: Philip E. B. Jourdain, The Development of the Theories of Mathematical Logic and the Principles of Mathematics', KS, 341. Frege uses the expression lingua characterica instead of lingua characteristica. For this, see G. Patzig's footnote 8 in Gottlob Frege, Logische Untersuchungen, ed. by G. Patzig, p. 10. 14 See Schirn (1976). IS Austin's translation of this passage is the following: "Now Leibniz's definition is as follows: 'Things are the same as each other, of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth'. This I propose to adopt as my own definition (Erkliirung) of identity .... Now, it is actually the case that in universal substitutability all the laws of identity are contained." I think it is misleading to use the word definition as the translation of Erkliirung, because Frege argues elsewhere that the concept of identity is indefinable. 10 This was originally suggested to me by Prof. Jaakko Hintikka. 17 For the sharp distinction between objects and concepts, see also 'Ober die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', KS, p. 233, and 'Ober die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', KS, p. 270. 18 I have changed P. Long's and R. White's translation to the effect that I have adopted the word reference as the translation of the German word Bedeutung, while Long and White use the word meaning in this connection. 19 A similar idea concerning Frege's central role in the history of logic has been put forward by Ignacio Angelelli. See Ange1elli (1967), pp. 253 - 254. Aristotle's view is discussed by Jaakko Hintikka in the article 'The Varieties of Being in Aristotle' (this volume). 20 Different kinds of haecceitism have been discussed by R. M. Adams (1979). He defines haecceitas as the property of beillg identical with a certain particular individual (Adams, 1979, p. 6). For the details of Frege's doctrine, see Haaparanta (1985). 21 For this point I am indebted to Prof. Jaakko Hintikka. 22 Cf. Hintikka (1981 b) and Hintikka, 'The Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge'. See also Haaparanta (1985).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Frege, G., Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Verlag von L. Nebert, Halle a. S., 1879; repro in Frege (1964), pp. 1-88. (Referred to as BS.) Frege, G., 'Ober den Zweck der Begriffsschrift', in Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft fiir Medizin und Naturwissenschaft fiir das Jahr 1882, Verlag von G. Fischer, Jena, 1883, pp. 1-10; repr. in Frege (1964), pp. 97 -106. Frege, G., Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung iiber den Begriff der Zahl, Verlag von W. Koebner, Breslau, 1884; repr. and transl. by J. L. Austin in The Foundations of Arithmetic/Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik,. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1968. (Referred to as GLA.) Frege, G., Funktion und Begri'f. Vortrag. geliaIten in der Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1891 der Jenaischen Gesellschaft fiir Medizin und Naturwissenschaft, H. Pohle, Jena, 1891; repro in KS. pp. 125 - 142. Frege, G., 'Ober Sinn und Bedeutung', Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100 (1892), 25 - 50; repro in KS, pp. 143 - 162.

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Frege, G., 'Uber Begriff und Gegenstand', Vierteljahrschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (1892), 192-205; repro in KS, pp. 167 -178. Frege, G., Grundgesetzeder Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, I. Band, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1893. (Referred to as GGA I.) Frege, G., 'Rezension von: E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Erster Band, Leipzig, 1891, Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 (1894), 313 - 332; repro in KS, pp. 179 - 192. Frege, G., 'Uber die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene', Berichte uber die Verhandlungen der koniglich siichsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften :;u Leipzig, Mathematisch-Physische Klasse 48. Band (1896), 361 - 378; repro in KS, pp. 220 - 233. Frege, G., Ober die Zahlen des Herrn H. Schubert, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1899; repro in KS, pp. 240 - 261. Frege, G., Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet, I/. Band, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1903. Frege, G., 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie', Jahresberichte der Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, 12. Band (1903), 319 - 324; repro in KS, pp. 262 - 266. Frege, G., 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie II', Jahresberichte der Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, 12. Band (1903), 368 - 375; repro in KS, pp. 267 - 272. Frege, G., 'Was ist eine Funktion?', in Festschrift Ludwig Boltzmann gewidmet zum sechzigsten Geburtstag, 20. Februar 1904, Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 656 - 666; repro in KS, pp. 273 - 280. Frege, G., 'Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie I-III', Jahresberichte der Deutschen Mathematiker- Vereinigung, 15. Band (1906), pp. 293 - 309,377 -403,423 - 430; repro in KS, pp. 281 - 323. Frege, G., 'Anmerkungen zu: Philip E. B. Jourdain, The Development of the Theories of Mathematical Logic and the Principles of Mathematics', The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 43 (1912), 237 - 269; repro in KS, pp. 334 - 341. Frege, G., 'Der Gedanke, eine 10gische Untersuchung', Beitriige zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealism us, Band I (1918), 58-77; repro in KS, rp. 342-362. Frege, G., 'Die Verneinung, eine logische Untersuchung', Beitriige zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealism us, Band I (1918), 143 - 157; repro in KS, pp. 362 - 378. Frege, G., 'Logische Untersuchungen, dritter Teil: Gedankengefiige', Beitriige zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealism us, Band III (1923), 36-51; repro in KS, pp. 378 - 394. Frege, G., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by P. Geach and M. Black, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1952. Frege, G., Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsiitze, ed. by I. Angelelli, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1964. Frege, G., The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Exposition of the System, transl. and ed. by M. Furth, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964. Frege, G., Logische Untersuchungen, ed. by G. Patzig, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, G6ttingen, 1966. Frege, G., Kleine Schriften, ed. by I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt and Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1967. {Referred to as KS.) Frege, G., Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1969. (Referred to as NS.) Frege, G., On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic, transl. by E.-H. W. Kluge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971.

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LEILA HAAPARANTA

Frege, G., Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, transl. and ed. by T. W. Bynum, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972. Frege, G., Wissenschaftliche Briefwechsel, ed. by G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A. Veraart, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1976. (Referred to as BW.) Frege, G., Logical Investigations, ed. by P. T. Geach, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977. Frege, G., Posthumous Writings, transl. by P. Long and R. White, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979. Frege, G., Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, abridged for the English edition by B. McGuinness and transl. by H. Kaal, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.

Adams, R. M., 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity', The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 5 - 26. Angelelli, I., Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1967. Angelelli, I., 'Friends and Opponents of the Substitutivity of Identicals in the History of Logic', in Schirn (1976), Band II, pp. 141-166. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, ed. by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, London, 1928. Bell, D., Frege's Theory of Judgement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979. Dummett, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1981. (First published in 1973.) Dummett, M., The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Duckworth, London, 1981. Forgie, J. W., 'Frege's Objection to the Ontological Argument', NoUs 6 (1972),251- 265. Grossmann, R., 'Structures, Functions and Forms', in Schirn (1976), Band II, pp. 11- 32. Haaparanta, L., Frege's Doctrine of Being (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 39), Helsinki, 1985. van Heijenoort, J., 'Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language', Synthese 17 (1967), 324-330. Hintikka, J., '''Is'', Semantical Games, and Semantical Relativity', Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979), 433-468. Hintikka, J., 'Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument', Dialectica 3S (1981), 127-146. (Referred to as Hintikka, 1981a; in this volume.) Hintikka, J., 'Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism', in E. Morscher and R. Stranzinger (eds.), Ethics, Proceedings of the Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium, HolderPichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1981, pp. 375-390. (Referred to as Hintikka, 198Ib.) Hintikka, J., 'Semantical Games, the Alleged Ambiguity of "Is", and Aristotelian Categories', Synthese 54 (1983), 443 - 468. Hintikka, J., 'The Varieties of Being in Aristotle', this volume, p. 81 -114. Hintikka, J., 'The Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge', forthcoming in the Proceedings of the 1981 Cambridge Conference on Transcendental Argumentation. Hugly, P., 'Ineffability in Frege's Logic', Philosophical Studies 24 (1973), 227 - 244. lshiguro, H., Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language, Duckworth, London, 1972. Kahn, C., The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973. Kahn, C., 'On the Theory of the Verb "To Be" " in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology, New York University Press, New York, 1973, pp. 1 - 20. Kant, I., Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, in Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, Band II, Vorkritische Schriften II, 1757 - 1777, G. Reimer, Berlin, 1905, pp. 63 - 163.

ON FREGE'S CONCEPT OF BEING

289

Kant, 1., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781, 2nd ed. 1787, in Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, Band III, O. Reimer, Berlin, 1904; trans\. by N. Kemp Smith, The Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1929. Kaplan, D., 'How t() Russell a Frege-Church', The Journal of Philosophy 72 (I975), 716-729. Kauppi, R., 'Substitutivity salva veritate in Leibniz and in Modern Logic', Ratio 10 (1968), 141-149. Klemke, E. D. (ed.), Essays on Frege, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, and London, 1968. Kluge, E.-H. W., 'Freges Begriff des Logischeinfachen', in Schirn (I976), Band II, pp. 51-66. Kneale, W. and Kneale, M., The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. Mates, B., 'Identity and Predication in Plato', Phronesis 24 (I979), 211-229. Schirn, M. (ed.), Studien zu FregelStudies on Frege /- III, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt, 1976. Sluga, H. D., 'Frege as a Rationalist', in Schirn (1976), Band I, pp. 27-47. Sluga, H. D., Gottlob Frege, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1980. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, R., 'Freges Auseinandersetzung mit der Auffassung von "Existenz" als ein Priidikat der ersten Stufe und Kants Argumentation gegen den ontologischen Oot~esbeweis', in C. Thiel (ed.), Frege und die moderne Grundlagenforschung, Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Olan, 1975, pp. 119-133. Woods, M. J., 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society75 (I974-75)., 167-180.

Dept. oj Philosophy, University oj Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40B, SF-OOI70 Helsinki 17, Finland

INDEX OF NAMES

Abelard, Peter xii, xiii, 5, 8, 23,123,141, 145-156,158-163,166-176,178-180 Ackrill, J. L. 78,100-103,112 Adams, R. M. 286, 288 Alanen, Lilli 242-246 Albertus Magnus 126, 141, 214, 220 Albritton, Rogers 112 Alexander of Aphrodisia 116, 121, 125, 186, 187 Alexander the Great 97, 272-273 Allan, K. 77 Allison, Henry 266 Alquie, F. 243, 247 Ammonius 118-121 Angelelli, Ignacio 285, 286, 287, 288 anonymus Cantabrigiensis 125 anonym us Moraux 119, 141 anonymus Pragensis 132 anonymus Taran 121 Anselm 249, 250, 252-253, 262 Apelt, O. 103, 112 Aquinas, Thomas xiii, xiv, 80, 178-208, 210,212-216, 218-222, 224 Aristophanes I I Aristotle x, xi, xiii, xiv, I, 3, 5, 8-9, 13, 17,20-22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 33,49-56, 58-59, 61, 63-90, 92-98, 100-108, 110-117,119-121,123,125,141,142, 145-146, 149-150, 152, 154, 160, 162-163,168,173-178,180,181,190, 194-196,199,201,204-205,213,215, 219,221,222,224-227,229,242,247, 252-254,266,267,274,281,285,286, 288 Arnauld, A. 218, 223, 233-234, 236-238, 246 Asclepius 121, 134 Ashworth, E. J. 140, 141 Augustine 193 Aureoli, Peter xiv, 207 Austin, J. L. 78, 89, 287 A vicenna 188

Bach, E. 77 Bacon, Robert 123, 131, 141 Bacon, Roger 129, 141, 142 Bailey, C. 142 Balme, D. M. 86, 112 Bambrough, R. 25, 74, 113 Barnes, Jonathan 25, 26, 265 Barth, T. A. 216 Beck, A. L. 219,241 Beck, C. H. 75 Beck, L. J. 247 Bekker, Immanuel 116, 141 Bell, David 274, 288 Benardete, Seth 82, 112 Bennett, Jonathan 265 Benveniste, Emile 23, 24, 100, 103, 112 Black, M. 77 Blass, F. 74 Bluck, Richard S. 81, 112 Boehner, P. 142,218,219,222· Boethius, de Dacia 135 Boethius, A. Manlius S. 115, 117-121, 127,132-134,141,142,145,160-161, 176-178 Bonansea, B. M. 216,219,221,222,243, 248 Bonaventura 224 Bonitz, Hermann 77,79,100-101,112 Borgnet, A. 126, 141 Boutroux, Emile 242 Braakhuis, H. A. G. 123,128,141,142, 180 Brentano, F. 79 Bresnan, Joan 109-112 Brito, Radulphus 132 Brody, B. A. 77 Brown, S. F. 142,216,218, 219, 222 Brugmann, K. 23, 45, 47 Brunschwig, J. 79 Buchanan, E. 79 Buridan, John xv, 135, 136, 138-142, 211,218,.220

291

292

INDEX OF NAMES

Burley, Walter 141 Bury, R. G. 142 Bynum, T. W. 288 Cargile, J. 76 Cassin, B. 116, 141 Catan, J. 2\3, 221 Caterus 229, 236 Cathala, M.-R. 80 Chatillon, J. 179 Cherniss, Harold 34-35,45,47,81 Clarke, Francis P. 221 Code, A. 75 Conington, Richard 216 Cornford, Francis M. 44,47,81 Couturat, L. 45, 47 Dal Pra, M. 179 Dancy, Russell M. x, xi, 83, 95, \05, 112, 213,219,266 David (pseudo-David) 119,141-142 Davidson, Donald 76, 266 de Alvernia, Petrus 135 de Faversham, Simon 127 De Finance, J. 216,219 De Libera, A. 141 De Raeymaeker, L. 216, 221 de Rijk, L. M. 123,141,142,172-180 215,221 Debrunner, A. 23 Decker, B. 222 Del Punta, F. 142 Delbruck, B. 23 Descartes xv, 27, 223-225, 228-248, 250 Dexippus 118 Diels, H. 142 Doig, James C. 199,213,219 Donagan, A. 241,247 Dummett, Michael 76-77, 196, 199, 286, 288 Duns Scotus, John 201, 204, 207-213, 216-222,224,226-227,236,243,246, 248 During, I. 25 Ebbesen, Sten xii, xiii, xv, 117-118, 126. 128,131-132,140-143 Edwards, A. 242. 243, 244

Elias (pseudo-Elias) 118-119,141-142 Elizabeth, Princess 242, 246 Engel. S. Morris 266 Ephesius, Michael 120 Etzkorn, G. I. 142 Eustratius 118 Fabro, C. 215,219 Farler, C. Sam 172 Fillmore, C. J. 77 Fleming, N. 74 Fobes, F. H. 74 Foot, P. 75 Forgie, J. W. 288 Forster, E. S. 79 Frankfurt, Harry G. 112 Fredborg, K. M. 128, 142 Frede, Dorothea 197 Frede, Michael ix, x, 75, 78, 112 Frege, Gottlob xiv, xv, 60, 77, 78, 186, 188,192,196, 198, 199,256,259-260, 265-267,269-277,279-289 Furth, Montgomery 96, 112, 287 Gabriel, G. 288 Gal, G. 142, 218, 222 Galantiere, L. 215,220 Galileo 113 Gallop, D. 25-27 Gambatese, A. 142 Geach,PeterT. 45,47,75-77,196-199, 277-278,280,282,287,288 Geiger, L. B. 215,219 Gerth, B. 23 Geyer, B. 23,173, 178, 179 Giles of Rome 133 Gilson, E. 215,219,241,247,266 Goethe, J. W. 45 Gomboez, W. L. 265 Gomez-Lobo, A!fonzo 25, 81, 87-89, 112 Goodwin, W. W. 45,47 Gorgias 115-116,121 Gosling, J. 74 Graeser, Andreas 112 Graham, A. C. 3 Griffin, N. 77 Grossmann. R. 288 Gueroult, M. 245

INDEX OF NAMES Guthrie, W. K. C. 81 Hager, F. P. 79 Haldane, E. S. 241-247 Hamlyn, D. W. 195,198,199 Happ, H. 213,219 Haring, N. M. 172, 179 Harlfinger, D. 121, 142 Harman, G. 76 Harms, R. T. 77 Heidegger, M. 63 Helias, Petrus 177 Henrich, Dieter 265 Hermann, G. 23 Hermes, H. 288 Herodotus 24, 25 Hertz, M. 179 Hick, John 265 Hilbert, D. 271 Hintikka, Jaakko x, xv, xvi, 23, 26, 78, 82,87,90, 101-102, 106, 112, 113, 181, 197, 199,215,218,265-267,269, 276, 285, 286, 288 Hoeres, Walter 212,217-219 Homer x, 11-12,66-67,85, 115-116, 128, 157, 165,254 Honnefelder, L. 216,217,219,220 Hooker, M. 241,247,248 Howell, Robert 266, 267 Hubien, H. 218,220 Hugly, P. 288 Hume, David 3, 247 Hunt, R. W. 177 Husserl, E. G. 280, 287 lamblichus 118 Irwin, T. 74, 78 Ishiguro, H. 289 Jacobi, K. 172, 174, 179 Jacobs, W. 74,78,79 Jolivet, 1. 172, 177, 179 Jourdain, Philip E. B. :86 Judy, A. G. 142 Kaal, H. 288 Kahn, Charles ix, x, 47, 74, 78, 79, 81, 96, 100, 103, 113, 196, 199, 269, 289 Kambartel, F. 288

293

Kaminski, S. 216,220 Kamiah, W. 75 Kamp, 1. A. W. 75 Kane, W. H. 214,220 Kannisto, Heikki 261-262, 267 Kant, l. xv, xvi, 249-267, 272, 275, 279, 284-285, 288, 289 Kaplan, David 255-256, 283, 289 Kaulbach, F. 288 Kauppi, R. 289 Keil, H. 179 Kelley, F. E. 142 Kemp, Smith 267, 289 Kennan, E. L. 75 Kenny, A. 179,180,199,214,220,241, 242,247 Kilwardby, Robert 124-128, 130-\31, 142 Kirwan, Christopher 74, 75, 80, 84, II? Klowski, J. 24 Kluge, Eike-Henner W. 282, 288, 289 Kneale, M. 289 Kneale, W. 289 Kneepkens, C. H. 141, 180 Knuuttila, Simo 113,214,217-220,241, 266 Koehler, K. F. 1\3 Koyre, Alexandre 241, 243, 247 Krakow, Bjag 138 Kranz, W. 142 Krapiec, M. A. 216,220 Kretzmann, N. 170-172,179,180,214, 220-222 Kripke, S. 76 Kuhner, R. 23,45,47, 74 Kurdzialec, M. 216, 220 Laeisz, R. 267, 289 Land, J. P. N. 246, 247 Langston, D. C. 220 Larkin, T. 79,80 Laupp, H. 79 Lee, E. N. 77 Leibniz, G. W. 36, 70, 106, 112, 212-213, 218-221, 254, 261-263, 276, 280, 286, 289 LePore, Ernest 285 Leroux, Ernest 247

294

INDEX OF NAMES

Lewis, Frank 76 Lewry, O. 122-124,127-128,142 Lloyd, G. E. R. 242, 247 Lockwood, M. 76, 78 Loemker, L. E. 218, 220 Lombard, ·Peter 189 Long, P. 286, 288 Louis, R. 179 Loux, Michael J. 113,213,218,220 Lovejoy, A. O. 261 Lucretius 117, 120, 142 Luschei, E. C. 45, 47 Lyons, John 23, 24, 77 Lyttkens, H. 215,220 Magentinus, Leo 116 Mahoney, E. P. 214,220 Maier, Heinrich 79,81,83,100,107,113 Maieru, A. 178, 179 Malcolm, John 196, 199, 242, 245 Malcolm, Norman 241, 247 Mandonnet, P. 197,198,222 Manheim, R. 77 Mansion, S. 79 Maritain, J. 215 Marshal, David J. 200 Marshall, W. 286 Mates, Benson x, 23, 78, 82, 113, 220, 269,289 Matthen, Mohan 25, 27 Matthew, M. 217,221 Mazzarella, P. 143 McCabe, Herbert 196, 199 McGill, Arthur C. 265 McGuinness, B. 288 McInerny, R. M. 214,215, 220 Mei, Tsu-Lin 77 Meillet, A. 23 Meiser, C. 117,141,178 Melissus 11,13-14,17-18,25 Mersenne, M. 243, 246 Mesland, D. 246 Mill, John Stuart 4, 23, 60, 269 Miller, Barry 195, 196, 199 Minio-Paluello, L. 178, 179 Mohr, J . C. B. 265 Montague, Richard 75, 255 Moody, E. A. 178,179 Moos, M. F. 198

Moraux, Paul 141 Moravcsik, J. M. E. 78,81,97,113 Morscher, E. 288 Mourelatos, A. P. D. 26, 78 Munitz, Milton K. 23. 76, 113, 289 Neal, Gordon C. 81, 112 Niiniluoto, IIkka 218,220 Nuchelmans, G. 172, 176, 177, 179 Ockham, W. 100, 113, 135-136, 139-140,142,162,211,217-219,221, 222, 224, 227, 229, 240, 243, 244, 247 O'Donnell, J. R. 179 Oesterle, Jean T. 196, 198 Osterr, M. 123 Owen, G. E. L. x, xi, 22, 25, 49-50, 59, 74,78-81,86,101,113,190,215,221 Owens, Joseph 76, 213, 221 Parmenides 1,4,7, 12, 14-17,21-22, 25-27,29-33,38,44, 82, 116, 142 Patzig, G. 198, 286, 288 Peano, G. 281,286-287 Pelletier, F. J. 75 Pera, C. 222 Perlmutter, D. M. 77 Petrus, de Hibernia 134 Phelan, G. 215,220 Philoponus 116-118, 120 Pinborg, Jan 133, 140, 142, 178-180, 214, 220, 221 Pirotta, A. 222 Plantinga, Alvin 265 Plato ix, x, I, 4-5, 12, 14-23, 25-30, 32-36,38-43,44-47,50-54,60-63, 74-78,81,101,112,113,116,120, 134,202,213,215,221,273,282,289 Platts, M. 75 Porphyrius 118-119 Poser, H. 218,221 Prauss, Gerold 267 Prester, John 51,61 Priscian 145, 149, 179 Protagoras 11- 15, 25, 45-46 pseudo-Scotus 211 Punjer 275 Quine, W. V. 24,44,47,75,200

INDEX OF NAMES Rashdall, H. 141 Reimer, G. 289 Reina, M. E. 141 Remes, Unto 266 Richard of Conington 219 Roberts, L. N. 140, 142 Rorty, R. 77,78 Ross, G. T. 247 Ross, J. F. 213,215,221,241-246 Ross, W. D. 25,44,47,75-77,79-81, 85,101,113,178,219,242,288 Russell, Bertrand 4, 23, 33-34, 45, 47, 106, 289 Ryan, J. K. 216,219,221,222,243,248 Ryle, Gilbert 81, 106, 113 Saarinen, Esa 102, 113, 218, 220, 256, 266 Schaffer, Jerome 266 Schepers, H. 218, 221 Schim, M. 76, 286, 288, 289 Schmaus, M. 216, 221 Schmidt, C. C. E. 45, 264 Schmidt, F. 47 Schmidt, R. W. 221 Schwyzer, E. 23,45, 47 Scott, T. K. 141 Sextus Empiricus 116 Shircel, C. L. 216, 222 Shorey, P. 28, 221 Siger 214, 220 Simplicius 118-120 Sluga, H. D. 289 Smyth, H. W. 45,47 Soames, S. 77 Socrates xiii, 7, 9,10,14,16,27,29-33, 38,40,43-46,50-56,58-61,64-65, 67, 70-72, 78-80, 83-84, 86, 94, 97, 106,123,125,156-157,159-166,177, 182-183, 188, 196, 197,200,202 Sommers, F. 241,247 Sorabji, Richard 25 Spiazzi, R. M. 80, 179,222 Spinoza, B. 246, 247 Stead, C. 80 Stenius, Erik 241 Stephanus 118 Stranzinger, R. 288 Strawson, P. F. 196, 199

295

Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer 267, 275-276, 288 Suarez, Francisco 212, 217-219, 222-224, 230, 240, 242-247 Taran, L. 26, 141 Taylor, Richard 265 Thiel, C. 267,288,289 Thomas, R. 179 Thomason, R. H. 75 Thompson, M. 78,79 Thorp, J. W. 79,80 Thucydides 24 Trendelenburg, Adolf 103, 113 Trentman, J. A. 218,222 Tugendhat, Ernst 23 Tweedale, M. M. 172-179 Ulger, V. 178 van Heijenoort, Jean 277-278, 288 Veatch, Henry 196, 197, 199 Veraart, A. 288 Verardo, R. A. 222 Veres, Torno 197, 199 Verhaar, John W. M. 3,22,23, 199 V1astos, G. 25, 31, 34-35, 44-47, 74-75, 81 Vollert, C. S. J. 242-244, 246 von Fritz, K. 79, 80 von Wright, Georg Henrik 241 Wagner, Hans 263-265 Waltz, T. 79 Walzer, Richard 23 Wedberg, Anders 44, 47 Wedin, M. V. 79 Weidemann, Hermann xiii, xiv, 81,114, 196, 198, 200, 215, 222 Weinberg, Julius R. 106, 114, 241-244, 247 Wells, N. J. 241,242,247 Westerink, L. G. 142 White, F. C. 74 White, R. 286, 288 Whorf, Benjamin Lee 77 Wieland, Georg 195 Wiggins, D. 76 William of Sherwood 141, 179

296

INDEX OF NAMES

Williams, B. 247 Williams, C. J. F. 23,78,241,245 Wilson, M. D. 241,242,247,248 Wittgenstein, L. 45, 47, 247, 288 Wolff, Christian 23 Wolff, Robert Paul 266 Wolter, A. B. 216, 217, 218, 222, 243, 248

Wolterstorff, N. 74 Woods, M. J. 94. 114, 289 Zdybicka, Z. J. 216,220 Zeno 25 Zimmermann, Albert 178, 180, 198,200

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Thomas Aquinas 181-195,201-207; William Ockham 135-136 (see also copula, existence, einai, esse, 'is') body 223, 226, 228, 232-241

abstract entities 39-40 abstract terms 39, 43, 119, 121, 182 accident, accidental 19, 21, 58, 64, 68-73, 83, 93-95, 107, 124, 150, 152-153, 157, 181-184, 188, 191-194, 197, 204, 2i5, 225-228, 231-232,264 actuality 5, 17, 68, 95, 128, 133-134, 182-187, 190-191, 195, 201-204, 208-213,217,255 actuality sense of 'is', see 'is' adequate knowledge 237 adjectives 7, 33, 39, 41, 43, 54, 63, 123 ambiguity xi, 4, 29, 34, 38, 40, 78, 81-82. 85,148-149,155,181,186-189,191, 195,240, 269-270 ampliation 138 anaphora 256 antihaecceitist 283 aorist 7 apodeictic syllogisms 88 ars sermocinalis 167 aspect of the verb 4 attribute 32, 75, 208, 210, 224, 230-231, 238,241

calculus ratiocinator 276 categorematic words 148, 156 categorial content 148, 152-153 categorial proposition 120, 166 categories xi, xiii, 5, 14, 17, 21, 68, 71-73, 78-80, 85, 90-92, 99, Ill, 118, 147-150, 101-108, 181-182,186-189,192,208,225,262 characteristics (Merkmale) 271- 272, 278, 282 chimera xiii, 115-116, 118-123, 125, 128-129,131-140,157-158,160,216 clear and distinct concept 230, 232, 234, 236,239 complete entities 232, 236-239 complete expressions 159,272-274 compossible 211-212 concept 117, 135, 148, 159-160, 172, 202-203, 225-226, 281-284 concept-words 273, 282 conceptual beings 224 conceptual existence 117, 227 consigni/icatio 146, 149-154, 161, 190 convertible notions 208, 224 copula xii, 1-12, 17-21,23,26,74,94, 101, 107, 122-125, 139, 147-148, 152-158, 163-165, 168-169, 171, 184-185,189,191,194,195,258-259, 270, 272, 277 count noun 111

barbara 87-88 Bedeutung 272-273, 277, 279-280, 282 Begriffe erster und zweiter Stufe 270, 285 being, philosophical concept of: Abelard 149-152, 155-162; Aristotle 17, 49-50, 55-59, 64-73, 81-96, 100-111,200-201; Boethius of Dacia 132-134; Descartes 224-234; Frege 269-285; John Buridan 138-139; John Duns Scot us 207-213; Kant 249-265; Leibniz 212-213; Melissus 13-14, 17-18; modists 131; Parmenides 14-18, 25-27; Plato 16-21, 34-39, 42-44, 51-55; Protagoras 12-14; Robert Kilwardby 124-131; Roger Bacon 129-131;

de re 211-222 deep structure 155, 160, 163 definition 18-20, 76, 84, 102, 120, 129, 135, 139, 193,204,282 dictio 127, 158,205 dictum 159-162

297

298

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

disjunctive attributes 208, 210 disjunctive concept 207 distant vs indistant composition 137 distinction of reason 230-231, 236 divine: attributes 236; intellect 209-210, 217; omnipotence 204, 209, 217, 243, 254,257; omniscience 212; possibilities 203-204,209; will 209, 217 dualism: Cartesian 223-224, 232-241; Platonic 20

einai: hap/os 49,59,67, 89; kath' hauto 56, 64-68, 70-73 enuntiatio 159 equivocity 39, 124, 130, 150, 164-165, 168,186-188,204-205; pros hen xi, xii, 3, 205 esse, ens, est 12:'-124, 128-133, 135, 138, 145-152, 155-158, 162-166, 172-178, 182-195, 198, 204-208, 212-217 essence, essential 18-21,55-59,64,67, 71-73, 83, 85-86,90-95, 126-128, 132, 155-156, 182-184, 192, 194, 201-204, 206, 210-211, 224-225, 227,231-235,271,282 essentialism 50, 55, 57, 61, 63, 94 existence 1, 3-4, 9-17, 21, 61, 65-67, 71,75-78,81-82,85-92,96,99,101, 105,107,124,127-128,131,156-157, 181,183-188,192,202,206,210-211, 227,238,257,259,269-272,275-276, 280, 284; as a predicate 210, 249, 252-254, 256, 258-259, 263-264, 276, 278-279; degrees of 54, 131, 206, 250; 'is' of existence, see 'is' existential: generalization 253, 259; import xii-xiii, 9, 79, 91-93, 152, 155-158,165,253-254,271; quatifier 10,59,251,259-260,269-270 extensional 154, 167, 204 fallacy: of consequent 125, 127; of equivocation 17, 127; of the magnifying glass 64-65, 73; secundum quid et simpliciter xiii, 125-126, 136, 138 fictitious entities 135; see chimera first-order concepts 271-272, 275, 277 first-order logic 92,96-97,260,269-270

focal meaning xiv, 3,107-108,190 form 95, 105, 108, 110-111, 167, 197, 213, 224, 229, 238 forman distinction 226-227, 236 Forms (Plato) 4,19-21,32,41,52 Frege - Russell distinction ix-xi, xv, 81-87, 89-90, 92-93, 96-98, 101, 107- 108, 110, 112, 186, 188, 249, 257-260, 265, 269, 272, 285 function-names (Funktionsnamen) 272-274 game-theoretical semantics 102- 103, 252,269 generic implication 81-82, 249, 270 genus 14, 71, 73, 90-92, 99, 101, 122, 129, 182, 238 great chain of being 202 haecceitas 212 Hermann's rule 50 hierarchy of being 206 higher order predicate 265 homonymy 82, 108; see equivocation idea 29, 31,42; see Forms (Plato) identifiability 208, 210-212 identity 29, 34, 63-64, 76, 78, 81-83, 85-86, 88-89, 92-96, 99, 101-102, 104,107, 167, 181, 188,210-212,269, 272, 279-280 identity theory of predication 167, 188 impossible beings 120, 133-134, 136-138, 140, 216-217 incomplete expressions 158-159,272 incomplete entities 237 indistant composition 137 individual 92, 94, 105, 107, 110-111, 128, 210-213, 226, 229, 243, 255, 282 individuation 94-95, 110, 202 inesse principle 212 infinite words 117,119,127,129-130 inherence theory of predication 167, 188, 197 instantia naturae 209 instantiation 27, 96-97, 99, 102, 104 intellectus 146-147,190,192,214 intensional 54, 56- 57, 167, 209- 211

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 'is': accidental 56, 64, 66, 68-71; actuality sense of 181-187, 191; copulative (see copula), ellipsis hypothesis of (86-92); of existence ix, 1-4,6,9-17, 27,53,59,61,65-67,71,73,81-82, 84-91,93,96,99,101,105-107, 124, 183-188,249,260,265,269; of generic implication ix, 81-82, 249, 270; of identity 35-36,38-39,63-64,81-84, 88-89,93-94,99,101,183,186,188, 249, 258, 269, 281, 284; of location 3-4,7-11, 15, 17; of predication ix, 1-10, 17, 20-22, 26-27, 35-36, 38-39,53,59,61,63-64,81-84,86, 89,93-94,99,124,152,183-188,195, 249, 265, 270, 281 (see also copula); there-is sense of 182-187; veridical 3-4, 8-9, 12-13, 16-17, 20-22, 26- 27, 184. (See also being, einai, esse, existence.)

lingua characteristica 276 linguistic relativism 3 -4, 21 logic of tense 169 logical: functors 148; possibilities 204, 209, 212; predicates 264; truth 40; types 104-107 logically simple 282-284 many-sorted logic 97-98, 110 many-sorted quantification theory 97 mass terms III matter 94-95, lOS, 108, 110-111, 202, 213,226-227 mind 223, 232-241 modal: categories 262, 265; concepts 94, 203-204; distinction 228, 230-231; logic xiv, 211, 256; operator 41, 249-250; syllogisms 88; theoTY 167 modes: of being 131, 205; of intellection 205; of signifying 206 modists xiii, 131-132, 135 natural kinds 117, 201, 203 necessary beings 132-133, 250 necessity 88, 147, 161,234,249-254,262 nominal definition 120, 129, 135, 139 nominalists xiv numerical identity 88, 102, 224, 229

299

(to) on 6,8-9, 11-14, 18-20,27-28,68, 82,91,101 ontological argument xv, 249-253, 256, 261-263,271 ontological relativity 76 opinable 116, 119-125, 127-131, 136, 138 oratio 158 ousia 18, 71, 91, 93, 107, III Pauline predication 34, 39 possibility 204, 208-213, 234, 243, 252-258, 261-264 possible beings 132-139, 210-213, 234, 255, 261-263, 276 possible world semantics xiv, 250, 276 potentiality 5, 17,68,94-95,210,255 predication 1-10, 12, 17,20-22,27,29, 35-39,53,59,61,63-64,81-86,89, 92-95, 9~ 105, III, 124, 132-138, 162-171, 181-189, 249, 259, 269-272, 275, 279-284 principle of individuation 202 principle of plenitude 203,261-262 privation 17, 127, 182, 195 proper name 60, 76, 259, 272-274, 282-283 propositon: two-part analysis vs threepart anaiysis 163-171 quality 33,147,149-150,153,201,205, 207,226,229-231,240 quantification theory 92, 96, 104, 110 quantifier phrase 99, 110-111 quantifying in 255 quantity 33, 106, 149, 205, 207 question: types 103; words 104; and answers 101-102 quidditative: beings 132, 206, 210; definition 129 quiddity 203, 213

ratio: communis 205-207; propria 205-206 real distinction 206, 226- 232, 236, 240-241 real predicate 259, 264-265, 275, 278 reality 6, 19-20,22 reference, see sense-reference distinction

300

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

relations 33, 106, 162-163, 209 relative pronouns 98, 104 res signijicata 206 Russell's Antinomy 39

suppositio 134-137,162,167,188,197 surface structure 155 syllogism 87-88, 90-92 syncategorematic words 148. 156, 162

scibile 119, 132 scientific knowledge 87-91, 120, 139 second-order concepts 270-271,275, 278 secundum adiacens xii-xiii, 122-127, 164-165 self-predication 29 sense-reference distinction 60, 76, 195, 272-274, 277-280 sermocinalis scientia 168 signification 135-139, 147-155, 158-167, 184, 187-191, 204-206 simplification 57-58, 65-67, 70 Sinn 272-274, 277-280 soul, see mind species 73,86, 119, 122, 125, 128-129, 201-204,238,281 square of opposition 78 stative-durative 4 stative-mutative 20 substance, substantial 71-72, 79, 85, 93-94, 102, 104- 105, 107- 108, 110-111, 120, 127-128, 147, 149-152, 157, 181-187, 191-193, 201-202,204-207, 224-231,236-240 substitutivity principle 260 sUbsumption 271

temporal: copula 139; co-signification 150-154; meaning 149; predicates 106 terminist logic 204 tertium adiacens xii, xiii, 122-124, 164-165 there-is sense of 'is', see 'is' Third Man Argument 29-34, 43 (to) Ii en einai 20, 56-57, 85, 95 transcendental philosophy 261 transcendentals 208, 231 transformational grammar 62, 103 truth 8-22, 159-163, 184, 186, 189, 192-196 universals 33-35, 41,105,122,127,135, 225-226, 267 univocation 17, 131,204-207,212,230, 278 veridical sense of 'is', see 'is' well-definedness 251 wh-words xi, 98-99, 102 what-questions 98, 104- 105