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Blind Spots: The Roots of Unethical Behaviour at Wor Work k Acknowledging the perils of o f the ‘want’ self and addressing the informal values in an organization can lead to more ethical behaviour. by Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel
HOW et ethi hical cal do you thi think nk you are, compar comp ared ed to the oth o ther er peop pe ople reading readi ng this magazine? On a scale of 0 to 100, rate yourself relative relative to the them: m: if yo you u be beli liev evee yo you u ar aree amon amongs gstt th thee mo most st ethic ethical al in the the group,give group, give yourself a score near 100; if you consider yourself average, give yourself a score of 50. Now rate your organization: on a scale of 0 to 100, how ethical is it compared to others? If you’re like most of the people we’ ve asked, both scores will wi ll be hig high her tha than n 50 50.. If we ave average raged d the sco scores of all all the peop people le reading this, we guess the average would be about ab out 75. Yet that can’t be the case: case: the average score would would have .to be 50. Some of you must be overestimating overestimating your ethicality. The fact is, most
of us us overe overestima stimate te our our own own ethical ethicality ity at som somee poi point. nt. In eff effect ect,, we areunaware areunawa re of the gap bet betwee ween n how eth ethica icall we thi think nk we ar aree and and how ethical we truly are. Trad raditi ition onal al ap appro proac ache hess to eth ethics ics lac lack k an un unde derst rstan andin ding g of the uninte uni ntentio ntional nal-ye -yett-pre predic dictab table le cog cogniti nitivepatte vepatterns rns tha thatt res result ult in unet un ethi hica call be beha havi viou ourr. Ou Ourr ai aim m in th this is ar arti ticl clee is to al aler ertt yo you u to th thee blind spots that prevent us from seeing the gaps between our actual an and d de desir siredbeh edbehavi aviou ourr. Ou Ourr own res resea earch rch on ‘bo ‘boun unde ded d eth ethica icalit lity’ y’ and and ss fro from m th thee em emer ergi ging ng d d of Be Beha havi viou oura rall Et Ethi hics cs of offe fer r insights that can help us understand why we often behave contrary to our . best intentions. RotmanMagazineSpring 2011 /53
Ethical Gaps in Individuals
The notion that we experience gaps between who we believe our selves to be and who we actually are is related to the problem of ‘bounded awareness’. This term refers to the common tendency to exclude relevant information from our decisions by placing arbitrary bounds around our definition of a problem, resulting in a systematic failure to see important information. To illustrate, take a look at the following picture:
What do you see? Now, take a look at the Dalmatian sniffing the ground. Most people don’t see the Dalmatian on first look; but once they know she is there, they can no longer look at the image without noticing her. The context of the black black-and-white -and-white back ground groun d keeps us from notic noticing ing the Dalma Dalmatian, tian, just as our profit-focused work environments can keep us from seeing the ethical implications of our actions. As this exercise demonstrates, demonstrates, we are ‘boundedly aware’: aware’: our perception perceptionss and decision making are constrained in ways we don’t realize. We have found that in addition to falling prey to bounded awareness, we are also subject to ‘bounded ethicality’, or systematic constraints on our morality that favour our own self-interest. As a result, our evaluations of our own moral transgressions often differ substantially from our evaluations of the same transgressions committed by others. In one study of this phenomenon, participants were divided into two groups. In one, participants were required to distrib ute a resource (such as time or energy) energy ) to themselves and another person and could make the distribution fairly or unfairly. The ‘allocators’ were then asked to evaluate the ethicality of their actions. In the other condition, participants viewed viewe d anoth er perso person n actin actingg in an unfai r manne mannerr and subse subse-quently evaluated the ethicality of this act. Individuals who made an unfair distribution perceived this transgression to be less objectionable than did those who saw another person commit the same transgression. This widespread double standard – one rule for ourselves, a different rule for others – is consistent with 54 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2011
the gap that often exists between who we are and who we think we should be. While you might accept the fact that most people have inflated perceptions of their own ethicality ethicality,, in all likelihood you remain skeptical that this applies to you. In fact, you are probabl y certain that you are as ethical as you have always believed yourself to be. Let’s test this assumption. Imagine that you have volunteered to participate in an experiment that requires you to try to solve a number of puzzles. You You are told that you will wil l be paid according to your performance – a set amount for each successfully-solved puzzle. The experimenter mentions in passing that the research program is well funded, and explains that, once you have finished the task, you will check your answers against an answer sheet, count the number of questions you answered correctly, put your answer sheet through a shredder, report the number of questions you solved correctly to the experimenter, and receive the money that you reported you earned. Would you truthfully report the number of puzzles you solved, or would you report a slightly higher number? Note that there is no way for the experimenter to know if you cheated. While we can’t predict whether you would cheat on this task, we do know that lots of seemingly nice people people do cheat – just a little. They count a problem that they would have answered correctly, if only they hadn’t made a careless mistake; or they count a problem they would have aced if they only had another ten seconds. In addition, when piles of cash are present on a table in the room, people are even more likely to cheat than when less money is visible. In this case, participants presumably justify their cheating on the grounds that the experimenters have ‘money to burn’. This study was not the exception to the rule: ample research confirms that people who believe they are honest do in fact cheat when given an easy, easy, unverifiable opportunity to do so. Ethical Gaps in Organizations
Ethical gaps at the individual level are compounded when considered at the organizational level. One compellin g example is the 1986 explosion of the Challenger space shuttle after it was launched at the lowest temperature in its histor y. Extensive post-crash analyses documented that the explosion was caused because bec ause an O-ring on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters failed to seal at low temperatures. On January 27, 1986, the night before the launch, engineers and managers from NASA and from shuttle contractor Morton Thiokol met to discuss whether it was safe to launch the Challenger at a low temperature. In seven of the shuttle program’s 24 previous launches, problems with O-rings had been detected. Now, under intense time pressure, Morton Thiokol engineers hurriedly put together a presentation. They recommended to their superiors and to NASA personnel that the shuttle should not be launched at low temperat temperatures, ures, citing their judgment that there wa s a connection between low temperature and the magnitude of these past O-ring problems.
Bounded awareness refers to the common tendency to exclude relevant information from a decision by placing arbitrary bounds around our definition of the problem.
NASA personnel reacted to the engineers’ recommendation not to launch with hostility, h ostility, according to Roger Boisjoly , a Morton Thiokol engineer who participated in the meeting. In response to NASA’s negative reaction to the recommendation not to launch, Morton’s managers asked for the chance c hance to caucus caucu s privately. “Just “Just as [NASA manager] Larry Mulloy gave conclusion usion,” ,” writes Mulloy gave his concl Boisjoly, “[Morton Thiokol’s] Joe Thiokol’s] Joe Kilminster asked for a fiveminute, off-line caucus to re-evaluate the data and as soon as the mute button was pushed, our general manager, Je Jerry rry Mason, Mason, said in a soft voice, ‘We have to make a management decision.’” In the caucus that followed, “No one in management wanted to discuss the facts”, writes Boisjoly. In his opinion, his superiors were prima primarily rily focus focused ed on pleas pleasing ing their custom customer, er, which w hich had placed Morton Thiokol Thiokol in the position of proving that it was not safe to fly rather than the more typical default of not launching until there was reason to believe it was safe to fly. “The managers were struggling to make a list of data that would support a launch decision,” he writes, “but unfortunately for them, the data actually supported a no-launch decision.” Against the objections of their own engineers, the four Morton Thiokol senior managers present voted to recommend in favour favour of the launch. They then gave their recommendation to NASA, which quickly accepted the recommendation to launch. Perhaps the most startling aspect of this story was the data that engineers analyzed when trying to determine whether low temperatures were connected to O-ring failure. NASA and Morton Thiokol engineers argued about the possible role of temperature based on the fact that low temperatures were present during many of the seven launches that had O-ring problems. Many of the engineers on both teams saw no clear observable pattern regarding the O-rings. These were experienced engineers with rigorous analytic training. They were talented enough to know that, to find out whether outdoor temperature was related to engine failure, they should examine temperatures when problems occurred and temperatures when they did not. Yet no one asked for the temperatures for the 17 past launches in which no O-ring failure had occurred. An examination of all of the data shows a clear connection between temperature and O-ring failure, predicting that the Challenger had a greater than 99 per cent chance of failure. But
because the engineers were constrained in their thinking, they only looked at a subset of the available a vailable data and missed seeing the connection. The failure of NASA and Morton Thiokol engineers to look outside the bounds of ‘the data in the room’ was an error committed by well-intentioned people that caused seven astronauts to lose their lives and delivered an enormous blow to the U.S. U.S. space program. Unfortunately, it is very common for decision makers to err by limiting their analysis to the data in the room, rather than asking what data would best best answer answer the question being being asked. asked. These decidecision makers were guilty of a common form of bounded ethicality: moving forward too quickly with readily-available information, rather than first asking what data would be relevant to answer the question on the table and how the decision would affect other aspects of the situation. An organization’s ethical gap is more than just the sum of the individual ethical gaps of its employees. In fact, group work – the building block of organizations – creates additional ethical gaps. Groupthink – the tendency for cohesive groups to avoid a realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action in favour of unanimity – often prevents groups from challenging ethically-questionable decisions, as was the case with NASA’s fateful decision. Changing Yourself
Confucious said that “Only the wisest and stupidest of [people] never change,” and as a result, virtually all of us are ripe for change. Following are two ways to become more aware of your ethical blind spots. 1. Antic Anticipate ipate your your ‘want’ self. self. ‘System 1 thinking’ refers to our
fast, automatic, effortless and emotional decision processes, while ‘System 2 thinking’ refers to slower, conscious, logical and more reasoned decision processes. Not surprisingly, System 1 responses are more likely to be immoral than System 2 tho ughts. This suggests that learning to think before acting, in more reflective and analytical ways, can help help us move toward toward the ideal ideal image image we we hold of ourselves ourselves.. But doing so entails being prepared for the hidden psychological forces that crop up before, during and after we confront ethical dilemmas. The ‘want’ self – that part of us that behaves according to self interest and often without regard for moral principles – is Rotman Magazine Spring 2011 / 55
silent during the planning stage of a decision, typically emerging and dominating at the time of the decision. Not only will your selfinterested motives be more prevalent than you think, but they likely will override whatever ‘moral’ thoughts you have. If you find yourself thinking thinking “I would never never do that” or “Of course course I’ll choose the right path,” it’s likely that you’ll be unprepared for the influence of self-interest at the time of the decision. One technique for fighting the ‘want’ self involves putting in place ‘pre-commitment devices’ that seal you to a desired course of action. For example, in one study Philippine farmers who saved their money by putting it a ‘l ock box’ were able to save more money than those who did not, even factoring in the small cost of the lock box. By eliminating their ability to to spend the money money immediately, the lock box effectively constrained the ‘want’ self. When faced with an ethical dilemma, we can use similar strate gies to keep our ‘wa ‘want’ nt’ sel selff fro m dom domina inating ting mor moree rea reason soned ed decision making. In addition, research on the widespread phenomenon of ‘escalation of commitment’ – our reluctance to walk away from a chosen course of action – shows that those who publicly commit to a decision in advance are more likely to follow through with it than are those who do not make such a commitment. You might also precommit to your intended ethical choice by sharing it with an unbiased individual who you believe to be highly ethical. In doing so, you can induc inducee escal escalation ation of comm commitmen itmentt and incre increase ase the like likelihood lihood that you will make the decision you planned – and hoped – to make.
3. Evaluate your your unethical choice accurately. accurately. Because we want
to see ourselves as ethical, our recollections of our behaviour tend to be biased in that direction. De-biasing oneself isn’t easy – most of us need training to help us identify the distorted feedback we give ourselves. Rather than focusing on how we should behave, such training would emphasize the psychological mechanisms that lead to unethical behaviour and inaccurate recollections of such behaviour. In addition, it would incorporate techniques to help people accurately recall their behaviour. Training individuals to note the biases and distortions that impede accurate evaluation of their actions can help mitigate the effects of these biases. Changing Organizations
In The Ford Pinto Case, Douglas Birsch and and J John ohn Fielder Fielder recount that when it was discovered that the Pinto’s gas tank was unsafe, nobody reported it to Lee Iacocca . “Hell no,” replied one Ford engineer. “That person would have been fired. Whenever a problem was raised raised that meant a delay delay on the Pinto, Pinto, Lee would chomp on his cigar, look out the window and say ‘Read the product objectives and get back to work.’ work.’ Iacocca Iacocca was was fond of saying, “Safe “Safety ty doesn’t doesn’t sell.” sell.” Clearly, without a leader who believes in ethical decision making, an organization will not behave ethically. But at the same time, having an ethical leader is not sufficient: findings findings from the emerging field of Behavioural Ethics suggest that the following less obvious aspects of unethical behaviour must also be addressed. Hidden-but-powerful informal values. The informal values
2. Give voice to your ‘should’ self. Focusing on the high-level
aspects of a situation is one way to do this. For example, a group of researchers was able to reduce the immediate temptation of eating a tasty pretzel by refocusing participants’ participants’ attention away from the concrete aspects of the temptation – how good the pretzel would taste – and toward its abstract dimensions. They did so by asking participants to imagine that they were looking at a photograph of a pretzel rather than an actual pretzel. In a similar manner, when we are faced with an ethical dilemma, we may be able to give the ‘should’ self a stronger voice by focusing on the abstract principles that guide the decision: rather than thinking about the immediate payoff of an unethical choice, think about which values and principles you believe should guide the decision to give your ‘should’ self a fighting chance. Another efficient strategy involves reformulating a dilemma into a choice between two options – the ethical choice and the unethical choice, which highlights the fact that by choosing the unethical option, you are not choosing the ethical one. In one study, study, individuals who evaluated two options at a time – an improvement in air quality (the ‘should’ choice) and a commodity such as a new printer (the ‘want’ choice) – were more likely to choose the option that maximized the public good (improvement in air quality); by contrast, when participants evaluated the options independently of one another, they more often chose the printer. 56 / Rotman Magazine Spring 2011
imparted at work play a critical role in employee behaviour. What pressures do employees feel, and why? What ethical challenges do they face? What types of decisions does the organization actually reward? What qualities characterize those who make it to the top? One way to get to the heart of these questions is to try to identify who really really ‘runs’ ‘runs’ the the company company – which which may may not neces necessarily sarily mean the CEO. In the later days of Arthur Andersen, Andersen, it was the consultants who had the most power power,, and and at Ford during the Pinto era, it was the salespeople: “This company is run by salesmen, not engineers; so the priority is styling, not safety,” said one engineer. Identifying these ‘pockets of power’ can reveal a great deal about an organization’s true values. If winning consulting business is an accounting firm’s penultimate goal, what considerations are being pushed aside to achieve it? If salespeople are running an auto manufacturer, whose voicess are being silen voice silenced? ced? Payi Paying ng attentio attention n to what isn’t being talked about within an organization can provide valuable information about informal values, as exemplified in this quote from Barbara “We were supposedly Toffler,, a former Arthur Andersen employee: “We Toffler still the guardians of the public trust, but no one ever mentioned that. Everyone did, however, talk about making money all the time.” ‘Ethics talk’ – or a lack lac k thereof – also reveals a great deal about an organization. How is unethical behaviour described? More importantly,, how is it disguised? For example, when someone is importantly found to have lied to a customer, customer, is the word ‘lying’ used, or is the
Paying attention to what isn’t being Paying talked about within an organization can provide valuable information about informal values.
behaviour disguised as ‘misrepresenting the facts’? Is stealing described as an ‘inappropriate allocation of resources’? There is power in calling unethical behaviour by its name: if it isn’t labeled as such, it is unlikely that an intervention will be attempted, let alone succeed. Ethical ‘sink holes’. The difficult task of identifying how informal values differ differ from desired values values can be made easier easier by identifying identifying characteristics that make misalignment more likely. We suggest paying close attention to three particular characteristics: uncertainty,, time pressure and isolation. ty The more uncertainty there is in an environment, the more likely unethical behaviour is to occur. In environments characterized by high uncertainty, individuals may be able to downplay the ethical implications of a decision and, in doing so, become more likely to code the decision as a business decision decision rather than an ethical one. Uncertainty has also been identified as a catalyst in the divergence between the ‘want’ and ‘should’ self. By introducing the idea that an outcome may not have ethical implications, the ‘want’ self may be able to focus on its own desires, increasing the probability that the individual will make an unethical choice. In the case of the Ford Pinto, focusing on the likelihood that the engines would not combust upon impact faded other possible outcomes – including engine combustion and subsequent loss of life – from consideration, allowing the decision to be re-coded as a business rather than an ethical decision. Time pressure is another likely source of unethical behaviour. The busier and more rushed people are, the more likely they are to rely on (automatic) System 1 thinking. Time pressure reduces the cognitive resources available and decreases the odds of making ‘should’ choices. This clearly characterized the Ford Pinto scenario: described in the book as “the shortest production planning period in modern automotive history,” the Pinto’s production schedule was set at under 25 months, in stark contrast to the average of 43 months. We can increase our likelihood of making ‘should’ choices by analyzing ethical dilemmas in an environment free of distractions and time pressures. Isolated individuals and groups also tend to develop norms that diverge from an organization’s stated norms. From 1990 to 1994,
General Electric paid fines ranging from a $20,000 criminal fine to a $24.6 million civil fine for unethical behaviour that included money laundering, defective pricing and mail fraud. In one 1992 incident, GE pled guilty to defrauding the Pentagon and agreed to pay $69 million in fines. The company took responsibility for the behaviour of a former marketing employee who, working with an Israeli Air Force general, helped to divert Pentagon funds to their personal bank accounts and to Israeli military programs that were unauthorized by the United States. As a result of these and other incidents (and being shut out of government contracts for six months), GE now strives to prevent isolated groups from hatching fraudulent plots. In closing
Once you identify your organization’s own ‘sink holes’, focus on promoting ethical values to key individuals, particularly those with access to and control over information and staff. Communicating desired values to these employees and finding ways to make them stick will provide the biggest payoff in terms of reforming your organization’s informal culture. While we have no way of knowing what ethical challenges you are facing in your personal and professional life, we do know that many of us fall short of our own ethical standards. Applying Applying the lens of Behavioural Ethics, we have identified some of the ways in which you can make choices that better align al ign with your own and your organization’s values. In the end, using the tools at our disposal, each one of us can contribute to creating a more ethical world.
is the Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration at Tenbrunsel is Harvard Business School. Ann Tenbrunsel the Rex and Alice Martin Professor of Business Ethics in the Department of Management at Mendoza College of Business at the University of Notre Dame and co-director of the Institute for Ethical Business Worldwide. The preceeding is adapted from their new book, Blind Spots: Why We We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do About It (Princeton University Press, 2011). Max Bazerman
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