Bersamin Cases Digest

DECISIONS AND OPINIONS DECIDED BY JUSTICE LUCAS BERSAMIN (2009 – 2015) Lex Cervus Fraternity ▪ Lex Augustiniana Sororitas “We Never Forget Traditional Spirit”

BAR OPERATIONS 2017

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2009 RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC. (AM. No. 09-6-9-SC | 19 August 2009) FACTS: In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote : The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to pay a nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee. The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this "privilege" to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations. In addition, this law deals mainly with "individual indigent" and it does not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reachedout to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for "common prescriptions", to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them.

poor. In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus: Sec. 21. Indigent party. -- A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a) Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300, 000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.

ISSUE: Can the Courts grant to the Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people?

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

RULING: To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.

The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its

Lex Cervus Fraternity ▪ Lex Augustiniana Sororitas “We Never Forget Traditional Spirit”

3 members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person's poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts. In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

DUCO VS. COMELEC

(G. R. No. 183366, August 19, 2009) FACTS: On October 29, 2007, simultaneous barangay and sangguniang kabataan (SK) elections were held all over the country. In Barangay Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, the petitioner was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay. His opponent, respondent Narciso Avelino, initiated an election protest in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), seeking a recount of the ballots in four precincts upon his allegation that the election results for the position of Punong Barangay were spurious and fraudulent and did not reflect the true will of the electorate. The MCTC ultimately ruled in favor of respondent Avelino. Duco filed his notice of appeal on January 25, 2008 and paid as appeal fees the amounts of P820.00 under Official Receipt (OR) No. 3879928; P530.00 under OR No. 8054003; and P50.00 under OR No. 0207223. On April 30, 2008, however, the COMELEC dismissed Duco's appeal. Duco moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC denied his motion on May 22, 2008

when there is no showing on the part of the public respondent that item number 3 of the same was complied with. RULING 1: The action of the First Division was patently contrary to Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. In this connection, Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, outline the correct steps to be taken in the event motions for reconsideration are filed, to wit: Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.-Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc. Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Reconsideration.--The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof. The outlined steps were obviously not followed. There is no showing that the clerk of court of the First Division notified the Presiding Commissioner of the motion for reconsideration within 24 hours from its filing; or that the Presiding Commissioner certified the case to the COMELEC en banc; or that the clerk of court of the COMELEC en banc calendared the motion for reconsideration within 10 days from its certification. Lest it be supposed that the Court overlooks the violation of the Constitution, we set aside the second assailed resolution (dated May 22, 2008) for being contrary to the Constitution and in disregard of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. For sure, the First Division could not issue the resolution because the Constitution has lodged the authority to do so in the COMELEC en banc.

(1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in strictly applying the COMELEC rules of procedure, as amended;

RULING 2: Nonetheless, we do not remand the motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc for its proper resolution. As we have done in Aguilar v. COMELEC, we are going to resolve herein the propriety of the dismissal of the appeal "considering the urgent need for the resolution of election cases, and considering that the issue has, after all, been raised in this petition."

(2) Whether or not the COMELEC again committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to strictly apply COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130 dated 18 September 2002

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the notice of appeal must be filed within five days after the promulgation of the decision. In filing the appeal, the appellant is required to pay the appeal fees imposed by

ISSUES:


4 Sec. 3, Rule 40, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130. Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the fees "shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within the period to file the notice of appeal." The petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal on January 25, 2008, that is, within five days after the promulgation of the MCTC decision on January 22, 2008. On the same day, he paid P1, 400.00 as appeal fee to the Clerk of Court of the MCTC. His payment was, however, short by P1, 800.00, based on Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 02-0130. Moreover, he paid the appeal fee to the MCTC cashier, contrary to the mandate of Sec. 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the payment be made to the Cash Division of the COMELEC. The petition for certiorari lacks merit. The dismissal of the appeal was in accordance with Sec. 9 (a), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently states: Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal.- The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds: (a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx The payment of the deficiency beyond the five-day reglementary period did not cure the defect, because the date of the payment of the appeal fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the notice of appeal. Accordingly, his appeal, filed already beyond the five-day reglementary period, rendered the decision of the MCTC final and immutable. Still, the petitioner contends that the COMELEC should have liberally applied its procedural rules in order not to override substantial justice. He claims that he honestly believed in good faith that his appeal fees were sufficient. He alleges that he paid the appeal fees required under A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, which took effect May 15, 2007, per the certification dated May 19, 2008 of the Clerk of Court II of the MCTC. He submits that the COMELEC should have accepted the postal money order for P3,000.00 remitted with the motion for reconsideration and given him ample time to come up with any deficiency which he was more than willing to pay. We

cannot

heed

the

petitioner's

plea.

At any rate, the plea for a liberal application of technical rules of procedure to promote the ends of justice is undeserving of any sympathy from us. Time and again, we have ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket fee within the period to appeal is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Such payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory, as if no appeal was filed.

The petitioner ought to be reminded that appeal is not a right but a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law. Lastly, the petitioner's claim that the MCTC was not furnished a copy of Resolution No. 02-0130 lacks substance. The resolution was not unknown to the MCTC and to his counsel, because it had already been issued on September 18, 2002. His counsel cannot feign ignorance of the resolution for, as a lawyer, he had the duty to keep himself abreast of legal developments and prevailing or pertinent laws, rules and legal principles. Having determined that the petitioner's appeal was properly dismissed, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner. Alas, the petitioner did not discharge his burden. The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

ISMUNLATIP H. SUHURI vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 181869 | 2 October 2009) FACTS: Suhuri ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Patikul, Sulu during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. He was opposed by Hayudini and a third candidate, Datu Jun Tarsum. During the canvassing held on May 17, 2007 within the Sulu State College in Jolo, Sulu, Suhuri orally objected to the inclusion of the election returns from the complained 25 precincts. The affected precincts carried a total of 4,686 votes. He later filed with the MBC written petitions regarding such exclusion on May 17, 18 and 19, 2007. He asserted that the 25 election returns were "(1) [o]bviously manufactured; (2) [t]ampered with or falsified; (3) [p]repared under duress; and (4) [characterized by] [s]tatistical improbability." The MBC ruled against Suhuri in the evening of May 19, 2007 by rejecting his objections to the 25 election returns. Then and there, he manifested his intent to appeal vis-à-vis the ruling. He filed his notice of appeal shortly thereafter. In the same evening, the MBC proclaimed Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor for having obtained 7,578 votes as against Suhuri's 6,803 votes based on a complete canvass of the election returns, for a margin of 775 votes in favor of Hayudini. On May 23, 2007, Suhuri filed a petition-appeal with the COMELEC, docketed as S.P.C. No. 07-118. The petitionappeal was assigned to the Second Division.


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On May 25, 2007, Suhuri likewise filed an election protest ad cautelam dated May 21, 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Patikul, Sulu to contest the results of the elections for Municipal Mayor of Patikul, Sulu. On June 28, 2007, however, the RTC held the election protest in abeyance upon Suhuri's own motion due to his pending pre-proclamation controversy in S.P.C. 07-118. In a further move, Suhuri brought a so-called petition to declare a failure of election with urgent motion to suspend and/or annul the canvass of the election returns dated May 18, 2007, referring to the results from the 25 precincts in Barangays Anuling, Bongkaung, Langhub, Latih, and Maligay, all within Patikul, Sulu. However, the COMELEC en banc denied the petition for insufficiency of evidence on October 9, 2007. On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, gave due course to Suhuri's petition-appeal. On July 24, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, ruling on Suhuri's petition-appeal, excluded the 25 questioned electoral returns from the canvass for the position of Mayor of Patikul, Sulu; and voided the proclamation of Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor. In due course, Hayudini moved for the reconsideration of the July 24, 2007 ruling of the Second Division. Initially resolving Hayudini's motion for reconsideration, Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Nicodemo Ferrer voted in favor of the resolution of the Second Division, while Acting Chairman Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner and Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. Due to the fact that the required majority vote necessary to reverse the resolution of the Second Division was not reached, the COMELEC en banc conducted a re-hearing on November 22, 2007 pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. At the re-hearing, Suhuri presented 20 witnesses, who affirmed and identified their respective affidavits. For his part, Hayudini waived the cross-examination. Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their memoranda, and the appeal was then deemed submitted for resolution. On January 29, 2008, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its assailed resolution, granting the Motion for Reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the Resolution of the Second Division, and declaring the proclamation of Kabir Hayudini as VALID. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Suhuri's grounds for nullifying Hayudini's proclamation as the duly elected Mayor proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. 2) Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that the issue proferred by petitioner does not involve a preproclamation controversy.

RULING 1: Suhuri's Grounds Were Not Proper for a Pre-Proclamation Controversy. A pre-proclamation controversy, according to Section 1, Article XX of the Omnibus Election Code, refers to: xxx any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. Not every question bearing on or arising from the elections may constitute a ground for a preproclamation controversy. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the scope of a preproclamation controversy, as follows: Sec. 243. Issue that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. Clearly, Section 243, supra, limits a pre-proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein. The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (Section 234, Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Section 235, Omnibus Election Code); or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (Section 236, Omnibus Election Code). To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election irregularities. For as long as the election returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind the election returns in order to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or counting of votes. Suhuri submits that the 25 challenged election returns were defective for being manufactured, tampered with


6 or falsified, and for statistical improbability. He lists the following irregularities to buttress his submission. Suhuri further submits that threat, violence, duress and intimidation attended the preparation of the questioned election returns. As proof, his petition-appeal has included the following affidavits. In fine, Suhuri's submissions and supporting affidavits show that the election returns for Precinct Nos. 51A/52A lacked one of the necessary BEI signatures; that six of the contested election returns lacked some or all of the signatures and/or thumbmarks of the poll watchers; that another six election returns might indicate a statistical improbability of results; and that only one election return had no entries in the spaces for the precinct number, barangay, city/municipality and province. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the cited irregularities and omissions could not be the bases for granting his petition for the exclusion of the 25 election returns in a pre-proclamation controversy. Firstly, the defects cited by Suhuri were mere irregularities or formal defects that did not warrant the exclusion of the affected election returns. Indeed, the mere attendance or presence of the formal defects did not establish the commission of palpable irregularities in the election returns. As held in Baterina v. Commission on Elections, the grounds for the exclusion of election returns from the canvassing as raised by the petitioners' therein -referring to, among others, the failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors, and the lack of signatures of the petitioners' watchers, both involving a violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing - did not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing, being but defects in form insufficient to support the conclusion that these had been tampered with or spurious. In this regard, the Court has said that the conclusion that election returns were obviously manufactured or false and should consequently be disregarded from the canvass must be approached with extreme caution and made only upon the most convincing proof; and that only when the election returns were palpably irregular might they be rejected. Secondly, the MBC corrected the defects before the canvass of the election returns upon finding the cause of the defects to be satisfactorily explained by the members of the Board of Election Tellers. The COMELEC en banc expectedly approved of the MBC's actions, absent any other plausible explanation for the defects supported by substantial evidence. We agree with the COMELEC en banc. The actions of the MBC were reasonable and warranted. Judicial notice is properly taken of the fact that the conduct of elections in many parts of this country, particularly in areas like Patikul, Sulu, often come under circumstances less than ideal and convenient for the officials administering the elections; and of the fact that the process of elections usually involves sleepless nights, tiresome work, and constant dangers to the lives and personal safeties of the many officials who work to see to it that the elections are orderly and peaceful and their results are obtained

smoothly and with the least delay. We can easily conclude that such trying circumstances often lead to unintended omissions in form similar to those Suhuri pointed out. Thirdly, the allegation of a statistical improbability reflected in the election returns, lacks substance and merit. The doctrine of statistical improbability was first pronounced in Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections, in which the Court upheld the power and duty of the COMELEC to reject the returns of about 50 precincts affecting the elections of Senators, because their results were "contrary to all statistical probabilities," thus: It appearing therein that -- contrary to all statistical probabilities -- in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, -- again contrary to all statistical probabilities -- all the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts. Lagumbay expounded on the doctrine of statistical improbability and the doctrine's effect on the power of the COMELEC to reject the results reflected in the election returns when such returns showed prima facie that they did not reflect the true and valid reports of regular voting. Under Lagumbay, therefore, the doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the election return. The doctrine has no application where there is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one party. Thus, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zerovote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation. The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices - which is truly called for - innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us dismiss Suhuri's urging that some of the electoral results had been infected with the taint of statistical improbability as to warrant their exclusion from the canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, his petition and the records nowhere show that his party-mates received a similar number of votes (or lack of any) by which to conclude that there were a unique uniformity of tally and a systematic blanking of other candidates belonging to one party.


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Fourthly, Suhuri contends that threat, violence, duress and intimidation were attendant in the preparation of election returns of the 25 contested precincts. He has presented the affidavits of voters and poll watchers from the 25 precincts whose election returns he questioned; the affidavit of one Ermalyn J. Jamasali, a member of the BEI of one of the precincts; and the affidavit of Police Inspector Panisan, Chief of Police of Patikul, Sulu. Yet, the affidavits, because they referred to incidents that had occurred at the various precincts during the voting, did not substantiate Suhuri's allegation of duress, threats, coercion, and intimidation during the preparation or making of the election returns. The COMELEC en banc rightly noted and pointed this out in its assailed resolution. Fifthly, BEI member Jamasali narrated in her affidavit her having personally witnessed fraud committed during the elections. Even assuming that the fraud she thereby exposed constituted an irregularity in the conduct of the elections, the incident, being isolated, did not warrant the exclusion of all the 25 election returns, but only of the return for the precinct where the fraud had occurred. However, the exclusion of the election returns from that precinct (i.e., Precinct 17A/18A), if called for, would not alter the overall result for the mayoralty contest in Patikul, Sulu, considering that said precinct had only 189 registered voters. We note that Hayudini had a winning margin of 775 votes over Suhuri. Lastly, Police Inspector Panisan's election report, albeit official, would not justify the exclusion of the returns from the precincts clustered in the Anuling Elementary School. Concededly, Panisan's report, being hearsay because he had not himself actually witnessed the incidents described in the report, was unreliable and had no value for purposes of Suhuri's petition-appeal. It would not be trite to emphasize that the results of an election should not be annulled based on hearsay evidence. RULING 2: In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent for its issuance of the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner. Suhuri did not discharge his burden as petitioner, to satisfactorily show that his grounds were proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. We cannot go to his succor, for the COMELEC cannot not look behind or beyond the 25 contested election returns in a preproclamation controversy. Moreover, contrary to his urging, the COMELEC en banc did not rely mainly on the

report submitted by the MBC on December 4, 2007 in order to find against him. It is clear that the COMELEC en banc took note of the matters and circumstances that Suhuri himself had submitted to its consideration when it rendered its assailed resolution. If it did not accept his submissions, it did not abuse its discretion, because it based its assailed resolution on the established facts, the law, and the pertinent jurisprudence. Before closing, we stress that the powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature. This is the reason why the question of whether or not there were terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the elections should be ventilated in regular election protests. The COMELEC is not the proper forum for deciding such protests. Accordingly, a party seeking to raise issues, the resolution of which compels or necessitates the COMELEC's piercing the veil of election returns that appear prima facie to be regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election contest.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 164195 | December 4, 2009) FACTS: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government. After the initial processing at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. AFC and HPI received separately from the DAR’s Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at P86, 900,925.88 or P165, 484.47 per hectare while HPI’s properties were valued at P164, 478,178.14. Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties. AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and No. 113359. AFC applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 from VOS to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363. Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP’s valuation, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of P26, 409,549.86, while HPI withdrew the amount of P45, 481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, the Register of Deeds of Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued TCTs and


8 Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. (RTC BRANCH 2 TAGUM CITY) AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated. Summons was served to defendants DAR and LBP. The trial court appointed as Commissioners persons it considered competent, qualified and disinterested to determine the proper valuation of the properties. DAR and LBP submitted their Answer. The pre-trial order issued by the trial court reads: This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just Compensation, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, and also whether the value of the land and improvements as determined by the Land Valuation of Land Bank for the determination of just compensation, and whether the plaintiff has violated Section 13 of DARAB new rules and procedure. The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection The court-appointed commissioners submitted their appraisal report. The case was considered submitted for decision. After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision fixing the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs AFC and HPI. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration mainly on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are agricultural. LBP also sought a reconsideration of the award of attorney’s fees, the interest on the compensation over the lands and the order of the trial court regarding the payment of commissioners’ fees. In an Order, the trial court modified its decision. From this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted. Subsequently, the trial court, citing this Court’s ruling in the case of "Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, "that a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper mode of appeal from a decision on the determination of just compensation rendered by a special agrarian court, issued an Order recalling its Order and directed LBP to file a Petition for Review within the reglementary period. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon was not yet final at that time; hence, it is not certain whether the decision in that case would have a retroactive effect and that appeal is the appropriate remedy. This was denied by the trial court in its Order.

(COURT OF APPEALS) LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222) before the Court of Appeals assailing the orders of the trial court. The Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. In a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and the assailed orders were NULLIFIED and, accordingly, SET ASIDE. AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution. Earlier, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Review (CAG.R. SP NO. 74879). In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court. The appellate court held: The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized. It is only through a statement thereof in the petition can it be determined whether or not the petition was filed on time. For its failure to state the material dates, the petition can and should be outrightly dismissed. xxxx The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach material portions of the record as would support the allegations in the petition. More specifically, copies of the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the DAR, the order denying it, and the notice of appeal were not attached to the petition. The Decision became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by the appellate court. (SUPREME COURT) On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP, AFC and HPI filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the filing by LBP of the Petition for Certiorari is already barred by res judicata. 2) Whether or not the ruling of the SC in the Arlene De Leon Case, giving only prospective effect to its earlier resolution as to the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, is applicable in the instant case. RULING 1: AFC and HPI pray that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222 be reversed and set aside and that the Decision of the RTC in Agrarian Cases be declared as final and executory. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Decision, dated 12 February 2004, and Resolution, dated 21 June 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, giving due course to LBP’s appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED, this Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of public interest, the speedy administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to the present Petition and decide the same on its merits. Thus, the Decision, dated 25 September 2001, as modified by the Decision, dated 5 December 2001, of the


9 Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Branch 2, in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 is AFFIRMED. No costs. NO. The following are the elements of res judicata:    

The former judgment must be final; The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; It must be a judgment on the merits; and There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the former judgment must be on the merits is not present. It must be remembered that the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based on technicality, that is, for failure on the part of the DAR to state material dates required by the rules. Having been dismissed based on a technicality and not on the merits, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Res judicata applies only where judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first. RULING 2: NO. In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, decided on 10 September 2002, respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. They voluntarily offered the subject property for sale to the government. Unable to agree on the valuation offered by the DAR, respondents filed a petition with the RTC to fix the just compensation. In due time, the RTC rendered judgment fixing the compensation of the property. Before the Court of Appeals, the DAR and LBP filed separate petitions. The DAR filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the RTC. LBP raised the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of ordinary appeal. The petition of the DAR was given due course. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal on the ground that the same was erroneous. LBP filed a petition for review before this Court. In Land Bank, we explained: A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution of this Court dated 20 March 2003, this Court emphasized the prospective application of the Decision dated 10 September 2002, that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution. Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court should be brought to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The

Court of Appeals will no longer entertain ordinary appeals thereon. However, this rule applies only after the finality of the Resolution of this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon dated 20 March 2003. In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it gave due course to the appeal of LBP. LBP’s Notice of Appeal was filed on 27 December 2001. This was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated 15 May 2002. LBP’s appeal was, thus, perfected before this Court’s Resolution in the aforementioned Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon case. Hence, the Court of Appeals could give due course to LBP’s petition.

2010 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO (G. R. No. 191002 | 17 March 2010)

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)


10 was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. RULING: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-34150 | 16 October 1971) FACTS: After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the court have jurisdiction over the case. 2) Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional? 3) Whether or not the petition will prosper.


11

RULINGS: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed. 1) The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution. 2) The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together. 3) The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO (G.R. No. 191002 | 20 April 2010) FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling. ISSUE (Section 4): Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential

appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII? RULING: The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism. Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

LOKIN, JR. vs. COMELEC

(621 SCRA 385, June 22, 2010) FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to CIBAC’s Manifestation of Intent to participate in the party-list election. Respondents, President and chairman Villanueva submitted the certified Certificate of Nomination of CIBACto the COMELEC Law Department. Pia Derla submitted a 2nd Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, Jr (petitioner) as party-list nominees as she affixed her signature as “acting secretary-general” of CIBAC. The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized Respondents filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification,” seeking to nullify the certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contented that Derla had misrepresented herself as “acting secretary-general”, and not even a member of CIBAC. Resolution filed by the COMELEC First division granted the petition and ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunge from the records, and declared respondents’ group as the true nominees of CIBAC. COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division’s findings as the commission reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her authority to file a certificate, whereas respondents presented evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to CIBAC’s Constitution and bylaws. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr. (petitioner) to file Petition for Certiorari for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the said Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized as the legitimate nominees and representative of CIBAC party-list. ISSUES: (1) WON the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to file the part’s Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; (2) WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. RULINGS:


12 (1) The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of party-list representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government.” Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. (2) No error because it is indicated clearly in the law that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the partylist, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with COMELEC.

GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC (621 SCRA 499 | 22 June 2010)

CASE DOCTRINE: (Political Law: Election, Remedial Law): The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251 BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, .M. No 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure just and orderly administration of justice and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials. FACTS: Castillo and Revilla were mayoralty candidates during the 2007 local elections. After Revilla was proclaimed as the elected Municipal Mayor, Castillo filed and Election Protest Ad Cautelam, in the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.

Revilla then sought for the dismissal of the election protest alleging the erroneous filing of the case in the wrong Branch, violating Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 which designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite. Consequently, the RTC dismissed the case. Hence, Castillo appealed before the COMELEC which, however, dismissed the appeal for being brought beyond the five-day reglementary period. ISSUES: (1) Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for filing? (2) Was the appeal validly dismissed? RULING 1: It merely set the proper venue, it was not jurisdictional. It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials. RULING 2: YES. Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that “an aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.” In this case, Castillo only file her notice of appeal eight days after her receipt of the decision. The period and perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgements, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial system. A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the short period of five days as the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed. Also, the court cannot also presume the timeliness of her appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The


13 presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal was actually tardy. Hence, the appeal was validly dismissed.

MANIEBO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (627 SCRA 569 | 10 August 2010) CASE DOCTRINES: (Political Law: Admin Law): The presumption of good faith does not apply when the employee’s Certificate of Eligibility conflicts with the CSC’s Masterliest of Eligibles. Long and satisfactory government service does not mitigate the penalty of dismissal when there is refusal to own up to and when there is lack of remorse for dishonesty. (Remedial Law): An appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition; These rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudicing a party’s substantive rights. FACTS: Justina M. Maniebo was issued a promotional appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she appeared to posses the qualifications for the position. But when the CSC Regional Office No. IV verified her name against the Masterlist of Eligibles, she was found out to have actually failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only 60%.She was then charged with possessing of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty after having indicated in her Personal Data Sheet that she had passed the CSC (professional) examination with a rating of 74.01%. ISSUES: 1) Was the CSC was correct in imposing the penalty of dismissal in view of the circumstances obtaining in the case? 2) Did the court of appeals err in dismissing the petition based on alleged technicality? RULINGS: 1) YES. A permanent appointment implies the holding of a civil service eligibility on the part of the appointee, unless the position involved requires no such eligibility. Where the appointee does not possess a civil service eligibility, the appointment is considered temporary. The subsequent acquisition of the required eligibility will not make the temporary appointment regular or permanent; a new appointment is needed. Accordingly, any temporary employee who has served for the required duration of seven years must first be found by the CSC to continuously possess the minimum qualifications for holding the position, except the required eligibility, before he or she may be granted civil

service eligibility. Among the minimum qualifications is the continuous observance of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The petitioner failed to comply with this necessary minimum qualification. She thrived on her having misled the Government into believing that she had possessed the requisite civil service eligibility for the various positions she had successively held in her 20 years of service. In the first place, she would not have been appointed in a permanent or temporary capacity, had the CSC sooner discovered her dishonesty. R.A. No. 6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very beginning for being based on a false representation of eligibility, like that of the petitioner. A contrary construction of the statute will, in effect, reward dishonesty. 2) NO. The CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was founded on the correct application of the applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is intended to immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by having all the material necessary to make such determination before it. This is because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice. The petitioner was not entitled to a liberal construction of the rules of procedure. The petitioner repeatedly disregarded the rules too many times to merit any tolerance by the Court, thereby exhibiting a deplorable tendency to trivialize the rules of procedure. Yet, such rules were not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance might have resulted in prejudicing a party’s substantive rights. The bare invocation of substantial justice was not a magic wand that would compel the suspension of the rules of procedure. Of necessity, the reviewing court had also to assess whether the appeal was substantially meritorious on its face, or not, for only after such finding could the review court ease the often stringent rules of procedure. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be reduced to mere trifles.

JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ vs. ONG (SCRA 626 | 24 August 2010) (A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J) FACTS: Respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justices sought reconsideration of SC Decision finding them guilty for simple misconduct. The charge was based on the complaint of Assistant Prosecutor Rodriguez who alleged that the respondents failed to hear cases as collegial during scheduled sessions by hearing the cases either alone or only two of the three of them, and for falsification of public documents grounded on their


14 issuance of orders signed by the three of them making it appear that they acted as a collegial body. It was also alleged that they have conducted themselves in gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct for intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings. Justice Ong and Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. ISSUES: 1) Was the collegiality of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan preserved despite separately conducting hearings? 2) Were the respondent justices liable for improprieties during hearings amounting to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct? RULING 1: NO. Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto. The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him. Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that

the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all) Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was illmotivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces. RULING 2: NO. The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements amounting to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct. The Court found the respondent justices’ conduct only unbecoming. By publicizing their professional qualifications, they manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of selfconceit. The court found their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court. Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that: Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers


15 and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. Publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM-AT

certification issued on August 14, 2002 by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections. The conviction was brought for automatic review, but the Court transferred the case to the CA for intermediate review on November 9, 2004, conformably with People v. Mateo. On August 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused for qualified rape in C.A.G.R. No. CR HC No. 00758, viz: IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26 in Criminal Case No. 5-2001 is hereby AFFIRMED. Following the CA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, the accused now appeals to the Court. On April 20, 2010, the Court received the letter dated April 15, 2010 from Bureau of Corrections Assistant Director for Operations Rodrigo A. Mercado, advising that the accused had died on March 25, 2010 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa City. The report of Dr. Marylou V. Arbatin, Medical Officer III, revealed that the immediate cause of death had been cardiorespiratory arrest, with pneumonia as the antecedent cause. On June 22, 2010, the Court required the Bureau of Corrections to submit a certified true copy of the death certificate of the accused.1avvphi1 By letter dated August 16, 2010, Armando T. Miranda, Chief Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison, submitted the death certificate of the accused. Under the foregoing circumstances, the death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in this Court totally extinguished his criminal liability. Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provides:

(630 SCRA 445, September 14, 2010)

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Luna, Apayao tried and found the accused guilty of qualified rape in its decision dated December 11, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM-AT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged against him, this court hereby sentences said accused to suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH.

xxx

The accused is further ordered to pay the victim, "AAA", the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) by way of civil indemnity plus exemplary and moral damages of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00). The accused is ordered to be immediately shipped to New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, for imprisonment thereat while awaiting the review of this decision by the Supreme Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. On December 13, 2001, the accused was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, per the

The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action. UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the appeal of the accused is dismissed, and this criminal case is considered closed and terminated. 2011


16 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (643, SCRA 150, February 15, 2011) FACTS: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause RULING Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and


17 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE SECOND SEMESTER OF 2009 (645 SCRA 309, March 15, 2011) Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality in reporting to work. Tardiness, if habitual, prejudices the efficiency of the service being rendered by the Judiciary to the people, and cannot be tolerated. Thus, we sanction certain administrative employees of the Court for their habitual tardiness. This administrative matter emanated from the reports dated June 16, 2010 and June 17, 2010 made by the Leave Division under the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) to the Complaints and Investigation Division, also under the OAS, to the effect that the following employees had been habitually tardy in the second semester of 2009. On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned employees to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against them for their habitual tardiness during the covered period, which habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, viz: An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year. xxx The concerned employees subsequently rendered their respective explanations. The OAS concluded that the concerned employees had incurred habitual tardiness and that their justifications were unacceptable. Thus, it recommended the penalties to be imposed on the concerned employees. ISSUES:

use of every moment of such hours for the public service, because only thereby may the public servants recompense the Government and the people for shouldering the costs of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire the public’s respect for the justice system. The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court officials and employees reflect the premium placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work in the Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative duty of everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts’ good name and standing as true temples of justice. There is no question that all the concerned employees incurred habitual tardiness within the context of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, supra. Thereby, they fell short of the standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of justice. Worthy of stress is that the nature and functions of the employment of the officials and employees of the Judiciary require them to be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. They are always accountable to the people, whom they must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. They can surely inspire public respect for the justice system by strictly observing official time, among others. Absenteeism and tardiness are, therefore, impermissible. The respective justifications of the concerned employees (consisting of illness or poor health, travel difficulties, household responsibilities, and similar causes) are not unacceptable. Already in Re: Supreme Court Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of 2005, we enunciated that justifications for absences and tardiness falling under the categories of illness, moral obligation to family and relatives, performance of household chores, traffic and health or physical condition are neither novel nor persuasive, and hardly evoke sympathy. If at all, such justifications may only mitigate liability. RULING 2: We next discuss the penalties. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, considers habitual tardiness as a light offense with the following penalties: First Offense Reprimand Second Offense Suspension

1) Whether or not the evaluation of OAS should be adopted by the Court. 2) Whether or not the penalties imposed are proper. RULING 1: We adopt the evaluation of the OAS. It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This canon includes the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient

Third Offense Dismissal The penalties recommended by the OAS are well taken. However, in the case of Albert C. Semilla, we moderate the recommended penalty of suspension for three months without pay to one month suspension without pay but with a final warning that a repetition will be dealt with more severely upon humanitarian considerations. Although we insist that every official or employee of the Judiciary must meet the standards of


18 public service, we must practice compassion in deserving cases to avoid the wrong and unwanted impression that the Court wields only mailed fists. Semilla deserves a degree of mitigation. In that regard, Section 53 of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. Thus, the mitigating factors in Semilla’s favor are the following: (a) His length of service and satisfactory performance (i.e., having started as messenger of the Court on November 7, 1979 and having served continuously until the present, with his performance in the first and second semesters of 2009, the year in question, being satisfactory);

3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court FACTS: THE COMPLAINANT, THEN AN ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III IN THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, FILED AN AFFIDAVITCOMPLAINT DATED OCTOBER 23, 2008 CHARGING JUSTICE ONG, JUSTICE HERNANDEZ AND JUSTICE PONFERRADA, AS THE MEMBERS OF THE FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN WITH: 

grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure);



falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not);

(b) The fact that this infraction of habitual tardiness was his first since 2003; and (c) His pleas for compassion (due to his medical condition of benign prostatic hyperthropy, for which he was under the care of the SC Clinic since May 2009, and due to his reporting to work and returning home through his bicycle to add to his financial capacity as a solo parent of his family). Even so, we hereby emphatically hold all the concerned employees to their respective promises that they will not commit the same infraction hereafter, or else they will be at the end of the mailed fists of the Court. Our compassion, which is not limitless but discriminating, should not be taken for granted.

ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, vs. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, AND RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN (A. M. NO. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011) SC RESOLVED: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of the complainant. THROUGH THE DECISION, WE FOUND AND HELD JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ LIABLE FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, AND DISPOSED AGAINST THEM AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (JUSTICE PONFERRADA), AS FOLLOWS: 1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely; 2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and

improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez’s making the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006), to wit: (a) ‘We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.’ (b) ‘You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing. (c) ‘Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother’ and (d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed by all three respondents).


19

IN THE DECISION OF AUGUST 24, 2010, SC EXPLAINED: Respondents’ Violated the Provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan; and their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.  JUDGES ARE NOT COMMON INDIVIDUALS WHOSE GROSS ERRORS MEN FORGIVE AND TIME FORGETS. They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. 

THE RESPONDENT JUSTICES WERE LIABLE FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT

NOT

Considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent. Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces. 

RESPONDENT JUSTICES DID NOT ENSURE THAT THEIR PROCEEDINGS ACCORDED WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURE.

Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials.



RESPONDENT JUSTICES’ SIGNING OF THE ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE FLAWED PROCEEDINGS DOESN’T AS A FORM OF FALSIFICATION OR DISHONESTY, IN THAT THEY THEREBY MADE IT APPEAR THAT THEY HAD ALL BEEN PHYSICALLY PRESENT WHEN THE TRUTH WAS DIFFERENT.

Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense. 

UNBECOMING CONDUCT OF JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ



THE COURT APPROVES THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR’S FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION THAT NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE COMPLAINANT’S CHARGE THAT JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ HAD UTTERED THE IMPROPER AND INTEMPERATE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THEM.

In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them. 

JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ ADMITTED RANDOMLY ASKING THE COUNSELS APPEARING BEFORE THEM FROM WHICH LAW SCHOOLS THEY HAD GRADUATED, AND THEIR ENGAGING DURING THE HEARINGS IN CASUAL CONVERSATION ABOUT THEIR RESPECTIVE LAW SCHOOLS.

They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. 

THEIR ACTS AS BESPEAKING THEIR LACK OF JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT AND DECORUM, WHICH NO JUDGE WORTHY OF THE JUDICIAL ROBES SHOULD AVOID ESPECIALLY DURING THEIR PERFORMANCE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.

They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court. 

INDEED, SECTION 6, CANON 6 OF THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY CLEARLY ENJOINS THAT:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal


20 representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 

PUBLICIZING PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OR BOASTING OF HAVING STUDIED IN AND GRADUATED FROM CERTAIN LAW SCHOOLS, NO MATTER HOW PRESTIGIOUS, MIGHT HAVE EVEN REVEALED, ON THE PART OF JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ, THEIR BIAS FOR OR AGAINST SOME LAWYERS.

Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. 

JUDGES SHOULD BE DIGNIFIED IN DEMEANOR, AND REFINED IN SPEECH. IN PERFORMING THEIR JUDICIAL DUTIES, THEY SHOULD NOT MANIFEST BIAS OR PREJUDICE BY WORD OR CONDUCT TOWARDS ANY PERSON OR GROUP ON IRRELEVANT GROUNDS.

It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. 

JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ WERE GUILTY OF UNBECOMING CONDUCT, WHICH IS DEFINED AS IMPROPER PERFORMANCE.

Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.” Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality 

THE CHARGE OF MANIFEST PARTIALITY FOR ISSUING THE RESOLUTION GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 25801 IS DISMISSED.

As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have “failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.” 

IN THEIR JOINT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY:

[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Court’s finding that the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of what the provisions of the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong and Hernandez can only express their regret and apology. 

JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ PRAY FOR:

Exoneration, contending that they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they “have not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces;” their actions were not willful in character or motivated by a “premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose;” or even if their actions might be “irregular, wrongful, or improper,” such could not be characterized as simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction. 

JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ POSIT THAT THEY CANNOT BE MADE ACCOUNTABLE FOR UNBECOMING CONDUCT BECAUSE THEY ADMITTEDLY POSED QUESTIONS ON THE LAW SCHOOLS OF ORIGIN OF THE COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE THEM:

That their propounding the queries, per se, did not justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby never derided any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on their alma mater. 

JUSTICE ONG PRAYS THAT THE SANCTION IMPOSED UPON HIM BE MADE EQUAL TO THAT METED ON JUSTICE HERNANDEZ.

He “implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that ‘the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court,’ and ‘in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.’” 

COMPLAINANT INSISTS THAT RESPONDENT JUSTICES BE FOUND GUILTY OF ALL ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES MADE AGAINST THEM; AND THAT THE PENALTIES OR CHASTISEMENT BE INCREASED TO BE COMMENSURATE TO THEIR INFRACTIONS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion should be given merit. RULING: ALL MRs ARE DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and


21 the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez 

SC DENY J. ONG’S RECONSIDERATION

MOTION

FOR

SC deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration 

RESPONDENT JUSTICES CANNOT LIGHTLY REGARD THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR ALL OF THEM TO SIT TOGETHER AS MEMBERS OF THE FOURTH DIVISION “IN THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF A CASE OR CASES ASSIGNED THERETO.”

The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. 

INDEED, THE ABILITY OF THE FOURTH DIVISION TO FUNCTION AS A COLLEGIAL BODY BECAME IMPOSSIBLE WHEN NOT ALL OF THE MEMBERS SAT TOGETHER DURING THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS.

The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him. Respondents’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. 

THE THREE JUSTICES OF A DIVISION, RATHER THAN A SINGLE JUDGE, ARE NATURALLY EXPECTED TO EXERT KEENER JUDICIOUSNESS AND TO APPLY BROADER CIRCUMSPECTION IN TRYING AND DECIDING SUCH CASES.

The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court

generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all). 

IT IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE, THEN, THAT NO MALICE OR CORRUPT MOTIVE IMPELLED RESPONDENT JUSTICES INTO ADOPTING THE FLAWED PROCEDURE.

As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings. 

AS TO THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ AGAINST THIS COURT’S FINDING OF UNBECOMING CONDUCT ON THEIR PART, THE MATTER HAS BEEN FULLY ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION OF AUGUST 24, 2010.

SC held to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon him be similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez. 

THE VARIANCE IN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESPONDENT JUSTICES AS MEMBERS OF THEIR DIVISION COMPEL THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITIES.

Justice Ong, as the Chairperson, was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings of the Division. This circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to treat Justice Ong differently from the other respondents. 

SC NOTED IN THE DECISION THAT IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FOURTH DIVISION, JUSTICE ONG EXUDED AN UNEXPECTEDLY DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VALID OBJECTIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT

He steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not direct and control how the proceedings of the Division were to be conducted. Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the running of the Division and their having relied without malice on the Justice Ong’s direction and control should not be reproved as much as Justice Ong’s misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and liability as Members of the Division were properly diminished.

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (648 SCRA 47 | 12 April 2011)


22 FACTS: The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by complaint, impleading as defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and 59 individual defendants. Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through the 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF block of shares. Contention of the Republic of the Philippines: That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, who took undue advantage of his association, influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Ruling of the Sandiganbayan: Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for failure of plaintiff to prove by preponderance of evidence its causes of action against defendants with respect to the twenty percent (20%) outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation registered in defendants’ names. Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of coconut levy funds – in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.’s fiduciary obligation – are, necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the government. ISSUE: Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire SMC shares in violation of his fiduciary obligation as a public officer. RULING: Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties. It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. Republic’s burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that respondents’ SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds was not discharged.

The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code (like the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation Code (like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, among others) require factual foundations to be first laid out in appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence thereon would be unwarranted and unreasonable. Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had committed breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no clear factual allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the trust relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangco’s being an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the loans or borrowings, their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be alleged and proved. The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might even preclude any consequent trust implication but is more inclined to be a contract of loan. To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not provide for such requires evidence that confidence is reposed by one party in another who exercises dominion and influence. Absent any special facts and circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a lender and borrower are not fiduciary in nature. DISPOSITION: The Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari and, AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-F. The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel Corporation in the names of respondents Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil Case No. 0033-F is the exclusive property of Cojuangco, et al. as registered owners.

LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC (652 SCRA 798, June 28, 2011)

ACTION: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.


23 FACT: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING: We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

BAYONETTA vs. REYES

(660 SCRA 490, November 22, 2011) FACTS: Chamelyn filed an administrative case against Atty. Luis (Rivera). According to her, she was invited to attend as maid of honor for her best friend’s wedding to be held in the United States. To facilitate the issuance of a US Visa, she engaged the services of Luis, who introduced himself as an immigration lawyer, and promised to facilitate the issuance of her US visa upon payment of an initial amount of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the release of the US visa. They both agreed that if the US visa was denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview or for derogatory records, Luis would return the amount. Despite receipt of the amount by Luis, Chamelyn was not even scheduled for an interview at the US embassy, and Luis failed to perform his undertaking. Luis failed to return the amount, hence she filed criminal and administrative charges against Luis. In his defense, Luis admitted receiving the money, but averred that his failure to do so was brought about by the false pretences of a certain Rico Pineda, a purported US consul, who also defrauded him after receiving the money he gave for Chamelyn’s US visa. He attached as proof emails from Rico, and photographs of him and his family together with Rico.


24 The IBP in its report and recommendation recommended that Luis be suspended from the practice of law for four months. It found Luis liable for misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, for engaging in deceitful conduct, failing to deliver the service he undertook to perform; and being remiss in returning the P350,000.00. It also refused to believe his alibi on his purported transactions with Rico, and his evidence consisting of emails and photographs which were self-serving. ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP is correct in its findings and recommendation to suspend Luis from the practice of law for four months. RULING: After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing[1]. In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law[2]. Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such

cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him[3]. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable[4], as in this case. Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.: CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxxx Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith[5]. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client[6]. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics[7]. Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin[8], the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz[9], the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainant’s US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years. Finally, the Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains


25 applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement[10].” Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. 2012

CONCEPCION vs. MINEX IMPORT CORPORATION/MINERAMA CORPORATION (663 SCRA 497, January 24, 2012) CASE DOCTRINE: The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee who commits an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the employer. Neither a criminal prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a requisite for the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal for a just or lawful cause must still be made upon compliance with the requirements of due process under the Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is liable to pay nominal damages as indemnity to the dismissed employee. FACTS: Respondent Minex Import-Export Corporation (Minex) employed the petitioner initially as a salesgirl,rotating her assignment among nearly all its outlets. She was assigned at SM Harrison Plaza kiosk with the instruction to hold the keys of the kiosk. On November 9, 1997, the petitioner and her salesgirls had sales of crystal items totaling P39,194.50. At the close of business that day, they conducted a cash-count of their sales proceeds, including those from the preceding Friday and Saturday, and determined their total for the three days to be P50,912.00. The petitioner wrapped the amount in a plastic bag and deposited it in the drawer of the locked wooden cabinet of the kiosk.At about 9:30 am of November 10, 1997, the petitioner phoned Vina Mariano to report that the P50,912.00 was missing, explaining how she and her salesgirls had placed the wrapped amount at the bottom of the cabinet the night before, and how she had found upon reporting to work that morning that the contents of the cabinet were in disarray and the money already missing. Later, while the petitioner was giving a detailed statement on the theft to the security investigator of Harrison Plaza, Vina and Sylvia Mariano, her superiors,

arrived with a policeman who immediately placed the petitioner under arrest and brought her to Precinct 9 of the Malate Police Station. There, the police investigated her. She was detained for a day, from 11:30 am of November 10, 1997 until 11:30 am of November 11, 1997, being released only because the inquest prosecutor instructed so.On November 12, 1997, the petitioner complained against the respondents for illegal dismissal in the Department of Labor and Employment.On November 14, 1997, Minex, through Vina, filed a complaint for qualified theft against the petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the employerdenied the employee dismissed with due process and thu liable for damages? RULING: Yes. To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just and valid cause. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s representative in connection with the employee’s work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. Indeed, the employer is not expected to be as strict and rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the probabilities of guilt before terminating the employee. Unlike a criminal case, which necessitates a moral certainty of guilt due to the loss of the personal liberty of the accused being the issue, a case concerning an employee suspected of wrongdoing leads only to his termination as a consequence. The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is thus higher – proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt – than the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employee – substantial evidence. In so stating, we are not diminishing the value of employment, but only noting that the loss of employment occasions a consequence lesser than the loss of personal liberty, and may thus call for a lower degree of proof. Yet, even as we now say that the respondents had a just or valid cause for terminating the petitioner, it becomes unavoidable to ask whether or not they complied with the requirements of due process. The petitioner plainly demonstrated how quickly and summarily her dismissal was carried out without first requiring her to explain anything in her defense as demanded under Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code. Instead, the respondents forthwith had her arrested and investigated by the police authorities for qualified theft. This, we think, was a denial of her right to due process of law, consisting in the opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. In fact, their decision to dismiss her was already final even before the police authority commenced an investigation of the theft, the finality being confirmed by no less than Sylvia Mariano herself telling the petitioner during their phone conversation following the latter’s release from police


26 custody on November 11, 1997 that she (Sylvia) “no longer wanted to see” her.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be given to the employee before dismissal encompassed not only the giving to the employee of notice of the cause and the ability of the employee to explain, but also the chance to defend against the accusation. This was our thrust in Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Bungabong, where we held that the employee was not afforded due process despite the dismissal being upon a just cause, considering that he was not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to confront his accusers and to defend himself against the charge of theft notwithstanding his having submitted his explanation denying that he had stolen beer from the company dispenser. The termination letter was issued a day before the employee could go to the HRD Office for the investigation, which made it clear to him that the decision to terminate was already final even before he could submit his side and refute the charges against him. Nothing that he could say or do at that point would have changed the decision to dismiss him. Such omission to give the employee the benefit of a hearing and investigation before his termination constituted an infringement of his constitutional right to due process by the employer.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later,” which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

CAGAS vs. COMELEC

(663 SCRA 645, January 24, 2012) FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.

As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses. Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections? HELD: No. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of their sovereignty. After the legislative branch’s enactment of a law to create, divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local government unit or units, the people in the local government unit or units directly affected vote in a plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.


27 The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials.

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGINEER OSCAR L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO OF FH-GYM MULTI-PURPOSE AND TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, AGAINST CA JUSTICES (664 SCRA 465, January 31, 2012)

CASE DOCTRINE: Judicial officers do not have to suffer the brunt of unsuccessful or dissatisfied litigants baseless and false imputations of their violating the Constitution in resolving their cases and of harboring bias and partiality towards the adverse parties. The litigant who baselessly accuses them of such violations is not immune from appropriate sanctions if he thereby affronts the administration of justice and manifests disrespect towards the judicial office. FACTS: On June 7, 2011, the Court received a letter from Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, claiming himself to be the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative (FH-GYMN). The letter included a complaint-affidavit, whereby Ongjoco charged the CAs Sixth Division composed of Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (as Chairman), Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino as Members for rendering an arbitrary and baseless decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 entitled FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative v. Allan Ray A. Baluyut, et al. The genesis of CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 started on July 26, 2004 when FH-GYMN requested the amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the City of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan through the Committee on Transportation and Communications (Committee) of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman to issue motorized tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its members. During the ensuing scheduled public hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC President Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an employee of the Sanggunian), were alleged to have uttered statements exhibiting their bias against FH-GYMN, giving FH-GYMN reason to believe that the Committee members were favoring the existing franchisees Francisco Homes Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association (FRAHTODA) and Barangay Mulawin Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association (BMTODA). Indeed, later on, the Sanggunian, acting upon the recommendation of the Committee, denied the request of FH-GYMN. On July 15, 2005, FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging Baluyut, Concepcion, Aguirre, Mendoza with violations of Article 124(2)(d) of the Cooperative Code, Section 3(e) and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act), and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Employees). The complaint also charged Eduardo de Guzman (FRAHTODA President) and Wilson de Guzman (BMTODA President). Eventually, the complaint of FHGYMN was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence as to the public officials, and for lack of merit and lack of jurisdiction as to the private respondents. FH-GYMN sought reconsideration, but its motion to that effect was denied. FH-GYMN timely filed a petition for review in the CA. In the meanwhile, FH-GYMN filed in the Office of the President a complaint accusing Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III, and Graft Investigator and Prosecution Officer Robert C. Renido with a violation of Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019 arising from the dismissal of its complaint. On January 31, 2011, the CAs Sixth Division denied the petition for review. FH-GYMN, through Ongjoco, moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the petition for review, with prayer for inhibition, but the CAs Sixth Division denied the motion. Thereafter, Ongjoco initiated this administrative case against the aforenamed member of the CAs Sixth Division, wherein he maintained that respondent members of the CAs Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review was based; that they summarily denied the petition for review without setting forth the basis for denying the five issues FH-GYMNs petition for review raised; that the denial was unjust, unfair and partial, and heavily favored the other party; that the denial of the petition warranted the presumption of directly or indirectly becoming interested for personal gain under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019; and that the Ombudsman officials who were probably respondent Justices schoolmates or associates persuaded, induced or influenced said Justices to dismiss the petition for review and to manipulate the delivery of the copy of the decision to FH-GYMN to prevent it from timely filing a motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the decision promulgated on January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal foundation, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution? 2) Whether or not the administrative charge against respondent Justices had no factual and legal bases? RULING 1: The Court finds the administrative complaint against respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals baseless and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly dismiss it. Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal


28 foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review; and that the respondents as members of the CAs Sixth Division thereby violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides as follows: Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal basis therefor. The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth Division complied with the requirements of the constitutional provision. Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CAs Sixth Division that the Deputy Ombudsman found no substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the respondents met the constitutional demand for a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law on which the decision was based. The CAs Sixth Division did not have to point out and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition considering that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the denial of the petition. Moreover, the CAs Sixth Division expressly found that FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as the petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial evidence. In administrative cases involving judicial officers, the complainants always carried on their shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their allegations through substantial evidence. That standard of substantial evidence is satisfied only when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of although such evidence may not be overwhelming or even preponderant. RULING 2: Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he genuinely wanted the Court to sustain his allegations of misconduct against respondent Justices, that his administrative complaint must rest on the quality of the evidence; and that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and speculations would not suffice to hold them administratively liable for rendering the adverse decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this administrative complaint against them despite conceding in the administrative complaint itself his having no proof of his charges.

It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary. We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos proclivity to indiscriminately file complaints. His proclivity reminds us now of Joaquin T. Borromeo whom this Court pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of court he repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him. The Court imposed the penalty for contempt of court to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority. Having determined that the administrative charge against respondent Justices had no factual and legal bases, we cannot hesitate to shield them by immediately rejecting the charge. We do so because unfounded administrative charges do not contribute anything worthwhile to the orderly administration of justice; instead, they retard it. Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass and go unchallenged. We recognize that unfounded administrative charges against judges really degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be warranted to now direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act


29 of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent Justices. RESOLUTION: The Court: (a) dismisses the administrative complaint against Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino for its utter lack of merit; and (b) orders Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO (681 SCRA 27, September 18, 2012) CASE DOCTRINE: The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive suspension for 90 days of a civil service officer or employee pending investigation of her administrative case is authorized provided that a formal charge is served to her and the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that she is guilty of the charge as to warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing that the respondent officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file at her office is not a prerequisite before she may be preventively suspended. FACTS: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly owned government corporation whose primary purpose is to guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to any domestic entity, enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in business in the Philippines. On May 13, 2003, the Board of Directors of TIDCORP formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. The relevant portions of the formal charge read: After a thorough study, evaluation, and deliberation, the Board finds merit to the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Committee on the existence of a probable cause for Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Insubordination, and Gross Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties. However and to avoid any suspicion of partiality in the conduct of the investigation, the Board hereby refers this case to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to conduct a formal investigation. TIDCORP referred the charge to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) for formal investigation and reception of evidence. Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive suspension for 90 days. Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which issued on January 21, 2004 Resolution No. 040047 declaring her preventive

suspension to be "not in order." The CSC stated that under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service officer like Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the disciplining authority only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit: (1) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly influence or intimidate potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. According to the CSC, TIDCORP did not prove with substantial evidence the existence of any of such grounds. Anent the potential tampering of documents by Demigillo, the Commission similarly finds the same remote. There is no showing that the documentary evidence of the case leveled against her were in her possession or custody as would otherwise justify the imposition of preventive suspension. As borne by the evidence on record, the acts complained of against Demigillo constitute verbal tussles between her and President Valdes which were all recorded and documented by the TIDCORP. In this situation, there is no chance of Demigillo’s tampering with documents. From the foregoing disquisition, the Commission finds that the preventive suspension of Demigillo for ninety (90) days was improvidently made because the possibility of exerting/influencing possible witnesses or tampering with documents, which is the evil sought to be avoided in this case, does not exist. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration by the CSC, TIDCORP appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting the sole issue of: Whether or not the CSC erred in so holding the preventive suspension of appellant Demigillo was not in order. On November 7, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not TIDCORP’s 90-day preventive suspension of Demigillo is valid. RULING: The Court grants the petition, and hold that the 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (RAC) embodies the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance of government agencies and constitutional bodies like the CSC. Section 1, Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of the RAC states that the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government. Section 51 and Section 52, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the RAC respectively contain the rule on preventive suspension of a civil service officer or employee pending investigation, and the duration of the preventive suspension, viz: Section 51. Preventive Suspension. – The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or


30 grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. – When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. Under Section 51, supra, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that preventive suspension pending investigation "is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him." As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the witnesses during investigation or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word "intended." Relevantly, CSC Resolution No. 030502, which was issued on May 5, 2003 for the proper enforcement of preventive suspension pending investigation. Consequently, the CSC and the CA erred in making the purpose of preventive suspension a condition for its issuance Although, as a rule, we defer to the interpretation by administrative agencies like the CSC of their own rules, especially if the interpretation is affirmed by the CA, we withhold deference if the interpretation is palpably erroneous, like in this instance. We hold that TIDCORP’s issuance against Demigillo of the order for her 90-day preventive suspension pending the investigation was valid and lawful. The petition for review on certiorari was granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 7, 2006 was set aside, and the order for the preventive suspension for 90 days of Demiglio pending her investigation for grave misconduct was declared as valid

LLOREN vs COMELEC

(681 SCRA 27, September 18, 2012) FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682 votes as against petitioner’s 4,930 votes. Alleging massive votebuying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other electionrelated manipulations, petitioner commenced Election Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos, Leyte. In his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Pua alleged that the election protest stated no cause of action, was insufficient in form and content, and should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required cash deposit. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not appeal was perfected. 2) Whether or not there was a valid election contest. RULING 1: Yes. The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. In A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the Court promulgated the Rules of Procedure In Election Contests Before The Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (hereafter, the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC), effective on May 15, 2007, to set down the procedure for election contests and quo warranto cases involving municipal and barangay officials that are commenced in the trial courts. The Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC superseded Rule 35 (“Election Contests Before Courts of General Jurisdiction”) and Rule 36 (“Quo Warranto Case Before Courts of General Jurisdiction”) of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-415-SC, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court that rendered the decision, serving a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party if the party is not represented by counsel. Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC prescribes for that purpose an appeal fee of P 1,000.00 to be paid to the trial court rendering the decision simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal. It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC did not supersede the appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC under its own rules of procedure. As a result, “the requirement of two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions caused a confusion in the implementation by the COMELEC of its procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees necessary for the perfection of appeals.” To remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, effective on July


31 24, 2008, whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing the appellant to pay the COMELEC’s appeal fee of P 3,200.00 at the COMELEC’s Cash Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the COMELEC within a period of 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. The non-payment of the motion fee of P 300.00 at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not warrant the outright denial of the motion for reconsideration, but might only justify the COMELEC to refuse to take action on the motion for reconsideration until the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding when no full payment of the fees is ultimately made. The authority to dismiss is discretionary and permissive, not mandatory and exclusive, as expressly provided in Section 18, Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule. In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, acknowledging that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of LucenaCity; yet did not withdraw his CoC.

RULING 2: Yes. Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as follows: Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition.— xxx c. An election protest shall also state: (i) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and had been voted for the same office; (ii) the total number of precincts in the municipality; (iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified; and (iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts. As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The omission rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content, and warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, however, he later on filed for its withdrawal.On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, her husband.

TALAGA vs. COMELEC

Thereafter, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

(GR. NO. 197015 | October 9, 2012) In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification. FACTS: Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon declared that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He allegedtherein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the upcoming elections.

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, alleging that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid. 2) Who among the contending parties should assume the position. RULING 1: Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution. The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.


32

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory law. The objective of imposing the threeterm limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.

RULING 2: Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in the office. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit: Section 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x xx CONCURRING OPINION/s: Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code is clear that before a substitution of candidates for an elective position could be validity done, the official candidate of a registered or accredited political party should die, withdraw or must be qualified for any cause. In the present case, the records will show that at the time Ruby C. Talaga filed her Certificate of Candidacy, or May 4, 2010, there was still no ground for substitute since the judgment on Ramon Talaga’s disqualification had not yet attained finality. DISSENTING OPINION/s: It is Castillo who should be seated as Mayor – a.

the violation of the three-term limit rule is a unique but proper ground for disqualification and not for the cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);

b.

the petition filed by Castillo against Ramon was based on the three-term limit rule and, hence, was a petition for disqualification, but no effective disqualification ever took place since Ramon never qualified to serve for a fourth term; and

c.

since Ruby did not validly substitute Ramon and Ramon opted to exit out of the election race (although through an erroneous mode of asking for a ruling disqualifying him), neither of the two can be considered candidates and the votes cast in their favor should be considered stray;


33 thus, Castillo should be proclaimed as Mayor of Lucena City.

would lead the court to doubt the findings of the RTC and the CA on the credibility of the two daughters.

Hidden behind but not erased by this simplistic recital of the issues, rulings and dissent is the legal reality that these cases pose issues way beyond the question of substitution that appears on the surface. They require a look into the nature of a CoC; distinctions between eligibility, or lack of it, and disqualification; the effects of cancellation and disqualification; the applicable remedies; and the unique nature and the effect of the constitutional three-term limit for local elective officials. Although Castillo denominated his petition as one for cancellation or denial of due course to Ramon’s COC and sought the same relief, it did not raise any of the specified grounds for such action under Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

Moreover, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape to the proper authorities have not always been considered as an indication of a false accusation. The Court discussed that, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).

2013

Thus, the presence or absence of injury or lacerations in the genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has been committed or not. Such injury or laceration is material only if force or intimidation is an element of the rape charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO

The accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s credible, natural and convincing testimony.

(G.R. No. 170634 | January 8, 2013) FACTS: Pedro Buado y Cipriano Jr. was found guilty by the RTC of Valenzuela (May 5, 2003) of two counts of rape committed against his two minor daughters- 10 yrs old and 8 yrs old. He was sentenced to suffer in each case the death penalty. The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping his two daughters and shifted the blame on his drug addict son. He assailed the credibility of the two daughters’ testimonies were replete with incredulous statements, and insisting that they were motivated by anger and revenge than by a sincere call for justice. He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (April 27, 2005). The CA affirmed the conviction, but reduced the death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the appeal. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appelant of the crime charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; and 2) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the Death Penalty upon the accusedappelant despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the Special Qualifying Circumstances of Relationship and Minority. RULING 1: The appeal has no merit. The trial records entirely supported the lower court’s findings in favor of the credibility of the two daughters’ recollections. On the other hand, the accused did not bring to the Court’s attention any facts and circumstances of weight that, if properly considered, would change the result into one favorable to him. He did not even submit to the court any argument that

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if the rape is committed with the attendance of any “aggravating/qualifying circumstances.” One of such is “when the victim is under 18 years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.” Both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved. RULING 2: During the trial, the Prosecution adduced no evidence to establish the minority of one of the raped daughters in Crim. Case No. 912-V-99. Hence, the court concurs with the CA’s conclusion that the accused could not be properly found guilty of qualified rape. Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed Reclusion Perpetua as the penalty. On the other hand, in Crim. Case No. 974-V-99, it sufficiently stated the minority of the other daughter and her being a legitimate daughter of the accused. Accordingly, the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of death. But, with the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. Thus, the retroactive application of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made here because it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for parole, because Sec 3 of R.A. No. 9346 expressly provides that persons “whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act” shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, as amended.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (G.R. No. 188056 | January 8, 2013) FACTS: Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy


34 Group “buy back agreement” that earned them check payments that were dishonored.

disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse.

Thus, they filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after the Spouses were defrauded in a business venture.

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, x x x x.

The DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of the Spouses was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the Spouses violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that D.O. No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts. 2) Whether or not the questioned Department Order and Memorandum violate the spouses’ equal protection of the laws. 3) Whether or not it violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases. 4) Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect. RULING 1: Yes. The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition. The court emphasized that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrant, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue

RULING 2: No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. RULING 3: No. The Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases. RULING 4: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.


35

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX,ZAMBOANGA CITY vs. THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR.KHEM M. INOK (G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013) FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for human resources development in science and technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery. Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439. Thereafter, Brenda Nazareth, DOST Regional Office No. IX released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas, several Notices of Disallowance were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use of saving of GAA was vetoed by the President. The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum a Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, for the authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and legal. RULING: No. In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. The prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOST’s savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the reenacted GAA for 2001. Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits.

Then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.

The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government.

Hence, the petitioner lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.

DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD) which denied the appeal and affirmed the NDs. Thus, the petitioner elevated the matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office.

(G.R. No. 191644 | February 19, 2013)

Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision denying the petitioner’s appeal with the modification that only the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 were to be set aside in view of the authorization issued by Executive Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President. Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the main argument that the payment of Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX employees are allowed pursuant to RA No. 8439.

FACTS: Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.


36

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a holdover, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of Appeals.

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO vs. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS (G.R. No. 168613 | March 5, 2013)

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid. 2) Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the “hold-over principle”. 3) Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other. RULING 1: No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution. It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants. RULING 2: No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. RULING 3: No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is

FACTS: Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP. Thereafter, the Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002, on October 22, 2002 to approve a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position classification system, and a new set of qualification standards. LCSD was abolished. Ma. Rosario Manalang- Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes issued her appointment as head of RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a reappointment under the reorganization plan. Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed from her position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to which she had been previously assigned during the reorganization of July 1998. She insisted the Board of Directors had not been authorized to undertake the reorganization and corporate restructuring. Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), raising the same issues. The CSC ruled through Resolution No. 041092 that the 2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for being authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656; that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 granted a continuing power to TIDCORP’s Board of Directors to prescribe the agency’s organizational structure, staffing pattern and compensation packages; and that such grant continued until declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by Congress. The CSC held, however, that TIDCORP’s implementation of its reorganization did not comply with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656, that although there was no diminution in Demigillo’s rank, salary and status, there was nonetheless a demotion in her functions and authority. The CSC further held that the dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not comply with the mandatory requirement under Section 2, particularly 2.2 Rule XII of


37 the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. The CA ruled that being the alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Board of Directors of the TIDCORP is authorized by law to have a continuous power to reorganize its agency. It further ruled that, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization Moreover, it ruled that in utter disregard of respondent Demigillo’s right to security of tenure, petitioner TIDCORP demoted her in the guise of "reorganization." Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP. 2) Whether or not the reorganization of TIDCORP effected in 2002 was valid. 3) Whether or not Demigillo had been legally dropped from the rolls. RULING 1: No. The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President that sat them in the Board. When the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President. RULING 2: Yes. The court upholds the 2002 reorganization and declares it valid for being done in

accordance with the exclusive and final authority expressly granted under Republic Act No. 8494, further amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, and the law creating TIDCORP itself. Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers and employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the Board shall have exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and reassign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding. RULING 3: No. Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494, we declare that there are no legal and practical bases for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place a set-up completely different from the previous one, including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. Hence, Demigillo was not demoted because she did not suffer any diminution in her rank, status and salary under the reorganization. Her reassignment to the RCMSS, a smaller unit compared to the LCSD, maintained for her the same rank of Senior Vice-President with a corresponding increase in pay grade. The reassignment resulted from the valid reorganization.

MALIKSI vs. COMELEC (GR No. 203302| 11 April 2013) SUBJECT: Requisites of Judicial Due Process FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected


38 Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division. In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division— referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading during the revision. Hence, Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards. HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right to be present and observe the decryption proceedings. The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayan’s Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order. In an order dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional anount for expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from our clustered precincts, and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered

to Maliksi’s counsel. The decryption took two weeks to finish. Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. The Court has ruled: xxx The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. xxx. There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, it is settled that “opportunity to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process. The court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES B. REYES, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND STEPHEN C. CRUZ; CARAG JAMORA SOMERA AND VILLAREAL LAW OFFICES AND ITS LAWYERS ATTYS. ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. AND BEATRIZ O. GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, LAWYERS FOR MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND VISAYAN SURETY AND INSURANCE CORPORATION. (A.M. No. CA-13-51-J | 2 July 2013) SUBJECT: Pleadings and practice; Civil procedure; consolidation of cases HELD: It is true that under the Rules of Court, trial is permissive and a matter of judicial discretion. This is because trials held in the first instance require the attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely entails an expense that can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the same issues involving the same parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the primary objective of consolidation of cases. But the permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate adjudications. In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical


39 claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties or interests even as it enhances the administration of justice.

RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION. (A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC | 9 July 2013) SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Judge; Gross inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases FACTS: This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell. According to the Audit Team’s Report, Branch 27, Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases and 22 civil cases. Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court that a fine of P50, 000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents. In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011 the OCA reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine of P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the cases submitted for decision and in resolving the pending motions or incidents in other cases. The OCA noted that the case records did not bear any requests for extension of time or any directive for the transcription of stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy caseload would not justify the failure to promptly decide and resolve cases because he could have simply asked the Court for an extension of time. HELD: The Supreme Court said that Carbonell’s failure to decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period without any justifiable and credible reasons constitutes gross inefficiency. They reiterated that as a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request. The Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine fromP50,000 to P20,000 considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge.

FERDINAND A. SAMSON vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA (A.C. No. 6664 | 16 July 2013) SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Attorney; Conflict of interest FACTS: Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaintaffidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charged Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa. During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. In this regard, they established Atty. Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in said courts. HELD: The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behoves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship


40 is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

already resigned from her position effective on January 2, 2003.

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Eventually on February 12, 2007, the Court directed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC to provide Catena’s current and correct address within 10 days because of Judge Yap-Fernandez’s intervening disability retirement. After the subsequent attempt to serve still failed because, as noted on the envelope, Catena as the addressee had "moved out," the Court deemed the resolution of October 26, 2009 as served on her on April 13, 2011.

CONCERNED CITIZEN vs. NONITA V. CATENA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50, PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P | 16 July 2013) SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from an undated anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Nonita Catena (Catena), a Court Stenographer III of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan (RTC) with gross dishonesty she allegedly committed in connection with her Civil Service eligibility accusing her of having caused another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. On January 18, 2002, Justice Jose P. Perez, a Member of this Court, as Deputy Court Administrator, forwarded the complaint against Catena for investigation by the Legal Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). On February 21, 2002, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, a Member of this Court, the Court Administrator then, directed Catena to comment within ten days on the anonymous complaint. Catena implored the OCA for a 30-day extension of the period within which to submit her comment.Despite her request being granted, she failed to submit a comment, causing the Court to issue a tracer letter on September 24, 2002, but still enjoining her to comply with the previous directive to file a comment within five days from notice, or else the complaint would be resolved without her comment. Catena still failed to comment on the complaint thereafter, prompting the Court to require her on March 17, 2004 to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and to comply with the October 1, 2003 resolution by submitting the comment within 10 days. On March 9, 2005, however, Judge Nelia Yap-Fernandez of the RTC formally informed the Court that Catena had

Respondent, NONITA V. CATENA was located at her residence in PurokSandiwa, Barangay Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa but refused to sign the herein NOTICE, nevertheless received the document. Agent of the Puerto Princesa District Office served the herein NOTICE on respondent on July 25, 2011 and the same was communicated to the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations Services in Manila. HELD: Respondent, a court stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded. Respondent’s dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (704 SCRA 561, September 03, 2013) FACTS: Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001


41 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan, ruling that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982,theVelazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. ISSUES: (1)Whether or not it is sufficient that the classification of land as alienable and disposable occurs at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. (2) As for purposes of Section 14(2) of the PD 1529, whether or not a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable may be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription. RULINGS 1: In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. RULING 2: In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

EMBIDO vs. PE

(708 SCRA 1, October 22, 2013) FACTS: Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received 2 letters from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom, requesting for a copy of


42 the decision in Special Proceedings Case No.084 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela entitled “In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, ”whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo. They found, however, that the RTC had no record, as Special Proceedings No. 084 was docketed as “In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria,” whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria. They informed Mr. Hunt that what he had was a falsified court document, and proceeded to communicate the situation to the NBI, thus triggering an investigation. Meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit stating that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision for P60, 000. This was corroborated by the affidavit of Mary Rose Quioyo, Shirley Quiyo’s sister. Respondent invoked his right to remain silent when the NBI invited him to explain his side. After the investigation, the NBI recommended that respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act3019, as well as for the Office of the Court Administrator to commence disbarment proceedings against him. Respondent submitted a counter-affidavit denying participation in the falsification. He alleged that he merely gave Shirley Quioyo advice on annulment laws, that Dy Quiyo was the one who caused the falsification through people on Recto Avenue, and that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa had executed a sword statement that her late husband, Manual Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. The IBP found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Pe should be disbarred. RULING: YES. In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a nonexistent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their

professional fidelity and integrity. Thus, the Court finds and pronounces Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Pe, Jr. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and disbars him.

DE LEON vs. PEDREÑA

(708 SCRA 13, October 22, 2013) FACTS: Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. Records show, as established by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January 30,2006 after asking about the status of the case Atty. Pedreña told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride with him and he would just drop Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she refused to ride with him but Atty. Pedreña persistently told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedreña rubbed the Jocelyn’s right leg with his hand tried to insert his finger into her hand, grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area and pressed his finger against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and told him categorically that she was getting off the car. Instead he accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed her to get off. In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon. IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his disbarment, the IBP Board of Governors however, modifed the penalty to three month suspension from practice of law. Upon motion for reconsideration by Atty. Pedreña which the Board denied, they increased the penalty to six months. Thereafter transmitted records and resolution to the Court for approval. ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Pedreña is guilty in violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of Code of Profession and Responsibility. RULING: Yes, Atty. Pedreña is guilty. The Supreme Court adopted the finding and conclusions of the IBP Investigating Commissioner. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. Yet, the Court considers the recommended penalty of suspension for six months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.


43 GANZON vs. ARLOS

(708 SCRA 115, October 22, 2013) FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter-ego to suspend and remove local officials. This is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. RULING: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

VIVO vs. PAGCOR (709 SCRA 276, November 12, 2013) FACTS: The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office.5 On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources

Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;6 that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension. Petitioner's counsel assailed the propriety of the show cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. The petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The memorandum of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the administrative inquiry. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request. PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the service. A motion for reconsideration was filed, however, denied. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner's right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. In fine, the Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding Board Resolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of Directors. PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA. CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. The CA remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits, specifically the issue of whether the dismissal had been for cause. ISSUE: Whether or Not the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for due process was violated transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative due process. RULING: The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable


44 opportunity to explain his side. That the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the administrative case against him, that counsel, Atty. Cesar B. Jimenea Jr. of the Jimenea and Associates, ensured that the petitioner’s every concern reached PAGCOR, and that he was clarified of any matter affecting his rights all throughout the investigation and hearings. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that P AGCOR had properly observed the requirements of due process in its administrative proceedings against the petitioner. Wherefore, the Court denies the petition. (41-45) 2014

HEINZ R. HECK vs. CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR. (719 SCRA 339, March 18, 2014)

SUBJECT: Legal Ethics FACTS: In September 2000, complainant Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City. According to Heck, he was a victim of the "faulty, highly improper, suspicious anomalous and unlawful practice" by the respondent, who had obstructed justice by delaying cases and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo A. Adaza, his business partners and friends. The controversy arose from the filing in 1999 by Heck of a criminal case for unjust vexation against one Oliver Cabrera in the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) in Cagayan de Oro City. After the case against him was dismissed, Cabrera countered with two criminal cases against Heck — one charging the latter with illegal possession of firearms and the other with unlawful incrimination of an innocent person. Atty. Adaza represented Cabrera in both cases. The OCP initially dismissed I.S. No. 2000-1860 for insufficiency of evidence, but Atty. Adaza moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal. The respondent granted the motion for reconsideration. Heck challenged the order of the respondent. In the meantime, other pending complaints against Cabrera (for unjust vexation and grave threats) were also dismissed because of prescription and insufficiency of evidence. Heck moved for the reconsideration of the dismissals twice, but his motions were denied.

ISSUE: WON Pros. Gamutin should be disbarred due to his actions RULING: The court considers that the evidence adduced by the complainant insufficient to warrant the disbarment of the respondent. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. A lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics. Otherwise, the lawyer merits exoneration. The court cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck’s unexpected tirade in his presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Heck’s disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in general. Any selfrespecting government official like the respondent should feel justly affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence, including harsh words like those uttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified in making the utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now view the actuation of the respondent in reacting to Heck’s utterance. The Court will not permit the respondent’s good record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to Heck’s remark. Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the respondent’s actuations to be arrogant and overbearing, but it is not fair for the court to take the respondent to task in the context of the events and occasions in which the actuations occurred in the absence of a credible showing that his actuations had been impelled by any bad motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics.

ARAULLO vs. AQUINO III (728 SCRA 1, July 01, 2014) FACTS: The respondents maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue;7 that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation;8 and that the Court should apply legally


45 recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion ISSUES and RULING: 1) The Court’s power of judicial review Issue: The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination. Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive. Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 2) Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. Pertinent provisions Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. xxxx Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees. Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned. Section 38 refers to the authority of the President “to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act.” When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned. Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which the allotments were withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned. At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular


46 appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with. 3) The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA Argument: The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President. Held: Tenable. The Court reversed its ruling. Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item veto power of the President, must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not be only general provisions. Item, definition: the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a “specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to. Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified

amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65. 4) Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible Argument: Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer of appropriation, not savings. Held: Section 25(5) is clear. The Court stood by its previous pronouncement.

VINUYA vs. ROMULO (732 SCRA 595, August 12, 2014) FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. ISSUE: Whether or not to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. RULING: The court ruled that the State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by


47 considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State, (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so. It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad. Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment. We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no nonderogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international crimes. Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and ergaomnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

MADRID vs. DEALCA (734 SCRA 468, September 09, 2014)

SUBJECT: Legal ethics FACTS: Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ISSUES: (1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility? (2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795? RULING: 1) The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thus wise: Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the


48 numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration. 2) Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.

CAUSING vs. COMELEC (734 SCRA 495, September 09, 2014) FACTS: Petitioner Elsie Causing (Causing) assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC En Banc) promulgated on September 9, 2011 dismissing her complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-131 entitled Elsie S. Causing v. Hernan D. Biron, Sr. charging Municipal Mayor Hernan D. Biron, Sr. (Mayor Biron) of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo with violating COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: 1) Procedural issue: Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari 2) Substantive Issues:Mayor Biron’s acts did not violate the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Resolution RULING: 1)Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed. Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before coming to the Court. Causing

submits, however, that she was not required to file the motion for reconsideration because the only recourse of an aggrieved party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of the petition for certiorari under either Rule 64 or Rule 65. The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) Where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases. 2) On the merits, the petition should also fail. The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment;” while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving


49 Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away. We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement,” including the mere change in office location. Moreover, Causing’s too-literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused. This means that the courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. In short, no act can be pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made so by statute prior to its commission (nullumcrimen, nullapoena, sine lege). So, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. Equally material is that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials and employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and functions. His explanation that he transferred Causing’s work station from her original office to his office in order to closely supervise her after his office received complaints against her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor. The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor Biron’s “crystal clear intention” to replace and transfer her during the election period. As the COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not receive the order, and Causing remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted. Without the actual appointment of Belonio as the Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to criminally charge Mayor Biron of violating Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case, Causing initiated an administrative case in the Civil Service Commission to challenge her “reassignment” pursuant to the same office orders. In that administrative case, she referred to the personnel movement not as a transfer or detail, but as a reassignment that constituted her constructive dismissal. On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City ruled that although Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to the personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment

ALLEGED LOSS OF VARIOUS BOXES OF COPY PAPER DURING THEIR TRANSFER FROM THE PROPERTY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), TO VARIOUS ROOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY (737 SCRA 176 | 30 September 2014)

"Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service." FACTS: A financial audit of the books of accounts of MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon covering the period July 28, 1993 to August 31, 2004 disclosed that: (1) some collections were not properly and accurately recorded in the cashbooks; (2) there were shortages in the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund in the amounts of P48,207.10 and P5,l 16.00, respectively; (3) the financial reports on the JDF, General/Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF) and Fiduciary Fund (FF) were not regularly submitted to the Accounting Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA); (4) the records control is not systematic; (5) no legal fees forms were attached to the case records; (6) daily transactions in the FF account were not duly recorded in the cashbooks; and, (7) documents needed to validate withdrawals of cash bonds from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office (MTO) of Bulan were missing. The OCA concluded that Guan was remiss in the performance of his duties and is administratively liable for: 1) failing to properly remit his cash collections in contrast with the requirements set forth in the Commission on Audit (COA) and Department of Finance (DOF) Joint Circular 1-81 and in Administrative Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992 as amended by Administrative Circular(A.C.) No. 3-2000 dated June 15, 2000; and, 2) failing to remit FF collections, in complete derogation of Administrative Circular No. 50-95 dated October 11, 1995. ISSUE 1: Whether or not Guan is guilty of Gross Neglect? RULING: Yes. Here, Guan’s shortages with respect to the JDF in the total amount of 49,609.10 and to the SAJF totalling to 5,824.00 were both due to unreported and undeposited collections. Guan’s transgressions did not merely consist of delay in the remittance of his collections but to his total failure to deposit the same as well.


50 This is a clear case of gross neglect of duty. As held, "Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare." In this case, the frequency of the instances alone, i.e., for two separate periods of accountability, Guan was both found to have incurred shortages with respect to the JDF and SAJF due to unreported and undeposited collections, makes respondent’s neglect of duty so serious in its character as to threaten the public welfare. "Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service." ISSUE 2: Whether or not Guan is administratively liable? RULING: Yes. While Guan had already been dropped from the rolls for being absent without official leave (AWOL) in A.M. No. 06-5-171-MTC, he still remains administratively liable, although the penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed upon him. "A fine can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules provides that fine as a penalty shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had the respondent not resigned [or been dropped from the rolls] the rate for which is that obtaining at the time of his resignation. The fine shall be deducted from any accrued leave credits, with the respondent being personally liable for any deficiency that should be directly payable to this Court. He is further declared disqualified from any future government service." NOTE: Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts’ ‘funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises.’ They are ‘liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment’ of those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance ‘constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall beheld administratively liable.’

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS AND DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE (737 SCRA 195 | 30 September 2014)

Anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from a source unwilling to identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason. But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to

be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions worthy of consideration for not being selfserving. the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with, and its veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the finger of accusation at two employees of the Court for engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable rates of interest, with low-ranking employees of the Court as their targets. FACTS: An undated letter-complain addressed to the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court triggered this administrative matter. The letter complaint, purportedly sent by a concerned employee who chose to remain anonymous, assailed the profitable money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks Disbursement Division of the Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). It stated that the respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services; that such money-lending had been going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300 Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as collateral for the individual borrowings. Lopez denied the allegation that she had lent money to around 300 court employees, and that she had held their ATM cards in her custody as collateral; but admitted having lent money to only about 20 personnel of the janitorial agency and to some low-ranking employees of the Court, like the utility workers and messengers for a period of two years. She said that she would receive only P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed that she did not consider as interest. She insisted that she did not require her borrowers to pay her the P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed because they voluntarily gave her the amount; and that she did not engage in money lending because she did not offer to lend money to anyone. ISSUE 1: Whether or not Lopez and Montalvo are guilty of lending money with usurious interest rates? RULING: The respondents are both responsible fiduciary officers in the FMBO, the office that is in charge of all the financial transactions of the Court, including the preparation and processing of vouchers to cover the payment of salaries, allowances, office supplies, equipment and other sundry expenses, utilities, janitorial, and security services, and maintenance and other operating expenses, and the issuance of corresponding checks therefor. The respondents discharge the delicate task of handling the payment of employees’ salaries and allowances. (Ruling on Montalvo) The complaint against Montalvo should be dismissed for no factual basis. His


51 involvement in money lending was not shown to be habitual, going on only as far as accommodating his friends during their personal emergencies without imposing any interests. The statement in the lettercomplaint to the effect that both respondents have been in the forefront of syndicated lending activities was not supported by any proof. It is notable that Montalvo firmly denied the allegations against him, and that Lopez corroborated his denial.

and declared to be violating Administrative Circular No. 5.

(Ruling on Lopez) Ms. Lopez is guilty of lending money with interest which at most would reach up to 10% of the total amount borrowed. While she denied that the loan is somewhat like the famously known "5-6" loan.

RULING 3: No. In ordering the administrative investigation of the respondents, the Court was moved only by the most laudable of purposes.

She is the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division that handles the preparation and issuance of checks to court employees. It is beyond question that her official functions consist of, among others, the supervision of office staff. This gives us the impression that she took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her office, thus, placing at risk the integrity of the division and the whole Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). As an officer of the FMBO she can be privy of the benefits which may be given. From there, employees can borrow and/or advance money from her and where she may easily accede knowing that after all there will be benefits forthcoming. Her actuation although not related to her official functions as division chief, has undeniably fell short of the high standards of propriety expected of employees of the Judiciary. It is considered as conduct unbecoming of an official of the Judiciary. ISSUE 2: Did Lopez’s money-lending activities render her administratively liable? RULING: Yes. "moonlighting" activities : Although many "moonlighting" activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held. In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division of the FMBO, a major office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the Checks Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO under so much undeserved suspicion. She ought to have refrained from engaging in money lending, particularly to the employees of the Court. We do not need to stress that she was expected to be circumspect about her acts and actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of her position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions as such would thereby become unavoidable. There is no doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing the reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public. She plainly disregarded the Constitution. Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts that the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. The Court has invariably imposed commensurate sanctions upon court employees found

ISSUE 3: WON the Court unfairly selective in causing their investigation upon the anonymous complaint but ignoring the "far more serious accusations" against "employees, officials and justices even." Their accusation has tended to diminish the public’s faith and confidence in the Court itself.

The investigation would never be unfair because they would thereby be accorded the full opportunity to be heard in order to clear them. The Court accords to Montalvo and Lopez the reasonable opportunity to show because why they should not be disciplined or otherwise sanctioned for their censurable statements. They were not being singled out because the Court has always acted upon every appropriate complaint or grievance – anonymous or not – brought against officials and employees of the Judiciary without regard to their ranks or responsibilities, including any of its sitting Members, the incumbent Justices of the third-level courts, and other active judges of the first and second levels of the courts. Verily, everyone who works in the Judiciary answers to the exacting standards of conduct in order to maintain the integrity of the Judiciary and to preserve the esteem of the public for the courts, for the very image of the Judiciary is inescapably epitomized in the official conduct and the non-official demeanor of judicial officers and court personnel. To accuse the Court of unfairness and discrimination was, therefore, censurable. NOTES: Anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from a source unwilling to identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason. But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions worthy of consideration for not being selfserving. the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with, and its veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the finger of accusation at two employees of the Court for engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable rates of interest, with low-ranking employees of the Court as their targets. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, ET. AL


52 (G.R. No. 191672 | 25 November 2014) Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. FACTS: In 2010, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III (Duque) as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH) (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions? RULING: Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as

provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit: (a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure; (b) Engaging in the practice of any profession; (c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and (d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duque’s tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Court’s pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this, the


53 Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without

impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque’s official actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER (748 SCRA 286, January 27, 2015) Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of


54 agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. COA DENIED the petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act). The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not petitioner complied with rule on proof of service (2) Whether or not the “fresh period rule” applies on Rule 64 (3) Whether or not the remedy of Certiorari is proper RULING: Motion for Reconsideration is without merit (1) NO. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by

registered mail, with registered receipts attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. (2) NO. Jurisprudence dictates that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late. (3) No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government Code in the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose. It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.


55 MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, ET AL. (G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209442, 209517 & 209569 | 3 February 2015) The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. The ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or not due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact. The want of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court, which is not a trier of facts. FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion.

an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods. Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code refers to the authority of the President “to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the GAA.” When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned. The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code22 does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG.

ISSUES:

Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.

1. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection, constitutional?

Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

2. Did the Court’s Decision invalidated all DAP-funded projects?

2. No. It is to be emphatically indicated that the Decision did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the country’s economy, and acknowledged its laudable purposes, most especially those directed towards infrastructure development and efficient delivery of basic social services. It bears repeating that the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development.

On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

3. Did the Court’s Decision throw out the presumption of good faith of the authors, proponents and implementors of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)? RULING: 1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as


56 This modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAPfunded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65. Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have no appropriation cover under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the DAP funded projects that originally did not contain any appropriation for some of the expense categories (personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond with the program specified in the GAA. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to. 3. No. The Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor imputed bad faith to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP. The contrary is true, because the Court has still presumed their good faith by pointing out that “the doctrine of operative fact cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.”

TESDA v. COA (G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015} FACTS: The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar year 2003, TESDA paid for healthcare maintenance ALLOWANCE of P5,000.00 to covered TESDA employees. This was pursuant to Administrative Order (AO) No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, which was purportedly based on Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, series of 1997, and Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act. In the letter of CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII to DOLE Region VII Auditor, Ms. Damiana Pelino, the former, HOWEVER, informed the latter that there are no existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care Maintenance Allowance and medical Allowance to all government officials and employees. Hence, DOLE Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is clearly without legal basis. Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAONational, subsequently issued Notice of Disallowance

(ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006 of the P 5,000.00 allowance. MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single activity or endowment to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of a system of healthcare for government employees. A careful perusal of MC No. 33 and its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to afford government employees a sustainable health care program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not COA properly disallowed the payment of the healthcare allowance? 2) Whether or not TESDA’s claim that of giving allowances as a better option tenable? RULING 1: YES. COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in instances when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere. MC No. 33, series of 1997 provides that [a]ll government offices shall provide the following a. Health Program for Government Employees which shall include 1. Hospitalization services, 2. Annual mental, medicalphysical examinations. The Court stated MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single activity or endowment to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of a system of healthcare for government employees. A careful perusal of MC No. 33 and its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to afford government employees a sustainable health care program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision. It was not to give the allowances to the employees. Thus, it was right for COA to disallow payments of healthcare allowances. RULING 2: NO. MC No. 33 and its precursor were worded in a plain and straightforward manner to the effect that the “(h)ealth program for employees shall include any or all of the following: 1) Hospitalization services, and 2) Annual mental, medical-physical examinations.” Whatever latitude was afforded to a government agency extended only to the determination of which services to include in the program, not to the choice of an alternative to such health program or to authorizing the conversion of the benefits into cash. The giving of health care maintenance allowance of P5, 000.00 to the TESDA’s employees was not among any of the hospitalization services or examinations listed in the circular.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (767 SCRA 282, August 18, 2015)

CASE DOCTRINES: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm


57 to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.” FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong. a.

Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong. 2) Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk. RULING 1: YES. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Bail as a matter of discretion. Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable. Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court. Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, reviews the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice


58 is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. RULING 2: YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail. The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized: x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguards their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (Emphasis in decision) Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE LEONEN Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis – the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues that “[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan,” nor were these grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme Court. “Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.” Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to wit: [This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion. x x x. Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, … and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. x xx Procedure for granting bail. Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held: It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the


59 court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expect judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion based on prematurity. Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail. The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the certification of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that: Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible. x x x The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard. x x x

Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated upon, This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a substantially different version of the opinion, one which did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail is a matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian considerations as the basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity. The majority opinion offers no “guidance”. The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only. “The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.” There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled. Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced. The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on international law. As applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail. Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not the accused was a flight risk. CHEVRON PHILS., INC. vs. CIR (G.R. No. 210836 | September 1, 2015) FACTS: Chevron Phils. Inc. (Chevron) sold and delivered petroleum products to CDC in the period from August 2007 to December 2007. Chevron did not pass on to CDC the excise taxes paid on the importation of the petroleum products sold to Clark Development Corporation (CDC) in taxable year 2007; hence, it filed an administrative claim for tax refund or issuance of tax credit certificate. Considering that respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) did not act on the administrative claim for tax refund or tax credit, Chevron elevated its claim to the CTA by petition for review. CTA First Division denied Chevron's judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit through its decision and later on also denied Chevron's Motion for Reconsideration. In due course, Chevron appealed to the CTA En Banc, which affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division, stating that there was nothing in Section 135(c) of the NIRC that explicitly exempted Chevron as the seller of the imported petroleum products from the payment of the excise taxes; and holding that because it did not fall under any of the categories exempted from paying excise


60 tax, Chevron was not entitled to the tax refund or tax credit. Chevron sought reconsideration, but the CTA En Banc denied its motion for that purpose in the resolution. Chevron appealed to the Court, but the Court (Second Division) denied the petition for review on certiorari through the resolution for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CTA En Banc. Hence, Chevron has filed the Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether Chevron was entitled to the tax refund or the tax credit for the excise taxes paid on the importation of petroleum products that it had sold to CDC in 2007. RULING: Yes, Chevron was entitled to the refund or credit of the excise taxes erroneously paid on the importation of the petroleum products sold to CDC. Pursuant to Section 135(c), petroleum products sold to entities that are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes are exempt from excise tax. As a duly-registered enterprise in the Clark Special Economic Zone, CDC has been exempt from paying direct and indirect taxes pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916 (The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995), in relation to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9400 (Amending Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992). Inasmuch as its liability for the payment of the excise taxes accrued immediately upon importation and prior to the removal of the petroleum products from the customs house, Chevron was bound to pay, and actually paid such taxes. But the status of the petroleum products as exempt from the excise taxes would be confirmed only upon their sale to CDC in 2007. Before then, Chevron did not have any legal basis to claim the tax refund or the tax credit as to the petroleum products. Consequently, the payment of the excise taxes by Chevron upon its importation of petroleum products was deemed illegal and erroneous upon the sale of the petroleum products to CDC. Section 204 of the NIRC explicitly allowed Chevron as the statutory taxpayer to claim the refund or the credit of the excise taxes thereby paid.

AGUSTIN vs. COMELEC (774 SCRA 353, November 10, 2015) In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). On October 5, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.5 As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as SPA No. 13-023 (DC), alleging that the petitioner had

made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. The petition stated the sole ground thus wise: THE DECLARATION UNDER OATH MADE BY THE RESPONDENT THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE OR SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO (sic) CONSTITUTES MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic) HE HAS NOT RESIDED AS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR IN THE LOCALITY HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED; and prayed to issue an order to immediately deny due course and or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Arsenio A. Agustin. In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S./American Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012. On January 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution, pertinently holding: As can be clearly gathered from the Velasco case, a candidate's status as a registered voter is a material fact which falls under the same classification as one's citizenship or residence. While they are under the same classification as referring to a candidate's qualification for elective office, the requirements are different. The requirement that a candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he must be so one year before the elections because this refers to the residency qualification. On this score, it could not be said that respondents falsely represented the length of their residence in the municipality simply because they became registered voters thereof only fairly recently. As far as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed by law for such registration. Anent petitioner['] allegations that respondents were unable to vote because they are residents of other countries, the records are bereft of any evidence that would substantiate this. It is a fundamental rule that he who alleges, not he who denies, must prove. Mere, petitioners have not adduced a single shred of competent evidence that respondents were actually residents or citizens of other countries that is why they were unable to vote. The petitions are denied for lack of merit. On February 12, 2013, Pillos moved for the reconsideration of the January 28, 2013 resolution with the COMELEC En Banc.14 He underscored in his motion that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in


61 which he declared that he was a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioner's declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements. The petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration. On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course to the petitioner's CoC, observing as follows: Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the burden of proving through his evidence that he complied with the statutory requirements imposed upon dual citizens provided under Republic Act 9225, particularly Section 3 and 5(2) thereof, to wit: x x x x While Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance. Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustin's Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached as Annex "B"; however, said attachment has not been made available for the perusal of this Commission. Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225, Agustin's COC must be cancelled and/or denied due course. Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration is only granted as against Respondent Agustin. On May 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court.17He attached thereto copies of the Order of Approval dated February 12, 201218 and his Oath of Allegiance dated March 9, 2012,19 both issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii. He further attached certifications issued by Election Officers in Ilocos Norte attesting that the documents had been received by the COMELEC and retained in its files. He explained that the documents were not presented during the course of the proceedings because the sole issue raised by Pillos' Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had involved only his (petitioner) compliance with the one-year residency requirement. Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 8, 2013, praying that a writ of execution be issued to implement the cancellation of the petitioner's COC. On Election Day, May 13, 2013, the name of the petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for obtaining 5,020 votes, the highest among the contending parties. Sensing that the 30-day period within which a petition for certiorari should be filed in the Supreme Court was about to expire, the petitioner filed on May 24, 2013 an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated May 3, 2013. On May 28, 2013, the petitioner thus instituted this case, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc based on the following grounds: The assailed En Banc Resolution was promulgated in gross violation of Petitioner's guaranteed Constitutional Right to Due Process and to be informed of the facts and the law on which the same was based; and The grave erroneous appreciation of the facts, law, and the evidence of the case. Meanwhile, on June 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, pointing out that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an en banc resolution was not allowed under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and that, accordingly, the April 23, 2013 resolution was deemed final and executory pursuant to Section 8, paragraph 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, issued the writ of execution.24 On July 16, 2013, the Court required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the COMELEC En Banc resolution dated April 23, 2013. ISSUE: Whether or not the disqualification of the petitioner to run as mayor for being a dual citizen is valid. RULING: The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no material misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual basis for the cancellation of the CoC. Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual citizen. With his disqualification having been determined and pronounced by final judgment before the elections, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted. Accordingly, his rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections. Administrative due process was observed. Before anything more, let us deal with the petitioner's insistence that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in resolving Pillos' motion for reconsideration based on a ground that was neither the basis of nor raised in the Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin; that the non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not be fatal to his constitutional right to run for public office especially because the sole ground for Pillos' petition in the COMELEC had dealt only with the residency requirement; that Pillos could have included citizenship as a ground by the amendment of his petition, but he did not move for that purpose; that he duly complied with the requirements for the re-acquisition of his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225, and the proof of the re-acquisition had been submitted to the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte; and that the COMELEC, by not at least holding a clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm such matters, violated his right to due process by denying to him the opportunity to prepare for his defense. The petitioner's insistence lacks merit. We note that the petitioner's citizenship came to the fore because he himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer


62 to Pillos' petition to cancel his CoC in order to bolster his allegation of compliance with the one-year residency requirement. As such, he could not credibly complain about being denied due process, especially considering that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos' motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that the observance of due process in administrative proceedings does not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. Also, due process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The rule is the same in election cases. The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing as a mayoralty candidate. A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person's declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise: [A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. The Court has described the nature of a Section 78 petition in Fermin thusly: [t]he denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the feet that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such he made a material representation in the CoC that was false. The Court has stressed in Mitra v. Commission on Elections32 that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible, viz.: The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of COC that falls short of the foregoing requirements should not be granted. The petition of Pillos in SPA No. 13-023 (DC) was in the nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC of the petitioner because it contained allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) the petitioner as a candidate made a representation in his CoC; (b) the representation referred to a material matter that would affect his substantive right as candidate (that is, the right to run for the position for which he filed his CoC); and (c) he made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office, or he deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. Pillos further challenged the petitioner's eligibility for public office based on his failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement stated in the Local Government Code, and ultimately specifically prayed that the COMELEC "issue an order to immediately deny due course and or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Arsenio A. Agustin."34 Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner's CoC not because of his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his failure "to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225."35 In our view, such basis for cancelation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run for public office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, to wit:


63 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; x x x x More particularly, the petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012,36 after having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad37 despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012.38 He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen.39 Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, viz.: Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons arc disqualified from running for any elective local position:

The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before Election Day; hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted. Considering that the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to cancel the CoC requires a finding that he made a material representation in the CoC that was false, the COMELEC En Banc, in granting Pillos' motion for reconsideration, expressly held the petitioner ineligible to participate in the elections or disqualified from the mayoralty race, which was the basis for the cancellation of his CoC. Such reason cancelling the petitioner's CoC despite the absence of the material misrepresentation at the time he filed his CoC might not be in order, but the undisputed fact is that the COMELEC En Banc expressly decreed his disqualification in the April 23, 2013 resolution. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added) Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat's favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng's proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.

(d) Those with dual citizenship; A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.40 Even if it made no finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code.

Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity of his CoC, the petitioner would be reduced to a noncandidate under the terms of Section 6, supra, should it be shown that the disqualification attained finality prior to the 2013 elections. The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate. It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring the petitioner


64 disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality. Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and that the petitioner's disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. Pillos' submission is correct. Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 3, 201343 upon receiving the April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos' motion for reconsideration,44such filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed final and executory because Section l(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion for reconsideration.45 Within the context of Section 13, Rule 18,46 and Section 3, Rule 37,47 both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being issued by the Supreme Court. Under the circumstances, the finality of the petitioner's disqualification pursuant to the April 23, 2013 resolution prior to the May 13, 2013 elections rendered him a non-candidate, and the votes cast for him should not have been counted.48 Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections.


Bersamin Cases Digest

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