Angeles v. Uy Facts: Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan City charged Atty. Thomas Uy with violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. Complainant states that respondent’s acts also rendered him administratively liable In a different case, a certain Norma Trajano alleged that she paid 20k to private complainant and the balance of 16.5k was delivered to Atty. Uy, the lawyer of private complainant in the different case. Complainant Del Rosario manifested that she did not receive the 16.5k pesos paid to Atty. Uy. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money. But such an assertion was belied when Del Rosario manifested her willingness to accept the money. Uy alleged that the amount was safely in his office in the same building. As such, the proceedings were suspended in order for Uy to get the money from his office. Yet, Uy never returned hence the administrative case against him. In his comment, Uy contends that he kept the money in his office because it was the wish of his client. He allegedly informed them of such money and tried to give it to them but they insisted that he retain it in order for them to not spend it. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that Uy be suspended for one month. It was decided that the complainant’s side of the story had more merit. Issue: WON Uy is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the CPR Held: The Court agreed with the Office of the Bar Confidant. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary. It requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client. Canon 16 of the CPR provides that ―a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.‖ Furthermore, Rule 16.01 states that ―a lawyer shall account for al the money or property collected or received for or from the client.‖ Respondent failed to promptly report and account for the 16.5k he had received from Trajano on behalf of his client. If it were true that Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted it to Uy, she would have known his whereabouts. That she did not know it showed falsity of the claim. In Aya v. Bigornia, the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi, the Court held that ―lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.‖ Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation. Under the circumstances, Atty. Uy should be suspended for only one month.
Cruz v. Jacinto Facts: Spouses Fernando Cruz and Amelia Cruz seek the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto Jacinto. Atty. Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case requested the Cruz spouses for a loan in behalf of a certain Conceptiopn Padilla who he claimed to be an old friend. The spouses authorized him to start preparing all the documents relative to the registration of the Real Estate Mortgate to secure the loan. The complainants agreed to the request and were presented by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract and a TCT in the name of Padilla. Upon maturity of the loan, the spouses demanded payment from Padilla by going to the address. However, no such person was living in the address. Furthermore, the TCT presented to them was verified as a fake title by the Register of Deeds. The evidence of the complainants included the statement of Atty. Jacinto’s housemaid and Estrella Palipada, the secretary of the office of Atty. Jacinto. Palipada stated that she was instructed by Jacinto to notarize the said contract by signing the name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri. A case for estafa was filed against Jacinto. Jacinto alleged that the criminal information filed against him had already been dismissed because of the voluntary desistance of the complainants. He further averred that he had no idea that the Certificate of Title used to obtain the loan was a fake one. IBP recommends that Jacinto be suspended for six months. It is the lawyer’s sworn duty to obey the laws of the land to promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1). Respondent still averred that the complainants have no cause of action against him as the same has been waved on account of the desistance and quitclaim they executed. Issue: WON complaint should prosper Held: The Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP. The assertion of respondent must fail. The practice of law is so intimately affected with public interest that it is both a right and a duty of the state to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. Respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his clients and by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the CPR must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole. Wherefore, Jacinto was suspended for six months.
Diaz v. Kapunan Facts: Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a business partnership. The business failed to prosper and suffered losses. They formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of 90k laid upon Mendezona’s hacienda. Later on, Mendezona was nowhere to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. Thus, the hacienda was offered for sale at public auction. Diaz’s lawyer, Atty. Kapunan told the deputy sheriff of Leyte that he was ready to bid on the property up to 16k in order to assist the Mendezona family. Later, Diaz and Kapunan entered into an agreement wherein Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding in consideration of 1,000 pesos from Diaz. Following the termination of the sheriff’s sale, Diaz pressed charges against Kapunan for alleged unprofessional conduct. It was found that Kapunan was also the lawyer of the Mendezona family and was given extensive authority. When Kapunan took part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his clients and not for the benefit of his clients. Three charges were considered against Kapunan. The first two were related to Kapunan’s attempt to represent both the parties in the case and to molest and disturb Diaz by frviolous motions. The third charge has to do with Kapunan having intervened in the manner in which he did in the sale of the property of his client Mendezona. The Atty-General is of the opinion that the facts constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal Code. Issue: WON Kapunan is guilty of such violations. Held: Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the following persons, naming them, ―cannot take by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another.‖ The provision contained in the last paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers. The Court does not believe this article has been infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased property at a public or judicial auction and because his participation was in representation of his client.
In article 542 of the Penal Code, it punishes ―any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking party in any public auction.‖ The agreement of both parties wherein Diaz pays Kapunan the sum of 1,000 pesos to withdraw from the sale is exactly the situation covered by article 542 of the Penal Code. Execution sales should be open to free and full competition in order to secure the maximum benefit of the debtor. The Court concluded that Atty. Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of art. 542 of the Penal Code. However, since the complainant is equally guilty with the responded Kapunan and the latter was found to be acting in good faith, Kapunan shall only be reprimanded.
Gonato v. Adaza Facts: An administrative case filed by complainant against their former counsel Atty. Adaza charging him with malpractice and violation of trust. Complainants engaged the services of respondent as their counsel for a separate case wherein complainants allege that respondent demanded from them the amount of 15,980 pesos to be used in paying the docket fee and other court fees. Thereafter, complainant asked for the official receipts. The complainants were told that respondent only gave photocopies of the RP receipts. Complainants personally went to respondent’s law office to demand the original copies but to no avail. This prompted the complainants to verify the authenticity of the receipts with the Clerk of Court and it was discovered that the photocopies of the receipts did not reflect the same amount on the original copies. Respondent admits that he received the said amount and intended it to cover the expenses necessary for the case to prosper. However, after careful study, he appropriated the said sum to his acceptance and appearance fees. The IBP recommended the suspension of responded for 3 months. IBP found sufficient evidence that there were no such filing fees which were due when respondent asked complainants for the amount of 15,980 pesos. Issue: WON respondent is guilty of malpractice Held: The Court agrees with the IBP. Respondent’s act of asking for an exorbitant amount on the pretext that it was needed for the payment of court fees constitutes malpractice which is a serious breach of professional duty towards complainants. Respondent expressly admitted having received the money, but he persistently refused to return it despite repeated demands. This conduct is clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness as he was clinging to something which was not his and to which he absolutely had no right. Respondent’s shallow excuse that he applied said money to his fees is merely an afterthought and cannot justify his refusal to return the same as this was made withouot the acquiescence of the complainants.
It is settle that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Canon 7 of the CPR mandates that ―a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.‖ The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case glaringly reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the CPR particularly Canon 16 which provides that ―a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.‖ As a member of the Bar, respondent was and is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in said Code particularly Canons 15, 16, 17, and 20 for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. Wherefore, Atty. Adaza is suspended for a period of six months.
Celaje v. Soriano Facts: A disbarment case filed against Atty. Soriano for gross misconduct. Andrea Celaje alleged that respondent asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond, which complainant found out later, however, to be unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the trial court. Respondent also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or to be given to the judge handling the case. When complainant approached the judge and asked whether what respondent was saying was true, the judge denied them and advised her to file an administrative case. IBP found respondent guilty of gross misconduct in his relations with his client and recommended that he be suspended for three years. Complainant alleged that she remitted to respondent amounts of money totalling to more or less 270k but were not in writing. There is no ill-motive at all on the part of complainant to fabricate charges against respondent. Unfortunately, none of the 270k was ever documented and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not be established and sustained. However, it was found that an amount of 5,800 from the 14,800 intended for the injunction bond remains unaccounted for. Complainant reiterated her accusations against respondent and expressed that she had been aggrieved and misled by respondent. According to complainant, this was made possible because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on legal matters and practices. Issue: WON respondent is guilty of malpractice Held: The Court resolved to adopt the recommendation.
The CPR (Canon 16) mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He sahll account for all money or property collected or received from his client and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. It was established that respondent could not account for the 5,800 pesos which was supposed to be part of the sum for the injunction bond. Respondent’s failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. As the Court pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. The attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer. In Small v. Banares, the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the CPR. Considering the similar circumstances, the respondent in this case was suspended for two years.
Penticostes v. Ibanez Facts: Encarnacion Pascual, sister in law of Atty. Penticostes was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. Pascual gave 1,804 pesos to respondent as payment of her SSS contribution in arears. Respondent however did not remit the amount in the system. Complainant filed with RTC for professional misconduct against Ibanez due to the latter’s failure to remit the SSS contributions and was a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Respondent then paid the amount to the SSS in behalf of Pascual. He then claims that the action was moot and academic as the amount was already paid. The IBP recommended that respondent be reprimanded. Held: Court adopts recommendation. While there is no doubt that the payment was made, it is clear that such payment was only made after a complaint had been filed. The Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ―[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ It is glaringly clear that respondent’s non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon
The belated payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyer’s handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held that ―(t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.‖ The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. o Respondent’s claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ―These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.‖ o As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, ―a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyer’s disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public’s eye. ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent
Rubias v. Batiller Facts: Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. Issue: Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute Held: The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: guardians; agents; administrators; public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and others especially disqualified by law. Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract."
DE LAIG V. CA Facts: Petre Galero obtained from the Bureau of Lands a Homestead Patent covering 219, 949 sq. m. of land located at Labo, Camarines Norte. On June 25, 1940, Galero sold the land to a Mario Escuta for P300. Escuta also sold the same land to Florencio Caramoan. Through a proper court action, Petre Galero with Atty. Benito Laig, the deceased husband of herein petitioner Rosarion Vda. De Laig as counsel, recovered the subject land after the court wasconvinced that the alienation violated Sec. 118 of the Public Land Act. Later on, a deed of sale was executed by Galero as vendo in favor of Atty. Benito Laig as vendee.
Galero sold to Atty. Laig the subject land with its improvements for P1,600 plus Atty.’s fees dueto Atty. De Laig for his legal services as counsel for Galero.
ISSUE: WON the sale between Galero and Atty. De Laig was made in violation of Art. 1491, CC. HELD: NO. The property in question was no longer the subject of litigation. The sale was made after the reconveyance case has been decided and which decision has becomefinal.
MANAQUIL v. VILLEGAS FACTS: This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS. It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna. In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zerna’s estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator. ISSUES: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease. Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred. RULING: First issue: NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, considering that administrator LEONG was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of LEONG, cannot be taken to
task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto. Second Issue: NO. There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, ―lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession‖ are prohibited fro leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months. NOMBRADO v. Hernandez Facts: Disbarment case charging respondent with malpractice on two counts namely for having appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a civil case for focible entry against Aresenio Pansaon, his former client and for having appeared as counsel for the accused and also for the complaining witness in a criminal case. With respect to the first count, respondent was engaged by Arsenio Pansaon as his counsel in the prosecution of a criminal case against Crispin Nazareno. However, the case was dismissed due to the absence of complainant during trial. Years later, Nazareno filed a complaint for forcible entry against Pansaon through Atty. Hernandez. Pansaon moved for the disqualification of Hernandez as counsel but the motion was withdrawn. When the disbarment case was heard, Pansaon testified for petitioner and said that he perhaps lost the case since respondent Atty was privy to valuable information from Pansaon. Respondent denied the claim and averred that he did not receive any valuable document from Pansaon in connection with the case. Under the second count, respondent was counsel for Storeo Pontawe and and Teofilo Aumida in a criminal case. Before the hearing, respondent was asked by complaining witness Ramon Morales to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the real accused in this case are not the persons mentioned above. During the hearing, a heated exchange of arguments arose between respondent and the private prosecutor Atty. Danao because of the latter’s insistence on calling Morales to the witness stand despite expressed desistance to prosecute the criminal case. Respondent manifested his intention to intervene in behalf of the complaining party in connection with the action of Atty. Danao in this case. Issue: WON respondent was guilty of malpractice Held: First Count:
The Court made mention of their remarks in Hilado vs. David. In that particular case, the court held that communication between attorney and client are a complicated affair consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.... It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. Second Count: Respondent's act of preparing the motion to dismiss and stating in the course of the hearing thereof that he was intervening "in behalf of the complaining party", did not constitute simultaneous appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there was no longer any conflict to speak of, the complainant having desisted from prosecuting the case against the accused. Consequently, there was nothing improper in respondent's conduct. Upon the facts established in connection with the first count the Solicitor General has recommended that the penalty of reprimand and warning be administered.
ALCANTARA v. DE VERA Facts: The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent The IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario.
Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him. He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts. Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorney’s fees. Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client’s family. He argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest. Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of ―extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorney’s fees.‖
Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred for his actions Held: Yes. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, the Court explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. There is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any illmotive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, the Court finds that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility] provides: o CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. o Rule 21.02 – A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto. The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
MERCADO v. VITRIOLO Facts: Rosa Mercado seeks the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Complainant’s husband filed for the annulment of their marriage but motion was dismissed. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. Respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. Respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than ―Rosa F. Mercado.‖ She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado. In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City; (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the ―Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,‖ before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption; (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay; and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan. Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. Respondent he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate factfinding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith. In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are
two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone. Complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of violating the attorney-client relationship Held: The Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings. In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest.[15] Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client’s secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19] and continues even after the client’s death Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[22] In fine, the factors are as follows: (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment (2) The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.[26] The client must intend the communication to be confidential. (3.) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations
In the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant’s allegations. The Court notes that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove. Complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. The complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PFLEIDER v PALANCA FACTS: Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider. Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda Asia in Negros Occidental for a period of 10 years It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the listed creditors of Pfleider Pfleider filed a suit for the rescission of the lease agreement of the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals of Palanca. Pfleider also filed for the disbarment of Palanca on the grounds of: Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider to settle his estafa case against Matiao in 1965 and the latter also failed to deposit the sum of P5,000 with the court Palanca has fraudulently charged the P5,000 as part of the lease rental of the Hacienda Asia Palanca also falsely represented having paid one Guintos the sum of P866 for the account of Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only received P86 The list of creditors which Pfleider has confidentially supplied Palanca was disclosed by Palance inviolation of their attorney-client relationship ISSUE: W/N Palanca committed a breach of fidelity owing form a lawyer to his client HELD: NO! There is no substantial blame against Palanca inasmuch as the latter’s services were implicitly terminated by
Pfleider when he sued his lawyer. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyerclient relationship. Also, Pfleider delivered the list of creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation thereof would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
BAUTISTA v BARRIOS Facts: Rufina Bautista engaged the services of Atty. Barrios to draft an extra-judicial partition between Bautista and her brothers and sisters and Rovero on the other side. Barrios prepared the deed. Rovero later on refused to comply with the terms of the deed. Bautista sued him. Instead of representing Bautista, Barrios instead appeared for Rovero. Barrios defense: it was Rovero who engaged his services in preparing the deed and not Bautista Issue: W/N Barrios may handle a case nullify a contract which he prepared Held: No, he may not. Suspended for 2 years. When Bautista approached Barrios to enforce the deed, Barrios merely said that she has no cause of action. Barrios did not inform her that he was already representing Rovero. Supposing that Barrios was indeed representing both Bautista and Rovero, he could not appear for one as against another. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Honrada was the clerk of court and acting stenographer of the First MCTC. Paredes was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan. Sansaet was the counsel of Paredes. It appears that Paredes applied for a free patent and Certificate of Title over a lot. It was initially approved, but the Director of lands subsequently filed for the cansellation of the patent and title on the ground that the land had been reserved as a school site. The lower court ruled to nullify the patent and title after finding out that Paredes obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations. An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. However, the fiscal directed the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. After some time, Gelacio, the one who filed the perjury case, sent a letter to the OMB seeking the investigation of the 3 personalities for falsification of public documents. The alleged falsified documents were documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of the perjury charge.
In a sudden turn of events, Atty. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court . Atty. Sansaet was, in effect, asking to be a state witness against Paredes. However, the OMB denied the request of Atty. to be a state witness on the ground that the confession made by Paredes to Atty. was privileged communication.
Issue: W/N the confession made by Paredes to Atty. is privileged communication. Held: The confession made by Paredes is not covered by privileged communication. This case is actually an exception to the rule. It can be assumed that there was confidential information made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the falsification case, because Sansaet was the counsel. A distinction must be made between communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. It is true that by now those crimes had already been committed. But for the application of the atty.-client privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the atty. In other words, if the client seeks the advice of the atty. with respect to a crime already committed at the time of the communication, it is privileged information. But if the client consults the atty. regarding a crime he is about to commit after the consultation, such is not privileged information. In the present case, the confession made by Paredes to Sansaet were in reference to a crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the atty.-client privilege. Besides, for the rule to attach, the purpose of the consultation must be for a lawfule purpose. Without the lawful purpose, the privilege does not attach.
TIANA v. OCAMPO Facts: First case: Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent Amado Ocampo who has been her "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has always had her unqualified faith and confidence. One Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment 2 from a parcel of land. Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania that he will take care of everything and that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement which the latter signed without reading.
Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another two years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a certain amount for the sheriff Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled some legal problems and executed some notarial deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the services of various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil cases, involving violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases. Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case. He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a document which supported her claim, over the property in question. Ocampo, after going over the document, expressed his doubts about it authenticity. This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months. But Tiania never fulfilled any of her obligations. She moreover made the situation worse by selling the contested property to a third party even after an alias writ of execution had ordered the transfer of the possession of the disputed property to Blaylock. Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, Ocampo said that the overdue filing of a complaint against a lawyer should already create a suspicion about the motives of the complainant or the merit of the complaint. Second Case: The Angel spouses, complainants in this case, allege that sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of Blaylock for the amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo (the same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot. With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction. Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from Laura Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of Blaylock. The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said documents until they received a complaint naming them as defendants in a collection suit The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that there was no need for them to engage the services of a new lawyer since he will take care of everything. These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the legal profession. They lost their property as a result of the respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of his expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and trusting clients. As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate explanation.
Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock, who introduced to him the Angel spouses in 1972. Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the background of the Angel spouses in connection with the loan they were seeking from Blaylock. The Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with malpractice and gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and violation of his oath of office as an attorney
Issue: WON respondent Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests? Held: Yes The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The Court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. The aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the respondent, who would have reached seventy three (73) years, as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm in its stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the advance years of the respondent in his favor. Wherefore, respondent is suspended for a period of one year.
ORCINO v GASPAR Facts: Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Complainant paid respondent his fees as stipulated. Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties and performed them religiously from the preliminary investigation with the office of the prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with the RTC of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence. Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his absence.
Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records. Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not bear the consent of complainant. The court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent." Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, this complaint.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to represent his client if said client refuses to give his consent to the lawyer’s motion to withdraw his appearance.
Held: No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. In the instant case, respondent did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw. Corollary Issue: Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance filed by respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based upon a good cause? No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ‖A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases‖. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the foregoing instances nor can it be said that it is analogous thereof. BACARRO v CA FACTS:
Bacarro is the registered owner of a lot located in Cagayan de Oro city. He claims that he was compelled by the Municipal Judge of Baungin, Bukidnon to appear before the judge's ofice and then and there coerced and forced, under threat of prosecution and loss said land, to execute a deed of reconveyance of 1/2 of the land to Gaerlan. Bacarro then filed a complaint for the annulment of said deed of reconveyance. Atty Luminarias and Caballero entered their appearance, in said cas as counsel of Bacarro in collaboration with Atty. Pacana. The judge of the lower court ordered an amendment to th complaint of Bacarro. Mrs. Gaerlan filed a written manifestation inviting attention to the fact that petittoner Bacarro had not complied with said order. The judge then issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for new trial/ reconsideration was filed by Atty Caballero on behalf of Bacarro. Motion was denied in an order issued by the judge dated November 14, 1966. Notice of said order was not received by Atty Caballero until March 15, 1967, on which date he filed a notice of appeal. Gaerlan objected to the approval of said notice of appeal, upon the ground that the period to appeal should be reckoned from Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of the order was served upon Atty Pacana. On this allegation, the motion was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not period to appeal from order denyingh motion for new trial/ reconsideration began to run on Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of said order was served upon Pacana, or on March 16, 1967, when notice was served upon Atty Caballero. HELD: This is not a case of substitution. By entering his appearnce, Atty Caballero did not substitute Atty Pacana but became one of the attorneys for Bacarro. Neither did Atty Caballero substitute or try to substitute Atty Pacana. The statement in the motion for reconsideration to the effect that, through Atty Caballero, petitioner Bacarro, "after duly relieving his previous counsel moved for the reconsideration of the order, had the effect of continuig the services of Caballero and dropping Pacana. Whether Bacarro could - as regards the Court of Gaerlan - validly dispense with the services of Pacana, without securing his consent, or without proof that he had been notified of Bacarro's motion for reconsideration YES. Client may at any time dismiss his attorney. The relatioship between Bacarro and Pacana ceased to exist from the filing of the motion for reconsideration/ new trial, insofar as the court is concerned and form receipt of copy thereof by Atty. Salcedo, insofar as Gaerlan was concerned. ARAMBULO v. CA Facts: Petition and review to set aside the resolution of CA which, for failure to pay the docket fee, considered their appeal abandoned and dismissed pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. They claim that the notice to pay the docket fee was addressed to an attorney who had already withdrawn his appearance with their consent.
Petitioners and private respondent are parties to a contract for the construction of a 4storey dormitory building. Private respondent, as the contractor, filed an action City against the petitioners-spouses Carlos S. Arambulo and Eloisa I. Arambulo to claim the balance of the contract price and the increase in the construction cost due to additional scope of work done and increase in the cost of materials. The defendants, through Atty. Romeo P. Pineda, filed an Answer with Counterclaim. At the pre-trial, the defendants were represented by Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr., who submitted a special power of attorney executed by the defendants wherein he was designated as their attorney. Since then and until he purportedly withdrew as counsel, he appeared at the trial for the defendants, handled the case, and prepared and signed all pleadings for the latter. The minutes of the trial court for the hearings reveal that it was Atty. Jimenez who appeared for the Arambulos, cross-examined the witnesses for the plaintiff and conducted the direct examinations of Eloisa and Carlos Arambulo. After Atty. Jimenez crossexamined anew the plaintiff's witness, Architect Ernesto Nasol, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents. Later on, Atty. Jimenez filed a withdrawal of appearance with the express conformity of the defendants while Atty. Pineda entered his appearance as their new counsel. The Chief of the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals sent Atty. Jimenez a letter informing him that the original records of the case were being processed and also requiring him to pay the docketing fee of P400.00 and the additional amount of P20.00 pursuant to R.A. No. 3870 within fifteen days from receipt thereof. No such letter or any notice to pay the aforesaid amounts was sent to Atty. Romeo Pineda. The CA promulgated a resolution which rendered the appeal abandoned and dismissed due to the nonpayment of docket fees. The clerk of court of the CA made an entry which declared the resolution final and executory. No copy of the judgement was sent to Atty. Pineda. When the sheriff of the trial court attempted to enforce the writ of execution, the petitioners, through Atty. Pineda, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Reinstatement of Appeal, and Acceptance of Docket Fee. On the said date, they also paid the required docket and other legal fees. ut the Court of appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 June 1992 on the ground that the Resolution of 11 November 1991 had already become final and the records had been remanded to the trial court after the entry of judgment was made. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: WON public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal Held: The main thesis of the petitioners is that since the notice to pay the docket and other fees was served not on their new counsel, Atty. Pineda, but on Atty. Jimenez who had already withdrawn as their counsel when the case was still with the trial court, the service of such
notice on the latter was void and did not bind them, consequently, the dismissal of their appeal deprived them of due process. Private respondent contends therein that Atty. Pineda was the original counsel for the petitioners and that he never formally withdrew as counsel even after Atty. Jimenez, who had not made any "formal appearance," "took over the handling of the defense for and in behalf of defendants Arambulos"; hence, they "gave the impression that they were acting in corroboration with each other and since Atty. Jimenez took over the active role as counsel, all pleadings and notices were coursed through him." Private respondent then concludes that the "alleged withdrawal of Atty. Jimenez and entry of appearance of Atty. Pineda were of no moment." Moreover, their status as collaborating "counsels for the defendants" is "borne by the fact that the court has not ruled on their motions to withdraw and enter appearance respectively." The petition is partly impressed with merit. The court does not hesitate to rule that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal of the Arambulos solely on the basis of the alleged failure of the petitioners to pay the docket and other fees. As earlier adverted to, the notice with respect thereto was not furnished to or received by their counsel of record, Atty. Romeo Pineda. The rule is that every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby; however, service upon a party represented by counsel shall be made on his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon said party himself is ordered by the court. When a party is represented by a counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds, including motions and pleadings of all parties and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. Notice to counsel is notice to the client. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. was filed with the trial court on 12 February 1991. Since the withdrawal was with the clients' consent, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client's consent. The first paragraph of Section 26 of Rule 138 expressly provides: Sec. 26. Change of Attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. Under the first sentence of this section, the retirement is completed once the withdrawal is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act of the clerk of court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the adverse party.
The failure of the clerk of court to do either does not affect the validity of the retirement. The appearance of the new counsel, Atty. Pineda, did not likewise require the approval of the court. The dismissal of Atty. Pineda is clearly authorized under the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 26 of Rule 138 which reads as follows: A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract . . . . Accordingly, the public respondent Court of Appeals should not have declared the appeal abandoned and ordered its dismissal solely on the basis of the failure of the petitioners to comply with the June 1991 notice to pay the docketing and other fees, which was erronuously sent to Atty. Jimenez. However, in the case of Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, made this apt observation: Indeed, if the appellant does nothing to press his appeal, it may safely be concluded that he believes that judgment of the trial court to be correct and his appeal aims to accomplish nothing more than mere delay in the execution of the adverse judgment, certainly unfair to the appellee who is denied the enjoyment of the fruits of his victory in the case as long as the appeal is not resolved. This statement certainly holds true here. Not only did the petitioners and their counsel sleep on their right, they put nothing in their Motion for Reconsideration, Reinstatement of Appeal, and Acceptance of Docket Fee that gives a semblance of merit to their appeal other than their general statement that they "have a meritorious case, and they are confident that they are favored by the evidence, the law, and jurisprudence," which they merely reiterated in the instant petition. the failure of Atty. Pineda and the petitioners to exercise due diligence with respect to the appeal was either done deliberately to delay the execution of judgment, which we cannot tolerate, or caused by negligence, in which case the settled rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client should be applied. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
